

JFK 22
Folder 7

Introduction

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED.

- 1 -
main heading:
ISSUE I: CUBAN
CONSPIRACY

The attempts of the United States
ASSASSINATE
government to assassinate Cuban premier
Fidel Castro as well as other foreign
leaders during the turbulent decade
of the '1960's shocked and disgusted
the American citizen. When sources
disclosed that the ~~US Government~~
Central Intelligence Agency (hereinafter "CIA")
intentionally solicited and received
the assistance of various members of
organized crime, La Cosa Nostra, in
the furtherance of ~~the~~ such plots, ~~the~~
more outrage prevailed. Civilized
society simply did not and does not
condone such acts as a legitimate

instrument of foreign policy. There

is no excuse ^{of the effect and influence of these} ~~actions~~ ^{no} ~~actions~~ ^{did not stop,}

rationalization.

with ~~invoking~~ ^{invoking}

~~the~~ the disdain of the American public and world. ~~There~~ There

assassination attempt gave birth to

the haunting theory that Fidel Castro orchestrated

~~the~~ the assassination of President ^{defensive}

John F. Kennedy in ^a retaliation for

the plot on his life.

~~The~~ In its Final Report

published ~~in~~ in April, 1976, the

Senate Select Committee to

Study Governmental Operations

with respect to Intelligence

Activities (hereinafter "SSC") responded to this theory.

Still present
open
open

~~(hereinafter "SSC")~~ ~~has provided~~ ^{to}
~~the following information that the report is~~
~~attached hereto and included in the~~
 In this report focused on
 The SSC ~~examined~~ two

~~Central Intelligence Agency~~ operations of "CIA"
 (hereinafter ~~referred~~)

the Central Intelligence Agency" which
~~provoked~~ provoked
 may have ~~provoked an action by~~

~~Castro~~ Castro into retaliation. First,

the SSC documented the ~~joint effort~~
 joint effort of the ^{CIA} ~~Agency~~ and
 Organized Crime ~~to~~ to ~~Castro~~ Castro
 eliminate

Second, the SSC examined the
 nature and extent of the CIA

AMLASH operation. ~~This report~~
 The ~~report~~ concluded its analysis
 SSC ~~concluded its analysis~~

~~for the purpose of analysis~~ ~~and the~~
 with the statement that

~~that it is not a true finding~~

~~_____~~ " [t]he Committee believes the investigation should continue in certain areas, and for that reason does not reach any final conclusions. " ①

This ~~_____~~ analysis ~~_____~~ an attempt to make ~~_____~~ ~~_____~~ is ~~_____~~

~~_____~~ such conclusions. It is not the the remainder of this material purpose of ~~_____~~ ~~_____~~ to ~~_____~~ the

~~_____~~ ~~_____~~ to minutely review

the details of the CIA-mafia plots or of

the AMLASH operation, ~~_____~~

~~_____~~ to resolve ^{all of} the conflicting

viewpoints of the SSC and the CIA in regard ^{OR TO SUBJECT ANYONE TO ②} ~~_____~~ moral tongue-lashing.

to the importance of the ^{various} operations, instead,

this material ^{FIRST} seeks to ~~_____~~ present ~~_____~~

~~_____~~ ~~_____~~

CIA operation AMLASH and of the

~~_____~~
a comprehensive review of theⁿ

involvement or potential involvement

of organized crime in the CIA operations

against Castro during 1960-1963. ~~_____~~

~~_____~~ from

this review certain influences and

conclusions are then drawn

concerning the nature, scope, and

~~_____~~ ramifications of these

operations.

II BACKGROUND MATERIAL - ~~RELEVANT~~ Summary

A. CIA - MAFIA PLOTS

The genesis of the utilization of the United States criminal syndicate by the CIA to attempt to assassinate Castro is placed by the 1967 Report of the Inspector General as occurring during a conversation between the Deputy Director of Plans, Richard Bissell, and the Director of Security, Colonel Sheffield Edwards⁽³⁾

4 These plots extended from 1960 until ~~late~~ early 1963 and can be divided into ^{two} ~~three~~ steps.⁽⁴⁾ The first step occurred from August, 1960 until

April, 1961, and can best be
termed as ^{Phase I or} the pre-Bay of Pigs
period. ⑤ From April, 1961 until

late 1961 the CIA takes the
position that the plots were dormant. ⑥

In late 1961 the CIA decided to
renew the ^{CIA-MAFIA} A plots and kept them

active until late 1962 or early 1963. ⑦

During the initial stage of
Phase I Edwards assigned the
specific task of locating the ^{proper} proper
persons to assassinate Castro to
James "Big Jim" O'Connell, who was
Chief of the Operational Support
Division of the Office of Security. ⑧

Both men agreed that O'Connell should

contact

~~O'Connell~~

~~Robert A. Mahan~~, whom the CIA

previously

had previously used in several covert

operations, to recruit the necessary

personnel. ①

Mahan subsequently contacted

Roselli, who in turn recruited

two persons initially known to

O'Connell as "Sam GOLD" and "Joe". ②

along with Mahan

O'Connell says he later discovered the

true identities of these persons to be

Sam Giancana and Santo Trafficante,

respectively. ③

After meeting several times

in Miami and deciding upon poison

pills as the method of assassination, the

1967 I6 Report contends that

Trappicante made the arrangements for ~~the~~ the assassination of Castro with one of his contacts inside Cuba on one of the trips he allegedly ~~made~~ made to Havana, Cuba. ⁽¹³⁾ This contact was Juan Orta, a Cuban official who held a position close to Castro. ⁽¹⁴⁾

¹⁹⁶⁷
The ^ I G Report then states that Roselli passed the pills to Trappicante. ⁽¹⁵⁾

Roselli subsequently told O'Connell that the pills were delivered to Orta in Cuba. ⁽¹⁶⁾ Orta apparently retained the pills for a few weeks and then returned them since he was unable to fulfill any plan. ⁽¹⁷⁾ Orta was no longer in a position to kill

Castro because he had lost his Cuban post. (18)

With Orta unable to perform the syndicate looked elsewhere. Roselli next told O'Connell, sometime during early 1961, that [redacted] Trappuciani knew a man prominent in the Cuban exile movement who could accomplish the job. [redacted] Dr. job - Dr.

Manuel Antonio de Verona y Loreda. (19)

After receiving [redacted] approval Trappuciani approached Verona about assassinating Castro and reported that Verona was receptive. (20) The 1967 I G Report states that O'Connell again distributed pills which eventually reached Verona. (21)

[redacted] This activity concluded

the pre-Bay of Pigs phase of the plots.

The 1967 IGR does not document any attempt to actually administer the pills to Castro.

The 1967 IGR relates that after a period of "dormancy" ^{apparent} Bissell ⁽²²⁾ Bissell in approximately November of 1961 directed William Harvey⁽²³⁾ to reactivate

the CIA-mafia plots. O'Connell

therefore introduced Harvey to Roselli. ⁽²⁴⁾

During this phase the CIA decided against

using Giancana or Trappianni; ~~_____~~

~~_____~~ instead, a person referred to

as "MACEO" entered the plot as the person who would ^{help} provide Cuban contacts. ⁽²⁵⁾

In addition, the plots still utilized

the services of Antonio de Verona. ⁽²⁶⁾

plots
~~etc~~
Even though the ~~etc~~ no longer included Trappuntano and Giancana.

the CIA ~~etc~~ admitted that Roselli most likely kept them informed.

The CIA noted in the 1967 IGR that

"[i]t would be naive to assume that

Roselli did not take the precaution of

informing higher-ups in the syndicate territory

that he was working in a territory

considered to be the private domain of

someone else in the syndicate." (27)

In June of 1962 Roselli reported that

to Harvey that Verma dispatched

a three man team into Cuba with the

general assignment of recruiting others

to kill ~~etc~~ Castro, and, if the opportunity

arose, to kill him themselves, maybe through
the use of pills. ⁽²⁸⁾ In September of 1962
Roselli reported to ~~Harvey~~ Harvey in
Miami that the "medicine" was
reported in place, that the three man
team was safe, and that Verma
was prepared to ~~dispatch~~ dispatch another
three man team to infiltrate Castro's
bodyguard. ⁽²⁹⁾ In December, ~~of~~ 1962,
Roselli and Harvey agreed that not much
seemed to be occurring and by ⁽³⁰⁾ February,
1963, Harvey terminated the plots. ⁽³⁰⁾

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

B. The Las Vegas Wiretap Incident

The 1967 ~~Inter~~ IGR also mentioned an event that occurred during ~~the~~ Phase I of the CIA-mafia plots ^(INSET A) on October 31, 1960, Las Vegas police arrested Arthur J. Balletti, an employee of a Florida investigator named Edmund DuBois, for placing an electronic bug in a hotel room in Las Vegas. ⁽²¹⁾

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Subsequent ~~investigation~~ ^{authorized} investigation determined that Robert A. Mather ~~was~~ ^{and possibly the wiretap} the surveillance of the subject involved and that Mather probably acted on behalf of Giancana and the CIA. ⁽³²⁾

The violation of the wiretap statute

~~SECRET~~
B. The has "

which resulted in the first dissemination
of the details of the plot to persons other
than the ones involved in the operations.

INBETA

used during

INSET A

CIA-mafia plots^A On

on 31, 1960, Las Vegas police

arrested Arthur J. Balletti, an employee

of a Florida investigator named Edmund

DuBois, for placing an electronic

bug in a hotel room in Las Vegas. (21)

~~SECRET~~

Subsequent ~~investigation~~ investigation

authorized

determined that Robert A. Mather ~~was~~

and possibly the wiretap

the surveillance of the subject involved

and that Mather probably acted on

behalf of Gianessa and the CIA. (32)

The violation of the wiretap statute

placed the case under
~~of the~~ federal jurisdiction and

the FBI soon began^{ing} investigation. In

the course of this investigation Mahen

informed the FBI that he ~~was~~ ^{instituted}

the surveillance ~~of~~ ^{on behalf of}

~~operation with the CIA involving~~

~~general~~ of CIA efforts to

obtain Cuban intelligence through

the hoodlum element, including

Granada. ⁽²³⁾ In its efforts to prevent

the prosecution of Balletti, ~~of~~

Mahen, and an ^{unidentified} individual known as

J. W. Harrison, the CIA eventually

told the ~~the~~ ^{Justice Department} the details of ^{Phase I of} the

CIA-mafia plots to kill Castro.

This can best be ~~related~~ related through

the following [memorandum from ~~the~~
J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General
Ramsey Clark [quoted in part]. (34)

Blank letterhead memorandum

3-6-67

TO: Attorney General

From: Director, FBI

TOP Secret

[redacted] Attorney General Robert Kennedy indicated that a few days prior to [5-9-62] he had been advised by the CIA that Robert A. Mahen had been hired by the CIA to approach Sam Giancana with a proposition of paying \$150,000 to hire gunmen to go into Cuba and kill Castro. He further stated ~~the~~ CIA admitted having assisted Mahen in making the "bugging" installation in Las Vegas which uncovered this clandestine operation and for this reason ~~the~~ CIA could not afford to have any action taken against Giancana or Mahen. Mr. Kennedy stated that upon ^{learning} learning CIA had not cleared its action in hiring Mahen and Giancana with the Department of Justice

he issued orders that the CIA should never again take such ~~actions~~ steps without first checking with the Department of Justice.

Mr. Kennedy further advised that because of this matter it would be very difficult to initiate any prosecution against Giancana, as Giancana could immediately bring out the fact the United States Government had approached him to arrange for the assassination of Castro. He stated the same was true concerning any action we might take against Mahon for any violation in which he might become involved.

~~could be prosecuted~~

~~In summary, the Las Vegas wire tap and resulting investigation forced the CIA to acknowledge the existence of the CIA-mafia plots to non-CIA government officials, implicated the~~

~~CIA in an illegal writap, and
created a strained atmosphere with
the Department of Justice.~~

~~The primary purpose of~~

In summary,

^ the Las Vegas writap is that it forced
the CIA to acknowledge the existence
of the CIA-MAFIA plots to non-CIA

government officials ~~and~~ and provided
the first ^{OCCASION} ~~for~~ for participants to ~~manipulate~~
the operation ^{to} prevent prosecution.

~~of
the
CIA
and
the
MAFIA
plots~~

c. Robert Maheu and the Long Committee

The next major event related
to the CIA-mafia plots occurred
in 1966 when Maheu used his
involvement with the CIA to

INSET AFTER FOOTNOTE 35

The attorney for Mahan, Edmund Reupert

Morgan, informed the House Select Committee on Assassinations (hereinafter the "Committee")

that Mahan contacted him during ~~the~~ the fall of 1966

~~and~~ and said he was going to be

called before the Long Committee in

conjunction with the Morgan ^(35a) investigation.

Mahan then informed Morgan of the plots

and suggested that any testimony might

necessarily reveal his previous covert

activities with the CIA. ^(35b) Morgan then

contacted Senator Long and Lawrence Houston,

the General Counsel to the CIA, to

reiterate Mahan's concerns in an ^{apparently successful} effort

to block ~~any~~ ^{any} testimony. ^(35c)

of the matter.

The use was state that

Roselli contacted Edwards who subsequently spoke to the FBI ~~_____~~ in regard to Roselli. (38)

The SSC report that Roselli again contacted CIA sources in an effort to thwart prosecution when Roselli was arrested for fraudulent gambling activities at the Inians Club in Beverly Hills in 1967. (39) Roselli contacted Harvey, ~~_____~~ who was no longer ~~_____~~ a CIA employe, to represent him. (40) Harvey subsequently ~~_____~~ attempted to influence the CIA into preventing the prosecution. (41) The Justice Department ~~_____~~, however, subsequently

convicted Roselli for a violation of
the anti-gambling laws. (42)

E. ■ DEBUT OF THE RETALIATION THEORY

The genesis of this theory can
be attributed to an interview ~~with~~ ^{that}
Premier Castro held on September 7, 1963
with Associated Press reporter Daniel
Harker. In that interview Castro
warned against the United States
"aiding terrorists plans to eliminate
Cuban leaders." He stated, according
to Harker, that United States
leaders would be in danger if
they promoted any attempt to
eliminate the leaders of Cuba.
writer James J. Rowley who is from

u
atio

notified the FBI. ⁽⁴⁵⁾ ~~_____~~ Morgan

~~_____~~ informed the Committee that

Roselli initially approached her complaining of excessive FBI surveillance even since he had been involved in the patriotic

venture. ⁽⁴⁶⁾ Roselli also informed ~~_____~~ ^{MORGAN} that Castro had retaliated ~~_____~~ for these plots by ^{ASSASSINATING President Kennedy} ~~_____~~ ⁽⁴⁶⁾

AFTER receiving this ~~_____~~
~~_____~~

information the FBI decided not to

further investigate the allegation. ⁽⁴⁷⁾

Following the publication of the Jell Anderson and Drew Pearson articles of

March 3 and 7, 1967, however, where

the ~~_____~~ theory of retaliation first

gained public notoriety, President Johnson

ordered the FBI to investigate the

matter. ⁽⁴⁸⁾ The FBI consequently ~~_____~~

interviewed Edmund Morgan on
 March 20, 1967⁽⁴⁹⁾ Morgan informed the
 FBI that he represented clients that
 were responsible individuals who entered into
 a project that they understood to have
 high governmental backing and which involved
 the assassination of Fidel Castro.⁽⁵⁰⁾ Morgan
 then stated that his clients had
 reason to suspect that Castro learned
 of these plots and killed President Kennedy
 in retaliation.⁽⁵¹⁾

~~The SSC next states that
 the FBI investigation resulting
 President Johnson acquired a personal interest
 in the theory of retaliation and which
 prompted Helms to order the CIA
 Report of
 1967 Inspector General's Report⁽⁵²⁾~~

The FBI investigation resulted in President Johnson acquiring a personal interest in the retaliation theory which prompted CIA Director Richard Helms to prepare a report on the assassination plots. (52)

~~On October 10, 1967, the Washington Post reported that Helms had fully revealed the retaliation theory. This states:~~

F. 1967 ~~Washington Post~~ IGR

On March 23, 1967 Director Helms ordered the CIA Inspector General to prepare a report on the CIA assassination plots. (53) This report detailed the ~~accounts~~ accounts of various CIA operations against Cuba ~~including~~ including an analysis of the ^{ORGANIZED CRIME} CIA ~~plots~~ plots and the

IGR
AMLASH operation. The ~~AMLASH~~ also

examined the 1960 Las Vegas wiretap incident. In reference to the AMLASH operation with IGR ~~to~~ ~~to~~ ~~to~~ ~~to~~ related

~~AMLASH~~ AMLASH's activities in

Madrid, Spain in late 1964 and

early 1965 where AMLASH was

meeting with Manuel Artome. (54) The

IGR further noted that Rafael

Garcia-Bongo, a former lawyer

for Santo Trappiarte, was in

Madrid, Spain 15 March, 1965. (55) Bongo

claimed to be in contact with dissident


Cuban military leaders, including

AMLASH. (56)

NOTE ON
WHAT BECAME
OF THE
RIVER

G.

~~Anderson~~ Anderson Articles



①
②

In 1971, Anderson once again published information promoting the retaliation theory in two articles dated January 18 and 19. These articles exhibited more detail, relating that several assassins [made it to a rooftop before being apprehended] within shooting distance of Castro, that this event occurred in late February or early March, 1963, that Robert Kennedy at least condoned the CIA-MAFIA plots, and that Roselli delivered poison pills to be used in killing Castro to a contact at the Miami Beach Fountainbleau Hotel on March 13, 1961. ⑥

~~Anderson~~ this is the proper # cycle.



#

Roselli deportation

the same year that Anderson released additional information on the plots,

In 1971, the CIA contacted

the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, in an attempt to prevent information on CIA operations from being disclosed in the ~~event~~ event INS brought deportation proceedings against Roselli. (57)

The SSC stated in ~~its~~ its Interim Report, ^{released in November, 1975,} that the deportation order

still ~~was being litigated~~ in the process of being litigated. (58) In August,

1976, authorities discovered Roselli's ~~body~~ butchered body stuffed in an oil drum and floating in Miami's Biscayne Bay. (59)

His colleague in the plot to kill Castro, Sam Giancana, had been shot to death ~~in~~ in his home in June, 1975.

I. The Senate Select Committee **To** Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities.

In connection with its mandate to investigate the full range of governmental intelligence activities the SSC "examined the performance of the intelligence agencies in conducting their investigation of the assassination and their relationship to the Warren Commission." (61)

In April, 1976, the SSC published its Final Report (Book II) which in essence faulted the CIA for its errors of omission in not informing the Warren Commission of the CIA's on-going plots against the revolutionary government in Cuba and its attempts on

the life of the premier, Fidel Castro.

~~2000~~

After reviewing the details of the CIA-MAGA plots the SSC stated that "Castro probably would not have been certain that the CIA was behind the underworld attempts" and that ~~it~~ ^{it would have been} unlikely that Castro would have distinguished the CIA plots with the underworld from ~~any~~ ^{any} plots ~~by the underworld~~ ~~community~~ ~~or~~ ~~by~~ ~~the~~ ~~community~~ sponsored by the Cuban exile community and not affiliated in any way with the CIA. ⁽⁶²⁾

The SSC identified the AMLASH operation, however, as being "clearly different" from the underworld plots. ⁽⁶³⁾

The SSC stated that ~~the~~ AMLASH was
in progress at the time of the
assassination, ^{that it} could clearly be traced
to the CIA, and that ~~the~~

~~the~~ AMLASH's proposal for
had been endorsed by the CIA
a coup, the initial step being the
assassination of Castro. (64) The

SSC cautioned, however, that it saw
"no evidence that Fidel Castro or others
in the Cuban government plotted President
Kennedy's assassination in retaliation for
U.S. operations against Cuba." (65)

As related in the Introduction
to this ~~the~~ material the SSC did not
reach any conclusions because it
believed additional investigation needed to

occur. (26)

J. The CIA 1977 Inspector General Report (IGR).

Stung by the Senate criticism
 and the rippling effect that Book II
 caused in the media, the CIA prepared
 a comprehensive report in 1977
 designed to answer, at least within
 the CIA, the critical questions postulated
 in the SSC Final Report. ~~Even the~~ ~~Even the~~

~~1977 IGR laudably recognized ~~the~~
 the inadequacy of the CIA's narrow
 response to the Warren Commission's
 quest for all possible relevant
 information. The 1977 IGR
 acknowledged this in the following~~

goes with
 other
 page

The 1977 IGR identified ~~the~~ a principal theme of Book II as the possibility that Castro retaliated against the United States for attempts on his life and that the CIA operations may have specifically caused any such action by Castro. ⁽¹⁾ In responding to this theory the CIA decided to ~~investigate the matter~~ perform the following:

- 1) to conduct a full review of information and operations on the Cuban target to identify any activity that might relate to the assassination of President Kennedy, and
- 2) to review the possibility that CIA activities against Cuba did, by their nature, cause Castro to order the assassination of President Kennedy. ⁽²⁾

The ~~the~~ details of the 1977 IGR are thoroughly ~~completely~~ related in this material because ~~the~~ no source has previously publicly released them.

1. Syndicate Operations

Before analyzing the AMTASH operations the CIA first related new considerations pertaining to the syndicate operations. The FBI refers to a series

of articles ^{written by Paul Meckill and} appearing in the New York Daily News in April, 1975. ~~Articles~~
by Paul Meckill

these articles

of in ~~the~~ ~~series~~ ~~of~~ ~~articles~~ ~~from~~ ~~April~~ ~~1975~~

• ~~Meckill~~ Meckill described how

Frank Fiorini, now known as Sturgis,

allegedly recruited Marie Lorenz

to spy on Castro ⁽¹⁹²⁾ and how Sturgis knew

planned to use him in
Juan Ortiz and used Ortiz in planning to

~~conduct~~ a bombing attempt assassination

of Castro. ⁽¹⁹³⁾ Sturgis claimed Meckill ~~states~~

asserted that Sturgis claimed he had been a hotel operator for the CIA for at least a decade and that Sturgis was in touch with all the casino operators in Havana during the period of the Castro takeover. ⁽¹⁹⁴⁾ In

Another article on June 13, 1976, Melkill related the claim of Marie ~~Loreny~~ Loreny that in the fall of 1960 Frank Sturgis, acting for the CIA, gave her two capsules of poison powder which she was to sprinkle in some food or drink of Castro. ⁽¹⁹⁵⁾

The writers of the 1977 IGR were quite concerned with their assertions because Orta's name had ^{publicly} surfaced in connection with

a Castro assassination plot before
the ~~admission of the~~ SSC revelation
of the CIA - organized crime plots and thus
assignment to poison Castro given to the
the ~~admission of the~~ "official
close to Castro who may have received kickbacks
from the gambling interests." The possibility that
Orta was involved in ^{assassination} plots other ~~than~~ the
CIA operation ~~with Orta~~ also attracted
the attention of the CIA.

In reference to Sturgis' allegation
that he had been a hired operator for the CIA
for a decade the 1977 IGR asserted that
"he was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban
employees in the Miami area, but had no
direct relationships with the Agency." (197)

IGR ~~197~~
The ~~IGR~~ recommended that Sturgis,

through
 through his gambling activities and relationships
 with various casino ~~operators~~ owners,
~~Sturgis~~ may quite possibly have known
 Orta, and ~~that~~ also raises the question
 of whether Sturgis may have been a source
 of information to Castro regarding Orta's
 participation in any assassination plot. (198)

In reference to the Lorenz - Sturgis
 poison pill ~~plot~~ plot the 1977 ICR noted
 the similarity of this plot to the ^{details in the} '18
 October 1960 (199)
~~October 1960 FBI memo, [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]~~

~~It is also documented that [unclear] may~~
~~have been involved in plots when the CIA~~
~~approached him (200)~~

~~The putative conclusion advanced~~
~~by the CIA concerning these [unclear]~~

Castro. ⁽⁷⁸⁾ ~~(79)~~ The plan allegedly involved the use of poison pills concealed in a jar of face cream; the plan failed because the pills dissolved. ⁽⁷⁹⁾ The IGR then mentions the October 18, 1966 FBI memorandum where Sam Giancana referred to the ~~assassination of Castro~~ his knowledge of a plot to assassinate Castro involving a woman. ⁽⁸⁰⁾ who would drop a pill in some drink or food of Castro. ⁽⁸⁰⁾

The CIA concluded that this October date is too early for the CIA syndicate operations and that ^{therefore} the syndicate may ~~have~~ have been acting independently. ⁽⁸¹⁾ ~~_____~~

The CIA also concluded that Antonio de Verona, the Cuban exile leader active in the syndicate operations, may have already been active in plots with the Mafia when the CIA approached him. ⁽⁸²⁾ The CIA cited two FBI memorandums as support. First, a 21 December 1960 memorandum pertaining to underworld support for some Cubans, and second, a 18 January 1961 memorandum relating an unconfirmed report that Verona was one of the Cubans receiving support. ⁽⁸³⁾

The CIA ~~also~~ further acknowledged that although the ~~operation~~ the operation with the Mafia was ~~suspended~~ ^{suspended} after the Bay of Pigs it appeared to

still be in progress when re-activated
in April, 1962. (84)

The IGR summarized its sponsored position concerning non-CIA syndicate operations in the following passage:

It is possible that CIA simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had underway... [I]n a sense CIA may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to its material contributions was also supplying an aura of official sanction (85)

2. AMLASH

The IGR states the SSC suggests that AMLASH ~~was possibly~~ ~~was possibly~~

~~was~~ a Castro agent assigned a provocation mission which would then justify

relationship, or, in the alternative, that

AMLASH was a security risk through

which details of the plotting may have

surfaced to Castro thus providing the

impetus for provocation. ⁽⁸⁶⁾

the IGR cites the SSC as holding that in either

Case

~~Case~~ AMLASH should have been

reported to the Warren Commission. ^(P7)

contends

The IGR ~~case~~ neither theory is

correct ⁽⁸⁸⁾ ~~the relationship between the CIA and AMLASH~~ plotting

that the relationship between the

CIA and AMLASH before the death

of President Kennedy was so

"insubstantial and inconclusive that

it provided no basis ~~for~~ for AMLASH,

to feel that he had any tangible

CIA support for plotting against

Castro. (89)

In support the IGR proceeds to narrate the Agency's understanding of the operation. On August 17, 1962, the case officer for AMLASH reported that he "[has] no intention [of giving AMLASH/1] physical elimination mission as requirement but recognize this ~~as~~ [as] something he could or might try to carry out on his own initiative." (90)

Headquarters replied the next day, "Strongly concur that no physical elimination mission be given AMLASH/1." (91)

On September 7, 1963 the CIA received the following cable:

From August 29, 1962 until September, 1963 the CIA ~~is~~ states it did not have any contact with AMLASH. (92)

AMLASH still feels there only two ways accomplish change either inside job or invasion too realistic enough to realize latter out of question. ~~See~~ According AMWHIP, AMLASH still awaiting for US reveal plan of action. (93)

The IGR notes that the SSC interpreted "inside job" as referring to an operation against Castro; the CIA, however, says it refers to a general commitment concerning how to effect change. (94) The IGR also states that at this point Book II ~~is~~ says "characterization of this phase of the AMLASH operation is disputed." (95) The CIA contends that any dispute only exists in the eyes of the SSC. (96)

The IGR next comments

on an interview of Castro by AP reporter Daniel Harker in which Castro said that anti-Castro terrorists had the support of U.S. leaders.⁽⁹⁷⁾ The IGR states that the ~~SS~~ Book II implies that AMLASH/1 may have reported to Castro what the SSC characterized as assassination plots.⁽⁹⁸⁾

The CIA response is that "Castro's remarks at that time could not have stemmed from anything said to AMLASH/1 by CIA officers as they proposed nothing and undertook nothing."⁽⁹⁹⁾

On October 11, 1963 the case officer called headquarters and said that AMLASH/1 claimed to have

the necessary people and equipment to overthrow Castro without ~~the~~ U.S. assistance. ⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ On October 29, 1963 Desmond Fitzgerald met AMLASH/1 in Paris. ⁽¹⁰¹⁾ At this meeting the CIA maintains ~~say~~ that Fitzgerald rejected AMLASH's request for an assault ~~weapon~~ ^{injection} weapon, specifically, a high powered rifle with a telescopic lens. ⁽¹⁰²⁾ The CIA contends that at this point it was clear that AMLASH was informed that there would be no U.S. assistance until after the fact which is contrary to the SSC statement in BOOK IV to the effect that it was uncertain how AMLASH interpreted the put-off

by Fitzgerald. (103)

On November 19, 1963, Fitzgerald approved informing AMZASH/1 that he would be given a cache inside Cuba and that a high-powered rifle with a scope would be included upon request. (104)

ON November 20 ~~AMZASH~~ the case officer informed AMZASH that he ~~was~~ would be receiving the meeting he requested. (105)

← summarized the
The IGR ~~concluded in~~
significance of these contacts with ~~disruption of the AMZASH operations~~

AMZASH as related to the contentions in BOOK IV in the following

passage:

(106) This meeting occurred on November 22.

Whatever the relationship with AMLASH/1 following the death of President Kennedy, there is every indication that during President Kennedy's life AMLASH/1 had no basis for believing that he had CIA support for much of anything. Were he a provocateur reporting to Castro, or if he was merely careless and leaked what he knew, he had no factual basis for linking or reporting any actual CIA plot directed against Castro. '06

~~AMLASH/1~~
~~had~~ ~~the~~
~~analysis~~
 he had knowledge of CIA plots & reported to Castro.
 is
 SSA was

Finally, ~~in~~ in reply to the SSC

allegation that the CIA ~~was~~ inadequately responded to the Warren Commission's request for all possible relevant information, the IGR observed:

While we can understand today why the Warren Commission limited its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have served to re-inform the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader view of the matter. CIA, too, could have considered in specific terms what most saw in general terms -- the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the assassination (JFK) because of tensions of the time. ... The Agency should have taken broader initiatives, then, as well." (7)

could have seen what the top half adds. ←

K. ~~Recent Anderson Articles~~
Recent Anderson Articles

In September 1976 and October, 1978,
~~October, 1978~~

Anderson again published article

which ~~was~~ ⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ propounded the retaliation theory. In addition, ~~Anderson~~

For the first time Anderson publicly revealed that

John Roselli served as his source

for the retaliation theory ^{in all of the articles} ~~all~~ published through the years.

-44a-

The September 7, 1976 article appearing in the Washington Post contains all components of ~~the~~ ^{the} relation theory. This states:

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten Behind John F. Kennedy's Murder

Mafia mobster John Roselli may have taken the secret of the John F. Kennedy assassination with him to his death. He was brutally murdered a few weeks ago, his hacked-up body stuffed into an oil drum and dumped into Miami's Biscayne Bay.

Before he died, Roselli hinted to associates that he knew who had arranged President Kennedy's murder. It was the same conspirators, he suggested, whom he had recruited earlier to kill Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

By Roselli's cryptic account, Castro learned the identity of the underworld contacts in Havana who had been trying to knock him off. He believed, not altogether without basis, that President Kennedy was behind the plot.

The Cuban leader, as the supreme irony, decided to turn the tables and use the same crowd to arrange Kennedy's assassination, according to Roselli's scenario. To save their skins, the plotters lined up Lee Harvey Oswald to pull the trigger.

Roselli could never be pinned down on names or details. It was also difficult to assess whether he knew what he was talking about or whether he merely described what he thought might have happened. Certainly there

They were under the loose control of Florida's Mafia chieftan, Santos Trafficante. His gambling enterprises in Havana had been closed down by Castro after the 1959 revolution. In fact, Trafficante had been lodged for a period in a Cuban jail, an indignity that didn't endear Castro to him.

After Trafficante made it back to his Florida haunts, he left part of his organization behind in Havana. Some of his henchmen even managed to develop contacts in Castro's inner circle. These were the people Roselli wanted to use to knock off Castro.

But Roselli didn't have the stature inside the Mafia to make the necessary arrangements with Trafficante. So Roselli called in his patron, the Chicago godfather Sam (Momo) Giancana, to deal with Trafficante.

As Roselli's associates tell it, he persuaded Giancana that it would be to their advantage to win the good will of the CIA. Convinced, Giancana flew down to Florida to make the preliminary arrangements.

Once Giancana and Trafficante set it up, Roselli used the Havana underworld to plot Castro's demise. At first, they tried to plant poison pills, supplied by the CIA, in Castro's food. The

In an impromptu, three-hour interview with Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker, Castro indicated that he knew about the attempts on his life and warned that U.S. leaders also might not be safe. That was Sept. 7, 1963.

According to Roselli, Castro enlisted the same underworld elements whom he had caught plotting against him. They supposedly were Cubans from the old Trafficante organization. Working with Cuban intelligence, they allegedly lined up an ex-Marine sharpshooter, Lee Harvey Oswald, who had been active in the pro-Castro movement.

According to Roselli's version, Oswald may have shot Kennedy or may have acted as a decoy while others ambushed him from closer range. When Oswald was picked up, Roselli suggested, the underworld conspirators feared he would crack and disclose information that might lead to them. This almost certainly would have brought a massive U.S. crack-down on the Mafia.

So Jack Ruby was ordered to eliminate Oswald, making it appear as an act of reprisal against the President's

M. Schulz
L. Rubin
WANT TO
BE BEFORE
YOU HOME

To fulfill this process
~~the HSCA reviewed material from~~

numerous governmental sources that
pertained to the persons and operations
relevant to the investigation.

~~the HSCA reviewed material from~~
~~the following sources:~~

~~the following sources:~~

~~testimony before the Committee members.~~

~~the following sources:~~

~~the following sources:~~

~~Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal~~

~~Bureau of Investigation, the Department of~~

~~State, the Department of Defense, Bureau~~

~~of the~~

These persons included: ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

1. John Roselli - principal in CIA-O.C. operation
2. Santo Trafficante - principal in CIA-O.C. operation
3. Antonio de Verema - principal in CIA-O.C. operation
4. Sam Giancana - principal in CIA-O.C. operation
5. Robert Mahon - principal in CIA-O.C. operation
6. Michael McLaney -
7. Samuel Benton
8. Norman Rothman
9. John Martino
10. Edward P. Morgan
11. Edward K. Moss
12. Dino Cellini
13. Richard Cain
14. Charles Tourine
15. Rafael ~~XXXXXX~~ "Macho" GENEER
16. Evelio Duque Miyar
17. Jorge ~~XXXXXX~~ Alonso Pujol
18. Joseph Shimon
19. Angelo Bruno
20. Sam Mannarino
21. Kelly Mannarino
22. Edward Browder
23. Joseph Merola
24. Arthur Balletti
25. Dominick Bartone
26. Richard Helms
27. James O'Connell
28. Luis Balbuena Calzadilla
29. AMLASH

Need to look up "guini" blunts in these people

- 30. dd William Alexander Morgan
- 31. ee JUAN ORTA
- 32. ff JACK Anderson
- 33. gg Rozelli attorneys
- 34. h.h. FRANK Sturgis
- 35. i.i. Fidel Castro

Whenever applicable and desirable

~~the HSCA~~ the HSCA either interviewed
or subpoenaed these persons or ~~had~~ them to give
testimony before Committee members.

The government sources ~~to~~ where
& reviewed material
~~supplied~~ the HSCA requested ~~_____~~
were
~~_____~~

1. Central Intelligence Agency
2. Federal Bureau of Investigation
3. Drug Enforcement Agency
4. Department of Defense
5. Department of State
6. ~~Department~~ Department of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
7. United States Customs Service
8. Immigration and Naturalization Service
9. United States Senate Committee on
Intelligence
10. ~~United States~~ United States Secret Service
11. Chicago Crime Commission
United States Sen S.

Secret

12. Chicago Police Department
13. New York Police Department
14. Public Safety Department, Organized Crime Bureau, Dade County, Florida
15. ~~former~~ Cuban Government.

In the ~~majority~~ majority of instances review of any material at these ^{Sources} ~~sources~~ and any statements from individuals were not pertinent to any assassination plots against Castro, particularly the CIA-Organized Crime or the AMLASH operations.

~~Further, almost all~~ ^{almost all} relevant information acquired was already known through the SSC investigation and the CIA Inspector General Reports. For this reason the following analysis ^{principally} represents conclusions derived from

substantively the same as that
information ~~already considered by~~ which

the SSC and CIA previously ~~considered~~ ^{considered.}
Consequently, ~~the following information~~
The HSCA investigation ~~concluded that~~

~~concluded that~~ further documentation

resulted in additional corroboration

~~the following information~~ of this information
a diversity of sources
from ~~primary sources~~ 108

What remains to be drawn are the conclusions.

in his testimony of the CIA, ~~testified that the~~

~~_____~~ before this Committee

stated that the AMLASH operation was not designed to be an assassination plot. ^{As already indicated,} The 1977 ~~_____~~ IGR ~~_____~~ concluded

that AMLASH had "no factual basis for leading or reporting any actual CIA plot directed against Castro" during President Kennedy's life. ¹⁰⁸⁶

~~_____~~

~~_____~~

~~_____~~

Joseph Langosch, the Chief of

Counterintelligence for the CIA's Special ^{the component responsible for CIA operations directed against the Government of Cuba and the Cuban Intelligence Services,} Affairs Staff in 1963, offered a

contrasting view to the testimony of

Mr. Helms and the assertions of the
^{108c} Desmond Fitzgerald
1977 IGR. ~~The Special Affairs Staff~~

~~He~~ headed the Special Affairs Staff which
was responsible for the AMLOASH operation.^{108d}

~~page~~

In an affidavit to the Committee

Largosch recalled that:

[F] the AmLOASH operation prior
to the assassination of President
Kennedy was characterized by
the Special Affairs Staff,
Desmond Fitzgerald (sic) and
other senior CIA officers as
an assassination operation
initiated and sponsored by
the CIA. 108e

Largosch further recalled that as of

1962 it was highly possible that the

Cuban Intelligence Service was aware

of AMLOASH and its association

with the CIA and that the information upon which he based his conclusion that the AMZASH operation was insecure was available to senior level CIA official, including Desmond Fitzgerald. ~~108F~~ 108F

In response to Langosch's sworn statements, the Committee received the affidavit of Kent L. Pollock from the CIA. Pollock "served as Executive Officer for Desmond Fitzgerald during the entire period in which he was Chief of the Special Affairs Staff ... and discussed with him the AMZASH operation as it progressed." Pollock specifically contested the

assertions of Langosch stating:

To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Fitzgerald considered the AMLASH operation to be a political action activity with the objective of organizing a group within Cuba to overthrow Castro and the Castro regime by means of a coup d'etat. I heard Mr. Fitzgerald discuss the AMLASH operation frequently, and never heard him characterize it as an 'assassination operation'. Mr. Fitzgerald stated within my hearing on several occasions his awareness that coup ~~de~~ d'etat often involves loss of life 1089

He also stated:

Desmond Fitzgerald did not characterize the AMLASH operation as an 'assassination operation'; the Case Officer did not; I, as Executive Officer did not, never discussed any aspect of the AMLASH operation with Joseph H. Langosch; the Deputy Chief, the other

(25)

56-

branch chiefs and the special assistants could not have so characterized it since they did not know about the pen (the pen was specially filled with a hypodermic syringe in response to urgings by AMCLASH for a means to start the coup by killing Castro.) The case officer offered the pen to AMCLASH on the day of President Kennedy's death. AMCLASH rejected the pen with disdain.

108h

Q

Q

~~If the AMCLASH operation was~~

~~not an assassination plot~~

~~during President Kennedy's death,~~

~~The Committee believes that if~~

~~Castro ~~ascertained~~ the ~~source~~~~

~~between AMCLASH and the CIA,~~

~~and that the operation was not an assassination plot during~~

~~that this discovery would not have~~

(A) 57'

Assuming that AM LASH was
not an assassination plot during the
life of President Kennedy, ~~the Committee~~ ^{& that}
~~believes that even if Castro uncovered~~
its existence and scope, ^{the Committee believes that} ~~Castro~~ would not
have been provoked in a manner sufficient
to ~~assassinate~~ induce ~~retaliation~~ ^{as assassinating President Kennedy}
in retaliation.
~~the form of assassination~~

Assuming that AM LASH was
an assassination plot ~~and that~~
during the life of President Kennedy
and that Castro uncovered its
existence and scope, the Committee
still believes that Castro would
not have ^{resorted to assassinating the} ~~assassinated the~~
President of the United States in

retaliator.

~~An interview~~

~~The reasons supporting this contention are ~~that~~~~

In his interview with the Committee Premier Castro ~~stated~~ ~~the~~ set forth some

reasons supporting this contention. ~~stating~~ The Committee agrees with the ^{reasoning} ~~logic~~ in ~~most~~ his statements. Castro said in part:

In response to the delegates that the Cuban government orchestrated the assassination Castro ~~stated~~ ^{said:}

But -
also address
the on this.

That was insane. From the ideological point of view it was insane. And from the political point of view, it was a tremendous insanity. I am going to tell you here that nobody, nobody ever had the idea of such things. What would it do? We just tried to defend our folks here, within our territory. ~~stating~~ Anyone who subscribed to that idea would have been judged insane... absolutely sick. Never,

① 59

in twenty years of revolution, I never heard anyone suggest nor even speculate about a measure of that sort, because who could think of the idea of organizing the death of the President of the United States. That would have been the most perfect pretext for the United States to invade our country which is what I have tried to prevent for all these years, in every possible sense. Since the United States is much more powerful than we are, what could we gain from a war with the United States? The United States would lose nothing. The destruction would have been here.

Castro also added:

I want to tell you that the death of the leader does not change the system. It has never done that.

~~Ques~~ In this interview

Castro also commented on

the speech of September 7, 1963

which has been ~~referred to~~

cited throughout the years as an

indication that Castro may have

assassinated President Kennedy in

retaliation. Premier Castro asserted:

So, I said something like those plots start to set a very bad precedent, a very serious one -- that that could become a boomerang against the authors of those actions ... but I did not mean to threaten by that. I did not mean even that, not in the least .. but rather, like a warning that we knew; that we had news about it; and that to set those precedents of plotting the assassination of leaders of other countries would be a very bad precedent ... something very

negative. And, if at present, the same would happen under the same circumstances, I would have no doubt in saying the same as I said (then), because I didn't mean a threat by ~~it~~ that. I didn't say it as a threat. I did not mean by that that we were going to take measures - similar measures - like a retaliation for that. We never meant that because we knew that there were plots. For three years we had known there were plots against us. So, the conversation came about very casually, you know, but I would say that all these plots or attempts were part of the everyday life.

~~Assassinating Castro~~
 Some reasoning, which Committee cautions is speculative, maybe of some assistance here.

^ It does not seem likely that Castro would make a veiled reference to assassinating American leaders in retaliation for

plots on his life if he was actually
 contemplating
 planning such ~~acts~~ acts. He would want
 as possible
 to call as little attention to himself
 as possible. Rather, it seems Castro

was attempting to display his public
 and knowledge of
 dismay ~~to~~ such attempts in an
 effort to prevent their continuance.

Consequently, ~~in the absence~~ together
 with an absence of any other evidence
 implicating Castro in the assassination,

~~the Committee believes that~~
 the Committee believes that this incident,
~~is not significant.~~

while displaying Castro's displeasure
 at American activities, ~~it~~
~~does not~~ does not ~~implicate~~
 implicate Castro in the ~~assassination~~
~~of~~ ASSASSINATION.

~~_____~~


~~_____~~

~~_____~~

The Committee believes that additional ~~_____~~ reasons to discount any involvement of Castro in ~~_____~~ which are also compelling. The assassination ~~_____~~ The Committee cautions that these reasons, while persuasive, are still necessarily ~~_____~~ speculative.

P173
SIR

First, William Atwood, Special Advisor to the United States Delegation to the United Nations, was involved in diplomatic efforts to establish a framework for detente during the fall of 1963. Atwood told the SSC that George Bundy, an advisor to President Kennedy, told him that President



(37)

-64-

Kennedy was in favor of ^{pushing} "pushing towards
an opening ~~to~~ toward Cuba" to take
Castro "out of the Soviet fold and perhaps
wiping out the Bay of Pigs and maybe
getting back to normal." Atwood
also arranged for a French journalist,
Jean Daniel to meet with Kennedy
prior to a scheduled trip by Daniel
to see Castro. Daniel and Kennedy
discussed the prospect for reestablishing
United States - Cuba relations and Kennedy
asked Daniel to see him after visiting Castro.
The Committee believes that
such efforts to establish a peaceful
co-existence between the United States
and Cuba would be ^{hindered} ~~impeded~~ any

desire by Castro to assassinate

Kennedy.

Second, the Committee also believes that among the

~~of all the United States~~ leaders of

the United States President Kennedy ~~it~~

~~the~~

supported a less hostile attitude

and position toward Cuba. Then,

Ⓟ - skip 4 spaces

renewed diplomatic relations

with the prospects of ~~detente~~ in the

air and the knowledge that Kennedy

possessed a more ~~for~~ favorable attitude

toward Cuba than other military or

political leaders, Castro would have

had ~~every~~ reason to hope that Kennedy,

maintained the Presidency. Even if Castro

the relations between Cuba and the

felt ~~conditions were bad with~~

United States were bad under the Kennedy

Presidency,

~~Administrations~~, then ~~any~~ ^{were legitimate} reasons

to suspect they would have been worse

under any other Administration.

Further, the Committee does not believe that eliminating Kennedy would necessarily have ^{favorably} altered the United States' operations and lessened the threat to Cuba. In addition, the Committee does not believe Castro would have ~~acted~~ ~~given~~ ~~the~~ ~~United~~ ~~States~~ ~~the~~ ~~occasion~~ ~~to~~ ~~destroy~~ ~~Cuba.~~ ~~If~~ assassinated President Kennedy became such an act, if discovered, would have afforded the United States the excuse to destroy Cuba. The risk would not have been worth it.

B. Issues Pertaining to the CIA-Organized Crime Plots

1. Scope and Nature of Plots - Analysis

~~James O'Connell informed the Committee that...~~

a) Roselli Knowledge of CIA Sponsorship

James O'Connell ~~also~~ informed the Committee that Makeu told Roselli he represented an international group of clients who had ~~to~~ vested interest in Cuba. ⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ Roselli, however, testified to the SSC that Makeu told him from the beginning that O'Connell was with the CIA. ⁽¹¹⁰⁾ Makeu confirmed this account to the SSC. ⁽¹¹¹⁾ Makeu also stated in a deposition to the Committee that Giancana knew at the time that ^{Further} O'Connell was with the CIA. ⁽¹¹²⁾ Trappucchi testified to the Committee that Roselli informed him that he, Roselli, was operating as an agent of the CIA. ⁽¹¹³⁾

The weight of the evidence indicates that Roselli, and thus Giancana and Trappucchi, knew the CIA was behind the assassination plots. ~~at~~ ~~recognition of CIA~~ ~~at~~ an early stage. This recognition

of CIA initiation is important because shows that

it ~~was~~ Giancana and Trappiante and their organized crime knowledge became ~~well known~~ ~~within~~ ~~the~~ ~~CIA~~ involved with the CIA.

~~was~~ ~~of~~ ~~government~~ ~~protection~~

a) ~~The~~ ~~Timing~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~Introduction~~ ~~of~~ ~~Giancana~~ ~~and~~ ~~Trappiante~~

b) ~~Discovery~~ ~~of~~ ~~True~~ ~~Identities~~

~~McClellan~~ ~~to~~ ~~1967~~ ~~TGR~~ ~~relates~~

~~that~~ ~~O'Connell~~ ~~learned~~ ~~the~~ ~~true~~

~~identity~~ ~~of~~ ~~Sam~~ ~~Giancana~~ ~~the~~ ~~entrance~~ ~~of~~ ~~Roselli~~ ~~arranged~~ ~~for~~ ~~Giancana~~

and Trappiante into the plots and

introduced them to O'Connell as

"Sam Gold" and "Joe." (114) ~~the~~ ~~1967~~

~~TGR~~ ~~relates~~ ~~that~~ O'Connell concludes

he learned the true identities of

These persons a few months after
the operation was in progress when he or Mahen
saw an article in one of the Sunday
sections of the Miami newspaper. ⁽¹¹⁵⁾ ~~that~~
This article supposedly pertained to
Organized crime in the United States and
~~it~~ contained pictures of top
hoodlums, including Sam Giancana
and Santo Trappicante. ⁽¹¹⁶⁾ In the
1967 IGR O'Connell stated that the
article came ^{the} ~~from~~ ^{in the Miami Times} Parade magazine. ⁽¹¹⁷⁾
Mahen ~~contends~~ ^{also} ~~contends~~ that he did
not know the true identities of Sam
Gold and Joe until this article appeared. ⁽¹¹⁸⁾

~~The SAC searched for and conducted~~
~~a search of supplements to all Miami~~

~~The day~~ also ~~that~~ O'Connell stated ~~that after~~ this incident ~~the CIA~~ occurred after the ~~CIA was~~ "we were up to ~~our~~ ears" in the operation and consequently the CIA decided to progress forward. (119)

The SSC ~~searched for~~ conducted a search of supplements to all Miami newspapers for the requisite time period and could not locate any such article. (120) The Committee consequently searched Parade magazine for the fall of 1960, all of 1961, and all of 1962, the years which spanned the entire operation. ~~As of~~ The Committee learned that on January 21, 1962, Parade

published an article entitled, "Our government's crackdown on organized crime," written by JACK Anderson, which contains a listing of the top ten hoodlums in the country as well as ~~several~~ ^{several} photographs of mobsters,

including ~~[redacted]~~ Sorro Trafficante. (121) The

article ~~[redacted]~~ focuses on the efforts of attorney general Robert Kennedy's campaign against organized crime and mentions both Giancana and Trafficante.

Although this Parade article appears

~~[redacted]~~

~~[redacted]~~ to ~~[redacted]~~ O'Connell and Mahan's correspond with ~~[redacted]~~ description,

it is over one year past the beginning

~~[redacted]~~

~~[redacted]~~

~~[redacted]~~ months of the ~~[redacted]~~ operation.

Indeed, it occurs ^{nine months} ~~after~~ after the completion of Phase I of the plots. Additionally, neither the SSC nor the Committee has discovered any other article pertaining to organized crime in Parade magazine or the supplements of any Miami newspaper for the alleged time period.

It appears O'Connell and Mahan are lying in an attempt to look for an ex post facto reason for continuing the operation after the introduction of two of the top ~~prof~~ organized crime figures in the United States. Implicit in their contention is that while the CIA wished to solicit ^{criminal} ~~organized crime~~ sources to assassinate Castro

it would not knowingly have recruited

~~any figures from the top echelon of organized crime.~~

any figures from the top echelon of organized crime. (1222)

Additionally, O'Connell's statement that

"we were up to our ears in it" is even more difficult to fathom since the operation

according to the 1967 IGR the operation was in its embryonic stage in the fall of 1960

and no pills were even delivered until approximately February or March of 1961.

Without additional support the Committee does not believe the

contentions of Mahon and O'Connell.

~~the~~ ^{THIS CIA} plot to assassinate Castro

was necessarily a highly volatile and

secret operation. Once Roselli introduced

additional contacts into the scene it is

not logical that the CIA would have
expected to verify the identities of ~~_____~~
~~_____~~ exactly who they were

~~dealing with conspiring with~~ ~~_____~~

~~individuals~~ such principals. On the

contrary, it is more believable and more

~~likely~~ probable that the CIA ascertained

the true identities of "Sam Gold" and "Joe"

at an early stage and consciously

progressed forward in the operation

confident that these two persons, in

the words ~~of~~ attributed to Colonel

Sheffield Edwards, were individuals

"tough enough" to handle the job. (122)

~~_____~~

c) Roles of Principals

1) Phase one

~~_____~~

Colonel Sheffield Edwards assigned O'Connell the task of finding someone to assassinate Castro. (123) ~~_____~~

Edwards & O'Connell both decided to

utilize makeer as someone to recruit

persons to effectuate the operation. (124)

O'Connell also described his role as

the liaison to the CIA and ~~_____~~

confirmed that all reports on

information would proceed through him

to the Agency. (125) In addition, O'Connell

said he acted as a "babysitter" to

Roselli; that is, remaining with him

to occupy his time to ensure that

Roselli was fulfilling his role. (126) ~~During Phase II of the plots ~~_____~~ William Harvey assumed~~

O'Connell's position who was assigned slusher. (126c)

There is a discrepancy over who suggested Roselli for the operation, (127) but in any event, he was recruited because he had connections with persons who ~~could handle the assignment during both phases of the operation.~~ could handle the assignment. (28) ↓

Conflict arises over the role of Giancana. Roselli informed the SSC that Giancana was only a "back-up" man. (129) ~~It should be noted that~~ Giancana was murdered four days before Roselli made this statement. Maher, however, described Giancana as having a key role and characterized his job as "to locate someone in Castro's entourage who could accomplish the assassination." (130)

Joseph Shimon, a close friend of Roselli

who had knowledge of the plot at

the time, ~~and~~ stated that

~~Gianara~~ Roselli contacted Gianara

to provide Cuban contacts. ⁽¹³¹⁾ Shimon further

characterized Gianara as only providing

contacts, specifically Santo Trafficante,

and not as an active participant. ⁽¹³²⁾

~~1967 FBI report that Gianara only provided contacts~~

~~Roselli. (132)~~

~~The role of Trafficante, the~~

~~only living principal organized crime~~

~~figure involved in the plots, is the~~

~~major source of conflict.~~

The most sound

~~analysis~~ of analysis is that Gianara

solely served as a person Roselli

could approach who ~~also~~ could ~~see~~ then

make the necessary contacts ~~to~~

specifically Santo Trafficante.

into the Cuban domain, Roselli, ~~and~~

who FBI files indicate

~~subordinate of~~

~~to~~ represented Giancana's interests in

Las Vegas and was subordinate to him, would

not directly contact the organized

crime boss of the Cuban and Southern

Florida area, ~~in this case Santo~~

w/out FIRST contacting

Trappicante. ~~Roselli would contact~~

his superior, Giancana, who would

then ~~make the decision~~ make any

necessary arrangements. Both Giancana

and Trappicante, being bosses of

two organized crime domains, would

have the means, power, and stature

to arrange for the assassination. ~~It~~

~~would not have been proper for Roselli~~

~~to have independently after contacting~~

Trappicante, who had the ~~needed~~
influence to recruit the necessary
personnel to actually perform the assassinations,
Giancana probably was not an active
participant in the process of passing pills or
actually arranging the assassination. (133)
~~and recruiting Cubans.~~



The role of Trappicante, the
only living major organized crime figure
involved in the plot, is a major source of
conflict. The 1967 IGR contains several
references to Trappicante which characterize
his function. In discussing how the poison
pills could be given to Castro it states
that "Trappicante ('Joe, the courier') was
in touch with a disaffected Cuban
official with access to Castro and presumably

of a sort that would enable him to surreptitiously
poison Castro. " (134) Later the report states

that "Roselli passed the pills to Trappicante"

and that "Roselli reported to O'Connell

that the pills had been delivered to

Orta in Cuba. " (135) After Orta lost

his position in the Cuban government and

could no longer pass any pills the FOR

says "Roselli told O'Connell that

Trappicante knew of a man high up

in the Cuban exile movement who

might do the job. " (136) Roselli identified

him as Antonio de Verona. (137) ^{The} ~~Also~~

~~All relate that~~

following paragraph further explains

Trappicante's role:

Trappicante approached Verona and told him that he had clients who wanted to do away with Castro and that they would pay big money for the job. Verona is reported to have been very receptive, since it would mean that he would be able to buy his own ship, arms, ~~etc~~ and communications equipment. (138)

~~Some information of the Committee~~
 Trappicante testified in public ~~that Trappicante~~

to the Committee that Roselli asked him ^{solely} to act as an interpreter between the American operators and the Cuban contacts. (139)

Trappicante denied handling or carrying any person pills used in the ~~assassination~~

operation. (140) denied ~~recruiting~~ ~~Trappicante~~

~~Trappicante~~ of Verona, and ^{recruiting} denied ~~Trappicante~~ Osta. (142)

~~Roselli~~

TRAFFICANTE'S

In his Senate testimony Roselli confirmed ~~that~~

that ^{that} ~~he~~ acted as a translator.

O'Connell, however, informed the Committee that Trappuante was the person in contact with Cubans in Havana. (143)

Granana partially confirmed this ~~that~~ in the 1967 T6R ~~by~~ by identifying Joe a man who would serve as a courier to Cuba and make arrangements there. (144)

O'Connell also confirmed that he was the only CIA conduit and that if the 1967 T6R states Trappuante contracted or procured the assassins then it accurately reflects the information the CIA received. (144)

-67-
85-

It is interesting ~~to~~ that the
1975 and 1978 Congressional testimony
of Roselli and Trappiante corroborate
each other but remain contrary to
~~the facts~~ how the principals reported
the facts in ~~the~~ 1967. ~~The weight~~
~~of the~~ evidence ^{strongly} indicates that Trappiante
was not merely an interpreter but
an ~~integral~~ ~~part~~ of the active
participant in passing the poison pills
and in recruiting the potential assassins.
This is important in dramatizing the
deep involvement of organized crime with the
CIA in these plots. One can understand
why Trappiante today wishes to downplay
his role; the facts, however, simply do

It is reasonable to assume that Roselli at least kept both Giancare and Trappiante informed of the operator's progress ~~and~~

D) Delivery of the pills

Neither the 1967 FGR or the SSC pinpoints the date on which O'Connell delivered the pills to ~~O'Connell~~ Roselli during Phase One of the plot. The chain of custody, as already mentioned, was for Roselli to deliver the pills to Trappiante. ~~the subsequent~~ The subsequent ~~transfers~~ transfers remain a mystery but Roselli reported to O'Connell that the pills had been delivered to Orta in

Cuba in late February or early
March, 1961. (148)

Joseph Shimon informed the
Committee that he and Maken travelled
together to Miami to the Fortaineau
in ~~mid~~ March, 1961, to witness the
Pallen - Johansson fight. (149)

Once there Maken informed him of the
plot to assassinate Castro. (150) Shimon also
says ~~he attended a meeting~~ that during
this trip he attended a meeting where
a poisonous liquid to be used in
the assassination was passed. (151)

~~Shimon's version probably~~
Shimon is probably the source for
Anderson's
fact Anderson's column of January, 19,

~~II~~
81.

1971, which fixes the date of the
passage of the poison at the Fontainebleau
as March, 13, 1961.

In any event, it appears certain
the CIA ~~did not pass any~~
that ~~the CIA~~ [^] plots, poison, or assassination
weapons before February of 1961. The
fall segment of the plots only constituted
a planning stage; no one undertook any
operational activities.

E) LOCATION OF TRAPPUANTE

To support the description of
Trappuante as a courier the 1967 IOR
states that "[a]t that time the
gambling casinos were still operating
in Cuba, and Trappuante was making

regular trips between Miami and

Havana in syndicate business" (152)

The Committee has obtained some evidence
~~which~~ ~~which~~ ~~which~~ indicates

that Trappante was ^{not} travelling to Cuba

during this period. No records

available to the Committee from INS,

State Department, or the FBI

reflect any travels after February, 1960,
During this time

~~Trappante~~ the FBI maintained physical

surveillance on Trappante during ~~this~~

~~period~~ (153) Trappante testified before

the Committee that he only made

two trips to Cuba after his release
from the Trescowia prison

from ~~prison~~ in August, 1959, and

that these trips occurred within

two to three months of this release. (154)

considering Trappante's reported top position in the LA COSA NOSTRA,

Additionally, it seems more reasonable that Trappante would send a representative to Cuba to conduct any business rather than risk being detained by Castro again.

If Trappante was actually travelling between Miami and Havana the implications are interesting. He was either willing to risk being detained again or had ~~had~~ acquired assurance from the Cuban government regarding his safety.

In any event the presence of Trappante during ~~the~~ the fall of 1960 in Cuba raises the possibility of a cozy relationship between him ^{and} ~~the~~ the Cuban government than previously believed. Such a relationship during the period when Trappante

was scheming to assassinate Castro
invites the theory that Trappante was
possibly informing the Cuban government
of activities in the Miami area in general
and ~~part~~ of the plots in particular.

In return for such information Trappante
~~would~~ could ^{have acquired} ~~lost~~ lost gambling
~~as well as~~ as well as
~~operations~~ operations ~~and~~ support and a Cuban smuggling
~~operation~~ ~~and~~ ~~support~~ for the
smuggling of contraband into the
United States. If the Committee realizes
the enormous ramifications of such a
theory and cautions that it has
not received any information or
evidence in this regard. In addition,
the ~~available~~ available evidence

indicates Trappiante was not ~~possibly~~ traveling between Miami and Havana although the Committee recognizes that Trappiante could ~~to~~ make ~~such~~ such trips and not disrupt his ~~own~~ normal routine in Miami and Tampa thus possibly undermining the effect of any surveillance.

F) Verona's Other Contacts

As previously related the FBI forwarded to the CIA a memorandum on 21 December 1960 revealing that U.S. racketeers were making efforts to finance anti-Castro activities and subsequently forwarded another memorandum

on 18 January 1961 which associated
Verona with those schemes. (155)

~~At the time of her introduction~~

~~into the plot~~

~~to carry out the~~

Other sources were also providing
assistance to Verona to conduct anti-
Castro operations. At the time of
her introduction into the CIA -
Organized crime plots the CIA was
funding Verona through the Revolutionary
Democratic Front and the Cuban
Revolutionary Council. (156) Verona
informed the Committee that the
purpose of the Council stemmed
from an agreement with the American

government to invade Cuba and
establish democratic control of the
island. (157)

Adding to the support for Uerona
were the promotional efforts of Dino
and Eddie Cellini who ^{reportedly} were working
through a Washington, D.C. public
relations firm, Edward K. Moss and
Associates. Moss had previous CIA
associations and was supposedly
acting as a conduit for funds
supplied by the Cellini brothers
with the understanding that this group
would receive privileged treatment
in the Cuba of the future. (158)

-78-

-94-

In his testimony before the
Committee Verma also described a
meeting ~~at the home of Meyer Lansky's~~
with Jorge Alonzo Pujol and Meyer Lansky in
home
in Miami in the summer of 1960. (159)

Lansky said he had business interest
in Cuba and wanted to help the
Cubans fight Castro, destroy Castro,
and by and establish a democratic
government. (160)

~~There~~
The logical inference to be drawn
from ~~these~~ this is that the CIA,
Organized Crime, and other persons
interested in removing the Castro
regime all settled ~~at~~ upon de
Verma, probably independently.

19'
95'

as a person who had the potential of
uniting the multitude of exile groups
to overthrow Castro. Additionally,
Verma's reported contacts with
organized crime raises the possibility
that he was involved with them in
a plot to kill Castro before the
evolution of the CIA - organized
crime plots. If this was the case
then Tappan's recruitment of
Verma into the CIA operation would
result in providing official U.S.
sanction to an already existing independent
operation. [The CIA recognized this
in stating "it is possible that Verma
already was involved in independent

~~80~~

96.

operations with the criminal syndicate when
first approached prior to the Bay of Pigs
in March 1961 to carry out the Castro
assassination. ⁽¹⁰¹⁾ (Footnote to p. 19 TABC 1977 I G)

G) Introduction OF "JOE" AND "GOLD" AND RELATED Events

~~organized crime plot~~

The timing of the introduction of Giancana ("gold") and Trafficante ("joe") is important to the analysis of the true role of organized crime in the Castro assassination ~~attempts~~ plots.

This introduction, together with other related events, further suggests the thesis that the CIA found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operation that the syndicate already had commenced.

According to the 1967 IGR, the entrance of Giancana and Roselli occurred during the week of September 25, 1960. (162)

In contrast, the SSC did not assign a ~~precise~~ precise date for their entrance because of conflicting evidence between the 1967 IGR and Mahon's Senate testimony which set the date after November, 1960. (163) The SSC did conclude, however, that Giancana was involved in the operation ^{during} ~~in~~ October because of the Las Vegas wiretap incident which occurred on October 30, and because of the October 18, 1960 FBI memorandum which revealed Giancana had told several people of a ~~plot against Castro~~ ^{his involvement in a plot to} assassinate Castro. (164)

Although these two events ~~are~~
~~by the GSE~~ which the SC C cites ^{may} ~~likely~~ ~~may~~
 support the involvement of Giancana
 during October they also ~~may~~
~~likely~~ invite speculation of independent
 organized crime operations. The October 18,
 1960, FBI memorandum is particularly
 applicable
~~likely~~. This states:

[D]uring a recent conversation with several
 friends, Giancana stated that Fidel Castro was
 to be done away with shortly, said it
 would occur in November. Moreover, Giancana
 said he had already met with the would-be
 assassin on three occasions, the last
 meeting taking place on a boat docked
 at the Fontainebleau Hotel, Miami Beach.
 Giancana stated everything had been
 perfected for killing Castro and that
 the assassin had arranged with a
 girl, not further described, to drop
 a 'pill' in some drink or food of Castro, ⁽¹⁶⁵⁾
~~and also stated~~

Junior ~~the~~ ^{according to the} ~~the~~ ^{1967 IGR} poison pills, which the CIA prepared

at Ganciana's request, were not ready for delivery until late February or early March, 1961, ~~according to~~

~~the CIA's records~~ - it

is extremely doubtful that Ganciana's November, 1960, assassination plot was

part of the CIA operation. Rather

it appears that ~~the~~ organized crime

~~had it~~ already had its poison plan

in progress, using a messenger of Castro,

to accomplish the deed, when the CIA

fortuitously entered the scene.

Organized crime then occupied a

perfect position. If their private

plot ~~was~~ succeeded they then ^{would} possess ~~it~~

~~100~~

far-reaching blackmail potential against
 the CIA which they could exercise at
 an ~~the~~ opportune moment. If their
 intrigue failed, however, they could
 then assume the position that they were
 only executing the directives of the
 government.

H) ■ Richard CAIN

The "assassin" that Giancana
 refers to in the October 18 memo may
 have been Richard Scallzetti Cain.

Cain, in connection with the Top Echelon
 Criminal Enforcement Program, informed the
 FBI of his criminal activities and ^{close} associations

with Giancana. (166) In 1956 Giancana admitted

to ~~be~~ infiltrate the Chicago Police

Department Cain admitted that he had

and been on his payroll
 covertly worked for Giancana while
 he was a member of the Chicago Police
 Department from 1956 - 1960, director
 of a private detective agency from 1960 - 62,
 and Chief Investigator for the Cook
 County Sheriff's Office from 1962 - 1964.

all of
 this should
 be in a
 footnote.
 do not
 type

Cain's superiors dismissed him from
 office when Cain went to trial in a
 drug case investigation. (167) After 1964
 Cain travelled extensively with Giancana
 throughout the world and also served
 a three year sentence in the Terakana
 Federal Penitentiary following a 1969
 conviction for conspiracy in the 1963
 robbery of Franklin Park Bank. (168) As a
 result of this bank robbery Cain became

all of this should go in a footnote

a target of the TOP Echelon Criminal Enforcement Program. (169)

Early in his career Cain established

~~extensive polygraph and electronic~~

~~surveillance operations~~ a reputation

for experience in sabotage, polygraphs,

and electronic surveillance. (170) Cain

reportedly also was fluent in Italian

and Spanish, (171) and ~~traveled~~ traveled extensively through Latin America.

slain in gangland fashion in a Chicago

restaurant. (172)

Start in here → Several of Cain's activities during the fall of 1960, together with his past

sp experience, ~~and the suspicion~~

~~that~~ support the proposition that

~~that~~ Cain was involved in any Cuban

~~Affair Giancana participated in. First,~~

Cain

if Giancana was involved in any ^{specifically an assassination of Castro independent of the CIA plot,} ^{would have}

Cuban affairs, he [^] recruited Cain to

assist him.

First,

record

~~Cain~~ CAIN maintained a ~~record~~ record

of voluntarily providing information to the

CIA ~~on~~ concerning ~~his~~ his foreign

ventures, a practice Giancana may have

promoted in an effort to gain possible

leverage with the CIA. In a ~~CIA~~ CIA

memorandum to the FBI dated 4 November 1960

in his first contact with the CIA:

CAIN supplied the following information:

1) ~~Cain reported to the CIA that in 1950-52~~

while in Miami, Florida, he

installed several telephone taps on

various Cuban revolutionary

figures ~~under~~ under the supervision

of William Buenny, a private detective

who had contact with the Batista government.

William Buenny →

(169)

- 2) That on October 2, 1960, William Buenny, then operating out of New York City, met with Cain at O'Hare Airport and asked him ^{offered him \$25,000 to travel to} ~~whether~~ ~~he would be interested in traveling~~ to Cuba at the request of former President Prio to install telephone taps on various Cubans; and
- 3) That in 1959, Constantine Kengles, a former attorney ~~of~~ for the Cuban 26th of July movement, inquired ~~with~~ whether Cain would instruct CASTRO Army officers in the use of polygraphs. (166) (173)

It seems more than coincidental that ~~_____~~
~~_____~~
 Cain's approach ^{to} the CIA to supply
 this ~~_____~~ occurred simultaneously
 with ~~_____~~ information ~~_____~~
 with ~~_____~~ Guarnano's ~~_____~~ meeting with Roselli and
 Cain subsequently ~~_____~~ the
 matter. ~~_____~~ ~~_____~~ ~~_____~~ that
~~_____~~ ~~_____~~ volunteered
 information to the CIA during 1961-63.

Second, ^{ON} ~~ON~~ November², 1960, a confidential informant told the Bureau that on October 20, 1960, Sergio Montejo, the former head of the July 26th Movement in Chicago, met Richard S. Cain in the office of Constantine Kargles, the former attorney in Chicago for the Cuban 26th of July Movement and former counsel in the United States for the Cuban Government headed by Fidel Castro. ⁽¹⁷⁴⁾ Cain indicated to Kargles that he had clients who wished to get news stories and photographs out of Cuba concerning rebel activity in the Cuban foothills. ⁽¹⁷⁵⁾ Cain further indicated that he ~~wanted~~ wished to cover this story and was soon going to Miami

in an attempt to enter Cuba, and that Jack Marley, a Chicago columnist, and Bob Ayman of Life magazine, had knowledge of this venture. (176)

Third, on November 2, 1960, the

FBI interviewed CAIN in Miami at the

Sands Hotel, Miami Beach. (177) CAIN said he

was a representative of Accurate Detection

Laboratory, ~~_____~~ Life magazine,

and sixty-four other newspapers. (178) After

providing information on the military

armaments in Cuba, ~~_____~~ (178a) CAIN said that the

Resistance Movement had eight hundred

men fighting in ~~_____~~ the Escambray

Mountains and that he was awaiting the

opportunity to parachute into the Escambrays

~~_____~~
in

to ~~take~~ take photos for L.K. (179) Cain said that Antonio de Verona ~~provided~~^{gave} him the information on the Cuban armaments. (180)

When ~~_____~~ CAIN is ~~_____~~ PLANS to visit Cuba, either to install wiretaps for former President Prió or to take

photographs ~~of~~ of rebel activity, or both, are considered presence in Miami and his reference to ^{the ASSASSINATION OF CASTRO 17 November}

simultaneously with Giancana's ~~meeting~~ with Roselli and ~~_____~~ and

with Cain's approach to the CIA, ~~under~~ the true purpose and possible interrelation of these events become ~~the context of events associated with these events become~~

~~_____~~ even more suspect. The assignment

wiretap ~~cover~~ and the photographic story may ~~be~~ have been covers; Giancana may have been attempting to send Cain to Cuba to supervise the poisoning attempt on Castro. Cain ~~was a member of~~

belonged to La Cosa Nostra, spoke Spanish,
had extensive contacts in Latin America, ~~was~~
was well-versed in sabotage and investigative
procedures, ~~was~~ had been on Giancana's
payroll for four years, and apparently ~~was~~
arrived in ~~by~~ by approximately
attempting to ~~go to~~ Cuba in November, 1960. ~~the~~

~~was mentioned by Giancana designated by~~
~~Giancana for the assassination.~~ ~~Case~~ Luther,

in his FBI interview

Cain's ~~reference~~ referenceⁿ to Antonio de
Verona, [~~the~~ ~~name~~ Trappicanto ~~recruited~~
~~to participate in the plot in approximately~~
~~March, 1961, and~~ the period that the CIA

conceded may have ~~already~~ been active in
independent organized crimeⁿ ~~plots~~ ^{ASSASSINATION} against
Castro prior to his recruitment by
Trappicanto in March, 1961, raises

more suspicious.

These events can be interpreted to indicate that Cain may have been the "assassin-to-be" whom Giancana referred to in the 18 October 1960 FBI memorandum, or he may have been the contact man for the operation.

The Committee cautions that this analysis ^{is obviously} ~~is~~ ~~speculative~~ speculation ~~is~~ ~~speculative~~



Cain could also ~~have provided another~~

~~service~~ have provided another service to Giancana.

As already indicated, ~~the~~

called J.W.

~~was~~ a second person, ● HARRISON,

allegedly accompanied and assisted Ballitti

in the wiretap. Although the justice



Department vigorously pursued this

investigation and prepared to indict

~~_____~~, ~~_____~~, and ~~the person known~~

As ~~J. W. Harrison~~ the principals, ~~no~~ no

~~no~~ could determine who Harrison was and
participant

~~no~~ ~~no~~ would admit to ~~_____~~ knowing

his identity. There is no doubt he existed;

he signed the hotel register ^{and} accompanied

Balletti ^{ON} the flight to Las Vegas, ⁽¹⁸¹⁾ Both DuBois,

the private investigator Makeu hired to conduct the

surveillance, and Balletti maintained that

Makeu ~~provided~~ ~~was~~ arranged for J. W.

Harrison to accompany Balletti from Miami

to Las Vegas to assist in the operation.

Makeu denied this. ⁽¹⁸²⁾ O'Connell, the

CIA liaison man, ~~was~~ informed the Committee

that whoever Harrison was he was not
a CIA employee. (183)

Clearly someone arranged for ~~make~~
Harrison's presence and knows his true identity.

~~Deane~~

Since DuBois and Balletti ~~were~~ acted
only as the instruments ^{pieces of} ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~CIA~~ ~~operation~~, ~~and~~

~~it seems logical that they~~
~~had no knowledge of CIA or CIA operations,~~

it seems logical that they would have revealed
Harrison's identity in the face of federal
prosecution if Harrison were just an employee

of DuBois with no connection to the CIA or
the associates of ~~make~~ in
to ~~make's~~ ~~friends~~ ~~associates~~ in an

CIA operation against Castro. ~~the~~ ~~use~~ ~~of~~

next
page

~~evidence support and influence support~~

~~the conclusion that make did provide~~

~~_____~~

Thus, Ballietti And DeBois either did not know the identity of Harrison or felt that their client's interests prohibited them from revealing such information.

Clearly someone arranged for Harrison's ^{presence} ~~presence~~ and ~~_____~~ ^{knew} his identity. It seems most likely that Maher provided Harrison at the request of a source that ~~_____~~ had a direct interest in the surveillance.

~~for Harrison to partake in the surveillance~~
~~the [unclear] together with the [unclear] of [unclear] [unclear]~~
~~Despite his denial the evidence~~

~~and [unclear] support the conclusion~~

~~That [unclear] did [unclear] for Harrison to~~
~~the [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]~~
~~made [unclear] with the identity of CIA.~~

~~from [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]~~
~~and [unclear] [unclear].~~

informed the Committee that he instituted
the surveillance to pacify Giancana's
concerns that Phyllis McGuire was having
an affair with Don Rowan and to
uncover any possible leads
regarding the operation. ^{(184) (mp. 4a)} Rowan confirmed
^{(185) p. 79 SIR}
these two accounts in his Senate testimony.

~~In part it is~~

A. It is probably correct, in part, partially
correct that Giancana did request
Makou to buy Rowan's room. Shimon

~~[scribble]~~

~~[scribble]~~

~~[scribble]~~

~~[scribble]~~

Shimon further informed the Committee that Giancana █ told him he paid \$5,000 for the Las Vegas operation. CI of Shimon p.5 (186)

Assuming that makeu did provide ^{most likely} for Hanson he ~~is all probability~~ did at the request of so ~~for~~ someone else. makeu did not have any reason to independently prefer one person over another; The CIA ~~or~~ Giancana, however, did have such a personal interest. Giancana's interest obviously stemmed from his relationship with McGuire and it is probably correct that Giancana requested makeu to buy Rowan's room. This personal interest could ~~possibly~~ have

prompted Giancana to direct Mahere

to use ~~one of his~~ a person of

Giancana's choice. Cain fits that

role perfectly. He was ~~in Miami~~ ^{during}

late October and early November, ~~and was~~ Miami

~~the~~ a skilled electioneer

on their trip to Las Vegas.

surveillance technician, In his deposition

Mahere denied any knowledge of Cain. (187)

shown ~~a~~ several photographs

of CAIN from the late 1950's and early

1960's Arthur Ballitti also could not

identify CAIN as Harrison.

if no one would ~~identify~~ identify Harrison in 1960 there is no reason ~~for~~ to expect any change in testimony.

The CIA had a personal interest because of in surveilling McGuire ~~because~~

the 18 October 1960 memorandum

where Giancana discussed ~~the~~ an

assassination plot against ^{Castro} the SSC

was
And in Miami during
was the debarkation point for

late October and early November, ~~and was~~ Miami
~~the~~ a skilled electioneer
on their trip to Las Vegas.

surveillance technician, In his deposition

Mahere denied any knowledge of Cain. (187)

shown ~~a~~ several photographs

of CAIN from the late 1950's and early

1960's Arthur Ballitti also could not

identify CAIN as Harrison.

if no one would ~~identify~~ identify Harrison in 1960 there is no reason ~~for~~ to expect any change in testimony.

The CIA had a personal interest because of in surveilling McGuire ~~because~~

the 18 October 1960 memorandum

where Giancana discussed ~~the~~ an

assassination plot against ^{Castro} the SSC

(188)

-100- 716-

This memo caused the CIA
concludes that ~~the~~ CIA ~~was~~ ^{to be} concerned
with determining if Giancana was
leaking information on the CIA-
organized crime plots. This may be
partially correct, but the ~~the October FBI~~
memorandum as already indicated the
FBI memorandum depicts a plot ~~substantially~~
in progress and involving a girl which does
not resemble the October status of
the CIA operation. The CIA ~~should~~ ^{could} have
been more concerned that Giancana was
involved in a separate assassination plot
and consequently ~~should~~ ^{could} have been
~~more~~ concerned with its
nature and extent. ~~Since~~ ^{Since} the reasons
why Phyllis McGuire would ^{have} been the target

for such surveillance ~~was~~ ^{was} two-fold. First, her relationship with Giancana might have ~~dictate a closeness which~~ entailed her knowing of certain clandestine activities.

Second, she was one of the "several friends" ^{in the conversation} ~~with which Giancana had the conversation~~ related in the 18 October memo. ⁽¹⁸⁹⁾

The CIA intent would also explain why a wiretap was ~~used~~ installed. Mahan informed the Committee that he ~~could not~~ ^{could} only order physical surveillance of the target, Rosen, and could not understand why anyone ~~pl~~ ^{primary} installed a wiretap since the ^{primary} intent ~~was~~ ^{was} ~~it~~.

to check on McGuire's reported affair
 with Rouss. ⁽¹⁹⁰⁾ p 40 Com drpo
~~Physical~~ Physical surveillance
 and a room bug would, admittedly,
 be more than adequate to uncover
 any affair. If, however, Makin also
 wished to investigate the possibility
 of leaks in the operation as well as
 the possibility of Giancana's involvement
 independent
 in a separate plot, then the use of
 a wiretap ~~is~~ would have been
 a ~~more~~ logical.)

~~Therefore, both the CIA~~

~~Giancana had a permit intercept in the~~

~~top.~~

~~After the Las Vegas operations~~

that investigating this affair was not the primary

~~Assembly~~

focus of the Las Vegas operation

It can be argued that

direct surveillance
~~of McGuire~~
of McGuire

~~would have been~~

would have been

~~the~~ optimum method to investigate

her

~~for~~ ^{such} leaks and information ^{that} Giancana

may have given her.

~~would have been~~ ~~indirectly~~ ~~surveillance~~. This,

however, would have run the risk of incurring

the wrath of Giancana and his possible

departure from the CIA assassination plots

~~if~~ if anyone detected the surveillance.

Through the cover of surveilling Roussin for

a possible affair with McGuire, however, the
had the opportunity to

CIA ~~could have~~ ~~surveilled~~ may have ~~been~~

~~possibly~~ ~~may have~~ ~~been~~ indirectly surveilled McGuire

to obtain information on the assassination plots

for a reason which met the approval of Giancana.

Indeed, Giancana probably ^{always} ~~believed~~ ~~that~~

120

- [04]

that his direction to investigate a possible
affair was the only issue involved in the
surveillance. In any event, the
objections of both Ganesana and the
CIA could have been achieved whether
HARRISON was a Ganesana [redacted] choice,
specifically CIAIN, or ^{an} [redacted] Agency
operator.

121 - ~~105~~ - ~~1000~~ -

After the Los Vegas operation back-fired

~~boomeranged~~ the CIA obviously

ASSASSINATION plots. ~~10000~~

decided to continue the ~~operations~~. This

~~10000~~ O'Connell, et al,

indicated that ~~they~~ felt the security

of the ^{CIA} organized crime plots had

not been seriously breached. ^{Additionally,} ~~also~~

it ^{possibly} indicated that the CIA ~~possibly~~

determined that even if ~~Guatemala~~

were involved in an independent

operation, that it ~~did not~~ would

not hamper their efforts, and that

all interests could be reconciled. The

CIA continued on the same track,

blithely going "to bed" with ~~the~~

~~the~~ organized crime.

122 ~~122~~
-1961-

I) The "girl" in the 18 October 1960 memorandum.

In this memo Granera spoke of a girl ~~who was taken to Castro~~ who ~~was~~ was going to drop a pill in some food or drink of Castro. This format is again a contradiction to the CIA operation which initially relied on Juan Orta, a secretary in Castro's prime ministry, to administer the pill.

The identity of this 'girl' referred to by Granera has not been ascertained but it is reasonable to assume that Trafficante ~~was~~ ~~is~~ is the prime position to recruit a mistress of Castro because of his numerous contacts in the Cuban gambling and prostitution circles. (Consequently,

123

~~SECRET~~
-107-

The use of a girl is quite logical and further supports ~~the~~ the involvement of organized crime in an independent plot to Kill Castro

American gamblers routinely maintained Cuban mistresses and Trappiacchi was a typical example. A witness also informed the Committee that Castro customarily arrived at the Nacional Hotel unescorted to visit one of his paramours. ⁽¹⁹¹⁾ indicates This indicates that it may have been relatively easy for Trappiacchi to have arranged for a young woman to serve Castro and to attempt to poison him. Consequently, the use of a girl is quite logical and further supports the involvement of organized crime in an independent plot to Kill Castro.

124 - 1/10/87

5) Articles on Frank Sturgis

As indicated in Section II

Paul Moskell of the New York Daily News

wrote several articles in 1975 and 1976

concerning activities of Frank Sturgis.

→ These articles further ^{reflect} ~~support~~ the theory that organized crime was involved in independent Castro ~~assassination~~

assassination ~~of~~ plots

consequently

The Committee "agrees ~~that~~ with

the CIA assertion that the Agency

"may have been peggy-backing on the

syndicate and, in addition to its

material contributions was also supplying

an aura of official sanction." ~~It~~

~~accordance with this theory that~~

125

~~113~~ - 109 -

~~Consider the following~~

~~considerations~~

The following ^{emerge} considerations ~~arise~~ from this theory and more ~~study~~ thoroughly respond to the allegations in the meekill articles.

First, organized crime probably initiated independent assassination plots against Castro prior to any CIA involvement in late 1960. ~~The~~ Such plots may have been in progress when the CIA reactivated its plans to kill Castro in April, 1962.

Second, organized crime could quite possibly have been directing activities such as those described in the New York

Daily News article.

Third, Frank Sturgis most probably established contacts with organized crime through his gambling associations and probably was used by them in some capacities. This does not ^{imply} that he was a member of organized crime.

Fourth, Frank Sturgis probably knew Ota and could have been involved with him in an assassination plot. Since Sturgis is not a reliable source, however,

his allegations are suspect.

According to the Committee's review ^{of all available} evidence,

Fifth, the CIA was not involved in any operations with Ota prior to

late 1960. as ~~determined by~~

Sixth, Sturgis was not necessarily
 involved with Lorenz or Orta in a plot
 to kill Castro. He may have learned
 of plots involving Orta and possibly Lorenz
~~etc~~ in Miami ~~in 1965~~ after Orta
 arrived there in 1965. ~~It is interestingly,~~

← ^{April,} the 1975, Meskill articles did not ^{relate} ~~relate~~

the Sturgis - Lorenz plot to kill
 Castro with poison pills. It is only after
 the publication of the SSC Interim Report
 in November, 1975, and the Final Report
 in April, 1976, that Meskill ~~describes~~ ^{describes} this

plot. Thus, Sturgis may have combined
^{accurate} information ~~obtained from~~ ^{obtained} Orta ^{and} other

Miami sources with the facts the
 SSC presented ^{and then} ~~is fabricating~~ ^{fabricated}

-11/2- 128

~~the 18 October~~
together with other evidence such as the 18 October memo,

the LORENZ

• story ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~18 October~~ ~~memo~~ appears ^{to} logical and
which ~~is~~ ~~the~~ ~~18 October~~ ~~memo~~ can unfortunately
~~be~~ ~~the~~ ~~18 October~~ ~~memo~~ succeed in appearing

both logical and believable.

K) Implications of Phase Two of the Operation

Significant differences are apparent between Phase One and Phase Two which reflect ^{upon} ~~the~~ ~~the~~ organized crime's motivation and seriousness in fulfilling its part of the bargain originally indicated in 1960.



First, in Phase One, Roselli and his colleagues demonstrated their ability to execute the contract on Castro by naming their source who was, indeed, in a position close to Castro. In Phase Two the modus operandi and the ability of the assassin or assassins becomes quite vague. Harvey reported that Venona ^{access} had an asset in Cuba who had ~~access~~



- 1/1/47

130

to someone in a restaurant which Castro frequented who could administer the poison. (201)

In June 1962 Roselli reported to Harvey that Verma had dispatched a three man team to Cuba to recruit persons to kill Castro, or to kill him themselves, maybe with poison pills, if the opportunity arose. (202)

Harvey said they had no specific plans. (203)

Second, as already indicated, the cast of the organized figures involved changed.

Mareu, Gramera, and Trappiante allegedly retired from the scene, with

a "Macco" assuming the position of
Roselli +

Trappiante. Verma remained. ~~As the~~

~~CIA concluded it is quite probable~~
~~almost certain~~

~~that Roselli kept Trappiante, and probably~~

~~Jeanera, informed of the progress of~~

~~the plot.~~

The Committee agrees with the CIA that these figures, at least Trappanese and Jeanera, were kept informed of the progress of the plots.

What is puzzling is the introduction of a person simply referred to as "Marco" into a highly sensitive and covert CIA operation without any apparent attempt by the CIA to check his background or ascertain his identity. It seems ~~unbelievable~~ ~~extraordinary~~ ~~unusual~~ that the CIA would propel the plots forward without performing any security checks. Further, although the

Indeed, it seems more logical that at least Roselli and Hanrey did ascertain the identity of Marco and for whatever reason decided to withhold this information.

INSERT
D

H6a
132

A related issue is whether "phases" actually existed or whether the operations to kill Castro encompassed ~~are~~ a continuous time period. ~~The AS indicated~~ ~~pre~~ ~~presumably~~ indicated the CIA maintains that the plot was dormant from the Bay of Pigs until Hamrey assumed direction in the Spring of 1962. Both Hamrey and O'Connell stated, however, that ~~they~~ took Hamrey "tools over a going operation." ~~The exact details of what this ongoing operation entailed has not been divulged, ~~at~~~~ Considering that Roselli was able to immediately mobilize his forces in 1962 in response to Hamrey's request and that this

mobilization involved Urrua, whom
Traffante recruited in Phase One, it seems
reasonable to assume that some of the
individuals in Phase One were ~~recruited~~ actively
after the Bay of Pigs and
attempting to kill Castro ~~during the~~
~~current period,~~ ~~probably~~ ~~at least through~~
~~the summer of 1961~~ until the advent
of Soviet solidification. These efforts,
however, may well have been conducted
without CIA knowledge and again support
the theory of independent organized crime ^{plots.} ~~efforts~~
~~to kill Castro.~~

-116-
-134

1967 IGR characterizes Macco as Roselli's man, it is more probable that Trappiante, who had recruited all the Cuban personnel previously used in the attempts and who maintained the most complete network of Cuban allies in Miami and Cuba, provided the individual. If this speculation is accurate, then it displays Trappiante again performing a direct role during Phase II, a function ~~which~~ every source has denied.

Insert
D

During late 1962 and early 1963 ~~despite the~~ ^{the} apparent efforts

~~to kill Castro~~ Phase TWO undramatically and slowly terminated. In retrospect, the ~~very~~ ambiguous modus operandi, the lack of identity of the potential

Assessing, the total reliance of Harvey
on Roselli for any information, and the
seemingly apathetic desire of the CIA to corroborate
any information from Roselli all converge
to posit the ~~theory~~ theory
that organized crime was not seriously
attempting to assassinate Castro after
following the
~~the theory of organized crime~~ the
solidification of Soviet influence ~~of~~
in the Castro regime. Trafficante, Lansky,
and other Cuban casino owners must have
realized by the ~~spring~~ 1962 that
the "golden goose" of Havana had
laid its last egg, and that fortunes
were to be made elsewhere. Certainly, history
shows growing Lansky influence in

the Bahamas and Las Vegas, Trafficking
profits in the Dominican Republic, and burgeoning
volita operations in Florida arising from the
influx of Cuban exile. Further, organized
crime ~~may~~ have determined
that the new
Justice Department ~~may~~ crackdown
probably not have
would ~~not~~ permitted the ~~so~~
"wide open" Cuba of the pre-Kennedy
era even ~~if~~ if
the United States ~~could~~ had succeeded
in ousting the Cuban regime. ~~to~~

As analyzed in the motivation section
of this analysis, however, the organized
crime still had a strong ~~is~~ center
~~Despite the~~
Consequently, while the United States

government, specifically the CIA, still possessed a viable interest in assassinating Castro, organized crime did not.

Despite these reasons to discontinue attempts to kill Castro, organized crime still had a strong incentive to string the CIA along. This incentive, specifically, this incentive was ~~the~~ to establish a relationship with the CIA for subsequent use in ~~the~~ ~~any~~ prosecutions for unrelated offenses and ~~for~~ ~~this~~ ~~is~~ ~~thus~~ ~~against~~ ~~organized~~ ~~crime~~. ~~bluntly~~ ~~the~~ ~~Department~~ ~~of~~ ~~Justice~~ ~~considered~~ ~~this~~ ~~theory~~ ~~motivation~~ ~~is~~ ~~more~~ ~~thoroughly~~ ~~explored~~ ~~and~~ ~~supported~~ ~~in~~ ~~Section~~ ~~III~~ ~~(2)~~.

the following section.

2. MOTIVATION ^{OF} ~~FOR~~ ~~THE~~ ORGANIZED CRIME
TO BE INVOLVED IN PLOTS

Despite the reasons just
presented to discontinue attempts to kill
Castro, organized crime still had strong
incentive to stay the CIA along.
Specifically, this incentive was to
establish a relationship with the CIA
for subsequent use in thwarting
prosecution for unrelated offenses and
thus blunting any Justice Department
proceedings against organized crime.

The Committee believes that
organized crime, while ^{always} recognizing the
benefits of establishing a ~~support~~ ~~with~~
relationship with the CIA, ~~initially~~ ^{initially was}
also ~~seriously~~ ~~intending~~ ^{seriously} ~~intending~~ ^{intending} in assassinating

Castro to regain lost ~~to~~ territory.

As already indicated, the Committee

believes this desire ~~linked~~ with the
And others Factors just mentioned.

solidification of Soviet influence. After

this occurrence it appears ~~to~~ organized

crime may only have put forth

the "appearance" of involvement and good

faith in the plots to further define a

relationship with the CIA. Indeed, the

CIA prevention of prosecution in ^{1961 in} the

Las Vegas ~~murder~~ incident would have

given ~~more~~ ^{more} ~~value~~ ^{value} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~value~~ ^{value} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~such~~ ^{such} ~~a~~ ^a ~~relationship~~ ^{relationship} and impetus for continuing

confirmation of the value of such a

relationship and impetus for continuing

it in 1962 even though the assassination

Handwritten scribbles on the left margin, including the word "Dept" written vertically.

of Castro may no longer have been a viable alternative.

The actions of Maken, Giuncana, and particularly Roselli in the years following these plots support this

theory. As related in Section II,

~~that~~ these individuals ~~actually did~~

were ~~not~~ their CIA affiliation and knowledge of the plots ^{in attempts} to hinder

law enforcement prosecutions and objectives. (20#)

~~Their support was not successful~~
The success of some of their efforts

verifies the tremendous blackmail potential

they possessed. As Sam Papich, the

FBI liaison to the CIA, commented

in May, 1967, Giuncana and Roselli

had the CIA "over a barrel" because
of "that operation" and he doubted

that the FBI would be able to

● do anything about either Giancana
or Roselli because of "their previous
activities" with the CIA. ⁽²⁰⁴⁾ It is

clear that at least one group benefited
from the failure of the assassination plots.

~~121~~ ~~124~~
142
3. Retaliation theory.

The Committee found no evidence that these operations provoked Premier Castro to assassinate President Kennedy in retaliation.

The Committee also has found no evidence that Castro knew of CIA sponsorship of these activities or even knew of their existence prior to the death of President Kennedy. Even if Castro did discover their existence, however, the Committee does not believe that Castro would have connected them with the CIA. In this regard, only a few persons knew of CIA sponsorship; the Cuban operators and any others engaged in penetrating Cuba or directly participating in

the assassination efforts were reportedly
told

~~that~~ that United States businessmen

on organized crime sponsored the operation

~~As just indicated in the previous
section the Committee believes that~~

~~organized crime participated in the~~

~~plot in part to bring the CIA along~~

~~and thus foster a growing relationship~~

~~which subsequently could be exploited~~

~~to prevent prosecutions of the organized~~

~~crime figures involved in the plot. ~~the~~~~

~~Committee determined~~

~~1 [redacted]~~

In an article

- in the Washington Post on September 9, 1976,

Anderson revealed that ex-CIA agent William Harvey, attorney Edward P. Morgan, and ~~John~~ reputed mobster John Roselli were his sources. ~~The~~ Committee has determined that John Roselli was the person who informed Harvey & Morgan about the plot and the relaxation theory;

Thus, only one source, John Roselli, actually ~~existed~~ existed. ~~Further~~ Further, John Roselli supplied all information concerning the operation to the CIA through either James O'Connell or William Harvey.

The Committee notes that the ~~information~~ ~~of the relaxation theory~~ and the dissemination details public dissemination of the ~~information~~ of

The plots corresponds remarkably to the efforts of John Roselli to prevent his deportation in 1966 and 1971, and to prevent his prosecution for illegal gambling activities in 1967. There

coincidences plus other evidence ~~has~~ have led the Committee to conclude that ~~John Roselli is the main author of the plots~~ John Roselli ~~is the main author of the plots~~ ^{manipulated} → the part of the plots ~~into~~ into the retaliation theory ~~in~~ in efforts to force the CIA to favorably intervene into his legal affairs to prevent the further disclosure of the plots in general and the retaliation theory

in particular and to prevent further waves of public paranoia. The Committee notes that in some instances John Roselli was successful.

Even assuming that Castro did

~~not~~ ascertain the evidence of the

CIA-organized crime plots and that
and ignoring the Committee belief that Roselli fabricated the
retaliation theory,

the CIA sponsored them, [^] the

it is unlikely

Committee still believes [^] that Castro

would ~~have~~ resorted to assassinating

the President of the United States in

retaliation for the reasons indicated

in the ~~document~~ AMLHSIT portion of

the Issue Analysis section. Specifically,

these reasons are:

- 1) the ~~project~~ project of exposing Cuba to ~~total~~ invasion and destruction would not have been worth the risk;
- 2) ^{the act of} changing a leader does not necessarily change the system;
- 3) Castro may have recognized that among

the leader of the United States Kennedy maintained the least hostile approach towards Cuba; and

- 4) The growing prospect of détente between Cuba and the United States would have refrained Castro from assassinating a ~~US~~ American official.

4. Related Organized Crime Activities

The Committee found no ^{or indications} evidence from the review of this material that the organized crime figures involved and other persons involved in the plots to kill Castro participated in the assassination of President Kennedy ~~with~~ or without any Cuban assistance.

[Handwritten scribble]
 Kennedy
 Castro

The Committee received evidence that further raises the possibility ~~that various~~ that various organized crime figures ~~may have been~~ involved in the ~~CIA~~ organized crime plots ~~may have had knowledge of these plots or~~ were ~~involved~~ involved in ~~the~~ attempts to assassinate Castro unrelated to the CIA.

~~The Committee investigated~~

~~Norman Rothman~~

To ascertain more information about organized crime's knowledge about Castro assassination plus the Committee investigated Norman Rothman, ~~Rothman~~ a ~~Cuban gambling~~ ~~a person~~ who was active in operating various casinos in Cuba before the Castro takeover and who consequently maintained associations with organized crime and the Batista regime. ~~At various times~~ Rothman ~~operated~~ ~~the~~ ~~same~~ as manager of the Sons Souci and Capa Cavara Clubs in Cuba representing the interests of the Mannarino brothers of Pittsburgh. ^{John Mannarino} (106)

[REDACTED]
 FBI files on Rothman indicate that
 a proposal to kill Castro was made to
 Rothman as a "quid pro quo" in
 which Rothman expected to avoid
 imprisonment for ~~the~~^a 1960 gun running
 conviction. During an FBI interview
 Rothman stated that he had been in
 "personal contact with White House
 attorney Harry Hall Wilson, as well as
 Assistant Attorney General John
 Liegenthal, both of Washington, D.C." and
 members of the Kennedy Administration.
Footnote to p. 26

In a deposition to the Committee
 taken in Miami on April 16, 1978,

Rothman expanded on the theme to include

151

10/11

a series of mysterious telegram
 summoning him to the White House for
 a series of two or three meetings which
 began in Attorney General [Kennedy's]
 office with members of his staff and
 continued in a conference room where
 Rothman's assistance in providing
 contacts inside Cuba was explored. At
 the last meeting Rothman ~~remembered~~ ^{says that:}

single
 span &
 indent

"one of them happened to discuss
 [the assassination of Castro] with me,
 but not in a technical way. You
 know, just in a casual way. ~~later~~
 that is about it. I cannot for the
 moment remember it word for
 word because it is too far back."
 #27

Walt
152

The evidence suggesting such an approach by Robert Kennedy is entirely uncorroborated and makes no sense when viewed in light of the Justice Department crackdown on organized crime. Further, it seems extremely doubtful that any meeting ^{with Rothman} on this topic would ever ~~be~~ have occurred ~~at the White House~~ at the White House.

Consequently, the Committee ~~believes~~ ^{believes it highly} unlikely that ~~such~~ such events occurred.

The Committee also reviewed evidence which indicates that organized crime ~~may~~ may have been aware of the AMLASH operation during its existence.

The 1967 IGR identified some
 name links between the AMLASH
 operation and ~~organized~~ the organized
 crime operation. The IGR did not
~~detail however~~ sufficiently analyze,
 however, that the common denominator
 in two of the links was Santo Trafficante.

a. LINK ONE

In March, 1961, the CIA received
 information that a high-ranking
 military figure in the Castro regime
 and a former personal secretary of
 Castro both wished to defect. The
 military officer was Rolando Cubela
~~de~~ Secades (AMLASH) and the former

secretary was Juan Orta, the operation used in Phase I of the CIA-organized crime plots. As already indicated, the 1967 IOR ~~study~~ ~~and~~ documents that Trappanante recruited Orta.

The Committee has determined that other than the coincidence of both Orta and AMLDASH seeking infiltration at the same time there is nothing to suggest a relationship between the two men in attempting to assassinate Castro, not a common denominator such as Trappanante, Roelli, ~~or~~ ~~any~~ ~~other~~ ~~members~~ of the American gangster syndicate.

155

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

~~as redacted~~

his link is therefore insignificant

**THIS COPY IS NOT
FOR RELEASE.**

b. LINK TWO

-8-

gambling syndicate.

Link Two

In mid-March, 1965, Rafael Garcia Bongo, a noted Cuban lawyer whose brother occupied the prestigious position of Minister of Sports in Cuba, contacted CIA station personnel in Madrid to inform the agency that "he was in contact with a group of military officers who were planning to kill Castro" (1967 I.G. Report, p.). It quickly became clear to CIA employees that Bongo's reference was to Cubila and the group of military men who were allied with him in attempting to depose Castro. Although the 1967 and 1977 I.G. Reports are silent as to their attitude toward Bongo's information, it must be assumed that they did not respond affirmatively since the AMLASH operation was in progress at the time and Artime was in the process of delivering arms caches to Cubela's people within Cuba.

Interestingly, Bongo identified himself to Agency personnel as a lawyer for the Capri Hotel and Casino in Havana who had been jailed in July 1959 for a period of 75 days, allegedly as a reprisal for representing Santo Trafficante. Bongo's utilization of the short prison term to establish his "bona fides" is questionable as Trafficante was in jail during August 1959. For the Cuban government to wait for 3 years to exact retribution for that representation makes no sense. Possibly, Bongo was involved in approaching the Castro

**THIS COPY IS NOT
FOR RELEASE.**

156

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

as reflected

government in 1962 on Trafficante's behalf for permission to reopen the Capri casino.

Bongo's trip to Madrid apparently involved more than a contact with the CIA for he was arrested for counterfeiting and held until his old client, Santo Trafficante, arrived with a suitcase full of cash to obtain his release. ~~(See interview of FBI SA Wendall Sall. See also deposition of Victor Espinosa Hernandez.)~~ Presumably, Bongo was paroled back to Cuba, at an unspecified later date, where he died.

One aspect of the Bongo-Trafficante relationship in Madrid deserves fuller treatment although it is doubtful that anything more than supposition can result from further exploration. ^{possibly indicated} It has been reported by Jack Anderson that his private and secret source until his death, John Roselli, had reason to speculate that Cubans originally recruited by Santo Trafficante to kill Castro were "turned around" and sent back to the United States where they were directly involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. ~~(See Anderson column, dated 9-7-76; interview by Fenton and~~
~~, another columnist, George Crile, carried the story a step further by suggesting that Trafficante became a witting participant in the Cuban Prime Minister's plan of retaliation. ()~~ If this line of hypothecation is adapted then the trip to Madrid by Bongo could assume some sinister implications such as the possibility that Bongo's real purpose in contacting ^{CIA in} ~~the~~ Madrid ~~Station~~ was to act as

a double agent for Castro in ascertaining the nature and scope of the AMLASH operation. Castro certainly became aware of the Arttime meetings with Cubela in the fall of 1964 since the list of charges upon which Cubela went to trial in 1966 began with these Madrid meetings. If Castro had begun his suspicions of Cubela's role with the CIA during late 1964 or early 1965, it is likely that he would have begun counter-intelligence measures to confirm his fears which could have led to Castro sending Bongo to Spain to contact the Agency. Given Trafficante's close ties to Bongo (~~see also Aleman footnote in AMLASH section~~), it can be postulated that Trafficante was aware of Bongo's true mission prior to his departure or became knowledgeable when he bailed him out of jail in Madrid. (~~Unfortunately, we have no way of knowing whether Bongo stopped in Miami to see Trafficante prior to going to Spain unless we could obtain the case file from Secret Service of the Italian killed in Miami who was supposed to be Bongo's partner according to S/A Wendall Sall.~~)

Trafficante^{also} could have received news of Cubela's ties with the Agency through his close associate Jorge Nobregas who was described by Gorge ~~Caric~~ in his Washington Post article (circa 8/17/76) as "having worked with the CIA, was in Cubela's student revolutionary group in Cuba, and always close to Trafficante."

Actually, given the extent of Trafficante's high-level contacts within the exile community and the low-level security

158

~~CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT~~

in the CIA exile operations, it is extremely logical that Trafficante and other members of the underworld knew, in some fashion, part or all of the AMLASH plot. The question becomes: So what? Short of being able to blackmail the government about the modus operandi of the 1960-62 events, the significance of mob knowledge of AMLASH is not readily apparent. ~~However, if Trafficante was in fact a double agent, a whole other scenario emerges. Now?~~

One further reference to Bongo surfaced during an interview by Committee Staff with Jose Aleman on March 14, 1977 when Aleman related that Jorge Nobregas introduced Aleman to Trafficante. Santo Trafficante offered to assist Aleman in obtaining a Teamster loan ostensibly out of gratitude for Aleman's relative (Bongo) representing Trafficante in Cuba. Trafficante fully admits the Teamster loan proposal which was to be arranged by Frank Ragano, Trafficante's personal lawyer, who also represented Jimmy Hoffa and Frank Chanez in criminal cases.

Of course, the most relevant aspect of the Trafficante-Aleman meetings in September 1962 to this Committee is the statement attributed to Trafficante by Aleman that ". . .you don't understand me. Kennedy's not going to make it to the election. He is going to get hit." Aleman reported that the inflammatory prediction occurred during a lengthy diatribe against the Kennedy administration's campaign against Jimmy

159

~~+~~
~~+~~

If Trappante was a double agent, working for the CIA but actually supplying information to Castro, then another scenario emerges. It is then logical to assume that Castro knew of the AMLASH ~~plots~~ and CIA-organized crime operations from their inception. As mentioned earlier in this material Trappante could have received a sanctuary ^{and} assistance in smuggling ~~the~~ narcotics contraband ~~plots~~ for such information. As also discussed earlier, however, the Committee believes that even if Castro had knowledge of ~~the~~ CIA sponsorship of plots against his life

160 ~~24~~ II -

that ~~the~~ ~~information~~ ~~was~~ ~~not~~ ~~disclosed~~
~~by~~ ~~Walt~~ ~~that~~ this would not have
provoked him to kill President Kennedy.
The benefit of ~~past~~ contemporaneous
knowledge of the plots ~~was~~ ~~not~~ ~~disclosed~~
would be to ~~neutralize~~ neutralize their
effect. Consequently, the Committee
believes that any contacts between
AMBLASH and Somo ~~are not relevant to~~
~~a~~ ~~rehabilitation~~ does not affect the
credibility of the rehabilitation theory.

c. Link thru

contained in the 1967 IGR

The SSC noted that informants¹
from ~~source~~ "A," Victor Spinosa Hernandez,
~~reported~~ ~~which~~ raised the

TF-161

possibility that a link existed
between the AMHAST operations
and the 1960-62 CIA plots to
assassinate Castro using underworld
contacts.

162

INTRODUCTION

In its concluding section of the Final Report, Developments After the Warren Commission, the Select Senate Committee to Study Governmental Operation (SSC) speculated that organized crime may have had a continuing knowledge of all CIA operations against Castro during the 1960's.

"The 1967 I.G. Report noted that information given by "A" suggested a link between the AMLASH operation and the 1960-1962 CIA plots to assassinate Castro using underworld contacts. In other words, the information "A" provided raised the possibility that underworld figures who were aware of the assassination plots in which William Harvey participated, may have also been aware of the AMLASH operation."

Start here now →

→ A review of the 1967 I.G. report does not sustain the Senate's conjecture in that there is no available evidence cited in the Report to suggest that "A" (Victor Spinoso Hernandez) had knowledge of, or involvement with, any of the syndicate or Cuban exiles who participated in Phase I or II of the CIA-Mafia assassination plots during 1960-62. What Book ~~II~~ did was to seize upon the 1967's tentative identification of ~~these~~ "name links" between the 1960-62 ^{organized} ~~gangster~~ operation and AMLASH intrigue, and expand the amorphous nature of those "name links," which included "A," into a theory that "A" was the conduit through which the Syndicate became knowledgeable of both the AMLASH operation and the initial CIA efforts to

eliminate Castro.

The only solid factual basis for Book ~~VI~~'s tie-in between AMLASH and the 1960-62 CIA syndicate plots is ~~based upon~~ upon Victor Espenosa's exile activities in June-July 1963, which Book ~~VI~~ *examined* *D*

More, CIA files contained at least some FBI reports on "A," the Cuban exile who was involved in transporting explosives to New Orleans in 1963. These reports detail his involvement with anti-Castro exiles and "underworld figures" who were operating the guerilla training camp in New Orleans in July 1963.

The "underworld figures" reference relates to ^{Michael} ~~Melie~~ and William McLaney who have been considered organized crime affiliates by some law enforcement and media personnel. (See profile.) Again, however, no evidence from any source places McLaney into the early CIA plots to kill Castro or into the AMLASH operation. A review of the June-July 1963 activities of McLaney and Victor Espinosa leads only to the inference that their operation was a private limited venture with no agency or syndicate support and very little chance of success. (See ~~Review of Lake Ponchatrain in McLaney Profile. Footnote re Victor Espinosa.~~)

Moreover, the link between McLaney, Espinosa and the organized crime principals connected to the initial CIA Castro plots must be dissected in order to make a judgement as to the likelihood of ^{the SSC} ~~Book VI~~'s speculation that the syndicate held "inside" information on Agency operations in 1960-65.

Since the Senate did not attempt to interview either of the McLaney brothers or Victor Espinosa in 1975 nor ~~inquire of the witnesses~~ ^{ASIC principals of} ~~to~~ the 1960-62 plots ~~into~~ of their knowledge or relationship to McLaney or Espinosa, the Senate's hypothetical question of underworld knowledge of the full range of CIA Castro plots is based upon a minimum of hard data and a maximum of free-wheeling conjecture.

The evidence linking Espinosa to any known organized crime figures consists of his admission to being friends with "Cappy" Rothman, Norman Rothman's son, and a casual knowledge of American gamblers gleaned from his student days of visiting the Havana casinos.

Mike McLaney ^{is} ~~is a~~ ~~figure whose~~ ties to organized crime have been ~~seriously~~ questioned within federal law enforcement agencies since the 1950's but no solid evidence has linked him to Trafficante, Rosselli or Giancana.

Since McLaney has been most frequently mentioned as a "Lansky man." To place a witting ~~McLaney~~ into the 1960-62 plots, it requires a series of major speculative hurdles which include: (a) Myer Lansky was a plotter with Trafficante; (b) McLaney was Lansky's "action" man; ^{and} (c) the various underworld figures acted in concert in promoting anti-Castro operations. ^{The Court has held that} None of these premises are easily supportable with facts ^{and consequently does not place any}

irrelevant & repetitive from main passage

HORNBECK/br

significance in the ~~link~~ *Victor Espinosa*

link.

-165-

As indicated earlier, both Sam Giancana and John Roselli were murdered. Sam Giancana was shot in ~~his~~ the basement of his home in Chicago in June, 1975, just prior to his scheduled testimony before the SSC regarding the CIA organized crime plots. John Roselli's butchered body was found in ~~an oil drum~~ inside an oil drum which was floating in Key Biscayne Bay, Florida, in ~~which~~ ^{which was shortly} August, 1976, ~~shortly~~ after his testimony before the SSC regarding the CIA - organized crime plots.

Various theories have surfaced

-166-

concerning why ~~and who~~ they were

killed and who was responsible. One theory relevant to this investigation of ~~the most popular theory has been~~

is

~~that~~ ~~has been~~ that Giancana and

Roselli were killed because of their participation

in the Castro assassination plots and the

SSC attempt to elicit information on the

plots. In this regard Trappicanti

has ~~be~~ most often been the person assigned

responsibility for the deaths. On the

other hand, the Justice Department

informed the Committee that it believes

~~the hit~~ ~~murders~~ were mob that

~~the~~ organized crime performed the murders

and that ~~the~~ the reasons were unrelated

to the CIA-organized crime plots.

-167-

The Justice Department is still investigating both murders. The Committee has not uncovered evidence ~~relating~~ ~~to~~ relevant to solving these murders. The Committee does believe, however, that a variety of motivations inspired the deaths. These motivations included internal ~~mob~~ mob conflict, especially in the case of Giancana, and participation and knowledge of the CIA-organized crime plots. The Committee considers it highly probable that Trafficante ~~assisted~~ ~~was or decided~~ approved of and assisted in the murders, ^{of at least} ~~particularly~~ John Roselli. ~~The Committee believes that~~ Trafficante Trafficante's motivations would

The Committee does not believe that such activities were necessarily connected to the assassination of President Kennedy.

have been to maintain a low profile in connection with the CIA plots and to ~~prevent disclosure~~ to prevent disclosure of other persons involved in the plots as well as other operations and activities which an investigation of the plots might uncover.

For instance, TRAFFICANTE may have had a covert relationship with Castro which may

entailed ~~his~~ his summary contraband through Cuba ~~and~~ into the United States.

9 For reasons already indicated the
Committee does not believe Castro
assassinated President Kennedy.

As a result of ~~investigation~~ ^{this investigation}
~~conduct~~ ^{also has} the Committee found
~~that~~ ^{convincing} no evidence ~~is available~~ that
the organized crime figures and
other persons involved in the
plot to kill Castro participated
in the assassination of President
Kennedy ~~and~~ without any
Cuban assistance

Consequently, although the deaths
of Roselli and Gianina ~~partially~~
~~are related~~ at least are ^{related} partially
~~related~~ to the CIA-organized crime
operations, the Committee does not
believe that they are related to
the assassination of President Kennedy.

IV CONCLUSIONS

The Committee makes the following conclusions.

A. AMLASH OPERATION

single space
and all
capitals =>

1. The Committee finds no evidence that the AMLASH OPERATION PROVOKED PREMIER CASTRO TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN RETALIATION.
2. The COMMITTEE HAS ~~RECEIVED~~ ~~CONFLICTING EVIDENCE AND~~ ~~THEFORE~~ NOT BEEN ABLE TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE AMLASH OPERATION PRIOR TO THE DEATH OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY CAN BE CHARACTERIZED AS AN ASSASSINATION PLOT.
3. ASSUMING THAT AMLASH WAS NOT AN ASSASSINATION PLOT DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND THAT CASTRO UNCOVERED ITS EXISTENCE AND SCOPE, THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES ~~IT~~ ~~IS~~ ~~HIGHLY~~ ~~UNLIKELY~~ ~~THAT~~ CASTRO WOULD ~~HAVE~~ ~~BEEN~~

PROVOKED IN A MANNER SUFFICIENT TO INDUCE ASSASSINATING PRESIDENT KENNEDY. IN RETALIATION.

4. ASSUMING THAT AMLASH WAS AN ASSASSINATION PLOT DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND THAT CASTRO UNCOVERED ITS EXISTENCE AND SCOPE, THE COMMITTEE STILL BELIEVES ^{it is unlikely} THAT CASTRO WOULD ~~BE~~ HAVE RESORTED TO ASSASSINATING THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN RETALIATION.

Insert Reasons

B. CIA - ORGANIZED CRIME PLOTS

1. THE COMMITTEE FINDS NO EVIDENCE THAT THESE OPERATIONS PROVOKED PREMIER CASTRO TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN RETALIATION.
2. THE COMMITTEE FINDS NO CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE THAT CASTRO KNEW OF ~~THE~~ ~~EXISTENCE~~ OF THESE PLOTS DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY, ^{EVEN} AND IF CASTRO DID LEARN OF THEIR EXISTENCE, THE COMMITTEE DOES NOT

PROVOKED IN A MANNER SUFFICIENT TO INDUCE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY. IN RETALIATION.

4. ASSUMING THAT AMLASH WAS AN ASSASSINATION PLOT DURING THE

5. THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THAT ANY KNOWLEDGE ~~ON~~ ^{ON THE PART OF} ORGANIZED CRIME OF THE AMLASH OPERATION OR ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN ORGANIZED CRIME FIGURES INVOLVED IN THE CIA-ORGANIZED CRIME PLOTS AND AMLASH WOULD NOT ALTER THE CONCLUSION THAT CASTRO WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY.

1. THE COMMITTEE FINDS NO EVIDENCE THAT THESE OPERATIONS PROVOKED PREMIER CASTRO TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN RETALIATION.

2. THE COMMITTEE FINDS NO CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE THAT CASTRO KNEW OF ~~THE~~ ~~SPONSOR~~ THE EXISTENCE OF THESE PLOTS DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY, ^{EVEN} AND IF CASTRO DID LEARN OF THEIR EXISTENCE, THE COMMITTEE DOES NOT

BELIEVE THAT CASTRO WOULD HAVE NECESSARILY
CONNECTED THEM WITH THE CIA.

DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY THAT

3. ASSUMING THAT[^] CASTRO DID LEARN
OF THE EXISTENCE OF THESE PLOTS
~~ADDDED~~ AND THAT THE CIA WAS
SPONSORING THEM, THE COMMITTEE STILL
BELIEVES^{it is unlikely} THAT CASTRO WOULD ~~BE~~
HAVE RESORTED TO ASSASSINATING
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

4. THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THAT
ORGANIZED CRIME WAS INVOLVED IN
ATTEMPTS TO ASSASSINATE CASTRO
INDEPENDENT OF ANY CIA OPERATIONS.

5. THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THAT
THE PRINCIPAL REASON WHY ORGANIZED
CRIME PARTICIPATED IN THE PLOTS WAS
TO STRING THE CIA ALONG AND THUS
FOSTER A GROWING RELATIONSHIP
WHICH COULD SUBSEQUENTLY BE EXPLOITED
TO PREVENT PROSECUTIONS OF THE ORGANIZED
FIGURES INVOLVED IN THE PLOTS.

6. THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THAT
JOHN ROSELLI ^{USED} ~~CONSIDERED~~ THE FACTS OF
THE CIA-ORGANIZED ^{CRIME} ~~CONSIDERED~~ ^{PLOTS} TO
FABRICATE THE RETALIATION THEORY
IN EFFORTS TO PREVENT HIS PROSECUTION
IN LEGAL MATTERS.