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largest faction and had organized delegations in Miami, New York, Chicago, Venezuela and Cuba. (Ibid) The clandestine faction operating in Cuba was lead by Pepin Fernandez Badue who used the alias "Lucas". (Ibid) When Fernandez arrived in the U.S. in October 1961, he presented his credentials to the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC), claiming he was the representative of the MDC movement in Cuba, and Council president, Dr. Miro Cardona, accepted him into the CRC. (Ibid) The "Lucas" faction remained with the council but declined in importance because Fernandez failed to consult with the Executive Committee of his faciton nor did he make any effort to hold the group together. (HSCA Security File 092, Senstudy Document, Volume 32, Item 1, #97-4110-72)

The Rasco faction of MDC had as it Military Chief an independently wealthy young Cuban, Laureano Batista Falla. (Ibid. Item 2, #97-4110-123) Fre~~e~~-spirited and under no financial pressures, Batista was able to organize and partially finance the infiltration attempts of the MDC (HSCA #009303, FBI #97-4623-149, Section V) which made this one of the most active and effective underground groups in Cuba during the early 1960's. (HSAC Security File 092, Senstudy Docuemnt, Volume 37, Item 4,

*149
From (1960-62)
See 146
HSCA #009303, Pg. FBI 97-4623-149, Sec 5*

CIA/OS LRF (national approval form)

#105-95461-15, page 4)
Batista was associated with the CIA as a "political & psychological agent".
He sustained it. The CIA sponsored a training camp for the MDC at Perrine, Florida, prior to the April 1961 invasion. (HSCA #009303, p. 4, FBI #97-4623-149, Section 5) Batista made many (CIA-sponsored) trips from this camp to deliver explosives, guns and ammunition to the Cuban underground. (Ibid) ^{Prior to} Before the Bay of Pigs invasion, all underground groups worked together, sharing

supplies and information. (HSCA Security File 092, Senstudy Document, Volume 37, Item 4, #105-95461-15, p. 4) However, the repressive measures of the Castro regime after the invasion caused members of the Cuban underground to live in fear of discovery and made intergroup liaison extremely risky. (Ibid, p. 2) Despite the inherent dangers, the underground movements of the MDC and Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP) worked jointly for an all out sabotage effort in the fall of 1961. (Ibid)

In 1961, he was elected President of the "Batista" faction of the MDC, which then became the "Batista" faction

~~(Batista was associated with the CIA beginning in early 1960 and was used as a political and psychological agent, but the association was brief. (CIA/OS Laureano Batista Falla, Operational Approval form) He organized public demonstrations protesting U.S. government failure to properly aid Cuban exiles in their attempt to overthrow Castro. (HSCA #009303, p. 6, FBI #97-4623-180, Section 6, Correlation Summary) and by 1962, the CIA informed the FBI it had no operational interest in him. (Ibid, p. 5, FBI #97-4623-149, Section 5)~~

In 1962 he became President of the MDC and
(HSCA 009303, p. 8, Item 4, FBI #105-183815)

The "Batista" faction of the MDC, entered into a number of

so named after the youthful military chief rose to the position of Pres in 1962

associations with other exile groups for the purpose of propaganda, sabotage and supplying the Cuban underground.

~~In 1962~~ many MDC members joined the Cuba Committee, formed to counteract the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, a pro-Castro organization. (CIA/DDO, MDC Volume 3, Cable to Director from JMWAIVE, 6/21/62, #14986) In 1964, the MDC and DRE (spell out) worked together ~~for~~ to formulate plans for an underground organization to infiltrate Oriente Province. (CIA/DDO, Laureano Batista Falla, Info. Cable TDCS DB 3/660-090, 3/14/64.

in the U.S.

in 1962

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It was the year 1963, however, that found the Batista faction of the MDC involved in a large number of anti-Castro activities.

The MDC made a unity pact with the Commandos L in which the latter group was to provide training and assistance in military intelligence and the MDC was to provide 3 small boats and a team of men to infiltrate Cuba. The MDC also made a pact with Dr. Carlos Prio Socarras, former President of Cuba who donated \$50,000 to the group for military aid in return for its promise of political support. (CIA/DDO, MDC Volume 5, Information Cable (UFG-3536,) 9/3/63)

In April 1963, Frank Sturgis, Miami-based soldier of fortune, supplied information that Batista, Orlando Bosch Avila, Manuel Artime and Alexander Rorke were jointly planning an air strike over Havana on April 25. (HSCA #009303, page 1, FBI #97-4623, Section I) According to Sturgis, the strike was to originate from an airstrip in Puerto Rico and the target a sugar refinery. (Ibid) - *The bombs were of the homemade variety and put together by Batista (Ibid p. 5, item 2)* Alexander Rorke publically announced the strike had taken place as scheduled, which took the other planners by surprise and they dismissed it as a publicity stunt. (Ibid) ^{Sturgis} Sturgis *claimed the strike was still in the planning stage and financial backing had not been completed* ~~said the original planners were still trying to raise the funds necessary to implement their plan.~~ (Ibid) This incident created a stir and resulted in an intensive FBI investigation of Rorke's allegation. (HSCA #009303, p. 3, FBI # 97-4623, Sections II through VI) It was felt that Rorke's story was probably untrue (Ibid, p. 2, #97-4623-35) since Radio Havana, ^{immediate} contrary to usual policy, made no protest of the bombing. (Ibid, p. 3, FBI #97-4623, Section IV)

Even Batista, who accompanied Rorke on the raid, was upset by the premature announcement. (HSCA #009303, item 2, p. 4, FBI # 97-4623-149)

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(Copy sent to Vol 32, item 1 p 4)

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Richard Rudolph Davis, A Cuban alien, ~~with an American~~
~~mother~~ (HSCA 012981) had a peripheral association with the
MDC through his contact with Batista in the summer of 1963.
(Ibid) Davis was residing in New Orleans and, although not
at an earlier time
an MDC member, claimed/to have been a "coordinator" for the
group and the New York Police Department. (Ibid) He was
a friend of Batista and contacted him because he knew Batista
was in a position to recommend men in the Miami area who
needed work. (Ibid) Davis claimed he could provide employ-
ment for a small group of Cuban emigres.

Davis had entered into a business deal with geologist
David L. Raggio and a wealthy, right-wing New Orelanian, Gus
de LaBarre, forming the Guatemalan Lumber and Mineral Corpora-
tion. (Ibid) It was their intention to train the Cubans on
some land in Lacombe, Louisiana to which de LaBarre had access
through his nephew, Frank de LaBarre. (Ibid) After the train-
ing period, they were to be sent to Guatemala to cut mahogany.

A group of about 18 Cubans did arrive, under the leader-
ship of a well-known Cuban exile, Victor Paneque (Ibid), who
used the military code name of Commadante Diego. ^{092 Custody Vol 32, Stan 2} (cite) ^{97-4110-123, P. 2}
According to Davis, the men arrived dressed in khakis (HSCA 006716,
p. 4) with the idea they were to receive military training.
(HSCA 006716, p. 2, FBI, Richard Rudolph Davis, Volume I,
Report from New Orleans, 7/3/64)

In the latter part of July 1963, the FBI conducted a
raid on property near that of the lumber company training camp,
where they seized a cache of dynamite and other explosives.
(Ibid). This raid, according to Davis, unnerved his trainees,

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and they elected to return to Miami. (Ibid)

A somewhat different version of this episode comes from Gus de LaBarre's nephew and attorney, Frank, who first related his story in 1966 to his former law school classmate, Jim Garrison. (HSCA 012981, Fonzi memo 9/6/78)

de LaBarre said his Uncle Gus had introduced him to Davis, whom deLaBarre described as a "floater". They came to see de LaBarre about drawing up Articles of Incorporation for the Guatemalan Lumber Company and that is when he learned of their plans to bring unemployed Cubans from Miami to train as loggers. Uncle Gus sent provisions to the exiles on a daily basis and solicited money for food and clothing from friends and relatives.

de LaBarre said he didn't pay much attention to the activities of the group but, when he heard on his car radio that the FBI had seized a cache of ammunition at a house in Lacombe, he immediately called his uncle. Although receiving assurances that the lumber group was not involved, de LaBarre called the officers of the corporation together and insisted that the Cubans be taken out of there. Davis claimed, according to de LaBarre's version, that the Cubans did not want to leave, whereupon de LaBarre had to some some real "brainstorming". He rented a Hertz ton-and-a-half truck and instructed Davis to take it to the camp and tell the Cubans "that the invasion is on." Davis complied, and the Cubans loaded their gear, jumped in the truck and were brought to the Greyhound bus terminal in New Orleans. Each Cuban was given a one-way ticket to Miami plus a small amount of cash and told they would get their orders

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when they reached Miami. Looking as though ready for war, with knapsacks and guns bulging from under their clothes, they boarded the bus and de LaBarre had no more contact with them. The last he heard of Davis was in 1964 when one of de LaBarre's friends reported he had gone into business with Davis and was left with a lot of bills. (Ibid)

on Rork's part. ^{and} Sturgis said the original planners were still trying to raise the funds necessary to implement their plan. ^(this) This incident created a stir and resulted in an intensive FBI investigation of Rork's allegation (HSCA 009303 p 3, FBI # 97-4623, sections II through IV) It was felt that Rork's story was probably ^{entire} untrue and that ~~he may comply~~ ^{(HSCA 009303 p. 2, # 97-4623-35} Airgram to Director from SAC Miami, Apr 26, 1963.) since Radio Havana, contrary to usual policy, made no protest of the bombing. (HSCA 009303, p. 3, LBF # 97-4623, Sec IV, ~~undated CIA Info. Cable # 00 k-3~~ ~~261,871, 5/21/63~~)

Insert West Germany

Insert Richard Rudolphi Davis story.

Concurrent with his ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ addition to his ~~planned~~ involvement with leaders of other exile organizations, Batista was dealing with foreign governments in an effort to gain support for his faction of the MDC. At a meeting in Miami in July 1963, ~~the~~ Luis Somoza, former President of Nicaragua, offered the MDC a base for operations in that country which the MDC accepted. (CIA/DDO LBF VOL 1, Info. Report CSDB-3-655, 718, dtd 7/26/63) ~~Information~~ Information was received by the CIA that Venezuelan President Romulo Betancourt also offered to make a base available for the MDC and provide personnel and supplies to them. (CIA/DDO, LBF VOL 1, Info Cable ~~000~~ ~~261,871, 5/21/63~~)

In ~~Oct~~ ^{August} 1963, after the World Congress of Christian Democrats in Strasbourg, France, two West German officials of the Christian Democratic Party conferred with the MOC in Miami. (CIA/DDO, MOC Vol 5, Info Cable (4FG-4531), 11/29/64) According to one of the officials, the West Germans, after months of study, had decided to finance the MOC, not because they were particularly fond of them but felt once Cuba was liberated, the Cubans would have a moral superiority over the rest of Latin America. (Ibid)

~~add 1964~~

Insert for p. 9.

U.S. Customs raided MOC headquarters in Miami on Apr 21, 1964 and confiscated a large cache of arms & ammunition & ~~arrested Batista~~ after which the military section set up separate headquarters ^{the MOC} & continued to store materials for infiltration & attack missions against Cuba. (092, Senstudy Vol. 32, Item 2, 97-4110-123, p.1)
In July, Batista & Victor Panquea infiltrated men & equipment into Cuba to form a nucleus of guerrilla bands (Ibid^{p2}) Batista said these men were awaiting receipt of adequate arms & ammunition at which time they go into the mountains. (Ibid p 2)

~~the~~ study courses in military training & theory were given ~~there~~ conducted there

092
Senstudy VOL 33, Item 2, p. 2, 97-4110-132

~~Financing~~ ~~Insert for p 9.~~ Batista ~~published an article in PATRIA~~ publicly claimed

The MOC labeled persons or organizations who received financial aid or backing from the U.S. government as "check-eaters." (092-Senstudy Vol 33, Item 2, p. 5, 97-4110-132)

reverted

Batista was displeased with the manner in which his men were treated in the LA Countries, saying that local police treated Cubans in a harsh manner, violated their civil rights & confiscated their property. (HSCA Security file 092, Study Document Vol 33, Item 1, # 97-4110-86, p. 13-14) He alleged this treatment was a direct result of U.S. diplomatic influence on these governments to prevent Cuban files from going on military missions (Ibid) He stated he preferred to operate out of the Miami area because it was apparent ^{that} although the U.S. govt. had a policy of stopping Cuban raiders, it did not prosecute them. (Ibid)

(Insert Customs)

The MOC was ^{low on funds} In the latter part of 1964, Batista was had to concentrate ^{his} efforts on fund raising. ~~for~~ ^{the MOC}, soliciting contributions from a number of leading prominent Americans.

(Ibid, Item 2, 97-4110-132 p. 3) He also and expressed an interest in making contact with the John Birch Society ~~for~~ ^{insert} as a possible source of financing. (Ibid) The MOC had a cache of equipment believed to have been stolen from Ft Jackson, N.C. (Ibid) ~~and~~ left ~~for~~ ^{insert} when Batista visited the MOC

training base in the Dominican Republic in Sept., it is ~~believed~~ he took this equipment with him (Ibid p.5)

→ Batista eventually gave up his anti-Castro activities, moved to Washington, D.C. and received a Doctoral degree in political science in Spring 1970 and then moved to Venezuela. (HSCA .009303, p.7, Item 3., FBI # 97-4110-207, Report from Miami, 1/28/70)

The MDC suffered the fate of other anti-Castro organizations - finding it increasingly difficult to finance infiltration and sabotage missions and experiencing increased surveillance by U.S. authorities who were determined to limit their activities. The organization gradually declined in importance. ↗