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REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF

CIA
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DATE: MAR 2016

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Institutional Planning, Operation Mongoose

As desired by General Taylor on 12 March, the planning for Operation Mongoose is now prepared on a format of separate planning for each Department and Agency involved. Revised planning along this line is submitted herewith.

Activities already approved are marked with an asterisk. Further planning must await determination of policy questions raised in my 12 March 1962 memorandum to the members of the Special Group (Augmented).

Planning transmitted to you by my memorandum of 10 March 1962 should be returned to me for destruction as a matter of security.

Attachments

Distribution:

Copy: To:
1 - General Taylor
2 - The Attorney General
3 - Secretary Rusk/Deputy Under Secretary Johnson
4 - Secretary McNamara/Deputy Secretary Gilpatric
5 - General Lemnitzer (through General Craig)
6/7 - Mr. McCon [through Mr. Helms/Mr. Harvey]
8 - Mr. Murrow/Mr. Wilson
9/10 - Chief of Operations

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6 (1) (K) (C)

OSD: NO OBJECTION
23 JUNE 68

Excluded from automatic regrading: DOD Directive 5200.10 does not apply.

Document contains ___ pages.

Copy No. ___ of 10 copies. Series A.
PHASE 1 (CIA)

INTelligence OPERATIONS

1. * Dispatch one intelligence agent operation to key area selected by CIA.
   
   Collect and report intelligence on anti-regime attitudes, on potential resistance, and on vulnerabilities and strengths of Communist security system.

2. 3 third-country intelligence staff officers in place in Havana.
   
   To collect intelligence.

3. 2 third-country trained intelligence officers, ready to travel in Cuba for temporary periods.
   
   To collect intelligence.

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

PURPOSE

There is a risk that this action will disclose this U.S. intelligence activity within Cuba. Selected personnel are being intensively trained. This first team has 2 agents. An area in which resistance has been reported has been selected. Agent operations must stay alive, make useful contacts, and report securely to CIA. Physical risk to personnel is substantial, due to lack of intelligence. First reports from first team are expected by the end of March, while reports from the second and third teams, dispatched in March, are expected to start in April.

Many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba will be trained for paramilitary skills as well as intelligence collection, with the thought that they will be in place inside Cuba and ready to act whenever paramilitary operations are decided upon. However, CIA has noted that, once the agents are inside Cuba, they cannot be controlled effectively from outside Cuba, although every effort will be made to attempt such control.

These staff intelligence officers may also be used in the future for communications or agent handling, if future developments warrant.
ACTIVITY


PURPOSE

To collect intelligence required for the operations, to identify and earmark intelligence assets as refugees arrive, and to provide security against Communist agent operations.

CONSIDERATIONS

This operation, in response to early recommendation as essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at utmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, with a new building completed and occupied, and with a staff of 43 at work. Operations commenced 15 February and, as of 9 March, 33 people were active at the Center. (CIA responsibility, with support by Defense, Justice, State, USIA.)

As the operations develop, there will be both increased intelligence collection and a need for current an Intelligence Estimate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully. It is likely that a more informal method of producing an Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level (than now governing the issuance of NIE's) may have to be followed. CIA is now publishing daily intelligence summaries on Cuba and is planning a bi-monthly or weekly report summing up intelligence for this purpose. (CIA responsibility, with support of others as required.)

OTHER OPERATIONS

5. * Periodic intelligence estimates, as required by progress of operations.


INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

7. * Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>PURPOSE</th>
<th>CONSIDERATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establish 2 additional third-country resident agents in Cuba.</td>
<td>To collect intelligence.</td>
<td>Possible future use in communications and support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By 31 March, have 105 agents selected and 50 agents trained.</td>
<td>To ready agent operations.</td>
<td>Effectiveness and numbers are dependent upon purpose of recruitment, nature of training, and policy decisions controlling these factors. If the recruitment and training are for resistance activities, the task of recruitment and training will be much less difficult than if they are limited to intelligence-collection purposes only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. * Develop intelligence potential of Cuban &quot;colonies&quot; in U.S.</td>
<td>To exploit the intelligence possibilities of former residents of Cuba (including U.S. citizens) now in the United States.</td>
<td>There are &quot;colonies&quot; in Washington, D.C., and other U.S. cities which are &quot;little Cubas.&quot; Family, Church, and business interests provoke unusual, personal ties inside Cuba for some of these residents; a real potential exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise available. (FBI support and coordination is basic in this effort.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. * Develop additional interrogation centers in other areas by 31 March 1962.</td>
<td>To collect intelligence in a Latin atmosphere, at different levels than now seem possible in the continental U.S., to spot additional intelligence assets and to provide security against Communist agent operations.</td>
<td>As Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, CIA will activate other interrogation centers as promptly as feasible. Negotiations with local authorities are being undertaken to activate centers, if possible, in Mexico City, Caracas, Aruba, San Juan, Puerto Rico, and Santiago, Chile. These are being surveyed for possible centers. (CIA responsibility with support by others as necessary.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**OTHER OPERATIONS**

None.

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.
<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12.* Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.</td>
<td><strong>To collect intelligence.</strong></td>
<td>Number of agents undetermined as yet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Five third-country agents, temporarily travelling legally, in Cuba.</td>
<td><strong>To collect intelligence.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**OTHER OPERATIONS**

None.

**INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS**

| | 16 - 30 April 1962 |
| | |
| 14.* Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba. | **To collect intelligence.** | Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances. |
| 15. One third-country legal resident agent in Havana. | **To collect intelligence.** | Possible use for communications and support. |

**OTHER OPERATIONS**

None.

**INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS**

| | 1 - 15 May 1962 |
| | |
| 16.* Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba. | **To collect intelligence.** | Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances. |
| 17. Three legal resident agents in Cuba. | **To collect intelligence.** | |

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.
18. One or possibly two trained staff intelligence officers (non-U.S.) resident in Havana.


OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

20. * Four teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.


To collect intelligence.

22. Four additional resident agents inside Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

23. Five "legal travel" agents inside Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

24. By 31 May, selection of 50 additional agents and train 35 additional agents.

To ready agent operations.

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

PURPOSE

16 - 31 May 1962

"Legal travel" means persons are in Cuba visiting, some for extended periods.

Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances. CIA will be attempting to cover as much of Cuba as it can.

Difficult

CIA will be attempting to cover as much of Cuba as it can. The main factor of determining location of resident agents is to find a place where a trained agent can stay viable.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
ACTIVITY

OTHER OPERATIONS

25. By 31 May, develop a plan for counterfeiting currency, which would not be implemented until a decision was made to debase the economy of Cuba.

PURPOSE

To debase the economy of Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

A counterfeiting program is being developed. Needs are to staff the proposal thoroughly to permit a policy decision to be made and to staff out a feasible distribution plan. It is expected that no decision to implement such a plan would be made immediately.

1 June - 31 July 1962

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

26. * 10 to 15 teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

Number of agents in each team and selection of areas will be determined by developments of the previous actions and by conditions.

27. Reinforce and resupply agents and teams previously placed or activated inside Cuba.

To reinforce and resupply, as possible.

Numbers, areas, and supplies are completely dependent upon conditions at the time, and upon policy approval of methods to be used (that is, if air delivery can be used, or if this activity must depend upon maritime delivery).

28. By 31 July, select 100 additional agents and train 70 additional agents.

To ready agent operations.

29. * Collection of psychological material.

To provide documentary and photographic evidence of the tyranny of the Communist regime.

This evidence will be used by CIA and USIA to neutralize the influence of Castro and the Communists in the Western Hemisphere.

30. * Survey airfields, military installations, and communication centers.

To provide current intelligence on key security resources of the regime.

This is conceived of as ground surveys, and the possible recruitment of military and other official personnel as intelligence agents.

31. * By the end of July, have operations to penetrate the regime.

To provide current intelligence on the actions and intentions of the regime.

This requires attempts to place trained agents inside government organizations, or to defect officials "in place."

Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.
### ACTIVITY

**OTHER OPERATIONS**

None.

### PURPOSE

32. Comprehensive and definitive intelligence report on attitudes and abilities of the population inside Cuba.

**End of July 1962**

To provide the Special Group (H.R. 5442, augmented) with a hard estimate of the Cuban situation.

The intelligence estimate will provide a vital basis for a Special Group recommendation on whether or not the U.S. should undertake actions to make maximum use of Cuban resources as a justification for decisive U.S. military intervention.

### CONSIDERATIONS

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

**TOP SECRET SENSITIVE**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Make political decision to intervene with U.S. military forces in Cuba.</td>
<td>To overtly engage the U.S. prestige in support of a Cuban revolt to an extent that would require the U.S. to become involved in ensuring the ultimate victory of a Cuban revolution, this involvement must include the commitment of U.S. military forces as necessary to achieve such victory.</td>
<td>This political decision will require consideration of the legal and moral factors, assessed in the perspective of world opinion and U.S. security interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. U.S. officials and news releases on policy decision.</td>
<td>Indicate policy and commit prestige of U.S. government to appropriate support of the Cuban people vs. Communist dictatorship.</td>
<td>Top officials of Executive and Legislative branches to make timely statements. This should encourage similar attitude by leaders of other nations and help spirit of Cubans. Development of sympathy leading to favorable opinion about outside support for Cuban people is a goal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Latin American leaders, government and public, in support.</td>
<td>Commit national prestige and power of Latin political, intellectual, labor, youth, religious, military leaders to cause of Cuban people against Communist regime. For local public impact, international support, and morale of resistance within Cuba.</td>
<td>Timely and ringing public statements will be encouraged. Maximum publicity at country of origin, other countries, and into Cuba by CIA assets. Support of State action by CIA and USIA is involved.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. After political decision is made, commit U.S. military forces in accordance with contingency plans.

To intervene as required to achieve victory for the revolutionary forces.

Consistent with security aspect, U.S. military forces are placed in a state of readiness. The military forces must be prepared to assist in the maintenance of order until the revolutionary government is in control.

CONSIDERATIONS

DOD support planning, stockpiling, readiness of U.S. forces. The hazard of a victory cannot be guaranteed without maximum readiness with CIA provided for commitment of U.S. military personnel in combat operations.

PURPOSE

DOD support planning, stockpiling, readiness of U.S. forces. The hazard of victory cannot be guaranteed without maximum readiness with CIA provided for commitment of U.S. military personnel in combat operations.

ACTIVITY

To assure that Cuban "freedom-fighters" are fully equipped to attack the Cuban regime's military and police forces. This must include the immediate commitment of U.S. leadership personnel in combat operations.

To assure that Cuban "freedom-fighters" are fully equipped to attack the Cuban regime's military and police forces. This must include the immediate commitment of U.S. leadership personnel in combat operations.

PHASE II (Design)

To assure that Cuban "freedom-fighters" are fully equipped to attack the Cuban regime's military and police forces. This must include the immediate commitment of U.S. leadership personnel in combat operations.

OPERATION MONROE
## OPERATION MONGOOSE
### PHASE II (CIA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Support U.S. military actions in Cuba.</td>
<td>To provide intelligence, guerrilla action, and Cuban political-psychological support of U.S. military operations.</td>
<td>CIA capabilities must be continuously assessed and considered in the development of military planning. Executive responsibility for directing the use of covert assets must be clearly understood as resting in the U.S. military commander of the U.S. intervention, as in agreed-upon wartime operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOP SECRET SENSITIVE**
OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE II (USIA)

ACTIVITY

1. Increase news emphasis on Cuban revolt and intervention from the outside to help the Cuban movement.

PURPOSE

To neutralize opposition to U.S. policy and, if possible, gain support for U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere.

CONSIDERATIONS

Optimum exploitation of news material available to CIA and Defense is essential.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
**OPERATION MONGOOSE**  
**PHASE I (State)**  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
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<th>CONSIDERATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political and economic operations to isolate Castro regime and neutralize its influence in the Western Hemisphere.</td>
<td>Activities in consonance with U.S. policy established after the April 1961 failure in Cuba.</td>
<td>These activities will have some negative impact on the Cuban people, who are part of the target, but are consistent with an overt policy of isolating Castro and neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere. They are noted here, for the sake of completeness, as actions now being carried out by the Department of State under other existing programs and projects.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE I (Defense)

ACTIVITY

1. Expand special intelligence and other sensitive intelligence coverage of Cuba as required.

2. Develop the means of the Inter-American Defense Board to provide substantive intelligence on Cuban activities.

3. Provide logistic and personnel support for CIA intelligence operations into Cuba.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue the planning and essential preliminary actions to assure a decisive U.S. military capability for intervention.

PURPOSE

To develop increased "hard" intelligence.

To add to the U.S. intelligence coverage on Cuba and possibly to strengthen the concern of Latin American states for security.

To ensure optimum implementation of the intelligence plan.

To overthrow the Communist government of Cuba.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

March July 1962

CONSIDERATIONS

Use of cays near Cuba entail unacceptable security risks when vulnerable to Cuban landing parties. (Defense, in collaboration with CIA.)

Sensitivity of using this multi-national organization clearly restricts potential use by USA. Visibility of operational interest is an acceptable risk here.

The intelligence plan requires support by U.S. military manpower and equipment.

The U.S. military intervention must be conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist Bloc's ability to take effective counter measures is reduced to a minimum.
OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE I (USIA)

ACTIVITY
Propaganda programs to isolate Castro regime and neutralize its influence in the Western Hemisphere.

March - July 1962

PURPOSE
Activities in consonance with U.S. policy established after the April 1961 failure in Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS
These activities will have some general impact upon Castro support and influence in the Western Hemisphere. There will be some new material for use as the Phase I intelligence Operations produce but essentially the program is a continuation of that already in effect.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Teams</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 July 1962</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Nov. 1962</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Feb. 1963</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 to 38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 to 33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Sept. 1962</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>50/2 ready</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>31 May 1962</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Teams - 2 to 5 bodies**

**INFLUENTED RES. AGENTS**

**STAFF TO'S**

**LEGAL AGENTS**

**SELECTED TRAVELERS**

**T.O.P. SECRE-T**

**T.O.P. S.E.C.R.E.T.**