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JOINT UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
TASK FORCE, ATLANTIC
Fort Bragg, North Carolina

COMJUWTA CS

18 December 1962

HISTORICAL RECORD OF JUWTA CUBAN OPERATION

1. PURPOSE.

The purpose of this report is to document activities of Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Atlantic (JUWTA) during the CUBAN operations from 25 October 1962 through 1 December 1962.

2. GENERAL.

a. JUWTA was activated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina on 25 October 1962 by direction of Commander in Chief, Atlantic with the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Major General (then Brig Gen) William P. Yarborough, Commanding General, US Army Special Warfare Center was designated Commander, JUWTA as an additional duty by CINCJUWTA with the concurrence of CG, USCONARC.

b. CINCJUWTA component commanders, with the exception of CINCLANT activated JUWTA component forces required under Appendix XI to Annex V of CINCJUWTA Contingency Operation Plan 314/316-61 and passed operational control to JUWTA on 26 October 1962. CINAJUWTA was not activated during the emergency. OPCON of Naval forces listed in Appendix XI was not passed to COMNAVJUWTA. Naval forces were made available on an "as required" basis.

c. Planning and operations commenced on 26 October 1962 and continued through 1 December 1962.

3. MISSION.

a. The JUWTA mission was to prepare, coordinate, and execute as directed by CINCJUWTA, a detailed country plan for the conduct of unconventional warfare (UW) operations in CUBA.

b. As stated in COMJUWTA (Draft) OPLAN 314/316-62, COMJUWTA would, when directed by CINCJUWTA, conduct unconventional warfare operations in CUBA in support of and in coordination with plans and objectives of CINCJUWTA component commanders to:

   (1) Reduce the combat effectiveness and morale of the CASTRO Government.

   (2) Provide US military personnel and other selected individuals the means to remain free from enemy control in unfriendly territory.
CONJUWTF A CS

SUBJECT: Historical Record of JUWTFA CUBAN Operation

18 December 1962

(3) Reduce the military, psychological and political potential of the CASTRO Government.

(4) Assist in establishing friendly political control in CUBA.

4. AUGMENTATION.

a. JUWTFA.

(1) Prior to the activation of JUWTFA, JUWTFA planning and functions were a responsibility of the Plans Division (JS8) of CINCLANT. At activation, JUWTFA was organized in accordance with the joint Table of Distribution in Appendix II to Annex Y of CINCLANT OPLAN 314/316-61 and provided 26 officers and seven enlisted men. JUWTFA was augmented with additional personnel under authority contained Sub-section 5, Section 2, JCS Pub 2, dated November 1959, subject: Unified Action Armed Forces, (UNAAF).

(2) The initial staffing of JUWTFA was inadequate and required considerable personnel augmentation to provide internal and external security, communications and administrative support, liaison, and additional staff personnel to plan and conduct operations.

(3) Additional personnel and equipment were obtained from the Army and Air Force to provide essential communications on a twenty-four hour basis, provide adequate administrative and control procedures, and augment the staff to meet all operational requirements.

(4) Based on the augmentation needed to make JUWTFA fully operational, recommendations were submitted by CONJUWTF A letter, dated 26 November 1962, subject: "Organization for the Conduct of Unconventional Warfare in the Atlantic Command Area." This letter proposes a new Joint Table of Distribution providing for a full wartime complement, a planning staff, and the necessary staff augmentation to bring the planning staff to its full wartime complement.

b. ARJUWTF A.

(1) Colonel William Evans-Smith, Commanding Officer, 7th Special Forces Group Airborne, 1st Special Forces was designated Commander, Army Forces, JUWTFA (COMARJUWTF A) on 26 October 1962. A command and control element, Special Forces Operational Base (SFOB), was activated at Fort Bragg, and COMARJUWTF A was assigned operational control of Army Forces listed in Appendix II to Annex Y of CINCLANT OPLAN 314/316-61, less the military police platoon, light truck company, and CIC detachment.

(2) Subsequently, CG, USA SWAR Cen was directed by CINCARLANT to provide ARJUWTF A, from within U. S. Army Special Warfare Center resources, the psychological warfare, CIC, light truck and military police type support.
TOP SECRET

COMJUWTA CS

SUBJECT: Historical Record of JUWTA CUBAN Operation

listed under Appendix II to Annex Y of CINCIANT OPLAN 314/316-61. Augmentation from outside U. S. Army Special Warfare Center resources was required to provide military police type support for both JUWTA and ARJUWTA security. Two officers and 66 enlisted men were attached to ARJUWTA as a substitute measure.

(3) In addition to the above augmentation, the SFRP was augmented to achieve a proper operational readiness status. Further, ARJUWTA operational planning and training exercises conducted indicated a requirement for additional SFRP augmentation and increased force tabs to properly undertake operations in CUBA. Recommendations for changes in the ARJUWTA troop list were forwarded to CINCIANT by 1st Indorsement, this headquarters, dated 3 December 1962, to Letter, Headquarters, 7th Special Forces Group (Abn), 1st Special Forces, dated 26 November 1962, subject: Recommended Changes to Troop List in COMJUWTA OPLAN 314-61 (U).

c. ARJUWTA.

(1) Colonel Chester Jack, Commanding Officer, 1st Air Commando Group, was designated Commander, ARJUWTA (COMARJUWTA) on 26 October 1962. A command and control element from the 1st Air Commando Group was activated at Eglin AFB Auxiliary Number 9, FLORIDA, and COMARJUWTA was assigned operational control of Air Force Forces listed in Appendix II to Annex Y of CINCIANT OPLAN 314/316-61.

(2) Augmentation to ARJUWTA forces listed, was not required.

d. NAVJUWTA.

(1) Captain I. J. Superfine, USN, was designated Commander, NAVJUWTA (COMNAVJUWTA) on 26 October 1962 with no assigned forces.

(2) Naval forces listed in Appendix II to Annex Y of CINCIANT OPLAN 314/316-61 were to be provided by CINCIANTFLT to COMNAVJUWTA for support of JUWTA operations as required.

(3) Two SEAL Team Detachments, one officer and five enlisted men each, were assigned to operational control of COMNAVJUWTA on 5 November 1962.

(4) CINCIANT provided two submarines for support of joint Special Forces - SEAL Team amphibious training (4-5 November and 16-17 November) and for support of Exercise DEVIL'S TRIDENT (30 Nov - 4 Dec).

(5) Augmentation to NAVJUWTA forces listed above was not required.
Subject: Historical Record of JUWIFA CUBAN Operation

5. Exercises Conducted: During the period 20 October 1962 through 4 December 1962, JUWIFA monitored and/or conducted the following exercises and training:

a. Amphibious Training Exercise:

(1) During the period 2-5 November 1962, twelve selected Special Forces personnel conducted Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) lock-out training from submarine USS SPINEFISH, vicinity Norfolk, Virginia. Adverse weather and the inability of submarines to bottom due to external SONAR equipment precluded fulfillment of all training objectives. However, familiarization was accomplished in lock-out procedures and the techniques of lung swim drills, shipboard training, and infiltration from submarines. This training pointed out certain deficiencies in amphibious entry techniques. Further joint training is required to perfect and standardize Special Forces techniques in all phases of amphibious entry operations.

(2) During the period 3-4 November 1962, the two Special Forces "A" Detachments scheduled for infiltration from submarines participated in amphibious infiltration training vicinity Newport, Florida. Utilizing submarines USS SEA CAT and USS TIRANTE, training was conducted in embarkation, debarkation, float outs and towing, beach landing, and recovery operations. Considerable difficulty was encountered because the Special Forces Detachments lacked proper equipment, rubber landing boats, safety equipment, and waterproof material. In addition, the detachments had had no previous training in submarine operations. Results of training were unsatisfactory and additional training was requested, including the use of SEAL Team Detachments for beach reconnaissance, after receipt of proper equipment.

(3) A second submarine training exercise was conducted in the Florida Key area on 16-17 November 1962 by two Special Forces "A" Detachments and two SEAL Team Detachments, who embarked on the USS SEA CAT and USS TIRANTE from Key West, Florida. Ten-man rubber boats had been procured.
and the Special Forces Detachments had conducted inflatable boat training at OPA LOCMA. This training, the previous submarine training, the use of proper equipment and the use of SEAL Team Detachments, all contributed to a successful exercise. Problems encountered revealed a need for silent motors for Special Forces use, infra-red signalling equipment for Special Forces - SEAL Team use, better waterproofing materials for equipment.

b. Joint Air-Ground Operations:

Throughout the month of November 1962 all Special Forces detachments scheduled for air infiltration conducted air drops and tactical exercises from 1st Air Commando Group C-47 and C-46 aircraft at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Instruction and training included the use of the CIA procured HET-2 Homing Beacon and the commercially procured SKYRAFTER VHF (AM) radio for air-ground communication. Results obtained on both items were marginal and the development of satisfactory equipment is required. The field exercise covered marshalling, infiltration, assembly, sterilization of DZ's, movement to safe areas, and establishing communication. While the above training was considered successful it was apparent that additional Special Forces - Air Forces training in unconventional warfare air operations is required to develop better techniques, coordination, and ability to conduct unconventional warfare air operations.

c. Exercise Devil's Trident:

This exercise was conducted, as approved and directed by CINCLANT, beginning with E-Day DEFCON stand down on 30 November 1962 and ending with exfiltration (D-9) on 4 December 1962. The purpose of the exercise was to test modified prepositioning, infiltration, and resupply phases of COMJUNTA OPLAN 314-315-62, follow-on detachments were not played. Although Sea infiltration was successful and all flights were flown on schedule, training results were considered marginal because adverse weather precluded actual infiltration and resupply drops and adverse atmospheric conditions disrupted communications. However, JUNTA planning for prepositioning, infiltration, and resupply phases was considered valid.

6. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED.

a. General: Problems were encountered in all the major JUNTA functional areas. In some cases these problems were solved, in others unsolved because solution was beyond the capability of COMJUNTA. The major problem areas are discussed in the body of this report. Others, less significant to effective performance are discussed in the separate inclosures and appendices.

b. Personnel and Administration:
18 December 1962

SUBJECT: Historical Record of JUNIPEL Operation

(1) No mobilisation designee rosters were maintained for JUNIPEL in pre-alert planning. JUNIPEL was hastily manned with officers and enlisted men with, for the most part, no previous exposure to unconventional warfare and joint staff duty.

(2) The Mobilization FRD made no provision for headquarters support personnel: Comptroller, Supply, Adjutant General and Security. In consequence, no units or activities had been previously designated to provide this support. Personnel, when finally made available, were not properly qualified to perform their duties. Particular difficulty arose with respect to security clearances. The headquarters was manned by some key personnel who were not cleared for Top Secret material; and more serious, staff section chiefs not authorized access to sensitive intelligence which was prerequisite to valid planning.

(3) The procedures and policies for administration were completely lacking on activation of JUNIPEL. In consequence, diversion of effort and backtracking to correct errors occurred in the formative stage which were injurious to operations and planning.

c. Logistics:

(1) Logistical planning [guerrilla] supplies had not progressed to the point of solid coordination of qualitative and quantitative requirements. Specific requirements, including packaging and rigging conformation, were not determined. [force] were the only supplies available throughout the operation. Present requirements to include storage and positioning are not fully met at this time.

(2) [Advanced base reconnaissance and base support] agreements were non-existent at the time of the alert. JUNIPEL support requirements were imposed as unprogrammed responsibilities of installation and activity commanders in consequence. This situation was equally applicable to air movement requirements for prepositioning and displacement and coordination of post-link up logistic support of JUNIPEL forces in Cuba. The latter two problems areas are the subject of coordination at this time.

d. Operations and Intelligence:

(1) The largest single impediment in the field of operations and intelligence was the almost complete gap which existed between the CIA and JUNIPEL. This single factor makes any confidence in the JUNIPEL plans evolved during the emergency an impossibility. The nature of unconventional warfare is such that there must be a continuity in operations and intelligence in the transition from a condition short of war to military operations. The lack of such continuity makes unconventional warfare
operations in support of contingency operations by a JUWTP a movement planning exercise unrelated to the situation which exists in the target area.

(2) The complete and utter lack of current unconventional warfare estimates of the situation with resultant working intelligence requirements led to serious intelligence gaps which were never closed during the operation. This situation was aggravated by what can be considered a denial of available intelligence of a sensitive nature due to lack of prior establishment of the need for access and need-to-know for JUWTPA Headquarters in pre-emergency planning.

(3) The pre-emergency JUWTPA planning was premised on preparation of country plans by a subordinate element of COMJUWTO when activated. This procedure delayed evolution of properly coordinated plans until the onset of the emergency and created a situation which was not conducive to planning an unconventional warfare operation.

(4) Psychological Warfare and Civil Affairs planning was impeded by policy gaps, lack of discernible continuity of objectives and programming for Cuban operation and intelligence upon which viable planning could be based.

(5) Planning requirements completely unrelated to JUWTPA capabilities, unsupported by proper policy guidance as to national policy, without allocation of resources necessary for operations, and seemingly inconsistent with national intelligence estimates diverted from the effort to evolve a workable plan for support of CINCJINT OPPLAN 316-62. This was particularly serious in view of the limited unconventional warfare experience in the JUWTPA staff.

e. Communications:

(1) Pre-emergency planning gaps in frequency allocations, reception signals and link up communications requirements were a cause of major concern in the first two weeks of planning.

(2) Cryptographic clearances and devices which were required for COMJUWTPA command and control denied JUWTPA headquarters direct communications with component forces and adjacent headquarters for the first week of operations.

(3) Pre-emergency planning gaps in communications equipment requirements and procurement lead times led to acquisition of equipment from JUWTPA component forces at the expense of their capability to support themselves in case of displacement to CUBA. This situation had not been corrected as of 1 December 1962.
TOP SECRET

COMJUWTA CS
SUBJECT: Historical Record of JUWTA CUBAN Operation

f. Funding.

Prior planning for funding was not in sufficient detail. No provision had been made prior to activation for financial arrangements which would provide the necessary funding for establishment of the headquarters or to obtain supplies and equipment on an emergency basis.

g. Force T abs.

(1) The uni-service allocation of Special Forces assets without a positive control by JCS as to priorities aggravated by transitional reorganization associated with the Special Action Force concept found Special Forces with a dearth of area and linguistically qualified personnel.

(2) Incomplete pre-emergency planning failed to develop full requirements for Special Forces participation in CINCJUCONC INPLAN 316-62. This was particularly apparent in liaison requirements.

h. Training.

(1) The operation demonstrated a need for Special Forces amphibious training in submarine infiltration techniques.

(2) Air ground training demonstrated the need for additional training of both Air Force personnel and Special Forces in the conduct of unconventional warfare air operations.

7. NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

25 October 1962

JUWTA activated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Headquarters opened, security and communications established, and skeleton staff reported for duty.

Major General (then Brig Gen) William F. Harbrough assumed command.

Two JUWTA liaison officers sent to HG, CINCJUCONC.

26 October 1962

Remaining personnel listed in Appendix IV to Annex Y of CINCJUCONC INPLAN 314/316-61 reported for duty with the exception of CIA operations personnel, Navy Logistics Officer, and two Marine liaison officers.

JUWTA component forces headquarters activated, less CIA Forces, and commanders designated.

TOP SECRET

8
TOP SECRET

CINCUNTF CS
SUBJECT: Historical Record of JUNIETA CUBAN Operation

18 December 1962

26 October 1962
(continued)

Component forces activated and OPCOM assigned commanders concerned, less Naval Forces listed in Appendix II to Annex V, CINCJAN OPNAV 314/315-61.

Reconnaissance party dispatched to OPA LOCEA Air Base, Florida to determine suitability for JUNIETA Advance Staging and Recovery Base.

Area study of three UN areas, emphasizing Area I, initiated by ARUNIETA.

CINCJAN authorized COMUNTF direct liaison with CINCJAN component commanders and requested CINCJAN component force commanders direct liaison with COMUNTF.

OPA LOCEA Air Base, Florida designated Advance Staging and Recovery Base.

JUNIETA issued warning order to ARUNIETA to open, with ARUNIETA, the Advance Staging and Recovery Base; prepared to receive, store, and secure 5,000-man CIA guerrilla warfare prepack in air delivery form, and to receive and restage Special Forces "A" Detachments for employment in CUBAN operational areas.

JUNIETA requested CINCJAN approval to develop own external assets for use in CUBAN operations.

Three COMCARIB Special Forces "A" Detachments reported and assigned to OPCOM ARUNIETA.

28 October 1962

JUNIETA issued AFJUNIETA Movement order to deploy initial cadre to joint Staging and Recovery Base at OPA LOCEA and on order, be prepared to move additional personnel, equipment and aircraft to achieve full operational status.

JUNIETA requested CONSULTANTS to preposition two submarines at KEY WEST, Florida for support of JUNIETA amphibious infiltration operations.

JUNIETA initiated movement...
28 October 1962
(continued)

JUVITA proposed CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS for support
CINCINNATI of PLAN’s 312 and 316 dispatched to CINCINNATI.

JUVITA liaison with CINCINNATI component task forces
confirmed by CINCINNATI.

29 October 1962

[ARJUWIJA elements closed at Advance Staging
and Recovery Base CPA LOGEA. Communications opened to
CINJUWIJA and SPFIB.

30 October 1962

JUVITA PLAN FOR EXECUTION of JUVITA CONCEPT OF OPER-
ATIONS dispatched to CINCINNATI and JUVITA component
forces.

JUVITA informed CINCINNATI that ARJUWIJA would furnish
liaison detachment to TF 123, and Special Forces "B"
Detachment with TF 123 would accomplish ARJUWIJA/
JUVITA liaison. Detachment at US NAVAL BASE GUANTANAMO
for liaison with TG 123.7 and eventual liaison with
TG 129.2.

31 October 1962

Two submarines on station at KEY WEST, Florida on
twelve hour standby for support of JUVITA operations.

JUVITA TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES for execution of
JUVITA CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS dispatched to CINCINNATI and
JUVITA component forces.

1 November 1962

JUVITA designated Guerrilla Warfare Area IV in CUBA for
planning purposes.

2 November 1962

ARJUWIJA directed, on order, to dispatch one liaison
officer to Landing Group West (TG 129.1) and one liaison
team (SP "B" Det) to landing Group East (TG 129.2) to
be prepositioned at GUANTANAMO Defense Group (TG 123.7).

SCUBA lockout training from submarine USS SPIKEFISH
Commenced vicinity NORFOLK, Virginia.
TOP SECRET

18 December 1962

SUBJECT: Historical Record of JUNIATA CUBAN Operation

3 November 1962

RECOVERY PLAN for recovery Special Forces and other
selected personnel from operational areas dispatched
to JUNIATA component forces.

CINCINNATI approved dispatch of liaison detachment to
COMNAVBASE GUANTANAMO.

JUNIATA changed boundaries of the Areas I and II.

Two Special Forces "A" Detachments, scheduled for
infiltration from submarines, initiated training
exercise from submarines USS SEA CAT and USS TIRANT
vicinity of HAFORT, Florida.

4 November 1962

CINCINNATI approved JUNIATA CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

Joint AIRPULNTA-ARJUNTA air operations commenced with
instruction, training, and use of CIA procured HET-2
Homing Beacons.

Submarine training completed and Special Forces Detach-
ments returned to CDR LOCHA.

5 November 1962

Two SEAL Team detachments (one Officer, five EM each)
propositioned at KEY WEST for support JUNIATA infra-
structure and recovery operations.

CINCINNATI notified JUNIATA of capability to provide
12 CUBAN MATERIALS for Marine Expeditionary Force use
SCUBA submarine lock-out training vicinity NORFOLK,
Virginia completed and personnel returned to FT ERIAGG,
N. C.

6 November 1962

ARJUNTA liaison detachment (SF "B" Det) closed at
US NAV BASE GUANTANAMO.

JUNIATA requested CINCINNATI to procure activation CIA-DOD
Agreement so that JUNIATA could obtain access to CIA
developed intelligence and external and internal assets.

7 November 1962

CINCINNATI notified JUNIATA to plan for use of command and
control detachment in CUBA to exercise OPCOM all
committed Special Forces.
COMINTCS

SUBJECT: Historical Record of JUWTA CUBAN Operation

18 December 1962

8 November 1962  JUWTA dispatched to AFJUWTA preliminary AIR MISSION REQUIREMENTS beginning 5-day CINCIAZ OPLAN 312-62.

9 November 1962  Planning and preparations for operations continued.

10 November 1962  DO

11 November 1962  DO

12 November 1962  COMINTCS requested two days submarine infiltration training in FLORIDA KEYS area for OPA LOGCA pre-positioned Special Forces "A" Detachments.

13 November 1962  Planning and preparation for operations continued.

14 November 1962  COMINTCS authorized AFJUWTA to return OPA LOGCA pre-positioned Special Forces "A" Detachments to Fort Bragg upon completion submarine training 16-17 November 1962.

15 November 1962  Two Special Forces "A" Detachments, two SEAL Team Detachments and CIA observers embarked on submarine USS SEA CAT and USS TIRANTE from KEY WEST, Florida for training in Florida Keys area.

16 November 1962  Planning and preparation for operations continued.

17 November 1962  JUWTA dispatched COMMAND AND CONTROL PLAN for operations in CUBA, subsequent to D+2 for OPLAN 316-62, to JUWTA component forces; JUWTA UW staff to be integrated in JTF CUBA HQ and AFJUWTA-JUWTA command and control elements to establish Joint Command Post vicinity SAN ANTONIO DE LOS BANOS airfield for coordination air support operations.

JUWTA directed AFJUWTA and ARJUWTA to establish Joint Command Post at OPA LOGCA, Florida for coordination of infiltration, air support, and supply and resupply from or through OPA LOGCA.

18 November 1962  Planning and preparation for operations continued.

19 November 1962  DO

20 November 1962  DO
21 November 1962  AFJWTF A submitted weight and cube data for deployment of command and control element to CUBA.

22 November 1962  Planning and preparation for operations continued.

23 November 1962  JUWTA dispatched warning order to component forces on EXERCISE DEVIL'S TRIDENT; implementation on stand-down to DEFCON 5 or CINCLINT order. Purpose to test pre-positioning and infiltration phases of JUWTA OPLAN 314/316-62.

24 November 1962  Planning and preparations for operations continued.

25 November 1962  DO

26 November 1962  JUWTA endorsed JUWTA Letter, subject: "Recommended Change to Troop List in CONJUWTA OPLAN 314/316-62" to CINCLINT. Distribution of DRAFT CONJUWTA Contingency OPLAN 314/316-62 made to CINCLINT, CINCLINT component headquarters, and JUWTA component forces for concurrence, comments, and recommendations.

Proposed Joint Table of Distribution for JUWTA dispatched to CINCLINT outlining full wartime complement, planning staff, and augmentation to bring planning staff to full wartime complement.

27 November 1962  CINCLINT approved EXERCISE DEVIL'S TRIDENT for planning; implementation on CINCLINT approval within 72 hours after relaxation from DEFCON 3.

28 November 1962  Planning and preparations for operations continued.

29 November 1962  ARJWTA liaison detachment prepositioned at US NHBASE returned to FORT BRAGG, N. C.

JUWTA informed CINCLINT that EXERCISE DEVIL'S TRIDENT would be three-day exercise; air infiltration at FORT BRAGG and sea infiltration in FLORIDA KEYS AREA on D-1 and exercise completed on exfiltration D+2.

CINCLINT ordered execution EXERCISE DEVIL'S TRIDENT; D-day designated 30 November 1962.
COMJUWTA CS
SUBJECT: Historical Record of JUWTA CUBAN Operation

18 December 1962

30 November 1962  CINCLANT confirmed JUWTA relaxation to modified
DEPCON 5 with modifying instructions to follow.

EXERCISE DEVIL'S TRIDENT initiated.

1 December 1962  CINCLANT instructions for JUWTA stand-down to
DEPCON 5 not yet clarified.

4 December 1962  EXERCISE DEVIL'S TRIDENT completed. Results marginal
because of adverse weather and extreme atmospheric
communication interference.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

4 Enclosures
A. Omitted
B. Summary of J2 Activities
C. Summary of J3 Activities
D. Summary of J4 Activities
E. Summary of J6 Activities

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