AGENCY: ARMY
RECORD NUMBER: 198-10007-10002
RECORD SERIES: CALIFANO PAPERS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

ORIGINATOR: ARMY
FROM: JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.
TO: GENERAL KRULAK
TITLE: CUBA AS A BASE FOR SUBVERSION

DATE: 02/14/1963
PAGES: 139

SUBJECTS:
CUBAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Secret
RESTRICTIONS: 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 02/10/1998

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS: Califano Papers, Box 1. Transmittal of report entitled "Cuba as a Base for Subversion" from Califano to Krulak.
14 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL KRULAK:

This book will have to be held by you on an EYES ONLY basis.

The 1700 meeting with Mr. Yarmolinsky will be held in Mr. Vance's office.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

Attachment

Room 3E 733
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## CUBA AS A BASE FOR SUBVERSION

### GENERAL

**SHTF 85-4 62 (9 Nov 62)**

Next Attached

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROPAGANDA</th>
<th>TAB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presea Latina and Printed Material</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Havana's International Broadcasting</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Contact</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Counter Effort</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| FUNDS | | |
|-------|---|
| Sole Report of Evidence | 1 |
| Reports of Cuban Funds for Subversion | 2 |

| TRAINING | | |
|----------|---|
| Summary Report of Training in Cuba Program | 1 |
| Travel for Training | 2 |
| Activities Upon Return from Cuba Miscellaneous | 3 |

| ARMS SHIPMENTS - FROM CUBA | | |
|--------------------------|---|
| Methods of Operation | 1 |
| Reports of Arms Smuggling | 2 |

| COMMUNICATIONS | | |
|----------------|---|
| Electronic Communications | 1 |
| Documents | 2 |
| Couriers | 3 |

| SABOTAGE | | |
|-----------|---|
| Reports of Sabotage | 1 |
| Terrorist Activities | 2 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION FOR LATIN AMERICA</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cuban Relationships and Policies</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Activities and Conflicts</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation Reports</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBVERSION -- Actions, which may or may not be inimical to U.S. interests, designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, morale, or political strength of a constituted government.
CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE CAPABILITIES IN LATIN AMERICA

THE PROBLEM

To describe and evaluate Castro's capabilities, with Soviet help, for carrying out subversion and sabotage in Latin America after satisfaction of all US conditions relative to the withdrawal of strategic weapons systems from Cuba and a consequent US commitment not to invade.

NOTE: In this estimate we have considered Castro's raw capabilities, taking note of, but not working out in detail, US and Latin American capabilities for counteraction.

SUMMARY

A. The dangerously unstable situation that prevails throughout much of Latin America is the product of fundamental inequities and historic circumstances; it is not the creation of Castro and the Soviets. Castro's efforts, with Soviet help, to exploit this situation by means of subversion and sabotage have not produced significant results. Propaganda exploitation of Castro and Cuba as symbols of revolution has probably been more effective to date than other subversive activities. Castro's influence in Latin America had waned by the time of the missile base crisis and was further reduced by the revelation that he had accepted Soviet strategic missile bases on Cuban soil and by the manner of the Soviet decision to withdraw them.

B. Implementation of an agreement between the US and the USSR whereby the strategic weapons systems would be withdrawn and the US committed not to intervene in Cuba with force will leave Castro with a new immunity and a greater freedom
for subversive actions throughout Latin America. The extent to which this potential is realized will depend upon the situation in Cuba, Soviet policy toward Cuba, and the policies and performance of the other Latin American governments and of the US with respect to the Castro threat. There are many targets in the hemisphere vulnerable to Castro-Communist subversion and sabotage, and the Soviets are likely to assist Castro in reaching them by contributing both to his security at home and to his capability for action overseas. As in the period before the missile base crisis, the effect of Castro's subversive activities will depend not only upon his capabilities but upon the attractiveness of the Cuban example and the willingness of the American governments to take determined counteraction. This willingness will probably be weakened by fulfillment of the US commitment not to invade Cuba.

C. We have examined how Castro's subversive potential would be affected by alternative courses of Soviet policy regarding Cuba: (1) virtual withdrawal of support; (2) continuation of economic and military support ranging from present up to substantially increased levels. We believe that course (1) would considerably reduce Castro's subversive potential, and that the Soviets are unlikely to elect it. We conclude that Soviet course (2) would maintain Castro's potential for subversive action at least at present levels or actually raise it to the point where he could undertake amphibious and/or airborne subversive operations against close-in targets.
THE ESTIMATE

I. CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES BEFORE THE MISSILE BASE CRISIS

Aims

1. From the time of his accession to power Fidel Castro has sought to gain acceptance of the Cuban revolution as a model for others and of himself as the leader of revolutionary forces throughout Latin America. He has constantly sought to foment revolutions in other Latin American States. Moreover, Castro has generally had the support of the Sino-Soviet Bloc in the pursuit of these aims.

Means

2. Castro began his career of sponsorship for revolutions in Latin America in 1959 with landings of small rebel forces in Nicaragua, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. None of these were successful and he turned to other means.

3. From the beginning, propaganda has been one of the principal instruments on which Castro has relied. In addition to the main transmissions of Radio Havana for external listeners, which have had a great deal of revolutionary content, he has beamed special programs devised to stimulate revolutionary action to each of half a dozen selected countries. A major effort has been made through Prensa Latina, the Cuban news service, to disseminate Castro-Communist propaganda. Printed propaganda has also been sent from Cuba into most other Latin American States, and Cuban diplomatic missions and personnel have actively disseminated it. Students returning from indoctrination in Cuba have helped establish Cuban Institutes for Friendship among Peoples which have functioned as propaganda outlets.

4. Thousands of Latin Americans have been brought to Cuba; about 1,200 foreign trainees are believed to be there now. Many hundreds have been trained in revolutionary techniques and guerrilla warfare. Cuba has been made a main transit point for travel between Latin America and the Bloc.

5. Financial support has been provided by Cuba to revolutionary groups in a number of countries, although the cases on which we have reports involved relatively small sums of money. Arms shipments have

*See Annex A.

*Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic.
also been reported, but the evidence is unclear as to quantities shipped and the extent of Cuba's role in these transactions. We believe that there is an extensive agent net in Latin America directed from Havana.

6. Castro has associated himself with revolutionary activist groups throughout Latin America. In most cases these have been Communist, but where the regular Communist Party favored a legal or parliamentary line he has not hesitated to support dissident Communist groups, e.g., in Brazil, and non-Communist revolutionaries, e.g., in Guatemala and El Salvador. In some cases he has sponsored new revolutionary organizations, e.g., in Panama, Colombia, and Peru. In Chile he has endorsed a popular front coalition made up of Communist and moderate leftists.

Evaluation

7. Instances of financial and material support sent by Cuba to revolutionaries in other countries which have come to our attention are probably only a part of the total effort. Even so, the effort seems to have been relatively small and ineffective. Yet along with the political and psychological stimulus which Castro's influence has provided, Cuban subversive activities have perceptibly strengthened activist revolutionary groups. Dangerous situations subject to exploitation by Castro and the Communists exist in a number of Latin American countries—notably Venezuela, Brazil, British Guiana, the Dominican Republic, and Bolivia. These dangers arise from political and social tensions which existed long before Castro came to power. They might lie dormant for some time; but with Castro as a potential detonator, they are more likely to blow up. The detonative compound will exist as long as Castroism survives, whatever may happen to Castro personally.

8. The most dangerous aspect of Castroism has been its broad appeal as a symbol of revolutionary change and nationalist assertiveness in Latin America. Propaganda from Cuba has taken advantage of this fact and has almost certainly been a more important influence in the Latin American situation than Castro's other subversive activities. During 1960 and 1961 Castroism became a force to be reckoned with politically in a number of Latin American countries. Certain governments felt obliged to move in the direction of neutralist and leftist positions. This influence waned, however, after Castro identified himself with the Bloc in late 1961. Nevertheless, the appeal to Castro's movement continued to be a source of major concern to almost all governments and seriously restricted their willingness to associate themselves, at least publicly, with the US.
II. CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE POTENTIAL IN THE AFTERMATH OF AN AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD WITHDRAW THEIR STRATEGIC MISSILES AND THE US GIVE ASSURANCES THAT IT WOULD NOT INVADE CUBA

9. Castro's subversive capabilities—and his disposition to use them—will be enhanced by the sense of security provided by such sophisticated weapons as are retained in Cuba after the withdrawal of Soviet strategic missiles. The IL-28 bombers, if retained, and other modern equipment noted in Annex B, would be important in this regard. A US commitment not to invade Cuba will further strengthen his sense of immunity from reprisal and almost certainly encourage him to intensify subversive activities in other Latin American countries.

Response of Castro Supporters to Missile Base Crisis

10. Castro's supporters throughout Latin America, with few though important exceptions (e.g., sabotage of oil facilities in Venezuela), failed to respond to the missile base crisis with effective acts of sabotage or with impressive public demonstrations. Two important limiting factors should be taken into account in judging this response, however. US action to alert Latin American governments led them to make extensive advance preparation, including deployment of security forces and the roundup of suspects, a condition of readiness which is unlikely to be maintained indefinitely. There also may have been some uncertainty among the activist followers of Castro whether they should make their big effort in response to the announcement of the US blockade, or wait for the anticipated US invasion. Moscow's apparent failure to provide guidance may have contributed to the confusion. It is our judgment, however, that the response to Castro's appeal for attacks on the US and its friends indicates that his power to command revolutionary action, at least in the circumstances of the missile base crisis, is limited.

Support Which Castro Can Expect in the Future

11. The range of Castro's support has been, we believe, considerably narrowed by events since Castro declared himself a Communist. Revelation of the fact that he had allowed the Soviets to establish offensive bases under exclusive Soviet control has alienated many non-Communist nationalists, genuine neutralists, and even revolutionaries seeking social and economic betterment. San Tiago Dantas, formerly Foreign Minister under President Goulart and an author of Brazil's nonalignment policy, and leading Mexican officials have publicly expressed their disenchantment.

12. The activist revolutionaries are probably the only important force on which Castro can now count, but even their support has apparently been rendered less effective by differences on the question of Soviet relations with Castro and with Latin American Communist parties.
Castro's Resources for Continued Subversive Activity

13. Arms. (See Annex B.) Castro has substantial stocks of arms. In addition to Soviet Bloc materiel there are stores of arms inherited from the Batista regime not being used by Castro forces and available for distribution outside Cuba. In the past he has apparently been hampered in his efforts to use arms for subversive purposes by problems of transport and delivery. He has at his disposal, however, 11 IL-14 transports belonging to Cubana airlines which could be used to deliver arms under certain circumstances. The IL-28's now in Cuba are inappropriate for subversive purposes. However, they could be used for air drops. Cuba has many small craft suitable for infiltration of men and arms. The 6 Khronshtadt subchaser, 16 P-6 motor torpedo boats, and 12 Komar missile boats obtained from the Bloc could also be used for arms deliveries. If the projected trawler base is built up, trawlers—both Cuban and Soviet—could be used for arms deliveries. If Soviet submarines call at the trawler base or at other Cuban ports, they, too, could be used in support of subversive activities. We see no evidence that Cuba has or is developing a sophisticated amphibious warfare capability, and all the means of delivery of arms by sea noted above would be vulnerable to precautionary measures by Latin American military and naval forces.

14. Propaganda apparatus. Castro's propaganda machine remains intact. For the time being, however, his diplomatic missions are likely to find it harder to disseminate propaganda than in the past, both because of new precautions by local governments and because of a reduction in the numbers of cooperative volunteers outside the organized Communist groups.

15. Money and equipment. Despite differences between Castro and the USSR concerning dismantling of the missile bases, we believe that the Soviets will continue to supply Castro with money, supplies, and equipment for subversive activity. The Soviets have certainly supplied Castro with sophisticated instruments of intelligence collection, sabotage, and clandestine communications.

16. Organization. The organization of Castro's subversive assets throughout Latin America was shown by the recent crisis to be loose and otherwise faulty. We estimate that Castro will make a strong effort to strengthen and improve it, and that he will continue to receive support in this effort from the Soviet apparatus, both in Cuba itself, where the Soviet Ambassador is a veteran officer of the KGB, and in other important centers of Soviet activity such as Mexico City and Montevideo.
Other Factors on Which Castro's Subversive Capability Will Depend

17. If the US and USSR reach and implement the agreement stated in the problem Castro will gain an immunity which he lacked before the missile base crisis. He will, furthermore, still have most of the arms and equipment which were delivered in the post-July buildup, as well as enhanced capabilities provided by accelerated training. Presumably his enemies will have about the same, or less, freedom to engage in propaganda, sabotage, support for resistance activities, and other actions designed to overthrow Castro than they had before the crisis—at least certainly not more. Unless Castro is gravely endangered by internal political and economic problems, there is no reason to believe that anti-Castro activities are any more likely to jeopardize his position than they did before the crisis.

18. Situation in Cuba. Castro's ability to engage in subversive activities will be influenced significantly by the strength and stability of his position at home. Heightened political and economic difficulties in Cuba would restrict Castro's subversive effort, while the more secure he is at home, the more freedom and strength he is likely to have for subverting other governments and re-establishing his prestige and influence. Castro's position in Cuba will depend in part on his own policies, but is likely to depend even more upon those of the Soviets.

19. Alternative Soviet policies. There are several courses of action with respect to Cuba which the Soviets are likely to consider. Some leaders may argue that the whole policy of economic and military support for Castro should be abandoned along with the plan for the deployment of strategic missiles in Cuba. We believe, however, that the Soviet stake in Cuba as an ally and as a Soviet center in Latin America is still too high to abandon. The stake in Castro as a person, however, is questionable. If the Soviets did make a decision to withdraw support either from Castro or from Cuba, we believe that Cuban capability for subversion in Latin America would be greatly reduced, at least for a time. This capability would be reduced more in the case of the Soviets withdrawing support from Cuba than in the case of their abandonment of Castro alone.

20. An alternative course would be for the Soviets to continue to extend economic and military assistance. Such assistance could range all the way from the amounts necessary to maintain Cuba in its present condition, including support of the expanded military establishment, to substantial increases. Such a policy would probably reduce considerably Castro's internal problems and thus give him additional freedom to engage in external subversion and sabotage. Additions to Castro's stocks of small arms would not in themselves change his capability for subversive activity, as he already has supplies of surplus arms. However, if the Soviets were to provide substantial additional air and
sealift capability, the Cubans would be able to mount large-scale subversive interventions in neighboring countries. Furthermore, whatever degree of success is achieved in improving Cuba’s position and in expanding its physical resources, Cuba’s net capability for subversion and sabotage will in the last analysis largely be determined by the overall situation in Latin America.

21. We do not believe that Castro or the Soviets can yet foresee what the effects of the recent crisis will be over the long term on their relationship. The crisis has probably created difficulties of a political and psychological nature that neither of them can readily solve, however determined they may be to do so. Castro may have been moved by the treatment he has received at the hands of the Soviets to consider modifying his relationship with them and seeking to improve his relations with the OAS and possibly even the US. We believe, however, that he is unlikely to find feasible ways of reducing his dependence upon the USSR. The Soviets certainly must consider that they have effective means of exercising control over Castro. Furthermore, his repeated assertions of continued loyalty to Marxism-Leninism make it unlikely that he is seriously contemplating a restoration of relations with the OAS, or that he could succeed if he tried.

22. Policy of other American nations. Castro’s subversive capabilities will be greatly influenced by the policies and actions of other Latin American nations, as by those of the US. We believe that the high state of security alert that has prevailed since 22 October and the show of unity that marked the recent crisis are unlikely to last. There is sure to be a revival of nationalist sentiments. On balance, however, we believe that the prospects for countersubversive action by Latin American States, on their own and in conjunction with the US, are improved. Many responsible Latin Americans will have interpreted recent events to mean that firm and united action can be effective against the Soviet threat from Cuba. However, Latin American governments will probably be less willing to take coordinated action against Communist inroads if the US commits itself not to invade Cuba.

**Likely Future Targets for Cuban Sabotage**

23. The extent of Castro’s capabilities for sabotage and other clandestine activity in Latin America will depend upon the complicated factors noted above. Whatever his capabilities are, he will not be at a loss for targets against which to use them. Some of the more obvious targets are:

a. **US missions and personnel.** US missions and personnel all over Latin America were designated as targets for attack in the various calls for action which went out during the recent crisis. Action against
such targets has a primarily political and propaganda value to Castro in that it tends to show public opposition to US policy. It is also relatively easy for Castro to promote attacks against official US installations in a crisis situation and to get help from all the various elements which are opposed to American influence in the area. Future attacks may be anticipated in situations in which Castro feels that the public resentment of US policy exists or can be stirred up.

b. Physical targets vulnerable to a limited sabotage effort. Prime targets for sabotage will be mining, industrial, and business installations in which there is a large proportion of US capital, which are otherwise associated with the US, or which are so important to the local economy that damage to them would create difficulties for governments which are anti-Castro and cooperating with the US. Oil facilities in Venezuela, including the oil and water pipelines to the refineries on the Paraguana Peninsula, and similar facilities are likely to be chosen as targets for Cuban sabotage. Installations for the handling of Venezuelan iron ore are also likely objectives. US installations in Panama might be attacked.

c. Port and communications facilities are generally vulnerable to sabotage and are appealing targets to Cubans and other Latin American Communists particularly in countries which are cooperating with the US and whose communications media are taking an anti-Castro line. Telephone, telegraph, radio and television facilities, and most public utilities, particularly electric power and transformer stations, are potential targets. Selection of targets for sabotage will depend on the importance of particular facilities but even more on the varying access of Castroites and Communists to them.

d. Political targets susceptible to exploitation. Political instability throughout Latin America, in almost every case characterized by pressures from below upon relatively conservative and generally anti-Communist governments, provide Castro with opportunities for subversive political activity. Particularly unstable situations include the following:

(1) *Venezuela*, where Communist-inspired disorders have been kept in check by the government, but where continued Communist and leftist violence may lead the military to take control. In a country such as Venezuela, where the stability of an anti-Castro and anti-Communist government depends heavily upon one man, assassination is another danger.

(2) *Nicaragua*, where Communist-led groups, in anticipation of coming elections, may seek to incite or exploit violence against the Somoza regime.

(3) *Guatemala*, where President Ydigoras' position is weak and uncertain.

---SECRET---
(4) The Dominican Republic, where the problems of political reconstruction after a generation of dictatorship have proved almost more than the caretaker government can handle, and where some political groupings amenable to Castro's influence are seeking to gain a footing.

(5) Bolivia, where the struggle for dominance within the ruling MNR Party between the moderates and those on the far left is ready-made for exploitation by Castro.

(6) Brazil, where Communists have penetrated the government and military to some limited extent, the tide of nationalist and anti-US feeling is strong, and depressed socio-economic conditions and inefficient government administration provide Castro many opportunities, especially in the northeast.
PROPAGANDA

General: Since 1 January 1959, the Castro/Communist Regime has placed great emphasis on its propaganda efforts throughout Latin America, as reflected in the quantities of personnel and obvious amounts of funds devoted to this enterprise. One of the first efforts was to establish PRENSA LATINA, a Cuban news agency with exchange agreements with TASS and the NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, as the principal Castro/Communist overt outlet. Shipments of printed pamphlets, books, magazines and leaflets have been discovered in Cuban diplomatic pouches in Mexico, Panama, Chile and Argentina. The baggage of most travellers departing Cuba contains printed propaganda. Cuban government personalities such as Dr. Armando Hart, Minister of Education, are known to have transported quantities of this printed material. Personal representation plays a great part in the Castro/Communist propaganda program. Travellers to Cuba for economic, political and cultural meetings are indoctrinated and are provided material for further distribution upon return to their home countries. Student, labor, youth, women, and professional organizations serve as a medium for propaganda dissemination. Diplomatic and economic representatives have cultivated local communists, influential leftists, and anti-government dissidents through personal contact. Radio plays an extremely important part in the Castro/Communist propaganda effort within Cuba and externally.

TAB 1 - PRENSA LATINA and Printed Material

This tab contains a detailed summary of Cuban efforts to organize propaganda and press control and an item illustrating Cuban efforts to mail printed material through Mexico.
TAB 2 - HAVANA'S INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

This tab contains a recent summary of Havana's broadcasting program with examples of Cuban propaganda inciting revolt in Latin America. Additionally, this tab contains four separate items indicating in greater detail the types of broadcast information currently being disseminated.

TAB 3 - PERSONAL CONTACT

This tab contains 4 items as follows: (1) An example of attempted diplomatic influence in Bolivia; (2) A tabulation of representatives attending a recent Congress in Cuba (by profession, country, and organizations represented); (3) An item on propaganda through the Cuban sponsored labor organization (CTCR); and (4) An example of propaganda through a cultural organization with inferred connections to an international organization strongly influenced by Communists.

TAB 4 - U.S. COUNTER EFFORTS

This tab contains a recent summary of USIA programs on Cuba and a more detailed item on USIA radio broadcasting to Latin America.
The following description of the Cuban Government's measures this past year to organize propaganda and press control is based upon the 25 September report of an official German service supplemented by August 1962 information from a fairly reliable independent source.

In early 1962 the ORI decided to establish a Comité de Orientación Revolucionaria (COR) to be responsible for all propaganda activities of the Cuban Government and for censorship of the press. Cesar Escalante, an old-time Communist, a member of the ORI National Directorate and brother of Aníbal Escalante who was later "purged" by Castro, was appointed head of the COR and thus given control over the entire Cuban press, radio, and television. By August, Cesar Escalante was reported to have a personal staff of 15 workers, most of whom were Communist Party members, and to be holding weekly briefing sessions with editors of the four large Havana newspapers, entrusting censorship to these editors.

In late June 1962, the ORI set up a committee to be in charge of coordination of Cuban propaganda throughout Latin America. This committee was subordinate to the COR, and consisted of representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Relations, the Prensa Latina news agency and the COR. The director of Prensa Latina was the news agency's representative on this committee. The representative of the COR, however, along with the representative of the Foreign Ministry, believed to be Ramon Renate y Molina, were said to have actually determined the policy of Prensa Latina.

The reorganization of Prensa Latina is described as Escalante's most important accomplishment. Since mid-July 1962 the news agency has been increasingly employed as an instrument of the Cuban Foreign Ministry and is serving as its propaganda medium in these countries with
which Cuba no longer maintains diplomatic relations. Cesar Escalante now controls Prensa Latina's activities both in Cuba and abroad. He is assisted by Ramon Calcines Gordillo, also a veteran Communist and member of the ORI National Directorate, who acts as liaison official with the Communist parties of Latin America. Calcines has been reported as being also a director of the Cuban Institute of Friendship with Peoples (ICAP) with which Prensa Latina maintains close relations.

The staff of the Prensa Latina center in Havana is to be enlarged from 150 employees to almost 1,000 by January 1963. The center also employs about 250 salaried personnel in Latin America in addition to numerous free-lance correspondents. The Latin American section of the Prensa Latina center enjoys a favored position with special privileges given to "sub-agencies" working in countries which have broken diplomatic relations with Cuba. The sub-agencies in several Latin American capitals are to be enlarged as operational centers for certain areas - for example, Bogota will be a coordinating center for Colombia, Venezuela, Panama, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua; and Mexico City for Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala.

The 100-Kilowatt VHF transmitter of Radio Havana is of special importance for increasing Cuban propaganda activities in Latin America; at the end of propaganda broadcasts the station reportedly also transmits specific directives to Cuban agents abroad. The manager of the radio station is Baldomero Alvarez Rios, president of the Cuban-Chinese Friendship Committee, who maintains close contact with Shen Chien, Communist Chinese ambassador to Cuba. Communist China is said to have considerable influence on Cuba propaganda activities.
A biweekly periodical, Panorama Economico Latinoamericano, which is distributed throughout Latin America, is to be given wider circulation and published additionally in an English-language edition. Fernando Colino, editor of the periodical, is said to be planning a campaign on "the economic tragedy of the Latin American peoples." (CIA CS-3/530, 108, 5 December, SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
NO FURTHER DISCLOS

COUNTRY Mexico/Cuba

REPORT NO. CS-3/536,706

SUBJECT Return of Cuban Propaganda
To the Cuban Embassy by the
Mexican Post Office

DATE DISTR. 8 February 1963

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES RD

DATE OF INFO. 21 January 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City (21 January 1963) FIELD REPORT NO. HMM-6958

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Person (F) with good contacts in the Cuban Embassy in
Mexico City. Appraisal of Content: 3.

Recently Mexican postal authorities returned a large amount
of Cuban propaganda to the Cuban Embassy with the stamp "no
such address." Heriberto Jorrín Múnoz, an employee of the Cuban
Embassy, commented that with such tactics the Mexican Post
Office "is sabotaging the Cuban Revolution."

Field Comment. TDCS-3/526,575 reported that on 26 October 1962
Mexican authorities had refused to accept a considerable volume
of airmail from Cuba which was destined for countries
other than Mexico and ordered the mail returned to Cuba.
SPECIAL MEMORANDUM

HAVANA'S INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

31 JANUARY 1963

I. HOURS ON THE AIR

II. SAMPLES OF RADIO PROPAGANDA
    INCITING TO REvolt IN LATIN AMERICA

Prepared for:
Information Copy for

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

"Radio Free Dixie" is a one-hour weekly transmission in English to Negroes in the United States, broadcast over the facilities of Havana's 50-kilowatt transmitter "Radio Progreso" and its network of eight relay stations situated throughout Cuba. Robert F. Williams, the North Carolina Negro who fled to Cuba to avoid prosecution for alleged kidnapping, is the director and chief commentator of this program, which is heard every Friday night at 10 p.m. EST. Using "jazz" terminology and frequently crude language, Williams tells his "oppressed North American brothers" that they are going to have to "fill a lot of jails and a lot of graves, and not just with black boys; either," in order to achieve "freedom and social justice." Assisting Williams are newscaster Carlos Moore and "musical hosts" (disc jockey and commentator) Jo Salas. "Radio Free Dixie" is heard very well in southern Florida and can probably be heard in many areas of the southern United States without elaborate technical facilities.

"The Friendly Voice of Cuba," formerly a popular Havana radio station known as "Radio Mambi," began broadcasting in May 1962. Although this powerful station does not so announce, its transmissions are apparently intended for listeners in the United States. "The Friendly Voice of Cuba" broadcasts from 6:00 in the morning to 1:00 a.m. EST. All of its programs, except for four seven-minute Spanish news shows, are in English. Its approach is a shade more subtle than that of "Radio Free Dixie." It is heard best in southern Florida, but can also be heard in many parts of the southern United States.

The official international service called "Radio Habana Cuba" is considered to be the chief external radio propaganda outlet of the Cuban Government. More commonly known as "Radio Havana," this station broadcasts weekly a total of 18 hours and 50 minutes of propaganda in languages which include English, French, Arabic, Portuguese, Spanish, and Haitian Creole, to listeners in Europe, the Mediterranean area, and the Western Hemisphere. "Radio Havana" is under the supervision of Marcos Behemaras, deputy director (for international broadcasting) of the Instituto Cubano de Radiodifusión. In addition to the normal information
and entertainment, it transmits special programs—"sponsored" by so-called exile groups—the evident intent of which is to encourage subversion of the incumbent governments of Peru, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic. Programs with similarly subversive intent were formerly beamed to Nicaragua and Honduras; these were discontinued in September 1962.

Although first observed by FBIS monitors on 14 March 1961, the Cuban international service was not officially inaugurated until May Day of that year, when it began presenting a relatively modest schedule of programs in English, French, and Spanish for Europe and the Americas for a total of 42 hours a week. Since then, "Radio Havana" has grown by leaps and bounds, finally emerging as Latin America's number one international broadcaster. Its time on the air is as follows, in hours per week:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language/Country</th>
<th>Hours</th>
<th>Minutes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arabic to the Mediterranean area</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haitian Creole to Haiti</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English to Europe</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English to the Americas</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French to Europe</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French to Canada</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French to the Mediterranean</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese to Brazil</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish to Europe &amp; the Mediterranean</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish to the Americas</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The technical facilities of "Radio Havana" are at a transmitter site about 23 miles southwest of Havana. At present, no more than four shortwave transmitters are being used, but in the past as many as five have been observed on the air at the same time. These transmitters range in power from 10 to 100 kilowatts, enabling "Radio Havana" to be heard all over the world. Programs are sent from studios to the transmitter site by means of microwave relays.

In addition to the regularly scheduled international service, these transmitters have been known to broadcast special programs in order to take advantage of particular political situations. When serious disorders broke out in the Dominican Republic in late 1961, for example, broadcasts emanating from a self-styled "clandestine" station called "Radio Revolucion del Movimiento Católico de Junio" demanded the overthrow of the Dominican government. The station went off the air after about a week, but not before direction finder (DF) bearings and other technical clues indicated that the Buena transmitter site was the point of origin.

"Radio Havana" announces that it makes its facilities available to political groups from other Latin American nations so that they can beam programs
back to their homelands. These programs are now broadcast as follows:

The Peruvian Anti-Imperialist Struggle Movement (Movimiento Peruano de la Lucha Anti-Imperialista) broadcasts the "La Voz del Peru Revolucionario" program to Peru on Sundays at 7 to 7:15 p.m., EST.

The Guatemalan Information Committee (Comitè Guatemalteco de Información) transmits the "Messaje a Guatemala" program to Guatemala on Tuesdays and Saturdays at 9 to 9:15 p.m., EST.

The Dominican Liberation Movement (Movimiento de Liberacion Dominicana) broadcasts the "Patria Libre" program to the Dominican Republic on Wednesdays and Fridays at 9 to 9:15 p.m., EST.

Similar programs were broadcast to Nicaragua and Honduras, but were dropped in September 1962 in favor of a "Radio Havanna" program called "Trinchera Americana," now heard nightly from 9:30 to 9:40 p.m., EST. This program is more flexible in that it attacks the regime of any Latin American nation, changing its target from night to night according to the exigencies of any given prevailing political situation.
II. SAMPLES OF PROPAGANDA INCITING TO REVOLT IN LATIN AMERICA

Reproduced below is a selection of some of the more inflammatory statements that have appeared in Havana broadcasts to Latin America as a whole (Section A) and in special programs tailored for listeners in Peru, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic (Section B). The quotations are arranged in reverse chronological order. Most of the statements are taken from programs broadcast within the past two months, with a sampling from the spring of 1962 included for purposes of comparison. Passages not included in quotation marks are paraphrases.

A. Broadcasts for Latin America in General (Radio Havana in Spanish to the Americas)

23 January 1963:

The People's animosity against Betancourt "has been growing with each passing day. Already there has been an elaboration of revolutionary tactics, the application of which is causing the very foundations of the spurious government to tremble. The National Liberation Front is turning out to be the most effective executor of the will of the Venezuelan people at this time. The slogan of the people is 'A Complete Change of Government!'"

12 January 1963:

"The situation in El Salvador is disastrous in every respect; the people are on the verge of a complete collapse or a violent reaction. The more the Salvadorans are oppressed, the more they strike back for their liberation, particularly since the Cuban revolution.... The masses are acquiring a great awareness of their strength and the possibility of its effective use, thanks to measures like the United Revolutionary Action Front, which declares itself to be the organization created by the people to carry out the revolution the people need."

UNCLASSIFIED  page XX-I
9 January 1963:

"The Paraguayan people are now determined to get rid of the government, which has ignored the most elementary rights, which has turned the country over to the insatiable voracity of the monopolies, and which is preparing an electoral force in order to remain in power against the people's wishes. Moreover, the people of Paraguay have decided to acquire their freedoms at all costs, and the crimes committed by Stroessner to dissuade them will be useless."

25 December 1962, quoting a statement attributed to Ecuadorian communists:

"The domestic political crisis is worsening. Administrative inefficiency of the dominating classes is becoming more glaring. Contradictions among the dominating class are increasing. And servility to Yankee imperialism is spreading. The real solution to this crisis is: To strengthen the people of all sectors in their struggle for their rights; to create a solid front with the masses; to overthrow the imperialists and oligarchs from power; and to set up a people's authority able to carry out a program of radical reforms."

29 December 1962, from a speech by Education Minister Amado Nater:

"To want every American nation and every man in Latin America to fight for his country, fight for his nation, fight for his national independence. This is what we want and that we desire, and this is what imperialism does not want. It does not want it because it knows that sooner or later this struggle will lead to liberation from imperialism, and it was the liberation from imperialism which guided Cuba to socialism, because liberation from imperialism naturally leads to socialism. What we want is for the people of Latin America to fight for their country and for the son of Latin America to fight for their country."

28 November 1962:

"Venezuelan events in recent days have lost none of their intensity. Given the vigor of the clashes between the Venezuelan patriots—perfectly organized for action in the fields and in the cities—and Romulo Betancourt's traitorous forces, decisive episodes should be expected within a few days. Venezuela is the weakest trench in the imperialist front in the Americas. Let it not be forgotten that the traitorous regime in Caracas, despite all appearances, is under fire from a great popular offensive."
The following quotations are taken from broadcasts in the spring of 1962:

1 May 1962, speech by Ernesto Guevara:

"Sometimes some comrade in Latin America asks us what we think of this or that place, how shall the problem be faced in this or that place. We always answer that there is no secret way to seize power and that the working class, helped and strengthened by the peasant class, must never seek the most bloody battles, because it will cost thousands and thousands and millions of lives of their sons. But the seizure of power by the working class is a historic necessity, and no one can oppose history... The years ahead, comrade, will be the scene in all of America of constant fratridial struggles."

8 April 1962, commentary on Ecuador:

"As of today, Aces donde, the people are rising up in arms against you, your infamous coalition government, the reactionary elements of the army, the bosses, the powerful, the exploiters, and above all, imperialism, in order to fulfill the slogans that you proclaimed and betrayed: land reform, tax reform, and national dignity. The people, Aces donde, never forget their word."

4 April 1962:

"The present government of Víctor R. Fuentes must be forced to abandon office, and the Congress, composed mainly of deputies who hold office as a result of fraud and impunidad, must be dissolved."

22 March 1962:

"Cuba has said, and has repeated a thousand times, that it is not necessary to export revolution, because each of the oligarchical, tyrannical, and despotic governments under which América suffers is itself preparing the conditions necessary for the people to rise up against it. And the people who suffer these proimperialist, bloody governments do not need to have parachutists drop into their mountains. They themselves seek solutions for their problems. The only thing of which Cuba can be accused is of having opened the way of having won its freedom fighting in guerrilla warfare against a cruel dictatorship."

UNCLASSIFIED  page XI-3
UNCLASSIFIED

B. Special Broadcasts

I. To Peru:

21 January 1963:

"Our standard must be a national liberation, a transforming liberation, a transforming revolution... The people of Peru know only too well that elections will not solve their problems because Peru needs a complete change, a radical transformation of its economic, political, and social structures.... Therefore we must continue to fight, not for small or partial victories but for a transformation of Peruvian society, for the destruction of capitalism."

7 January 1963:

"The military government junta may rest completely assured that there will be revolution in Peru and the people will take over.... We wonder if among the members of the armed forces there is not a group of truly honorable and patriotic men who love the people of Peru and are ready to place their weapons at the service of the people.... This is a year which will mark the beginning of a new era in Peru. Now is the time to resist with greater force and vigor. Strike against abuse; strike against violations.... The strike is the most powerful weapon. The strike can do more than can rifles and bullets."

2 April 1962:

"The Peruvian people know perfectly well that the Cuban revolution represents a hope for us and for all the nations of America. It is not enough to call oneself a revolutionary or support the revolution; it is necessary to adopt a revolutionary attitude."

2. To the Dominican Republic:

19 January 1963:

"The Dominican Liberation Movement calls on the entire nation to demonstrate its repudiation of the alleged visitors (two U.S. warships) which are coming to outrage the country and to be, suspiciously, present precisely when the people are filling the streets in their struggle against the imperialist U.S. Government. Everyone, forward to the fight for freedom, for national independence, and social progress!"
15 January 1963:

"The people must come again into the streets and demand that the emergency law be revoked immediately... Citizens, all to the fight to end the repressive and antidemocratic measures!"

31 December 1962:

"The experience of this year makes obvious to all the need to carry out the national antifeudal, anti-imperialist revolution. To carry out this revolution means to destroy the reactionary, antinational, and despotic power of the large landowners and the great bourgeoisie in league with foreign imperialism."

26 December 1962:

"The situation can be changed only by the grassroots mobilization of the popular masses, which will bring about the proper conditions to carry out an anti-imperialist, antifeudal revolution of emancipation."

3 April 1962:

"The time will come—and it is sooner than you think—then the popular masses of our country, the massacred, tortured, starving, and irremedial masses, will know how to settle accounts with every one of their oppressors... To the streets! To arms! Down with the illegal Trujillista Council of State!"

21 March 1962:

"The Trujillista Council of State is not competent to resolve the serious national problems in the interest of the country. That is why it must be overthrown and replaced by a government of the people whose hand will not tremble in liberating the country from feudal extortion and Yankee imperialism domination."

3. To Guatemala:

5 January 1963:

"The workers and employees, by means of strikes, and the peasants, by starting a big resistance movement everywhere, must make their strength felt so as to accentuate the popular nature of the struggle and pave the way to revolution. The Guatemalan people repudiate Ydigoras and his clique."

UNCLASSIFIED
An even larger number of direct Havana radio incitements to revolt have been noted in transmissions to Latin American countries recently, apparently reflecting the increased references to the need for other Latin American countries to follow Cuba's example which have been noted in recent speeches of regime leaders.

Thus a 1 January Cuban broadcast quoted a Guatemalan writer as saying that "after Cuba the American revolution will cleanse the other countries of this dirty blight of ignorance, maintained purposely by interested groups. Now America has only one way to go - the way of revolution that began in Cuba." A late December broadcast about Peru claimed that "a powerful guerrilla movement is growing; it already forms the nucleus for a future national liberation army." A 3 January report on the meeting of the Uruguayan Communist Party quotes its first secretary as saying: "The next phase will be one of hard battles. A sharpened class war may break out at any time and unleash the revolutionary storm ... There is no other way but to forge the social forces of the revolution step by step, shaping the unity of the anti-imperialist forces whose nucleus is the left-wing liberation front." A specially beamed "Dominican bulletin" to the Dominican Republic on 31 December quoted a communique of the "Dominican Liberation Movement" as saying: "The experience of this year makes obvious to all the need to carry out the national, anti-feudal, anti-imperialist revolution." On 3 January, Havana radio attacked President-elect Bosch of the Dominican Republic for preparing to sell his country to the "American monopolists." The radio also repeated instructions from a Cuba-based Dominican exile group urging Dominicans
to mobilize in support of striking workers. Ten leading Dominican pro-
Castro exiles recently were transported to Cuba from Europe aboard a
Czech plane. (FBIS Special weekly report to the Daily Summary,
4 January, OFFICIAL USE ONLY; last sentence above—SECRET INFORM.)
Havana broadcasts to Latin America continue to take the line that Cuba "is not exporting revolution," but to stress the necessity and inevitability of internal armed left-wing revolution in individual Latin American countries - calling for a "solid front" of the masses in support of such revolutions throughout the hemisphere, and indeed throughout the world.

The Dominican Republic and Venezuela continue to receive special emphasis in these Havana broadcasts. Broadcasts of 23 and 26 December called the Dominican elections a "farce," and made the point that such elections are no substitute for armed revolutions - such as "the heroic Venezuelan revolution which has stirred the whole continent."
A 27 December broadcast on the Venezuelan situation as such said: "The workers, students, intellectuals, and men and women of Venezuela fight bravely. Members of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left and of the Democratic Republican Union, Communists, and other patriots, civilian and military, have fought and still do fight against the traitorous and fascist regime of Betancourt." The commentator said that patriots have risen in arms in the mountains and cities of Venezuela; and that the guerrilla movement remained active in various regions of Venezuela.

(FRIS Special Report to the Daily Summary, 28 December, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)
Radio Havana's regularly scheduled program to Peru on 7 January was particularly strong in its appeals to the "Peruvian people" to continue their revolutionary struggle.

The program, like others directed to several other Latin American countries, purports to be directed by a group of exiles living in Cuba. The 7 January broadcast to Peru urged continuation of the struggle "since we already have a good part of the road behind us." The revolution may be lengthy, the broadcast states, but "it is too late now to contain the uncontrollable...the more brutal the repression, the greater will be the force of the people in their struggle..." Young army officers were urged to side with the people and, at the right moment, to "know where to direct your rifles."

Broadcasts of this type have been directed in recent months to a number of countries, including the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Late last month, Radio Havana began broadcasting daily programs to Haiti in the Creole language. (FBIS Daily Report, 9 January; and FBIS Operational Developments 371, 4 January, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)
A Havana radiobroadcast 10 January quoted the Central Committee of the Venezuelan Communist Party as calling President Betancourt's government the "principal enemy of the Venezuelan people today."
It called on the people and Communist Party of Venezuela to "master and use all forms of combat needed to achieve liberation and national sovereignty."

A 7 January broadcast beamed from Havana to Peru said that "the military-government junta may rest completely assured that there will be revolution in Peru and the people will take over power," and it concluded - "Now is the time to resist with greater force and vigor; strike against abuse, strike against violations...the strike is the most powerful weapon. The strike can do more than rifles and bullets."

(EBIS, Special Report to Daily Summary, 11 January, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)
CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE
J 071535Z DEC 62
AT USARMA LA PAZ BOLIVIA
TO RUEPDA/DA WASHDC
INFO RULPC/CINCARIB
RUEAF/CAIRC
RULPAC/USARCARIB
RUEPDA/DIA WASHDC "DLVR"

CONFIDENTIAL/TDTG 071535Z FM USARMA LA PAZ SGD UIMERT.
CITE CK-59. DA FOR ACSI. USARCARIB FOR G-2.

RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTS THAT OF CARABINERO GUARDS RECENTLY PLACED
AT SEVERAL AMBASSADORS RESIDENCES. THOSE REPORTING TO CUBAN
RESIDENCE ARE PERSONALLY MET BY AMBASSADOR, WINED AND DINED INSIDE
RESIDENCE, GIVEN SHORT LECTURES ON ADVANTAGES OF CUBAN REVOLUTION
AND OBSERVED LEAVING CARRYING ARMS FULL OF PROPAGANDA.
COMMENT: ARMA CHECKED AND FOUND THIS TO BE TRUE. CAS ALSO
VERIFIED. AT THIS RATE, CUBAN EMBASSY WILL BE ABLE TO TALK PERSONALLY
WITH EACH CARABINERO OF LA PAZ REGIMENT WITHIN THREE MONTHS. SCP-3
BT

ACTION: ACSI
INFO: DCSOP, OSD, JCS, AF, NAVY, CMC, DIA, DIA(AQ)

DA IN 297251
"ALL AMERICA WOMEN'S CONGRESS", held Havana, Cuba, January 11, 12, 13, 1933.

Attendance:

Number of Countries Participating 19
Number of Guest Countries Represented 15
Number of Delegates 435
Number of Guests 95
Total number of Women Attending 520
Cuban Woman Attending 177
Net Total Foreign Woman Attending 343

Breakdown of Delegates, by Occupations:

Workers: factory workers, peasants and employees 110
Professionals 49
Housewives 95
Teaching profession 20
Students 4
Writers 3
Journalists 2
Congresswomen 2
City councillors 2
Businesswomen 325

Number of Delegates, by Countries:

1. Argentina 19
2. Bolivia 1
3. Brazil 6
4. Canada 17
5. Colombia 13
6. Costa Rica 8
7. Cuba 177
8. Chile 31
9. Ecuador 4
10. El Salvador 3
11. Guatemala 10
12. Honduras 3
13. Mexico 93
14. Nicaragua 2
15. Panama 2
16. Paraguay 3
17. United States of America 14
18. Uruguay 15
19. Venezuela 2

From Cuba 177
Net Total Women Attending From the Rest of the Continent 248

(Based on figures given in "Hoy" January 15, and "Revolución" January 14, 1933)

Presidents of Delegations:

1. Argentina: Fany Edelman
2. Bolivia: Marta Vallejo
3. Brazil: Bertina Blum
4. Canada: Gilda Murray
5. Chile: Juliana Bampazeri
6. Colombia: Lidia de Hurtado
7. Costa Rica: Luisa González
8. Cuba
   - Vilma Espín
   - Marta Feijóo
9. Ecuador
   - Leticia del Valle
10. El Salvador
    - Línea Loza
11. Guatemala
    - Florencia Castro
12. Honduras
    - Clementina Batalla de Bassols
13. Mexico
    - Concepción Palacio
14. Nicaragua
    - Lidia Escallete de Gil
15. Panama
    - Presentación Lezcano
16. Paraguay
    - Name of president omitted
17. United States of America
    - Julia Árcevalo
18. Uruguay
    - Argelia Laya
19. Venezuela

Organizations Represented, by Countries:

Argentina
   Women's Inter-Partisan Commission; Argentina Vanguard
   Socialist Party; Women's Chapter; Co-Ordinating Committee
   of the Peronist Movement; Women's Chapter; Women's Commission
   of the Communist Party; Argentine Women's Union; Labour Unions;
   Group; the 62 Organizations; Labour Unions; Unity and Co-
   ordination Movement; Sponsoring Committee for the Congress.

Bolivia
   Sponsoring Committee for the Congress.

Brazil
   Women's Federation of São Paulo; Women's Interchange and
   Friendship Commission; Women's League of Guanabara State;
   Sponsoring Committee for the Congress.

Canada
   Congress of Canadian Women; La Ligue de Femmes Canadiennes;
   Fair Deal for Cuba Committee; Workers' Benevolent Association;
   United Jewish Peoples Order; Ladies' Auxiliary Committee
   (represented by the Chairman); Russian-Canadian Women's
   Federation; United Ukrainian-Canadian Women's Association;
   Peace Council Organization.

Colombia
   Democratic Women's Union; Political Party of the Left;
   Barristas' Society of Colombia; Liberal Revolutionary
   Movement; Sponsoring Committee for the Congress.

Costa Rica
   Costa Rican Women's Alliance.

Cuba
   Workers' Central Organization of Revolutionary Cuba; Union of
   the Communist Youth; High School Students' Union; University
   Students' Federation; Committees for the Defense of the
   Revolution; Movement for the Peace and Sovereignty of the
   Peoples; Cuban Women's Federation.

Chile
   Workers' Single Central Organization; Women's Union of Chile;
   Cuban-Chilian Institute of Culture; Women Workers' Union of the
   Telephone Company; Israeli Culture Center; Teachers' Labour Union;
   Professors' Union; National Society of Professors; Bookstores' 
   Labour Union; Sponsoring Committee for the Congress; National
   Committee of Young Chilean Women.

Ecuador
   Women's Union of Guayaquil; Sponsoring Committee for the Congress;
   University Women's Association.
El Salvador
Salvadoran Women's Fraternity.

Guatemala
"Dolores Bedoya" Women's Organization; Labour's Patriotic Youth.

Honduras
Honduran Women's Union; White Cross Mothers' Societies.

Mexico
Mexican Women's Democratic Union; Teachers' Revolutionary Movement; National Liberation Movement's Women's Action Group; University Women's Association; Group of Friends of Romania; United Front of Mazatlan-Sinaloa Colonies; Civic Committee of Guerreros; University and High School Teachers; Women's Co-ordinating Committee; Economists' Committee; National Workers' Union of the Teaching Profession; Revolutionary Labour Federation; General Union of Mexico's Workers and Peasants; Pro-Independence Women's Group of Michoacán; The Mexican Women's Vanguard; Mexican Women Workers' Union; Sponsoring Committee for the Congress.

Nicaragua
Political Party "Revolutionary Mobilization".

Panama
Vanguard for Nation Action; Women's Vanguard.

Paraguay
February Revolutionary Party; Women's Chapter; Women's Union; Women's Movement; FULNA.

United States of America
North-American Association of Friends of Cuba.

Uruguay
Liberation Front of the Left; Eastern Revolutionary Movement; Women's Union; Committee to Help Spanish and Portuguese Political Prisoners; Workers' Central Organization of Uruguay; Sponsoring Committee for the Congress.

Venezuela
National Women's Union of Venezuela; Assistance Federation of Venezuela.

Guest Countries Represented:

Albania
Algeria
Bulgaria
China
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
East Germany
Great Britain
Hungary
Indonesia
Romania
Spain
U.S.S.R.
Viet Nam
Officials of Cuba's organization for regimenting workers, the CTCR, are stressing to the Cuban people their responsibility for "liberating" other Latin American peoples. Havana radio has reported a talk to a group of volunteer harvesters of tubers and weeder of garlic and arum in a town of southern Havana Province, some of whom were locally recruited and some of whom were delegates from Latin America and Canada to the recent revolutionary commemoration ceremonies. The CTCR official responsible for this volunteer work said that Cuba was offering "its example to the 200 million exploited Indians, peasants and workers of Latin America; and that in the same manner that we receive help from the socialist countries, we have the duty to help other peoples to obtain their liberation." He added that the Cubans would fulfill that duty. (FBIS Daily Report, 15 January, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)
The World Peace Council (WPC) was expected to pay for the expenses of the Continental Congress in Support of Cuba, which is to be held in Rio de Janeiro from 28 to 30 March 1963, according to comments made by General Luiz Gonzaga Leite, president of the Society of Friends of Cuba (SAC), at a meeting of the SAC on 21 January 1963.

As of 21 January the SAC had not received any replies from the invitations sent to the African nations to participate in the congress. It was announced at the meeting that Valerio Konder, acting president of the Brazilian Pro-Peace Movement and a member of the SAC, was planning to go to Tanganyika to attend the Third Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference in early February and would take a copy of the convocation for the congress with him.

Plans were made for painting slogans concerning the congress all over the city and for placing large signboards along some of the main parkways. The possibility was discussed of persuading a well-known painter, such as Emiliano di Cavalcanti, to paint a picture for the congress, which would be raffled off for the benefit of the congress.

At a meeting of the SAC on 15 January a series of pro-Cuba meetings, which would be held before the congress, was planned. The possibility of inviting certain Brazilian artists to perform at the meetings in order to attract a large crowd was discussed. The SAC was also trying to obtain the signature of Dias Gomes, the theatrical producer, on the convocation of the congress. Gomes planned to go on 19 January to Cuba, where he was to direct a play.
February 6, 1963

CURRENT USIA PROGRAMS ON CUBA

1. Special Multi-Media Project to tell Cuban story in perspective from its early promises through the missile crisis. Initiated December 14 with target date for completion February 15. Theme: "This is what happens to a country which lets itself be embraced by communism."

Products in preparation under this project are:

   a) a two-reel film for theatrical and mobile unit showing;
   b) a television film with interviews from around the world expressing disillusionment that the Cuban revolution became a pawn in the international communist game;
   c) a photo booklet;
   d) a radio dramatization for both shortwave broadcast and local placement;
   e) a photo exhibit.

2. Regular Program

Radio (see attachment on VOA broadcasts to Cuba)

   - Nine hours Spanish daily to Latin America, three especially directed to Cuba (latter also relayed by medium wave)

   - Package programs for local placement. Over 4500 hours per week on some 1500 Latin American stations (counting all programs, of which those relating to Cuba represent a large proportion).

   - USIA-Miami Office (1 Foreign Service Officer, 11 Cuban employees) producing daily half-hour package of interviews, excerpts from letters, refutations latest Cuban propaganda.

   - Themes (see attached memorandum)

Press and Publications

   - Wireless file: 10,000 words news and commentary daily via teletype to all Latin American posts for placement in local press. Average 15 articles weekly relating Cuban situation.

   - Packet materials - Articles and photos of more timeless interest
mailed to posts.

- Miami Office provides articles on latest Cuban developments derived from interviews with refugees and study of Cuban press and radio.

- Publications - Six anti-Castro cartoon books distributed in eight million copies. New series in progress, including one on food shortages in communist world and Cuba, and three cartoon books on Alliance for Progress theme.

- Mexico Reproduction Center and USIS posts in Latin America originate a number of pamphlets on Cuba.

Book Development

Support of low-cost Spanish editions of anti-Castro books, which have included "Las Cadenas Vienen de Lejos," by Alberto Baeza Flores; "Cuba, First Satellite in the Americas," by Daniel James; "El Infidel Castro" by Yves Gilbert; and now in production, "The Sensual Revolution" by Victor Franco. Portuguese edition in Brazil of Theodore Draper's "Castro's Cuba: Myths and Realities."

Television

"Panorama Panamericano" - weekly 15-minute videotaped show televised regularly in 42 cities of 18 Latin American countries with estimated 10 million viewers.

Special productions. Examples: Film on Cuban children, "Tactics of Communism" series (one on Castro land reform), missile crisis specials, etc.

Acquisitions. Examples: "Anatomy of Betrayal - Dateline Cuba" (from Armstrong Circle Theater; "The Tunnel" (Berlin wall documentary from NBC).

Films

"Horizons" - monthly news film magazine for commercial theater showings in Latin America, featuring occasional items on Cuba.

Specials - "The Unfinished Struggle"; "The Promised Land" (animation
on land reform); "The Revolution Betrayed," etc.

3. USIS Field Operations in Latin America

USIS maintains offices in 45 major cities of Latin America. Total American field personnel in Latin America is 215, including 29 Student Affairs Officers and 9 Labor Information Officers. Locally-employed nationals total 782. USIS assists 119 Binational Centers in the area.

Major posts are equipped to carry out extensive press, film, radio, exhibit, book, cultural, and personal contact programs. Most posts originate their own materials designed to fit the local situation.
Current Voice of America Programming on Cuba

The Voice of America broadcasts 8 3/4 hours in Spanish daily to Latin America, of which 2 3/4 hours is tailored especially for the Cuban audience. The transmission times of the Cuban hours are 6:00 to 7:00 a.m., and 10:00 to 11:45 p.m.

The "Appointment with Cuba" hour (10:00 to 11:00 p.m.) consists of 15 minutes of news, followed by a five-minute commentary on some development in the Cuban situation, a 30-minute Miami-produced package (interviews with refugees, commentaries refuting the latest Cuban propaganda claims, excerpts of letters received from listeners inside Cuba), and a ten-minute sports feature emphasizing the activities of Cuban athletes in the U.S.

The 11:00 to 11:45 p.m. broadcast opens with 15 minutes of news and is followed either by a half-hour dramatization or a 15-minute news documentary and 15 minutes of features. A 150-installment series of a soap-opera type adventure, featuring three brothers combatting a Castro-like regime, was run at this time until recently. A new series of this dramatization is now being produced under contract in Miami with Cuban writers and actors and will soon be broadcast to Cuba in the same time spot.

The 7:00 to 8:00 a.m. broadcast to Cuba also opens with 15 minutes of world news and repeats the Miami package and features of the previous night.

In the six hours of daily broadcasts to the general Latin American audience, which can also be heard in Cuba, the total material relating to the Cuban situation averages approximately one hour. This consists of commentaries, interviews with refugees, and news documentaries.

In addition to the short-wave broadcasts (relayed also to Cuba on medium wave by two mobile transmitters), the main features on Cuba are sent out as tapes to all USIS posts in Latin America for placement with some 1500 local radio stations. The number of listeners reached by this means is many times greater than the shortwave audience.

The main themes emphasized in the Voice's Cuban programming are: 1) Castro's betrayal of a legitimate national revolution; 2) the subservience of the Cuban regime to international communism; 3) the economic failures of the regime, relating these to the pattern of communist failures in the rest of the world; 4) the isolation of Cuba in the face of continental solidarity opposing Cuba's alliance with the communist bloc; and 5) the U.S. position that Cuba will one day be free.
USIA RADIO BROADCASTING TO LATIN AMERICA

1. Direct Shortwave
   a. Spanish - 8 hours/45 minutes per day.
      (3 hours are programmed for Cuba)*
   b. Portuguese - 3 hours per day.

2. Packaged Programs
   Spanish and Portuguese language tapes are air-mailed to USIA stations in Latin America - some 4,000 hours per week are broadcast over 1,500 local stations. The program material consists of dramatizations, news documentaries about the Alliance for Progress, economics, political commentaries, etc.

3. Miscellaneous
   About 150 LA local stations rebroadcast (either simultaneously or from tapes) portions of the Spanish and Portuguese programs listed in "Direct Shortwave" above. These rebroadcasts are in medium wave bands to local audiences. USIA has no estimate of the total hours involved per day or week.

*This time is simultaneously broadcast over medium wave transmitters to Cuba and the Caribbean.

(Data supplied by:
Mr. William Wagley of USIA
Code 182/2340)

13 February 1963

SECRET
Funds

General: Despite continuing reports of Castro/Communist offers of financial assistance to individuals and groups in Latin America, there is no proof that the delivery of funds was actually made. Cash transactions other than those made with Cuban pesos outside of Cuba would be virtually impossible to trace. There is some fairly firm evidence that in March 1962 an amount of $10,000 was provided to the Guatemalan "13 November Movement" based in Mexico City for use in actions against the Government of Guatemala.

Individuals travelling to Cuba on various occasions are known to have received both transportation and financial assistance, but the amounts have not been established. A number of reports indicate representatives in Latin America have channelled funds to sympathetic individuals or groups.

Tab

1. Evidence of Funds

This Tab contains a summary of the sole report considered as evidence of fund transfers by DIA. CIA representatives have informed DIA that the original raw report is not immediately available.

2. Reports of Cuban Funds for Subversion

This Tab contains a large number of reports alleging fund transfers in Brazil, Guatemala, Columbia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Honduras. Most of the reports indicate the funds are to be used in activities against the local government. (Amounts vary from small sums for travel up to thousands of dollars.)
Guatemala: A new attempt to oust the Ydigoras regime may be made shortly by the Cuban-supported "13 November" group of ex-Guatemalan army men. The Guatemalan military attaché in Mexico told his U.S. counterpart there that "13 November" leaders in Mexico appear well-financed and are buying arms and supplies for an operation to begin late this month or early next.

The group, which led a guerrilla outbreak earlier this year, is reported by a usually reliable source to have received at least $10,000 in Cuban financial assistance since last March. Meanwhile, sporadic bomb explosions in Guatemala City may mark the beginning of a new anti-government campaign, though the U.S. Embassy there reports that at the moment there are no vital issues stirring up popular feeling against the regime.
Monthly financial aid from the Cuban Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to Juliao's left-wing peasant leagues in northeastern Brazil has reportedly been cut off by orders from Havana. A key leader of the dissident Communist Party of Brazil may have been responsible for the cutoff by recently revealing the serious internal friction within Juliao's organization to a Cuban Embassy official. (CID DFP Recife TDCS-3,530,312, 5 December, CONFIDENTIAL)
Guatemala/Cuba

Planned Return of Manuel Galich as Presidential Candidate, with Possible Support from Fidel Castro

January 1963
Guatemala, Guatemala City

22 January 1963

Former Guatemalan police official (B); from a member (B) of the Communist Party of Guatemala. Appraisal of Content: 3.

Upon his return from Habana, Cuba, from the anniversary celebrations, Humberto Barillas, member of the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT), said that, in addition to a meeting with Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, he had also talked with Manuel Galich, Fidel Castro, and Jose Manuel Fortuny. He said that Galich had told him that he would return to Guatemala to begin his presidential campaign toward the end of February and that Castro had offered to lend Barillas money to be used in Galich's campaign.

1. Field Comment. See TDCS-3/535,004.

Headquarters Comments

Barillas' first name was reported as Gilberto in CS-3/532,931 and CS-3/535,649.

2. Galich, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs under Arbenz, is now head of the Communist Cultural Center in Habana.

Fortuny is a former secretary-general of the Communist Party of Guatemala.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Security of the United States within the meaning of Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794. The transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

COUNTRY: Colombia/Venezuela/Cuba  
REPORT NO.: CS-3/5555

SUBJECT: Cuban Subversive Activities in Colombia and Venezuela  
DATE DISTR.: 30 January 1963

NO. PAGES: 3  
REFERENCES: RD-W-2107

DATE OF INFO.: 1952 - January 1953  
PLACE & DATE ACQ.: Colombia, Cali (7 January 1953)  
FIELD REPORT NO.: HLB-3158

This is unclassified information. Source gradings are definitive. Appraisal of content is tentative.

SOURCE: Member (F) of the Communist Party of Colombia in Cali. Appraisal of Content: 6

1. During a discussion on 5 January 1953 between Ismael de Jesus Zapata, a member of the Department of Valle Regional Committees of the Communist Party of Colombia (PCC), and F. I. Plata, whom Zapata describes as a Cuban deep-cover agent working with the Seventeenth January Worker-Student-Fascist Movement (MOC) in Colombia and Venezuela, both criticized the MOC for its soft policy and fear of taking a more active role in the guerrilla activities in Colombia. They indicated there is a split between the followers of Gilberto Milla, White, Political Secretary of the MOC, and those who advocate the Castro-Communist concept of active participation in the guerrilla bands. Both agreed the only hope for the MOC is to follow the Castro policy, as have the Communist Parties of Peru, Venezuela, and Bolivia. Plata said it is possible there will soon be a change in the position of the MOC leaders in Bogota.

2. Plata said the MOC is not a local movement but rather part of a Latin American concept which is being assisted by Castro and the Cuban Government. He said he has been in Cali for one year on a special assignment from the top leaders in Cuba to see that arms, money, and instructions from Venezuela originating in Cuba were into the hands of the MOC groups. Plata said he has also been helping to recruit Venezuelan youth, largely from schools and universities, to fight with the MOC bands in Colombia.

3. Plata said he lived for many years in Caracas and that his apartment there is still a meeting place of Cuban guerrilla leaders operating in Venezuela. Two Castro agents, who represent themselves as being anti-Castro, live in his apartment now. He added that the apartment is a center that maintains contact with Colombia through associates in Bogota, Cartagena, and Puerto, and that several Cubans and Cuban-trained Colombians are working with the MOC in Colombia. He said that Pedro Emilio Castro, Fidel's older brother, lived for a long time at his apartment in Caracas, but has now returned to Cuba, where he is not involved in politics. Plata added that he has visited Cuba several times, the last visit in February 1951, when he was introduced to Fidel.
Castro and had two conferences with him. The Castro organization in Caracas is in direct contact with Castro agents in Miami, who consider Caracas their most important center in Latin America. The Nati group, which is made up of persons in the anti-Castro organization there who ostensibly escaped from Cuba, maintains contacts with all of the Latin American groups.

4. Plata said an important shipment for MOEC is due to arrive from Venezuela via Cucuta in February 1963. It is to be used in the MOEC plans to increase their activities in the Department of Santander. Plata mentioned Santander several times in the discussion as an area where the MOEC will play a more important role in violence in the future. He said there are several MOEC training areas in Colombia and Venezuela. Plata said he ostensibly is a salesman of refrigeration equipment for Comerciales Unidas Ltda., Carrera 58 No. 15-75, Cali. He said most of the MOEC representatives in Colombia pose as traveling salesmen. He asserted MOEC is looking for new people who are not known to the Colombian authorities to help them transport arms and equipment around the country.

5. Plata said he was born in the municipality of Malaga, in the Department of Santander; that he is married to Yaruma de Plata, who has one arm missing; and that they have two daughters, one of whom is married to a Venezuelan doctor.

6. On 6 January 1963, Zapata and Plata went to "Los Pasuchos," a restaurant near the country club of Cali. The owner of the restaurant, a Gomez (ind.), is a member of the MOEC. They inspected a new tent that was acquired for a MOEC guerrilla leader known as "Macropo," who is active in the northern part of the Department of Tolima. Plata expressed a desire to obtain more of the tents for MOEC operations in other areas. He said he was expecting money from Venezuela by the first of February. Francisco Calero, formerly thought to be the MOEC leader in Cali, attended the meeting briefly and was ordered around as a subordinate of Plata.

7. During the conversation at the restaurant it was asserted that Fidel Castro had given US $50,000 dollars to Luis Emilio Valencia, one of the leaders of the United Popular Revolutionary Action (FUR). The money had been given to Valencia to build up an organization to participate more actively in sabotage and guerrilla activities. It was said that Valencia used the money for his private use and as a result the FUR has collapsed and might not be assisted any more by Castro. Since the failure of FUR, there is increased importance on the MOEC organization.

Source Comment. Plata, who appears to be approximately 60 years old, is well acquainted with the MOEC contacts in Ibagué. He also has a very close relationship with Zapata, who was in complete agreement with the criticism of the "soft line" of the PCC as represented by Vieira. It also appears there is a much closer understanding and co-operation between MOEC and PCC at this level than appears on lower levels.

Field Comments

1. Members of the Regional Committee of the Department of Valle have expressed differences in the recent past with the action of the Central Committee of the PCC over the lack of action during the Cuban blockade. They have spoken of their plans to participate in sabotage in the Cali area. Apparently the aggressive faction, headed by Zapata, has been overruled by Jose Cardona Hoyos, secretary-general of the local regional committee.

2. Cucuta, capital of the Department of Norte de Santander, is on the Venezuelan border and is a traditional center of smuggling between the two countries.

3. There is no record of Comerciales Unidas in the Cali telephone directory. Plata did present his business card, which lists the address and name of the company as reported above.

4. Malaga is in the east central part of the Department of Santander, about 80 miles from the Venezuelan border.

5. "Mariposa" is the alias of a MOEC guerrilla leader who controls a band in the northern part of the Department of Tolima. Cf. CS-3/533, 975.
in the anti-Castro organization there who ostensibly escaped from Cuba, maintaining
contacts with all of the Latin American groups.

Plata said an important shipment for MEOC is due to arrive from Venezuela via
Cucuta in February 1963. It is to be used in the MEOC plans to increase their
activities in the Department of Santander. Plata mentioned Santander several times
in the discussion as an area where the MEOC will play a more important role in
violence in the future. He said there are several MEOC training areas in Colombia
and Venezuela. Plata said he ostensibly is a salesman of refrigeration equipment
for Comerciales Unidas Ltda., Carrera 54 No. 15-75, Cali. He said most of the
MEOC representatives in Colombia pose as travelling salesmen. He asserted MEOC
is looking for new people who are not known to the Colombian authorities to help
them transport arms and equipment around the country.

Plata said he was born in the municipality of Palaga, in the Department of
Santander; that he is married to Maruja de Plata, who has one arm missing; and
that they have two daughters, one of whom is married to a Venezuelan doctor.

On 6 January 1963 Zapata and Plata went to "Los Puachos," a restaurant near the
country club of Cali. The owner of the restaurant, a Gomez (可以用), is a member of
the MEOC. They inspected a new tent that was acquired for a MEOC guerrilla leader
known as "Mariposa," who is active in the northern part of the Department of
Tolima. Plata expressed a desire to obtain more of the tents for MEOC operations
in other areas. He said he was expecting money from Venezuela by the first of
February. Francisco Calero, formerly thought to be the MEOC leader in Cali,
attended the meeting briefly and was ordered around as a subordinate of Plata.

During the conversation at the restaurant it was asserted that Fidel Castro had
given US $9,000 dollars to Luis Pedro Valencia, one of the leaders of the United
Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR). The money had been given to Valencia to
build up an organization to participate more actively in sabotage and guerrilla
 activities. It was said that Valencia used the money for his private use and as a
result the FUAR has collapsed and might not be assisted any more by Castro.
Since the failure of FUAR, there is increased importance on the MEOC organization.

Source Comment. Plata, who appears to be approximately 60 years old, is well acquainted with the MEOC contacts in Ibagué. He also has a very close relationship with Zapata, who was in complete agreement with the criticism of the "soft line" of the PCC as represented by Vieira. It also appears there is a much closer understanding and co-operation between MEOC and PCC at this level than appears on lower levels.

Field Comments

1. Members of the Regional Committee of the Department of Valle have
expressed differences in the recent past with the action of the
Central Committee of the PCC over the lack of action during
the Cuban blockade. They also have spoken of their plans to
participate in sabotage in the Cali area. Apparently the aggres-
sive action, headed by Zapata, has been overruled by Jose
Cardona Hoyos, secretary-general of the local regional committee.

2. Cucuta, capital of the Department of Norte de Santander, is on
the Venezuelan border and is a traditional center of smuggling
between the two countries.

3. There is no record of Comerciales Unidas in the Cali telephone
directory. Plata did present his business card, which lists
the address and name of the company as reported above.

4. Malaga is in the east central part of the Department of Santander,
about 80 miles from the Venezuelan border.

5. "Mariposa" is the alias of a MEOC guerrilla leader who controls
a band in the northern part of the Department of Tolima.
Cf. CS-3/533,975.

6. Calero appeared to be the MEOC leader in Cali by virtue of the
fact that he represented it in meetings with the PCC and FUAR
during the Cuban blockade. It now appears he is a local agent
who devotes part time to MOEC, being directed by Plata, who is probably a full-time agent of the Castro government in charge of recruiting and controlling Cuban assistance to the organization in the Cali area.

7. The FUAR seems to have been in a recess during recent months in the Cali area. In early November Luis Emiro Valencia, one of the leaders of the FUAR, was asked directly if there was any truth to the story circulating in Cali that Castro had given him 50,000 dollars to help FUAR. He laughed and asserted the amount mentioned in Bogota is only 30,000. He said his only assistance from Cuba was a 1,000-dollar first prize in a literary contest in 1959 or 1960 and two paid trips thereafter to judge other literary contests. It is difficult to determine the truth of Valencia's denial or the charges mentioned herein. The story has been circulating in Cali for approximately six months and could be hearsay on the part of either Plata or Zapata. It is noteworthy that Valencia has refused to espouse common ideology with the PCC, except for Castro, which Valencia insists he will not accept if it is a tool of international Communism.
TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Sections 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

COUNTRY
NICARAGUA, COSTA RICA, MEXICO, CUBA, USSR

SUBJECT
FUNDS SUPPLIED BY SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY TO PROMOTE CASTRO-SPONSORED INVASION OF NICARAGUA

REPORT NO.
TDCS 3/534, 229

DATE DISTR.
16 JANUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE
PRIORITY

REFERENCES
43

PLACE & DATE ACQ.
NICARAGUA, MANAGUA, 15 JAN 63

APPRaisal
43

FIELD REPORT NO.

TDCS 3/534

FIELD COMMENT
SOURCE SAID THAT HIS INFORMATION HAD BEEN CONFIRMED.

1. OCTAVIO FLORES, NICARAGUAN CITIZEN CONNECTED WITH A BUSINESS IN THE UNITED STATES, VISITED THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY ON 13 JANUARY 1963, WHERE HE WAS GIVEN $20,000, WHICH HE TOOK TO SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA, THAT SAME DAY. THE MONEY IS TO BE USED TO PROMOTE A CASTRO-SPONSORED INVASION OF NICARAGUA.

2. ON 15 JANUARY REYNALDO VIQUEZ RUIZ, NICARAGUAN COMMUNIST LEADER, FLEW FROM MANAGUA TO SAN JOSE, WHERE HE PLANNED TO MEET FLORES.

3. FLORES HAS 75 SUBMACHINE-GUNS AT LAS BRISAS, WHICH IS ON THE COSTA RICA-NICARAGUA BORDER.

4. FIELD DISSEM: CINGARIB, CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 792 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

(When Filled In)

TELEGRAM

INFORMATION REPORT

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY
NICARAGUA/HONDURAS/CUBA

DIAAP-3

REPORT NO.
TDCS
3/535,840

DATE DISTR.
30 JANUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE

PLACE & INFO.
NICARAGUA, MANAGUA (28-29 JANUARY 1963)

DATE ACQ.
12-25 JANUARY 1963

APPRAISAL
3

REFERENCES
IN. 59179

FIELD REPORT NO.
HNM-740

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE
A NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL (C); FROM A NICARAGUAN OFFICIAL IN HONDURAS (F); FROM A MEMBER (F) OF THE FLN.

1. LEADERS OF THE FREnte DE LIEBERACION NACIONAL (FLN - NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT), A CUBAN-SUPPORTED ANTI-SOMOZA REVOLUTIONARY GROUP, PLAN TO SEND FOUR GROUPS OF GUERRILLAS FROM HONDURAS INTO NICARAGUA WHEN SUFFICIENT ARMS AND MEN HAVE BEEN COLLECTED. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE FLN WILL NOT BE READY TO BEGIN GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES UNTIL SOMETIME AFTER THE NICARAGUAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS WHICH WILL BE HELD ON 3 FEBRUARY 63.) THREE OF THE GROUPS FROM HONDURAS PLAN TO ATTACK NICARAGUAN MILITARY POSTS AT OCOTAL, SOMOTO, AND JINOTEGA. THE FOURTH GROUP WILL OPERATE IN THE CAPE GRACIAS A DIOS AREA AND WILL BE SUPPLIED BY SMALL BOATS. THE FLN PLANS TO SUPPLY THE OTHER GROUPS

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CLASSIFICATION—DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI OIC ORR ORI OGO EXO

STATE/DIR

DIA

ARMY/ACSI

NAVY

AIR

JCS

SECDEF

NSA

NIC

AID

USIA

OCI

OIC

ORR

ORI

OGO

EXO

FBI I&NS

TELEGRAM

INFORMATION REPORT

TELEGRAM

FORM 3-41

1K

OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

(15-20)
BY AIR AND A LANDING STRIP IS BEING PREPARED ON THE PLAINS NEAR CERRO AGUILA. THE ATTACKS BY THE GROUPS FROM HONDURAS WILL BE COORDINATED WITH SIMILAR ATTACKS WHICH WILL BE MADE BY FLN GROUPS WHICH HAVE BEEN ORGANIZED WITHIN NICARAGUA.

2. THE FLN IS BEING DIRECTED FROM CUBA AND IS ORGANIZED IN HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA. GUILLERMO URBINA VASQUEZ AND DR. NOEL JARQUIN TOLEDO, NICARAGUAN COMMUNISTS OR PRO-COMMUNISTS WHO LIVE IN HONDURAS, WILL BE IN CHARGE OF ALL FLN ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE CUBA. (SOURCE COMMENT: THEY WILL REPLACE CARLOS FONSECA AMADOR, FORMER CHIEF OF THE FLN IN HONDURAS, ON DIRECT ORDERS FROM CUBA. FONSECA WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE GUERRILLA GROUP THAT WILL OPERATE NEAR CAPE GRACIAS A DIOS.) DR. ORLANDO QUANT QUINTANA AND GERMAN GAITAN MORA, NICARAGUAN LEFTISTS AND REVOLUTIONARIES, ARE THE LEADERS OF THE FLN GROUP IN NICARAGUA.

3. THE FLN NOW HAS 53 MEN IN THE MOUNTAINS ALONG THE HONDURAN-NICARAGUAN BORDER UNDER THE COMMAND OF CAPTAIN JOSE DUBAS HERRERA, AN OFFICER OF THE CUBAN MILITIA. THEY WILL BE JOINED BY 18 MEN WHO ARRIVED IN HONDURAS FROM CUBA BETWEEN 15 AND 25 JANUARY. (SOURCE COMMENT: SOME OF THE 18 TRAVELED TO HONDURAS BY AEROLINEAS PERUANAS (APSA) AND OTHERS CAME BY LAND THROUGH GUATEMALA AND EL SALVADOR.)

4. THE MEN LED BY DUBAS ARE WELL ARMED, BUT ADDITIONAL MEN ARE EXPECTED AND MORE ARMS MUST BE OBTAINED BEFORE THE GUERRILLA OPERATIONS CAN BEGIN. ON 17 JANUARY IN TEGUCIGALPA, IVÁN OCTAVIO SANCHEZ
ARGUELLO, A LEADER OF THE FLN, SAID THAT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS (U.S.) TO BE USED TO BUY ARMS FOR THE FLN. HE SAID THE MONEY HAD BEEN SENT FROM CUBA BY NOEL GUERRERO SANTIAGO, NICARAGUAN COMMUNIST AND A LEADER OF THE FLN. (SOURCE COMMENT: AN ADDITIONAL FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS WAS PROVIDED BY GENERAL CARLOS PASOS LEIVA, A NICARAGUAN REVOLUTIONARY IN COSTA RICA.) SANCHEZ SAID THAT THE ARMS WILL BE BOUGHT FROM OFFICERS OF THE HONDURAN CIVIL GUARD AND SAID THAT MOST OF THE ARMS THAT THE FLN NOW HAS WERE BOUGHT FROM THE CIVIL GUARD.


6. THE FLN IS TRYING TO RECRUIT LIEUTENANTS AGUSTIN RAUDES AND ALFREDO QUESADA, OFFICERS OF THE NICARAGUAN AIR FORCE. ON 18 JANUARY EITEL BOLANOS ORTEGA, A MEMBER OF THE FLN IN HONDURAS, SAID THAT THE FLN HAD SENT LETTERS TO RAUDES AND QUESADA ASKING FOR THEIR COOPERATION. THE LETTERS WERE DELIVERED BY FANNY MANFUT DE ULLOA.

FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY CINCARIB CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE
In early February 1962 there was a meeting of the directorate of the Communist Party of Cuba and the Brazilian leaders Francisco Julioa and Basilio Rodriguez da Silva. The meeting was also attended by Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Ramiro Valdes, and the Soviet Ambassador. It was decided: (a) to send $500,000 (dollars) in cash for propaganda campaigns in Brazil, (b) to eliminate physically Governor Carlos Lacerda, (c) to send to Brazil 1,000,000 copies of the Second Declaration of Havana. Miguel Guterres, Director of Press of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, was called in connection with the sending of the 1,000,000 copies: his attention was called to the fact that the sending of propaganda through the diplomatic pouch to Brazil had been very unsatisfactory in recent months.

At the meeting the Soviet Ambassador took a strong stand that an all-out effort should be made to produce an uprising in Brazil. He also said that Brazil would have to follow Soviet practice in that certain politicians and men of the right would have to be eliminated.

Juliao, Rodriguez da Silva and other Brazilians received four days' training at El Caribe Military School in the use of arms and preliminary instructions in guerrilla warfare. The instructor was General Alberto Bayo.
1. Headquarters Comment. Ruborac is probably identical with Miguel Bruqueras del Valle, who was described as Director of the Press Department on the official list of delegates to the Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Uruguay in January 1952. Bruqueras is now assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Brazil as Cultural Attaché.
The Lima paper La Tribuna on 3 December published a document which it was claimed had been found in the crashed Brazilian plane in which ten Cuban officials died. Without referring specifically to Cuba, the paper discusses a "national and another international congress of solidarity" to be held in Brazil from 16 to 20 January, 1963; and it requests $10,000 additional to help finance these congresses. The Lima article about the document suggested that the request was intended for Fidel Castro and that its discovery was another indication that Cuba is financing Latin American Communism. (FEIS Daily Report, 5 December, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)
Guatemala/Cuba

Planned Return of Manuel Galich as Presidential Candidate, with Possible Support from Fidel Castro

January 1963

Guatemala, Guatemala City

22 January 1963

Former Guatemalan police official (B); from a member (B) of the Communist Party of Guatemala. Appraisal of Content: 3.

Upon his return from Habana, Cuba, from the anniversary celebrations, Humberto Barillas, member of the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT), said that, in addition to a meeting with Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, he had also talked with Manuel Galich, Fidel Castro, and Jose Manuel Fortuny. He said that Galich had told him that he would return to Guatemala to begin his presidential campaign toward the end of February and that Castro had offered to lend Barillas money to be used in Galich's campaign.

1. Field Comment. See TDCS-3/535,004.

Headquarters Comments

Barillas' first name was reported as Gilberto in CS-3/532,931 and CS-3/535,649.

2. Galich, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs under Arbenz, is now head of the Communist Cultural Center in Habana.

Fortuny is a former secretary-general of the Communist Party of Guatemala.
COUNTRY       Ecuador/Cuba

SUBJECT      Refusal of Jorge Rivadeneyra Altamirano to Account to the Cuban Government for Funds Received for Revolutionary Purposes

DATE OF INFO.      Mid-January 1963
PLACE & DATE ACQ.   Ecuador, Quito 17 January 1963

SOURCE: Member (R) of the Communist Youth. Appraisal of Content: 2 (that Arellano was quoted correctly); 3 (truth of Arellano's statements).

On 16 January 1963 Jorge Arellano Gallegos, a leader of the Communist Party of Ecuador (Partido Comunista de Ecuador, RD) in Quito, said that Jorge Rivadeneyra Altamirano, leader of the abortive guerrilla movement at Santo Domingo de los Colorados in April 1962, had been called to Cuba to explain the expenditure of funds given him by the Cuban Government for revolutionary purposes. Arellano added that Rivadeneyra had refused to go to Cuba. According to Arellano, Santiago Perez Romercoeur, who was also involved in the guerrilla movement, had returned to the Cuban Government 50,000 sucres (about US$2,273) which had been entrusted to him.
COUNTRY NICARAGUA/COSTA RICA/MEXICO/CUBA/USSR

REPORT NO. TDCS 3/581, 229

DATE DISTR. 16 JANUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

REFERENCES 02 IN 50694

SOURCE NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL (C).

(FIELD CONTENT: SOURCE SAID THAT HIS INFORMATION HAD BEEN CONFIRMED.)

1. OCTAVIO FLORES, NICARAGUAN CITIZEN CONNECTED WITH A BUSINESS IN THE
   UNITED STATES, VISITED THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY ON 13 JANUARY
   1963, WHERE HE WAS GIVEN $20,000, WHICH HE TOOK TO SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA,
   THAT SAME DAY. THE MONEY IS TO BE USED TO PROMOTE A CASTRO-SPONSORED
   INVASION OF NICARAGUA.

2. ON 15 JANUARY REYNALDO VIQUEZ RUIZ, NICARAGUAN COMMUNIST LEADER, FLEW
   FROM MANAGUA TO SAN JOSE, WHERE HE PLANNED TO MEET FLORES.

3. FLORES HAS 75 SUBMACHINE-GUNS AT LAS BRISAS, WHICH IS ON THE COSTA RICA-
   NICARAGUA BORDER.

4. FIELD DISSEM: CINCARIB, CINCANL.

END OF MESSAGE
SECRET

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT - CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NO FOREIGN DISSENG/CONTROLLED DISSENG/NO DISSENG ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY ECUADOR/CUBA/LATIN AMERICA REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/653,193

OBJECT FINANCIAL SUPPORT BY CUBAN GOVERNMENT TO ECUADORAN COMMUNISTS

DATE DISTR: 11 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

Date of Info: 2-4 February 1963

Place: Ecuador, Quito

REFERENCES: IN 63940 RD-4-21017

Appraisal

2 (THAT THE REMARKS MADE WERE CORRECTLY MEMBER (8) OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ECUADOR.

1. ON 2 FEBRUARY 1963 A PERSON CLOSE TO PEDRO SAAD, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ECUADOR (PCE), SAID THAT FIDEL CASTRO HAD PROMISED THAT ALL OF THE MONEY RECEIVED FROM THE UNITED STATES IN THE PRISONER EXCHANGES WOULD GO FOR THE "LIBERATION" OF LATIN AMERICA AND THAT $100,000 HAD BEEN ALLOTTED TO THE PCE, OF WHICH $50,000 HAD ALREADY BEEN DELIVERED TO THE PCE THROUGH SAAD, SECRETARY-GENERAL, PCE. PERSON SAID THAT THE MONEY WAS GIVEN UNDER THE CONDITION THAT IT BE USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE "LIBERATION," INCLUDING THE LOCAL PURCHASES OF ARMS AND SUPPLIES, BUT NOT FOR SALARIES OR TRIPS, AND THAT SAAD HAD ALREADY SPENT A LARGE PART OF THE MONEY ON "BUREAUCRATIC EXPENSES."

2. ON 4 FEBRUARY 1963 RAFAEL ECHEVERRIA FLORES, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE PINCHINCHA PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PCE SAID THAT CERTAIN REQUESTS MADE BY ANTONIO FLORES BENITEZ, LEFTIST REVOLUTIONARY WHO IS WORKING WITH ECHEVERRIA, IN OCTOBER 1962 HAD BEEN GRANTED BY THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT, AND THAT HE (ECHEVERRIA) EXPECTED TO RECEIVE MONEY FROM CUBA SOON BY WAY OF PEDRO MARTINEZ FIREZ, CUBAN DIPLOMAT IN SANTIAGO, CHILE. ECHEVERRIA SAID THAT THE MONEY WAS TO BE WITHOUT THE COPY

SECRET
KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATIONAL LEADERS OF THE PCE, AS CASTRO WAS
FOLLOWING THE CHINESE RATHER THAN THE SOVIET LINE AND WAS HELPING
PEOPLE LIKE ECHEVERRIA WHO WERE ALSO FOLLOWING THE CHINESE LINE. FOR
THIS REASON THE NATIONAL LEADERS OF THE PCE, WHO FOLLOW THE SOVIET LINE,
COULD NOT BE MADE AWARE OF THE HELP.

3. (FIELD COMMENT: IN VIEW OF THE APPARENT CONTRADICTION
BETWEEN THE REPORT THAT CUBA IS SUPPLYING FUNDS TO THE NATIONAL LEADERS
OF THE PCE AND ECHEVERRIA'S REMARK THAT CUBA HAS APPROVED FUNDS FOR HIS
GROUP WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATIONAL LEADER'S OF THE PCE, IT
IS POSSIBLE THAT CUBA IS FURNISHING ASSISTANCE TO BOTH GROUPS INDEPENDENTLY
AND WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE OTHER GROUP WITH THE AIM OF CONTINUING
ASSISTANCE TO THE GROUP WHICH FIRST SUCCEEDS IN ESTABLISHING GUERRILLA
OPERATIONS. THE CUBANS PROBABLY KNOW THAT BOTH GROUPS ARE COMPETING
IN THIS. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT ECHEVERRIA'S COMMENTS ABOUT CUBA'S
ACTION IN RELATION TO THE SINO-SOVIET DIFFERENCES WERE EITHER GIVEN
TO HIM BY THE CUBANS AS A REASON TO KEEP THE AID SECRET FROM THE NATIONAL
LEADERS OF THE PCE OR WERE INVENTED BY HIM TO IMPRESS HIS LISTENER WITH
THE NEED FOR SECRET.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, AIR, CINCAND, CINCCLAFF.
Training

General: Immediately after Castro seized Cuba, Latin Americans began to visit Cuba at the invitation of the new Cuban Regime. Shortly thereafter reports of training activities conducted by veterans of the Sierra Maestra for these visitors began to come in. Initially, the training was badly handled, poorly organized, and consisted primarily of indoctrination in the techniques employed by the 26th of July Movement in its struggle against Batista. Few graduates of these courses were greatly impressed by what they had been taught. As Soviet advisors arrived and made their influence felt, training improved and training facilities were expanded.

The Cuban government established a school in the Sierra Maestra capable of handling about 600 students where techniques of guerrilla warfare could be imparted to visiting Latin Americans. Students sent to this school were mostly teen-age and young adult males selected from Communist youth and leftist organizations. Some young females were also included. The course of instruction consisted of physical conditioning, weapons familiarization, tactics, demolitions, methods of conducting demonstrations, leadership, organization of subversive groups, political indoctrination, etc. Upon completion of the course, graduates were sent home to organize and lead local groups and prepare for "the inevitable revolution." Travel and maintenance expenses generally were borne by the Cuban government. In 1962, from 1,000 to 1,500 Latin Americans received this training in Cuba. There is no estimate of the number of trainees currently in Cuba. (See Report at Tab I which was read by the President and referred to the Cotrell Committee.)
Note: On page 92 of Mr. McCone's testimony he states --

"I think I said that we knew of some 1,000 to 1,500 that were in training there at the present time." The duration of the training courses ranges from 4 to 40 weeks. CIA has indicated informally that the bulk of the 1,000 to 1,500 reported above are still in Cuba.

U.S. intelligence agencies are largely dependent upon third country sources for information concerning those who received training in Cuba. Systems of documenting these visitors and their travel to and from Cuba are in the process of being undertaken by many Latin American nations. Among the problems which confront Latin American security forces are the fact that Cuban visitors employ many devious means in travelling to and from Cuba; some states desire not to infringe on the freedom of movement of its citizens; the use of false documents or aliases by travellers; and the difficulty of obtaining a useful exchange of intelligence among Latin States. There is also some problem of separating Cuban-inspired plotters from the leftists, oppositionists, and political plotters who travel in neighboring states.

**Tab**

1. **CIA Report on Training of Latin Americans in Cuba**
   
   This tab contains the best overall summary of the training of Latin Americans in Cuba.

2. **Program of Training**
   
   This tab contains 4 items; (1) Recent detailed reports from an Argentine Communist who trained in Cuba; (2) Questionnaire which Peruvians training in Cuba were required to fill out; and (3) Two reports of student who had access to notes of Salvadore's returning from Cuba.

---

SECRET
Travel of Individuals to Cuba for Training

This Tab contains a number of reports indicating the travel of individuals and groups of up to 30 individuals to Cuba for training. These reports indicate training of individuals from Ecuador, El Salvador, Paraguay, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and the Dominican Republic. Two of the reports indicate that some of the individuals have received or are scheduled to receive training in the Soviet Union.

Activities Upon Return from Cuba

This Tab contains items reporting activities of individuals upon return to their home country (Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Peru, British Guiana, Ecuador, Brazil and the Dominican Republic). These reports vary in description of activities in which Cuban trained individuals will participate (from small scale guerrilla activity up to invasion). Numbers referred to in these reports vary from one to 400. The top two reports connect individuals returning from Cuba with terrorist type activities.

Miscellaneous Training Reports

This Tab contains five items as follows: (1) Interesting report by student recently returned (see conclusions last page); (2) Two reports on the use of International Games as a cover for training; (3) An item reporting links between Guatemalan exile group in Cuba and training; and (4) Interesting excerpts on training from Canadian Ambassador to Cuba.
MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Sterling Cottrell
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

The President has read the attached copy of a CIA report on the training of Latin Americans in Cuba. He has also read the note from Roy Cline, which is attached.

The President desires that you and your group take on this problem and report to him in the usual way.

Bromley
Bromley Smith

SECRET
To White House (Attn: General Clifton), From Ray S. Cline

Your note concerning the President's query about subversive training of Latin Americans in Cuba was mainly answered in our current intelligence memorandum of 17 January. We did not cover, however, the operational question of how to do something about the flow.

Our general view on this point is as follows. The main thing the United States can do to restrict the flow of Latin American youth to Cuba for training in subversion is to frustrate the aims and tarnish the image of the Castro regime. Beyond this, we should try through overt and covert political pressure and educational efforts to induce Latin American governments and security services at the main transit points to monitor and impede the traffic of trainees to and from Cuba. Ways and means of doing this might well be examined by the Cottrell task force.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
19 January 1963

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Training of Latin Americans in Cuba

1. It is estimated that at least 1,000 and perhaps as many as 1,500 "individuals from other Latin American countries were in Cuba for varying periods of time during 1962 to receive ideological indoctrination or guerrilla warfare training. Many of them are still there. In addition, during 1962 there were 60 to 70 trainees from British Guiana and an undetermined number, perhaps 100, from various African countries, including Angolans, Kenyans, Tanzanians, and Negro nationalists from the Republic of South Africa. Most of the trainees are young—in their teens, twenties, and early thirties. A sizable proportion had attended universities or secondary schools in their home countries.

2. In a public address on 9 June 1961, Fidel Castro announced that his government intended to grant 1,000 scholarships to "poor students" from other Latin American countries for the next school term, and 100 scholarships to students from other countries of the world. By this means, Castro has explained, the students will be equipped to participate in the "construction of socialism" in their home countries after the "inevitable anti-imperialist revolutions" occur there.

3. A portion of the students from other Latin American countries come to Cuba with the idea that

---

The estimates of total numbers of trainees in Cuba excludes those whose visits have been tied to a particular event in Cuba such as the 2 January anniversary celebrations and who have not remained more than a week or two. Also excluded are those who have merely passed through Cuba on route to the Sino-Soviet bloc, as well as the many Communist or pro-Castro party functionaries who visit Cuba frequently.

SECRET
they are to take standard courses at Cuban universities or other institutions in such subjects as agronomy, irrigation techniques, industrial management, etc. Even if their courses in Cuba are as represented to them before their arrival, they are undoubtedly given heavy ideological indoctrination and, like Cuban students, expected to "volunteer" for various emergency tasks such as picking coffee and harvesting sugar. Many of these probably also receive training in guerrilla tactics and other techniques of subversion.

4. Other students are frankly told before they leave their home countries for Cuba that their training in Cuba will be in guerrilla warfare tactics, that it will be a rigorous program, and that they will be required to maintain strict standards of conduct and security.

5. There have been a number of reports—from clandestine sources in Cuba, from sources in contact with the trainees after they have returned from Cuba, from Cuban refugees, and from a few of the trainees themselves—concerning the types of training which the young non-Cubans undergo in Cuba. The guerrilla training programs for Latin Americans in 1961 and 1962 do not appear to have been particularly well organized. In some instances, the trainees were moved to protest the fact that there were long periods when they were doing little or nothing; in other instances they were disgruntled over what they felt was harsh treatment, or when they thought too much was expected of them. The majority of the trainees, however, probably took the experience in stride.

6. Included in the guerrilla training programs have been long marches through the forests and mountains, especially in the Sierra Maestra mountains where Castro carried on his guerrilla campaign against Batista. Students often are required to hike to the top of Pico Turquino, Cuba's highest mountain (6,230 feet). During the hikes, they engage in simulated guerrilla defensive and offensive exercises, are taught how to fend for themselves in the wilderness, how to find directions with compasses and maps, and how to assure the security of their encampments. Back in their camps, they are taught such subjects as means of communications among guerrilla bands, strategy and tactics of the guerrilla fighter, marksmanship, and weapons familiarization. The training
reported that they were given instruction only in US weapons. The instructor explained to them that as guerrillas they must capture and use the arms of the enemy and in Latin America the authorities use US weapons. They are also given instruction in demolition of bridges and other structures, in the manufacture of explosives and the construction of Molotov cocktails.

7. Scattered throughout the entire course are periods of ideological indoctrination, sometimes given in the training camps and sometimes for large groups in Havana. They are also given instruction in the general strategy of the "anti-imperialist struggle" and often specific advice on how best to carry out the struggle in their individual countries. A group of students from El Salvador, for instance, visiting Cuba last October, were told that they should give more emphasis to the penetration and control of groups at the National University and to the control of the labor movement. It was explained to them that they should initially seek as wide support as possible from all political factions and that when the initial stages of the revolution had been accomplished the non-Communists could be eliminated.

8. The instructors are mostly Cubans, but there have been some Spaniards and a few Algerians reported among the instructors. General Enrique Lister, Spanish Communist veteran of the Spanish civil war who subsequently received military training in the USSR, is in Cuba. He reportedly assists in the guerrilla training program. None of the reports on the subject give credible evidence of Soviet or other bloc instructors for these trainees. However, a small portion of those trained in Cuba subsequently go on to the Sino-Soviet bloc where they may be subjected to further training. One report states that the experiences of guerrilla fighters in Algeria and in Southeast Asia have been used to expand on the Cuban experience to permit a broader study of the "art" of guerrilla warfare in Cuba.

9. Fidel Castro and Che Guevara evidently take a personal interest in the guerrilla training of other Latin Americans. A number of the trainees in Cuba have been treated to personal pop talks from these, as well as other, Cuban leaders.
10. An Argentine trainee who arrived in Cuba early last July and left in late December has described in some detail his experiences in Cuba during this period. He was first approached by an Argentine pro-Castro leader last June as to whether he would be interested in taking courses in Cuba on guerrilla warfare and "city fighting." After several days he agreed. With three other Argentines, none of them orthodox Communists but all of them radicals, he left Buenos Aires on about 1 July. He traveled by way of Uruguay, Chile, Brazil, and Trinidad to Cuba. In Chile, the Cuban embassy supplied him with travel money and "complimentary visas" to enter Cuba. He arrived in Havana on 5 July. During most of July he had little to do as a group of about fifty gradually collected at a camp near Havana. They eventually protested this lack of action and were visited by Fidel Castro, who apparently came to assure them that their program would shortly get underway. On 30 July they began a series of marches into the woods somewhere in the Organos mountains in Pinar del Rio province under the command of two Cuban officers. Most of his activity between August and October seems to have been concerned with guerrilla training. Training with him were 34 others, most if not all of them apparently Argentines. There were political disputes among them, particularly concerning the pro-Communist Argentine Peronist leader John William Cooke, a political exile in Cuba who apparently had some degree of authority over the Argentine trainees but who was resented by them.

11. During the October crisis the entire group "volunteered" to join the militia in defense of the Cuban revolution "threatened by Yankee invasion." After the crisis eased, they began classes in "political economy" taught by a Spaniard named "Guillen." These classes were held daily for eight days until 5 November, when the group was again sent into the field for guerrilla training. They engaged in firing practice, with various types of weapons, including rifles and bazookas. On 16 November they were moved to a new area for a new course in "guerrilla tactics." This included practice in hanging hammocks, digging trenches, making wire entanglements, as well as exercises in the mountains. During this period, some members of the group rebelled against taking another long march in the rain. The Cuban officers tried to discipline
them by taking away their food, but then all the members of the group went on a hunger strike in protest. Discipline then appears generally to have broken down, the trainees got their way but were no longer motivated to study. The source and most other members of his group left Cuba and arrived in Prague on 23 Decemver. At his first opportunity, he left Czechoslovakia and reported his experiences to officials in a West European country.

12. This source's total period of training in Cuba was approximately six months. Other trainees have gone for periods of three months or less. An unknown number have probably remained a year or more and, in some instances, remain in Cuba indefinitely. The latter sometimes join one of the numerous groups of nationals from particular Latin American countries which, in effect, form cadres being groomed for eventual return to their countries, perhaps "after the revolution."

13. Information from all available sources indicates that nationals of all nineteen other Latin American countries, with the possible exception of Uruguay, have been among those receiving guerrilla training in Cuba during the course of 1962. Venezuelans seem most numerous; some 200 of them are estimated to have received training in Cuba during the past year. Relatively large numbers have also come from Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, and Bolivia.

14. Prior to the October crisis, the trainees going to Cuba usually traveled by regular commercial airlines or, on some occasions, by specially chartered Cuban commercial planes. Those coming from South America generally went via Uruguay, Chile, or Brazil to Trinidad or Curacao and from there by regularly scheduled Cubana or KLM planes to Havana. Those coming from Middle America generally traveled through Mexico and then by Mexicana or Cubana commercial planes to Havana. With the cessation of service to Cuba by KLM, Mexicana, Iberia and other Western airlines after 23 October, the regular Cubana service between Mexico City and Havana remains the only direct and regular air connection between Cuba and the rest of Latin America. There has been a sharp increase in recent weeks of travelers to Mexico from South America en route to Cuba. Many of those were invited for the 2 January anniversary celebrations.
in Cuba, but others may have remained for training.

15. Trainee transit through Mexico usually involves special procedures by the Cuban embassy there. The trainees, who travel as tourists, report first to the Cuban embassy. There they are given special Cuban entry papers; no entry is made in their passports. They are given pseudonyms for travel out of and back into Mexico—apparently a relatively recent innovation.

16. Some of the British Guianese trainees in Cuba have arrived aboard the Cuban merchant ships bringing Guianese rice to Cuba.

17. Some of the Latin American trainees arrive in Cuba via Czech or Cuban planes from Prague. It is not clear whether this route to Cuba is dictated by difficulties of getting there by way of Mexico or whether the students involved were already in Europe.
1. A group of Argentines, varying in number between 34 and 50, and including Peronists, Trotskyites, and Vanguard Socialists, attended a six-month course in guerrilla warfare in Cuba from July to December 1962. Part of the group traveled from Buenos Aires to Cuba by way of Chile where they received courtesy visas for Cuba and financial assistance from the Cuban Embassy. They had been told by Reinaldo Frigerio, leftist Peronist, that they would be met by John William Cooke, leftist Peronist residing in Cuba, but instead were met in Habana by a member of Cuban G-2 and taken to the Hotel Riviera, where they later met Cooke. Cooke told them that it was necessary to train expert guerrillas who could carry out the revolution in Argentina. He insisted that General Juan Peron knew about the training.

2. From the hotel the trainees were transferred to the Tabare finca, behind the Buen Pastor Seminary. After several weeks of inactivity they were visited on 20 July by Fidel Castro who promised that they would soon begin their training. They were transferred the next day to Rio Cistal and on 24 July they were visited by Comandante Escalona (fnu) who was responsible for the zone of Pinar del Rio, where they were to spend some time marching and camping out.

3. On 30 July the 34 men who were to take the course marched from the town of Artemisa into the woods; they were under the command of two Cuban lieutenants. Seven more trainees joined the group on its march to points within Pinar del
Rio; the march lasted about one month. On 26 August the 41 men returned to Tabare.

4. On 3 September the trainees were moved to a house called "San Antonio," at kilometer no. 18, Arroyo Arenas, Habana Province. The house had belonged to Celia Rosa Toucezt Masfera. From 28 August to 10 September, when classes began, training consisted mainly of Communist films which they were taken to see several times. From 10 September to 14 November classes were held in the following subjects: weapons and explosives, ballistics, communications, strategy, tactics, marksmanship, sanitation, and closed and open drill. Manolo (1nu), a Cuban, gave classes in explosives; Guillen (fnu) taught economics; Angel Martinez taught the class in guerrilla tactics and strategy; an unidentified mulatto instructed the class in communications; a 17-year old youth named Jose (1nu) taught marksmanship; and a man known as "Cara de Goma" (Rubber Face), a Cuban, served as political commissar. Weapon practices were made with 22-calibre Mauser rifles, Garand rifles, Thompson submachine guns, Browning and Husine rifles, bazookas, and 81-mm mortars. They also practiced with a 57-mm recoilless cannon.

5. Alicia Eguren de Cooke, John William Cooke's wife, visited the school at San Antonio; on one occasion she told the students in a speech that they had to forget Peron and Peronism since they had to organize a guerrilla army, an Army of Liberation.

6. On 14 November the trainees were moved to "Las Mil Lomas de Echeverria," five kilometers from the town of Pan de Guajaibon (N 22-48, W 82-21), Pinar del Rio Province. They dug trenches and individual foxholes and studied mines and fuses, illumination with infrared rays, and Bengal lights, and the construction of electrified and simple wire entanglements. On 17 November, under the direction of a Cuban lieutenant known as Manolo Nunez, they carried out two sighting exercises. Later that day they carried out two more sighting exercises and made a march with topographic maps of the area; the march did not turn out well because of errors of calculation on the map. Daily training from 15 November through 25 November was as follows:

18 November - Rested and studied.
19 November - Made observations from a hillock, studied, and made a scouting-type march.
20 November - Practiced defense exercises and fighting from individual foxholes; explored and located elements of a simulated barracks in the hills, taking notes with regard to an attack.
21 November - Studied plan of attack on the encampment.
22 November - Studied plan of attack on the encampment; marched in the rain, camping in the woods.

23 November - Practiced hanging and taking down hammocks; studied tactical manual.

24 November - Practiced security and emergency plan of the encampment.

25 November - Studied tactical manual.

7. On 26 November, during an exercise to practice security on the march, the advance and rear guard groups got lost in the woods. As a result there was criticism of poor leadership, and the instructor ordered them to repeat the operation. Several men refused, and the instructor ordered that they not be given anything to eat. Because of the order, the rest of the men refused to eat but through argument and an appeal to the Revolution they were eventually persuaded to do so.

8. While they were studying on 27 November, Lt. Manolo Nunez arrived from Habana with news that the course would be intensified because some of the group had a fixed date for their departure from Cuba for Argentina. During the day a conversation was overheard in which a Trotskyite said that the Cuban Government ought not to allow those who wanted to leave to do so since they might be dangerous when they got to Argentina. The conversation was repeated to members of the Peronist group, one of whom loaded a rifle, intending to shoot the Trotskyite. The shooting was prevented but the atmosphere was so tense that the two groups were ready to fight. At that moment the lieutenant instructor appeared and took away the rifles and ammunition; he immediately went to Habana to report the incident. By night the five Trotskyites were separated from their group.

9. On 29 November Cooke arrived and urged the immediate withdrawal of the Peronists and the Vanguard Socialists so that they could return to Argentina. That evening the trainees left for Habana, where they were housed in a residential building on Calle Septima. On 30 November the trainees, because of their semi-abducted situation, became very concerned and put on civilian clothes instead of their military uniforms. On 1 December some of the men left the house without permission, intending to take a walk; they were told by Ulises (inu), a Negro member of G-2, that they could not go out without the permission of the Cuban Government. They said that they wished to deal directly with the Cuban Government concerning their return home since they did not wish to have anything to do with Cooke, who they thought was deceiving them. Ulises immediately asked them for a written, personal report, including 1) their regard for and opinion of John William Cooke; 2) the type of work which they desired to do when they arrived in Argentina; 3) their political affiliations; and 4) the impressions produced
by the Cuban Revolution.

10. Even after the reports were submitted the rule against
leaving the building continued in effect, so they then
talked with the political commissar who went to see
about the matter. When he returned he said that he
had not been able to put the case before higher
authorities.

11. On 6 December one Guidi (fnu),4 someone Cooke's wife
had met in Montevideo, took several of the trainees to
have their photos taken for the visa required for
leaving Cuba. The Vanguard Socialists refused to
go because of the man's connection with Cooke; they
wished to deal with the Cuban representatives. When
one of the trainees who was taken to see Cook explained
his position, stating that he no longer would obey orders
from anyone but General Peron, Cooke replied that he
should be careful what he said, especially since the
Cuban Revolution had taken a turn toward the Chinese
policy in view of the behavior of the Soviet Union.

12. Guillen, the Spanish instructor, said that he had spent
an entire afternoon in the Albanian Embassy trying to
obtain aid for the Argentine guerrilla army.

13. During the period when the events described above took
place,5 Hector Villalon, an emissary from General Peron,
arrived with instructions to demand the immediate
departure from Cuba of all those who were studying in
the schools; in this he was supported by the Vanguard
Socialists.

14. The first group of trainees left Habana for their
return home via Prague on 11 December. The men, in
some cases, were given two passports, one Cuban and
one Ecuadorian. In Prague they were interviewed by
Vila (fnu), who is in charge of Cubana Airlines
flights in Prague. His assumed name is Velasquez.

15. The last assignment given the students in Habana was to
send a telegram after their arrival in Argentina to
Yoelando Perez, Instituto Cubano de Amistad con los
Pueblos (ICAP, Cuban Institute for Friendship with the
People) with the message "I could not accept the
invitation," which would indicate safe arrival.
Instructions were also given to return the passports
to Miguel Angel, No. 844-50 Calle Maldonado, Apartment
503, or to Calle Reconquista 354/56, apartment 205,
in Montevideo, Uruguay.

16. During the training and political instruction in Cuba
the men were organized in squads which were composed
as follows:6

Squad No. 1 - Alberto Alvarez, Ricardo Arenas,
Frederico Krause (sought by the Argentine police
under the name of Elias Seman),7 Roberto Garcia,
Pedro Ibanez, Jose M. Villar, Romulo Aganagay,
and Campos (fnu).

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

NW 55360 Docid:32423995 Page 91
Squad No. 2 - Jorge Monti, Mariano Penaroz, Julio Peralta, Alberto Albi, Ernesto Moranzo, Jorge Sotell, Ismael Fierro y Rodriguez.

Squad No. 3 - Cesar Vallejo, Ricardo Valdes, Enrique Viamonte, Ismael Valle, Alejandro Camposanto, Ramon Ravero, Fredoy Rivera, Hugo Decuco, and Angel Rameriz, director of the Trotskyite periodical Palabra Obrera, published in Argentina. 8

Squad No. 4 - Manuel Ordonez, Antonio Velasquez, Roberto Franco, Carlo Rivero, Juan J. Montenegro, Luis Bermudez, Jose Sanchez (Spaniard), and Santiago D'Alessio, Vanguard Socialist.

Squad No. 5 - Juan Jimenez, Jose Falcon, Rodrigo Beltran, Sergio Martinez, Alberto Ruiz, Jaime Adri, Jorge del la Fuente, Ricardo Canteca, Ireneo Ribas, a Catholic from La Plata and a Peronist.

In addition, there was a group which made up the general staff in which the acquaintances of one "Lucero" from Cordoba, Argentina, figured; he belongs to the Tres Banderas Party, of neo-Peronist ideology. Persons known as "Marelli," "Mellin," and "Belaz," followers of Cooke, were also associated with the general staff.

Headquarters Comments

1. TDSC-3/523,106, dated 21 September 1962, reported that Cooke had left Madrid on 20 September 1962, apparently without seeing Peron who had made it known that he would not receive Cooke.


3. Major Dermidio Escalon has previously been identified as military chief of Pinar del Rio Province.


5. The time referred to is apparently about 6 December.

6. It is presumed that the names below are aliases rather than true names.

7. In September 1962 a usually reliable source listed Dr. Elias Seman, Socialist, among Argentine organizers for the Second Latin American Youth Congress, then scheduled to be held in Santiago, Chile, in January 1963. The date for the congress has since been changed to February.

8. In February 1960 Palabra Obrera listed its editor as Abel Bengochia. In a report furnished by an official Argentine service in April 1962, Angel Bengochia was listed among seven leaders of the Palabra Obrera (Trotskyist) Party who had gone to Cuba for guerrilla training. The others were Ernesto Gonzalez, Hugo
Bressano, Daniel Pereyra, Juan Pundiz, Orellano (fnu), and Anibal Tesoro. Cf. CS-3/509,420.

1. Intensive training is being given in Cuba to large groups of Latin Americans, especially from Central America, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Panama; there are also some groups from Argentina and Uruguay. Instruction includes courses in guerrilla leadership and the manufacture of explosives and their use in acts of sabotage.

2. In this connection contact between Cuba and other countries is maintained through the members of the Committees for Solidarity with the Cuban Revolution and the Communist Parties of the respective countries, and the corresponding organizations in Cuba.

3. The following people are responsible in their respective countries for arranging travel to Cuba for training: in Peru, Guillermo Carnero Hoke; in Nicaragua, Dr. Mario Flores Ortiz, who is in Cuba at present and is head of the military organizations of freedom, and Francisco Bravo; in Ecuador, Oswaldo Yuyasamin; in Venezuela, Mario Fonseca; in Chile, Luis Enrique Munoz; in Paraguay, Orlando Rojas; in Argentina, Ernesto Sabattini and Jesus Mira; in Uruguay, Victorio Casarcelo; in Brazil, Dante Dacosta Fonseca; and in El Salvador, Luis Contreras Vargas, who is in Cuba at present and is a leading member of the United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR), which maintains the clandestine guerrilla organization in the mountains of El Salvador through means provided by Cuba.
4. Josef Hokes, former Czech Ambassador to Mexico, plays an important role in Cuba's revolutionary activity in Latin America. He is allegedly connected in Peru with Hugo Blanco, a revolutionary leader who lives in the mountains of Cuzco, to whom he has sent economic assistance and arms. He is said to have carried out similar actions for Alljo de Fleitas, a priest and guerrilla leader of Brazil. 

5. Invasions are not contemplated as a part of the revolutionary program in Latin America unless there are first internal uprisings. These could possibly be carried out, because equipment for such uprisings is already stored in strategic places.

6. Hokes was present at a reception which the Czech Embassy in Habana gave for Fidel Castro and other Cuban officials. Among those invited were Manuel Galich, of Guatemala, and Aleksandr Ishkov, Minister of Fisheries of the USSR.

7. Latin American leaders who wished to speak with Hokes in order to obtain assistance were presented in Mexico by Natividad Rosales and Luis Suarez.

8. Chinese leaders are demanding that Cuba invade Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Puerto Rico, and bombard Panama. They are also demanding that Cuba issue orders that the Communist and liberal soldiers in Venezuela overthrow the government and take power, and that the guerrilla organizations in Chile, Colombia, and Peru prepare for the declaration of a general revolutionary strike. As for Mexico, there they will only await an occasion when the military supporters of General Lazaro Cardenas and other active groups will take over power by means of a passive insurrection.

9. Cardenas and his supporters would rely upon receiving decisive assistance from the internal and external revolutionary organizations resulting from the coalition of Communist and revolutionary parties of Central America and Mexico which was carried out in Mexico in August 1962 and in which the Mexican leaders exercised control and supervision through Arnoldo Martinez Verdugo, a member of the central committee and the political commission of the Partido Comunista Mexicano (PCM, Mexican Communist Party). The coalition is made up of the PCM, the Partido Guatemala de Trabajadores (PGT, Guatemalan Communist Party), the Partido Socialista de Nicaragua (PSN, Nicaraguan Communist Party), the Vanguardia de Accion Nacional (VAN, pro-Cuban revolutionary group), the Partido Comunista Salvadoreno (PSC, Salvadoran Communist Party), Partido Comunista de Honduras (PCH, Communist Party of Honduras), Partido de los Trabajadores de Honduras (PTH, Honduran Workers Party), and other leftist groups. The administrative secretary of the organization works in the building of the Mexican-Czech Institute of Culture, at Calles Insurgentes and Reforma and in its Political Bureau at Calle Londres 252. The coordinator is the international Communist Max Aub Mohrenwitz, a resident of Mexico who works for the National University of Mexico. Also, Emilio Portes Gil, former president of Mexico, is involved in this.
coalition and relies upon the support of soldiers on active duty and on the National Front of Liberation.

10. The coalition has arms which were disembarked at Vera Cruz, Mexico, from the Soviet vessel TARKA (phonetic spelling) during late September or early October 1962. Arms have also allegedly been unloaded, in accordance with the plans referred to, somewhere along the coasts of Peru and Chile, and possibly in Brazil, in spite of the fact that the coalition did not include Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia and Brazil.

11. In addition to General Cardenas and the PCM, Mexican organizations associated with the coalition include the Partido Obrero-Campesino Mexicano (POCM, Mexican Worker- Peasant Party), the Federacion Obrema Revolucionaria (FOR, Revolutionary Workers Federation), and the Movimiento Revolucionario del Magisterio (MRM, Revolutionary Teachers Movement); they have allegedly been organized into a permanent association at Calle Salvador No. 30-301, profiting by the passive attitude of the official intelligence organizations, a portion of whose personnel also belong to this Communist conspiracy.

Headquarters Comments

1. Hokes left Mexico on 4 October 1962.

2. Fleitas is probably identical with Alipio de Freitas, who has made many speeches favoring revolution along Cuban lines.

3. Source did not provide the date of the reception; presumably it was in October 1962.

4. Suarez is probably identical with Luis Suarez Lopez, naturalized Mexican of Spanish origin, who is a Communist newspaperman.

5. Recently Portes Gil publicly denounced Cardenas and charged that he is working for a foreign power.
1. The following is a questionnaire which Peruvians taking guerrilla training in Cuba were required to fill out during their stay:

1. True name
2. Pseudonym
3. Where worked; at what; how long?
4. Profession; marital status; date and place of birth.
5. Addresses in Peru
6. Reason for leaving; other type of work performed
7. Parents, brothers and sisters, uncles and aunts, grandparents, whether alive or dead; closest living relatives, etc.
8. Friends of intimate political trust; names and addresses
9. Friends of different political ideology; names and addresses
10. Grade of education
11. Past and present membership in political parties
12. Length of membership and reason for leaving past political parties
13. Have you held any Government post? What type? Why did you leave; or continue? How long did you serve?
14. Have you held any post in a mass organization, union, sports, social, or cultural club? What position, how long?
15. Political leaning of the organization; who assist in
carrying out duties; their (political) tendencies and names?
16. Revolutionary organizations of your base. Who are the leaders? Names, and political affiliation.
17. Experience in clandestine struggles
18. Have you ever been deported? Why? How long? When?
19. Have you ever been arrested? How many times? How long? Reason? How were you released?
20. Give run-down on political situation in Peru; predominant parties, and the people.
21. Boundaries of your country
22. Political divisions
23. Military regions
24. Religious sects
25. Organization of police and investigative agencies of repression
26. Chiefs of repression, hated by the people--names, ranks, etc.
28. What means of mobility do they have available?
29. What means of communication; possible reinforcements?
30. What kind of informer organizations exist? Formation and chiefs
31. Possibility of guerrilla warfare in your region
32. Morale of the people for the struggle; organizations
33. What is the situation on the frontiers of your country--population and official control methods?
34. Give names and methods of persons engaged in smuggling.
35. How do we get in touch with them?
36. Give names of those whom we can trust.
37. Morale of the Army--its state of preparedness for anti-guerrilla warfare.
38. Do you have friends in official circles--if so, what do they think of anti-guerrilla warfare?
39. Morale of the police; working conditions, and salary
40. What would be the attitude of the police rank and file toward a revolution?
41. Requirements for entry into the country
42. Once inside the country, can one obtain personal documentation for cash? How?
43. Can a foreigner buy a house?
44. Is it possible to establish a commercial firm?
45. How can one obtain credentials for an accredited institution?
46. Where do officials meet?
47. Where do the governing classes meet?
48. Form of entry; requirements. (It is possible that this refers to entry to social meetings.)
49. Can one gain entry to these places of reunion by a cash payment?
50. Can one obtain a credential from someone to buy admission to such meetings?
51. How many people know that you are in Cuba?
52. When and how were they made witting?
53. Have you done military service? How long? Where? Rank?
54. Grade in military instruction
55. Aircraft in the country; location; number of planes
56. Army posts in the country; location; number of soldiers
57. Naval and river bases
58. Locations of military bases, and their potential.

2. Luis Perez had brought with him from Lima a map of Peru. On this map each member of the group marked the military installations with which he was familiar, as well as bridges, rivers, and anything else which was of importance in military strategy.
All these questions (the 58) had three principal motives: to know the future guerrilla fighter better; and, above all, his needs and limitations for the struggle; and, generally, his personal problems and those of morale. Time given for answering each question was unlimited. One of the possibilities is that of introducing arms by smuggling, as, for example, in the case of the borders, such as comrades from Cuzco; also, in the case of Comrade Betancur (pseudonym) who is from the town of Ayabaca, Piura, and who has facilities for smuggling arms, since his community borders on Ecuador, where large-scale smuggling of arms has developed. Also, the experiences of soldiers, such as Vallejos, who have served in such localities, show considerable practice in effecting such contraband. 1

1. Source Comment. In the question regarding possibilities of guerrilla warfare, the Cubans asked about possibilities of supply by air--suitable drop-zones, etc. It is possible that this questionnaire has been filled out by at least 100 Peruvians who have gone to Cuba. Among those who have enlarged on these topics, the range is from lawyers down to those who can barely write their names. Likewise, from the interest they are showing in Peru, it is presumed that many Cubans can introduce themselves into the country, passing as Mexicans or Panamanians, and set up profitable businesses and commercial firms. One of those who presented the questions had been in Brazil. The Cubans took two photos of those in training, front and profile, in militia uniform, but without cap.
SOURCE: Salvadoran student (C) who had access to the notes of one of the returning delegates. Appraisal of Content: 3.

1. On 7 October 1962 the officer in command of Battalion 102 of the Telahe zone of Habana limited the Salvadoran delegation to the First Latin American University Games to meet with the troops of this battalion. The officer informed his troops that the Salvadoran delegation had gone to Cuba to see the Cuban revolutionary movement in action and that the Salvadorans would be given a variety of information concerning guerrilla warfare. Raul San Román Gonzales, a lieutenant in the Cuban militiа, who acted as a guide for the Salvadoran delegation, said that the Salvadoran delegations would have a special program because all were members of the Frente Unido de Accion Revolucionaria (FWAR - United Front for Revolutionary Action), a Communist front, and because the Union of Cuban Communist Youth had recommended that this delegation receive training in revolutionary tactics.

2. The officer in command of Battalion 102 explained to the Salvadorans that all revolutionary groups must be reinforced in their early stages of organization by the recruitment of persons of different political views, and that when the revolution is on its way to success anyone who does not accept Communist leadership can be expelled from the group. He said further that this tactic can be used in El Salvador. The officer also recommended that the Salvadorans draw up plans which indicate points of strategic interest in El Salvador, including important intersections (plazas), bridges which could be sabotaged, terrain suitable for guerrilla activity, and airfields. He also said that they should acquire information as to the type of weapons used by the Salvadoran armed forces and as to normal troop movements. The officer pointed out, however, that in organizing an effective guerrilla movement particular attention must be paid to the ideological indoctrination of members of the movement so that each member is convinced that he is fighting for a just cause. If he believes this, there will be no morale problem.

3. The officer then showed the delegates a large map of Central and South America. This map contained the location of military forces of the Central and South American countries, the distances between major cities, and key highways and bridges. It also showed the centers of guerrilla activity in Guatemala, Colombia, and Venezuela. In addition, the map contained

---

**Note:** Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "*"
information as to the numerical strength of the armies, air forces, navies, and rural police forces of many countries. They also had information as to the types of weapons in use in the Central American countries, most of them surplus weapons from the Second World War. The Panama Canal was shown on a large map which had marked all access routes to the canal from both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, as well as the normal shipping and air routes. There were also large photographs which showed the locks of the canal and also a special diagram showing the types of ships which can pass through the canal.

4. Some members of the Salvadoran delegation received training in the use of Belgian (FAL) rifles during their visit with troops of Battalion 192.

Field Comment. Salvadoran delegates to the First Latin American University Games included Jose Luis Enriquez, Carlos Rafael Baires, Armando Rafael Morales, Danilo Armando Castro, Ricardo Ayala Kroufts, Jose Alfredo Hernandez, Rafael Mario (aka Rafael Onofre, aka Rafael Salvador) Guenca, Eliseo Antonio Sosa Montiel, Carlos Antonio Madriz, and Felix Rodolfo Villatoro. (Cf: CS-3/529,506).
Víctor Leon, a member of the Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorian Youth (URJE) from Esmeraldas, returned to Ecuador from Cuba on 22 December 1962. He is the first member of URJE to return from Cuba after receiving guerrilla training in that country. He went via Mexico to Cali, Colombia, by air and then overland to Guayaquil. After his arrival in Guayaquil, Leon said that he was the only URJE member in the group with which he was trained and therefore he did not know when the other URJE members undergoing training would return to Ecuador.

Source Comment. Evidently Leon did not bring any money back from Cuba because he asked for a loan so that he could go to his home in Esmeraldas. Leon is not particularly intelligent and therefore was not trained as an organizer. However, he is eager to start guerrilla activities in Ecuador.
C1 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION DA 923579 SINCE CASTRO REGIM SCAITED
POWERS ESTIMATED 300-350 SALVADORAN STUDENTS HAVE VISITED CUBA.
CURRENTLY 6-12 THERE AND ESTIMATED 6 REPORTEDLY BEHIND IRON CURTAIN.
VISITS MADE GENERALLY BY WAY OF MEXICO. SOME STUDENTS
REPORTEDLY HAVE RECEIVED MILITARY TRAINING AND INDOCTRINATION IN CUBA
TO BE APPLIED ON RETURN TO EL SALVADOR. NO FACTUAL INFORMATION
AVAILABLE ON WHICH STUDENTS HAVE RECEIVED TRAINING AND INDOCTRINATION.
ESTIMATED 5 OR 6 STUDENTS EACH ARE CURRENTLY WORKING AT COFFEE FINCAS
NEAR AHUACHAPAN, SONSONATE, AND BERLIN FOR PURPOSE OF SUBVERTING
COFFEE PICKERS. NO EVIDENCE OF DIRECT SUBVERSION EFFORTS AGAINST
ARMED FORCES. SCP-3.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

C

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

COUNTRY Paraguay/Argentina/Cuba

SUBJECT Return of Paraguayan Leftist to Argentina from Cuba

REPORT NO. CS-3/536,455

DATE DISTR. 7 February 1963

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES RD

DATE OF INFO. 9 January 1963

PLACE & Paraguay, Asuncion

DATE ACQ. 24 January 1963

FIELD REPORT NO. HYA-834

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Paraguayan security officer (B) from a Paraguayan Government official in Formosa, Argentina. Appraisal of Content: 2.

Retired Captain Guerrero Padin (fnu), a member of the left-wing group of the Paraguayan Febrerista Party, was seen in Formosa, Argentina, on about 9 January 1963. Since October 1962 Guerrero Padin had been in Habana, Cuba, where he received guerrilla training. Guerrero, who is separated from his family, spends as much time in Buenos Aires as he does in Formosa.

1. Field Comment. Guerrero Padin is probably identical with Rafael Guerrero Padin.

Headquarters Comment. In September 1962 a usually reliable source with good contacts in exile groups, reported that Guerrero Padin (fnu), a former captain in the Paraguayan Army, was an instructor in guerrilla warfare at a training camp near Habana. The source received this information from a member of the United Front for National Liberation (FULNA) who had recently returned.

2. Field Comment. According to a usually reliable source, Guerrero Padin is legally separated from his wife, Benefrida, who lives on Calle Caballero, between Tte. Farina and Manuel Dominguez, Asuncion, Paraguay.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

COUNTRY ARGENTINA / URUGUAY / CUBA

SUBJECT ACTIVITIES OF ARGENTINE PERONIST TERRORISTS

DATE OF INFO. 10 FEBRUARY 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. URUGUAY, MONTEVIDEO (11 FEBRUARY 1963)

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/537,168

DATE DISTR. 13 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES IN 67101

APPRAISAL 2 (THAT THE SUBSOURCE MADE THE REPORTED STATEMENTS)

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A PERSON IN CONTACT WITH PERONISTS IN URUGUAY (B) FROM A CONTACT (F) IN PERONIST CIRCLES.

1. NORMA KENNEDY AND FIVE OTHER ARGENTINE TERRORISTS ARE CURRENTLY IN MONTEVIDEO HAVING RECENTLY ARRIVED FROM CUBA WHERE THEY UNDERWENT GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING. THEY PLAN TO GO TO ARGENTINA IN THE NEAR FUTURE WHERE THEY WILL ORGANIZE GUERRILLA WARFARE OPERATIONS. (FIELD COMMENT: KENNEDY AND HER GROUP WERE REPORTED UPON BY THE SAME SOURCE IN AUGUST 1962 WHEN THEY ARRIVED IN URUGUAY CLANDESTINELY FROM ARGENTINA ENROUTE TO CUBA.) (SOURCE COMMENT: KENNEDY AND HER GROUP MAY BE HIDING ON A RANCH NEAR FRAY BENTOS, URUGUAY, OWNED BY JULIO GALLEGOS SOTO, ARGENTINE.)
PERONIST AND CASTRO SYMPATHIZER.) (FIELD COMMENT: GALLEGO MAY
BE THE INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MONTEVIDEO AND
THE PERONIST GROUP HEADED BY JOSE LUIS ALBAMONTE, 'AMERICO
BARRIOS. DURING THE FALL OF 1962 GALLEGO WAS RELIABLY REPORTED
TO BE IN TOUCH WITH CUBAN EMBASSY IN MONTEVIDEO AND TO HAVE
TRAVELLED TO BUENOS AIRES ON AN UNSPECIFIED MISSION FOR THAT
EMBASSY.)

2. ALICIA EGUREN DE COOKE, ARGENTINE TERRORIST AND GUERRILLA
RECRUITER AND WIFE OF TERRORIST JOHN WILLIAM COOKE, IS CURRENTLY
IN MONTEVIDEO. SHE PLANS TO REJOIN HER HUSBAND IN CUBA, POSSIBLY
IN LATE FEBRUARY 1963.

3. DR. (FNU) GUIDE, ARGENTINE PERONIST, IS CURRENTLY IN
MONTEVIDEO HAVING RECENTLY ARRIVED FROM CUBA. (FIELD COMMENT:
GUIDE MAY POSSIBLY BE IDENTICAL WITH ALFREDO OMAR GUIDI, MILITANT
PERONIST.)

4. AN UNIDENTIFIED PERONIST WHO ESCAPED FROM AN ARGENTINE PRISON
IN LATE 1962 WHERE HE HAD BEEN IMPRISONED FOR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES
SPENT SEVERAL DAYS IN MONTEVIDEO BEFORE BEING SMUGGLED BACK INTO
ARGENTINA BY ALBAMONTE IN LATE JANUARY OR EARLY FEBRUARY 1963.

5. THE PERONIST GROUP OF JOSE LUIS ALBAMONTE HAS COMMITTED
ITSELF TO AIDING FUTURE GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN ARGENTINA AND THERE-
FORE "MUST" ACCEPT CUBAN AID. THE KENNEDY GROUP; ALICIA DE
DA IN 16839
COOKE, AND GUIDE ARE ALL IN CONTACT WITH ALBAMONTE.

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCARIB CINCLANT

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO: DCSOP
DA IN 16839

END OF MESSAGE
According to a usually reliable Communist Party source in Brazil, two Brazilians, Carlos Danielli and Angelo Arroyo, have recently returned from Cuba where they received training in guerrilla warfare. Both have been relieved of all party activities to allow them to concentrate exclusively on guerrilla activities in Brazil. The National Executive Commission of the Dissident Communist Party of Brazil (CPB) planned to meet in Rio de Janeiro on 16 and 17 January to discuss a report to be submitted by Danielli and Arroyo regarding their training. (CIA, TDCS 3/34, 418, 17 January, SECRET)
ECUADOR/SSR/CUBA

COMMUNIST TRAVEL TO AND FROM

REPORT NO. CS-3/534,946
DATE DISTR. 24 January 1963
NO. PAGES 1
REFERENCES RD

DATE OF INFO. December 1962 - January 1963
PLACE & DATE ACQ. Ecuador, Guayaquil (December 1962 - January 1963)

REMARKS:
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE:
Ecuadorean (B) with access to travel information.

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 2.

1. During late December 1962 Ketty Romeo Loreux Giron, a member of the Communist Party of Ecuador (PCE), returned to Guayaquil from the Soviet Union.

2. During early January 1963 Antonio Ruiz Flores, a member of the PCE who had been in the Soviet Union for six months, returned to Milagro.

3. On 11 January 1963 Cesar Munoz Vicuna, a member of the PCE, was to travel to Moscow to undertake studies in civil engineering.

4. On 12 or 15 January 1963 Ecuador Padilla and Alfredo Almeida Vargas, members of the PCE from Milagro, were scheduled to travel to Cuba.

5. Julio Olmedo Munoz Gonzalez, Antonio Navarra Anchundia, Jose Luis Cardenas Pinto, and Carlos Baste Castillo, members of the PCE, were selected by the PCE to travel to Cuba during the last half of January 1963.
1. The following Colombians left Mexico City by air en route to Habana, Cuba, on 31 December 1962:

- Luis Enrique Gomez Restrepo
- Eduvino Mateus Porras
- Jorge Albornoz
- Fanny Puentes de Cruz
- Cecilia Porras de Child
- Manuel Tiberio Rozo Duque
- Prieto Guevara
- Maria Dalila Sierra Robon de Arcila
- Libia Colombia de Benavides
- Clotilde Guerrero de Dorado
- Camilo Dominguez
- Carlos Vicente Nunez Obondano
- Santiago Londono Londono
- Alvaro Echandia
- Silvio Agredo Yepez
- Justo Castellanos
- Jesus Antonio Villegas
- Jaime Rafael Altamar Pios
- Valentina Colombiana Arocha
- Jorge Child Veilez
- Antonio Becerra Becerra
- Hernan Lozano Mahecha
- Eduardo Kronfly
- Sara de Bejarano
- Helena Garavito de Garavito
- Maria L. Villaseca
- Jorge Vargas
- Ana Victoria Fajardo de Silva
- Cristina Zambrano
- Maria Irene Avila Barrera

All had courtesy visas.

Passport No. 33145
Passport No. 588669
Passport No. 58834
Passport No. 359708
Passport No. 692256
Passport No. 59845
Passport No. 046994
Passport No. 61694
Passport No. 62006
Passport No. 59816
Passport No. 5884
Passport No. 48938
Passport No. TQ 39586
Passport No. 71069
Passport No. 55712
Passport No. 38610
Passport No. 50833
Passport No. 70758
Passport No. 30437
Passport No. 59607
Passport No. 88613
Passport No. 88687
Passport No. 59880
Passport No. 59751
Passport No. 59440
Passport No. - not given
Passport No. 59848
Passport No. 59618
Passport No. 59522
Passport No. 55014
Field Comment. These people probably attended the celebration in observance of the fourth anniversary of the Castro regime. It is possible that some of them may remain in Cuba for the Latin American Women's Congress.

Headquarters Comments

1. Members of the extremist segment of the Liberal Revolutionary Movement.

2. Rozo was arrested by the Colombian authorities in May 1963 during a raid on a Communist meeting. At that time he was a student at Universidad Libre.

3. In March 1959 Guerrero was reported as a member of a preparatory committee to organize a Communist-front women's organization in Colombia.


5. Villegas is labor secretary of the central executive committee of the Communist Party of Colombia.

6. Bejarano was reported in August 1962 as a member of the Union of Democratic Women, a Communist-front organization.

7. De Silva has a long record of Communist activities.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

TRAVEL OF DOMINICAN-COMMUNIST DELEGATION TO CUBA

DATE: 14 DECEMBER 1962

TELLARD, DAUTHER (17 & 20 DECEMBER 1963)

1. ON 14 DECEMBER 1962 A CZECH AIRLINES (CSA) PLANE TRANSITING CUBA AIRPORT, EN ROUTE TO HAVANA, CUBA, FROM PRAGUE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, CARRIED THE FOLLOWING DOMINICAN COMMUNISTS:

A. MAXIMO LOPEZ MOLINA
B. ISLANDER CELIDIO DELMONTE
C. TOMAS PAVCINIO FRIGON ALVAREZ
D. JOSE ESTRELLA DE GOMES ARMAGH - (ALSO REPORTED AS JOSE MARIA ARMAGH)
E. JUAN JAVIER TATON DELMIRA
F. RANCHO AGU PER PRIBEGO MONTA
G. HUGO FRANCISCO CARRERA GARCIA
H. OCTAVIO FEDERICO RIGANTE RIGANTE

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C O M I S S I O N

STATE/DIR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCM ONE OCR QDR OBI O0 DCX

DD/T INELAB

AAP-3 FORM 1Kb OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

(15-20)
2. OTHER PASSENGERS WERE 21 CZECHS, THREE EAST GERMANS, TWO SPANIARDS, TWO
SPANIANS, ONE FINN, AND ONE ALGERIAN. THE CARGO INCLUDED AIRCRAFT SPARES AND DIPLOMATIC
MAIL.

3. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: THE ABOVE DOMINICAN COMMUNISTS ARE EIGHT OF THE TEN WHO
WERE DEPORTED FROM THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC TO FRANCE ON ABOUT 1 NOVEMBER 1962. MAXIMO
LOPEZ MOLINA IS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE MOVIMIENTO POPULAR DOMINICANO (MPD - DOMINICAN
POPULAR MOVEMENT), A LEFTIST PARTY DOMINATED BY COMMUNISTS; ISLANDER SELIG DELMONTE AND
ENRIQUE PARVINIO ERIKSON ALVAREZ ARE MPD LEADERS; JOSE ESTRELLA JACOBO ARMACH IS THE
PRO-CASTRO LEADER OF FENEPITA, THE DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES UNION; GUSTAVO
FEDERICO RICART RICART IS A MEMBER OF THE MPD; ANOTHER SOURCE HAS REPORTED THAT JUAN JOSÉ
HATOS RIVERA IS A SUSPECTED COMMUNIST AND AN ACTIVE MEMBER OF THE AGRUPACION POLITICA
CATORCE DE JUNIO (APCJ - 14TH OF JUNE POLITICAL GROUP), A PRO-CASTRO GROUP. SEE
TDOS-3/528,582 OF 17 NOVEMBER 1962, FROM ANOTHER SOURCE, WHICH REPORTED A MEETING IN
PARIS BETWEEN THE CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE AND ABOUT TEN DOMINICANS TO DISCUSS THE POS-
SIBILITY OF HELPING THEM TO GO TO CUBA WITHOUT PASSPORTS.

4. FIELD DISSEN: CINCARIB, CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE
An Ecuadorean youth who returned from Cuba on 18 November 1962 has spent most of his time since then training guerrilla candidates in Ecuador, according to a fairly reliable source who is a member of the Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth (URJE). The youth involved, Mario Vera Arrata, was one of four Ecuadoreans who on 22 November threw three sticks of dynamite at the USAID mission office building in Guayaquil, according to the source. The camp where Mario Vera is training guerrillas is said to be located near a small beach resort some 70 miles from Guayaquil. Training consists of learning how to march, rifle practice, the use of camouflage, and hand-to-hand combat. Mario Vera is the URJE's intelligence officer, according to the source, and is the principal courier for instructions coming directly from Cuba. (CIA Guayaquil CS-3/531,884, 31 December, CONFIDENTIAL)
Lima reports that three young Peruvian extremists shot and killed a civil guard from a car in Callao on 11 January. One of them was Miguel Tauro de Mala, a young Communist leader who attended the Latin American Youth Congress in Havana in 1960. He is said to be boasting after his arrest two days later that he pulled the trigger, and to be threatening other attacks on the authorities. A second one of the trio, Jorge Bejar, who is still being sought, attended the People's Conference in Havana early last year. No tie to Cuba has yet been reported for the third killer, Fernando Samaniego Pardiz, who has been arrested in Lima. (CIA, Lima IN 49651, 14 January, SECRET NOFORN)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

COUNTRY Costa Rica/Cuba

SUBJECT Inclusion of Militia Training in Communist Party Program

REPORT NO. CS-3/535,911

DATE DISTRIBUTION 4 February 1963

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES RD

DATE OF INFO. Mid-January 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Costa Rica, San José (17 January 63)

FIELD REPORT NO. HRS-3009

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Costa Rican (B) with good contacts in Communist Party circles, who talked with Lopez's mother. Appraisal of Content: 3.

Militia training will be included in new courses of instruction soon to be started by the Partido Vanguardia Popular (PVP—Costa Rican Communist Party). Alvaro Lopez Vargas, a PVP member who was formerly an employee of Public Works, was sent to Cuba in June 1962 to be trained in militia organization. Upon his return to Costa Rica, Lopez will help conduct similar courses in Costa Rica.
Cuba/Nicaragua

Cuban Training of Guerrillas for Landing in Nicaragua

REPORT NO. CS -3/534,165

DATE DISTR. 16 January 1963

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES RD-W-2107

DATE OF INFO. Mid-1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Belgium, Antwerp (7 January 1963)

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.


About July 1962 four hundred men, including Mexicans, Nicaraguans, and Cubans, were being trained in Cuba as a guerrilla unit which was to be landed in Mosquito, Nicaragua.

Field Comment. The Cuban naval officer did not know when the landing in Mosquito was to take place.
Two top Peruvian Communists (FCP officials) said on 13 December that Fidelista activities in Peru are being carried on largely through the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), according to a usually reliable clandestine source. The MIR was reported to have been given the task of helping guerrillas enter Peru clandestinely from Chile. Between two and three hundred Peruvians had gone to Cuba about a year ago, traveling in groups of twelve to fifteen, to study guerrilla tactics. The FCP had not directly participated in this MIR activity, which was under an expelled FCP member, which had so upset Communist Party leaders that they recently sent an emissary to discuss the matter with Fidel Castro. Members of the Communist Youth Group (JCP) has also met secretly with Castro agents without prior knowledge of FCP leaders, to prepare distribution of Cuban revolutionary propaganda and material on the formation of the Peruvian "army of liberation" being trained in Cuba.

Nor had the FCP been consulted by Havana with respect to the Latin American Congress in Defense of Cuba, originally scheduled to be held in Rio de Janeiro this coming January but since postponed – about which they had first learned through the local press. They agreed with the Brazilian, Argentine, and Chilean Communists that the congress should be postponed. They reportedly decided to call for a conference of Latin American Communist parties to discuss Cuba's attitude toward these parties. The Political Commission of the Peruvian FSP has resolved that the methods employed by the Cubans can only hurt the "liberation" movement in South America, and they termed these methods "erroneous, precipitate, and very dangerous." (CIA, Lima, TDCS-3/531,899, 20 December, SECRET--CONFIDENTIAL)
A regular CIA clandestine asset in Peru with close contacts in Peruvian left-wing circles reports that Cuba has given, and is still giving, training in Peruvians in Cuba - including demolition instructions, manufacture of explosives, and other aspects of guerrilla warfare. A 50-point questionnaire issued by the Cuban Government is said to "clearly pinpoint" Cuban interest in information which could be used for sabotage operations in Peru, subversion of the Peruvian police, and for illegal entry and travel in Peru. Some 150 Peruvians are reported receiving such training in Cuba. (CIA, Lima, 1746954, 9 January, secret origin)
There is a group of Negroes and Hindus from British Guiana studying "agronomy and military tactics" in Cuba, according to a letter dated 4 November recently received in Uruguay from an Uruguayan Communist employed in Cuba. The writer claimed that the British Guianese are "supervised" by an American couple who are Communists and who travel frequently between Cuba and British Guiana. The writer commented that British Guiana is soon to become the second Communist state in the western hemisphere. (CIA Montevideo WH 30671, 6 December, SECRET)
SECRET

A number of Ecuadoreans are currently receiving training in guerrilla warfare in Cuba, according to a usually reliable source who is a member of the Communist Party of Ecuador. The source was told by Rafael Echeverría, a Communist leader in Ecuador, that the Ecuadoreans being trained in Cuba would return to Ecuador to train and command guerrilla units there. Echeverría added that the top Ecuadorean Communist leader, Pedro Saad, had told him that the techniques of guerrilla warfare used by Castro against Batista were now antiquated and that current training in Cuba now emphasizes methods used by guerrillas in Burma, Vietnam, and Algeria. According to the source, Saad and other high party leaders in Ecuador are now coming around to the view previously urged on them by a minority faction of the party that the Communists should open guerrilla warfare in Ecuador as soon as possible. (CIA Quito CS-3/530, 530 7 December, SECRET)
The police in Rio de Janeiro report they have uncovered a pro-Castro plot to organize a revolution in Brazil. The police charge that Cubans who had undergone training in the Soviet Union and Communist China, have slipped into Brazil to train guerrilla bands in the northwest. Brazilian news reports predict a vigorous anti-Communist campaign there as a result of the affair. (CIA FBIS 07, Rio de Janeiro, 14 December, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)
SOURCE: Member (F) of the Communist Party of Colombia in Cali. Appraisal of Content: 67.

1. During a discussion on 5 January 1963 between Amado de Jesus Zarata, member of the Department of Valle Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Colombia (PCC), and F. I. Plata, whom Zarata describes as a Cuban deep-cover agent working with the Seventh of January Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MSEC) in Colombia and Venezuela, both criticized the PCC for its soft policy and fear of taking a more active role in the guerrilla activities in Colombia. They indicated there is a split between the followers of Gilberto Vieira White, Political Secretary of the PCC, and those who advocate the Castro-Communist concept of active participation in the guerrilla bands. Both agreed the only hope for the PCC is to follow the Castro policy, as have the Communist Parties of Peru, Venezuela, and Bolivia. Plata said it is possible there will soon be a change in the position of the PCC leaders in Bogota.

2. Plata said the MSEC is not a local movement but rather part of a Latin-American concept which is being assisted by Castro and the Cuban Government. He said he has been in Cali for one year on a special assignment from the top leaders in Cuba to see that arms, propaganda, and instructions from Venezuela, originating in Cuba, get into the hands of the MSEC groups. Plata said he has also been helping to recruit Venezuelan youth, largely from schools and universities, to fight with the MSEC bands in Colombia.

3. Plata said he lived for many years in Caracas and that his apartment there is still a meeting place of Cuban guerrilla leaders operating in Venezuela. Two Castro agents, who represent themselves as being anti-Castro, live in his apartment now. He added that the apartment is a center that maintains contact with Colombia through associates in Cucarmane, Cucuta, and Bogota, and that several Cubans and Cuban-trained Colombians are working with the MSEC in Colombia. He said that Pedro Emilio Castro, Fidel's older brother, lived for a long time at his apartment in Caracas, but has now returned to Cuba, where he is not involved in politics. Plata added he has visited Cuba several times, the last visit in February 1951, when he was introduced to Fidel
Castro and had two conferences with him. The Castro organization in Caracas is in direct contact with Castro agents in Miami, who consider Caracas their most important center in Latin America. The Miami group, which is made up of persons in the anti-Castro organization there who ostensibly escaped from Cuba, maintains contacts with all of the Latin American groups.

2. Plata said an important shipment for MOEC is due to arrive from Venezuela via Cucuta in February 1963. It is to be used in the MOEC plans to increase their activities in the Department of Santander. Plata mentioned Santander several times in the discussion as an area where the MOEC will play a more important role in the future. He said there are several MOEC training areas in Colombia and Venezuela. Plata said he ostensibly is a salesman of refrigeration equipment for Comerciales Unidas Ltda., Carrera 5a No. 15-75, Cali. He said most of the MOEC representatives in Colombia pose as traveling salesmen. He asserted MOEC is looking for new people who are not known to the Colombian authorities to help them transport arms and equipment around the country.

3. Plata said he was born in the municipality of Palaya, in the Department of Santander, that he is married to Maruja de Plata, who has one arm missing, and that they have two daughters, one of whom is married to a Venezuelan doctor.

4. On 6 January 1963, Zapata and Plata went to "Los Panchos," a restaurant near the country club of Cali. The owner of the restaurant, a Gomez (fmu), is a member of the MOEC. They inspected a new tent that was acquired for a MOEC guerrilla leader known as "Mariposa," who is active in the northern part of the Department of Tolima. Plata expressed a desire to obtain more of the tents for MOEC operations in other areas. He said he was expecting money from Venezuela by the first of February. Francisco Celero, formerly thought to be the MOEC leader in Cali, attended the meeting briefly and was ordered around as a subordinate of Plata.

5. During the conversation at the restaurant it was asserted that Fidel Castro had given US $50,000 dollars to Luis Emilio Valencia, one of the leaders of the United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUA). The money had been given to Valencia to build up an organization to participate more actively in sabotage and guerrilla activities. It was said that Valencia used the money for his private use and as a result the FUA has collapsed and might not be assisted any more by Castro. Since the failure of FUA, there is increased importance on the MOEC organization.

Source Comment. Plata, who appears to be approximately 60 years old, is well acquainted with the MOEC contacts in Ibagué. He also has a very close relationship with Zapata, who was in complete agreement with the criticism of the "soft line" of the PCC as represented by Vieira. It also appears there is a much closer understanding and co-operation between MOEC and PCC at this level than appears on lower levels.

Field Comments

1. Members of the Regional Committee of the Department of Valle have expressed differences in the recent past with the action of the Central Committee of the PCC over the lack of action during the Cuban blockade. They also have spoken of their plans to participate in sabotage in the Cali area. Apparently the aggressive faction, headed by Zapata, has been overruled by Jose Cardona Hoyos, secretary-general of the local regional committee.

2. Cucuta, capital of the Department of Norte de Santander, is on the Venezuelan border and is a traditional center of smuggling between the two countries.
who devotes part time to MOEC, being directed by Plata, who is probably a full-time agent of the Castro government in charge of recruiting and controlling Cuban assistance to the organization in the Cali area.

7. The FUAR seems to have been in a recess during recent months in the Cali area. In early November Luis Emiro Valencia, one of the leaders of the FUAR, was asked directly if there was any truth to the story circulating in Cali that Castro had given him 50,000 dollars to help FUAR. He laughed and asserted the amount mentioned in Bogota is only 30,000. He said his only assistance from Cuba was a 1,000-dollar first prize in a literary contest in 1959 or 1960 and two paid trips thereafter to judge other literary contests. It is difficult to determine the truth of Valencia's denial or the charges mentioned herein. The story has been circulating in Cali for approximately six months and could be hearsay on the part of either Plata or Zapata. It is noteworthy that Valencia has refused to espouse common ideology with the PCC, except for Castro, which Valencia insists he will not accept if it is a tool of international Communism.
Calculations and If another factor 25% reduction projected above, was
suggested, further, then the 40% blow would be even more.

As to the United States, he said that he
had no plans for a meeting, but he hoped to keep the
matter under consideration. He went on to say that
he would like to see the United States play a more
active role in the Asian situation. He expressed his
concern about the situation in Korea and suggested
that the United States should take a more active role
in the region. He also mentioned the importance of
trade with Asian countries and the need for
cooperation between the countries.

Regarding the Formosa situation, he said that
the United States had taken steps to protect
Formosa, but he also stated that the situation was
complicated and that the United States would
continue to work towards a peaceful resolution.

He ended his statement by saying that he
looked forward to a continued dialogue and hoped
that progress could be made towards a solution.

In conclusion, he emphasized the importance of
cooperation and understanding between
Asian countries and the United States, and
stressed the need for continued efforts towards
peace and stability in the region.
INTERNATIONAL GAMES USED AS TRAINING COVER

(S) (GP-1) The Latin American University games held in Havana from 7 to 21 October 1962, at which thirteen countries were represented, allegedly were used by the Cuban Government as an opportunity to indoctrinate and train a number of Latin American students. Several Salvadorean athletes reportedly took no part in the games but spent their time in training classes for "Socialist revolution" conducted by Cuban instructors. A number of athletes from other unspecified countries followed the same schedule.

HQ OSI COMMENT: (C) (GP-1) Such events as this competition supplements the vast training program conducted in Cuba. Many of the participants in the 1960 conference of the Communist front World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) in Havana stayed behind to take part in a "work camp" sponsored by the WFDY in the Sierra Maestras. Attendance at such events may also serve as cover for Party travel and other personnel previously selected for specialized training. The events also served to promote the image of Cuba as a major regional Communist stronghold. (SCIB, Vol XI, #24, 28 November 1962)

OSI COMMENT: (S) (GP-1) As was noted in the Panama section of this report, one of the Panamanians returning to Panama from the games carried with him a book entitled "Firing Manual" concerned with the care and handling of small arms. (OSI District 30; 30 Nov 62)
A Salvadoran student source has provided detailed information on Cuban instructions and encouragement to pro-Communist Salvadoran students who visited Cuba in October to participate in the First Latin American University Games in Havana. The source, who talked at length with one of the students who had visited Cuba, reported that the Salvadoran group to the games was given special instructions in "revolutionary tactics" on the recommendation of the leaders of the Cuban Union of Young Communists (UJC).

A Cuban military officer lectured the Salvadoran group on various aspects of the revolutionary struggle. He emphasized that in the initial stages all revolutionary groups must be reinforced by the recruitment of persons of "various political views," but that "as the revolution nears victory, all who do not accept Communist leadership can be expelled." He also gave the Salvadoran students advice on preparing for guerrilla warfare in El Salvador. He showed them a large map of Central and South America which pointed out the locations of military forces, key highways and bridges, and also showed the centers of guerrilla activity in several countries. There was another map showing the Panama Canal and large photographs of the locks. Some of the Salvadoran students received special instruction in the use of the Belgian FAL rifles.

The Cuban students had recommended that the Salvadorans give more emphasis to infiltration of the university and of the labor movement in El Salvador. (CIA San Salvador CS-3/529,533 and -536, 27 and 30 November, SENSIT/NO-FOREIGN-DISSEM)
FOLLOWING HIGHLIGHTS LENGTHY GOVERNMENT PRESS RELEASE ANNOUNCING
EXPULSION FOUR CUBAN EXILES HONDURAS (WHICH REPORTED SEPARATELY). RECONCEIVED HISTORY BEGINNING WITH CUBAN ARMED EXPEDITION PANAMA
USIA 1959, AND INCLUDING CASTRO SUPPORTED SUBVERSION, ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES OF CUBAN EMBASSY HERE BEFORE RUPTURE RELATIONS AND TRAINING OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT GUATEMALANS IN CUBA, WHICH LED TO YOROBAS GOVERNMENT BEING "FIRST TO REALIZE TREMENDOUS DANGER THAT CASTRO REPRESENTED FOR ALL THE AMERICAS". STATED US AND MANY LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES FIRST MISJUDGED CASTRO AS "LEFTIST DEMOCRACY". DANGER REPRESENTED BY CASTRO FORCED GUATEMALA ON OFFENSIVE IN ORDER NAVY DEFEND ITSELF BETTER AND LED TO ILL-FATED (NO FAULT OF GUATEMALA'S AIR FORCE) "BAY OF PIGS" VENTURE WITH US GOVERNMENT. FROM THAT TIME ON CASTRO'S "DEFACTO"
ARMY GOVERNMENT UNDERTOOK MANY SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST GUATEMALA, INCLUDING MARCH-APRIL 1962 DISTURBANCES WHICH COMMUNIQUE CHARACTERIZES AS LED BY UNSCRUPULOUS GUATEMALANS, COMMUNIST-LINERS AND DUPES. AMONG LATTER GROUP THOSE WHO DO NOT WISH PAY INCOME TAX.

CASTRO SPONSORS MANY EXILED GUATEMALANS TOTALING AROUND 27 PERSONS LED BY FORMER PRESIDENT ABENZ. THESE GUATEMALANS FORM GROUP WHICH CALLS ITSELF "GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA IN EXILE". COMMUNIQUE THEN RELATES SUBVERSIVE AND PROPAGANDA ATTEMPTS ABENZ COMPANY TO CAUSE REVOLUTION HERE AND STATES ARMS AND RADIO BROADCASTS, FORMER COMING TO GUATEMALA FROM BELIZE AND MEXICO. IN ADDITION MANY STUDENTS AND LABORERS BEING TRAINED IN CUBA AND SELECTED ONES SENT TO IRON CURTAIN COUNTRIES. ESTIMATED 600-700 PERSONS TRAINED IN CUBA NOW PREPARING SUBVERSIVE MOVEMENT FOR THE FIRST FEW MONTHS OF 1963. GOVERNMENT THROUGH SWISS WHO REPRESENT GUATEMALA IN CUBA TOLD CASTRO GOVERNMENT WOULD RECOGNIZE GOVERNMENT IN EXILE IF CUBANS DID NOT GET RID OF GUATEMALAN EXILES. AS IT ALMOST CERTAINLY WILL IN 1963.
UNCLASSIFIED

-2-- 398, DECEMBER 27, FROM GUATEMALA CITY

DEFACTO GOVERNMENT CUBA WILL REJECT GUATEMALAN NOTE AND GIVE INSTEAD GREATER SUPPORT TO GUATEMALAN EXILES, GOING A STEP FORWARD TO DEMONSTRATE GOOD WILL, INVITING CONSEJO REVOLUCIONARIO CUBANO MEMBERS TO LEAVE COUNTRY. LATTER GROUP MAINTAINS ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES AND MENACES CUBAN GOVERNMENT WITH IMAGINARY INVASIONS AND MAINTAINS GUATEMALAN PUBLIC IN STATE CONFUSION.

GUATEMALA NEEDS PEACE AND TRANQUILITY. IT HAS ALREADY DONE ITS PART AGAINST CASTRO. NECESSARY THAT OTHER COUNTRIES IN LATIN AMERICA NOW DO THEIR PART. ALSO GOG INFORMED US GOVERNMENT OF MISSILES AND OTHER ARMAMENT IN CUBA EIGHT DAYS BEFORE PRESIDENT KENNEDY MADE OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT.

GOG DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO GIVE THE PEOPLE PEACE AND CALM IN 1963 AND HOPE MEN OF GOOD WILL ON BOTH SIDES NOTE THE TRANSCENDENTAL STEP GUATEMALA TAKING IN GETTING RID CUBANS WHO IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER ARE CARRYING OUT ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE "DEFACTO" GOVERNMENT OF CUBA. GUATEMALA EXPECTS IN RECIPROCITY PEACE AND TRANQUILITY IN ORDER DEVELOP AND TO ELECT EFFICIENTLY ITS NEW PRESIDENT.

BELL

FB

ACTION: STATE(ARMY ACSI)
INFO: DCSOP, JCS, OSA, USDEL IADB
DA IN 815779

UNCLASSIFIED
In a report dated 15 November, Canadian Ambassador Kidd in Havana submitted the following analysis of the "Foreign Legion" in Cuba.

"Press publicity abroad about the formation of a Foreign Legion to fight for Castro may have given a somewhat misleading impression of what seems to be involved. At any given time, there are a large number of Communist or fellow-traveling Latin Americans and persons from other parts of the world in Cuba as guests of the government, usually under the auspices of the ICAP (Institute of Friendship for Peoples). Many of these people wished, or were pushed into volunteering, to defend Cuba when the mobilization took place. They were formed into scratch militia squads of no military value, but of some political use.

"We do not know whether their choice was free. We learned that some eighteen Guinese students studying here were mobilized without any opportunity to decline the honour. They seemed somewhat unhappy about the military duties which the scholarships they came to Cuba on had entailed, particularly as they are not Communists but firm supporters of President Cabral Romeu.

"A large number of the foreigners who have taken up residence in Cuba since the revolution are true believers of the most fervent kind, and would be pleased with the idea of fighting for the cause (though this is no indication of how they might react to actual combat). Some of the English-speaking friends of Cuba donated blood for the blood bank being formed to succor the wounded; a sacrifice made to the accompaniment of the usual publicity. A number of foreign residents are, of course, enrolled in regular reserve militia units. The Chilean Secretary told
us of his rage when a Chilean woman strolled into the embassy with full
militia regalia, including a pistol, to claim her mail.

"One would assume that to the extent the Cubans are providing
training in guerrilla warfare to Latin American extremists, these trainees
would be thrown into any fighting which might develop, but that no
publicity would be given to their presence at this time. Persistent, but
unreliable sounding, rumors would have it that there are a large number
of Africans (usually described as having rings in their noses and ears)
being trained somewhere in the island (the province of Matanzas is some-
times mentioned); they have been variously described as Guinean, Guinean,
and Congolese. I would imagine that the Cubans would be delighted to
provide military training to left-wing Congolese dissidents or Angolans,
but I have not a particle of evidence that any such people are here.

"The international brigades in the Spanish Civil War occupy an
important place in left-wing mythology. It would be quite natural for
the Cubans to dream of being able to secure similar support if fighting
took place on the island. It seems highly unlikely, however, that
foreigners would be brought to Cuba for this purpose in advance and
the present rather limited effort seems to involve foreigners who for other
reasons happened to be on the island when the crisis broke out."

{CONFIDENTIAL}