

Box 30  
File 7  
Doc 1SECRET

C. Berk

IGR 1967

1 4/25/67 Memorandum - re: plans to assass. Castro. Because of extreme sensitivity of operations, "as a matter of principle no official records were kept of planning, of approval, or of implementation."

W. Harvey retained sketched notes of his activities during years in? - these are the best source of date

most info given has come orally

2 everyone deemed knowledgeable interviewed except Dulles and Cabell

"If there are significant inaccuracies in the report, they are more likely to occur in faulty ordering of the sequence of events."

3 5 separate phases in Agency assass. planning the transitions from one to another not always sharply defined. Each phase reflects the prevailing Gov. attitude to Cuban regime

a) prior to 8/60: all schemes identified except one intended to discredit Castro's regime

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by influencing his behavior & altering his appearance

b) 8/60 - 4)61; <sup>the plots</sup> viewed by some <sup>participants</sup> as merely one aspect of overall active effort to overthrow Castro regime - culminated in Bay of Pigs

c) 4/61 - late/61: major scheme begun in 8/60 called off after Bay of Pigs - ~~was~~ dormant for several months as was most other operational activities related to Cuba

d) late/61 - late/62; scheme in c) reactivated in ~~late~~ early '62, pushed vigorously in era of Project MONSOON and in climate of intense admin. pressure on CIA to do something about CASTRO and his regime

e) late/62 until well into 1963; post-Cuba missile crisis 10/62 and collapse of Project MONSOON,

4

aggressive scheme begun in 8/60, renewed in 4/62, terminated in early '63.

2 other plots originated in 1963 but both deemed impracticable and did not come to fruition

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frustrated and unrealistic plotters influenced by severe pressure from Kennedy Admin.

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2 points of importance: 1) eliminates a leader will not

5 2) bringing about downfall necessarily cause  
of a govt requires removal downfall of govt

of leaders from positions re: internal CIA  
7 page - always a draft paper of 10/61  
risk that participants initiated in response  
will result to assass. to Gen'l M. Taylor  
desire for contingency  
plan

A third point: frequent resort to synecdoche  
i.e. reference to a part when the whole  
is to be understood e.g. use of  
phrase disarming of CASTRO which read  
narrowly + literally means to assassinate  
him but which is intended to be read in  
broader, figurative sense of dislodging  
CASTRO regime

Can also be read from other side of coin -  
i.e. doing something about CASTRO meaning  
killing CASTRO

6

IFR concludes that no reason to believe  
that operators <sup>were unduly influenced by</sup> intelligence publications  
contents

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reference to D. P. SECRET 7/67 column re  
16730 A. ... slot and use of prom-pills by team

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ISR concludes that there is a base in  
for for Pearson's reporting

a) CIA officer passed assassin weapon  
to Agency Cuban asset at Paris  
meeting on 11/22/63. The weapon was a  
ball point pen rigged w/ hypodermic  
syringe. Poison suggested for use was  
Black Leaf 40.

7

b) Aug 10, 1962 meeting of S6 (augmented)  
at Dean Rusk's conference room. At  
meeting Robert McKernan raised subject  
of liquidation of Cuban leaders. As a  
result Edward Janzdale prepared a  
Project MONTGOMERY action memorandum.

On 7/31/64 - another S6 meeting -  
discussed clandestine services info  
report on Cuban exile plot to assassinate  
CASTRO. CIA refused the request for  
funds and had no involvement in the plot.

c) On 2 occasions, early '61, early '62  
CIA supplied poison pills to crime  
syndicate members to assassinate  
CASTRO. '61 plot aborted, pills received  
'62 plot pills passed to Cuban exile  
leader in Fla., ita ~~1111111111~~ Cuba in  
May 1962. June 1962 - exile leader  
reported that street man team dispatched  
to CUBA to recruit for the operation.

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7. if oppy arose, the three men would attempt to kill CASTRO perhaps w/ the upell

8. Implication of D. Pearson story of direct, cooperative relationship among various plots is unfounded

9. miscellaneous schemes thru to 8/60  
March to August '60

3-4 schemes considered well before B. of P. time frame is speculative - good guess is 1959 - 1961

J. D. (Jake) Esterline, head of Cuba task force pre-B. of P. - not reliable witness in gen'l timing - all schemes under consideration while Esterline had direct respons. for CUBA operation

10. Esterline estimates March 1960 as time when planning would have progressed to consideration of means - by end of third quarter of '60, task force energies concentrated on "main - thrust effort" & thereafter no interest in pursuing other schemes

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no evidence that schemes approved at any high level than division **SECRET** OR believes no higher-level approvals were sought because in scheme progressed to point where approval to launch needed

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10

Aerosol attack on Radio Station  
(Ray Treckler), TSP, scheme discussed  
to spray LSD like substance on radio  
studio where CASTRO did broadcasts -  
nothing came of idea - discouraged  
because chemical was not really effective

11

(Henry <sup>03</sup> Boland), TSP  
resulted experiment w/ psychiatric energies  
but not related to CASTRO as a target

Contaminated Cigars

per B. of Phys processing contam. Cigars  
by Esterline. Cigars would produce  
temporary personality disorientation.

Wanted to have CASTRO smoke one before speech  
Might have been prepared by (Ray <sup>03</sup> Treckler)  
Esterline might have confused the chemical  
agent in that cigars might have been  
intended to make CASTRO's beard fall  
out, Esterline positive cigars were  
not lethal

12

Cigars not used because WH/4 couldn't  
figure out how to safely deliver them  
Esterline said he destroyed them before  
he left <sup>WH/4</sup> ~~going~~ in <sup>June</sup> 1961. 11111887

may  
indicate  
2 separate  
schemes  
didn't get  
DD/P's approval  
did not

Sidney Gottlieb of TSP believes cigars  
were intended for SECRET ~~stopping~~ - but Gottlieb  
believes ~~it~~ <sup>is a scheme</sup> didn't get beyond talk (3/M)

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13 Depilatory  
(R<sup>OB</sup> needs) recalls scheme to use depilatory  
to destroy CASTRO'S image by making  
his beard fall out. Idea was to dust  
thallium powder (the depilatory) in  
CASTRO'S shoes. Scheme got only so far as  
procurement of chemical and testing on  
animals. But scheme fell through  
because trip outside CUBA by CASTRO  
at which time powder was to be used fell thru.

14 Gambling Syndicate

2 phase operation

a) from 8/60 - 4/ or 5/61

b) from 4/62 - 2/63 (renewal of 1<sup>st</sup> phase)

Phase I

August 1960

DDP Bissel asked Sheffield Edwards, Director  
of Security of Edwards' cover established  
contact w/ U.S. gambling syndicate  
active in CUBA - objective was to  
assassinate CASTRO then Edwards said  
term was avoided in convers. w/ Bissel  
Bissel says idea originated w/ J.C. King,  
then Chief of WH Division

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(1/11)

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15 Edwards contacted Robert Mabeu.  
Mabeu had been an SA for FBI.  
Mabeu had provided in the past  
support to CIA in some of its more  
sensitive operations

CIA people in TOR report who worked for FBI  
Mabeu, <sup>Robert</sup> Cunningham, William Hawley, James  
O'Connell, Edward Morgan

16 Mabeu told Edwards he had contacts to  
U.S. crime syndicate. Mabeu agreed to  
participate only after being pressured by  
Edwards. Mabeu's interest was Johnny  
Roselli. Edwards and Mabeu agreed  
Mabeu would approach Roselli as  
representative of businessmen w/ interests in  
CUBA who needed CASTRO eliminated.  
\$150,000 authorized to pay for CASTRO's removal

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September 1960 - case officer for operation  
was James P. O'Connell, Chief, Oper-  
ational Support Division, Office of Security.  
9/14/60 - O'Connell & Mabeu meet  
Roselli in NYC - Mabeu makes the pitch  
Roselli agrees & says will introduce Mabeu  
to "Sam Gold" who could arrange it & had  
syndicate contacts in ~~SECRET~~



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17 Roselli declines payment, believed Dole would  
feel the same way  
Memo for Record prepared by Staff. Edwards  
5/14/62: no more ever payment to Roselli  
in Giancana. (Giancana "Hold")

CIK emp in office of Security  
Only O'Connell was made witting of operation  
at the time. Edwards didn't meet Roselli  
till summer of '62

Bissell informed of contact w/ syndicate  
by Edwards during ~~summer~~ late fall  
of Sept 1960. Only Bissell, Edwards,  
& O'Connell <sup>w/ CIK</sup> knew of the plan. Edwards  
stated that Helms was not informed  
of the plan because Bissell was handling  
CUBA at the time.

18 Edwards briefed Dulles and Cabell on  
the syndicate plan. Bissell was  
present at briefing. Edwards avoided  
use of "bad words" - descriptive  
term used was "an intelligence opera-  
tion" but Edwards sure that Dulles and  
Cabell knew what the nature of the operation  
discussion was

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Edwards described the channel as A (Maken)  
to B (Roselli) to C (the principle CUBA)  
The formal approval given - Edwards believes  
he had ~~to get approval~~ <sup>SECRET</sup> Bissell committed \$150,000  
for support of operation

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19

week of 9/25/60 - O'Connell, Mabeu  
go to Miami where Mabeu intro-  
duced to Sam "Gold" at Fontainebleau  
Hotel - "Gold" said he had a  
man "Joe" (Santos Trufficante) who  
would be courier to CUBA and make  
arrangements there

O'Connell never met "Gold" or "Joe"

O'Connell learned their true identities  
after weeks <sup>later</sup> from Parade Magazine supplement

see office of Security Memo to DDCI 6/24/6

At time of Miami meeting Trufficante was  
making regular trips between Miami  
and Havana on syndicate business

20

"Trufficante was to make the arrange-  
ments (for CASTRO's assets) with one of  
his contacts inside CUBA on regular  
trips to Havana."

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Fall and Winter 1960

Plan to first contact w/ Roselli, machinery  
for readygoing assets was set in motion

21

Not unusual for Chief of TSD to be by-pass  
in operations involving his people. Such practices  
and procedures may account for different recollection  
of what did happen SECRET significance

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- 21 <sup>03</sup> (Nechle) recalls treating a full box  
of cigars w/ bacterial toxin - similar poison  
which is fatal a few hours after ingestion
- 22 <sup>03</sup> (Nechle) kept one of the experimental cigars  
Had it as of 1967.

Dr. Edward Heunon got the cigars and  
kept them in his safe - destroyed  
them w/in a month of Shep Edwards' retirement  
in June 1963

- 23 Roosevelt, Chief of TSD remembers  
speaking to ~~Dr~~ Shep Edwards after  
Bissell discussed it w/ Edwards  
Roosevelt recalls 4 possible approaches;
- a) something highly toxic e.g. shellfish  
poison administered by a pin
  - b) bacterial material in liquid form
  - c) bacterial treatment of cigar or cigarette
  - d) handkerchief treated w/ bacteria
- Bissell and Roosevelt both recall that  
discussion was for bacteria in liquid form

- 24 January - February 1961 11111892  
Solid in form of pills (size of saccharine  
tablets) was actually prepared and delivered  
Pill form chosen because of ease and safety of  
hand line

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25. Hancock against use of firearms -  
would have been a suicide mission -  
he preferred a lethal pill. Inside  
man for ~~the~~ syndicate was Juan Orta,  
off. Chief & Director General of the Office  
of the Prime Minister (CASTRO) - Orta needed  
money

2/6/61 - <sup>recd.</sup> conversation between Gurn and  
(~~Trickle~~) - Gurn had tested pills on  
Guinea pigs & found them to be ineffective  
(G.P.'s had high resistance to bovine)

26. when tested on monkeys the pills worked  
O'Connell eventually received the pills.  
He recalls dealing w/ (~~Trickle~~) but  
(~~Trickle~~) has no record of delivering  
pills but he doesn't ordinarily keep  
detailed records of such things

27. O'Connell believes there were 6 pills - gave 3 of  
them to Roselle - passed sometime  
after 2/10/61

11111893  
Gurn was approached about the  
operation by William Harvey in Feb 61  
Harvey was briefed on the operation  
J.C. King also briefed <sup>then</sup> although King  
denies learning of the operation till much later

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3/1/61

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Late Feb - March 1961

27

Roselli passed pills to Trafficante  
Roselli told O'Connell that pills  
delivered to Orta in Cuba

Orta kept pills for couple weeks  
and then returned them - syndicate

28

said he got cold feet. By the time Orta  
had lost his position in the Prime Minister's  
office

" It seems likely that, while the  
Agency thought the gangsters had  
a man in Cuba with easy access  
to Castro, what they actually had  
was a man disgruntled at  
having lost access "

29

Orta suggested replacement who made  
several unsuccessful attempts. Neither  
Edwards nor O'Connell know who the was

March - April 1961

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Roselli tells O'Connell the Trafficante  
knows man in Cuban Exile movement  
who might do the job - Tony Varona  
(Dr. Manuel Antonio de Varona y Loreda  
Varona headed Democratic Revolutionary  
Front - agency supporter group)

Varona was associated by 1/18/61 FBI report  
~~with~~ w/ financial ~~of~~ syndicate to over-

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- 30 P.R. man for Varona was Edward K. Moss who had separate ties in Cuba thru his mistress' brothers (Celleni)
- 31 Trafficante approached Varona about killing CASTRO, Varona is receptive because its by money for ships, arms etc

Roselli  
knows  
O'Connell  
is it safe

O'Connell informs Robert Bannerman, Edwards deputy of the operation  
Bannerman was unhappy with the  
since Edwards out of town, Bannerman  
authorizes passing money (25 or 50 thou)  
to Varona office of Sedgemoor to DDX 6/24/66 des  
figure \$810,000 cash

- 32 ~~Roselli~~ O'Connell delivers money and pills to Roselli; Roselli gives money and pills to Varona.  
(little is known of the delivery channels beyond Varona)

April - May 1961

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- 33 Soon after Bay of Pigs Edwards sends word to Roselli thru O'Connell that the operation is off.  
O'Connell believes Sturadren was not firm and final and that something was going on between 4/61 and 4/62 but can't recall what  
He agrees w/ Hawes that when Hawes took over in 4/62 it was a "going operation"

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34

O'Connell believes he recovered the pills and destroyed them

5/14/62 memo by S. Edwards state that 6 persons had knowledge of the operation but ISR identifies

13 people who knew in late '60 or in only '61 of <sup>the</sup> plan to assass. Castro

- 1) Allen Dulles
- 2) Gen. Cabell
- 3) Richard Bissell
- 4) Sheffield Edwards
- 5) James O'Connell
- 6) J. D. Esterline
- 7) Cornelius Roosevelt
- 8) ~~(Ray Treichel)~~
- 9) Edward Gunn
- 10) William Hawley
- 11) Sidney Gottlieb
- 12) Robert Bannerman
- 13) J. C. King

35

4 persons outside got known to be writers of the operation and the Agency connection

- 1) Robert Mabeu
- 2) John Roselli
- 3) Sam Giancana
- 4) Santos Trafficante

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- 35 other aware but whose knowledge of  
C, A connection is speculative
- 1) Juan Orta
  - 2) Antonio Varona
  - 3) Varona's son-in-law

- 36 RFK and Lawrence Huston learned  
full details in May 1962  
as for <sup>see report</sup> Drew Pearson's ~~article~~ <sup>see</sup> if  
it approximates the TGR then  
the following might be knowledgeable
- 1) Edward P. Morgan
  - 2) Drew Pearson & Jack Anderson
  - 3) Earl Warren
  - 4) James Rowley
  - 5) Pat Coyne
  - 6) Atty Gen'l Ramsey Clark
  - 7) Various members of the FBI

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- 37 Gambling Syndicate - Phase 2
- 4 Feb. 61 Bissel assigned sensitive ~~mission~~ operation  
to Harvey - referred to as Executive  
Action Capabilities - standard capabilities  
to carry out assassinations when required  
Bissel recalls discussing development  
gen 1 capabilities - this is why Harvey  
was briefed by Edwards re gambling  
syndicate operation

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38

Bissell had discussed certain aspects quite problem w/ (Arnold Silver) and Sidney Gottlieb - Harvey uses (Silver) in developing Execution capability but not w/ respect to CASTRO.

Nelms was briefed <sup>on Harvey</sup> on general concept of E. A but did not mention the then ongoing plot to assassinate Castro

Exec Action - known as ZRRIFLE

Principal - OTWIN - <sup>recruited for</sup> use <sup>in</sup> <sup>03</sup> ~~Patrol~~ ~~number~~ ~~2~~ - recruited by (Silver)

was to be run by Justice O'Donnell - (He asked to be released - didn't want party etc - Bissell granted the request)

ZRRIFLE - first appears in file in 5/61 - first recorded approval 2/19/62 on 2/19/62 - DPP Nelms authorized

39

Harvey, by memo, to handle project on special basis

OTWIN gets annual salary of 7200 <sup>11111898</sup> + 7500 for operational expenses

Cover for ZRRIFLE was <sup>as</sup> an FI/D operation

11/15/61 - Harvey discusses w/ Bissell use of ZRRIFLE program in Cuba -

Bissell told Harvey to take over ~~of~~ Edwards contract w/ syndicate and run the operation against CUBA <sup>Nelms afterwards places HARVEY in charge of CIA Cuba task force</sup>

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Late 1961 - Early 1962

39 Harvey busy ~~with~~ following discussion  
w/ Bissell re the <sup>Edward's</sup> literary CASTRO  
operation

40 Feb - March 1962

Harvey 1<sup>st</sup> meets w Edwards re CASTRO  
operation in Feb 1962

Harvey ran Castro operation as one  
aspect of ZRRIFLE - but Harvey personally  
handled the Castro operation and  
did not use any of the assets  
developed in ZRRIFLE. Harvey  
treated Exec. Action program as  
synonymous w/ QJWIN

Harvey said when he wrote ZRRIFLE/QJWIN  
the reference was to Executive Action  
Capability; when he used the cryptonym  
ZRRIFLE alone, he was referring to  
CASTRO. Harvey said his correspondence  
would disclose this distinction. FGR  
reviewed the correspondence & for  
most part found it unrevealing

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41

QJWIN terminated by ~~(Superior)~~  
~~(Station)~~ at 4/21/64. No indication  
file that Exec Action Capability of ZRRIFLE/  
QJWIN was ever used

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41

April 1962

Edwards w/ Helms approval arrange for Harvey to be put in touch w/ Roselli. Harvey briefed Helms prior to <sup>first</sup> meeting w/ Roselli in its purpose & reported to Helms results of meeting w/ Roselli.

Thereafter, Harvey states he regularly briefed Helms on status of CASTRO operation.

April '62 - Edwards statement that the "verified Helms approval" is earliest indication of Helms willing to gamble syndicate operation

and that Helms approved that Harvey not brief the Director (McCone) on the meeting

42

Edwards believes that the operation was called off completely after Bay of Pigs and no further operational activity until Harvey met Roselli & reactivated the operation in 4/62

Harvey's recollection is supportive of Edwards except Harvey says he took over going operation

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43 O'Connell also believes there was something going on between 4/61 after B Pigs and 4/62 but can't remember particulars

4/8 - 4/9 - Hawley + O'Connell in NYC to meet Roselli

44 Hawley + O'Connell dispute whether Mahan was present at meeting bears upon whether Mahan knew the operation continued under Hawley

45 ~~Mahan~~, Hawley, Roselli, O'Connell + maybe Mahan go to Copacabana see Phyllis McGuire there - Roselli attempts to avoid her

Edwards says that when he briefed Hawley on takeover he did not mention Mahan so that he could screen Mahan out of the operation

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46 O'Connell carryover into Phase II for purposes of continuity - appears to be a few weeks - his role in the operation ended by June 1962 when he was assigned PCS to (Okinawa)

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47 Hawey arrives in Miami on 4/21/62 - finds Roselli in touch w/ Tony Varona. Hawey reports to TSK how he took over a "going operation". O'Connell concurs.

48 Hawey didn't want Giuncannain or reactivation of the operation - Hawey believes Roselli honored the request. Rafficante no longer involved. Roselli ~~know~~ had man known to

Hawey as Maceo - also used name Garcia - Gomez and Godoy. Hawey describe Maceo as "a Cuban who spoke Italian".

Roselli remained prominent in the operation but he worked directly w/ Cuban exile and directly on behalf of CIA.

not likely to be Antonio Maceo Muck or associate of Varona because Muck well-known w/ Cuban exile and Hawey would have had knowledge of him

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49 "...It would be naive to assume that Roselli did not take the precaution of informing high-ups in the syndicate that he was working in a territory considered to be the private domain of someone else in the syndicate."

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49

After Pills given by Roselli to Varona, Varona requested arms and equipment for support of his operation. Harwey was ~~also~~ informed of this by Roselli. Harwey and JMWAVE station chief Ted Shackley procured the material at cost of \$85000 was T/Aid to Headquarters

Harwey + Shackley loaded equip into a U-Haul and parked it in parking lot at a drive-in restaurant. Roselli given the car keys

50

Delivery to Maceo, Varona, or Varona's son-in-law. Harwey + Roselli did not trust each other yet. Each placed a double-cross. ~~The~~ Each party surveilled the site (O'Connell was w/Roselli, Shackley w/Harwey - The truck was picked up + returned empty w/keys under the seat as prearranged. Harwey says Shackley never knew to whom delivery was made or for what purpose - he really was called upon to furnish support for HQ operation from which he was otherwise excluded

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May 1962

Harvey and Roselli communicated telephonically by prearranged system  
Roselli reported that pills in Cuba at restaurant where Castro eats regularly

51

June 1962

June 21 - Roselli reports to Harvey that Varona has dispatched 3 man team into Cuba; Harvey says 3 men has no specific plan for killing Castro. The 3 men would recruit others to kill C. If ops presented they or other would kill C, maybe using pill  
Harvey never knew their names

Sept 1962

Harvey and Roselli meet in Miami on 9/7 + 9/11  
"Medusa" reported in place, 3 man team safe + Varona ready to send another 3 man team to infiltrate Castro's bodyguard

52

Sept 1962 - Jan '63

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3 man team down + leave - Oct missile crisis develops, Between 12/22 + 1/6/63  
Harvey sees Roselli + Maces in Miami  
Pays Roselli \$2700 for Varona for 3<sup>rd</sup> man team expense. Harvey + Roselli talk by phone 1/11 - 1/16  
Roselli + Harvey agree ~~SECRET~~ much happening now  
+ future

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52Feb 63

Harvey in Miami 2/11-2/14 leaves word  
for Mares that it looks like it all  
over 2/15 - Harvey leaves Miami for  
L.A. to meet Roselli. At L.A. meeting  
Harvey & Roselli agree to close off the operation  
but that Roselli would continue to see Jerome,  
gradually reducing frequency until no contact

53

April - May 1963

Harvey says gets 2 phone calls from Roselli  
Harvey wants one last meeting w/ Roselli before  
Harvey leaves for Rome. Helms informed of same  
by Harvey, Helms gives approval

June 1963

Roselli in Wash. mid-June to meet w/ Harvey  
Sam Papuck calls Harvey while Harvey & Roselli  
are dining out who asks Harvey if he knows  
the dinner guest identity. Harvey says he does

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54

Harvey meets Papuck next morning. Explains  
that he is terminating an operational association  
w/ Roselli. Papuck says he must report  
this to J. Edgar Hoover. Harvey does not object  
Harvey <sup>says he</sup> asked Papuck to inform him in advance  
if it appeared that Hoover might call Mc Cone -  
because Mc Cone should be ~~debriefed~~ <sup>debriefed</sup> before receiving  
Hoover's call, Papuck agrees.

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Harvey says he then told Helms of the incident & Helms agreed that there was no need to brief Mc Lane unless Hoover's call is to be expected.

55

This was Harvey's last face-to-face meeting w/ Roselli

2nd phase writers persons  
 Richard Helms  
 William Harvey  
 James O'Connell  
 Sheppard Edwards  
 Jo Co King  
 Bruce Cheever  
 Ted Shackley  
 Ray Treichel  
 Antonio Varona

Varona's son-in-law

Maceo, Roselli's "man"

56

San Juan may have been informed of 2nd phase by Roselli, ditto Santos Raffaele  
 O'Connell believes Maken knew,

Possible leaks:

Roselli to Maken

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Maken to Edward P. Morgan (Maken's Wash laugh)

Morgan to D. Pearson

Pearson to Chief Justice President

Warren to Rowley (Chief of Sec. Service)

Rowley to Pat Conroy of the FBI, the FBI to Atty Gen's Clerk

441  
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The Wiretapping Incident

57

Late '61 - Early '62

Garcara's private life <sup>caused</sup> incident that made FBI aware of Agency's relationship w/ syndicate - requested briefs of a.o.b. on details of assassination plot

Phyllis Mc Gure - Garcara's mistress  
Garcara thought she was having affair w/ Dan Rowan - Garcara wanted Mc Gure's Las Vegas hotel room bugged. Makeu reluctantly agreed to bug room for Garcara

58

Date of incident is uncertain - could have been 1961 - after Bay of Pigs, maybe early 1962 but before 2/7/62 on which date Director of Security told FBI that CIA would object to prosecution

Edward & DuBois handles request for Makeu. DuBois assigns Arthur J. Bulletti & J.W. Harrison to do the job

+1111907

59

O'Connell says telephone tap used instead of planting bug in the room, Bulletti's equip. found by the maid + local sheriff called in. Bulletti arrested Harrison in R-00644 called Makeu in presence of staff officer

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59 Guy, case reached the FBI, ~~FBI~~ FBI  
wanted to press for prosecution under  
wiretapping statute. Maken on being  
approached by FBI referred them to  
60 <sup>Edward says</sup> Shey Edwards at CIA. Maken told  
FBI that the tap was for an operation  
working on for Edwards. FBI memo  
of 3/23/62 indicates that FBI <sup>now</sup> knew  
of ~~the~~ Cuban intelligence information  
operation and believed wiring of  
Rowan's room done for this purpose -  
but doesn't indicate FBI knew it ~~was~~  
~~was~~. The intelligence operation was  
assess. plot

March 1962

The memo of 3/23 confirms 2/7  
meetings between Edwards and FBI rep.  
2/7 meeting - Edward says Maken involved  
in sensitive operation w/ agency - Agency  
objects to prosecution

61 3/28 or 3/29 Edwards and FBI <sup>11111968</sup> Mason  
San Papick meet - Edwards reiterates  
his position re prosecution, Edwards  
makes record of meetings in 4/4/62 memo  
Dull and Biswell gone by the time, Helms  
didn't know of the operation - Edwards dealt  
w/ Papick w/out reference to anyone else at  
CIA

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April 1962

4/16 - Lawrence Houston, CIA Gen'l Counsel meets w/ Herbert J. Miller of Justice Dept (Criminal Division) and indicates Agency involvement w/out revealing details of assas. operation. Houston makes memo 4/26 of meeting, indicates Miller will cooperate but might mention it to Atty Gen'l

4/20 - Houston meets w/ Foley, Miller's asst - indicates that prosecution for other matters not related to bugging/flop is ok. ~~Be~~

62a

Because A.G. might be informed, Houston briefs DDIC Gen'l Carter who said he might at some time brief McCone. Not known if Carter briefed McCone. No indication that Carter briefed further on full details of assas. operation

May 1962

11111909

A.G. informed because he requested a briefing 5/7/62 - Houston and Edwards brief A.G. RFR "all the way" (Edwards words). A.G. indicated he would not prosecute on the ~~overlap~~ <sup>SECRET</sup> overlap. A.G. said that he expected to be informed in future if so ~~business~~ w/ ag'd crime again

SECRET

63 At A. G.'s request memorandum  
rec'd of meeting prepared  
Edwards & Houston both helped write it  
RFK request on 5/11, memo dated 5/14  
2 copies ~~to~~ - original to RFK, other to  
Shelby Edwards - Dir of Sec'y -  
true purpose of operation may be  
inferred from the memo  
McCore, Edwards says was not  
briefed on Carter or Helms

64 "From reports of the briefers, it is  
reasonable to assume that Kennedy  
believed he had such a commitment  
(to be told in advance of CIA involve-  
ment w/ US gangster elements) from  
Agency representatives

But at this very time that RFK  
briefed on Phase I, Phase II under Hawley  
was under way - as far as I know  
Kennedy was never told of Phase II  
5/14 - Hawley says he briefed Helms  
on meeting. Hawley advised against  
briefing ~~the~~ McCore + Carter + Helms con-  
curred.

66 It appears that FBI was not given  
a briefing of operation in anything like  
the detail given to Kennedy

11111910

SECRET

SECRET

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67

IGR characterizes Agency as  
first unwitting and then  
reluctant accessory after the fact  
in the wiretapping flap

August 1963

Chicago Sun-Time article 8/16/63 -

"CIA sought Giancana help for Cuba  
spies"

68

69

8/20/63 Chicago Sun-Time article

8/16/63 - DDP Helms memo to McCon  
forwarding a copy of 5/14/62 memo for  
record to RFK following 5/7/62

briefing of RFK on phase 1 operation

70

IGR - earliest date 8/16/63 - that  
have evidence of McCon's awareness  
of scheme to assassinate Castro using syndicate  
IGR says its not new knowledge that  
CIA allied w/ gangsters to collect info -  
what is new is that memo connect  
CIA + gangsters to <sup>assassinate</sup> plot re Castro

1111911

May - July 1966 - History Committee

71

SECRET

SECRET

P

71

72 Makeu worked for Marcho against  
Oroniss - Makeu received support  
thru State Dept request from CIA  
in 1954-1955 period

73

Makeu has been used over the years in a  
number of sensitive CIA operations.  
CIA didn't want him to testify before  
Long Committee

74

Makeu may have told his atty - Edward  
P. Morgan the details of the plan to  
assassinate CASTRO using gangster  
CIA has interviewed 3 times <sup>that</sup> Makeu ~~was~~  
1 - Marcho  
2 - Makeu

Seters in Early 1963

75

Skinner Durning Suit

11111912

76

Sydney Gottlieb, Samuel Halperin,  
William Hawley, + Fitzgerald knew  
of it - maybe (Mike Muskovsky)  
also Hawley says he mentioned it  
to (George McManus) special asst  
to DDP Helms - (McManus) told Halperin  
that he mentioned it to Helms  
Hawley denies any knowledge

SECRET

1/M

SECRET

7  
77

Booby-Trapped San Shell

Dr Fitzgerald, Chief SAS  
scheme deemed impracticable 03  
Fitzgerald, Halpern, + Bruce  
Cheever knew of it. Halpern believes  
he contacted TSD on this

M/S

Tab A Source of Info

file furnished by:

- 1) Div. of Security
- 2) Dep. Dir. for Support
- 3) Gen'l Counsel
- 4) Leg Counsel
- 5) Chief of W. H. Division
- 6) Col F. L. King, former chief of  
W. H. Division

biographic file + intell. pubs  
furnished by Director of Central Reference

1111913

List of those interviewed re Castro Assass Plot  
Donald Fitzgerald, Samuel Halpern, Bruce 03  
Cheever, J. C. King, Alfonso Rodriguez,  
J. D. Estature, Edward Gunn, Howard  
Osborn, James O'Connell, Sidney  
Yottlieb, Sheffield Edwards, Richard  
Bussel, Laurence Austin, (Ray Neidley),  
John Warner, Nativ Sanchez, William  
Hawes, Cornelius Roosevelt, Robert Bannerman,  
(Neville Brine), (Robert Obe)

03

24  
M



(Secads)

77

Project Amldash - Rolando Cubela

78

3/9/61 - (Jack Stewart, NY Cy Section)

officer meets <sup>03</sup>Cubela to get his views on Cuba - Cubela non-committal meeting arranged by AAUWHIP1, (Carlos Tepedino) - Cubela's friend

79

Cubela held rank of major in Cuban military - at the highest rank

Project AMLASTH grew out of initial meeting between (Stewart) and Cubela. The March 61 meeting <sup>03</sup> was inconclusive. Cubela said that 1st step to overthrow regime is to eliminate CASTRO which Cubela would do. He requested repeatedly that CIA furnish him equipment to do the job.

80

(Nesta Sanchez) was Cubela's case officer. "The Agency offered both direct and indirect support for Cubela's plotting."

3/28/61

11111914

Jim Onta x Cubela wanted to defect. CIA was for the exfiltration but called off because of report that Cuban police knew of Cubela's desire to defect x his departure plans. SECRET

It was known to CIA officers handling syndicate operation

SECRET

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81

8/14/61

Cubela sends message to (Repedino) that he wants to talk to a "friend" of (Slevents)<sup>03</sup> in Paris if possible (Paris station) ok'd to approach Cubela but no indication from files that actually contacted.

6/15/62

JMWAVE station cable-station asset (AM CONCERT) told by Lucia Echevarria Blanco that Cubela left for Helsinki on 6/10/62.

82

6/27/62 FBI forwards to CIA report of meeting w/ FBI informant on 6/11 in Miami. Informant states Cubela wants to defect. FBI informant was (Repedino). Bureau informed of (Slevents)<sup>03</sup> meeting w/ Cubela.

7/8/62

1111915

(Repedino) talks to JMWAVE station office. (Repedino) identifies this info source re Cubela as the Echevarria. (Repedino) discusses w/ CIA handling of Cubela's "planned defection" in Paris in 8/61.

2/PW

SECRET

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83

7/13 - 14/62  
(William Wainwright)<sup>03</sup> of HQ meets  
(Pepe) in New York. (Pepe)  
will assist Cubel's defection

~~83~~

7/30 - 8/6/62  
(Pepe) in Helsinki on 7/30 -  
Cubel meets w/ (Wainwright)  
on 8/1 - first of a series of  
meetings  
original objective of defection  
Cubel changed to recruiting him  
in place

84

(Wainwright)<sup>03</sup> note - Cubel also wanted  
to assassinate Carlos Rodriguez (top-  
ranking CASTRO subordinate) and the  
Soviet Ambassador & also FIDEL,  
by operation, if necessary

(Wainwright) said CIA must make no  
<sup>03</sup> commitments or plans

Cubel states he would only involve himself  
in a plan of significant action, and which  
was designed to achieve rapidly. He de-  
scribes to help Cuba

8/7 - 8/9/62

further meetings agreed to in Stockholm  
& Copenhagen - nothing signif.  
in Stockholm meetings except that

SECRET

SECRET

7  
84

he had told among his Cuban associates  
of his meetings in Habana w/ (Pepe) ~~Pepe~~

85

8/10 - 8/11/62

(Wainwright) <sup>03</sup> (Pepe) + Cubela in  
Copenhagen for further meetings  
(Wainwright) wrote that he used the  
<sup>03</sup> term assassinate in letters  
Cubela. Cubela found the term  
objectionable (as reported by (Pepe))  
The fact he did not object to (but the  
term)

" It is worth noting here that  
(Pepe), a Cuban jeweler  
(New York), was present at a series  
of meetings at which the assas-  
sination of Castro was discussed  
between ~~Pepe~~ <sup>Cubela</sup> and (Wainwright),  
whom (Pepe) knew to be a CIA <sup>03</sup>  
officer.

8/14 - 8/23/62

11111917

(Caleb Williamson) <sup>03</sup> Spanish speaking  
case officer (from Madrid) meets  
Cubela, (Pepe), + (Wainwright) <sup>03</sup> in  
Paris. (Williamson) <sup>03</sup> planned to polygraph  
Cubela - Cubela refused **SECRET**  
Cubela given S/W + demolition training 7/61

<sup>03</sup>  
8/17/62 cable by (Williamson)  
re: meeting in Paris; elim mission but  
only meeting in Cuba; in volunter  
Agony dilemma not  
to give Cubela any physical  
document mission 8/18/62 cable

SECRET

P  
86

8/29/62 - Cubela leaves Prague for Havana

9/5-9/8/63<sup>03</sup> - Cubela met in Brazil  
(by Wainwright) Repelino, & Nestor  
Sanchez - Messengers Cubela's case  
officer

Cubela reluctant to use S/W messages  
because he feared efficiency of Cuban  
Postal Censorship

Cubela wanted to approach (Ramon) Juan  
Diaz (AM(TRONK-10)) who was  
hiding (Miguel) Diaz Osalque (AM(CE-14))  
(Diaz) had recruiter<sup>04</sup> (Juan) for CIA + had  
address

Cubela told to assist (Juan) in his  
intelligence assignment - Cubela  
concerned about (Juan)'s drinking and  
"neurosis condition"

87

9/14/63

Cubela to Paris for extended vacation -  
to inform Castro afterwards

9/10/63

Cubela write (Repelino) - he want normal  
politics & doesn't want to be your friend  
again

11111918

SECRET

5/11

SECRET

P

10/3/63

87

~~10/10/63~~

Sanchez in Paris to see Cubela  
also present were (John (Tex) Stent +  
Richard Long. French were keeping  
Cubela under surveillance. CIA informant  
French that Cubela intended to defect.)

10/14/63

88

Cubela cable wants to meet senior U.S. official  
preferably RFK for assurance of U.S.  
moral support for his activities in Cuba  
Sanchez felt strongly that contact  
should be made

10/13/63

(Paris cable re Sanchez's return  
to HQ via AMKASIT)

10/17/63

Cubela meets w/ (Stent + Terpeding)  
reiterates his desire for high-level U.S.  
reassurance

89

10/29/63

11111919

Des Fitzgerald, Chief SAs, arranges  
to meet Cubela in Paris to give him the  
assurances he sought. Fitzgerald,  
according to AMKASIT file represented  
self as personal rep of RFK who  
was in Paris specifically to give Cubela assurances  
he wanted. Fitzgerald said he discussed plan  
w/ DPP Helms who said ~~SECRET~~ need to have  
approved by RFK

SECRET

7  
89

meetings held in <sup>in Paris</sup> 10/29 at (Ken Stern's) house  
Fitzgerald used alias (James Clark)  
(Nestor Sanchez) was the interpreter  
Stern not present at the meeting  
(Sanchez) made memo of meeting on 11/13/63

"Fitzgerald informed Cubela that the United States is prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-Communist Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leadership and assumes sufficient control to invite the United States to render the assistance it is prepared to give. It was emphasized that the above support will be forthcoming only after a real coup has been effected and the group involved is in a position to request U.S. (probably under OAS auspices) recognition and support."

11111920

90

"Those involved now recall the purpose of the meetings as being something quite different from that appearing in written records prepared at about the time of the meetings. Fitzgerald recalls that Cubela spoke repeatedly of the need for an assassin's ~~SE~~ <sup>SE</sup> weapon. Fitzgerald ~~wants no part of such~~ <sup>Fitzgerald</sup> ~~deliberate and~~ <sup>deliberate and</sup> ~~unplanned~~ <sup>unplanned</sup> ~~assassination~~ <sup>assassination</sup> ~~attempts~~ <sup>attempts</sup>."

P

90

Fitzgerald says he told Cubela that U.S. govt would have no part of an attempt on Castro's life.

(Sankey) memo states that Cubela wanted to know what technical support we could provide him

91

11/14/63 - (Wainwright)<sup>03</sup> meets (Nepedino) in N.Y.C. (Wainwright) contact report reveals Cubela's reaction to meeting w/ Fitzgerald:

Cubela satisfied w/ far policy concerned but not happy about not being given technical assistance for the operation. (Nepedino) said that Cubela dwelt constantly on this point."

11/19/63 - (Sankey) memo for record:

Fitzgerald approved telling Cubela he would be given a cache inside Cuba - cache could

"include high powered rifle w/ scope  
C/SAs requested written reports on AMLASH operation be kept to a minimum"

92

11/20/63 - following summary is

based on recollections of those involved  
Cubela didn't want to sacrifice his life for that of Castro - eng. the high powered rifle

SECRET



SECRET

7  
92

Gunn, Halpern, (Sanchez) settled  
in use of Blackleaf 40, common insecticide  
as poison that could be used to kill  
CASTRO

93

Plan at action stage on 11/20 -  
Halpern (Sanchez) contacts Gunn  
when says ~~needed~~ a ball point pen hypo-  
dermic that (Sanchez) would take up  
him the following day. Gunn  
then made it up & delivered it  
to (Sanchez) & returned two proto-  
types - as of 1967 still in Gunn's  
safe - doesn't remember (Sanchez)  
returning the device to him - he  
believes he was told Cubela would not  
accept the device

11/22/63

(Sanchez) in Paris - meets Cubela in the  
afternoon

99a

(Sanchez) shows pen to Cubela & believes  
he accepted it but said he would not  
take it to Cuba. ~~He~~ Cubela not impres-  
w/ the device. Gunn (Sanchez) says it  
was not loaded. Cubela was expected to  
supply his own poison

11111922

(Sanchez's) contact party meeting does  
not mention pen or poison

SECRET

SECRET

96

3/7/64 - HQ cable that high powered  
rifle main item requested by  
AMLAASH

3/13/64 JMWAVE can break rifle  
down so must omit from the  
cache

3/17-3/21/64 - 1 Amlash cache  
emphasized

4/24/64 - (Depedina) briefed to meet  
Carlos Jorge Robreno Marquez  
who has imp't message from Cuba

97

5/3/64 Cuba wants silence for  
for Belgian FAH submarine  
gun socket

5/5/64 TSP makes the silence

6/9-6/11/64

2<sup>nd</sup> Amlash cache put down  
with the FAH automatic rifle  
but silence not included

98

8/1/64 - ~~AMTRUNK~~ S/W message from  
(AMTRUNK) re recovery of caches

8/30/64 Manuel Antune ~~associate~~  
goes to France on 10/7/64 to  
meet with dissident members of  
Castro regime -  
11111924  
(Alberto Blanco Romay)

SECRET

SECRET

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98

11/12/64

Cubela in Prague for meetings

99

11/13/64

- Artime reports that will talk to Amlesh if he is contact man for dissidents. Artime thinks if Amlesh is the chief dissident we can forget about the operation

11/25/64 Cubela in Paris

12/4/64 - (Sanchez) request money \$4500

~~to meet~~ for Artime for travel to meet w/ dissidents.

Artime did travel to Europe

and meet the dissidents

12/6 - 12/7/64 (Sanchez) + Cubela meet in Paris

100

Cubela wants to continue. w/ his plans told that U.S. would not get involved in his plan. Cubela said if he needed help he would look elsewhere

12/10/64

- (Sanchez) memo indicates that Agency wants to put Artime + Cubela together w/out their knowing it had been engineered by CIA. But CIA didn't intend to furnish Artime assets w/plan to give Cubela

101

12/17/64

- Cubela + (AMTRUNK) did not go to Cuba site personally - HQ cables to fisherman used to receive **SECRET** <sup>Paris</sup>  
not 1000 101A B C D

4PV

11111925  
15-4

SECRET

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101

12/27/64 Artimo + Cubela meet in Madrid  
for first time

102

12/30/64 - Cubela + Artimo meet  
again in Madrid  
Artimo reports meeting to  
Sanchez in Fla. on 1/3/65  
Cubela told Artimo he hadn't  
been provided silence - If  
Artimo could get Cubela silence  
he would take it back to Cuba  
If one could get another silenced  
rifle, Artimo would cache it  
in Cuba for Cubela

1/25/65 (Sanchez) <sup>in Paris to meet</sup> ~~Cubela~~ ~~report~~  
P.H.H.

2/2/65 - (Sanchez) meets Cubela +  
(Nepedon) - Cubela says  
reached agreement w/ Artimo  
Artimo to provide package in Mexico  
Cubela to take back ~~to~~ in personal  
luggage

11111926

103

2/11/65 -  
2/12/65 ~~MATTHEW~~ reports from (Panama City  
Station) on Artimo's final meeting w/ Cubela  
Artimo delivered 3 packages to Cubela in  
Madrid. Cubela satisfied

16-7

17V

SECRET

SECRET

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3/4/65 -

15-2

103

3/15/65 - (~~Madrid sentin~~) cables that Rafael Garcia-Banzo Duabe in Madrid from Cuba - (~~introd to (Blatten office)~~)<sup>152</sup>

104

claimed to be in contact w/ dissident Cuban military leaders - he was referring to Cubela - Garcia-Banzo ~~had~~<sup>laughed</sup> had defended Santos Trufficante who was kicked out of Cuba

- same-link between Cubela & the gambling-syndicate plot

6/65 - HA decides to term all contacts w/ key members of Cubela group

" It had become increasingly apparent that the circle of Cubans who knew of Cubela's plans and of CIA's association w/ them was ever widening.

105

ing  
Last straw - June '65 -

Victor Espinosa Hernandez tells story to CIA about contact w/ Cubela friend in Paris who relayed Cubela message for CIA that in a position to kill Castro & others but wanted assurance of U.S. <sup>1111927</sup> government support. From his story it

was obvious that Espinosa knew the full details of the Cubela ~~operation~~

SECRET

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106

CIA files don't indicate what kind of "help" Cubela wanted from the CIA!

6/23/65 HQ cable to stations concerned re termination of contact w/members of the Cubela group.

107

Reuter's reports Cuban security police arrested Cubela & Guin who conspired w/ CIA

3/7/65 - Cubela & Guin on trial

3/8/65 excerpts from trial

108

109

Castro sends letter to court suggesting no death sentences for the accused

3/10/66  
transcript

110

Cubela & Guin get 25 years

Q - when is the sentence

Cubela: I thru the sentence away because it was burning my hands

Discussion of Assoc. at High-level govt meeting

11111928

111

Name of ~~Cubela~~ Cubela's dealings w/ CIA from 3/61 - 11/64 mentioned in the trial proceedings. 1st assoc of Cubela w/ CIA was in connection w/ trip to Europe in late 64. Not even a hint of the Ball Point Pen. & Roads

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129 —

130 —

131 —

132 "Phase Two is associated ~~with~~ <sup>in</sup> Harvey's mind w/ the Executive Action Confidentiality, which reportedly was developed in response to White House urgings."

133 "When Robert Kennedy was briefed on Phase One in May 1962, he strongly admonished Houston and Edwards to check w/ the Attorney General in advance of any future intended use of U.S. criminal elements. This was not done w/ respect to Phase Two, which was already well under way at the time Kennedy was briefed."

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111

ISK speculate on reason for w/idea evidence at trial

" Castro may have thought it politically imprudent to allow the expectation of someone so close to his inner circle, who had merely plotted w/out acting. If the full details of Cubella's involvement w/ CIA had come out in court, Castro might have had little excuse for asking for leniency

112

2 high-level interagency meetings at which aspects of CASTRO raised

- 1) meeting of S5(A)
- 2) held on 7/30/64 - 303 Committee probably at White House Situation Room

113

8/10/62

S5(A) meeting

Tom Parrott's minutes of the meeting make no mention of the subject of assassination.

The Coner & Harvey recall McNamara raised the subject - also Harvey notes show it was mentioned by Murrow

11111930

The Com. 4/14/67 memo recalls meeting on 8/9 or 8/8 /62 meeting at SCS operations Room in Pentagon when suggestion made that top people including Castro, of Cuban regime be liquidated

ISK says  
McCombs  
probably  
faulty

SECRET



SECRET

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113

McCone took immediate exception to the discussion & after meeting with McNamara & McNamara agreed. McCone says SCLM never gave suggestion serious consideration.

114

McCone said that terms such as "knock off Castro" & "dispose of Castro" were used but always construed to mean overthrow the Communist gov't in Cuba.

8/13/memo from Sandale to Hawley, Robert Hurwicz at State, Gen. Hanes at Defense & Gen. W. Belmont at OSA. Memo assigned resp. for drafting papers on various subjects related to Cuban operation.

Hawley's assignment had one portion deleted.

Hawley sent memo to DDP Helms on 8/14 saying Lytchen portion said "including elimination of leaders". Hawley had protested use of phrase to Sandale's assistant 7 rank <sup>Hawley</sup> and said should be deleted from all copies.

115

"Hawley told us that Sandale repeatedly tried to raise the matter of assassinating Castro w/ Hawley in the next several weeks." Hawley said he always avoided such discussions. Hawley believes that 5 people inside Project Mongoose ~~SECRET~~ Sandale's intellect or access as an aspect of it.

SECRET

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115

7/30/64

303 committee meeting - Peter Jessup was secretary

116

reference in minutes to 6/10/64 memo info report from DDP to Director. Also to other "elite" including Special Asst to Pres. for Nat. Sec'y Affairs, A. G. report related proposal for Castro assass. mod. to prominent Cuban exile. Name appeared to be involved - also Jose Mario "Pepin" Bosch, Pres. of Bacardi Rum Int'l. Record shows CIA only involvement in plot was the report info on its existence

117

only other evd. of the discussion is a 8/17/64 memo from DCI (McCone) to Beards reporting results of FBI interview w/ alleged participants

118

The Drew Pearson Story

119

The Possible Complications of the Gambling Syndicate Operation

O'Connell wrote report submitted <sup>directly</sup> <sub>to DDP</sub>

120

- 1) Makeu did brief his atty, Edward P. Morgan on Makeu's participation in Phase I.
- 2) Makeu didn't know of Phase II - never heard of it from Roselli
- 3) Makeu ~~is~~ suspects Roselli + Morgan have a relationship

121

List of who knows what

11111932

122

IGR points finger at Roselli as ultimate source of info on gambling syndicate plot and Morgan as Pearson's source

SECRET

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122 —

123 —

124 —

125 —

126

"In learning of the Roselli-Morgan link, we are relieved of the need for speculation as to how the story had gotten out. It is quite likely that Roselli is the source, Morgan the channel, and Anderson and Pearson the recipients, reason for leaking:

... "Roselli is drinking too much and talking and that Morgan is also drinking and talking to a newspaperman friend."

127

The Philippine National Bureau of Investigation has a Puerto Rican in custody who claims he participated in Castro-inspired assassin plot in Dallas. He also claims Castro made 7/62 speech threatening to assassinate Kennedy in retaliation for 2 Kennedy attempts on Castro's life. "We have found no record nor recollection of Castro having made such a speech."

128

The Puerto Rican is probably going to be deported to U.S. —

"We may expect the FBI to take him over and wrap him dry. We face the likelihood that things will get worse before they begin to get better."

SECRET

1111933