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1977 IER

6 AMTRUNK operation starting in 1963 sought to develop a capability to join dissident elements among the Cuban leadership into a group that could not the Castro regime. It was conceived by Cuban exiles and sold to the Kennedy Administration, which assigned it to the CIA.

little concrete progress during JFK's life in 1965 CIA withdrew from its assoc. because believed to be compromised

basic ?! about security some corruption due to involvement of personalities who ^{are} ~~was~~ suspected of having pro-Cuban sympathies, including possibly having been foreign agents

IER speculates that it is unlikely (AMTRUNK) to develop any outline till long after JFK's death suggests that it is unlikely to have provoked Castro at that time to use assass in retaliation

7 a full review of the operation shows that prior to the President's assassination not only had the CIA not agreed to give any support to AMTRUNK / 1, but had rejected his proposal to assassinate "Castro"

"... CIA's Bureau and the relationship between AMTRUNK / 1 and CIA for would have

7

known only that there was an inconclusive assessment that clearly had not progressed to the point that it constituted the base for the postulated provocation"

IOB down + denies possibility that actual CIA plotting w/ enemies significant which may have provided CASTRO w/ postulated provocation for the JFK assass

Items Selected by the SSC for Critical Comment

8

reference to reported 5-hour delay of a Cuban airline flight from Mexico City, awestruck arrival of mysterious passenger

* see file on Hilberto Polcarpo LOPEZ

IOB says flight on ground for only 4-hrs + it departed 1 hr before alleged arrival of the private aircraft

FBI investigated another man who departed on another Cuban flight - info was added for use in SSC report (somewhat), "a single report that caused him to be dramatized as a fall of errors as to be highly suspect"

also SSC emphasis in cable from Mex City station replying to 11/23/63 inquiry from CIA HQ asking for info on collection of information

cable DIR 84885, 28-11-63 11111935
MEXI 7045 (IN 62281)

24 November 1963

IOB reply, part of meeting with [unclear] [unclear]

8 as having contact w/ the Soviets but
9 as the subject of a December 1960 meeting
between funding of Cuban Embassy w/ a
Soviet, concerning press conference to be held
by AMKASH/1 in ~~Feb~~ Feb + March 1961

* "In any event, the meeting in December
1960 was prior to President Kennedy's
inauguration, which removes it yet
further from any possible relevance to the
subject matter. It really is not difficult
to understand why ~~the~~ the reference to
AMKASH/1's name did not lead to detailed
research about him."

I gen'l conclusions

① "The SSC Final Report contains
numerous factual errors, both
in the extensive treatment of a
selected operation (AMKASH) and in
a number of separate incidents that
it presents."

② "while one ~~can~~ ^{can} make the point
in principle that the Warren
Commission could have well
broadened its review to include
the anti-Cuban programs
of the U.S. Government, in trying to
make the case for that concept
Book 10 of the SSC Final Report
does not do so, though it
attempts to do so in its final
part on hand. It is difficult to
characterize it as generally

11

" it would have served to reinforce the credibility of (the Warren Commission's) efforts had it taken a broader view of the matter (or normal avenues of investigation). CIA, too, could have considered in specific terms what most saw then in general terms - the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the assassination because of timing of the time. It is not enough to be able to point out erroneous criticisms made today. The Agency should have taken broader initiatives then, as well. That CIA employees at the time felt - as they obviously did - that the activities about which they knew had no relevance to the Warren Commission inquiry does not take the place of a record of conscientious review.

11111937

" it must be recognized that CIA cannot be as confident of a cold trail in 1977 as it could have been in 1964

TAB B: CIA Pay. on the Inquiries

2. b. SSC report, to considerable extent describes AM-AASH operation inaccurately. The Report assigns it characteristics that it did not have during the period preceding the assassination of JFK, in order to support the SSC view ^{that it} should have been reported to the WC.
- c. question of aircraft flights on 11/22 & 11/24/62 to Havana
see "Unidentified Air Passengers" ~~file~~ folder

Travel to & fr USSR 1959-1962

11/26/63 Cable DIR 85133, 26.11.63

sent to Paris, Rome, Madrid, Copenhagen, Oslo, Helsinki, Brussels, The Hague, London & Ottawa - requesting any scrap info which bears on JFK's assassination

replies on 11/27/63:

HELS 2299 (EN 68739), ~~27~~ 11/27/63

ROME 1235 (EN 68802) "

OTTA 1275 (EN 69005) "

COPE 3469 (IN 69011) "

LOND 6097 (FN 69100) "

OTTA 1277 (EN 69233) 11/11/63

OSLO 4490 (FN 69290) "

MADR 4789 (IN 69328) 11/28/63

BRUS 2731 (FN 69352) 11/29/63

ROME 1235 (EN 69100) "

PARI 1710 (EN 694239) 12/15/63

PARI 1833 (IN 77148) 12/16/63

PARI 1715 (IN 77317) "

LOND 6097 (IN 69100) 11/27/63

4 London reported that British journalist
claimed that when imprisoned in Cuba in
1959 - Santos (happened), lives in luxury
in jail, Santos visited frequently by other
Americ. gangster lady

OTTA 1277 (IN 69233) 11/27/63

O. Kawa reported delight of Cuban embassy
staff over JFK death & instructions from
gov to cease looking happy in public

OSLO 4490 (IN 69290) 11/27/63

Oslo reported Soviets shocked - blame across
on extreme right wing

Other than above, initial reports produced
no other info

11/29/63 DIR 85973 query to Hague &
Frankfurt on Oswald's travel back to USSR

12/2/63 DIR 86077, query to Berlin,
Frankfurt, Bonn & The Hague

BONN 5579 (FN 73338) 12/4/63

HAGU 5116 (FN 73378) "

MUNI 8316 (FN 75065) 12/6/63

STUT 5545 (FN 76758) 12/9/63

ESNT 1400 12/9/63

1111939

above reports produced details about Oswald's
travel from USSR thru Germany & Netherlands
to US in June 1962

5 No evidence found through these queries
& related queries tying the S.O. to Oswald's
assass. of JFK

II Oswald Mexico Visit Sept Oct 1963

Cable to Mex City on 11/25/63 DIR 85655

"We have by no means excluded the
possibility that other as yet unknown
persons may have been involved or
even that other powers may have
played a role. Please continue all your
coverage of Soviet and Cuban Embassies
and your liaison w/ Mexicans

6 DIR 86064 30.11.63 11/30/63

Please follow all leads & tips - Question
of Oswald acted alone not fully resolved

DIR 88680 12/12/63

Continue watch of Soviets & Cubans for complaints,
propagandizing about the case. "FYI only,
Soviet Intel in India had letter sent
to (U.S. Government) leaders demanding
full investigation of case."

41111940

HMMW-12193, 17.12.16 17/17/63

7 HQ forwarded dispatch to Mex City section
commending them on job well done

"Your use of IFWVOY data, the statements of
Silova Dubak, and your analyses were
very important in the quick clarification
of the case, blinding out the really
minor aspects of 'foreign backing'"

III Gen'l Collection Requirements

7 DIR 84603, 22, 11, 63

all CIA stations abroad get cable from HQ saying look sharp for any unusual intelligence developments. - "Be on guard alert while new Pres. Take over the reins"

8 "Were there relevant or significant information on the subject of JFK assassination & Oswald, it would have been reported ~~at~~ either in response to the expression of general interest, or spontaneously, if such information was known to Agency sources"

If one believes that there was a conspiracy, w/ Oswald involved, one must accept the likelihood that his fellow conspirators would not have shared their knowledge beyond the narrow circle of those directly involved. Conversely, if there were no conspiracy, there obviously

9 ~~it~~ would be nothing to report in the first place. The absence of concrete reporting seems to prove, regardless of which is the case, as the basis for the apparent SSC view that no collection effort was undertaken."

41111941
comment in HQ dispatch to Mex City Sta on 12/17/63 - HM MW-12193, 17.12.63 re limited reporting from other stations "... this partly dictated by the facts of the assassination."

in comment to the report, citing Oswald's intel degree, retention in Cuba, JFK says that

9. There were no penetrations of CASTRO's inner circle when any info on subject (JFK assassination) would exist.

10. However, assets in Cuba did have reporting requirements.

III. Unpursued Leads

re Cuban airline flights + mysterious passenger see file on Gilberto Policarpo LOPEZ

11. Flight of 11/22 + 11/25 to Cuba from Mexico were passenger flights -
Flight of 11/27 appears to have been a cargo flight w/ 1 passenger - the man referred to in Book II SSC.

CIA conducted regular surveillance of Cuban flights, filing cable reports to HQ.
CIA had surveillance team, so did the Mexicans. When provided photos of passports, + ^{copies} passenger list.

+ Also have LIEN VOY telephone tap against Cuban Embassy, transcripts of conversations w/ Cuban office + Mexican Airport Control Office.

11-111942

11/22 / 1963 Flight

Book I of SSC report + later CIA could not explain, at times SSC would be informed of follow-up on 11/22/63 flight. In fact, the SSC was advised

12. that the Mexican authorities were asked about the reported flight delay, although there was no recorded response. The current review revealed additional information from the surveillance noted above, which bears directly on the subject.

13. "The report (of 5 hour delay of Cubana flight from Mex City to Havana on 11/22/63) in question was in error, and misled the SSC in its summary of the matter."

The Passengers on the 27 November 1963 Flight in CIA passing report to FBI + FBI not

doing followup investigation for WC

15. ISR's list of inaccuracies in SSC report - other position

1) Mex City Sta did not cable HQ that man looked suspicious. There was a 12/5/63 cable MEXI-7253 (IN 74227) which reported the man had crossed at Laredo, Texas on 11/23/63, that registered at hotel in Mex City on 11/25, checked out of hotel on 11/27/63 & was only passenger on Cubana flight that night - good photo of him taken at airport 11/11/63

2) dispatch followed HQ MEXI-22571, 12/4/63 reporting info & comments for brief of continuing following:

"Source states that timing and circumstances are concerning. Subject, Travel Agency Mexico is available for information."

15 also internal memo in ^{Mex City} Station -
see Memorandum for the Record, 12/3/63
which stated that the man was
reported to have "looked suspicious"

16 Monterey Base Cable 3/19/64
MNTY - 0829 (TN 43193) - info
on Cuban American of 11/27/63 flight
had by agent of Mexican federales

" The following should be noted about
the report: it misspelled the
man's name; it offered a bare state-
ment that he "was involved in the
Kennedy assassination"; it states
that he entered Mexico "on foot"
from Laredo, Texas (according to the
SSC Final Report, the FBI concluded
that he entered by automobile); it
asserts that he stayed at the Cuban
Embassy in Mexico City (while the date
and times of his registration and check-
out at a specific hotel in Mexico
City, where he stayed, were known); it
gave an incorrect number for his passport;
and, it stated that his Mexican tourist
card was issued in Nuevo Laredo, (when
it was known to have been issued in
Tampa, Florida). "

44-1111944

Mex City to respond to Monterey
Station cable regarding to copy on the
subject. When Mex City received
cable, its Deputy Chief of Station advised

SECRET

17 CR MEXI - 8740 (IN 43940), 3/20/64
that the information in Monterey
report "jibes fully w/ that provided
Stanton by (Mex) source, 4 December
63"

"The mistake of that cable cannot
be explained today, but wrong
it obviously was."

"Implicit criticism of CIA's not
collecting more info. on the man is
not well founded. It had no
real sources w/ access to info
concerning him; when a defector from
Cuba became available I suspect
information he was queried and the
results were provided the authorities."

TAB C CIA Operations against CUBA

4 "While CIA produced considerable
material for the investigation (see Tab E)
that more was not reported is a measur-
ful indication what was known (then
by those actually involved (in Cuban
operations (supply of info to W.C.), as
distinguished from what might be hypo-
thesized at a later date. To contend
to the contrary - which has been
suggested by some - would require a
wholesale and sweeping generalization
concerning employees of CIA, many of
whom know aspects of both the most
sensitive and the most
11-11-65

7 Operation AMTRUNK see Folder No. 7 -
Operations to Splet
CASTRO regime; (AMTRUNK
operation)

Alfredo Antonio Moreno Lopez
Enrique Cayardo Robles

Cuban spies - developed operational
concept to overthrow
the CASTRO gov - known
as the Leonido Plan

8 Moreno assoc in Miami

Jorge Agbunzyc Volsky
Cuban citizen of polish origin

married Cuban national after WWII
reportedly imprisoned following Bo. P. govt
reportedly work Castroite

Leonido Plan was discussed w/ Pad Szule
Szule claimed to get contacts - it was
through his intercession that Leonido
Plan gained gov-level support & approval

↓ Richard Goodwin was Szule contact at W. Ho
Volsky & Szule met Robert Harwitz

1. State Dept official to discuss the
plan - he presented the idea to CIA
CIA assigned it to Man Stalder &
became known as AMTRUNK

→ 4/17/63 - Szule tells Harwitz that Miami Station gave
Volsky copy to be used if operation proceeds not
considered official work

9 Early Sept 1963 - AMTRUNK had 3 intelligence
sources in Cuba

41111946

- a) Man Stalder
 - b) ...
 - c) ...
 - d) ...
- Harwitz reportedly died to CIA 10/1/64

10 Oct '63 - decision made to separate
Moreno from operational details
of AMTRUNK because of indiscretion
& poor security practice

By Nov 1963 - some persons successfully
recruited in Cuba but no progress
in setting up a any capability
fraction

11 Szulc & Volsky considered to be
highly suspect - re security considera-
tions

12 also Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez
Castro had Rabel set up Cuban

13 Maurice Lage - held job until 1960
when apptd Chief of Rural Housing
defected to US in 1962 - recruited
by JMWAVE Sta & used in AMTRUNK
activities - returned to Cuba on his
own in 1965. Was arrested and
sentenced to 30 years in prison but
set free in July or August of 1967.

"There were accusations that RABEL
was a Cuban agent as early as
July 1963. The accusations were never
proven."

14 F & R Days - very little planning +
concrete progress in AMTRUNK during
FFK's life

1111107

New Considerations on the Syndicate Operation

14

15 "While Onta (Juan) was reported in early 1961 as being used in CIA syndicate attempt against Castro, CIA had no direct relationships w/ him until he left Cuba, at which time he was used as a source of info on the Cuban leadership."

16

17 It is pertinent to note that in addition to Sturgis's reported role in Castro got re gamblers, Onta's availability for assassin attempt was understood to be due his last payoff to he had received from gamblers in bet. "One can deduce that Sturgis and Onta could have known one another because of their connections with the gambling activities as well as having contacts w/ the men heading the gambling orgs."

18

see vol 19 CIA report

"It is possible that Varona already was involved in independent operations w/ the criminal syndicate when first approached prior to the Bay of Pigs in March 1961 to carry out the Castro assassination. ^{7 per. Revolu. Trust} ^{Varona}

4111948

As late as 6/10/64 - it was reported that these gamblers had been ^{offered} to become leaders of the crime syndicate by Varona as a condition when approached by Roselli.

SECRET

20 In 67 FEB, notes that case officer ~~XXXXXX~~ ~~XXXXXX~~ said that the program reactivated in 4/62 & had been shut down following B.P. in 4/61 - he felt that something was ongoing in interim. "It is possible that CIA simply found they involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had under way" ... "In a sense ~~the~~ CIA may have been peppy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to its material contribution, was also supplying an aura of official sanction."

21 Considerations:

- 1/ ^{Possible} Indep crim syndicate operations Costa prior to CIA involvement in late 1960. ~~to~~ May have continued after B.P. 4/61 shutdown & be ongoing in some form when reactivated by CIA in 4/62
- 2/ Frank Sturges may have had contact w/ crim syndicate. Cards have been used by syndicate in its activities

22

3/ Sturges probably knew Onto. However, Sturges not in Cuba when Onto given assassin role. But Sturges may have fabricated his story for Miami gossip.

23 Arthur V... CIA... was connected w/ ~~the~~ ~~the~~ Cuba... in 3 occasions ^{CIA} 12/60, 7/62, 4/66

The 4 agents named in plan

28

① AMBROW/5 - a) 201 file opened on 5/15/60
 POA issued 12/18/61
 OA issued 1/31/62
 debriefing in Nov 1960 -
 indicates that he had contact
 w/ plotters against CASTRO &
 claimed to have attempted to
 make ~~some~~ ^{similar} plans. Infiltrated
 on 12/9/60 - exfiltrated
 on 2/15/61

(b) infiltrated
 3/3/61
 exfiltrated
 6/19/61

Sold mission to org. resistance
 groups

(c) infiltrated
 12/17/61
 exfiltrated
 3/29/62

still same mission

(d) infiltrated
 5/2/62

arrested 5/29/62 & executed 8/30/62

reported to never admit was CIA agent

name not in McGovern's book given by Castro

11111951

② AMCOAX/1 - AMBROW/5 asked to contact
 him re gen'l plan for 4/61

a) POA - 1/7/61

mission to org. for ~~resistance~~ ^{operating} in
 Cuba

infiltrated
 6/61

exfiltrated
 6/17/61 following D.P.

29

SECRET

29

(6) reinfilitrated

7/29/61 same mission
arrested

8/17/61 - serving 30 year term
in Mc Given's book

(3) AMR06/1 - another AMBRONC contact
for 4/61 plan

a) recruited in 9/60 & infiltrated then
received androps in 12/60
returned to U.S. 5/15/61 following B.P.

b) infiltrated

6/29/61 - mission to org. resistance
groups
& conduct sabotage

arrested 7/61 & 30 year term
name in Mc Given's book

30 (DAMPANIL/7 - another AMBRONC 4/61 contact

a) was a "walk-in" on 4/15/60

POA - 1/30/61

MOC name 8/12/60

mission to org. resistance in
Havana + Pinar del Rio

b) infiltrated 3/3/61

arrested 4/23/61 - 30 year term

in Mc Given's book

c) was infiltrated on 8/60

infiltrated 11/60

(prior to POA) 41111952

mission was sabotage & assass.

of prominent Cuban Communist

members in Havana

records destroyed by infiltration

in Cuba at that time

highly suspicious source who not authorized
to pass information on AMBRONC mission indicated

TAB D AMLASH OPERATION

1 1975 OR says actual nature & sign. of AMLASH
is not def. than Book 2

Book 2 suggests that Amlash may have
been Castro agent w/ provocation mission
that would justify his retaliation &
in alternative Amlash was a security risk
by which details of plotting could have become
known to Castro, providing some provocation.
& whatever the reasoning Amlash should
have been reported to W.C.

"We believe that neither these apply.
The character of the relationship between
CIA and Amlash/1, prior to Oswald's
assassination of President Kennedy,
was so insubstantial and inconclusive
that it provided no basis for Amlash/1
to feel that he had any tangible
CIA support for plotting against CASTRO.
Whether one is inclined to see Amlash/1
as either a double agent or provocateur,
or simply as a man who carelessly
revealed what he was doing, there
was little for him to report or to leak."

As of Sept '63

5 Comment

11111953

"It is noted at this point that AMLASH/1
was not a recruited agent at that time -
he was the only for that matter, as
Operational Approval was never granted
for this purpose. By the end of August
1962 the CIA attempted to recruit AMLASH/1

5 had made no real progress, although
he was viewed as an operational con-
tact w/ potential. On a year passed
between August 1962 and September 1963
when he was next contacted by CIA.
On terms of the relationship that he had
w/ the CIA the critical period, for
purpose of the paper, is therefore between
5 September and 22 November 1963.

7 9/9/62 HQ cable to AMLAH case officer
~~report~~ ^{apparently} AMLAH as chief conspir-
ator allowed to recruit his own
cohorts among whom he may find
persons susceptible to long
distance + covert disciplines -
Cable also spell out long range
requirements prior to action based
on Amblast possible internal organiza-
tion

8 9/7/63 cable reporting first 63 meetings w/ Amblast
"Amblast still feels there only two ways
accomplish change either inside
job or invasion he realizes
lenient realize late out of question,
According AMWHP, Amblast still
awaiting for US reveal plan of action

1. At conference - ¹³⁻¹⁴⁻⁶³ ~~initial~~ ^{reference} to "Amblast"
of the "did not" specify Amblast as conspiracy
in Rome E camp, ¹⁴⁻¹⁵⁻⁶³ ~~initial~~ ^{reference}
and you'll? of how to bring about change
and cooperation with Amblast, Rome

10

"The fact remains that whatever views Amblask/1 may have expressed, he had no response from his CIA contacts of any support for his proposals at that time. Whatever may have been the cause for Castro's remarks at that time they could not have stemmed from anything said to Amblask/1 by CIA officers as they proposed nothing and undertook nothing"

10/3/63 - Amblask case officer arrives in Paris to meet w/ Amblask even tho Amblask told Amblask he does not "intend to see your friend again"

Station officer in Paris had been in contact w/ him, 2 of whom participated in meetings that followed

10/11/63 - case officer cable HQ that Amblask claimed to have "necessary people and equipment inside Cuba) to accomplish overthrow w/out (U.S.) assistance"

Amblask wanted meeting w/ RFK for moral support assurance. Cable indicates that Amblask determined to attempt operation against Castro w/ or w/out (U.S.) support

11/11/63
RFK's typical "jumped" meeting on 8/7 to help sell his personal view of RFK's assurance of full US support if there is a change of the government in Cuba

11 10/29/63 - Ambush meets w/ Fitzgerald
in Paris. Case officer also at
meeting

12 11/13/63 - Case officer memo summarizes
meeting of D.F. w/ Ambush
US support only after real coup
effected + group involved in position
to request U.S. support.
U.S. won't commit to isolated uprising

B D.F. in 1967 IFR recalled that Ambush
repeatedly requested high powered rifle
w/ telescopic sights + other weapons to
kill Castro from a distance. D.F. stated
he rejected the request.
Case officer memo said nothing of operational
nature discussed at Fitzg. meeting

11/14/63 - Contact report of another meeting
in New York re Ambush reaction
to 10/29 Fitzgerald meeting -
Ambush happy about policy but
not fact that wasn't given
technical assistance for
operational plan.

14 1
If Ambush doesn't get advice
and materials from U.S. got
technician he will become
fed up + we'll lose progress
made

Comment Book II at p 18 ^{11/11/66} Chapter 3
Ambush filings in Fitzg. meeting
as unclear. IFR says the matter
is corroborated by declassified report

11/19/63 - Fitzg. approves telling Amalash
what he would be given a cache
inside Cuba, to include high
power rifle w/ scope

11/19/63 - Amalash tells CIA officer he plans
return to Cuba

11/20/63 - HQ calls Paris to delay
Amalash departure to permit
one more meeting which Amalash
requested

On same day, Amalash agrees
to delay ^{departure} of its something inter-
esting. Case officer said couldn't
assure it but it was a meeting
Amalash requested.

16

FBI ^{sup} notes is highly speculative
evidence of indication that Amalash
might receive specific support
be requested

11/22/63 - Case officer in Paris meets
w/ Amalash in afternoon

Conclusion

11. ... there is every indication ~~that~~ ^{11/19/57} that
during President Kennedy's life
Amalash/1 had no basis for believing
that he had CIA support for
much of anything. Were he a
prosecution reporter to Castro,
or if he was merely careless and
leaked what he knew, he had no
factual basis for making a report, or
any other plot directed against
the President.

Specific Sections of Book II

17 View of SSC as to why AMHATH should have been examined by WC is stated at p 5 of the Report

EBR disagrees saying Amblak w/out substance prior to JFK's death

18 Incorrect to say CIA endorsed Amblak's proposal. No agreement w/ Amblak & a commitment to him and even if Castro learned of contacts w/ him there was nothing to learn beyond fact of contact relationship was tenuous w/ no support promised to him for whatever he planned.

at p 68 SSC outlines position on significant plots

19 "we are inclined to acknowledge in principle the possibility - not seriously considered as a likelihood during the Warren Commission inquiry - that other operations could have suffered the defects attributed to the Amblak operation by the SSC Report."

41111959
"we tend to not expect a general attention could have been given by the Warren Commission to the Castro program of the U.S. Government, including CIA activities."

19

p 4 + P 19
SSC Final Report - attribute
Fitzgerald saying that
U.S. would support a coup &

gave gen' assurance that
U.S. would help in organizing
about the coup
attributed to case officer testimony
which doesn't jibe w/ 1963 volume
in subject

20

ISK says Fitzgerald ^{assurance of} support
contingent on if there is a
change in gov't in Cuba

- 21

re to CIA case officers who were
responsible for investigation
at time of WC - saying knowing
of Amblak operation would have
affected investigation - ISK says
"it is likely the views elicited
from CIA employees in 1975
probably were responsive to
representations by SSC staff
members as to what the operation
involved, as distinguished from
what it actually was"

21

Interview CIA office re investigation
read Fitzgerald testimony, interview
memoranda
the AMTAS # case office

same w/ synchmate stuff

Interview 67 FBR staff & internal
docs
also

21

p 249 Book II - reference to 67 FBR
wherein case officer Amlesh
ordered to break contact w/
Amlesh due to assassination of JFK
77 FBR says 67 FBR states that
case officer got cable from City saying
'everything was off' - but case
officer didn't testify that reason
for everything being off was JFK's
assassination.

22 OPM cable never found - it may never
have been sent being case officer
misrecollection. FBR says 2
sources in Book II don't support its
version

11111960

p. n 30, p 17 Book II - ? of Amlesh of security
not until after JFK assassination was ? of
security of sufficient concern for CIA
to break relation w/ him

23 Amlesh as protection - reworked
strangely - several 10 years of Boyer
memoirs - The Book which listed Amlesh
but not for period of CIA contact 3/61 - 11/67

p 26 of Book II - re Amalash name as
 known contact of Soviets
 in Mex Cy - Amalash
 real name in list of
 names on the Mex Cy cable
 above used as basis for Book II
 discussion of why Amalash name
 in list did not lead to identification
 of Amalash operation

- 21 Amalash name brought up by Soviet
 embassy official and Cuban cultural
 attache in 12/60 re Amalash planned
 press conference in Mex Cy 2/61-3/61
 and a report of contact between Amalash
 and the Soviet which was subject of
 inquiry -
 the 12/60 removes the question from
 relevance to subject because of the
 Kennedy crisis.

p 72 of Book II re 7/64 FBI report
 concerning CIA meetings w/ Amalash
 FBI report sup meeting was to plan
 Castro assas. - badly misrep
 time & events - substantially post
 date JFK death + not relevant to
 WC inquiry

- 25 p 75 Book II re testimony of Chief SA [unclear] / CE
 re selection uncertain. Book II
 gives the opinion re Castro assas by
 Amalash full play despite [unclear]
 question as to the reliability

25

P 68-75 Book I re what CIA people knew about Amtrak, what was understood and conclusion that should have been drawn
TGR says Book I overlooks intricate quality of Amtrak relationship during the period in question

26

P 78, 79, 105 Book I re Cuban exile designated A who informed FBI + CIA in mid-65 of Amtrak activities + A relationship w/ CIA. TGR says if read Book I carefully it is clear that 'A' was unaware of Amtrak's assoc. w/ CIA

- 1) info was 1 1/2 yrs after JFK ass
- 2) informant had no knowledge of earlier CIA / Amtrak relationship

27

28

" At the time of the 1967 FS report there was no issue of how to characterize the operation at different times, and the question was not addressed. Facing that question now, it is clear that toward the operational relationship developed after the death of President Kennedy, it was informal and without substance during his life. During that time it was not an assassination plot. The treatment of the question in the SSC Report is both impressive and misleading. "

11/11/87

TAB F

Material Forwarded To WARREN
COMMISSION AND FBI

Items here are reports and other papers
submitted to the FBI (which had primary
responsibility for the investigation) and the
the Warren Commission.

4 sections to the list

F.1 Dissemination to Dir. Comm. Comments

F.2 Dissemination to W.C.

SECRET

E3 Dissem to FBI on Persons & Allegations
 E4 Memoranda to W.C.

F 2

18

Dissemination of Reports to CIA Staff
 " Since CI Staff held the Agency's official file on OSWALD, all cable traffic (inter-ally) including dissemination by cable was sent to the Staff for filing in the official file. Additionally, cable dissemination was released by CI/LIAISON. Copies were, therefore, available to the Staff.

Since CI Staff released all log- form CSCI's, coordination also started from CSCI's, and maintained the CSCI log, the CI Staff received copies of all CSCI's.

18

Dissem. of Material to W.C.

19	Co D.	Date	NOT C.D.'S		
			Date	Subj	D/P
	100	12/13/63	1/21/64	memo from Helms	
	300	1/21/64		to J.L. Rankin re. Draft 3's for submission - Secret 6/1	
	691	1/22/64			
	321	1/25/64	2/5/64	note from Kara	
	347	1/31/64		messages to Rankin	
	361	2/5/64		14 attachments including recent Soviet States, on L-170	
20	1182	2/8/64	2/18/64	memo for FBI	

28 22 July 1964 DDP 4-3712 C.D. 1273
Memo from Helms, DDP to Rankin
Subject: Apparent inconsistencies in
Material furnished the Commis-
sion by CIA and the Department
of State

29 11 September 1964 DDP 4-4793
Memo from DDP Helms to Rankin
Subject: Publication of Documents furnished
to the Commission by the CIA

32 13 Oct. 1964 DDP 4-5275
Memo from DDP Helms to Rankin
Subject: Public. of Docs furnished
to Commission by CIA

DOC. DATE DOC. NO. ORIGINATING OFFICE

1 11/23/63 DIR 84915 (WH/3)

Info related to telephone call on 9/28/63
to Soviet Embassy in Mex City. Request
FBI

2

41111064

Tab E - Materials Forwarded to W.C

Tab F - Media Coverage of Oswald's Visit

Intel. Sources on Oswald's Visit
to Mexico in '63

umbrella type
project

1. Unilateral Coverage

{ LIPSTICK - multi-line phone taps
3 photo sites, mobile surveillance
team + mail intercept operation

LIFEAT - telephone taps -

- handled by case officer
& recruited agents

3 photographic site subscriptions
under LIPSTICK

managed
by a Mex agent

{ LIMITED - fixed to directly of post
Soviet Embassy
LILYRIC - alternate photo base means
street on limited front gate
LICALLA - Southwest of Soviet Compound
borderline - get good TD photos
of Soviet personnel

2

closed down when Station received word
that photo of the "unidentified man"
was being released by W.C

Film collected 3 times/week from
limited and Lilyric sites
Soviet film processed in outside
by the agent like the above

3 mobile surveillance done by ^{11/11/65} American
staff officers - had team of 6 recruited
agents stationed to intercept by
radio from limited site whenever someone
of interest left the ~~embassy~~ Soviet Embassy

3 unilateral mail intercept; Libright -
handled by American case officer

Guam Coverage

unreliable because as was the nature
of Mexican law at the time

4 Telephone tap w/ Mexican, called Lienvoy
^{at one time} run by Mex office - 30 lines on the
listening post, In 61 Station chief
became project case officer on LIENVOY

Oswald Coverage

Mexicans asked for telephone numbers of
Soviet, Cuban & Satellite Embassies
to do Lienvoy tap - we discovered
on unilateral lines toward discovery,
Mex connected 5 Cuban lines, 5 Soviet
lines, 3 Czech lines, 2 Polish lines,
and 1 Yugoslav line - recorded,
transcribed

plus monthly modest summaries for
Station chief of interesting conversations
& time lag of a day or two

5. Boris Yarosoff and Russian translation
translations ran about a week behind
date of conversation. All transcripts
made in Spanish or English since this
is all Stalkief could read & because
he ordered other transcripts for operations
done.

6 Ann Coogan's sister screened all photographs
as soon as station learned that
Lee Oswald had joined Soviet Embassy
0 Oswald came to attention of listening
post operators from tap of Soviet line.
It was picked up & taken to B. Tarasoff
for translation because the caller
was trying to speak in Russian.
There was some delay because Station
personnel wanted to review the
photograph, confidentially w/ the
typed transcript.

Tab G

Selected Newspaper Story w/ Comment
(A5) - Comments on Ronald Neasler's
Washington Post article of 11/26/76
re CIA w/ held details of Oswald's call

2 memo - J. Lee Rankin 3/24/64 for PPP Helms
Subject: CIA Dissem of Info on LHO
date 10/10/63

2) Memo for Rankin from Helms 1/31/64
re Info developed by CIA on
LHO activities in Mex 9/28-10/3/63

3) Letter to Helms 2/10/64 from Rankin

4) memo for Rankin 2/19/64 from
Helms - re Info on LHO in Mex, Helms
9/28 - 10/3/63

Tab # 4 w/ CIA comments

1. Jack Anderson column 5/6/77 alleges CIA activity in Dallas in 1963
2. " " " " 1/20/77 alleging CIA tried to falsify Oswald story
3. Norman Kempster story 1/1/77 alleging CIA w/ held date on Oswald
4. Clark Booth since involvement w/ Cuban exile
5. Ronald Kessler story 11/26/76 alleging CIA w/ held details of Oswald telephone calls, w/ report on handling of documents
6. John Gaskko story 11/13/76 alleges Oswald told Cubans of plans to kill Kennedy
7. Tabloid Midnight story 8/2/76 regarding CIA & Castro
8. Wash Post story 10/1/76 re CIA consideration of possibly interviewing LITTO in 1960