JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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EXEMPT PER E.O. 13526
SEC 3.3(b). [REDACTED]
DATE EXEMPTED : MAR 2016
JS RE-REVIEW DATE : 31 DEC 2037
OKAY TO RELEASE AS REDACTED

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>PURPOSE</th>
<th>CONSIDERATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22. &quot;Voice of Free Cuba&quot; broadcasts from submarine. (CIA, with Defense support).</td>
<td>To have a &quot;voice&quot; for resistance inside Cuba.</td>
<td>The initial broadcasts indicated that this can be made into an effective medium, at small risk. In strengthening the effectiveness, full use should be made of talents in the Cuban refugee community. CIA will coordinate this activity closely with State and USIA.</td>
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<td>23. Continue &quot;Radio Americas&quot; broadcasts from Swan Island as appropriate. (CIA).</td>
<td>To provide an irritant to the Castro/Communist regime.</td>
<td>Documented evidence available or obtainable should be fully exploited for impact upon hemisphere and world opinion.</td>
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<td>24. Make available to the International Narcotics Commission documented evidence of Cuban exportation/importation of narcotics. (State).</td>
<td>To create increased awareness in Latin America of Cuban subversive activities.</td>
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<td>25. Arrange for caches of limited Soviet-Czech arms to be &quot;discovered&quot; in selected Latin American countries, ostensibly smuggled in from Cuba. (CIA).</td>
<td>To sow and increase distrust in Latin America of the Castro/Communist regime.</td>
<td>This activity will be undertaken only on a spot basis, coordinated with U.S. objectives in the specific country.</td>
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</table>
27. (continued)

**CONSIDERATIONS**

Matshambre Mine - Santa Lucia

Texaco Refinery - Santiago

Shell / Esso Refinery - Habana

Regla Steam Electric Plant - Habana

Matanzas Steam Electric Plant - Matanzas

Moa Bay Nickel Plant

Paper Mill - Cardenas

Micro Wave Towers

Each operation entails risk, not only physical risk for the saboteurs, but also risk of attribution to the U.S. in case of capture. Care will be taken to give these actions the appearance of being done by internal resistance groups, and in isolating team members from press sources upon return. The U.S. handling of information, in case of contingency, will be established by CIA in coordination with USIA and State.
34. (continued)

In addition to meeting the above
cited intelligence objectives,
operational intelligence, and re-
cruitment leads as well as agent
material result from the Opa-locka
and Miami operations. In addition
to meeting basic intelligence re-
quirements above, timely opera-
tional intelligence is vital to CIA
current operations.

35. Spot, recruit, and train third
country nationals resident in Cuba.
(CIA, supported by State and Defense).

See 34 above.

36. Spot, recruit and train legal travellers
who have potential access to significant
information. (CIA, supported by State
and Defense).

See 34 above.

37. Continue Caribbean Admissions Center,
Opa-locka, Florida. (CIA, with Defense,
USIA, and other support).

See 34 above.

The continuation of the refugee flow and
the selective debriefing of refugees provide
the most significant source of intelligence.
Follow up debriefing of selected refugees
after departure from Opa-locka will
continue.
38. Continue CIA interrogation center. (CIA)

39. Maintain PAA service between the U.S. and Cuba. (State, with CIA support).

40. Continue and expand, as practical, communications intelligence coverage of Cuban communications nets. (Defense and CIA).

41. Continue monitoring overt Cuban broadcasts. (CIA).

42. Urge, assist, and/or support friendly third country intelligence services to expand their intelligence coverage of Cuban intelligence requirements. (CIA).

**ACTIVITY**

**PURPOSE**

See 34 above.

To provide intelligence and agent personnel and documentation, as well as to continue the exodus of skilled manpower from Cuba.

See 34 above.

See 34 above.

**CONSIDERATIONS**

Due to local conditions and problems, the Debriefing Center will continue to be more limited in size and selective in choice of refugees than Opa-locka. This is primarily an NSA problem but CIA will continue to assist as practicable.

PAA requires financial assistance to continue this activity.

It is recognized that significant increase in coverage of the internal micro-wave system would become a major budget and personnel problem.

This is done on a regular basis by FRIS.

This will be handled through existing liaison channels.
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PURPOSE
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To provide intelligence and agent personnel and documentation, as well as to continue the exodus of skilled manpower from Cuba

See 34 above

To obtain intelligence and propaganda material

See 34 above

CONSIDERATIONS
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