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TO: MR. CALIFANO
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COMMENTS: Califano Papers, Box 2, Folder 13. Memo from Patchell to Califano re: handling of Cuban refugees.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CALIFANO

SUBJECT: Refugee Handling

This paper, prepared by HEW, points up the problems of refugee handling and recommends that only one plane per day be authorized in the event flights are resumed. This recommendation is based upon the ability of HEW to handle that number of refugees through an expanded resettlement program (previously two or three planes per day were arriving).

There is no direct involvement of the Department of Defense in this program. The major issues are as follows:

a. The dichotomy of syphoning off resistance forces versus the normal U. S. assistance to refugees.

b. The dichotomy of assimilating refugees versus their desire to be ready to return to a "new" Cuba.

c. The problem of establishing an additional refugee center to take the burdens off of schools, housing, municipal services, employment, medical and health and community relations in the Miami area (the pros and cons of the establishment of a second center are outlined in the enclosure to the paper).

There are intelligence and security implications in the establishment of a second center which are not fully reflected in the enclosure. I suggest you take your lead from CIA and Justice on intelligence and security matters (Defense could be involved if we were required to establish a second screening point, however, this is of lesser importance).

There is no indication that HEW or Labor have sought assistance from private institutions other than those presently operating in the Miami area which include one Catholic organization, one Protestant organization and one interdenominational organization.
CAUTION:

Although it is not our business, suggest that care be exercised in your placing your stamp of approval on any program which restricts the inflow of refugees as this is against our fundamental principles.

Many of the problems are essentially economic and political and we would do best to be listeners rather than givers.

James K. Patchell
Lt. Colonel USA

NEXT ATTACHED IS PREVIOUS ACTION ON REFUGEES AND RED CROSS FLIGHTS AND SHIPS. (INFO ONLY - IT COULD GET INTO CONVERSATION).
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MCCORMICK BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Cuban Refugees on American Red Cross Flights and Ships

There is enclosed a memorandum containing replies to the President's direct telephone inquiry regarding:
1) when more Cuban refugees are expected; 2) the screening processes at Cape-Code; and 3) the instructions to the State regarding American Red Cross ship and airplane passengers.

William H. Brubech
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Memorandum containing replies to the President's direct telephone inquiry of February 16.
Subject: Cuban Refugees on American Red Cross Flights and Ships

A UBA Miami report (TAB A) expresses concern over the great number of undesirable entering the U. S. on Red Cross flights and ships.

The Coordinator's Miami Office has investigated the situation and concluded that despite some laxity in fulfilling documentation requirements in Havana there has been no appreciable change in quality of refugee arrivals since October as compared to the earlier influx (TAB B).

Neither the Police nor the Red Cross are currently in a position to assure enforcement of documentation requirements at the Havana and since neither have authority to act as U.S. immigration inspectors.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service conducts a post entry check of all passengers without proper documentation identical to that undertaken when proper documents are issued.

No refugees are expected in the near future on Red Cross transportation. The next vessel scheduled to carry prisoners exchange commodities to Cuba next week will not pick up refugees since it will proceed to Central America from Havana.

Cuba has suddenly and inexplicably suspended processing for continuation of U.S. citizens and their families (now totally numbers over three hundred) entering Red Cross flights.
Some restrictions of FBI flights to Cuba during the crisis exist in the South Florida Alliance Center (S.F.A.) at Miami. It has not been functioning. At the border, port of entry immigration inspectors determine on security and other grounds the eligibility of all F.B.I. cross-examined passengers to enter the U.S. Immediately thereafter, U.S. intelligence agencies review all cases for intelligence gathering purposes. When a Red Cross ship or airplane arrives, the case load per agent is heavier than had been the case when the CSC was operating, since fewer agents are currently employed.

Instructions to the police (which they are only partially fulfilling, since this matter is outside their jurisdiction) are:

1. Ship passengers must have valid U.S. visas or visas waivers. Priorities for departure among properly documented Cubans are established as follows:


b. Cuban relatives of U.S. nationals, presently separated from their immediate families.

c. Cuban parents whose children are already in the U.S.

d. Other Cuban families whose immediate members are separated.

e. Humanitarian cases, e.g., individuals requiring medical care or hospitalization in the U.S.
Type of Refugees on Red Cross Flights

1. From 18 Jan – 1 Feb 63 we have had five Red Cross flights arriving in Miami from Cuba carrying "US nationals." Presumably official Washington believes that these people are in truth hardship cases, of US nationals who were prevented from leaving Cuba before this date. In reality the passengers reflect more Cuban nationals than US, and represent to a very large degree Cuban nationals arriving in the US on the coattails of minor children who were born in the US. The specific figures for the month of January are 276 Cuban nationals and 217 US nationals. There were 196 children.

2. The Miami Field Office has been covering all Red Cross flights at the airport, and has interviewed all male adults. The results have been extremely poor, based on a large degree on the very low caliber of the individuals who are coming in. Appended is a memorandum prepared by Q Hunsaker concerning the type of refugees who are arriving, and we think it is completely accurate based on our own observations while covering these flights.

3. While we do not believe that we have any influence over continuance of Red Cross flights, we do feel that we should register our opinion concerning the type of individuals who are being permitted entry into the US under the guise of being US nationals and hardship cases.

4. Hunsaker mentions a number of mentally deficient. This has been quite true of the passengers on board the Shirley Lykes and the African Pilot. The Biscayne Boulevard Office within the last week has interviewed three individuals who had been confined in mental hospitals prior to their departure for the US. I encountered a fourth case on a recent Red Cross flight. Castro is obviously getting rid of his undesirable.
f. Immediate family members of the Brigade.

(ii) Aircraft passenger eligibility is limited to American nationals and their immediate families, and to compassionate cases acceptable to the Red Cross and the Department.

The S Int have now been instructed to furnish a list of prospective ship passengers for checking one week in advance of scheduled departure. To avoid any possibility of undesirable entering the U. S. from Cuba, the Government of Cuba will be notified that henceforth no one will be permitted to travel to the U. S. in Red Cross supply ships unless the Cuban authorities agree to prior screening by U. S. authorities.

Sterling J. Crettell
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

Attachments:


TAB B - Telegram from Coordinator's Miami Office No. 2, February 17, 1963.
MEMORANDUM

TO : Justin F. Gleichauf
FROM : Q. Hunsaker
SUBJECT: Type of Cuban Refugees Arriving

1. It seems obvious that the Cuban Government is utilizing the Red Cross transportation facilities to foist off on the US great number of undesirables. As has been well documented in reports secured from the arrivals themselves, (and the newspapers), the majority of the passengers on the "African Pilot" and the "Shirley Lykes" had little or no connection with the Invasion Prisoners. At the most, the "good" ones could ascribe their departure from Cuba to the fact that they had property the Cuban Government wanted. At the worst, the "bad" ones would appear to be Castro agents, Communists, nationalists, criminals and physically disabled.

2. The arrivals on the Red Cross plane of 25 Jan 63 were just about the dregs of Cuban society. The passengers made accusations against their fellow passengers, and from the reports secured from individuals, it was apparent that many of them were would be Castristas, neophyte Communists, or genuine Castro agents.

3. The arrivals on the plane of 1 Feb 63 were the worst collection of human beings it has ever been my misfortune to view. There were four or five honest hardship cases of very old persons. There were some who were obviously physical wrecks, there were a number of mentally deficient, and there were some who were obviously seriously ill with disease. In addition to those there were extremely low class people, there were almost illiterate negroes, and there were self admitted Fidelistas, and Nationalistas who had left the US after the April 1961 invasion to return to Cuba. Apparently, however, life got too tough for them there--or it was decided they could better serve the cause here.
4. These people are not, in my mind, genuine refugees. They are (1) cast-offs of the Cuban society, (2) arrogant Castro agents, or (3) people so devoid of political conviction that they could owe no allegiance to any country.

5. The wave of indignation experienced by the Immigration and Customs Inspectors is most revealing. These men, veterans of long years of experience in dealing with all types of humanity, have reached the point where they make open statements that "such trash should never be admitted to the US," and before I go on admitting people like this, I'll take my retirement."

6. Somehow, something should be done to call the attention of Washington to this most sorry state of affairs. This sovereign nation should say when people will enter this nation, and should also say who should enter this nation, regardless of how much the do-gooders howl about "humanitarianism." It is my opinion that until facilities are again set up properly to screen these arrivals at Opa-Locka, no more refugees should be allowed to come to the US.

7. The other members of the Miami Field Office Staff are in full accord with these recommendations.

Q. Hunsaker
FROM: CUBAN AFFAIRS OFFICE MIAMI

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2, FEBRUARY 17, 7 PM

PRIORITY

FOR COTTRELL CCA (FOR DELIVERY 8:30 A.M., FEB. 18)

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY RESULTS (AND COMMENTS THEREON) OF CCA/N EXAMINATION OF BASIS FOR STATEMENTS MADE IN MEMO FROM CAS FIELD OFFICE CONCERNING QUALITY PERSONS ENTERING US FROM CUBA VIA RETURNING RED CROSS PLANES AND SHIPS. IN COURSE OF EXAMINATION, CCA/N DISCUSSED ISSUES RAISED BY STATEMENTS IN MEMO WITH ORIGINATING OFFICE, INS, HSW AND US PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE.

1. ORIGINAL MEMO WAS NEVER INTENDED AS FORMAL DOCUMENTED REPORT TO BE GIVEN DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE IMMEDIATELY CONCERNED OFFICE IN WASHINGTON, RATHER IT WAS MEANT TO BE INTERNAL MEMO EXPRESSING PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS OF OFFICERS WHO HAD HAD CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE OVER NUMBER OF YEARS IN INTERROGATING THOUSANDS OF INCOMING CUBAN MALES. THESE OFFICERS HAD COME TO BE DISTURBED AND IRRITATED BY ENTRY INTO US UNDER SPECIAL PROGRAM OF WHAT APPEARED TO THEM TO BE UNDESIRABLES AND PERSONS OF LOW CALIBER, PARTICULARLY ON RETURNING RED CROSS PLANES.

2. WHEN THE BASIC MEMO WAS PREPARED AND FORWARDED TO WASHINGTON, FULL STATISTICAL DATA NOT AVAILABLE TO THE OFFICE CONCERNED. MODERATELY, SINCE THE MEMO WAS NOT INTENDED AS A FORMAL REPORT, IT HAD NOT BEEN PREPARED IN COLLABORATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES INVOLVED WITH RECEIPT AND PROCESSING OF INCOMING PERSONS IN THE SPECIAL PROGRAM. ORIGINATING OFFICE CONSIDERS HANDLING GIVEN MEMO.

This copy must be returned to RMR central files with notation.
SECRET

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MEMO IN WASHINGTON UNFORTUNATE.

3. IN LIGHT FOREGOING, MEMO SHOULD, IN MY OPINION, BE VIEWED AS HONEST, CANDID BUT NECESSARILY INCOMPLETE STATEMENT OF THE PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS OF EXPERIENCED PERSONS TOWARD A SITUATION WHOSE FULL DIMENSIONS THEY DID NOT KNOW.

4. ONE OF MAJOR FACTORS IN SITUATION HAS BEEN LACK FROM BEGINNING SPECIAL PROGRAM IN JANUARY OF FULL KNOWLEDGE AMONG INTERESTED AGENCIES MIAMI AREA OF SPECIFIC CRITERIA ESTABLISHED BY USG WITH RED CROSS, SWISS AND GOC FOR SELECTING PASSENGERS ON FLIGHTS AND SHIPS. FOR EXAMPLE, A PRINCIPAL SOURCE IRRITATION TO OFFICE ORIGINATING MEMO IS LARGE NUMBER CUBANS AND (IN VERY LIMITED NUMBER CASES) EVEN THIRD-COUNTRY (NON-US, NON-CUBAN) NATIONALS COMING IN ON FLIGHTS ON COAT-TAILS US NATIONALS, OFTEN MINOR CHILDREN. INS FIGURES SHOW THAT OF TOTAL INTAKE OF 636 PERSONS ON SEVEN RED CROSS FLIGHTS JANUARY 13-FEBRUARY 8, 277 WERE US NATIONALS, 225 WERE IMMEDIATE MEMBERS (HUSBANDS, WIVES, PARENTS, CHILDREN) OF FAMILIES OF US NATIONALS, AND 85 WERE MORE DISTANT MEMBERS OF FAMILIES OF US NATIONALS. EXCEPT POSSIBLY IN CASE OF THE LAST-GROUP, THERE WOULD SEEM TO BE NO REAL BASIS FOR COMPLAINT IF, AS CCA/M UNDERSTANDS, SELECTION IN HAVANA FOR THE FLIGHTS WAS DETERMINED ON GROUND OF US NATIONALITY AND CLOSE KINSHIP TO US NATIONALS. IN ANY EVENT, AGENCIES IN MIAMI AREA SHOULD BE KEPT FULLY INFORMED THROUGH CCA/M AND THEIR OWN CHANNELS OF STANDARDS SELECTION FOR SPECIAL FLIGHTS AND SHIPS.

5. ANOTHER SOURCE CONCERN TO CAS FIELD OFFICE HAS BEEN REENTRY UNDER SPECIAL PROGRAM (E.G. AS RELATIVES US NATIONALS) OF PERSONS WHO DEPARTED US FOR CUBA AFTER BREAK DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OR EVEN AFTER BAY PIGS. NORMALLY, THESE PERSONS WOULD BE DENIED VISA WAIVERS BY VIRTUE THEIR ABANDONMENT US RESIDENCE AFTER BREAK RELATIONS. NOW, HOWEVER, WITH DIFFERENT BASIS ELIGIBILITY FOR ENTRY, I.E., KINSHIP TO US NATIONALS, THEY CAN ENTER, BUT ALWAYS SUBJECT, IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED, TO FURTHER INS CHECK. CAS FIELD OFFICE CONSIDERS PERSONS WHO FALL INTO THIS CATEGORY AND THERE HAVE BEEN A HANDFUL OUT OF TOTAL INTAKE, SHIP AND
-3-2, February 17, 7 PM, From: Cuban Affairs Office, Miami

Plane, of 3490, to be at best opportunists. It is probably true that opportunist label justified for majority this small group, but pending careful investigation each case possibility certainly exists some have been genuinely dissimilar and therefore represent at least potentially useful. A few Castro elements should be noted that US knowledge of no cases in which denial visa waiver to person who has now entered under special program had been based on suspected subversive activities, if a person entering under special program were to have been denied visa waiver on security grounds, he would be subject to normal INS procedures and controls.

6. Basic question raised by memo is: Has there been a substantial difference in quality in all aspects, including security, health and economic and social classification, between group entering under special program and "normal" intake under PAA flights prior October cut-off? Gas memo takes position there has been and strongly implies special program has been used by Castro as means getting rid of persons he wants out of Cuba (including mental and physical incompetents) or planning in US persons who may serve his purposes here, INS conditions (latter with respect physical and mental condition of arrivals) state that by and large there has been no change in quality. (Should be noted gas generally sees adult males only, INS uses see all arrivals.) Regarding plantings of Castro sympathizers or agents in special group, gas office originating memo believes incidence of derogatory information on or their supervision of arrivals on recent special flights (ship arrivals not being taken into account) considerably higher than in prior prior flights. bulk such cases seems to relate to persons who returned to Cuba from US after day taboo INS, looking at entire (ship and plane) special program, does not consider incidence "subversive-type cases to be higher than in "normal" pre-crisis program. Since October INS has developed about no such cases which are under investigation in opinion INS, none of these cases involved agent activity as matter of normal procedure.
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ANY INFORMATION REFLECTING POSSIBLE AGENT ACTIVITY AND
DEVELOPED IN COURSE INTERROGATIONS CARRIED OUT UNDER CBS FIELD
OFFICE DIRECTION IS PASSED TO FBI, INS, AND OTHER INTERESTED
CBS ELEMENTS.

7. RELATED TO GENERAL QUESTION SECURITY IS NUMBER ENTRIES
DEFERRED BY INS. OF 62% ARRIVING BY PLANE, INS DEFERRED 128
OF WHICH APPROXIMATELY 100 REPRESENTED PERSONS (AND ALL MEMBERS
THEIR FAMILIES) ABOUT WHOM US CITIZENSHIP THERE WAS SOME
QUESTION, ABOUT 15 OF REMAINDER WERE PERSONS (AND ALL MEMBERS
THEIR FAMILIES) WHO WERE MEDICAL "HOLDS" OR WHOSE THIRD-COUNTRY
NATIONALITY CREATED DOUBTS ABOUT THEIR ELIGIBILITY FOR REFUGEE
STATUS. REMAINDER WERE PERSONS (AND ALL MEMBERS THEIR FAMILIES)
ABOUT WHOM SOME SECURITY QUESTION HAD BEEN RAISED. VERY LOW
FIGURE (3 FROM TOTAL OF 2844) OF DEFERRALS OF SHIP ARRIVALS NOT
MEANINGFUL; PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE NO ADVANCE INFORMATION ON NAMES
AVAILABLE. CHECK LIMITED IN CASE IMMEDIATE PROCESSING SHIP
ARRIVALS TO INS CARIBBEAN INDEX. THIS FOLLOWED BY FULL INS
SECURITY CHECK ALL SHIP ARRIVALS, WHICH IS NORMAL INS PROCESSION
FOR ALL PLANE ARRIVALS AS WELL.

8. IN OPINION CBS FIELD OFFICE, REACTIVATION OPA-LOCKA FACILITY
WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL FOR BETTER SCREENING ARRIVALS UNDER
SPECIAL PROGRAM. AT PRESENT TIME, NECESSARILY QUICK INTERROGA-
TION ADULT MALES CONDUCTED AT AIRPORT AND EVERGLADES, FOLLOWED
WHERE INDICATED BY FURTHER INTERROGATION OF INTERESTING CASES
IN TOWN MIAMI. THIS CANNOT BE AS INTENSIVE AS OPA-LOCKA
SYSTEM BECAUSE OF LIMITED NUMBER INTERROGATORS AND "BUNCHING-
UP" OF LARGE NUMBER ARRIVALS, ESPECIALLY WHEN SHIPS ARE USED.
BETTER INTERROGATION IN DEPTH AT OPA-LOCKA WOULD AFFECT NOT
ONLY PERSONS WITH POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION BUT ALSO
THOSE ABOUT WHOM BONA FIDE THERE MAY BE QUESTION. SUSPICIONS
ABOUT LATTER GROUP COULD BE TESTED MORE EFFECTIVELY THAN PRE-
SENT SYSTEM PERMITS. IT ALWAYS BEING UNDERSTOOD THAT WHETHER
PRESENT OR OPA-LOCKA ARRANGEMENT, INS USED CBS FIELD OFFICE NOT
AGAINST DESIGNATED FOR INQUIRY FOR INTERESTED AGENTS, OR OTHER
HAND, INS HAS MADE CLEAR THAT REACTIVATION OPA-LOCKA WOULD
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REPRESENT NO ADVANTAGE IN ITS OPERATIONS AND THEREFORE IT IS SATISFIED WITH PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS.

9. FOR GENERAL INFO, OF TOTAL 2,854 ARRIVALS BY SHIP, 1,050 WERE RELATIVES BRIGADE MEMBERS OF WHICH 542 WERE CLOSE (PARENTS, WIVES, CHILDREN) AND 508 MORE DISTANT. AS EXPECTED, AFRICAN PILOT HAD MOST RELATIVES (712), SHIRLEY LYKES NEXT (326), AND SANTO CERRO VERY FEW (10). IN ADDITION TO BRIGADE RELATIVES, SHIPS CARRIED 1,280 RELATIVES OF OTHER CUBANS ALREADY IN US (507 CLOSE, 762 MORE DISTANT) AND 366 OTHER CUBANS (NO RELATION TO BRIGADE OR OTHER CUBANS ALREADY IN US). REMAINING 147 CONSISTED US NATIONALS AND FAMILIES, AND THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS AND FAMILIES (VERY FEW ON BOARD) FOR WHICH NO BREAKDOWN AVAILABLE (ALLOWANCE FOR SMALL MARGIN ERROR SHOULD BE MADE IN ALL ABOVE FIGURES).

10. WITH RESPECT CUBANS LACKING PROPER DOCUMENTATION (VISAS, VISA WAIVERS), THERE ARE NO FIGURES AVAILABLE ON THIS POINT FOR ARRIVALS BY PLANE. THERE WERE A TOTAL OF THE FLIGHTS OF 16 CUBANS NOT RELATED IN ANY WAY TO US NATIONALS). FOR SHIPS, 1122 OF A TOTAL OF 2,854 DID NOT HAVE PROPER DOCUMENTATION (399 ON AFRICAN PILOT, 437 ON SHIRLEY LYKES AND 286 ON SANTO CERRO). IF POSSESSION OF US VISAS OR VISA WAIVERS WAS A PRE-REQUISITE FOR DEPARTURE FROM CUBA, AND I HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY CCA THAT IT WAS AT LEAST IN THE CASE OF SANTO CERRO, THIS HIGH FIGURE SHOWS LAXITY IN SWISS AND/OR RED CROSS SCREENING IN HAVANA.

11. IN SUMMARY, I CONSIDER MEMO, BASED AS IT WAS ON PERSONAL REACTIONS AND IMPRESSIONS AND INCOMPLETE DATA, TO REPRESENT ONLY A PARTIAL UNCOORDINATED AND THEREFORE OVERDRAWN PICTURE OF THE SITUATION. I WISH TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE ORIGINATING OFFICE NEVER INTENDED THE MEMO TO BE CONSIDERED AS ANYTHING MORE THAN AN INTERNAL DOCUMENT EXPRESSING PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS. AS A RESULT OF MY EXAMINATION OF THE GENERAL SITUATION, I AM SATISFIED THAT, ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN LAXITY IN THE APPLICATION IN HAVANA, IT IS NOT A PERSISTENT CONDITION (AND I AM NOT
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WELL INFORMED ENOUGH OF THE PROCEDURES THERE TO BE CERTAIN THAT JUDGMENT IS COMPLETELY ACCURATE), THE GENERAL QUALITY OF THE SPECIAL PROGRAM ARRIVALS HAS NOT BEEN APPRECIABLY DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF ARRIVALS UNDER THE PRE-CRISIS "NORMAL" PROGRAM. IN OTHER WORDS, THE USG, IN MY VIEW, IS NOT NOW BEING "HAD" ANY MORE THAN IT WAS BEFORE OCTOBER 22. FURTHERMORE, I AM SATISFIED THAT, WITH ONE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION (OPA-LOCKA), THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN EXISTENCE IN THE MIAMI AREA NOW FUNCTION AS WELL AS THEY DID BEFORE THE CRISIS. IN FACT, IN ONE VERY IMPORTANT RESPECT -- THE HANDLING OF VERY LARGE CONCENTRATIONS OF ARRIVALS -- THE VARIOUS AGENCIES HAVE MET AND OVERCOME IMPRESSIVELY PROBLEMS NOT ENCOUNTERED UNDER THE NORMAL PROGRAM.

12. RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) STEPS BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY THROUGH THE SWISS AND RED CROSS TO ASSURE THAT BASIC USG CRITERIA FOR SELECTING PERSONS TO ENTER US UNDER SPECIAL PROGRAM ARE CLOSELY ADHERED TO IN HAVANA.

(2) ALL MIAMI AGENCIES CONCERNED BE KEPT FULLY AND PROMPTLY INFORMED OF CRITERIA GOVERNING SELECTION IN HAVANA.

(3) ALL MIAMI AGENCIES CONCERNED BE GIVEN AS MANY DETAILS AS POSSIBLE AS FAR IN ADVANCE AS POSSIBLE OF PLANNED FLIGHTS OR SHIP MOVEMENTS UNDER SPECIAL PROGRAM, THIS TO INCLUDE ADVANCE PASSENGER LISTS.

(4) THE OPA-LOCKA INTERROGATION FACILITY TO BE REACTIVATED TO HANDLE SPECIAL PROGRAM ARRIVALS, ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS WILL IMPROVE INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND WILL NOT AFFECT SIGNIFICANTLY INS OPERATIONS.
POSITION PAPER IN REGARD TO THE HANDLING OF CUBAN REFUGEES IF FLIGHTS WERE TO BE RESUMED

Question: WHAT SHOULD THE UNITED STATES DO TO HANDLE THE ASSIMILATION, TEMPORARY OR PERMANENT, OF CUBAN REFUGEES ARRIVING AT THE RATE OF 400 TO 500 A DAY?

The answer to this question must be considered from the standpoint of two alternative assumptions:

(1) Continuation of the entry of the refugees into Miami with no provision for immediate mandatory Government directed movement (not resettlement in the strict sense of the word) to other areas; or

(2) Initial entry into other areas of the United States directly from Cuba or by Government directed movement from Miami immediately after arrival.

Were daily arrivals into Miami to be resumed but at an increased rate of from 400 to 500 a day with no provision for immediate mandatory Government directed movement elsewhere, an intolerable situation would develop in Miami because social, economic, and health facilities of that city are already overburdened by the existing Cuban refugee population.

During the calendar year 1962, approximately 82,000 refugees registered at the Miami Center and about 35,000 were resettled, leaving a net gain in the refugee population in Miami of 47,000 persons. There is an estimated 100,000 plus Cuban refugees now living in Miami who are severely taxing the total facilities of the area.

Arrivals at the rate of 400 to 500 a day, or 146,000 to 182,500 a year, is a 75% to 120% increase over 1962. Assuming that we were successful in increasing the resettlement figure to 52,000 persons per year, the increase in the Cuban refugee population in Miami would be between 94,000 and 130,000 a year. Accordingly, if the 400 to 500 daily arrivals were to begin on March 1, 1963, Miami's refugee population would approach, or be in excess of, 200,000 by March 1, 1964. This would have an extremely heavy impact upon the total economy of Miami and would exceed by far its ability to provide necessary housing, educational, social, health, and other facilities required by the refugees.

Examples of problems which would be created are:

1. Housing. This would probably be one of the areas of greatest impact. Exact statistics are lacking, but what follows sums up prevailing conditions in Miami. About one-half of the 100,000 refugee population live near the central Miami city region. One-quarter are in other sections of the city and the remaining one-quarter reside in county regions adjacent to the city or considerably removed from it. Recent surveys indicate that while there are no real slum conditions as yet, there is already considerable over-crowding in refugee dwellings.
Housing will be further complicated by area re-development and expressway construction already underway in Miami which will eliminate housing currently used by Negroes. An unestimated number of refugees will also be affected. There is every likelihood that Negroes will penetrate the fringes of the so-called "Cuban" areas in search of housing and that both elements will become competitors seeking low-cost housing. The result will be to add to existing real or imagined economic dislocation of both Negroes and the refugees with the inevitable local public opinion supporting the local Negroes.

2. School facilities. The public schools presently accommodate about 18,000 refugee children. The parochial system has about 5,000. The capacity of the latter has been at the overflow level for some time. The public school system is also at the point where its facilities are being stretched to the utmost. Use of portable buildings, double shifting, and "bussing" of refugee children to other areas already exist. Under the impact of the 1962 net increase in Miami's refugee population of 47,000 persons, the public school's refugee child load rose from about 11,000 at the start of 1962 to about 18,000 by the end of the year. If one applies the 1962 ratio of 150 students for each 1,000 rise in the refugee population to the estimated net increase in the population (were arrivals to reach 400 to 500 per day), the public school system would have to absorb at least another 14,000 students by March 1, 1964. This would give them a total refugee child school registration of at least 32,000 which is far in excess of available or anticipated facilities.

3. Employment. There are no solid figures for the number of refugees who have full or part-time employment in the Miami area. However, with about 100,000 refugees in the area—60,000 of whom are receiving assistance—it is reasonable to assume that 15,000 heads of refugee families have jobs of some kind. Despite the lack of solid data, it is safe to assume that refugee employees have dislodged others, particularly Negroes, from former jobs.

A net population increase (as computed previously) of at least 94,000 refugees would probably add at least another 30,000 potential job seekers in Miami who would be competing with other refugees and larger numbers of indigenous Negroes and whites. Total unemployment in Miami is already high—currently estimated at about 12% to 14%.

Miami does not have an industrially-based economy. New plants are coming into the area, but they will also attract skilled labor from other parts of the nation. There is no foreseeable time when Miami's economy will be able to absorb its present native and refugee employables.

4. Municipal services such as police, fire, sanitation, etc. No effort is made here to calculate the impact upon these facilities of the already existing or hypothetical refugee population in Miami. But it seems quite obvious that there will be a heavy impact which would require substantial expansion of services. Federal financial support would undoubtedly be sought for this purpose.
5. Medical and health facilities. The primary source of these services for refugees at present is the Miami Center's medical dispensary and cooperating hospitals. The dispensary will be working to full or over-capacity even with the planned increase in staff and facilities in terms of the present refugee population. Out-patient, in-patient facilities at county and private hospitals are also severely taxed by the current refugee population level. A 100% increase in the refugee population would add an unsupportable quantitative load to the Center's dispensary and outside facilities. Over 1,200 patients are now being treated each week at the Center dispensary and another 300 to 400 are treated at the hospitals.

6. Community relations. Difficult to assess—although not an acute problem at this time—it is doubtful that public officials or the general population in Miami and Dade County would accept without serious complaint a renewed refugee influx of the magnitude proposed by the question. A 100% increase in the refugee population would obviously add to current economic and social problems and create increased hostility toward the Cubans.

The HEW Cuban Refugee Center is currently planning an organized community relations project to assuage the resentment that now exists—based on real but mostly exaggerated situations. We seriously question whether any community relations program could successfully cope with the impact in Miami of an annual increase of 100,000 additional Cuban refugees.

General Observations: If the refugee influx goes to 400 to 500 persons a day, one of the following would have to be accomplished to avoid a substantial increase in the Miami Cuban refugee population.

a. remove at least 100,000 refugees a year from the Miami area either through resettlement or mandatory Government directed movement. Based upon experience over the past two years, an orderly, planned resettlement program of this magnitude is almost impossible of accomplishment. The implications of Government directed movement would require policy decisions at the highest level of Government.

b. construct or make use of existing facilities to serve as reception or processing centers and to house refugees in transit residence. Such a facility would have to provide lodging, mess, medical, protection, and social services as a minimum. School facilities would also have to be provided for children, and language training, etc., for adults. No effort has been made to compute the costs involved, but they would run into the millions of dollars. More importantly, the "refugee camp," a concept which is highly undesirable for reasons that are obvious, should be avoided.

c. use of Miami as a transit port of entry with Government directed movement within 24 hours of arrival to the location of one or more Centers elsewhere in the United States.

d. by-passing Miami as an initial point of entry and establishing such points in certain key locations. This would be the equivalent of establishing new refugee centers in a number of localities. It might be easier to by-pass Miami completely in the first place than it would be to force movement from Miami after entry.
For a review and analysis of the "considerations involved in establishing a second Cuban refugee center," see the attached summary of a study made in March 1962. While the figures in that report are no longer valid, the paper presents a fairly comprehensive review of virtually every factor--social to fiscal--and lists eleven factors "militating against the establishment of" another refugee center. (Incidentally, the additional costs are understated based on current information, and such costs would be further increased if the influx were approximately doubled over that contemplated in the paper.) The study was concerned with the establishment of a second center in New Orleans. However, the same basic considerations would be valid for other areas.

e. A highly developed resettlement program (either out of Miami or out of Miami and one or more additional centers) is an essential part of any approach to the handling of additional refugees relating to restoration of flights--regardless of the rate of arrival per week.

Regardless of what is done to reduce the impact on Miami, planned resettlement remains in our judgment the only long-range, constructive approach either to handling the present refugee population in Miami or any new refugee concentration elsewhere. As previously stated, the prospect of reaching and maintaining an over-all resettlement rate at a 100,000-a-year level within the foreseeable future cannot be expected.

There are several steps which could be taken to enhance resettlement opportunities. Several of these require high-level policy decision but are of great importance to an acceleration of the resettlement program. These items include, among others:

1. Adjustment of refugee status from that of parole or waiver to that of alien admitted for permanent residence;

2. Control over the type of refugees admitted to the United States;

3. Screening out of those who should be eliminated for reasons of mental and physical health with due regard being paid to the humanitarian aspect of reunion of families.

However, even if these steps were adopted, it is questionable whether the voluntary approach to resettlement could reach more than a 50,000-a-year level.

Conclusions and Recommendations

It is our judgment that the foregoing information substantiates the following conclusions and recommendations.

Conclusions:

1. That the facilities of Miami are such that it cannot accept a restoration of an influx of Cuban refugees of a magnitude approximating 400 to 500 a day. Furthermore, were this influx to be forced upon Miami, public opinion would react violently against such a move.
(2) That there are considerations of service and cost which make the desirability of opening a second center subject to substantial question.

(3) That the question of Government directed movement of either the existing Cuban population or new arrivals from Miami should receive the highest possible policy consideration within the Government. The use of facilities as reception centers should also be subject to the same type of scrutiny.

(4) That not more than 50,000 Cuban refugees a year can be resettled from the Miami (or other) area through a voluntary resettlement program.

Recommendations:

Based upon the four above listed conclusions, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare would strongly urge that the number of new Cuban refugees permitted to enter this country be restricted to a number which would not exceed our ability to resettle them within the various communities of this country. This maximum figure for the foreseeable future appears to be 50,000 a year, or approximately 1,000 a week. This would represent approximately one flight per day. This is only about one-third of the number who would enter if 400 to 500 Cuban refugees were admitted a day. Additional consideration can be given to this matter after appropriate exploration is made of alternative courses of action such as the use of reception centers and Government directed movement. Consideration should also be given to the possibility of controlling emplanement of passengers in Cuba to assure that to the extent possible priority is given to parents of unaccompanied children and to close relatives of Cuban refugees already in the United States.
The establishment of a second Cuban refugee center in New Orleans has been proposed as one method of relieving the mounting pressure upon the social, economic and health facilities of Miami due to the increasing number of Cuban refugees who enter the United States at Miami, Florida, and remain there.

To be effective, it would be necessary that Cuban refugees coming to the United States be diverted from Miami. Thus, if no substantial number of additional refugees were to arrive in Miami and the voluntary agencies in the Miami center would continue their resettlement activities with some success, the pressures on Miami would be lessened. The optimum effect of a second Cuban refugee center would be to reduce the migration of additional refugees to Miami to a trickle and to relocate a number of those who were in Miami prior to the establishment of a second center. To achieve the above objectives, it is essential that:

1. The great bulk of Cuban refugees who would otherwise enter the United States at Miami would be directed to New Orleans. Refugees might travel to New Orleans via Miami where INS inspection would take place, or travel directly to New Orleans.

2. Services similar to those in Miami be available to Cuban refugees in New Orleans. If a stop-over in Miami was not made, the necessary services would include INS inspection and Federal center registration. In any case, it would be necessary to provide financial assistance, health care, education, resettlement, and employment for individuals and families and care and protection of unaccompanied children.

In weighing the feasibility of a second refugee center, consideration should be given to whether a second center would achieve the desired objectives and if so, the price (financial and otherwise) which would need to be paid. Important to this consideration are the current situation in Miami, the flow of Cuban refugees to the United States, the cost of establishing a second center for Cuban refugees and of providing the necessary supporting services in New Orleans, and the effect any such move would have on Federal-State relations and National Policy with respect to the refugees.

A. Factors in Favor of Establishing a Second Cuban Refugee Center in New Orleans, Louisiana

1. A second refugee center located in any part of the United States should drastically reduce the entry of Cubans in Miami. Boat travelers would continue to arrive in Miami and undoubtedly some refugees entering at New Orleans would find their way to Miami. But the overall effect in relieving the social, economic, and health pressures upon Miami should be significant.
2. The absence of a large, well-established Cuban community in New Orleans might facilitate resettlement. There would be much less informal help to Cuban refugees in finding housing, jobs, and adjusting to American life than in Miami and less attraction to remain in New Orleans.

3. There is a limit to the number of refugees Miami can continue to absorb without serious consequences for its permanent residents and Cuban refugees. It is not possible to determine accurately what this absorption point might be, but it would seem that a city with a population of 980,000 could not absorb many more than the approximately 100,000 Cuban refugees already in Miami.

B. Factors Militating Against the Establishment of a Refugee Center in New Orleans

1. Getting the refugees to go to New Orleans instead of Miami. Unless we can either stop existing direct flights from Havana to Miami or coerce the choice of New Orleans, the Port of natural selection will continue to be Miami. The only apparent means of reversing the process of natural selection would be to use our influence so that the only direct flights available from Cuba would be to New Orleans. With no other choice, presumably the New Orleans flights would be filled.

2. In setting up another center in New Orleans, the Federal Government would be creating a local problem. The community would not be asking for help because of problems created by natural in-migration. As such, DHHEW would be soliciting cooperation of State and local authorities to act as the agent of the Federal government in providing certain services or in making their facilities available to Cuban refugees. This was the converse of the situation in Florida. Hence, there is no assurance that State and local authorities would cooperate willingly with the Federal government, or that they would be willing to absorb certain costs, such as the Florida State Department of Public Welfare and Dade County school system have done.

3. A second refugee center in New Orleans would add to program costs. For example, to provide a level of assistance payments to Cuban refugees in New Orleans commensurate with the public assistance programs would require a monthly average payment of $85.85 per case whereas the Florida Department of Public Welfare estimated assistance payments for March 1962, at about $72.55 per month. This alone would require an additional 4 million plus dollars. In addition, salary and office costs are higher in New Orleans than in Miami. It is also assumed that Louisiana and New Orleans would expect to be reimbursed the full cost of educating children of Cuban refugees, and that it would be necessary to accord similar consideration to Florida. In addition, the very fact of a second center would involve an increase in such items of expense as overhead, rental of IBM equipment, as well as considerable communications, record-keeping, and coordination problems, with resultant additional costs.

4. A second center may increase total resettlement and job placements but not necessarily in direct proportion to the staff engaged in resettlement or job finding. Actually, two centers might be competing for approximately the same potential number of resettlements and jobs.
5. The additional resettlements expected from a second refugee center might be realized by merely increasing the present resettlement staff in the Miami center. Increasing the resettlement staff in Miami would constitute a relatively small part of the additional cost of operating a second refugee center.

6. Cuban refugees in New Orleans would need more help from agencies in locating housing and in using community services because the smaller Cuban community in New Orleans could not provide the help furnished refugees by the large and well established Cuban community of Miami. Stated in the positive, the Miami Cuban community provides invaluable help to Cuban refugees in adjusting to a new culture and in attaining self-support. Because of a lack of a large Cuban community in New Orleans it is also contemplated that a higher proportion of registrants at the Center would apply for financial assistance than is the case in Miami.

7. It would be difficult to justify the separation of families and to prevent refugees with relatives or friends in Miami from gravitating there.

8. Coordinating work of two centers would be complicated, time-consuming and expensive, and would probably require a sizeable administrative organization.

9. If the second center does not succeed in resettling refugees quickly, it is possible that the result might be another Miami, so that instead of solving one serious problem the Department may be confronted with two serious problems.

10. It would be difficult to arrange air transportation from Havana to New Orleans. No airline is flying that route presently and the cost of transportation to New Orleans would probably be double the cost to Miami. Since fares are now payable only in Cuban pesos which must be spent in Cuba, it would probably be necessary for the Federal government to subsidize the operation.

11. There are approximately 1,500 Cuban refugees now living in the New Orleans area who, it is estimated, would file for financial assistance. Under present policies only persons residing in the Miami area are eligible for such assistance.

C. Pros and Cons of Stop-Over in Miami En-Route to New Orleans

Pros:

1. The advantage of a stop-over in Miami is that the facilities available for inspection by INS and registration by the Cuban Refugee Center in Miami could be used to perform these functions for Cuban refugees entering the United States at New Orleans, Louisiana, without any additional cost. This would avoid the necessity of duplicate facilities in New Orleans to perform like functions with the attendant problems of recruiting and training staff and finding suitable office space, and securing additional appropriations.
2. It would not be necessary to arrange for direct flights to New Orleans and charter arrangements from Miami to New Orleans are readily accomplished.

Cons:

To arrange a stop-over in Miami for screening and registration would entail the operation of a congregate housing and feeding program in order to carry out these functions efficiently and to prevent refugees from entering Miami. The organization and operation of a congregate housing and feeding program would necessitate housing facilities, staff, equipment, etc., all of which would have to be provided by the Federal government. Furthermore, there is no way to forcibly ship anyone to New Orleans after this process even if it were considered possible on policy grounds. There will be a natural desire to join relatives and friends in Miami. Certainly this would complicate the work of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in administering the Cuban refugee program. Though additional costs would be entailed to screen and register refugees in New Orleans, these costs would be partially offset by the savings resulting from reducing the volume of this work in Miami.