

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.

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BRIEFING PAPER ON THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC


I. Situation

Following the break in diplomatic relations in August 1960 U.S./Dominican relations have worsened steadily, and the anti-U. S. sentiment of the GODR was brought sharply into focus by the appearance of pickets outside our consulate on 5 January in protest against the OAS vote to extend trade sanctions against the Dominican Republic. The pickets bore signs condemning the interventionist policy of the U. S. and calling for the expulsion of Consul General Dearborn, whom they labeled a spy. The Dominican radio and press continued to censure President Eisenhower as being responsible for the present state of affairs, while maintaining a reserve concerning President Kennedy, apparently adopting a "wait and see" attitude, although it has previously expressed some reservations regarding the President's choice of advisers on Latin America.

On 26 January the GODR ordered the expulsion of U. S. Vice Consul James A. McNamara on the ground that he was making derogatory remarks about the country; however, it is probable that this expulsion was in retaliation and anger over the belief that the U. S. had provided information to Venezuela on Trujillo's efforts to overthrow or assassinate President Batencourt.

It is thought by some informed observers that the outcome of the sugar legislation which comes up for renewal in the U. S. Congress in March 1961 will be all-important to the future of U. S./Dominican relations. Some say that the Trujillo government cannot last another six months if they do not get their share of the Cuban windfall sugar; and rumors are circulating in Ciudad Trujillo that if they are deprived of the windfall the GODR plans to expropriate American properties and terminate U. S. consular relations.


II Operational Summary




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
B. Frente Civica Revolucionaria (FCR)



C. Vanguardia Revolucionaria Dominicana (VRD)



D.



### III Conclusions

(1) In many respects initial talks with FCR and VRD leaders reveal that they over-estimate their own capabilities. Neither has an immediate capability to introduce arms into the area or a firm plan of action.

(2) [REDACTED]


(3) Recent reports on internal conditions in the Dominican Republic clearly point out that the country is rapidly approaching a stage of complete economic paralysis, a situation that has created feelings of tension and desperation, not only among the opposition elements but within the ranks of the Trujillo clique itself. While sources within the middle class express fears of eventual liquidation of that class by the dictator and his son Ramfis, it is not likely that Trujillo will move until he learns of the outcome in late March 1961 of congressional action on the windfall sugar quota. If such action is favorable to Trujillo, it is probable that he will continue to rule uneasily for an indefinite period unless material outside pressure is brought to bear

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against him. If, however, his windfall is taken from him, it is the firm opinion of this Division that a violent reaction on his part will shortly thereafter be felt which will end either with the liquidation of Trujillo and his cohorts or with a complete roll-up of the internal opposition.



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