JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10214
RECORDS SERIES : FOIA SERIES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 215

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : OSD
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : INSTITUTIONAL PLANNING OPERATION MONGOOSE
DATE : 03/12/62
PAGES : 8
SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE

CLASSIFICATION : MEMORANDUM
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Reviewed by OSD, CIA, State.

[NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION REQUIRED CONCURRENCE OF CIA OSD]

DATE: MAR 2016

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Institutional Planning, Operation Mongoose

As desired by General Taylor on 12 March, the planning for Operation Mongoose is now prepared on a format of separate planning for each Department and Agency involved. Revised planning along this line is submitted herewith.

Activities already approved are marked with an asterisk. Further planning must await determination of policy questions raised in my 12 March 1962 memorandum to the members of the Special Group (Augmented).

Planning transmitted to you by my memorandum of 10 March 1962 should be returned to me for destruction as a matter of security.

Attachments

Distribution:

Copy: To:
1 - General Taylor
2 - The Attorney General
3 - Secretary Rusk/Deputy Under Secretary Johnson
4 - Secretary McNamara/Deputy Secretary Gilpatric
5 - General Lemnitzer (through General Craig)
6/7 - Mr. McCone (through Mr. Helms/Mr. Harvey)
8 - Mr. Murrow/Mr. Wilson
9/10 - Chief of Operations

The Department of State releases this document in part and postpones release of portion(s) of it under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102-526)

Reviewed on 7/30/98
Portion(s) Postponed Under 6, 1 (C)

Excluded from automatic regrading: DOD Directive 5200.10 does not apply.

Document contains 12 pages.

Copy No. 1 of 10 copies. Series A.
PHASE I (CIA)

ACTIVITY

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

1. * Dispatch one intelligence agent operation to key area selected by CIA.

   Collect and report intelligence on anti-regime attitudes, on potential resistance, and on vulnerabilities and strengths of Communist security system.

2. Third-country intelligence staff officers in place in Havana. (6)

3. Third-country trained intelligence officers, ready to travel in Cuba for temporary periods. (C)

   To collect intelligence.

   To collect intelligence.

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

PURPOSE

1 - 15 March 1962

CONSIDERATIONS

There is a risk that this action will disclose this U.S. intelligence activity within Cuba. Selected personnel are being intensively trained. This first team has 2 agents. An area in which resistance has been reported has been selected. Agent operations must stay alive, make useful contacts, and report securely to CIA. Physical risk to personnel is substantial, due to lack of intelligence. First reports from first team are expected by the end of March, while reports from the second and third teams, dispatched in March, are expected to start in April.

Many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba will be trained for paramilitary skills as well as intelligence collection, with the thought that they will be in place inside Cuba and ready to act whenever paramilitary operations are decided upon. However, CIA has noted that, once the agents are inside Cuba, they cannot be controlled effectively from outside Cuba, although every effort will be made to attempt such control.

These staff intelligence officers may also be used in the future for communications or agent handling, if future developments warrant. (C)
1 - 15 March 1962 (cont)

ACTIVITY


PURPOSE

To collect intelligence required for the operations, to identify and earmark intelligence assets as refugees arrive, and to provide security against Communist agent operations.

CONSIDERATIONS

This operation, in response to early recommendation as essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at utmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, with a new building completed and occupied, and with a staff of 43 at work. Operations commenced 15 February and, as of 9 March, 33 people were active at the Center. (CIA responsibility, with support by Defense, Justice, State, USIA.)

5. * Periodic intelligence estimates, as required by progress of operations.

To up-date NIE 85-62, so that current estimates can be considered at national policy levels.

As the operations develop, there will be both increased intelligence collection and a need for an Intelligence Estimate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully. It is likely that a more informal method of producing an Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level (than now governing the issuance of NIE's) may have to be followed. CIA is now publishing daily intelligence summaries on Cuba and is planning a bi-monthly or weekly report summing up intelligence for this purpose. (CIA responsibility, with support of others as required.)

OTHER OPERATIONS

6. ✶ Continue negotiating for help in contaminating locomotive lubricants. (C)

To cripple Cuba's rail transportation. (C)

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

16 - 31 March 1962

7. * Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

One team of 4 and one team of 3 agents. Both teams include personnel who have had resistance training and some past experience.

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
ACTIVITY

8. Establish 3 additional third-country resident agents in Cuba. (c)

9. By 31 March, have 105 agents selected and 50 agents trained.

10. * Develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U.S.
    To exploit the intelligence possibilities of former residents of Cuba (including U.S. citizens) now in the United States.

    To collect intelligence in a Latin atmosphere, at different levels that now seem possible in the continental U.S., to spot additional intelligence assets and to provide security against Communist agent operations.

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

PURPOSE

To collect intelligence.

To ready agent operations.

CONSIDERATIONS

Possible future use in communications and support.

Effectiveness and numbers are dependent upon purpose of recruitment, nature of training, and policy decisions controlling these factors. If the recruitment and training are for resistance activities, the task of recruitment and training will be much less difficult than if they are limited to intelligence-collection purposes only.

There are "colonies" in Washington, D.C., and other U.S. cities which are "little Cubas." Family, Church, and business interests provoke unusual personal ties inside Cuba for some of these residents; a real potential exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise available. (FBI support and coordination is basic in this effort.)

As Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, CIA will activate other interrogation centers as promptly as feasible. A center is being activated in Spain. Negotiations with local authorities are being undertaken to activate centers, if possible in Mexico City, Caracas, and Aruba, San Juan, Puerto Rico, and Santiago, Chile are being surveyed for possible centers. (CIA responsibility with support by others as necessary.)

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - 15 April 1962</td>
<td><strong>INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS</strong></td>
<td>To collect intelligence.</td>
<td>Number of agents undetermined as yet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12. * Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13. 5 third-country agents, temporarily travelling legally, in Cuba.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 - 30 April 1962</td>
<td><strong>INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS</strong></td>
<td>To collect intelligence.</td>
<td>Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14. * Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15. One third-country legal resident agent in Havana.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Possible use for communications and support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 15 May 1962</td>
<td><strong>INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS</strong></td>
<td>To collect intelligence.</td>
<td>Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16. * Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17. 3 legal-resident agents in Cuba.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

**TOP SECRET SENSITIVE**
ACTIVITY

18. One or possibly two trained staff Intelligence officers (non-U.S.) resident in Havana.


PURPOSE

To collect intelligence.

To collect intelligence.

CONSIDERATIONS

"Legal travel" means persons are in Cuba visiting, some for extended periods.

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

16 - 31 May 1962

20. * Four teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.


22. Four additional resident agents inside Cuba.

23. Five "legal travel" agents inside Cuba.

24. By 31 May, selection of 50 additional agents and train 35 additional agents.

Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances. CIA will be attempting to cover as much of Cuba as it can.

Difficult

CIA will be attempting to cover as much of Cuba as it can. The main factor of determining location of resident agents is to find a place where a trained agent can stay viable.

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
### ACTIVITY

#### OTHER OPERATIONS

25. By 31 May, develop a plan for counterfeiting currency, which would not be implemented until a decision was made to debase the economy in Cuba.

To debase the economy of Cuba.

1 June - 31 July 1962

### PURPOSE

A counterfeiting program is being developed. Needs are to staff the proposal thoroughly to permit a policy decision to be made and to staff out a feasible distribution plan. It is expected that no decision to implement such a plan would be made immediately.

### CONSIDERATIONS

#### NUMBER OF AGENTS IN EACH TEAM AND SELECTION OF AREAS

Number of agents in each team and selection of areas will be determined by developments of the previous actions and by conditions.

#### NUMBERS, AREAS, AND SUPPLIES

Numbers, areas, and supplies are completely dependent upon conditions at the time, and upon policy approval of methods to be used (that is, if air delivery can be used, or if this activity must depend upon maritime delivery).

### INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

26. * 10 to 15 teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

27. Reinforce and resupply agents and teams previously placed or activated inside Cuba.

To reinforce and resupply, as possible.

28. By 31 July, select 100 additional agents and train 70 additional agents.

To ready agent operations.

29. * Collection of psychological material.

To provide documentary and photographic evidence of the tyranny of the Communist regime.

30. * Survey airfields, military installations, and communication centers.

To provide current intelligence on key security resources of the regime.

31. * By the end of July, have operations to penetrate the regime.

To provide current intelligence on the actions and intentions of the regime.

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
ACTIVITY

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

32. * Comprehensive and definitive intelligence report on attitudes and abilities of the population inside Cuba.

PURPOSE

End of July 1962

To provide the Special Group (HCC 5412 augmented) with a hard estimate of the Cuban situation.

CONSIDERATIONS

The intelligence estimate will provide a vital basis for a Special Group recommendation on whether or not the U.S. should undertake actions to make maximum use of Cuban resources as a justification for decisive U.S. military intervention.

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE