

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

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3RD NR 497 THRU 499

Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act
of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
Case#: NW 65360 Date: 11-17-2022

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
- DATE: 7/28/75
- 1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

FROM : R. L. Shackelford *RLS*

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm.

Dep. AD Inv.

Asst. Dir.:

Adm.

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv.

Ident.

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval.

Spec. Inv.

Training

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm.

Director Sec'y

Reference is made to W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall memorandum dated 7/24/75, captioned as above. This memorandum advised CIA had prepared a document citing instances wherein CIA believed some of its activities may have exceeded its legal mandate. Portions of this CIA document were furnished this Bureau and referenced memorandum requested documents pertaining to a particular Bureau division and/or Intelligence Division section be reviewed to identify the subject matter and make an assessment as to whether any compromise to this Bureau's operation is involved. Those portions of the CIA document pertaining to the IS-2 Section of the Intelligence Division are pages 29, 30, 171, 190, 191, 193, 194, 197, 198, 203, 330, and 482.

A review has been made of the material, supra, and the following comments apply:

Pages 29, 30, under the heading "Merrimac," refer to recruitment and handling of "several Agents" to covertly monitor dissident groups in the Washington area and states one was so successful the "Agent" was turned over to the FBI. We have no idea who the "Agent" was and in absence of identifying information no compromise exists to Bureau operations.

Page 171 refers to CIA producing a document titled "Restless Youth" in two versions. The version dealing with radical students in America was sent only to the President and two other high officials. Page 171, itself, in no way compromises Bureau operations.

Pages 190, 191, also deal with the "Restless Youth" document, which disclose the document only went to nine readers, "a copy may be in the Johnson Library," and refers to updating of the document. These pages, themselves, in no way compromise Bureau operations.

62-116395

KAM:lm
(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

REC-102 62-116395-499

14 AUG 11 1975

5-27-75

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

Pages 193, 194, refer to CIA participation in preparation of several short intelligence memoranda dealing with the foreign connections of U. S. organizations and activists involved in the anti-war movement. Reference is made to collecting information from their own sources "and through liaison with the FBI." A reference is also made to primary source of information being "sensitive intercepts produced by NSA." While these pages do not directly compromise Bureau operations, disclosure of NSA intercepts could well indirectly adversely affect Bureau operations by disclosure of sensitive techniques which produce extremely valuable information to the intelligence community, of which the FBI is a part.

Pages 197, 198, refer to the response to an inquiry as to involvement in domestic affairs by the Director, Central Reference Service, CIA, and in no way compromises Bureau operations.

Page 203 refers to a similar response by Director, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, CIA, and includes a reference to their monitoring foreign broadcasts of Jane Fonda and Ramsey Clark and furnishing transcripts at the request of the FBI and Department of Justice for consideration for possible trial use. There is no compromise of Bureau operations involved as this was to be evidence in a public trial and would have required CIA personnel to publicly testify.

Page 330 again makes reference to "Restless Youth" and use of FBI reports. It also refers to a 1967 CIA study of "SDS and its foreign ties." The page, itself, does not compromise Bureau operations.

Page 482 refers to a "project MPLODESTAR," which involved manipulation of assets against targets in the "leftist and communist milieu in various parts of the world." Comments include "each case is cleared with the FBI..." The page itself does not compromise Bureau operations.

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

ACTION:

None. For information.

Existence of the 693-page CIA document and the information contained therein should be closely guarded and disclosed only on a need-to-know basis.

KRM

~~ABC~~
19/8

EP/OL

wrw

JBB
P.M.

KI

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection
- Intell.
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

TO : Mr. Cochran

DATE: 7/28/75

FROM : T. F. Kelleher *TK*

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide an assessment of the accuracy and possible damage that might be suffered by the Bureau by the release of information to the Senate Select Committee ^{by} CIA as set forth in Cregar to Wannall memorandum dated 7/24/75 captioned as above.

Attached are separate commentaries relating to items appearing on corresponding page numbers in the CIA document.

It is to be noted that no written record or personal recollection could be located concerning item 7, page 00118 relating to the purchase of cameras.

Attached are nine pages containing the results of the requested assessment. Copies of these assessments have also been made for each designated copy of this memorandum.

ACTION:

For information.

Enclosures

ENCLOSURE

- 1 - Mr. Cochran
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. McNiff

~~SECRET~~

14 AUG 11 1975

TFK:eb
(4)

Classified by 129
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~

Per 60324 UCBAW/SBS
Date 8-1-11

84 AUG 13 1975

~~TOP SECRET~~

RE: SENSTUDY

The following are comments prepared by the Radio Engineering Section of the FBI Laboratory and relate to copies of excerpted pages from a report written by the Central Intelligence Agency. Comments are keyed to page numbers which appear in the lower right-hand corner of each sheet.

1. Page 00112

Paragraph b. refers to FBI purchases of television equipment and is accurate as to equipment obtained. According to Bureau records, Purchase Order #21100 was issued to CIA on 4/11/73 and was amended 9/24/73. The items were 1 each WTC-20 @ \$18,300 and 1 each WTC-23 @ \$18,600. Purchase Order #21469 dated 5/1/73 was issued to CIA for 2 each lens systems totaling \$11,200.

No damage would be suffered by release of this information.

2. Page 00118

Item 9 lists 50 "Actuators, Recorders." This entry is partially correct.

Bureau records show that Purchase Order #8989 was issued to CIA on 11/17/71 for 30 each QTC-11s at \$488.25, and 20 each QTC-12As at \$236.25.

No damage would be suffered by release of this information.

Item 11 lists 1 "Camera, Video." This entry could refer to that transaction detailed in Purchase Order #18301 issued to CIA on 11/27/72 for 1 each WTC-20 camera in the amount of \$18,400. Tubes installed in these cameras were of the type mentioned under Item 12 and 13 below.

Item 12 lists 1 "Tube, Image, Burn-Resistance, Equivalent of WL 30691." This entry is accurate.

- 1A -

~~TOP SECRET~~
ENCLOSURE

62-116325-498

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Purchase Order #16555 was issued to CIA on 9/21/72 in the amount of \$4,639. The video tube was for use in a closed circuit television camera.

Item 13 lists 2 "Tube, Image, WL 30691" as having been furnished the FBI on 3/26/71 at a cost of \$4,607 each. This entry is probably a duplication of Item 4 on page 0019. Bureau records show that Purchase Order #5450 dated 5/21/71 was issued to CIA for this equipment for use in CCTV cameras. No purchase order to support two such acquisitions (March and May) could be located.

Item 14 lists 2 "Cameras, Television" at a unit cost of \$18,300. This entry probably refers to that equipment acquired under Purchase Order #21100 and is detailed in Paragraph b. page 00112, above.

No damage would be suffered by release of this information.

3. Page 00119

Item 2 lists 25 "Actuators, Recorders." The entry is accurate.

Purchase Order #17204 was issued to CIA on 10/18/72 for 25 each QTC-11s @ \$591.94. This equipment is identical to that obtained on Purchase Order #8989 mentioned above.

Item 3 lists "Tube, Image, Burn-Resistance" etc., and is a duplication of Item 12 on page 00118. Note identical dates.

Item 4 lists "Tube, Image, WL 30691" and is believed to refer to the transaction carried as Item 13 on page 00118.

Items 5, 6, and 7 list "Transmitters, Module, Plug-In, and Power Supply - UWP-39A." These entries are essentially accurate.

Purchase Order #4203 was issued to CIA on 4/6/71 for 2 each transmitters SRT-67 @ \$1372.35; 1 each transmitter QRT-10A @ \$3160.33; 1 each module QWT-18 @ \$1247.40; and, 1 each power supply UWP-39A @ \$538.65.

No damage would be suffered by release of this information.

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- 2 -

4. Page 00221

Item (A) is believed to be accurate and in the absence of additional detail no serious damage would be suffered by release of this information.

Item (B) is accurate and as long as target is not specifically identified no serious damage should be incurred. It should be recognized, however, that although the concept of intercepting cryptographic machine emanations would come as no surprise to those familiar with intelligence work, confirmation of a functioning system could encourage implementation of countermeasures which would deprive the U.S. of invaluable information.

Item (C) is accurate except that the equipment has not been operated for some time. Without specific identification no serious damage would result from disclosure of this information.

Item (D) is inaccurate to the extent that it states that "installation is not fully operational because the full complement of personnel have not yet arrived." Aside from that, disclosure of information could lead the knowledgeable foreign government to be certain of Bureau's participation and take whatever diplomatic steps they felt necessary. Decision to withhold is an operational/political one rather than one which would affect technical capabilities and, therefore, the Laboratory is making no recommendations in this regard.

5. Page 00222

Item (E) is accurate and entirely too revealing. If there is any way this item can be deleted from material yet to be given to anyone outside the intelligence community, it should be done. As written, it suggests a concerted effort toward a penetration to be attempted in the future. Disclosure of this information could easily negate millions of dollars already spent and literally years of work already performed - the largest single project ever undertaken by this Bureau. In view of our responsibilities in the counter-intelligence field, the FBI, as well as the intelligence community, and perhaps the free world as well, would suffer incalculable harm from release of this information. It would also be appropriate for the Intelligence Division to comment on this item.

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Item (F) is accurate and, although its disclosure is confirmatory no serious technical damage would result from its disclosure. To our knowledge, there has been no diplomatic protest, disclosure could precipitate such protest. Intelligence Division may wish to comment regarding this possibility.

Item (G) asserts that in one case it is known that CIA equipment was used against a "domestic target." This is insufficient information to identify this matter.

~~TOP SECRET~~

ARABIC LINGUISTS

(Item 6, pgs. 182 & 202)

X —

With regard to press allegations concerning the use of polygraph, it was noted that during July 1971 the President was alleged to be furious with unauthorized disclosure of classified information relative to the SALT Talks as disclosed in the New York Times. The President directed a sweeping investigation to determine the source of the disclosure and this was conducted under the direction of Mr. Egil Krogh and others of the White House Staff.

A subsequent article in the Washington Post dated September 3, 1971 stated that a State Department spokesman had acknowledged at a news briefing that agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had polygraphed State Department employees suspected of leaking information on the SALT Talks in July. This statement is not accurate and the Director of the FBI (J. Edgar Hoover) denied this allegation in a letter to the Washington Post and said that the polygraph examinations had been conducted by another agency.

As noted in the CIA notes in fact, it was CIA that conducted the polygraph examination in conjunction with the State Department and the FBI was not involved in any way in these polygraph examinations. It is recalled that FBI officials had been called to a White House meeting headed by Mr. Krogh in which it was indicated we might have to conduct some polygraph examinations and were so alerted. A subsequent call from the White House to the FBI instructed that the FBI polygraph examinations would not be required.

In view of above, it does not appear the FBI would incur any damage to its reputation or recognized use of the polygraph in carefully selected criminal and security matters in which we have jurisdiction.

X —

In regard to the CIA notes concerning the subject of the lending of Arabic linguists to the FBI, the following is noted:

The FBI's linguistic capacity is limited to those foreign languages in which translators can be fully utilized on a full-time basis. When we need translations of foreign language material beyond our normal translation capacity, we turn to the governmental linguistic community for assistance. Such help has been obtained in the past from such agencies as the Library of Congress, Voice of America, Foreign Service Institute, Defense Language Institute, CIA, NSA, Bureau of Indian Affairs, U. S. Information Agency and Smithsonian Institution. On occasions, we have also turned to private citizens for help in very unique situations involving exotic or rare languages.

The massacre of the Israeli athletes in Munich at the 1972 Summer Olympics and other Arab terrorist acts fomented a situation involving the national security of the United States. The FBI needed immediate assistance in the Arabic language field. A program was immediately instituted to hire our own Arabic translators and, in the interim period, CIA lent to our Washington Field Office the necessary Arabic translators to fulfill our responsibilities.

The opening of the People's Republic of China Liaison Office in Washington also created a need in the Washington Field Office for Chinese translators with special talents. Two such translators were borrowed from CIA and one of them became an FBI employee for a short time following his retirement from CIA.

All arrangements for the loan of Arabic and Chinese linguists from CIA were effected by the Intelligence Division and the Washington Field Office through their liaison with CIA, and the FBI Laboratory was not directly involved.

In summary, the CIA notes are accurate. It is not believed, however, that the FBI would incur any embarrassment or damages as a result of this interagency cooperation.

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DISCUSSIONS ON IMAGERY ENHANCEMENT TECHNIQUES

Item 8, (Pg. 00234)

Current personnel are unable to verify or disclaim contact with CIA regarding this photographic technique.

In all likelihood, this contact was made in conjunction with our continuing technical liaison with other Federal agencies.

This consultation was entirely proper and made to augment the Bureau's capabilities in this area. No deleterious effect can be seen as a result of exposure of this information.

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PURCHASE OF CAMERAS

(Item 7, Pg. 00118)

Based on the information furnished, no written record or personal recollection of current employees can attest to or disclaim the whether "20 camera sets" at a unit cost of \$656 were purchased from CIA.

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PURCHASE OF CAMERAS

(Item 8, Pg. 00118)

The F. B. I. , by purchase order #1793 dated 1/20/72, contracted for the purchase of 10 Tessina cameras on a transfer of funds basis arranged as a result of our liaison with the Technical Services Division of CIA. Cost of these cameras amounted to \$7,000.

The Tessina camera is a small, sophisticated camera which is employed in concealment devices needed for photographic surveillances.

Although the exact nature of the concealment devices we employ is not publicized, the disclosure of the fact that we purchased cameras suitable for this use is not considered inimical to our operations.

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FBI

August 4, 1975

Senstudy - '75
REQUEST FOR FBI MATERIALS

Rec'd from Senate Select Committee (8-15-75)

I. Materials to which the SSC staff has been given access; delivery requested by Friday, August 15, 1975:

- A. The notebook or binder containing materials on FBI legal authority and maintained in the Office of the Special Counsel.
- B. Materials pertaining to FBI-CIA relations in 1970 previously made accessible at FBIHQ in excised form; unexcised versions of the memoranda bearing the item-number designations 8, 9, 30, 32, and 37.
- C. "Foreign Operations Policy Manual," previously made accessible at FBIHQ.

D. The following materials maintained in the so-called "Official and Confidential" files and designated "non-derogatory," previously examined by SSC staff:

- 1. Agreement Between FBI and Secret Service;
- 2. Attorney General - Submission of Memoranda by FBI;
- 3. "Black Bag" Jobs;
- 4. Expansion of FBI Foreign Intelligence Coverage;
- 5. Intelligence Coverage - Domestic and Foreign;
- 6. Directives (60);
- 7. Cook, Fred (52).

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~~NOT RECORDED~~

9 AUG 6 1975

E. Summaries or notes on interviews conducted by Inspection Division for July 3 Inspection for the individuals whose names are underscored on the attached list (slightly expanded from previous access request).

F. Inspection Reports on the Intelligence Division and the San Francisco Field Office, as currently sanitized.

Phillips

84 AUG 6 1975

II. Newly requested materials; delivery requested by Friday, August 14, 1975:

- A. All of Section 8 of the Manual of Instructions.
- B. Sections 1, 6, 7H, 7J, 8L, and 14 F of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.
- C. Superseding versions of Section 6 of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.
- D. The following materials referred to in memoranda previously delivered to SSC regarding FBI Legal Attaches:
 - 1. Memoranda of W. C. Sullivan of June 7, 1971, and June 16, 1971;
 - 2. Memoranda of Mr. Wannall of May 27, 1971, and May 28, 1971;
 - 3. Letter of Hoover to the President dated September 21, 1970;
 - 4. Memorandum of W. C. Sullivan dated September 22, 1970;
 - 5. Memorandum of Mr. Brennan dated September 21, 1970;
 - 6. Memorandum of Mr. Child of May 23, 1969;
 - 7. Recommendations of Dalby, Felt, and Beaver upon the recommendation made in memorandum of Sullivan of June 7, 1971;
 - 8. Materials pertaining to conversations between the President and Hoover regarding foreign liaison operations in September 1970;
 - 9. Materials pertaining to conversations between Dr. Kissinger and Hoover in December 1970;
 - 10. Materials pertaining to communications between the FBI and the State Department regarding foreign liaison operations in 1970;
 - 11. Materials pertaining to a conference with the President regarding foreign liaison operations in June 1971;

12. Material pertaining to an inspection of all FBI foreign liaison posts conducted in 1971 pursuant to instructions from Hoover to Assistant Director Ponder in charge of inspections.
- E. Materials pertaining to the origin, operation, and termination of the Mass Media Program implemented by the former FBI Crime Records Division.
- F. Materials pertaining to the establishment and functions of the FBI External Affairs Division.
- G. "Guide to Indexing" and "Rules Pertaining to the General Index", cited at p. 14, Volume 1, of the Classifying Instructor's Guide.
- H. "The Standard Sub List".
- I. The following materials pertaining to Project INLET:
 1. Materials reflecting approval of the Project on or about November 20, 1969.
 2. Inspection Report referred to in SAC Memorandum of December 26, 1972.
 - ~~3. Any materials pertaining to recommendations that the Project be terminated.~~
 4. Letter from FBI to Congressman Les Aspin in 1973 regarding the Project.
- J. Materials pertaining to the policies and procedures of the FBI for the use of FBI agents for so-called "undercover" activity.

III. Newly requested materials; access to screen for delivery requested by August 18, 1975:

A. The following materials pertaining to Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault and Spiro Agnew:

1. All materials pertaining to the authorization or re-authorization by the President or the Attorney General of technical surveillance of the JFK Act 5 (g) (2) (D) in Washington, D.C. in 1968.
2. All materials pertaining to the initiation, authorization, conduct, and termination of technical or physical surveillance and "telephone checks" of Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault in November 1968.
3. All materials pertaining to the initiation, authorization, conduct, and termination of technical or physical surveillance and "telephone checks" of Vice Presidential candidate Spirto T. Agnew in November 1968.
4. All materials summarizing the results of technical or physical surveillance, including incidental overhearings, and "telephone checks" of Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault and Spiro T. Agnew in November 1968.
5. All materials pertaining to White House instructions to the FBI for the handling of the summary letters described in item 4 above.
6. All materials pertaining to actions taken by the White House as a result of information contained in the summary letters described in item 4 above.
7. The current addresses of the following former Special Agents, who may have participated in the technical or physical surveillance or "telephone checks" of Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault or Spiro T. Agnew:
 - a. Phil Claridge
 - b. William Jackson

B. The following materials pertaining to Yeoman Charles E. Radford:

1. All materials, including memorializations of oral communications, pertaining to the authorization, initiation, conduct, and termination of technical surveillances of Yeoman Charles E. Radford from December 1971 to June 1972.
2. All materials, including memorializations of oral communications, pertaining to the authorization, initiation, conduct, and termination of technical surveillance of two close personal friends of Yeoman Radford one retired from the Navy, the other a State Department employee, from January to April 1972.
3. All materials, including memorializations of oral communications, pertaining to the authorization, initiation, conduct, and termination of technical surveillance of Yeoman Radford's step-father in Oregon from February to April 1972.
4. All materials summarizing the results of the technical surveillances described in items 1 through 3 above.
5. All materials pertaining to actions taken by the White House as a result of information contained in the summary described in item 4 above.

C. With respect to surreptitious entries carried out by the FBI from January 1, 1960 to the present, all materials pertaining to the following:

1. The date, place, target, and purpose of each entry;
2. The request and authorization for each entry including the identities of the agencies and/or individuals who requested and/or authorized the entry;
3. The procedures and methods used for the conduct of each entry;
4. The results of each entry, including the information obtained and the identities of

the agencies and/or individuals to whom the information was disseminated.

- D. Materials pertaining to any jurisdictional agreements, agreements of coordination, or other agreements between the FBI and any other federal, state or local agency with regard to the conduct of and dissemination of information from surreptitious entries.
- E. The performance ratings (Form FD 185) of the following current or former FBI employees;
 - 1. George Berley
 - 2. Wilfred Bergeron
 - 3. William D. Campbell
 - 4. Richard Suter
 - 5. William Tucker
 - 6. Terry O'Connor
 - 7. Joseph English
- F. The current office assignment or last known address of the individuals listed in E. above.
- G. The following materials pertaining to NSA watch list activity, reportedly in operation from late 1967 through 1973, which involved the monitoring of international communications that were addressed to, or from, or included the names of persons on a changing "watch list:"] (S)
 - 1. All materials pertaining to the proposing, approving, putting names on, executing, evaluating, or terminating the watch list activity;
 - 2. All materials (including correspondence) sent by the FBI to the National Security Agency or any other entity in the Department of Defense listing names for the watch list or otherwise commenting on the activity;

3. Any internal FBI materials produced as part of the activity;
 4. Any NSA or Department of Defense materials (including correspondence and reports) regarding the watch list activity sent to the FBI.
- H. Materials pertaining to the authorization for FBI contacts with, dissemination of FBI information to, receipt of information from, and requests by the FBI for action by the Special Services Staff of the Internal Revenue Service. (circa 1969)
- I. "The Handbook of Technical Equipment".
- J. Materials pertaining to FBI activity with respect to the National Environmental Teach-In (also known as "Earth Day"), April 22, 1970.
- K. Philadelphia FBI Field Office file number 100-51132 (Women's Liberation). (1970-72)

