

JFK Assassination System  
Identification Form

Date: 4/19/201

## Agency Information

AGENCY : HSCA  
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10145-10263  
RECORD SERIES : CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 54-07-03A

## Document Information

ORIGINATOR : HSCA  
FROM : CIA  
TO :  
TITLE :

DATE : 03/20/1978  
PAGES : 23

SUBJECTS :  
CIA, FILES  
MEXICO CITY STATION  
CIA, METHODOLOGY

DOCUMENT TYPE : NOTES  
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified  
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 1B  
CURRENT STATUS : Redact  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/01/2003

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Box 29

TRANSMITTAL AND DOCUMENT RECEIPT

NSCA

TO: Mr. Goldsmith  
 Select Committee on Assassination  
 House of Representatives  
 Room 3381 House Annex # 2  
 2nd & D Streets S.W. Wash.: D.C. 20515

FROM: Office of Legislative Counsel  
 Central Intelligence Agency  
 Room 7 D 35  
 Washington, D.C. 20505  
 27 April 1978

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	20 Mar 78	Notes of Hardway & Goldsmith & Wolf Dillenger & Gestapo  000253-0000275		SECRET
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block;">OLC # 78-1546</div>				

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FORM 3772B  
 1-76

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KENNEDY

INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

OLC RECORD COPY

Identifying Information:

Name Mrs. BARBARA DILLINGER  
MR. HERBERT GZETZNER Date 3/20/78  
 Address \_\_\_\_\_ Place CIA/HQ  
 City/State \_\_\_\_\_ Telephone \_\_\_\_\_  
 Date of Birth \_\_\_\_\_ (M) or S \_\_\_\_\_  
 Social Security \_\_\_\_\_ Spouse \_\_\_\_\_  
 Children \_\_\_\_\_

Physical Description:

Height \_\_\_\_\_ Color Eyes \_\_\_\_\_ Hair \_\_\_\_\_  
 Weight \_\_\_\_\_ Special Characteristics \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ethnic Group \_\_\_\_\_

Personal History:

- a. Present Employment: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Address \_\_\_\_\_  
 Telephone \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Criminal Record
  - 1. Arrests \_\_\_\_\_
  - 2. Convictions \_\_\_\_\_

Additional Personal Information:

- a. Relative(s): Name \_\_\_\_\_  
 Address \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Area frequented: \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Remarks: \_\_\_\_\_

Investigator DAN HARDY, Mickey Goldsmith & Betsy Wolf  
 Date 3/20/78 Form #4-B

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Mickey R. Smith opened the interview by explaining the release letter and the mandate of the House Select Committee on Assassinations to [Dillinger] and [Bertetner].

Mr. [Bertetner] said that he had been [the head of the Soviet Section] of the Mexico City Station in 1963. His main duty was to get information on Soviet personnel and their activities for recognition purposes and espionage/counter-espionage activities. In line with these goals Mr. [Bertetner] was responsible for processing the product of [telephone] photographic and physical surveillance of the Soviet Embassy and Soviet personnel. Mr. [Bertetner] was also responsible for obtaining information through direct contacts with Soviet personnel and thorough agents who were in contact with Soviet personnel.

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1. Mrs [Dillenger's] main duty was reading the transcripts of the telephone tap operation. She received these transcripts once a day and would review them. Anything of importance or interest would be brought to Mr. [Bestetner's] attention. Both Mr [Bestetner] and Mrs [Dillenger] remembered that they received all the transcripts from all the taps on the Soviet Embassy. This included the Spanish and the English transcripts although the English were usually received later than the Spanish ones. Mrs [Dillenger] indicated that she had a "working knowledge" of Spanish.

Mr [Bestetner] was responsible for reporting the information he developed. He indicated that a report would either be written by himself, Mrs [Dillenger] or a reports office.

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In 1963 Mrs [Dillenger] was working [on a part-time, contract basis] She indicated that the transcripts were read daily as a matter of routine. The photo production was not reviewed unless ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ referred it to them.

<sup>H.D.L. - ENGER,</sup> Bestones reviewed ~~copy~~ carbon copies of the transcripts on yellow paper. Extracts from the transcripts were put into appropriate subject or "P" files. Both were sure that a chronological file ~~was~~ of transcripts was kept. They were less sure but thought that such a file was also kept on the production of the photo operation. Mrs [Dillenger] remembered that they did keep a subject file on Soviet contacts. Subject files were designated by a four part number, (ex: 00-00-0-0).

Both Dillinger and Bestener indicated that nothing was destroyed while Kim Scott was Chief of Station. They indicated that materials were probably destroyed after he left in 1969.

They received the transcripts from either [redacted] or [redacted]. Some of the transcripts were in Spanish and some were in English. Mr. Bestener indicated that he had a close working relationship with [redacted] and relied on him for personality assessments on Soviet personnel. He said that he had nothing to do with getting the tapes and/or transcripts to or from [redacted] except in those rare instances when there was no one else to do it.

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Dillinger and Bestener remembered that information from the tapes would usually

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have been reported within  
a day or two of receipt  
of the transcripts.

They remembered that  
the tap surveillance was  
constant. They also  
remembered that the  
photo surveillance was  
constant except for in-  
stances where it would  
be down for security  
reasons or equipment  
malfunction. They said  
that the photo operation  
attempted to get a picture  
of every foreigner in  
contact with the Embassy.  
They said that the photog-  
raphers had an "uncanny  
ability" to pick out foreigners.

The transcripts that  
they remembered receiving  
were literal transcriptions.  
They had never heard of  
summaries of the conver-  
sations being prepared.  
Mr. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ gave his  
personal assessments orally.

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or in writing separate from the transcripts. Mr. Westheimer does not remember marginal notations but did indicate that [redacted]

[AGENT] [redacted] had made the note about Oswald speaking broken Russian

[Dillinger and Westheimer] indicated that they did on occasion, work closely with [redacted] [redacted] on things of interest. There was not close contact between the Cuban and Soviet Operations.

[Dillinger and Westheimer] indicated that they routinely saw all the transcripts from the Soviet operations. They indicated that [redacted] did not, as a rule, make notations on the transcripts. As a rule he made his notations in a separate note or report. Mr. Westheimer did indicate that [redacted] did make the notation

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about Oswald's Russian.  
He said that he had never  
ordered ~~any~~ not to  
make marginal comments.

Mr. Bestetner said that  
[Absar] ~~was~~ was an exact  
transcript, he never determi-  
nations on his own as to  
whether something was  
relevant to counter-intelli-  
gence, counter-espionage, etc.]

They indicated that every  
conversation was transcribed.  
They could not recall the  
notation (previously  
transcribed)

[They said that the  
unilateral taps were not  
directed at the Soviet  
Embassy but at the private  
residences of Soviet officials.]

Mr. Bestetner said that  
there were no penetration  
agents in either the Soviet  
Consulate or Military  
Attache's office.]

[Dillinger and Bestetner  
said that they had no

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contact with anyone involved in the outside operation other than

Agent

[redacted] these contacts were restricted to [redacted] meetings, discussions, personality evaluations, and on rare occasions transmittal of the tapes or transcripts. Mr. [redacted] indicated that [redacted] involved

Agent

[redacted] more than any other translator and that he was more than adequately competent, reliable and honest.

They both said that they knew Dave Phillips and that he was Chief of Covert Action at the time. They remembered that he had been replaced [redacted]

Employee

[redacted] as Chief of Cuban Operations but were unsure of the time. They described Phillips as an aggressive, active, successful person. They said that he

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would have had access to everything about Oswald if he had been interested because he was close to him both

They said that [redacted] was professionally qualified for photography. He did not run the photo operation. His job was processing and printing the photos in the Embassy.

Dillinger and Bettner said that Jack Whitten was the head of the Mexico desk and that [redacted] to the best of their recollection also worked on the Mexico desk. They said that the info they usually reported would go to CIS or SR. All info reported would have gone to the Mexico desk. The information, cable would not have gone higher unless there was some controversy or higher interest involved. A report of a foreigner visiting a foreign embassy would not,

in Mr. Gestetner's opinion, flag higher interest or create the controversy necessary to attract higher attention. Mr. Gestetner indicated that such a report was almost mundanely routine, especially in late summer.

Employee

They said that [redacted] was responsible for repairing and maintaining the audio equipment.

Employee

They remembered [redacted] as an analyst in the Cuban section.

[redacted] was an outside agent involved in the recruitment and training of agents. He worked for Gestetner.

TEO 10/15/44

[redacted] was part, as was [redacted] of the "clique" that enjoyed Scott's absolute confidence and was involved in running the sensitive surveillance operations.

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Employee [redacted] was also in this group. Bestetner thinks he may have seen the photo surveillance of the Soviet compound.

Employee [redacted] saw the physical surveillance team.

Employee [redacted] was a technician involved in most of the operations, if not all of them.

Mr. Bestetner said that the only time he saw the actual reels of tape was when he was interested in hearing one of the conversations. He said that the tapes were not kept very long before re-use.

Mr. Bestetner said that [redacted] would routinely identify participants in a conversation if he could and would indicate the ID in the transcript. He does not recall ever instructing [redacted] not to make marginal comments.

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In preparing reports, Dillenger & Westtner said, other sources of info would be routinely checked due to their training as intelligence officers.

Westtner and Dillenger were asked if they had any independent recollection of how Oswald first came to their attention. Dillenger indicated that her memory was that the first information that she had received about Oswald was that he was seeking a visa. Mr. Westtner indicated that he had reviewed the file prior to our interview and his recollection was that the first notice that they had was from a transcript of Oswald's conversation with a guard on October 15 about a visa. They were then shown the October 1st transcript.

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Dillinger did not recall this transcript as the first one she saw. After seeing the cable she sent to HQ on 10/8 she said that this transcript must have been the one because of the similarity of the info. When asked whether there was a reference to a visa in the conversation, she acknowledged that there was not such a reference. When asked to explain her memory she said that the reference to a telegram to Washington and the fact that he was talking to the consulate had made it obvious to her that he was seeking a visa.

Dillinger was asked what action she took after receiving the transcript. She said that she would have had already seen the prior transcripts and may have rechecked them. Because of the absence of

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info from prior trans-  
 scripts in the cable.  
 Bestetner suggested that  
 some of the prior trans-  
 scripts may have been  
 unavailable because they  
 were being sorted around  
 the station. An examina-  
 tion of some of the prior  
 transcripts revealed routing  
 indications that Dillenger  
 acknowledged writing.  
 Dillenger had no recollection  
 of checking the photos. After  
 checking the station's files  
 for further info on Oswald,  
 she said, she wrote the  
 cable (Mexi 8:453) and, at the  
 same time, wrote a memo  
 to the Legat. Dillenger acknow-  
 ledged that the routing notations  
 would have been written  
 on the transcripts when  
 she first reviewed them.

Bestetner acknowledged  
 that a filing instruction  
 directing one of the 9/27  
 conversations to the Oswald

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"P" file was in his hand-writing. He indicated that this notation would have been made at the time that the "P" file was opened. Both West and Dillenger acknowledged that the connection between the conversation was noted prior to the assassination.

When Dillenger was asked about the paragraph in Mexi 6453 about the photo she said that she must have checked the photo. She was shown a photo of the MMM and said she thought that that was the man she was trying to describe. She could not explain why a photo was chosen from October first but was sure, since Oswald had indicated previous reports in the intercepted conversation, that the photo production from earlier days would

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also have been reviewed.

He also said that ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

*Employee*

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ may have added this paragraph

The files then shown the HQ response to Mexi 6453 (DIR 74830)

They speculated that Scott had written "sic" after "Henry" to indicate that his name should be noted as "Lee Henry Oswald"

as well as "Lee Oswald". They said that they could tell by the nature of the notations that they were made when the cable was received and not after the assassination.

They acknowledged that Scott had ordered the opening of a "P" file on the routing slip and that such a file would have been opened near the time of that instruction.

Dillinger acknowledged writing the notation that the dissemination requested had been done.

*Handwritten notes:*  
- See attachment  
- copy of...  
- file on...  
- full...  
- ...

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Dillinger said that the memo from Scott to the Ambassador dated 10/16/63 was the dissemination she had written. When asked how she had "determined" that ~~the~~ Oswald had spoken to Kostikov she said that she could not remember but she was sure she must have rechecked it and had proof as otherwise she would not have used such certain language. When asked why they the memo said that there was no clarifying info on Oswald's "request" Westover said that it was clear that they had only seen the one October transcript. When reminded that they had routinely seen all transcripts and had made filing and routing instructions on some of them prior to the date of this memo

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they were unable to explain this assertion in the memo. Dillinger did say that "They had no need to know all those other details."

Both Dillinger and Gestetner said that it was very unlikely that this had been discussed with Dave Phillips.

Gestetner acknowledged sending Mexi 6534 requesting a photo of Oswald. He does not recall receiving a response to this cable. When asked whether he had ever heard that, or any rumors to the effect that, HQ had a photo of Oswald, Gestetner first answered in the positive. He then retracted his answer and denied ever knowing or hearing a rumor, that HQ had had a photo. Gestetner said that if HQ had a photo of Oswald, taken by a to visit in Russia

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and obtained by OCO that he would expect it to be in the 201 file. No!

Gestetner acknowledged writing Mex 7019. He explained giving the date of the photo as October 28 by saying that there can be errors. He noted that the inference was that the date was September 28.

Neither Gestetner nor Dillenger could recall specific details about the post-assassination review of the surveillance materials. They said that the review of the photos would have been done by ~~Employee~~ Employee.

They were asked about the reference in MEXI 7023 about the topic of the first conversation being reported erased before the second one was received. They said that they would not find this unusual.

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Gestetner said that he did not know whether the conversation of 9/28 was reported before or after the ~~data~~ was learned that this conversation had been connected to Oswald by the Mexicans.

Gestetner could not explain why Mexi 7033 ~~(circled)~~ which he acknowledged writing said that all info available had been reported ~~when~~ the 9/27 conversations, the ~~visit~~ had not been reported. He can not explain why Mexi 7034, written by Allen White, says that the only known visit by LHO to an embassy was to the Cuban one on 9/28/63.

Gestetner ~~acknowledges~~ that it ~~would~~ have been very unusual for LHO to have visited the Embassies at least 5 times and not have been picked ~~up~~ by the photo ~~SECRET~~

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operation

Gestetner continually re-emphasized that HQ's visit & the report was a routine matter. He said that it was never considered as anything other than routine prior to the assassination. Hence, it was not surprising to him that HQ did not respond to his request for a photo.

Gestetner said that the nature of Oswald's visits to the Cuban and Soviet Embassy alone is enough to rule out the possibility of a foreign conspiracy involving either the USSR or Cuba.

When shown the "previously transcribed" notations in the 10/1 transcript Gestetner said that it meant they were in Spanish. Mr. Gestetner said that it could be

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Very unusual that  
Karamessines released  
the 10/10 DIR.

As to the possibility  
of conspiracy he said  
that we could rule out  
a foreign one. He assured  
us that he was aware  
of no "har-by-parkby"  
in Mexico. He said that  
he had never seen  
any indication of  
Agency involvement  
but he had never  
heard of Karamessines  
involvement @ the 10/10  
cable before.

We asked them not  
to discuss any of what  
we had covered with  
them with anyone  
other than HSCA  
staff members.

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