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NOTICE

CONFIDENTIAL
1. The AMSCHROLL activity was terminated 31 August 1967 and all operations ceased at that time.

2. The following AMSCHROLL employees were terminated effective 31 August 1967 and were given a termination settlement of three months' salary.

   a. Fernando ALLOZA (radio script writer)  201-286580
   b. (secretary)  201-753918
   c. Juan Manuel ESPINOSA-CONDE (clerk)  201-754327
   d. (stock clerk)  201-754907
   e. Alfredo HERNANDEZ-LOVIO (messenger)  201-738623
   f. [Dr.] Manuel MARINAS, Carmona
      DPOB: 26 December 1928
      Manzanillo, Oriente
      (radio script writer)  no 201
   g. Mrs. Ana Maria BARROSO, Gomez
      DPOB: 19 June 1938
      Cienfuegos, Las Villas, Cuba
      (typist)  no 201
   h. Rene GALIS-MENENDEZ
      DPOB: 23 June 1923
      Matanzas, Cuba
      (clerk)  no 201

Distribution: 7 - WH/COG

Cross Reference to: UFGA-29593  23 February 1968
Dispatch Symbol and Number 201-754907  201-286580
201-753918  201-789623

Classification: SECRET

MICROFILMED  FEB 08 1968
CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

SECRET

All of the persons on this list have been with AMSROLL in excess of three years except Alfredo HERNANDEZ-LOVIA who was terminated in October 1965. He was paid the full three months termination due to the unusually faithful service he has rendered for a very small salary. He worked full time for $90.00 per month.

3. None of those listed in paragraph two has an NOC or an OA with the exception of HERNANDEZ-LOVIA who was granted an OA on 29 May 1967. The Station requests that this OA be cancelled.

4. All of the above AMSROLL personnel were amicably terminated and the personnel have since been re-employed in the local community. So far as the Station is aware, there have been no security, personnel, or other problems of interest to the Station resulting from the termination of this activity.

5. There were four Station agents involved in this operation at the time of its termination. They were AMWORD-1, AMWORD-2, AMWORD-3, and AMFRAME-1. All but AMFRAME-1 were terminated and individual termination dispatches are being forwarded as appropriate.

Roger E. Marchbank

Roger E. MARCHBANK
SECRET

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
Administrative/TYPIC/amendment of MCC's

REFERENCE A. UFG 26355
B. USGA 46653
C. UFGW 6776

1. Action on the Reference A (AMFRAE-1) and Reference B (AMSCROLL-3) requests for amendment of MCC's is being held in abeyance pending receipt of your comments on the AMFRAME activity as requested in Reference C.

2. In the meantime we would appreciate additional information explaining the increased compensation for AMSCROLL-3. Reference A adequately explained the increase for AMFRAME-1, but Reference B contained none of the comments normally submitted with this type of request.

George L. TRANGER

Distribution:
3 - COS, JMWAVE

UFGS 10024 63 November 1967
SECRET

1 - WH/C/REG
1 - Chrono
1 - WH/S (Admin)
1 - AMFRAME-1
1 - AMSCROLL-3
1 - WH/Contracts
On 9 September 1967, LINCOP approved a status report on U.S.-based WIPACO-supported Anti-Communist Operations. The report contained the following specific proposals:

a. Termination of support to AMECO by 31 December 1967.

b. Termination of support to AMECO prior to 31 December 1967, but with a proviso authorizing retention of "two or three" agents in order to maintain access to and influence among Latin American labor leaders and organizations.

c. Termination of support to AMECO on or about 31 August 1967 but with a proviso for retention of contacts with two principal agents in order to maintain access to important political officials and organizations.

d. Termination of support to AMECO on 30 September 1967.

e. Continuation of support to AMECO for the production of Spanish-language materials aimed at assimilating Spanish-speaking citizens.

"The AMECO has registered as a profit-making commercial enterprise and has a legitimate monthly income of about $1,000; however, the Cuban instability of its staff, the nature of its output, and its modest income from non-WIPACO sources would strongly
...Continued...

In order to minimize the possibility of an instrument being held in the Foundation's possession prior to 31 December 1980, the Foundation shall be required to have a final agreement entered into by the Foundation, in which the Foundation agrees to pay the liquidation cost of approximately $450,000. From 1978 to 1980, the amount outstanding of the Foundation will only be approximately $450,000. However, due to the high interest costs and the need to maintain control over the Foundation's assets, the Foundation has been required to make payments in 1978 and 1979. These payments are currently being computed in July 1980, and it is anticipated that they will be made in August 1980.

Finally, let us know of your early approval to implement the amendment. Thank you for your cooperation.
REFERENCES: A. AMSCROLL Quarterly Progress Report for period 1 July - 30 September 1967
B. UPGW-6778

1. Please pouch additional information about the proposed development of "the new AMFRAME organization" in order to enable Headquarters to determine if there is any conflict with the intent of the LNOFT action approving the termination of AMSCROLL.

2. As you may recall, it was originally thought that distribution of economic data might be handled by AMHIM, after termination of AMSCROLL, possibly by creation of an AMHIM economic desk staffed by former AMSCROLL employees. In any event, neither Headquarters nor LNOFT anticipated that the termination of one organization would be followed by development of another conducting the same operational activities. On the contrary, our presentation to LNOFT emphasized further reductions of organizational support.

3. In addition to a detailed description of the proposed organization and related administrative and operational cost estimates, please forward more information about plans for distribution of the new series.

Michael C. Chaden

Distribution:
3 - COS, JMWAVE

MICROFILMED
N MV 18 1957
DOC. MICR. NOR.

19-120-26

DATE: 2 NOV 1957

UPGW-6778

SECRET 19-120-26

30 October 1967

Distribution:
1 - WH/Reg/C
1 - WH/COG/CA
1 - WH/COG
1 - 201-278758

WH/COG/CA P. Oberst 142 jmg 5003
We forward under separate cover three copies of the Spanish Edition of the current AMSCROLL Economic Report and in the future will send one English and three Spanish copies as requested in the reference.

Roger E. Marchbank

Attachment:
Spanish edition Economic Report, 3 copies, U/S/C

Distribution
2 - COS, Mexico City, w/att, U/S/C
√ 2 - C/WIL, w/o att
2 - WIL/COG, w/o att

DATE TYPED 23 Aug 1967
DATE DISPATCHED
SECRET 2422402 CITE MEXICO CITY (HXX) 24 Aug 67 M 38580

JM WAVE INFO DIRECTOR

TIPIIC AMS SCROLL

IF AMS SCROLL ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT IS PUBLISHED IN SPANISH AS WELL AS ENGLISH PLEASE SEND ONE ENGLISH COPY AND THREE SPANISH COPIES OF EACH ISSUE TO MEXICO STATION IN FUTURE.

SECRET

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19-126-26
24 Aug 67
SECRET 242133Z CITE MINAVE 8963 STEADMAN ACTING 24 Aug 67 ph 38564
DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY
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REF MEXICO CITY 2549 (IN 3692)

1. IN EVENT UPI DOES NOT PUBLISH REF STORY SUGGEST JMWAVE REWORK THIS AND OTHER SUGAR INFO AVAILABLE HERE INTO NEW STORY FOR SURFACING VIA AMSROLL. WILL ATTRIBUTE TO AMSROLL COMMERCIAL SOURCES.

2. IF UPI STORY PUBLISHED STATION WILL PICK UP IN ANHIM BULLETIN.

SECRET

SECRET
1. Station JMWAVE forwards by separate cover material that we believe will be useful for paragraph 1.A of reference A. We are forwarding only the basic material from which Santiago can make selections and can re-work into any desired format. Included is a collection of AMSCOLL economic studies which heavily emphasizes and documents Cuban mismanagement of its sugar industry—which of course is Cuba's principal source of foreign currency. In addition, there are analyses of other foreign trade problems such as the difficulties in obtaining adequate shipping, problems with products other than sugar sent to Canada and Europe for sale, as well as internal production and distribution difficulties. Also included are the texts of statements to the press given by senior defectors from the Cuban regime who were surfaced by the AMSCOLL organization. All of these statements discuss, often in considerable detail, the economic problems facing Cuba with which these individuals were personally knowledgeable. Also included in a folder concerning studies of Free World shipping with Cuba.

2. Though some of this material has been released to the press and all of it provided to AMSCOLL's mailing list of commercial, shipping, and financial firms that are interested in or are dealing with Cuban commercial organizations, it is accurate to say that this material has not received widespread publicity and therefore we believe that it should be helpful for your purposes. For the immediate future we will air mail additional information of this kind to Santiago's overt mailing address as such items come to our attention.

3. Santiago may or may not attribute these studies to AMSCOLL as it wishes.

Roger E. Marchbank

Attachments:
- H/C/A, U/S/C

Distribution:
- 2 COS, Santiago, w/atts, U/S/C
- √2 FBI, w/o atts
- 2 FBI/COG, w/o atts
- 2(□), w/□

Classified Information
- Secret

Date:
- 23 Aug 1967
- Dispatched on:
- SEP 26/5

UFGA 23431
"UNIDAD" MONTHLY, ISSUE No. 39, JULY, 1967.

FRONT PAGE:

a) RUSSIA PENETRATES ARAB OIL MARKETS: A complete re-print of our own news release on Soviet offers of oil to Spain, Great Britain, Switzerland, and other free-world countries. This is related to Soviet resales of Cuban sugar in the free world market, which provides the USSR with some hard currency at the expense of Cuba.

PAGE TWO:

a) CUBA: FIRST TERRITORY OF THE AMERICAS THAT DEPENDS ON THE USSR:

The nerve of the Reds, who claim that Cuba is the first "free" territory of the Americas. Cuba is, in fact, the first territory of the Americas that depends almost completely on the Soviet Union, economically speaking. Economic dependency can be illustrated in terms of foreign trade, and Cuba's trade with the Soviet Bloc has increased as follows: Exports, from 2.2% in 1959 to 80% in 1966; Imports, from 0.1% in 1959 to 78.6% in 1966. Cuba has also mortgaged her sugar production to the Soviets, and, as a result from this dependency, has lost her trading power in the free-world market, thus becoming still more dependent of the Soviet Bloc. No wonder Kosygin travelled to Cuba to sell his bearded puppet.

b) CARTOON: Sign reading "Arab boycott" is hung on Arab's oil pump, while the Russian happily collects from a free-world customer the price of the oil he has just sold him.

PAGE THREE:

a) Continuation of front-page story on Soviet penetration of Arab oil market.

b) A MESSAGE TO THE MANAGEMENT OF THE "ECUADOR" SUGAR MILL: We take the problems faced by the "Ecuador", as outlined in the EIR, and ask the management of the mill whether they have been able to solve each and everyone of those problems.

c) BOX: CUBAN: Cooperate with the struggle against the Red tyranny. Circulate this issue of UNIDAD after you have read it. Also send your comments and suggestions to
our P.O. Box.

d) Boomed elegantly DOWN WITH THE COMMUNIST REGIME!
La URSS trató de captar compradores en dicho mercado. ¿Ocurriría lo mismo con los mercados cubanos?

Este lunes de Investigaciones Económicas ha podido conocer que la Unión Soviética no ha perdido tiempo en penetrar el vacío comercial dejado por la actual disolución del mercado petrolero de los países árabes en Europa. Existen numerosos ejemplos.

Primero: La URSS ha convenido en enviar un millón de barriles adicionales de petróleo a España, además de los 1.5 millones de barriles contratados con anterioridad a la crisis del Medio Oriente. Los soviéticos no sólo ofrecieron suministrar productos petrolíferos, sino también los buques-tanque para transportarlos. En más, hemos sido informados de que un buque-tanque italiano de 40.000 toneladas estaba ya en el puerto de Tucumán, URSS, en el Mar Negro, tomando a bordo el petróleo que conduciría a España.

Segundo: La Junta de Comercio británica anunció que varias firmas británicas han solicitado autorización para importar petróleo crudo soviético desde el inicio de la crisis del Medio Oriente. En el caso de la Imperial Chemical Industries, Inc., de Londres, la solicitud envía autorización específica para importar petróleo a Unión Soviética. En 1965, el 7% del petróleo destinado a la Europa Occidental procedía de la URSS, y durante esos dos años (1963-1965) la preda de mercenarios por parte de los países árabes en Europa Occidental fue de un 5% (al 5%). Esta tendencia continúa, y las exportaciones totales de petróleo soviético aumentaron de 335,000 barriles diarios en 1965 a 553,000 barriles diarios en 1966, cayendo un 5% actualmente a 1,400,000 de barriles diarios. Además de España y Gran Bretaña, las exportaciones son también hacia Alemania Occidental, la Unión Soviética cuenta entre sus principales clientes a Italia, Francia y los países escandinavos.

Así, pues, como venimos diciendo, la Unión Soviética, durante los últimos años, ha mostrado gran agresividad para robar a sus clientes del mercado petrolero a sus aliados árabes, no obstante su apuro político a esos sectores. Actualmente, la URSS tiene una nueva oportunidad de hacer nuevas penetraciones en el mercado árabe... y la está aprovechando.
CUBA: PRIMER TERRITORIO ECONÓMICAMENTE DEPENDIENTE DE LA URSS EN AMÉRICA

Dicho lo cual, anuncian que Cuba es "el primer territorio libre de América", y que se ha "vendido" el poderio económico de las grandes potencias. La realidad, empero, es totalmente la contraria.

En efecto, Cuba depende hoy de la Unión Soviética y de sus demás satélites comunistas como no dependió jamás de ningún otro país o grupo de países.

La dependencia económica de un país con respecto de otro puede medirse en función del comercio entre ambos, ya que dicho comercio indica hasta qué punto una nación necesita del otro como mercado para sus exportaciones y como fuente de abastecimiento de sus importaciones.

Pues bien, en el caso de Cuba y el bloque soviético, las exportaciones de nuestra soberana hacia Rusia y sus satélites han aumentado del 12% en 1959 al 81% en 1966. En paralelo, las importaciones de Cuba procedentes del bloque soviético han aumentado del 5% en 1959 al 72.6% en 1966.

Los números no menten, y los números erogen la verdad indiscutible de que, durante 8 años de dominación comunista, nuestra infortunada isla se ha hecho cada vez más dependiente de la metrópoli rusa, estrechándose cada día más las ligaduras de dicha dependencia.

Por si todo esto fuera poco, Cuba le ha hipotecado a la URSS su producción azucarera.

Cuba, también, ha aplazado sus reservas de divisas, calculándose que en 1964 apenas superan esta cifra de 200 millones.

Como consecuencia de esta falta total de divisas, Cuba no puede comprar más que con los países comunistas, y con éstos realiza tratos de azúcar y otros productos en contra de procedente del campo socialista, sin que de esos convenios comerciales reciba metálico alguno.

En el periodo comprendido entre los años 1963 y 1966, Cuba sufrió un déficit de $132,000,000 en su comercio con los países comunistas. Y esta cifra no incluye la asistencia técnica comunista, ni los equipos militares, las baterías, y demás.

Como resultado de esta relación de sujeción con el bloque rojo, Cuba ha perdido su vigencia comercial con los más ventajosos mercados del mundo libre, lo cual, a su vez, ha aumentado dicha relación de dependencia, produciéndose el clásico círculo vicioso.

No en bote Kosygin se gasta el lujoso de viajar a La Habana como un príncipe, para regalarnos a Fidel Castro y darle instrucciones.

PENETRA... (Vista de la pág. 1)

Recados a la Administración del Central "Ecuador"

Hemos podido saber que en el Central "Ecuador", anti-"Barquis", se está con- frontando con una serie de dificultades y complicaciones para su operación. ¿Qué podemos hacer para solucionarlas?

Y de las tuberías de cobre que hacen falta, pero que no se conseguían en el bloque comunista, ¿qué? ¿Qué podemos hacer con el sistema de esteras transportadoras de la refinería? Había que renovarlo, pero no se sabía... ¿En qué paró la nueva planta eléctrica que iban a traer de Alemania Comunista? ¿Se "trabó" el negocio?

¿Cómo han resuelto el grave problema de los lubricantes líquidos? ¿Hay divisas para pagarle a Inglaterra por las bombas de nafta y los hidrocarburos "Estrella" que se necesitan?

¿Por fin habrá que esperar hasta 1969 para que los soviéticos instalen las dos calderas que require el central?

CUBANO:

Coopera al derrocamiento de la tiranía. Circula este número de UNIDAD. Cuando lo hayas leído, dile a alguna persona de tu confianza, o envuélvelo en un sobre o envuelve con cualquier nombre (por ejemplo, "Jesús González", P.O. Box 3540, Miami, Florida. Enviemos informes sobre sucesos de interés que ocurran dentro de Cuba. Tus críticas y sugerencias tampoco son bienvenidas.
A ti mismo te escuchas con la propaganda que haces contra Cuba. No que no es caso de que tú mismo desees de que tus amigas lo apoyen y todos sus cuentas que las refe-
ren todas las veces en los periódicos en el radio y en la televisión.

Tú debes mucho por la que te acerca el imagin.

No te desesperes, no tiene créditos. Los compañeros del Mundo Libre se van
retirando del comercio con Cuba. Comunista, los aban-
nde de todo el pueblo. El pueblo no apoyará el lepro 
contra la que te acerca el imagin.

que se me regre, comerciando con Fidel y le
para el pueblo de Cuba, y en el te acerca el imagin.

¿Qué harán comerciando con Fidel y te
para el pueblo de Cuba, y en el te acerca el imagin.

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SECRET

SECRET 2820312 CITE SANTIAGO 4743

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, MONTevideo, BOGOTA,
BUENOS AIRES, RIO DE JANEIRO, JMWAVE

TYPIC REDCOAT AMSCROLL

1. PEC 28 JULY CENTER SPREAD CARRIES JMWAVE STUDY

CUBAN TOTAL DEPENDENCE SOVIET UNION. SUBTITLES "FIDEL CASTRO
HAS MADE DOUNTRY OF MARTI COLONIAL NATION SUBJECTED SOVIET
IMPERIALISM", "FOREIGN TRADE MONOPOLIZED BY NATIONS SOVIET
ORBIT". CLIPPING TO JMWAVE. HENCEFORTH POUCHING PEC
JMWAVE REGULARLY.

2. SAME ISSUE HAS GOOD ITEMS OLAS, NASSER AND
POISON GAS, ANTI-SEMITISM SOVIET UNION, BATTLE FOR POWER
COMCHINA, HARRISON SALISBURY ARTICLE SOVIET CENSORSHIP.

SECRET

ET

19-12-26
26 July 1967
SECRET

MEMORANDUM

TO : Chief of Station

FROM : CA/Roger E. MARCHBANK

SUBJECT: TYPIC/OPERATIONAL

AMSCROLL Progress Report

1 April - 30 June 1967

WCA 1395

Distribution:

1 - COB

1 - CA/MARCHBANK

1 - CA Chrono

1 - RI Chrono

A. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

1. During the quarter under review AMSCROLL continued with its program to discredit the Cuban regime's economic management (or mismanagement) and to seek to discourage Free World trade with Cuba. To this end AMSCROLL continued publishing its serious economic studies and comment of the Cuban economic area. This material is made available to selected firms engaged in international trade and shipping, to commercial and technical journals, and to sugar brokers including certain banks and others interested in the sugar trade. AMSCROLL also continued with its radio program which is beamed to the Cuban audience and which is increasingly attempting to provide serious comment upon economic developments in Cuba or those areas of economic activity outside of Cuba which would have an interest among the Cuban listeners. During this quarter AMSCROLL received 15 letters from Cuba which compares with 18 received during the previous quarter. The monthly count was: April - 6, May - 5, June - 4.

2. On 30 April AMSCROLL ceased broadcasting over ANTHIGH. Effective 1 May the program was presented over JHOPPE. This change in station (and a consequent change in time) has perhaps effected the listenership in Cuba; however, we expect that any unfavorable developments will be overcome and that this program will at least re-gain its previous level of listeners. Typical themes included discussions of Cuba's housing problem, its actual sugar production measured against Castro's earlier claims of what the production would be, breakdowns and stoppages at the Cuban refineries, activities with the Soviet Union and the world sugar market, reporting the progress of the Venzuelaan dock workers boycott of ships of those nations that also trade with Cuba, the fight against bureaucracy, and economic aspects of the Middle East crisis.

3. A main AMSCROLL effort continued to be an analysis of the current sugar crop. As early as 13 February AMSCROLL predicted a harvest within the range of 6,100,000 and 6,400,000. By 6 May AMSCROLL was able to refine the harvest estimate from 6,047,000 to 6,101,000 tons. This estimate was further pinpointed to 6,100,000 tons in a release dated 16 June. These studies received newspaper attention and AMSCROLL has received favorable comment from sugar brokers and other technicians engaged in this business. As events
SECRET

are turning out, these estimates appear to have been sound indeed. The AMNHM bulletin continues to give good reply to these studies which results in their dissemination throughout Latin America.

4. AMSCROLL continued with its monthly release which lists the Free World ships that trade with Cuba. Both AP and AFP continued to file this information which results in its being published in the press and used on radio news broadcasts.

5. AMSCROLL continued its mailing program to Cuba, and during this quarter mailings approximated 5,000 which is the same level as the previous quarter.

B. ADMINISTRATION

6. The amount budgeted for the quarter under review was $33,500.00 of which $13,332.45 was spent. This significant decline in expenses was in large part due to the savings caused by the cancellation of the AMTHIGH radio program and by continued attention to economies of operation within AMSCROLL itself.

C. PROBLEMS

7. The Station is not aware of any specific problems having to do with the AMSCROLL organization. Mention might be made in passing of the over present morale problem (which is by no means limited to AMSCROLL) engendered by increasing economies and restrictions in operations.

D. PLANS FOR THE NEXT QUARTER

8. A major effort is being made to revamp the AMSCROLL radio program to increase its effectiveness as a reporter of economic developments of interest to the Cuban listener. Too often these programs spill over into the field of political reporting or uninformed comment upon developments in economic areas of which the script writers are largely ignorant. Our aim is to devise a program of economic reporting that will conform to the new guidelines being developed by the Station for all its radio programs.

SECRET

FRONT PAGE:

1) EDITORIAL: "The Arab Tragedy": Arab proverbs show that Arabs are wise. They were not too wise, however, when they took the Soviets as allies and protectors. For years, the Russians supplied the arsenal the Arabs were building up to wage holy war against the tiny Jewish enclaves. Furthermore, they reiterated their unconditional support to the Arabs. But when the "hour of truth" came, the Israelis made piecemeal of the Arabs and their Soviet Military hardware. The Russians failed to come to the assistance of their allies, and both were ridiculed to the fullest extent. This should be a lesson for Fidel Castro, who relies on the Soviets' military junk as much as on their support as "allies".

2) CASTRO HIMSELF PROPITIATES "BUREAUCRATISM": After a brief recession caused by the mobilization in the cane fields, the "war of bureaucratism" was renewed with full vigor by the Havana régime. Two Ministers were fired, whole Ministries were "rationalized", and payrolls were trimmed to the core. However, the same régime that voiced threats of prison terms against those that failed to comply with anti-bureaucratic instructions, creates new sources of bureaucratism, such as, for example, the Book Institute and the National Institute for Forestry Development and Products.

PAGE TWO

1) SUNSHINE, AIR, AND WATER.... BUT NO ECONOMIC SOLUTIONS: The MINISTRY Vice-Ministry for Technical Development has several fantastic projects in hand, such as the harnessing of solar energy and of the force of the wind, the employment of energy from tides in Southern Pinar del Río, and the desalinization of sea water. But, on top of their intrinsically fantastic character, these projects are paralyzed due to the lack of technicians and of technical handbooks. What great men Marx, Lenin and Castro! (Based on material by same title in E.I.R.).
2) CARTOON: Headline: BOYCOTT OF CUBA-TRADE SHIPS TO BE STRIKED UP! Castro faces a sinking vessel named "Maritime Trade With Cuba" and says: "It seems we have sprung a leak!"

Page Three:

1) MOROCCO SEEN DRIFTING AWAY FROM CUBA! A brief story on the sale to Morocco of 160,000 tons of Brazilian sugar. It seems, we point out, that Morocco is determined to quit Cuba as a sugar supplier. First she develops her own sugar industry, then buys from Cuba's competitors. (Based on a report carried by the E.I.R.).

2) CARTOON: Castro was carrying a bag (The Moroccan sugar market), but stumbled on his own "Ineptitude" and the bag "fell from his hands".
REFERENCE: UFPA 27811, 15 June 1967

Please forward Headquarters a copy of the attachment which went under separate cover to addressee only, on Reference dispatch.

Otis C. VIGEANT

Distribution:
3 - COS, JHSAVE
SECRET

Chief of Station, Santiago XXX

Chief, WH

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

D/F YOUR/AMCROLL

O Study of Cuba/USSR Commercial Relations

Reference: SANTIAGO 4468

Use: For use as determined by Santiago.

We forward under separate cover for station Santiago

the AMCROLL study in Spanish of economic relations between

the USSR and Cuba as requested by the reference.

Roger E. MARSHBANK

Attachment:

Study in Spanish, U/S/C

Distribution:

✓ 3 = COS, Santiago, w/att., U/S/C - To out pouch
✓ 2 = C/W, w/o att
✓ 3 = WH/COG, w/o att

JUN 15 1967
Editorial

UNA VERDAD COMUNISTA

Victor Volsky, Jefe de la Delegación Observadora Soviética al XII periodo de sesiones de la Comisión Económica de la O.N.U. para América Latina, declaró recientemente en Caracas que "Cuba Comunista es la hija menor de la Unión Soviética, y a los hijos menores se les mira".

Parece que estas son las que tienen la virtud de aparecer al más indiferente de los cubanos, ya que los mismos reflejan el aire de superioridad con que estos zarpeantes comunistas tratan a nuestra Patria. Sin embargo, no puede negarse que el insolente Volsky dio una verdad en Caracas, al menos en cuanto se refiere a la primera parte de su aserto.

Ciertamente, los hijos menores dependen de sus padres. Son ellos quienes les proporcionan todo lo necesario para su subsistencia; son ellos quienes determinan, con la incapacidad que supone la potencia paterna, el rumbo que tiene y el pasaje de su adolorida retahila; son ellos quienes se benefician del producto de sus labores.

Y, siendo así, no cabe duda de que Cuba es la hija menor de la Unión Soviética. La URSS y sus satélites, en efecto, venden a Cuba el 78.6% de sus importaciones; la URSS es quien determina la política que ha de seguir el gobierno cubano, y es la URSS quien recibe, conjuntamente con sus títulos de Europa Oriental, el 80% de los productos que exporta nuestra Patria. Ante las críticas en este brutal monopolio comercial, y ante la suprema autoridad que ejerce la metrópoli sobre su pseudo-colonía del Caribe, ¿quién puede negar que Cuba es, a todos los efectos prácticos, la hija menor de la Unión Soviética?

Y aquí la verdad: La mentira estriba en el aserto de que Cuba es la hija "mirada" de la URSS. Porque, como todo el mundo sabe, lo que es en realidad es una hija nómada, explotada, maltratada, y prostituida por esa "madre" desnaturalizada que es la Rusia Soviética.
Las Interioridades

Como mencioné con el Sr. Aguadas, FRANCOISTAS. Este caballero, con uno de sus menesteres, y no dejan de agradecer a la ciudad de FRANCO SHIPPING. Sus únicos principales son los barcos de CARABAS. El viaje de los barcos, y conocen también que son un problema y un peligro para el Sr. Aguadas.

Las Interioridades (Continuación)

Además de la presencia de los barcos de cuero de FRANCO SHIPPING, hay otras empresas que también necesitan de los barcos de CARABAS. Las más importantes son las de la empresa de Málaga, que tienen un negocio importante en el comercio marítimo y que dependen de los barcos de cuero para el transporte de su mercancía.

En 1965, los barcos de cuero fueron un problema importante para los FRANCOISTAS. La ciudad de CARABAS, con sus barcos, cubrió la demanda de los barcos de cuero y aseguró el funcionamiento de la ciudad. Sin embargo, en los últimos años, la ciudad ha tenido que buscar otras fuentes de ingresos para mantener su economía.
"HABLA UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA": por Radio Americanas, 1160 kcs., oda larga, de lunes a domingo a las 9:30 P.M.

Pepita Riera en "CONOZCA A LOS CHIVATOS": por Radio Americanas, 1160 kcs., oda larga, los martes y jueves a las 11:00 P.M.

Actual

Hablemos de un país con la propaganda y la lucha. Hablemos de que se está haciendo mucho en el campo de la lucha y la política. Hablemos de que el pueblo también puede hacer mucho en el campo de la propaganda. Hablemos de que el pueblo también puede hacer mucho en el campo de la lucha. Hablemos de que el pueblo también puede hacer mucho en el campo de la política.

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SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 06662

TO JANAVE

TYPIC ANSCROLL AMOT

REF: UFGA-27507 (4 MAY 1967)

PLS RETRANSMIT COPY AMOT PROPOSAL FORWARDED BY TM-028258. HQS.

COPY INADVERTANTLY DESTROYED.

END OF MESSAGE

19-1260-26

1 JUNE 67

WH/COG/NO

EARL J. WILLIAMSON

AC/WH

WH/COG/CA/EW

4163

JUNE 1967

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
1. Per Para two of Reference, we are forwarding under separate cover a revised mailing list for ANSCHROLL’s use. We have no additions or deletions to those addressers listed in Reference with the indicator “(bl.)”; they should continue receiving copies of the economic reports issued by ANSCHROLL. The addressers forwarded with this dispatch should receive copies of economic reports, of releases concerned with maritime matters, and of any other newspaper clippings and editorials which are considered appropriate by ANSCHROLL and/or Station JHSAVE; these addressers replace those listed in Reference with the indicators “(econ)” and “(mar.)”.

2. We believe the above revision will ensure a more effective USEPAWM use of ANSCHROLL’s materials during this period of press censorship imposed by the present Greek coup leadership.

ARNOLD D. TILLERHAUS

WALTER D. NEEDY

Attachment:
As stated above USC(-enL)

Distribution:
2 = COS/JHSAVE w/att
1 = C/WH w/att
2 = G/NE w/att

CS COPY
MAILING LIST

1. Mr. Athanasios Kanellopoulos
   Economikos Tachydromos
   3 Christou Lada Street
   Athens, Greece

2. Mr. Haralambos Klaras
   Editor, Vradyni
   3-11 Piraeus Street
   Athens, Greece

3. Mr. Christoforos Bitsides
   "Athens News Agency"
   Athens, Greece

4. Mr. Athanasios Paraschos
   Ethnikou Kyriki
   1 Christou Lada Street
   Athens, Greece

5. Mr. Leonidas Karapantziotis
   To Vima/Ta Nea
   3 Christou Lada Street
   Athens, Greece

6. Mr. Andreas Dimakos
   To Vima/Ta Nea
   3 Christou Lada Street
   Athens, Greece

7. Mr. Savvas Konstantopoulos
   Elefheros Kosmos
   8 Pappasoglou Street
   Athens, Greece

8. Mr. Kyros A. Kyrou
   Entia
   Athinou Gazi 7,
   Athens, Greece

9. Mr. Dimitrios Zannides
   23 Bisini
   Athens, Greece

CS COPY
10. Mr. Ioannis Vellidis
Makedonia
Thessaloniki, Greece

11. Mr. Solon Grigoriadis
Akropolis
12 Yeldiou Street
Athens, Greece

12. Naftilia Noa
Athens, Greece

13. Naftiki Hellas
Athens, Greece

14. Naftemoriki
Athens, Greece

15. Naftilaki Naftorgatiki
13 Chalkokondylí Street
Athens, Greece
UNIDAD MONTHLY, ISSUE, NO. 37, MAY, 1967

This issue has been almost entirely devoted to a reprint of I. Andrés Collazo's statement concerning his experience as a CUFLET representative in London. We have reprinted most of the contents of the statement in the form of a signed article entitled "INSIDE CUFLET".

As is known, Collazo tells of the "dog fights" that have raged between the privateers (such as FRAGISTAS) and CUFLET over violations of contracts, bad condition of the ships, etc.

He also discusses the decline in free-world shipping to Cuba and its causes, as well as the nature and background of the shippers that participate in the Cuban trade.

Besides the above, the following is included in this issue:

PAGE 1:

EDITORIAL: "A COMMUNIST TRUTH": Velshy, the Chief of the Soviet observing delegation to the CEPAL meeting in Caracas, said that "Cuba is the minor daughter of the USSR, and minor daughters are pampered". The Russian's insolence has roused the anger of all well-born Cubans. Yet, there's a lot of truth in what the Russian said.

Indeed, minor daughters depend on their parents, get everything they need from them, and are subject to their supreme authority. If the daughter works, she must also turn a good part of the fruits of her toil over to her parents.

This is what happens with Cuba and the USSR. The Soviets and their satellites sell Cuba 78.6% of her imports, dictate the policy of the Havana regime, and take 80% of her exports.

In view of this dependence, who can deny that the relation between Cuba and Russia is that of a minor daughter with respect to her parents?

The Russian only lied when he spoke of "pampering". Cuba is not pampered by Mother Russia; she is oppressed, exploited and corrupted by her.
PAGE 2:

CARTOON: (By Luis R. Cáceres, Jr.): A shabby-looking character faces Castro and tells him: "You're a nasy liar and an adventurer!". A Cuban in the foreground asks a friend: "Who is that, a "gusano"?" "No", replies the friend. "That's a Latin American pro-Soviet Communist".
SECRET

Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro XX

Chief, WH

Chief of Station, JUNAVE
DZVQOJ/PR/8267/AMOLPLR
Material on Trading with Cuba

References: A. DIRECTOR G2837
B. RIO DE JANEIRO 3758

Per reference A we forward by separate cover material produced and released by the AMCHOLL organization which we hope will be helpful in meeting your requirement to provide ALTAFID-1 with information on the negative aspects of commercial trading with Cuba.

Roger R. Marchbank

Attachments:
1. Maritime 8th Column press releases (U/S/C)
2. Defectors statements (U/S/C)
3. AMCHOLL Economic Reports (U/S/C)

Distribution
3 - CGS, Rio de Janeiro, w/atts, USC and
√ 2 - C/TH, w/o atts
2 - WH/CGG, w/o atts

26 May 67
UFCA 27672

CS COPY
SECRET

TO
SANTIAGO INFO JF/MAV

: TYPIC MISPAN AMSROLL

REPS: A UFGA-27416 (20 APRIL 1967)

2, SANTIAGO 4230 (IN 58430)

HQs defers to station judgement as to value prop play in Chile
of Ref a paper. However, wish to point out that paper quotes figures
and arrives at conclusion already well known and accepted by
individuals knowledgeable of sugar industry.

END OF MESSAGE

19-120-26
23 May 67

WILLIAM Y. BROE
C/WHD

EARL J. WILLIAMSON
AC/WH/COG

COordinating OfficerS

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
SECRET 161552Z CITE JMWAVE 72C2
DIRECTOR
TYPIC-NNVIPER
REF: RIO DE JANEIRO 3756 (0734)

IN SELECTING INFO REQUESTED PARA 2 REF ON NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF TRADING WITH CUBA HQS MAY WISH CONSIDER AN SCROLL SERIES OF ECONOMIC REPORTS ESPECIALLY VOL II NO. 7 OF 3 MARCH AND VOL II NO. 5 OF 19 DECEMBER WHICH DISCUSS IN DETAIL SUGAR PRODUCTION PROBLEMS.

ALSO STATEMENTS TO PRESS BY DEFECTORS SUCH AS AMRIVER-1, AMSRAIN-1 AND AMSNAKE-1 MAY BE HELPFUL. IF DESIRED JMWAVE CAN POUCH THIS MATERIAL TO RIO.

SECRET

BIO
SECRET

STORY BASED UPON STUDY DISCUSSED REF PUBLISHED
NIAH HERALD 12 MAY ENTITLED "SUGAR HARVEST IN CUBA
MAY BE DEBT SELLER 61. ALSO AP FILED STORY WITH
ITS NEW YORK OFFICE IDENTIFIED AS PUBLISHED MAY 11.
AIRMAILING ADDRESSEES BOTH ACCOUNTS.

SECRET

12 May 67  IN  66356

19-120-26

12 May 1967
Action Required: FYI

Reference: None

1. On 27 March 1967, a letter from Cuba was received at the postal address given by the radio program of ANSCROLL. The letter had been mailed in Havana on 4 March 1967 and the contents included three photos of an unidentified individual and one photo each of individuals identified as Reynaldo "TRSULA" Drea and Antonio "FERNANDEZ" Fernandez. A note which was included stated that henceforth the sender would identify himself as "Pancrasio." He indicated that if it was desired receipt of his letter could be mentioned on the ANSCROLL radio program but that no one should mention any of the contents be mentioned as this could reveal his identity to the DSE. Pancrasio stated his help would not be much but that his letters might contain information which could be of value. He wrote that he could not go into detail as he was unable to spend much time at the typewriter. Pancrasio concluded by saying the photos of Antonio and Reynaldo were in the hands of a security agent who had orders to find them. They had both been fugitives for a long time. The other photo (in triplicate) was of a Canadian citizen whose passport was retained by the DSE and was reported as lost for an unexplained motive.

2. On 10 April 1967, the message from Pancrasio was acknowledged by radio and he was thanked for his letter and told to continue his correspondence.

3. On 21 April 1967, a second letter from Pancrasio was received via Key West, Florida. The letter had been
UNIDAD MONTHLY, ISSUE, NO. 37, May, 1967

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SECRET

Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro

Chief, WH

Chief of Station, JEUAVE
DYVOR/PERU/JEWIVE

Material on Trading with Cuba

References:
A. DIRECTOR 02387
B. RIO DE JANEIRO 3756

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requirement to provide ALTIPID-1 with information on
the negative aspects of commercial trading with Cuba.

Roger E. MARCHBANK

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2. Defectors statements (U/S/C)
3. AMCHOLL Economic Reports (U/S/C)

Distribution
3 - COS, Rio de Janeiro, w/atts, USC
2 - C/WB, w/o atts
2 - WH/COG, w/o atts

MAY 29 1967
22 May 67
URG 27672
CS COPY
SECRET

K.W. MURPHY: fph
WH/COG/CA/EW
4163

DATE: 23 MAY 1967

SECRETARY DISSEMINATION:

BY:

FILE:

SECRET

SECTOR INFO JH WAVE

: TYPIC MS SPAWN ANSCROLL

REFS: A UFGA-27416 (20 APRIL 1967)

R SANTIAGO 4230 (IN 58430)

EQS DEFERS TO STATION JUDGEMENT AS TO VALUE PROP PLAY IN CHILE

OF REF A PAPER. HOWEVER, WISH TO POINT OUT THAT PAPER QUOTES FIGURES

AND ARRIVES AT CONCLUSION ALREADY WELL KNOWN AND ACCEPTED BY

INDIVIDUALS KNOWLEDGEABLE OF SUGAR INDUSTRY.

END OF MESSAGE

19-120-26

23 May 67

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

EARL S. WILLIAMSON
AC/WH/COG

COORDINATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
SECRET 161529Z CITE JWAVE 7202

DIRECTOR

THYPIX MHWIPER

REF: RIO DE JANEIRO 3756 (27/34)

IN SELECTING INFO REQUESTED PARA 2 REF ON
NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF TRADING WITH CUBA MG5 MAY WISH
CONSIDER ANSROOL SERIES OF ECONOMIC REPORTS ESPECIALLY
VOL. II NO. 7 OF 3 MARCH AND VOL. II NO. 5 OF 19 DECEMBER
WHICH DISCUSS IN DETAIL SUGAR PRODUCTION PROBLEMS.
ALSO STATEMENTS TO PRESS BY DEFECTORS SUCH AS AMRIVER-1,
AMRAIN-1 AND AMSNAKE-1 MAY BE HELPFUL. IF DESIRED
JWAVE CAN POUCH THIS MATERIAL TO RIO.

SECRET

BT
ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE: None

1. On 27 March 1967, a letter from Cuba was received at the postal address given by the radio program of AMSROLL. The letter had been mailed in Habana on 4 March 1967 and the contents included three photos of an unidentified individual and one photo each of individuals identified as Reynaldo "LUULU Brea and Antonio FERNANDEZ Fernandez. A note which was included stated that henceforth the sender would identify himself as "Pancrasio". He indicated that if it was desired receipt of his letter could be mentioned on the AMSROLL radio program but that never should any mention of the contents be mentioned as this could reveal his identity to the DSE. Pancrasio stated his help would not be much but that his letters might contain information which could be of value. He wrote that he could not go into detail as he was unable to spend much time at the typewriter. Pancrasio concluded by saying the photos of Antonio and Reynaldo were in the hands of a security agent who had orders to find them. They had both been fugitives for a long time. The other photo (in triplicate) was of a Canadian citizen whose passport was retained by the DSE and was reported as lost for an unexplained motive.

2. On 10 April 1967, the message from Pancrasio was acknowledged by radio and he was thanked for his letter and told to continue his correspondence.

3. On 21 April 1967, a second letter from Pancrasio was received via Key West, Florida. The letter had been
mailed from Habana on 13 March and was directed to Guillermo ALFONSO, 649 William Street, Key West. Typed on one of the two sheets of paper forwarded by Pancrasio was a note saying this was the first letter of a series. Pancrasio added the instruction to Guillermo ALFONSO to forward the papers to the same postal address which he had previously utilized. Copies of the contents of this letter are attached under separate cover. The one paper, dated 27 September 1961, appears to be a list of Costa Ricans who visited Cuba under the auspices of ICAP. The second paper appears to be a list of Brazilians who visited Cuba, probably in mid-1960 when Juscelino KORDON made a visit to Cuba as part of his presidential campaign in Brazil.

4. On 2 May 1967, a JMWAVE Officer visited Guillermo ALFONSO in an effort to identify Pancrasio and develop sufficient information to evaluate his information and determine the extent of his access. ALFONSO claimed he had no idea as to the identity of Pancrasio and was unable to suggest possible candidates from his relatives in Cuba, former work associates, classmates or neighbors. ALFONSO had retained the envelope from Cuba which contained Pancrasio's second message and a short message to ALFONSO. The note to ALFONSO stated that Pancrasio had received ALFONSO's name and address from an unidentified individual and that it was requested that ALFONSO forward the contents of the letter to the AMSCROLL address which was enclosed. ALFONSO was cautioned not to mention anything concerning the matter to anyone, especially to relatives in Cuba. Pancrasio stated this was his second letter (not fourth as indicated on the material which was forwarded on by ALFONSO) and that the first had been sent direct to the AMSCROLL address. It was stated that the first letter by which ALFONSO would serve as intermediary and that other letters would come at infrequent intervals. Pancrasio had decided to use an intermediary address as the AMSCROLL address was too well known. Pancrasio concluded his note by saying that he preferred to remain anonymous and that he would be remaining in Cuba for two more years. In addition to the above cited message, the letter to ALFONSO contained a calling card with the name Dr. Jean B. INNOCENT, President of the Haitian Revolutionary Movement. On the back of the card was typed in Spanish "without comment".

5. JMWAVE traces on FERNENDEZ, IRSULA and ALFONSO are negative. INNOCENT, according to HZPA-12507, dated 2 August 1962, is a Haitian terrorist, Fidelista, who was planning to enter Panama from Columbia.

6. ALFONSO was instructed to forward any mail received from Pancrasio in an expeditious manner and JMWAVE will follow any leads obtained which might help to identify Pancrasio in order to develop him into a more productive source of information.

Stanley B. JERSAWIT
Sude 27, 1961

FILMEO DE GRUPO DEL RCP 1 EN COSTA RICA

Félix Roa
- Gesica Rojas
Alicia Gómez - Albina de la O.
- Imee Ferrer
Julia Jiménez - L. García
Ort. D. Brito - Rosalía
Klara García - A. Pérez
Luis Acevedo - Regina Gómez
Miguel Ferrer - Francisco Robles
Eduardo Calderón - Luís Córcoles
Emmanuel Polo - Gustavo Cardenas
Marcela Casas - Maria Teresa García
Fernando Chaves - Cecilio Sierra
Luis García - Luis Guzmán
Carmen Salas - Carmen Sánchez
Félix Ortega - María Pinto
Liliana Johnson - Aurora Rodríguez
María Concepción - Jerónimo
Felipe Quezada - Paloma Ávila
Armando Valdivia - Ángela Santander
Inga Vera - Defensa Pérez
Manuel Romeo - Casa Rural
- Nancy Martínez
- Rafael García
- Juan Ferreras - Leandro Jiménez
- Samuel Sánchez - Pura Pérez
- Gerardo Félix - Jorge Rodríguez
- Pablo Rivera - Jorge Coto

Informe de acompañamiento

ACREDITACIÓN OFICIAL

Por prestar colaboración en el área de Información.

R. M. F. 1961

SLO. 27, COSTA RICA - 1963

COPY

19-120-26
DELEGACÃO DO BRASIL

Capt. Vicente Bienalo Palais
Dr. Júnio Andrade, D. Elena Quadros, Srs. Direto Maria Quadros,
Sra. Inês Quadros
Senador Alceu Arantes e Senhora
Deputado Paulo de Tarso e Senhora
Deputado Ancelto Lucio Cordoso
Deputado Seixas Pória
Deputado Frederico juliano e Senhora
Deputado Castilho Cabral
Sr. Augusto Fornagga
Sr. José Fontas
Sr. Helio Fernandez
Sr. Eutício Raimbaut
Sr. Horácio Vale Filho
Sr. Luís António Vilaes Beas
Sr. Pinheiro Lopes
Sr. Rui Paracuel
Sr. Marcial Alves
Sr. Carlos Castelo Branco
Sr. Ruben Franca
Sr. Carlos Pescuita
Sr. Cláudio Nitaris
Deputado Marico Costa Rago e Senhora
Sr. Aminio António Fílha
Sr. Edmundo Tereira
Sr. José Paes
Sr. Eneas Fidélis
Sr. José Costa
Sr. Edmundo Raimbaut
Sr. Fernando Sabino
Sr. João Batista Castajon
Sr. Milton Fernandes
Sr. Milton Santos
Deputado Eusébio Magalhães Jr
Sr. Osvaldo Pereira Legay
Sr. Carlos Vitor
Sr. José Vasconcel Comado Albeiro
Sr. José Carlos de Moraes
Sr. Walter Barbosa

TRIPULACAO

Srs. Arthur Portofo e Heitor Tidor
Srs. António José Schiattini Pinto e Gilberto A. Salomoni
Srs. Marly Vereira Piter
Srs. Paulino Lima e Jose Imperator
Srs. Léonardj Spitzer e Benjamin Bondarevsk
Srs. Lindolfo Montenegro e Alo Rodriguez Neto
Dr. Luc. B. Inozent
PRÉSIDENT
DU MOUVEMENT REVOLUTIONNAIRE MAÏSIEN
SECRET

SECRET 112305Z CITE JWAVE 7135
DIRECTOR INFO RIO DE JANEIRO, SAO PAULO
TYPIC MNHPAWN (AMSCROLL) AMOI
REFERENCE JWAVE 6970 (59 429)

1. STUDY DISCUSS PARA 1 REF RELEASED 5 MAY.
   ONLY PICK UP SEEN BY STATION WAS STORY IN DIARIO LAS
   AMERICAS 9 MAY. CLIP AIRMAILED TO ADDRESSES. HOE
   EVER AFP FILED STORY WITH NEW YORK OFFICE 9 MAY. WILL
   FORWARD COPY TEXTI WHEN AVAILABLE TO STATION, AMFRAME-1
   ASSURED BY LOCAL AP OFFICE THAT STORY WRITTEN BUT AS
   OF 11 MAY NOT FILED.

2. COPIES AMSCROLL STUDY POUCHED HGS BY TM-928341
   ON 10 MAY. AIRMAILING COPY TO INFO ADDRESSES.

SECRET
SECRET 1021372 CITE WAVE 1103 10 May 67 IN 64432

SECRET

SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR

REFERENCE AMSROLL

SANTIAGO 4230 (245743)

1. JWAVE PROCEEDING PER PARA 3 REF. STUDY "BEING DISTRIBUTED TO AMSROLL LIST 10 MAY. WILL AIRMAIL SANTIAGO SPANISH TRANSLATION WITH CHARTS. WILL APPRECIATE CLIPS INCLUDING EDITORIALS YOU MAY BE ABLE ARRANGE.

2. REQUEST YOU DEFER PASSING MATERIAL UNTIL 17 MAY OR LATER IN ORDER ALLOW TIME FOR ARRIVAL OF AMSROLL MAILING.

SECRET

SECRET

19-120-26

10 May 67
SECRET 032235 CITE JWAVE 6970
DIREC'TOR INFO RIO DE JANEIRO, SAO PAULO
TYPIC NHSPA NW AMSCROLL AMOT
REF DIRECTOR 97866

1. RE REQUEST PARA 2. REF. CURRENT STATISTICAL AMSCROLL STUDY
   COMPLETED 3 MAY INDICATE 1967 HARVEST TO BE MORE IN NEIGHBORHOOD
   6,1 MILLION METRIC TONS WHICH IN LINE WITH RESPONSIBLE ANALYSES
   (CF, CZARIKOW-RIONDA) AVAILABLE TO AMSCROLL. HENCE PREFER USE
   THEIR CONCLUSIONS BUT IN DISCUSSION SECTION WILL REFER FAVORABLY
   TO SUMMARY SECTION OF UFC-0667. THIS WILL ALSO AVOID SECURITY
   FACTOR OF USING PRECISE AMOT CONCLUSIONS. THIS STUDY WILL BE
   RELEASED BY AMSCROLL 5 MAY. WILL ADVISE PER REF OF WIRE SERVICE
   AND OTHER PICKUP.

2. AMOT STUDY OF 25 APRIL OF RECENT RISE OF SUGAR PRICE AND
   THEIR PROPOSALS TO COUNTER ROLE OF SPECULATORS FORWARDED TM928258
   ON 2 MAY. DRAFT OF AMSCROLL STUDY DISCUSSED ABOVE BEING
   FORWARDER PRIORITY POUCH 4 MAY. ALSO FORWARDING PERTINENT
   EXTRACTS OF SUGAR LETTERS FROM MERRILL LYNCH, CZARIKOW-RIONDA AND
   C. CZARIKOW, LTD WHICH GERMANY TO AMOT PROPOSALS.

3. AS THESE AND OTHER STUDIES REACH DIFFERENT CONCLUSIONS ON

19-20-26
4 MAY 1967
SIZE OF SUGAR CROP AND DUE ABSENCE HERE OF RELIABLE INFO ON SUCH KEY FACTORS AS EXTENT, IF ANY, TO WHICH SOVIET UNION WILL RELEASE CUBA FROM ITS COMMITMENT TO PROVIDE USSR WITH 4,000,000 TONS THIS YEAR (JMWAKE IN NO POSITION TO EVALUATE MERITS OF EITHER CONCLUSION) WE REFER TO HQS FOR EVALUATION OF IMPLEMENTING AMOT PROPOSALS. IN ADDITION SUCH ASSETS AS AMSCROLL, AMHM, ETC. AMRAIN-I OR AMSNAKE-I MIGHT PREPARE STUDIES ATTRIBUTING THEIR INFO TO PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AND RECENTLY ARRIVED REFUGEES.
SECRET

TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - FCOT-13169

FILE NO - NONE

DATE - 3 MAY 1967

INDEXING - NONE

MICROFILM - NONE

TO - CHIEF OF STATION, JWAVE

INFO - CHIEF, FE DIVISION

FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, OKINAWA

SUBJECT - TRANSFER OF JWAVE ADVANCE TO OKINAWA FOR ACCOUNTING

ACTION - SEE PARA 3

REFERENCE - UFGT-19178, DTD 13 APRIL 67

I. CONTENTS REF AND ATTACHMENTS NOTED AND REFERRED TO

REBHOLTZ WHOSE COMMENTS FOLLOW:

A. BOTH AMOUNTS ON VOUCHER 8511 PROBABLY PASSED AS ONE SUM TO AMBLEAK/1 WHO MAY HAVE SIGNED SINGLE RECEIPT FOR $1,500.00 RATHER THAN RECEIPTING $1,000.00 AND $500.00 SEPARATELY. RE-EXAMINATION APPROPRIATE FILES ON THIS ASSUMPTION MAY SOLVE MYSTERY.

B. ANY OUTSTANDING ADVANCES THIS MATTER WOULD HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED TO SUCCEIVING CASE OFFICER GORDON R. HAWLOTT THROUGH FORMAL MEMO WHICH JWAVE FINANCE MUST HAVE HAD PRIOR REBHOLTZ' CLEARING STATION. EXTRA COPY MAY BE IN MICROROLL FILES.

C. SINCE AMBLEAK/1 WOLADY CITIZEN /ALTHOUGH THOUGHT BY SOME ASSOCIATES A RBURMEX EXILE/, HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED DIRECTLY TO ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT AND DETAIL EXPENDITURES MADE WITH FUNDS IN QUESTION.

D. REBHOLTZ' RECOLLECTION PURPOSE OF ADVANCE WHICH JWAVE 1702 CITED ON VOUCHER AS AUTHORIZATION MAY CONFIRM, WAS DEPOSIT ON LEASE, RENOVATION AND REPAIRS HEIRLOOM COVER OFFICE IN FASHIONABLE AREA OF CITY. CLEARED WOLADY REALTOR WHO MADE ARRANGEMENTS, COPY OF LEASE IN JWAVE FILES, PERSONAL OBSERVATION.

SECRET TELEPOUCH FCOT-13169 PAGE ONE
TELEPOUCH  FCOT-13169 PAGE TWO

DELLING IN PROCESS BY HAWLOTT AND REBHOLTZ /INCLUDING
INSTALLATION AIR CONDITIONER THROUGH WALL/, AMBLEAK/ UTILIZATION
OFFICE AND POSSIBLE VISITS BY CLEARED WOLADY ATTORNEY AS CONSULTANT
ON HEIRLOOM ACTIVITY PLUS OTHER SUCH INDICATIONS SHOULD PROVIDE
AMPLE EVIDENCE MONEY PASSED AND EXPENDED AS AUTHORIZED.

2. IF ABOVE LEADS CANNOT BE FOLLOWED UP EFFECTIVELY,
SUGGEST REBHOLTZ' CERTIFICATION BE ACCEPTED THAT TO BEST HIS
KNOWLEDGE FUNDS PASSED AMBLEAK/ FOR APPROVED OPERATIONAL
PURPOSE. NOTE ADVANCE MADE 11 MAY 65 FOR ACCOUNTING ON OR BEFORE
11 JUNE 65, AND THAT REBHOLTZ ON ACTIVE DUTY AT JMWAVE UNTIL
31 JULY/ ALTHOUGH REF STATES DEPARTURE APPROX 1 JUNE/. TIME
FACTOR SUGGEST SUBSTANTIVE ACCOUNTING RENDERED WITHIN NORMAL
DATE LIMIT SINCE OVERDUE NOTICE EVIDENTLY NOT ISSUED EVEN 45 DAYS
BEYOND DUE DATE /WHICH REBHOLTZ SAYS WAS FIRM SOP AT JMWAVE/.

3. PLS ADVISE ASAP SINCE REBHOLTZ ETA 8 JUNE PCS TOKYO
STATION AND WISH TO CLEAR THIS ITEM RATHER THAN TRANSFER IT AGAIN.

VICTOR J. SANDVOLD

END

DISTRIBUTION
2 - COS, JMWAVE/VIA TELEPOUCH/
1 - CHIEF, FE DIVISION/VIA TELEPOUCH/
1 - CHIEF, WH DIVISION/VIA TELEPOUCH/

SECRET TELEPOUCH  FCOT-13169 PAGE TWO
SECRET 022125Z CITE SANTIAGO, 4236 (THILLEN ACTING)

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC MHSPOW AMSCROLL

REF: UFGA 27416 (20 APRIL 1967)

1. REFERENCE IS AN EXCELLENT PAPER THAT SHOULD SERVE OUR
PROPAGANDA PURPOSES WELL IN CHILE ESPECIALLY SINCE THE GOC SEEMS
TO DESIRE A SOFTENING OF ITS PREVIOUSLY HARD ANTI-CUBA LINE.

2. WE CAN REPLAY THE ARTICLE IN ITS ENTIRTY IN FUNERAL-1
OR PROBABLY PLACE A SUMMARY OF IT IN THE FUAMBER-1 SUNDAY
SUPPLEMENT. (A MORNING TABLOID OF SOME 200,000 CIRCULATION ON
SUNDAYS, very big for Chile). In either case attribution is
NO PROBLEM SINCE EITHER OF THEM WILL PLACE IT WITH OR WITHOUT
ATTRIBUTION.

3. THUS, IF IT SERVES YOUR PURPOSES WOULD SUGGEST THAT
AMSCROLL PUBLISH IT FOR PRIVATE DISTRIBUTION AFTER WHICH YOU CAN
SEND US THE SPANISH VERSION WITH THE CHARTS TOGETHER WITH A LIST
OF CHILEAN FIRMS IT WAS SENT TO AND WE WILL ARRANGE PUBLIC
DISTRIBUTION AS NOTED ABOVE. MIGHT ALSO BE POSSIBLE SPIN OFF SOME
EDITORIALS BY OTHER ASSETS EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER GIVING IT FULL
TREATMENT.

SECRET

2 MAY 67
DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere

INFO
Chief of Station, Athens
Chief, NE

FROM
Chief of Station, JWAVE

SUBJECT
Typic/AMSCROLL

C/O Request from Greek and Spanish Embassies for AMSCROLL Publications

on Shipping

ACTION REQUIRED: None, FYI

1. We forward by separate cover a copy of a letter from the Royal Greek Embassy in Washington addressed to AMSCROLL together with a copy of the requested publication. AMSCROLL answered the request by return mail and took the opportunity to include more recent material published by AMSCROLL which discussed Greek ships and Cuba. All of this material had earlier been sent the addressees and, further, had been sent the list discussed in UFGA-26541 (8 December 1966). We are also including in the separate cover attachment an article based upon AMSCROLL material that appeared in the American Marine Engineer.

2. On 27 April the Spanish Embassy in Washington telephoned AMSCROLL to request one copy each of the January and February 1967 AMSCROLL Studies of Free World Shipping with Cuba. The Embassy explained that its file of this publication was complete except for these two issues.

Rept. E. Menard

For Mark F. Efffield

Attachment:
As stated, usc(atc)

Distribution
3-C/WH, w/att, usc
2-COS, Athens, w/att. usc - To our Pearl
2-WH/COG, w/att. usc
2-C/NE, w/o/att. Sec

CS COPY

DATE TYPED: 28 April 67
DATE DISPENDED: MAY 11 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-27447

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-26/3
ROYAL GREEK EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

April 17, 1957

Movimiento Unida Revolucionaria
10 S.E. 9th Street
Miami, Fla. 33131,

Dear Sirs,

Would you kindly send us 2 copies
of your number 6 Political Notebook Series
The Maritime Fifth Column (Suplement).

Thanking you in advance,

Truly yours,

I. Kerasidis
Secretary.
who have been employed 25 years or more be established at $100.

"Excessor Clause"
The AFL-CIO has proposed that an "excessor" clause be incorporated into Social Security so that a re-

Greeks Discipline Cuba Traders

Fourteen ship owners and merchant marine Captains were recently indicted by Greek authorities for sailing transports to Cuba in violation of existing regulations.

The Minister of the Merchant Marine has reportedly sent to the proper prosecution authorities the files against the owners and captains of S.S. Irene, S.S. Euboea, S.S. Alice and S.S. Panamanca. All the vessels are registered in Piraeus.


The courts and the Merchant Marine Disciplinary Board are reportedly investigating charges against other owners and captains.

The steamer LOUIS YXES (Lykes Bros.) and the Yamashiro Muru recently collided during heavy weather at Kee-

Illness At Sea Rate Declines

Reported illnesses and injuries among seagoing personnel in 1956 in relation to the average number of sea-

faring jobs dipped to a new low for the last decade.

Recently announced figures stated that the combined percentage of illnesses and injuries, based on an average of 54,972 jobs last year, declined to 2.2 per cent from the 3.5 per cent reported on 65,029 jobs in 1955.

The respective percentages of injuries and illnesses also declined. The ratio of injuries last year dropped to 5.4 per cent from 6.5 per cent in 1955, and that of illnesses was down to 1.8 per cent from the first 40 per cent registered the previous year.

The percentage of illnesses is the lowest recorded since 1951, and that of illness is the lowest since 1957.

All told, in 1956 licensed and unlicensed U.S. merchant marine personnel were reported as injured or ill 43,046 times. Re-

ported injuries totaled 22,023 and reported illnesses totaled 21,023.
"UNITED" MONTHLY, ISSUE No. 36, APRIL, 1967.

FRONT PAGE:
(1) ANOTHER REGIME OFFICIAL DEFECTS IN GREAT BRITAIN: A brief story on the Colla-
zo defection, followed by excerpts from his original statement. Excerpts include;
reasons why free-world sea trade with Cuba is declining (U.S. Black List, Latin
workers' boycott, etc.); Cuba-trading shipowners take advantage of Castro and over-
charge him for charters; the personnel problem in "Manzanas"; the planned deception
for Expo 67 (exhibiting console record players made up of foreign components and
wood as Cuban-made); general conclusion: régime officials don't know where they are
headed for.

(2) EDITORIAL: HATED BY FRIEND AND FOE: The Russians hate Castro because he has
two-timed them in the Sino-Soviet rift; the Chinese loathe him because they regard
him as a mercenary who has sold out to the Soviets. Latin American Reds hate him
as well, because, as they say, he has promoted factionalism in their ranks. Anti-
Communists throughout the American hate him too, as there is not a country in the
hemisphere where mothers and wives are not mourning the loss of a dear one to Cas-
troite terrorists. And anti-Red Cubans would not touch Castro with a ten-foot pole.
Hated by friend and foe alike, how could anyone think that Castro may eventually
survive a chronic economic crisis that his own ineptitude has wrought on the nation?

PAGE TWO:
(1) MOROCCO BREAKS DEPENDENCE ON CUBAN SUGAR: From the EIR we take the story on the
Moroccan plan to develop their own sugar industry at the expense of purchases from
Cuba. This plan, we stress, is receiving Polish financial and technical aid, which
shows to what extent Castro's Red comrades are concerned with his sugar interests.

(2) DO THE SOVIETS SEND 'REJECT' PARTS TO CUBA?: Also from the EIR, this is the
story on the "coincidence" that poor-quality or defective parts began to arrive in
Cuba, under Soviet-Cuban barter agreements, right after the price of sugar dropped.

(3) WHERE IS RAUL?: A humorous poem by Luis R. Ciceres, Jr. It goes like this
(it rhymes in Spanish, of course): Where would Raúl be? — Is he out cutting
cane — or viciously murdering Cubans — or hiding inside a trunk? Where might
he be? — what could have happened to Raúlito? — maybe he's got the "shakes" —
or was abducted by (slept with) a Congolese? (This is a reference to the old
Cuban joke about Raúl being a homosexual and having a preference for husky Congo-
less).

(4) Box: CUBAN Help the fight against the tyranny. Pass this issue on to
your friends and trusted acquaintances. Report to us any news that might be in-
teresting (we give our P.O. Box No.). We welcome your criticisms, comments and
suggestions.

PAGE THREE:

(1) Continuation of front-page story on Collazo.

(2) CASTRO TO BE ACCUSED BY REDS: a brief story on the announced plans of the
Venezuelan Communists to charge Castro with meddling and promoting fractionalism,
at a forthcoming Communist meeting in Prague.
1. JNWave forwards herewith a study entitled Economic Relations Between Cuba and the Soviet Union: How Much Dependency? Both Santiago and Headquarters are being provided with an original and one copy of the study in English and an original and one copy in Spanish. Two sets of the one table and the six charts that support the study are also being forwarded each address. This is an ANSICOLL prepared study; the author is ABFEHACE-1 in collaboration with ABFEHACE-1 It was prepared in response to references A and B.

2. We have limited this study to an attempt to prove statistically the very rapid rise of Cuban economic dependency upon the Soviet Union. We have intentionally avoided editorializing as the facts speak for themselves; thus we have drawn no political conclusions, nor have we attempted to establish that this economic dependency carries with it an implicit policy control on the part of the Soviets (partly because policy control does not necessarily follow and, in any event, the reader is free to draw his own conclusions).

3. If it does not run counter to Station Santiago's plans, we suggest that ANSICOLL—a JNWave asset that studies and comments upon the Cuban economic scene—reproduce this study under its name for private distribution to its list of sugar brokers, trading firms, and international organizations that deal

Attachments:
As stated, h/w

Distribution
2 - COS, Santiago, w/atts., h/w
2 - C/WA, w/atts., h/w

CS COPY

Date Typed: 20 APR 67
Date Dispatched: 19-120-26/3
with or are interested in following the Cuban economic picture.
We would particularly like to bring this presentation to the
attention of European firms and organizations with which ANS-COLL
is in contact and which are a factor in Cuban trade. We believe
that this will also give a basis for attribution to Santiago
should the Station desire it; if not, the facts and figures could
be used by Station Santiago without attribution and without
sourcing, for that matter, as we believe that the figures will
stand.

4. JMWAVE will appreciate comments on the value of this
paper from Headquarters and Santiago. We also request a cabled
response from Santiago to the suggestion in paragraph 3 that
ANS-COLL reproduce this study.

Mark F. Efffield

Comments 23 May 67
Cabled 26
ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN
CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION; HOW MUCH DEPENDENCY?

Cuba's dependency on the Soviet Union is known. The question is: how much dependency? In order to arrive at some conclusion we have chosen Cuba's foreign trade statistics for the 1959-1966 period.

We will work under the following economic assumption: Economic dependency of one country on the other can be indicated to a considerable extent by their trade as this indicates the need one country has of the other as a market for its exports and as a supplier for its imports.

What we will do is to analyze the Cuban Trade Balance for the 1959-1966 period.*

1) According to the assumption we established regarding trade dependency, we can say that during 1959 Cuba was dependent upon the Free World for its markets as total trade value for that year amounted to $1,305,700,000 and trade value with the Free World represented $1,299,000,000 (or 98.8% of the total trade).

Broken down into exports and imports we see that in 1959 Cuban exports totaled $637,700,000 while total imports were $688,000,000. Thus, the trade balance showed a $26,300,000 deficit, which was a reflection of the trend started in 1958 due to*

* Every figure in this paper will be given in U.S. dollars unless otherwise indicated. The sources for the figures used throughout the analysis, the table, and charts were: "The Economist", "The New York Times", UN's Economic Reports on Latin America, "Cuba Comercio Exterior" magazine, "Visión" magazine, "US News & World Report", and The Economist Intelligence Unit's "Quarterly Economic Review".

It should be remembered that the figures refer only to the Cuban Trade Balance; i.e., imports and exports, and not to the Cuban Balance of Payments which would reflect loans and financial arrangements, plus the Soviet military and technical assistance; figures which do not appear in the balance of trade and which are not available to us with sufficient authenticity to warrant their use.

28 April 1967
Att. to UFGA - 274/6

CS Classification: 19-120-26
JDB 68-64/73
Box 19 Fold 3

19-120-26
the unstable political situation under the Batista regime and the economic insecurity of the new Castro regime.

Of the above mentioned exports, 97.8% were to Free World countries and only 2.2% to Communist countries. Import-wise, 99% were made from Free World countries, while 0.1% were made from Communist countries.

Thus, we can conclude that Cuba was still very much dependent upon the Free World as a trading partner but trade-wise during 1959, further, at least $623,800,000 (97.8% of total exports) was collected in hard currency.

2) In 1960, Anastas Mikoyan visited Cuba and the Cuban-Soviet trade agreement was signed. The effect of this agreement is immediately apparent when viewed through Cuba's foreign trade figures.

Total trade value decreased in 1960 to $1,168,000,000 from $1,305,700,000, Free World participation decreased more than proportionately as the value of Cuban trade with the Free World was $897,000,000, while trade with Communist countries increased to $271,000,000 (or 23% of total trade) versus $1,289,000,000 and $15,800,000 (or 22% of total trade) respectively in 1959.

The trade balance was in favor of Cuba in the amount of $68,000,000 as control of imports, especially from the Free World, established in 1959 was having its effect.

3) In 1961 the whole foreign trade picture was transformed. It was almost the reverse of 1960. Total trade amounted to $1,253,600,000, of which Free World participation represented $348,600,000 (or 27.8%) and Communist trade $905,000,000 (or 72.2%).

We can look at this another way. In 1960, Cuban exports earned $467,000,000 in hard currency. In 1961, the hard currency earnings amounted to $166,800,000 since the $458,100,000 value of Cuban exports to the Communist countries represented "agreement value" or "nominal hard currency value" as the trade was conducted under barter agreements, with the Soviet Union providing about 10% to 20% of the total Cuban export value in convertible currency.
Cuba was now dependent, economically, upon the Communist World, especially the Soviet Union. (The fact that little hard currency was obtained from its new trade partners further committed Cuba's economy to the Communist Bloc.)

4) In 1962, the trend continued. Total trade was $1,257,000,000, of which $1,031,000,000 (82.1%) was with the Communist Bloc and only $226,000,000 (17.9%) with Free World countries.

Another phenomenon appeared during 1962. The Soviets, who had been careful not to press Cuba during 1960 with respect to their trade balance (which was favorable to Cuba by $31,000,000), were shrewd enough to close the gap in 1961. The balance was favorable to Cuba by $11,200,000.

Clearly, the Soviet pressure was on. In 1962, Cuba faced a $227,000,000 deficit with the Communist countries. Compounding this is the fact that by 1962 Cuba had spent 30.6% of its hard currency reserves in Free World markets.

Dependency upon the Soviet Union arrived to stay as trade with the Communist World represented 82.1% of total trade and imports from the Communist area had, for the first time, surpassed Cuban exports to the Bloc.

5) Two interesting developments occurred in 1963. First of all, total trade with the Communist countries maintained the 1962 level ($1,031,000,000 in 1962 and $1,054,000,000 in 1963). But, the Soviet Union tightened the grip by increasing its exports to Cuba to $68,900,000 (in 1962 they represented $629,000,000), while Cuban exports to the Communist Bloc decreased to $366,000,000 (in 1962 they represented $402,000,000). Thus, the imbalance for Cuba increased to $322,900,000 (in 1962 it was $227,000,000).

At the same time, Cuba attempted an approach to the Free World markets by taking advantage of an increase in the price of sugar in the world market (sugar averaged 8.48 cts. per pound during this period). Cuba's total trade with the Free World increased to $354,300,000 (in 1962 it had been $226,000,000).

Nevertheless, the 1963 trade balance worsened for Cuba as it showed a $323,200,000 deficit. The Free World countries were able to turn the tables on Cuba (as in 1962...
they had a $12,000,000 deficit on the trade balance with Cuba and now Cuba was in a $300,000 surplus with the Free World.

6) For 1964, a favorable world sugar market (average price of 5.86 cts. per pound) encouraged Cuba to continue its flirtation with the Free World. The Cuban treasury was able to handle some hard currency for the first time in the Castro era and Cuban commercial missions were sent to Europe and Japan to purchase items no longer available in Cuba.

Total trade increased to $1,722,000,000 and the Free World participation increased from $354,300,000 (25.2%) in 1963 to $612,000,000 (35.6%). The Free World spending spree took its toll as the trade balance with the Free World showed a $30,000,000 deficit for Cuba. And here, we are speaking of a hard currency loss.

Not even in the midst of Cuba's affair with the Free World did the Soviet Union lose control of the situation. On January 20, 1964, Cuba was signing a trade agreement with the Soviet Union by which it was committing about half of its planned future sugar production to the Soviet Union for the next six years. The amounts Cuba agreed to deliver to the Soviet Union were: 2,100,000 metric tons in 1965; 3,000,000 in 1966; 4,000,000 in 1967; 4,000,000 in 1968; 5,000,000 in 1969; and 5,000,000 in 1970. The Soviet Union did agree to fix the price of Cuba's sugar at 6 cts. per pound, which perhaps seems generous in 1967, but hardly a good offer on January 20, 1964, as the price of sugar on January 19, 1964 was 9.50 cts. per pound. Adding insult to injury the Soviet Union did not include in the 1964 trade agreement its previous commitment to provide Cuba with 10% or 20% of the payments in hard currency as it had done in the 1960 agreement.

7) By 1965 Cuba was sending few trade missions abroad, virtually ceased its hard currency purchases, and found itself with almost no hard currency (the average price of sugar had dropped to 2.12 cts. per pound). During 1965 Cuba faced the Soviet Union more empty handed than before and the general trade situation returned to 1963 levels; except that by now the Communist countries had more participation and the Free World
had less. Total trade amounted to $1,551,000,000 (compared to $1,410,200,000 in 1963), but trade with Communist countries reached $1,195,000,000 (compared to $1,054,900,000 in 1963). Trade with the Free World remained at the same level - $354,200,000 in 1963 and $356,000,000 in 1965, but with a difference - the Cuban deficit in its trade balance with the Free World rose from $300,000 in 1963 to $60,000,000 in 1965.

So, the Soviets continued in control as trade with the Communist countries represented more than three quarters of Cuba's total trade for that year. The sugar production had already been mortgaged, the sugar market was depressed, and Cuba was more and more dependent upon the Soviet Union.

8) Then came 1966. Sugar prices decreased to an average of 1.86 cts. per pound. Total trade decreased to $1,465,000,000 as compared with $1,551,000,000 in 1965.

Trade with Communist countries also decreased (from $1,195,000,000 in 1965 to $1,160,000,000 in 1966) and the Soviets were able to push a little further and increased Cuba's deficit in the trade balance from $119,000,000 in 1965 to $200,000,000 in 1966.

Free World countries also gained. Total Free World trade decreased to $305,000,000 (from $356,000,000 in 1965), but the Cuban deficit increased from $60,000,000 in 1965 to $65,000,000 in 1966.

Our conclusions follow:

FIRST: Cuba is economically dependent upon the Soviet Union.

SECOND: This dependency is increasing. It has risen from 1.2% in 1959 to 79.2% by 1966.

To buttress this conclusion we point out that:

A) Cuba has mortgaged its sugar production to the Soviet Union.

B) Cuba has exhausted its hard currency reserves. While an exact figure is not available we estimated it to be about $20,000,000 in December 1964.

C) Cuba does not receive hard currency from its trade with the Communist countries under the present barter agreements.
D) Cuba has a $1,132,000,000 trade deficit with the Communist countries for the 1963 - 1966 period. Nor does this figure include Communist technical assistance, military equipment, scholarships, and the like.

THIRD: Cuba has lost its position as a meaningful trader in the Free World, which in turn has increased its dependency upon the Soviet Union.

Note. - For a statistical summary on Cuban Foreign Trade for the 1959 - 1966 period and for a graphic presentation of the above analysis see attached Table No. 1 and Charts Nos. 1 to 6.
CHART NO. 1
CUBAN FOREIGN TRADE
1959-1966
Expressed in Million US Dollars

Source: Table No. 1
CHART NO. 6
CUBAN TRADE WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE 1959-1966

TOTAL TRADE: 100%

EXPORTS
IMPORTS

WORLD SUGAR MARKET AVERAGE PRICES

[Graph showing trends in trade with communist countries from 1959 to 1966]

CTS PER POUND

SOURCE: TABLE NO. 1
TABLE NO. 1
CUBA: FOREIGN TRADE
1959 - 1966
(Expressed in million US $)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>EXPORTS</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>IMPORTS</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>TOTALS</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>BALANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Communist countries</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Communist countries</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>623.4</td>
<td>97.8</td>
<td>664.1</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>1287.5</td>
<td>99.9</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>637.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>666.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1303.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communist countries</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>151.0</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>120.0</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>271.0</td>
<td>23.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Communist countries</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>467.0</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>450.0</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>917.0</td>
<td>76.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>618.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>550.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1168.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist countries</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>458.1</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>446.9</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>905.0</td>
<td>72.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Communist countries</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>166.9</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>191.9</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>358.6</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>624.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>629.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1253.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist countries</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>402.0</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>629.0</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>1031.0</td>
<td>82.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Communist countries</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>119.0</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>177.0</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>296.0</td>
<td>23.9</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>521.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>706.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1227.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<td>1963</td>
<td>366.0</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>649.9</td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>1015.9</td>
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<td>1963</td>
<td>177.0</td>
<td>32.4</td>
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<td>25.5</td>
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<td>1963</td>
<td>543.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>827.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<td>687.0</td>
<td>66.6</td>
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<td>1964</td>
<td>201.0</td>
<td>30.8</td>
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<td>33.4</td>
<td>422.0</td>
<td>35.5</td>
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<td>1964</td>
<td>624.0</td>
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<td>908.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<td>657.0</td>
<td>78.9</td>
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<td>1965</td>
<td>148.0</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>228.0</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>376.0</td>
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<td>1965</td>
<td>681.0</td>
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<td>885.0</td>
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<td>1566.0</td>
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<td>620.0</td>
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<td>835.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1455.0</td>
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CHART NO. 5
CUBAN TRADE WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
1959-1966

EXPRESSED IN MILLION AGREEMENT US DOLLARS

EXPRESSED IN PERCENTAGES, TRADE VALUE = 100%

EXPORTS ———
IMPORTS ———

SOURCE: TABLE NO. 1
CHART NO. 4
CUBAN IMPORTS
1959-1966

IMPORTS FROM SELECTED AREAS EXPRESSED IN PERCENTAGES. TOTAL IMPORTS = 100.0%.

COMMunist COUNTRIES
FREE WORLD

SOURCE: TABLE NO. 1
CHART NO. 3
CUBAN EXPORTS
1959-1966

Exports to selected areas expressed in percentages. Total exports: 100.0%.

Source: Table A.11.
CHART NO. 2
CUBAN FOREIGN TRADE
1959-1966

TRADE WITH SELECTED AREAS EXPRESSED IN PERCENTAGES. TOTAL TRADE = 100.0%

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0


COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
FREE WORLD

SOURCE: TABLE NO. 1
MEMORANDUM

TO : Chief of Station, JMWAVE
FROM : PW/MARCBANK
SUBJECT : TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
AMSCROLL Progress Report
1 January - 31 March 1967

4 April 1967

WPW-1333

Distribution
3 - COS
1 - PW/MARCBANK
1 - PW/Chrono
1 - REG

A. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

1. During the quarter under review AMSCROLL continued its campaign to discredit the Cuban regime's economic management. As before, the campaign was conducted by the AMSCROLL radio program and by serious economic studies and comment that were provided its mailing list of sugar brokers, selected firms engaged in international trade and shipping, and commercial and technical journals. The Station continues to be encouraged by evidence of increased acceptance of the AMSCROLL efforts. For example, AMSCROLL received eighteen letters from Cuba during this quarter, all of which were in direct response to the radio program. Of these twelve were received in March which represents the highest monthly total since initiating the program. This compares with eleven the previous quarter and only three in the corresponding quarter of 1966. In January, the Vice President of the Association of Sugar Producers of Puerto Rico called upon the AMSCROLL offices to request AMSCROLL's assistance in preparing a chapter on Cuban sugar production problems to be included in a book this person is writing. AMSCROLL received requests from four universities or colleges requesting written material, from a graduate student preparing a thesis on the lot of the Cuban peasant, from the U.S. Army Special Warfare School Library, and others. The wire services, particularly Associated Press and Agence France Presse, continued to file stories based upon AMSCROLL releases.

2. The AMSCROLL radio program continued as reported for the last quarter—daily except Sunday for ten minutes over AMTFRF. In addition, on 1 January AMSCROLL began a thirteen minute program each Sunday on AMTFRF. These programs are in large part confined to subjects of an economic nature with the time on Sunday devoted to an in-depth analysis of what has occurred in this area since the previous Sunday. Typical themes hit throughout this quarter were: Economic and sociological aspects of Castro's 'San Andrés' speech of 28 January, an unfavorable balance of trade with Spain of $30,000,000, significance of Soviet trade with Chile as compared with Cuba, an analysis of a UN economic study of Cuba which shows that rice production in Cuba has declined 50% since 1960, the Royal British Institute's finding that Cuba's economy makes her a poor trading risk, and a report that Greek ship owners that persist in trading with
Cuba are being brought to trial. Throughout this period and whenever possible a particular effort was made to relate developments in China to present or possible developments in Cuba. The difficulties of the Chinese economy provided examples to which a Cuban "twist" could be put; e.g., the Chinese and Cuban economic failures demonstrate the failure of applied communism in the economic area.

3. AMSCROLL is continuing its analysis of the current sugar crop. Its releases on this subject continue to generate interest and the Station has seen coverage in The Miami Herald, El Universal (of Caracas), The Times of The Americas, and Diario Las Americas. The AMSCROLL releases on Free World shipping to Cuba were picked up by both AP and AFP and were published in the newspapers listed in the previous sentence as well as The Montreal Star. The AMIN Bulletin also carries the bulk of these releases and we can therefore presume coverage of at least some of this information in Latin America. An interesting study was an analysis of British/Cuban trade which demonstrates that Great Britain is now getting the better part of the bargain; this story was filed by AFP as was a story of the poor quality of molasses being sold by the Cubans to British firms. Finally, AMSCROLL continued to get mileage from the Daimler-Benz story by reporting that this German firm has finally refused to sell spare parts to Cuba; the story was filed by AFP and published at least by Diario las Americas.

4. AMSCROLL continued its mailing program to Cuba, but on a further reduced scale. During the quarter about 5,000 were mailed versus 8,000 during the previous quarter. We count a distribution during this quarter of 7,127 press releases and economic studies to places other than Cuba.

5. A recent development which may have an interesting operational potential was a telephone call to AMSCROLL from Czarnikow-Rionda, the New York sugar brokers, which was triggered by an AMSCROLL "case study" of the problems being faced by Cuban sugar mills. The firm told AMSCROLL that it has for some time suspected Cuban sugar production figures and wondered if AMSCROLL had any such suspicions. AMSCROLL (through AMFRAME-1) has written to say it would be most interested in following any leads from Czarnikow-Rionda that could support a conclusion that Cuban production figures are false, which is where this matter now lies. The officials of Czarnikow-Rionda are well known to AMSCROLL and we shall be interested in seeing what the firm develops for AMSCROLL.
B. ADMINISTRATION

6. The amount budgeted for the quarter under review was $36,750 of which $33,700.72 was spent. Of this amount, $9,728 was for salaries and $23,972.72 for operations and office expenses.

7. Funding is handled as follows: AMSCROLL operational and administrative expenses are reimbursed monthly by the case officer to the treasurer after submission of an accounting of funds spent. Funds for salaries are also given to the treasurer by the case officer which for tax purposes are paid by a local cover company.

C. PROBLEMS

8. The Station is not aware of any problems during this quarter worthy of comment.

D. PLANS FOR NEXT QUARTER

9. AMSCROLL broadcasting via AMTHIGH will cease 20 April and AMTHIGH has been so informed by letter dated 13 March. The AMSCROLL programs will thereafter be carried by JNHOPE. The Station expects that this move will result in a substantial saving.
1. What contribution or progress did activity make during quarter toward established objectives?

The AMSCHROLL organization continued to make progress to establish itself as a reputable analyst of Cuban economic developments. Once again it has accurately forecast the final sugar harvest weeks in advance of other authorities of which AMSCHROLL is aware.

2. What progress is the activity expected to make during the forthcoming quarter toward its objectives?

A revamping of the AMSCHROLL radio program to make it more objective will be a major effort of the forthcoming quarter.

3. Has the activity produced intelligence? Cite quantity and quality.

No. This activity is not designed to produce intelligence.

4. Is continuation recommended?

YES

5. Funds budgeted for FY 67 $134,000

Expended (estimate) during IV Quarter $23,120

Total expenditures (estimate) for FY 67 $123,038.41

SECRET
First Work Scheduled On Capital
British Honduras Plans Inland City

Compiled by Our Latin America Staff

BELIZE, British Honduras — Construction on a long awaited new capital in the interior for this British Central America possession is expected to begin within six weeks.

Total cost is estimated at $14 million. It will include roads, drainage, water supply, electricity, sewage disposal, public buildings and 288 houses of various types.

The public buildings will include a legislative assembly building, two multistory government office buildings.

Focus On LATIN AMERICA

a post office, magistrate's court, 62-bed hospital, two primary schools and one comprehensive secondary school.

The new capital site is about 30 miles inland from the hurricane-susceptible coastal city of Belize where about one third of the territory's 110,000 population live.

Grenade Injures 12 In Costa Rica Crowd

SAN JOSÉ, Costa Rica — A fragmentation grenade thrown into a crowd paying tribute to defeated presidential candidate Daniel Oduber injured 12 persons, including a 16-year-old child, police reported Saturday.

Police said three people had been arrested in connection with the grenade blast.

Argentina Students Lose School Role

BUENOS AIRES — The Argentine military government of Lt. Gen. Juan Carlos Ongania has banned students from ruling bodies of the nine state universities and warned students and professors to stay out of politics.

One-Day Halt OK'd In Refugees Flights
U.S. OFFICIALS Saturday announced that two Cuban refugee flights for Monday, May 1, will be suspended at the request of the Cuban government. Communist May Day activities are scheduled on the island that day.

The U.S. financed flights, which have brought more than 50,000 refugees to this country since they were initiated 17 months ago, will be resumed May 2 on a twice-a-day, five-day-a-week basis.

**Venezuelan Reds 'Condemn Terrorism'**

CARACAS — Venezuela's outlawed Communist Party made an about face at its latest secret meeting, rejecting the thesis of armed insurrection and favoring participation in elections, a Communist informant said here.

The Eighth Plenum of the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV), held somewhere in Venezuela, agreed to do without armed insurrection, condemn terrorism and participate in the next election, the Communist source reported.

The PCV was outlawed by former President Romulo Betancourt in 1963 and if the government does not permit legalization now, the party will negotiate its voting strength with leftist parties that operate legally in the country.

**19 Western Ships Call at Cuban Ports**

NINETEEN vessels from Western countries, including 10 flying the British flag, called at Cuban ports in March, a Cuban exile group in Miami reported Saturday.

The exile Revolutionary Unity (UR) organization, which keeps tabs on western world shipping to Cuba, said the 19 ships also included two each from Lebanon, Cyprus and Italy; and one each from Greece, Finland and Panama. The Panamanian vessel was the first flying that country's flag to call on a Cuban port since April 1963.

**Colombia Denies Using U.S. Troops**

BOGOTA — Colombian Army Commander Gen. Guillermo Punzo Saturday denied charges from Havana that U.S. troops are aiding the Colombian Army in its anti-guerrilla campaign.

He said armed subversive activities in the country are "in a process of disintegration" due to action of Colombian Army units.
To: Chief of Station, Kingston

From: Chief of Station, JNWave

Subject: TYPIC/AMS CROLL/Operational Letter from Rev. Henry Muir

Action Required: FYI

Reference: KINGSTON-2818

We forward for your information a copy of a letter dated 15 January from Rev. Henry Muir in which he requests "a million different copies" (sic) of AMS CROLL publications that he had previously seen. In view of the reference JNWave will instruct AMS CROLL to ignore this letter.

Philip G. ELMARD

Attachment: copy of letter, USC

Distribution:
1 - COS, Kingston, w/attn., USC
2 - C/WH, w/attn., USC
3 - WH/COG, w/attn., USC

CS COPY

DATE TYPED: 24 JAN 67
DATE DISPATCHED: 25 JAN 67
DISPATCH SYMBOLS AND NUMBER: UFCA - 26840
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 19-120-26/3
Dear Sir,

I wish you a prosperous 1967.

Give my respect to all your men for me.

I have returned to Jamaica on 16th Dec 1966.

You have promised to send me some leaflets for me to give them out in Jamaica so that people can read how wicked Communism is and you have not sent them. Why?

Please send what ever you are sending for me don't just give addresses on them only put the United Liberal Party on them. I don't want them to know where they came from. Please let me have even a small difference copy. We are sure getting ready for the elections soon.

I wish you all success in your undertaking.

Yours very truly,

Rev. Henry Muir
President United Liberal Party

74 & Spanish Town Road
Kingston 13 P.O Box 9
Jamaica W.I.

15th Jan - 1967
Chief of Station, JMWAVE
Quarterly Progress Reports Concerning Political Action Programs

Transmitted herewith are seven progress reports, listed below, for the second quarter of FY 67 concerning the Political Action programs of the Station.

AMHOP
AMHOP
AMHOP
AMHOP
AMHOP
AMHOP
AMHOP

Philip G. Elmard

Attachments H/W
7 Progress Reports

Distribution:
2 - WH/C W/Atts.
MEMORANDUM

TO: Chief of Station
FROM: PW/MONESTIER
SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

29 December 1966

WPD - 1269
Distribution
4 - COS
1 - PW/MONESTIER
1 - PW/Chrono
1 - REG

A. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

1. AMHOF maintained contact with party leaders throughout the hemisphere during the quarter. The majority of the correspondence was handled by AMCRIB/1, the leader of the youth wing, who was informed by the JUDCA secretary-general, both during his October visit and in subsequent correspondence, that the AMHOF youth wing was performing effective work and that a JUDCA study on AMHOF activities would be forthcoming. The JUDCA secretary-general favors the incorporation of the AMHOF youth sector into his organization.

2. AMHOF youth published two bulletins on their activities along with an interesting summary on the activities of their counterparts in other countries, which was mailed to a list of contacts and correspondents. Several party officials in other countries have requested to be placed on the AMHOF mailing lists, an indication that AMHOF is becoming more widely recognized as a representative political movement.

3. The AMHOF youth group has also organized a series of seminars which attracted from 30-35 participants during the quarter. The purpose, in addition to offering discussions on such subjects as politics, labor and agriculture, was to promote more group unity and to draw new sources of talent.

B. ADMINISTRATIVE

4. During the quarter, expenses totaled $9,075.77. This sum included monthly support to AMHOF, and salary and operational expenses of AMCRIB/1. This compares with a budget allocation of $3,750 for the reporting period.
C. PROBLEMS

5. The difficulties in the operation of the AMHOP project are due largely to the lack of effective leadership and initiative. The AMHOP youth wing is operating with reasonable effectiveness within its sphere but is hampered by the lack of active JUDCA membership.

D. FUTURE PLANS

6. Additional seminars are projected for the next quarter. Both AMHOP and its youth sector will maintain active correspondence to gain recognition as knowledgeable and active groups. In addition, future AMHOP activities will be aimed at creating a more cohesive organizational structure, attracting responsible leadership talent to the organization, and gaining greater recognition and possible financial support and guidance from the Parent International Movement.
MEMORANDUM

TO: Chief of Station
FROM: PW/MARCHBANK
SUBJECT: TYPIC/OPERATIONAL

AMKNOT - Progress Report  
1 October - 31 December 1966

23 December 1966

WPW - 1265
Distribution 4 - COS
1 - PW/MARCHBANK
1 - PW/Chrono
1 - RI Chrono

A. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

1. The AMKNOT organization continued during the quarter under review with its program of assisting Cuban merchant mariners who have defected from their service. Fifteen different cases were handled during this period which included five resettlement cases in areas other than JMAVE. Billets at sea were found for two more—one as a first mate and one as a third mate. The remaining eight received assistance in obtaining employment or what might be called administrative aid-assistance in obtaining social security numbers, etc.

2. Processing continued for those interested in employment by the Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS). Progress in obtaining the necessary U.S. Coast Guard certification is slow and of the four that applied for this during the previous quarter only two had received the certification by the end of the current quarter. During this quarter two more former Cuban merchant officers sought through AMKNOT this certification as they expressed interest in MSTS employment. The current status is: In process---2; Coast Guard certifications received---2; physical examinations given (and passed)---4. In addition, applications for employment together with the Coast Guard certifications and completed physical examination forms were forwarded 28 December to the cover company in Baltimore for 2. The remainder will be forwarded as the Coast Guard certifications are received.

3. The activities of the AMKNOT organization continue to receive publicity. The Station has four clips from different papers including one from El Universal of Caracas. AMKNOT issued one press release during this quarter which was an "eyewitness" account of the attempt of four Cuban sailors to obtain political asylum in the Canary Islands. In fact, this was a letter mailed to AMKNOT by USPOT-2 and signed in pseudonym. The story was picked up by Diario Las Americas in its 15 December issue.
B. ADMINISTRATION

4. The AMKNOT organization remains constituted as reported in the previous Quarterly Report. However, in December AMASK-1 was offered a permanent position as personnel director of a local shoe company that employs some four hundred people. His starting salary will be $475.00 per month which will be increased after the first three months and increased again after the second three months. The Station concurred with AMASE-1 that he accept for these reasons: (1) The AMKNOT position is not permanent, (2) it appears that AMASK-1 will be terminated when AMKNOT is closed, (3) this position should solve AMASK-1's personal financial problems, and (4) AMASK-1 has agreed to remain as chairman of AMKNOT without salary and to continue to lend his name to the organization. The Station expects to replace AMASK-1 with AMPOLISH-1 who appears qualified to handle the hand-holding and housekeeping aspects of AMKNOT. AMPOLISH-1 is presently employed by a local automobile dealer and is able to take the necessary time off to handle the AMKNOT matters. We see three advantages to this development: (1) The Station will be spared a possible disposal situation when AMKNOT is closed (it has been made clear to AMPOLISH-1 that this is a temporary assignment that at the most will last for a few months), (2) We have offered AMPOLISH-1 $200.00 per month versus $390.00 for AMASK-1, and (3) AMASK-1 should be in an excellent position to offer at least temporary employment in the shoe factory to mariners to come.

5. An estimated total of $2,505.00 was spent during this quarter. This amount represents AMASK-1's salary and allowances, office expenses, and English instruction for those seeking employment. Expenses by month were: October, $855.00; November, $825.00; and December (estimated), $825.00. The allotment for this activity for the quarter was $3,000.00.

C. PROBLEMS

6. The chief problem of the period was caused by the antics of Raul QUINTANA Ruiz who jumped ship in New Orleans after a run-in with the ship's captain and after difficulties with the Immigration and Naturalization Service over the lack of proper documentation to re-enter the country. QUINTANA has been resettled in California, though we may not have heard the last from him; AMASK-1 recently received a letter from QUINTANA which said that QUINTANA was about to sue the shipping line that had employed him for back salary and loss of personal effects that QUINTANA claims the captain had locked up. AMASK-1 was advised to ignore the letter in view of the difficulties already caused and in view of his potential for further trouble (see paragraphs 2 and 3 of JMWE-3680).
D. PLANS FOR THE NEXT QUARTER

7. The Station currently plans that AMPOLISH-1 will assume his duties with AMKNOT on 2 January 1967 as this is the date AMASK-1 will join the shoe company. AMKNOT will continue processing applications of those interested in MSTS employment and will encourage additional applications from those that appear qualified and interested. Also, AMKNOT, of course, will receive all defecting mariners that appear in the area and will continue to encourage, where it can, additional defections.
MEMORANDUM

TO : Chief of Station
FROM : PW/MARCHBANK
SUBJECT : TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
          AMCROW - Progress Report
          1 October-31 December 1966

19 December 1966

WPW-1261

Distribution
4-COS.
1-PW/MARCHBANK
1-PW/Chrono
1-REG

A. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

1. As reported in the previous Progress Report the
   AMCROW offices were closed and all personnel were terminated
   except for AMCROW-14. Thus there were no operational
   activities. However, the Station requested AMCROW-14
   to send President Leoni of Venezuela a cable congratulating
   him upon the action the Venezuelan Government took against the
   leftists operating from the Central University of Caracas.
   The cable was sent 15 December and was signed by AMCROW-14
   in his capacity as a former PBUMEN cabinet officer. This
   was in response to paragraph 2 of Caracas 5492.

B. ADMINISTRATION

2. AMCROW-14 continued to receive his termination pay
   of $425 per month. The final payment will be made 31 December.

3. A total of $1,349.25 was spent by AMCROW for the
   quarter ending 31 December which represents salary for AMCROW-14
   @ $425.00 per month plus a payment of $74.25 to the state
   unemployment fund.

C. PROBLEMS

4. There were no problems during this quarter. AMCROW-14 has
   apparently accepted the fact that he will be terminated 31 December.

D. PLANS FOR THE NEXT QUARTER

5. There are no plans for the next quarter as this activity
   will cease with the final payment to AMCROW-14 on 31 December 1966.

SECRET
MEMORANDUM

TO: Chief of Station
FROM: THIC/OPERATIONAL
SUBJECT: AMBAL - Progress Report 1 October - 31 December 1966

30 December 1966

Distribution
4 - COS
1 - THIC/OPERATIONAL
1 - FW/THIC
1 - FW/Chrome
1 - REG

A. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

1. Printed Propaganda - During the period under review this operation produced a total of 4,513 pieces of written propaganda for distribution as follows:

   a. Cuba: 500 copies of the AMBAL newsletter;
   b. Latin America: 4,000 copies of the AMBAL bulletin;
   c. Press Releases: 13 releases dealing with such subjects as the treatment of political prisoners, executions, violations of legal and human rights, etc. These releases were the bases for reports that appeared in Diario Las Americas and in the ARRIM bulletin.

2. Correspondence with International Organizations - Correspondence was maintained and exchanged with the International Commission of Jurists, the American Fund for Free Jurists, and the UN and OAS International Commissions of Human Rights. The subject matter of this correspondence was identical with the subjects mentioned in paragraph 1e above.

3. Impact - In an effort to focus attention on the Cuban political prisoners issue, AMBAL/1 prepared a 15 page document on this subject which he presented in person in October 1966 to the Human Rights Commission of the OAS. The president of the commission told AMBAL/1 that this document was the best he had seen on the subject and the commission, after discussion, agreed to continue efforts to get permission to travel to Cuba to investigate the charges contained in the document. AMBAL/1 also visited the UN Human Rights Commission, the Interamerican Federation of Lawyers, the American Fund for Free Jurists, and the president of the International Red Cross. All in all, the effort to focus attention on the political prisoners issue was successful and resulted in wire service, radio, and press coverage. A total of 23 clippings dealing with AMBAL/1's activities in this regard, was sent to Headquarters.
4. Radio - The weekly AMBASAL radio programs were carried by JhOPE and tapes of each program were sent to SWBULL/1 for re-broadcast. The content of these programs was in line with the juridical nature of the AMBASAL organization, although editorial comment was frequently made on current themes not specifically related to the legal field.

B. ADMINISTRATION

5. The 1987 fiscal year budget for AMBASAL is $42,000.00. On a quarterly basis the allotted figure is $10,750.00. During this quarter AMBASAL expenses amounted to $11,750.72, a total of $1,010.72 in excess of the allotted figure. Of the overall quarterly expenses of $11,750.72, agent salaries accounted for $7,000.00, radio expenses amounted to $1,901.72 and $2,859.00 was spent on printed propaganda, operational travel, and miscellaneous office expenses. Total operational expenses for the first six months of FY 1987 were $22,987.28, an excess of $2,487.28 over the $21,500.00 allocated for the first half of the fiscal year.

C. PROBLEMS

6. Termination of the principal agent may be difficult. Consideration is being given to the possible future use of AMBASAL/1 as a singleton agent. The alternative is to assist him in finding suitable employment; a difficult task given his age (42), complete lack of English, and aspects of his personality and character.

7. We do not anticipate any other problems relative to the termination of this operation. The AMBASAL newsletters sent to Cuba were stopped with the October issue and the monthly bulletin with the November issue. Four of the AMBASAL personnel were terminated 31 December and the radio programs were stopped in December.

D. PLANS FOR THE NEXT QUARTER

8. Three AMBASAL employees will be terminated effective 31 January 1987 and the AMBASAL office will be closed during that month. It is planned to permit AMBASAL/1 to retain some of the equipment now in his office to encourage him in his plans to continue to operate on a scaled-down, independent basis. We will continue to pay a monthly salary to AMBASAL/1 through March 1987 while attempting to solve his personal situation discussed in the preceding section.
MEMORANDUM

TO: Chief of Station
FROM: PW/RUBASH

SUBJECT: TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
AMLIRA - Progress Report
1 October - 31 December 1966

Distribution

4 - OAS
1 - PW/RUBASH
1 - PW/Chrono
1 - REG

A. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

1. During the second quarter of FY 1967 the AMLIRA group compiled a file of newspaper clippings concerning the political occurrences involving the Cuban delegation during the tenth Central American and Caribbean games held in Puerto Rico during June 1966. This file was sent in October to Mr. Avery BRUNDAGE, president of the International Olympic Committee, with the request that the file be brought to the attention of the IOC at the next meeting of that body for whatever action might be deemed appropriate.

2. Significant AMLIRA correspondence included the following:
   a. A letter to each member of the Special Consultation Committee on Security of the OAS pointing out the use made by Communist governments, specifically Cuba, of sports for propaganda and political ends.
   b. A letter from the Argentine representative on the IOC in which he acknowledges receipt of a tape with recorded inflammatory remarks by Jose LLANUSA, the head of the Cuban delegation to the 1966 CA and Caribbean games in Puerto Rico. In the letter the Argentine representative deplores such action as a violation of Olympic principles. This ties in with the action taken as indicated in paragraph (1) above.
   c. A letter to the Venezuelan Ministry of Interior protesting the visit of Venezuelan athletes to Cuba at the same time as Cuba is inciting terrorists to action inside Venezuela.

3. Approximately 5000 copies of the AMLIRA magazine were printed each month during the period under review. They were distributed by newsstand sale in Miami, New York and Puerto Rico; through various sports organizations in Latin America and Spain and by distribution as reading material on several Latin American airlines. The AMLIRA magazine provides international sports editorials of MUSEFLYNN value which are of specific interest to Latin American readership. Articles of propaganda significance which
SECRET

- 2 -

appeared during the past quarter included: A story on Negro athletes in the U.S. relating a Cuban claim that there was discrimination in the selection of the U.S. Olympic team; an article on the disqualification of a Cuban woman athlete because "she did not conform to the revolutionary principles of the sports movement in Communist Cuba" and an article which relates the Cuban claim that Cuba won the tenth Central American and Caribbean games.

4. During the quarter the AMLIBRA group issued several press releases concerning sports-newsworthy events involving Cuba and continued the regular five minute radio programs which are heard thirty times each week on Radio Americas beamed to Cuba and on WMAE in Miami. In addition the AMLIBRA organization provided recorded tapes of sports interviews and commentary to 58 independent radio stations in Puerto Rico and 14 countries in Central and South America.

B. ADMINISTRATIVE

5. During the second quarter of FY 67 the AMLIBRA organization expended $17,300 and had income of some $600 from news stand sales and advertising. Both these figures are approximate projections because the final December figures are not recorded at this writing. The net figure for expenditures during the quarter (some $16,700) exceeds the budgeted amount by approximately $400. However, this overrun will be absorbed in further budgetary cutbacks during the next reporting period.

6. The AMLIBRA activity expenditures also exceeded the budget allowance during the last quarter. To remedy this situation the following specific economy measures will go into effect beginning 1 January 1967:

a. One salaried employee will be dropped. Monthly saving....$250

b. Publication of monthly pamphlets with selected offprints from the AMLIBRA magazine will be discontinued.... Approx. monthly saving....$400

$650

It is expected that there will be other savings which will bring the total quarterly reduction in spending to about $2500.

C. PROBLEMS

7. There are no major unresolved problems involving the AMLIBRA activity.
D. PLANS FOR NEXT QUARTER

8. It is probable that the next World Baseball Championships sponsored by the International Baseball Federation will be held in Colombia. An effort will be made by the AMLERA group to mount an operation aimed at assuring the denial of an invitation to participate in these championships to the Cuban team.

9. The AMLERA group is preparing propaganda materials for use in a campaign to try to influence the sports authorities in the Caribbean and Central American countries not to allow their national teams to attend the Weight Lifting Championships to be held during 1967 in Cuba.
MEMORANDUM

TO: Chief of Station

FROM: PW/RUBASH

SUBJECT: TYPIC/OPERATIONAL

AMSTRUT-2 - Progress Report
1 October - 31 December 1966

Distribution

3 January 1966

UPW - 1276

4 - COS

1 - PW/RUBASH

1 - PW/Chrono

1 - REG

A. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

1. On 9 October 1966 AMSTRUT-2 spoke in New York before an audience of approximately 2500 persons on the occasion of the anniversary of Cuban Independence (Grito de Yara). The gathering was sponsored by AMICA. The audience response was enthusiastic and the press services (AP, UPI, AFP) issued wire releases on the AMSTRUT-2 statements which included a denunciation of Fidel CASTRO as a "hangman of his own people" and a "lackey of international Communism".

2. During October AMSTRUT-2 was interviewed by Henry GOTHALS of the Copley News Service. The article resulting from the interview was a sympathetic recounting of the AMSTRUT-2 activities on behalf of the cause of a free Cuba with specific mention of the AMSTRUT-2 book which is in preparation and the constant readiness of AMSTRUT-2 to travel, speak and work for the cause.

3. During November the AMSTRUT-2 Foundation made a contribution of $464 for visa and medical costs involved in the travel of a group of Cuban exiles from Jamaica to the United States.

4. The AMSTRUT-2 weekly radio spot on ANTHIGH continued without schedule change during the quarter. Significant themes included: comments on the degraded role of women in the Communist state compared with that in the free world; reference to the myth of Communist unity as revealed by the split between the ChiComs and the USSR; mention of the possibility that Cubans will be sent to North Viet Nam to fight and die; comment on the treatment of prisoners in Cuba and the UHAP and editorial comment on the visit of Raul CASTRO and President DORITOS to Moscow with the statement that Fidel CASTRO did not go because he did not dare leave the island. This latter comment inspired considerable press play locally as well as by the wire services.
B. ADMINISTRATION

5. During the second quarter of FY-67 there were expenditures of approximately $19,000 by the AMSTRUT-2 activity. This figure includes an estimate for the month of December because the final figures have not been received at this writing. The budgeted amount for AMSTRUT-2 for the quarter is $24,000 and there is an excess of budget authorization over expenditures of approximately $5000. This figure, however, gives an unreal budgetary picture of the AMSTRUT-2 activity. This $5000 will remain as a part of the budget allotment and may well be expended in a flurry of AMSTRUT-2 travel, publication activity and/or promotion during the next quarter. In other words the excess does not represent budget "fat" since the bulk of the AMSTRUT-2 expenses are not figured as month to month constants but obligated as the operational situation demands.

6. During December AMSTRUT-2 moved into a smaller house with a lower rent which will mean a saving of $100 per month. In addition, it is anticipated that a further saving will be realized in maintenance and upkeep costs.

C. PROBLEMS

7. The basic agent-handling problem presented by AMSTRUT-2's mercurial disposition, excessive generosity and understandable emotional approach to the role which must be played before the public still exists. However, it seems to have lessened somewhat as AMSTRUT-2 gains confidence in the language and in dealings with the public. There is little question that a contributing factor to the lessening of this problem is the reliance placed by AMSTRUT-2 on AMLYRIC-1 who serves as business advisor, buffer and hand-holder.

8. The problem of projecting the image of the AMSTRUT-2 Foundation as an independent charitable organization remains. The application for tax exempt status to the state of registry is in the works and when this application is approved it is likely that there will be an increase of private donations which, because of the new status, will be tax deductible. The problem lies in the dilatory behavior of the state authorities.

9. AMSTRUT-2 continues to be attractive to certain extremist political groups whose patriotic claims of objectives would often appear to parallel those of AMSTRUT-2 and the Cuban exile community as a whole. AMSTRUT-2 has not always been able to sort out the "good guys" from the "bad guys" and the problem lies in fending off these extremist groups and preventing them from exploiting AMSTRUT-2 for partisan political ends.
D. PLANS FOR NEXT QUARTER

10. AMLYRIC-1 has been in negotiation with a group of organizations at Harvard University which wish to sponsor an AMSTRUT-2 appearance there. The tentative plan at this writing is for AMSTRUT-2 to appear during the first part of calendar 1967.

11. The ghost-written AMSTRUT-2 book on AMTHUG-1 should be ready for first reading at least sometime during the next quarter.

12. It is planned to have AMSTRUT-2 prepare a rebuttal (probably to be ghost-written by AMLYRIC-1) to the interview with Fidel CASTRO which appeared in the January issue of Playboy magazine.

13. Further speaking engagements and tours by AMSTRUT-2 are being planned for the next reporting period. It is also planned that, with the official approval of the tax-exempt status of the Foundation, an extensive fund raising campaign will be launched to provide working capital and funding cover for operational activities as well as humanitarian and social welfare programs in consonance with the AMSTRUT-2 Foundation charter.
1. We enclose herewith a reproduction of a letter dated Havana, 29 November 1966 that was received by AMSROLL. We believe that the letter, signed "Carloso," was written by Manager of the International Department of the National Bank of Cuba. We say this as in early November AMSROLL mailed a copy of its newsletter using a return address the one used by the writer of this letter; this combination of name and return address was not used by AMSROLL in its other mailings. The Station had obtained name and position in the National Bank from a refugee debriefing report.

2. There are no Station traces. However, the tone of the letter is friendly and it might therefore be useful to index this information in the event that should travel abroad.

3. The Station examined the envelope for evidence of tampering. None was found, though this is not conclusive.

Attachment:
As stated, hw

Distribution:
3-WH/C, w/att, hw

[Signature]

MICROFIlMED
JAN 13 1967
for Philip G. Elmard

DATE TYPED: 19-120-14/3
DATE DISPATCHED: 1-7-120-26
TRANSLATION

Havana, November 29, 1966.

Mr. Rafael Brevil
P.O. Box 3940
Miami, Fla.

Dear friend:

Several days ago I received the book which you were so kind as to send me, something I am thankful for.

Although finding it interesting, I would appreciate that you stop sending me this type of literature to the Bank, since it might be harmful to me.

Accept appreciation from your friend,

"Carlos."

CS COPY

att. to UFGA-24689.
La Habana, Noviembre 29, 1966

Sr. Rafael Brevil
F.O.Box 3940
Miami, Fla.

Estimado amigo:

Hace unos días recibí el libro que tuviste la gentileza de remitirme, por lo que te doy las gracias.

No obstante lo interesante que lo encontré, te agradeceré no me envíes más ese tipo de literatura al Banco, pues puede perjudicarme.

Recibe afectos de tu amigo,

[Firmado]
The economic research unit of AMSROLL has throughout the past year received seven anonymous letters from Athens. These letters describe in detail Greek and Lebanese shipping with Cuba and appear to have been written by someone knowledgeable of his subject. The author apparently has access to AMSROLL publications as he makes reference to "your circulars". We forward a set of these letters by separate cover as they may be of interest and of possible use. The AMSROLL shipping studies have made a veiled acknowledgment of receipt of this material by referring to information received from friends in Greece; however, AMSROLL has used only those facts that we can check out here. As indicated on certain of the letters, copies of various ones have been sent to the "Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Washington", the U.S. Ambassador, London; or the U.S. Ambassador, Athens. A copy of the last letter received by AMSROLL was sent all three.

Philip G. Elwards

Distribution

2 - COS/Att U.S. SG

2 - WH/C/Att U.S. SG

Attachment

Letters

1 att.

CS COPY

DATE TYPED DATE DISPATCHED
5 Jan 1967 JAN 6 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-26699

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-36/3
Economic Research Eu. 3,
United Revolutionary,
10, S.E. 9th Street,
KINLY, Fla. USA.

Last week we wrote you few notes regarding illegal Cuban trading
also that the Greek Authorities, no doubt through US. pressure ( AT LAST),
are now investigating... names of ships and Owners who have been trading
with Cuba illegally since 1963. There is now quite a lot of propaganda
before that these investigations will be expedited through the Harbour
Masters in Greece, and Consular Authorities in ports outside Greece.
This news is of course to please USA, and to send to sleep those who
know nothing about the business, ordinary public opinion. As we said
before nothing much will be done, except some isolated, probably cases,
mostly of small Owners, to just please USA etc., In fact, nothing will
be done, because the Greek Authorities will firstly have to punish
THESALVAES before they can punish the Owners, Captains etc., mainly for
the following reasons:

1. The Greek Authorities know at all times where Greek ships are
trading, through their special Departments. They knew and
know where the ships were and are, and have never done anything
about it.

2. If in any special cases they did not know themselves, they
knew it through your circulars, also through the Black lists
issued by the USA Authorities.

3. Many ships arrived or sailed, or called for bunkers and
supplies through Greek ports, or ports abroad with Greek
Consular Authorities attending, and obtained clearance papers
for Cuba or cleared having arrived from Cuba. Not a word was
said about it.

4. AND MOST IMPORTANT.

Greek ships, by special law, pay Income Tax, nothing on profits
as other industries, but on each charter party voyage, whether
ordinary voyage or time charter. They pay a percentage ranging
from 1% to 4% on the gross freight or hire, depending on the
age of the ship (excluding new ships up to five years old paying
nothing). Tax is payable in six monthly periods. Then the Income
Tax Return is submitted to the Inland Revenue, Collector of
Taxes. Under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance, in the
following Documents are submitted and attached to the Returns.

A/. The CHARTER PARTY (properly certified).
B/. Freight Statement showing exact details of freight
rate, tons of cargo carried under that charter-party,
and the total freight (gross) earned and upon which
the tax percentage is payable.
C/. Sworn deposition of the Owners that all documents
submitted are correct and true, again confirming
the gross earnings of the voyage, which voyage must
be explained in detail, port loaded, port discharged,
dates, duration etc.
D/. MASTER'S LOG BOE, duly certified by the Harbour Master
or Greek Consular Authority, if vessel abroad at the
time, this under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
Mercantile Marine.

S/c att. L UFCA - 2667
CS COPY 19-120-24

It will be observed that in addition to all other sources of infor-
ation, the Ministry of Finance (Inland Revenue), and the Ministry of
- Mercantile Marine, were specifically advised, on each occasion, upon each voyage, by the Owners themselves, for the purpose of paying tax, the Authorities having been, and being very strict, in ensuring that no delay took place in submitting the Returns, and paying. Tax, and we can, therefore, see who is the first and biggest lawbreaker. Obviously, the Greek Authorities first, and the Owners second. As we said previously, fabulous profits have been made by the lawbreakers—the Owners mostly the friends of officials, and mainly Franjites clique—but such profits were partly shared by the Government, through higher tax per centage. If there was no illegal Cuban trading really permitted, these Greek ships would be employed in other trades, with small profits, and less tax to pay. We really feel that the USA is to blame because they were warned a very long time ago, almost soon after the law breaking had commenced, and several times afterwards, and through you, but nothing was done about it and allowed the comedy to continue. Officials almost openly say here that the USA did not really think that trading stop because the prohibitive law was passed in 1963 and that they knew that the law was passed only for politics and not to be enforced. Whether this is true or not, only the USA know. It is also said now, the Greek Authorities do not mind NO/1 starting enforcing the law, since Cuban trade has been restricted through the low price obtainable for sugar (about £14 per ton), and the economic difficulties of Cuba, thus also restricting imports into Cuba. Meantime of course millions and millions of dollars have been made from past trading, and partly present trading which enabled their chief partner and collaborator Franjites clique to build a vast empire of ships, so not much harm can be done even if they stop it now. There is no doubt, the USA have been very unfair and unjust to law-abiding citizens. The USA should either have demanded that both Greece and Lebanon (who made the law in return no doubt of USA help to those countries) comply with their Agreement with the USA and enforce the prohibitive laws of their respective countries, or relieve them of the obligation and cancelling the laws, so that all Greek and Lebanon Owners had the same chance of trading. USA's attitude is doing nothing about it, really makes them as guilty as the other two countries. You will find and be sure, that all the information we gave you in our previous and several reports, was correct and substantiated. All we have to say now is that any charters which allegedly are still valid because they were made before the prohibitive laws are as fake, as the investigations and punishments the Greek Authorities are supposed to be making against the law breakers. You will see how true also these will prove to be, unless the USA, if they want to, really investigate themselves the investigations with all the prejudiced people, with all the prejudiced people we have given you in past reports, and the present. We repeat, if nothing else, the USA owe it to the law-abiding Owners, to investigate the matter themselves, with their officials, and top men (including the examination of all Income Tax Returns as we said above), and see to it that law breakers, all of them small and big, are punished, and flags withdrawn, and all further trading is stopped immediately. It will, generally, do the USA good, if they were to prove to the world, people and Governments, even their friends and Allies, that the USA sees to it that agreements made with them must be kept and that they allow no doublecrossing and deceit.

cc Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Washington.

CUBAN TRADING

Economic Research Bureau,
United Revolutions
10 S.E. 9th St.
Miami, Fla., U.S.

Last year we gave you information and full details of vessels under Greek and Lebanon flags which continued, and still continue trading, with Cuba, the biggest and most influential of them being Frangistas, trading under both flags. We told you last year that we did not think Frangistas would stop trading. He has not. Only recently when a group of loyal and loyal Greek Owners took the matter to Greek Parliament, the U.S.A. Authorities appeared to wake up and demanded that the Minister of Foreign Affairs should ask the Minister of Mercantile Marine to produce a list of Owners still trading with Cuba. How come that a Greek Minister of Mercantile Marine should have a list, a very long list, of Greek ships still trading with Cuba, and yet he had done nothing about to stop the illegal trading, in contravention of his laws. Few months ago, few small Owners, the small fish of course, were asked to show where their ships had been trading, knowing of course they had been trading with Cuba. The local Courts were still "making enquiries". Nothing was done naturally about Frangistas, whose is responsible for about 90% of the whole have been prosecuted, by his partners, since it is more than obvious and clear that whatever has been the blessing of the Authorities, both in Greece and in Lebanon, Frangistas has been openly boasting, and he has proved his point, that the laws of Greece and Lebanon only apply to ordinary individuals, not to him. We do not know what the Minister's list is, but we shall not be surprised if that list contains only a fraction of his movements, and he will no doubt say that he has not fixed any ship at all since the law was passed in 1963 but that his contract was signed before the law. Of course he will. Any contract can be faked and back-dated, with the connivance of the Charterers. The only contract Frangistas had was with the Russians and the Russians never make contracts for more than one year. He has signed several contracts with the Russians since 1963. But let us forget about the Russians for a moment. Did he also have long years contracts with the Poles, with the Hungarians, the Checoslovakiens, Bulgarians, the Germans, the Chinese, the Syrians, the French, the Dutch, all Scandinuvians, etc., All the sugar in the World, and hundreds of ships would not be enough to cover these, had there been contracts. No, all his cargoes to Cuba and from Cuba (with possibly few cargoes with the Russians carried latest few months after the law was passed) were contracted after the law, and were fixed in the open markets a cargo or two or three at a time, either direct with the countries concerned or via London, and his ships have appeared in freight lists on the day they were fixed, in competition with other Owners and flags. If you or the U.S. Authorities were to appoint a reputable Chartering Broker in London, he would tell you exactly upon which date, what quantity, what destination, what rate of freight, each cargo was contracted. Why do you ask the Greek and Lebanon Authorities to demand that he produces a list of his 36 vessels with all their logbooks, the charter parties, the timesheets, the freight statements, and banking receipts and let all these be examined by the London Broker, not the Greek or Lebanon Authorities who cover his illegal trading. And what about the Cubans. Did Frangistas also have very long contracts with the Cubans, signed before the law in 1963, and are still valid and unexpired? Is this why Frangistas was in Havana at the end of last year, and again beginning of this year, when he fixed six liberties on timecharter for 912 months, commencing early in 1966, and did he also fix the EFRAOCHA for three years timecharter with the Cubans, during his visit in Havana as stated above, before the law was passed in 1963, bearing in mind that the vessel was built by the Russians at the end of 1965? Do you know that Frangistas is still negotiating with the Cubans, and Russians for the fixing of the 36 further ships the Russians will be building for him. Do you know that next January, the new sugar season starts, and that he already is in touch
with private Charterers, not the Russians or Cubans, for the fixing of his older tonnage, the Liberties? This takes place at a time that Greek and possibly Lebanon Authorities are supposed to be prosecuting him for his past sins. This is how much notice he takes of the Authorities. Dozens of Masters, Officers etc., including Frangistas are supposed to be in prison, to have paid huge fines, and to have lost their flags, in accordance with the provisions of the law. To our knowledge no one has been imprisoned, no one has paid fines, no flag has been withdrawn, and any time you want Frangistas do not look for him in his office. He will not be there. He has no time for office, he is too busy with the Authorities in Athens or Lebanon. Well, no one could ever imagine that the USA Authorities would continue to be taken for a ride, and to continue giving their aid to countries which use it against them. May be this is the American Policy, who knows. The USA did in fact say recently that unless Cuban trading is stopped, they would stop their aid. Firstly, is this enough, does it mean they do not mind for trading so far, so long as further trading is stopped, which will clear up and justify all Frangistas past sins? And secondly, we are certain, Frangistas, will find the way, to continue trading. So is to stop him. The Americans obviously cannot, the Greeks and Lebanese will not, therefore the Show goes on. Which means CHILLS DOES PAY, and stupid those who think otherwise. As before, it is regretted that we have to write to you again anonymously, and hope you forgive us. May be in your usual very informative circulars you can make your comments.
CUBAN TRADING

We expected by now some action from your end or from the American Authorities to whom we had sent our previous copied communication to you (Washington, Foreign Ministry, and U.S.A., Embassy, London), but regret that, at least to our knowledge, no action has been taken yet, and we assume this by virtue of the fact that the ships we mentioned previously just carry on the voyages for which they have been fixed, and their Owners openly negotiate further similar business from Cuba, as most of the trade to Cuba is presently done by Red flag ships. However, we supplement our previous letter by giving you some additional information.

A. Some Merchants in Cuba Trading, but mainly D. Enree, of Paris and Genex fix vessels or large contracts, with a long list of options as to where the cargo will be discharged, as often cargoes are shipped and not sold until after shipment and sailing of the vessel from loading port. These options start from Casablanca/Conch and continue into all Mediterranean/Red Sea/P. Gulf/India/Ceylon/Malay ports, sometimes as far as Japan. Freight rates depending at which port cargo is discharged, and final orders are usually given seven days after sailing from Cuba. As stated, the Lebanon Authorities ostensibly allow Lebanon flag ships to carry these cargoes to Arab Countries only, always subject to license. Owners apply for such license for Arab countries, and then if the Merchant orders the ship to say Italy or Germany or Japan, the ship just carries the cargo. Some Owners just do not apply for a license at all, and the Lebanon Authorities know what goes on, but turns the other way.

B. Greek and Lebanon flag ships just carry on trade in Cuba, and if you say they do not, then either you do not know about it, or they must camouflage their flags, or must fake (as regards eventual destination) the few cargoes they bring parties. Bills of Lading, manifests etc., even the number of ships trading in Cuba, given in your circular, is not correct, it is much larger, may be you do this intentionally for political reasons or maybe because you do not know.

C. Both the Greek and Lebanon Governments are in a position, in accordance with their famous laws, to stop immediately any ship, to take the flag away, and to impose upon the Owners very heavy fines and if the Owners do not pay the fines, then the ship will be immobilised since the Government will refuse cancellation of registry certificate, meaning that the ship cannot be put in a nother flag, and therefore become virtually non-existent. They can do lots of things, those Governments, but only if they want to and only if they want to apply their laws. To our knowledge, and we can assure you, we are very well informed, no such thing has taken place, no ship has been stopped and no one has been fined, and maybe, and mostly likely, will never be.

D. Whilst Owners we mentioned in our previous letter continue business as usual, and others, we notice with some surprise, that you are conspicuously avoiding and mentioning the name of Traviliris firm. Whereas we naturallycondemn and deplore this firm’s continuation of this trade, let us also be fair and just. This firm at least continues in a lawful manner, since they are floating only ships with flags whose Governments permit such trading in an unrestricted manner. So this firm are not law breakers, whatever else they can be accused of. On the contrary, you do not mention names of other Owners, who among other things are also Law breakers and amongst them the biggest and most influential.
In Frangistas, of Lisbon and Athens, represented by Purvis, London, having at his disposal some 35 Greek and Lebanon flag ships, trading mostly in C.S.A. Frangistas is also the sole importer of Russian timber into Greece, a huge trade. Also this same firm made an agreement with the Soviet Union few months ago and by virtue of this Agreement, the Soviet Union has commenced building for his fleet cargo ships, bulk carriers, tankers, and deepsea fishing Trawlers, at present worth $150,000,000, against Greek products, and some of these ships (Greek flag) will find their way to Cuba, we are almost sure.

In meantime some of the existing Greek and Lebanon flag Cuban traders were purchased with loans, through their governments, and these governments in turn received and receive help from the U.S.A., so in a vicious circle, some of the American money has gone for the purchase of ships to help trade with Castro's Cuba, whilst millions of American money is spent to stop this trade, what a world we live in.

It must be very obvious to you that many people, watchful people, intelligent and influential, know what goes on, and will continue to watch things until it is stopped, this mockery is stopped. It is also obvious that somewhere in one or more places, bribery and corruption are taking place, otherwise this state of affairs could not have started and cannot continue. We do not wish to believe that the American authorities do not know what goes. If Greek and Lebanon officials are bribed to close their eyes, O.K. but who stops the American authorities to "box the ears" of Greek and Lebanon authorities for allowing this situation to continue, and in so doing, they breaking firstly the laws of their respective countries, and breaking whatever agreement they have with the U.S.A. Government, and, what is more, with the American taxpayers money.

We do not intend continuing these letters, we think we have said enough and that we have given you and American authorities sufficient information which can be checked and verified. What we now want is results, namely, complete and instant stoppage of all Greek and Lebanon flag ships trading with Cuba, otherwise you will find that one after another many other owners, small and large companies, will re-enter, or enter Cuban trading with Greek and Lebanon flag ships, and no one should dare to condemn them. Also, do not forget that there are plenty of Companies which do not trade with U.S.A. anyway, therefore blacklisting is not of any importance.

Apologies again for the anonymity of this letter, and trust our reasons for it will be appreciated, especially when our facts are checked and found correct.

Geoff
Ministry Foreign Affairs, Washington.

American Merchant Marine Institute, Inc.
919 18th Street, N. W.  Washington, D. C. 20006

ALVIN SHAPIRO
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT

EARLE C. CLEMENTS
WASHINGTON CONSULTANT

295-4450

December 1, 1965

Dr. Rafael Rivas-Vasquez
Secretary for Economic and Professional Affairs
Movimiento Unidad Revolucionaria
10 SE 9 Street
Miami, Florida

Dear Dr. Rivas-Vasquez:

In response to your letter of November 19th, concerning Greek and Lebanese shipping to Red Cuba ports, I am enclosing some information I have obtained which should fulfill your requirements. In the case of the Lebanese Directives, you will note that no specific reference is made to shipping to Cuba.

Despite the fact that the enclosed information is not classified or restricted, it was obtained from a sensitive source and I would appreciate it if you would handle this matter discreetly.

We have been very pleased with the information your organization has been providing us concerning shipments to Cuba.

I hope that the data provided will be helpful to you.

Very sincerely yours,

Chester J. Szylinski
Director of Research

Attachment
We wrote you few days ago about the illegal Cuban trading and we now enclose here thoutting from today, 5th November 1966, Piraeus Newspaper "AraViLLA EXPRESS" from which you will observe that action is now being taken (three years too late and after millions of tons of cargo has been carried to and from Cuba) against owners, Captains etc. of Greek ships. The Greek Ministry of Mercantile Marine are also instructing port authorities to inquire and investigate when ships traded with Cuba since 1963. You see, until now or even now, the Ministry did not know... and now they will try to find out. No doubt owing to some half hearted pressure by the USA authorities, the Greek Authorities are at last compelled to at least show that they are trying to find out, now, which ships traded, also no doubt they will find some ships which traded and will prosecute the Captains and the Owners, and perhaps carry out some sort of punishment and naturally it will be the small and unimportant Owners they will trace. The big and influential will not even be traced. If one has to be traced, like Frangistas, they will find all necessary excuses and reasons for not prosecuting, the job for enquiring, prosecuting, and punishing the offenders is left with those with those connivance and knowledge trading continued since 1963, and still continues, so anyone can imagine, what kind of a job they will do. We wonder why no enquiries were made during 1963, 1964, 1965. Simply because enquiries were not necessary. You do not enquire about something you already know. The latest excuse of Frangistas, as we think you already know, comes through his brother, who is a Professor in Salonica University, that the law prohibiting Cuban trading was unconstitutional. This joke was as good as any, even better than the one about his false or fake contracts and charter parties. His other brother who is the real influence with the Russians and is a timber merchant having the monopoly of all Russian timber imports into Greece and some fruits from Greece to Russia, is the one who helped to secure the building in Russia of some 35 large liners and bulk carriers, plus a huge fish trawling fleet, in exchange for Greek products and part payment is cast from the vast profits they made out of their 35 second-hand Liberty vessels in Cuban trading. Even in this respect, do not forget that this privilege of building ships only goes to understand further building (they are cooking) was only given to the Frangistas clique by the Greek and Russian Authorities, and not to any other Greek Owner. Do the USA Authorities really think that the Greek Authorities (and in a smaller degree the Lebanon Authorities) will prosecute Frangistas, and even if they do, for eye-wash, they will find him guilty? You will see that nothing will happen. What we now have to say, as the only solution, may seem unpatriotic, but it is the only way to stop this rot. This is that the USA should discontinue immediately, and without any notice, all Military and Financial Aid to Greece and Lebanon, with intimation to them, that they will consider renewing same, as soon as firstly ALL trading with Cuba is stopped immediately disregarding any so called old contracts, and secondly AFTER they have prosecuted and punished properly all lawbreakers, small and big ones alike, and after all flags have been cancelled. This second action is a big debt the USA Authorities owe to all the Greek and Lebanon Owners who complied with laws of their countries and executed the wishes of the USA. It is a moral debt. These people will gain nothing because they do not ask for any money for all fortunes they lost in not trading with Cuba, but the USA, as a country known as just and democratic, will have failed in their duty if they are not going to just see discontinuation of further trading with Cuba, and no punishment for the past sinners, and talking of which, we think that the Greek and Lebanon Authorities committed and still commit a bigger sin than the Owners, since the Owners are simply out for high profits, but it is the Authorities who broke their word and
their agreement with the USA. Really it is the Authorities which deserve a bigger punishment. If the USA takes the suggested action, it will serve two purposes. One is that the question of Cuba will be settled, and the other, and probably more important, is that other Countries which also receive aid from USA will take notice and appreciate that same thing may happen to them, if they, some way or another, play the same games as Greece and Lebanon. The USA - if it is results that they want and not talk and excuses - must ACT first, and TALK afterwards. When this is done, the Authorities will trace in no time at all all the lawbreakers, will prosecute and punish them, and will stop all further trading. Simply because they already know all lawbreakers, and they have all the powers to punish them, but will not do so until it hurts, and it is going to hurt, a lot, if the Aids were stopped.

ΠΡΟΣΟΧΗ

Παραπέμπονται εἰς τὴν δικαιοσύνην
οἱ συναλλαγόσωμοι μετὰ τῆς Κώμης
Αἱ ἈΝΑΚΡΙΣΕΙΣ ΕΠΙΣΠΕΥΔΟΝΤΑΙ ΗΔΗ

ΠΑΡΑΠΕΜΠΟΝΤΑΙ εἰς τὴν Εισαγγελίαν Πειραιῶς οἱ πλοιαρχοὶ καὶ οἱ
πλοιαρχοὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν πλοίων τῷ

Τα ΥΕΘ διέταξε τὰς προενταγμένας καὶ λειτουργικὲς ἀρχές ὧν ἐπηρεάσει τὴν δικαιοσύνην
ἀναφερόμενοι διὰ τὸ πλοῖο τὸ ἀναφέρει τὴν 

Αἱ αυτοπροσωπεύσεις διακρίνονται θὰ ἀποτελῶν

Ἡ σύνδεσις

Καλαμάτας

Ὁ ΟΛΓη παρέδωσε

τὴν περιοχήν

γιὰ

Απήρ

409 ἐν

μελῶν

ρυμούλ

Ἐνεργη-

μίαν ἐμπορευτικὴν

ἀργυρίου τῶν

καὶ τὸ τὰ

412 μελῶν τὸ

ἀργυρίου τὰ

Τὸ ΥΕΘ, πρὶ

κεραυνοπτολεμαῖον

ἐλθὼν εἰς τὰ

καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ Πειραιῶ

ἸΚΑΝΟΝ

9-12-66

19-12-66
Your circulars regarding Cuban affairs and trading contain useful information but it seems that neither you nor the American Authorities are well informed. You know that, through American pressure, the Greek Government banned, several years ago, all trading with Cuba for Greek flag vessels, except few which were on timecharter and were allowed to run their charters, which finished a very long time ago. Similarly, the Lebanese Government banned all trading with Cuba for Lebanese vessels, for months ago, and only allow subject special licence, their ships to carry goods from and to countries of the Arab League. Both countries passed laws to this effect, and both state that infringement of the law carries very heavy fines against the Owners and Masters, and withdrawal of the flag.

That is what the laws say, but what is actually happening is another matter. Greek and Lebanese flag vessels have continued, since banning, to be fixed, have carried and are carrying cargoes, through a number of major Shipping houses, of Lisbon and London (Frankisthas, B. Purvis Shipping Co., London, their U.K. Agents, owning about 25 Greek and Lebanese flag Liberties and similar vessels, also Vlassopoulos, Livanos, etc., also owning a great number of ships with these flags. They simply say they do not care a damn about the ban, and continue to make fortunes in the Cuban trading, the reason being that as most other law abiding Owners with these flags do not go to Cuba, the market remains wide open for these people. They do not even try to hide, they just fix their ships, mostly in the Baltic Exchange, London and Athens, but also direct with Charterers in Poland, Hungary, Roumania, Russia, etc. and with Paris, and Genoa. The Governments of Greece and Lebanon, who made the laws, just look on, doing nothing about it, and this means that the laws were made, for paper value only. Some of these Owners fix their ships by name and flag, others just fix a contract to sail by name, later to be nominated later, and later they nominate Greek and Lebanese ships. Only the last few days, the following were fixed on the London market: Frankisthas, 50,000 tons sugar from Cuba to England for sugar Merchants Tate and Lyle, London, to be carried in 2 or 3 months, and Frankisthas has already nominated the NICOLAS F. (Greek flag) and San Spyridon (Lebanese flag), for 20,000 tons and the remaining 30,000 tons are being nominated also for Greek and Lebanese flag ships. The same Owner just also fixed one cargo for Valino (Sweden), and one to Odhia, Poland. He is presently negotiating several other cargoes, for his large Greek and Lebanese flag ships, with the aforementioned concerns, including another contract with D'Emre of Paris, via Genoa. The AIS GIANNIS (Lebanese) was fixed with Dreyfus, London, few days ago, to carry a cargo of beans from Vera Cruz and Tampico to Cuba, and after for sugar to Europe. Another concern trading with Cuba is Tsavliris of London and Athens, but this firm is not trading with Greek Lebanese flag ships.

The World thinks that you and American Authorities know all that goes on in Cuba. If so, it means that neither you nor American Authorities know and do not mind such trading with Greek and Lebanese ships if they know. We have given you some details of the latest fixtures. You and American Authorities can check up without any trouble and when they verify the correctness, they will no doubt protest immediately to the respective Governments, ask them to stop immediately the carriage of these cargoes and punish their Owners etc., as per their laws, and demand log books, freight accounts, etc. to verify all past trading, a tremendous one. If they think or you, do not do anything about it, it will mean that both you and American Government knew and know about this illegal trading and do not mind, in which case, we can more than assure you, that within the
next few weeks, the so far law abiding Owners of Greek and Lebanon flag
vessels, will also re-commence or start trading to Cuba, for the simple
reason that they will feel that they are breaking no laws, since they
who asked the Governments of Greece and Lebanon to pass the laws, do
not mind if they are not complied with. It remains, however, a great
mystery, because we cannot believe that the American authorities do not
know about this trading and why they have not protested to the Lebanon
and Greece Governments, and if they do not know, then there is something
very drastically wrong with their Intelligence.

Anonymous letters are not good things, in fact quite deplorable, but
we trust you will understand the reason for anonymity in this case, and
since you will no doubt like to know who wrote it, we can tell you is
written on behalf of some people who are very bitter and disappointed
that their compliance with the law puts them in disadvantage, especially
if it is proved that to comply with the law does not pay. We have
given you sufficient information to check facts immediately and stop
all the wrong doers. If they are not stopped, then your circulars will
have to increase in the very near future, the number of Greek and Lebanon
ships trading with Cuba.
CUBAN: TRADING

13th Nov. 1966

The Economic Research Bureau,
United Nations Office,
10, S.E. 9th Street,
Miami, Fla. USA

On the 16th instant we wrote you about the Castro Delegation which arrived in Athens recently to conclude new charting contracts. We can now report that the Delegation consisted of:

Mr. Herandez, Chief General Manager of CUBAS, Havana,
Mr. Fornaguera, Chartering Dept., CuIet, Havana, and that,
these two gentlemen arrived here at the invitation, and
as guests of FRANGISTAS with whom they remained during
their Athens stay. During of previous contracts discussed,
new contracts negotiated and concluded, both for cargoes
to Cuba, and sugar from Cuba for not only next year, but
for longer periods, covering liberties and ships being
built in Russia, and to be built, all new ships are and
will be under Greek flag. Older vessels are either Greek or
Lebanese. After Athens they went to Russia where they covered
the end of the business, and now they are in London,
having further talks with Frangistas London partners
PURVIS SHIPPING Co.

Mr. Fornaguera was until early this year, the Manager of
CUBAS London for three years, and is now again in
Havana’s Office. Both men are returning to Havana shortly.

When the Delegation asked FRANGISTAS about the steps presently

taken by the Greek Government in investigating (?) ships which have
been trading with Cuba since 1963, and prohibition of further trading,
FRANGISTAS assured them they have nothing to worry about, the prohibit-
ion is a false, so are the investigations and threatened punishment. He
also reminded them that these investigations took place before, but all
their cargoes were carried just the same, and numerous charters were
fixed at various intervals by FRANGISTAS through them, through Russia,
end through many private charters. He also assured them that whatever
he does is done with the full knowledge of the Ministries, and particularly
his special partners, high officials.

Most of previous information in our reports, and the information
contained in this report obtained direct, confidentially from FRANGISTAS
own Athens Office. If you, or USA Government have any wish to check up, it
is very easy, and single. If you or USA do not care to check now, then
you will see the accuracy of the report as time goes on. We are more than
certain you are satisfied that all our previous reports proved accurate
and were substantiated. We have to confess that we are now beginning to
believe that even you and USA authorities know all facts and truth and
either do not care or cannot do anything about it. There is no other
logical explanation, except that USA who are fighting Communists and
dictators in the name of democracy and freedom, it is this same USA who
are creating a dictator in the name of FRANGISTAS, whom it is the USA who
help him create waste fleets (rumours have it that shortly FRANGISTAS
is going to Moscow to place further building contracts), at the expense
of democratic Greek owners, who were compelled to either scrap and lay up
their ships (many have done this) rather than go to Cuba, at the request
CUBAN TRADING

2nd December 1966

The Economic Research Bureau,
Unidad Revolucionaria,
10 S.E. 9th Street,
Miami, Fla. USA.

Enclosed you will find cutting from yesterday's
NAFTIKA CHRONICA, which is the most influential and largest
Magazine in Greece, on maritime affairs. We trust you will
find same interesting.

FRANGISTAS clique meantime carry on the illegal Cuban
trading, and negotiate further contracts, which the Greek
Authorities are all out to punish Frangistas for his past sins.
And the U.S.A. just looks on. It is becoming obvious both
USA and Greece do not want Greek ships to carry on trade with
Cuba, unless same is done by Frangistas, their hero.

C.C. U.S.A. Ambassador, Athens,
U.S. Ambassador, London,
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Washington
CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH  

SECRET  

UFGA-26348

Reporting and its wealth of data and figures. AMFOUND-1 added that he is quite certain that those reports had been forwarded to the home office in DBRHNEN, although he could not personally vouch for this. The Station is happy to have this indication that AMFOUND-1's former office continues to receive this publication; AMSNAKE-1 had reported shortly after his arrival here that he had read the first issue of this series prior to his defection.

Philip G. Elhard
SPECIAL REPORT ON HURRICANE INES' EFFECTS ON CUBAN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

SUGAR

Evaluation:

The ERB estimates that Cuba will lose a total of 307,000 metric tons of sugar in its 1967 harvest as a result of hurricane Ines.

Greatest damage was done to the caña nueveyda, the uncut cane left over from the previous year. When Ines struck the ERB estimated there were about four million tons of caña nueveyda which should produce about 500,000 tons of raw sugar assuming a saccharose yield of 12.6%. The ERB arrives at this loss figure due the fact that fully 60%, or 3,000,000 tons, of the caña nueveyda was in the southern and central parts of Las Villas Province and the southern part of Oriente Province which is where Ines hit Cuba with its greatest force. In Cuba any hurricane usually destroys about 85% of the caña nueveyda that is hit. Thus the ERB estimates that Ines destroyed 1,360,000 tons. This will amount to a sugar loss of 171,000 tons, using the 12.6% saccharose yield figure.

The balance of the sugar loss will come from damage to the racon cane, the cane that sprouts again after having been cut. The ERB estimates a total of 16,600,000 tons of racon in Las Villas and Oriente provinces. The ERB's studies show that Ines struck 33% of this cane, or 5,400,000 tons. Historically, a conservative estimate of past damage to racon cane that is struck by hurricanes in Cuba would be 20%. Using this, Cuba's loss would be about 1,080,000 tons. Again, using the 12.6% saccharose yield figure, the raw sugar loss from the racon cane amounts to about 136,000 tons.

Available Information:

Pinar del Río Province: In 'Regional' Artemisa, 42 'caballerias' (state-owned) of sugar cane were damaged and 900,000 'arrobás' (*) of sugar cane were also damaged. 200 sugar bags of "Eduardo García Lavandera" sugar mill were damaged, specially from the rains. 50% of sugar cane areas went down on account of the winds.

In 'Regional' Costa Norte, they reported serious damage in the sugar canes.

(*) 'arroba' equals to 25 pounds.
Havana Province: None.

Matanzas Province: Sugar cane in Roque was heavily damaged. About 50% of the sugar cane was leveled, part of it will have a yield while other will dry up from root damage.

Las Villas Province: Sugar cane in Valle de Trinidad, crop damaged.
- Regional: Sancti-Spiritus: Serious damages to the sugar crop.
- Tunas de Zaza: gap in a sugar warehouse, but it was empty.
- El Veyno: 90% of the sugar cane was damaged (800 'caballarías' (*) crushed).

Camagüey Province: In Barajagua, Venezuela, San Díaz, Majagua, 'Regional': Ciego de Avila, the sugar cane suffered damage from the winds.

Oriente Province: Sugar cane suffered serious damages in the vicinity of Santiago. Near Yara, sugar cane fields were observed with two feet of water.
- In Boquerón 980 sugar bags were destroyed.
- In Casimena, Boquerón, Guantanamo, the sugar plantation suffered serious damages.
- In 'Regional': Guantánamo 7 cane shelters were destroyed and 39 were affected.
- In 'Regional': Palma-San Luis 500 'caballarías' of sugar cane were destroyed.

The roofs were blown off from sugar warehouses #4 and #5 in Guantánamo and the 2,500 bags of raw sugar stored therein became wet.

Tobacco

Commentary

Strong winds and heavy rains affect the quality of this plant, as long as they damage the tobacco leaves. Besides this, the leaves get stained and some rot as a result of being in contact with the wet soil, thus affecting the quality in one case, and becoming a total loss in the other. If the area is flooded, most tobacco leaves will rot.

Pinar del Río Province: In 'Juliana Alarcón' farm in Consolación del Sur and in 'Rosa, Salis' in San Juan y Martínez, the 10% of the tobacco seeds were damaged.

Havana Province: None.

(*) A 'caballaría' is a Cuban surface measure equal to 33.262 acres.
Cuba:

Matanzas Province:
None.

Las Villas Province:
Tobacco production was destroyed. Almost total loss of the tobacco crop. 5,000 houses of "curar tabaco" were destroyed in the following localities: Cabezas, San Pedro de San Juan, and Sancti-Spiritus. 33 houses full of tobacco (casas de tabaco) were destroyed, and 350 were partially destroyed. 7 houses of "curar tabaco" were partially destroyed in El Negral and 9 were completely destroyed, another 31 houses suffered minor damages.

Ciego de Avila Province:
None.

Oriente Province:
None.

Coffee

Commentary:
The hurricanes during September and October cause considerable damage to the coffee crop, because it is precisely during these two months when the coffee is harvested. Besides the damage to the coffee plants, the hurricane scatters the coffee beans which rot quickly in contact with the wet soil.

Pinar del Rio Province:
None.

Havana Province:
None.

Matanzas Province:
None.

Las Villas Province:
Coffee production was destroyed. Almost total loss of coffee crop.

Ciego de Avila Province:
None.

Oriente Province:
The ANAP (National Association of Small Farmers) called all the members of this association to pick up all the coffee crop that was seriously damaged. Until October 1st., in Buey Arriba and Guisa, 472,000 full-cans of coffee were collected, that represents a 27% of the actual crop, that was calculated in 1,740,000 full-cans. They are sending workers of Jiguani, Santa Rita and Guato Crasto to Buey Arriba coffee plantation. In 'Regional' Baracoa the hurricane Ines ripped the coffee crops. In 'Regional' Guantanamo 12,000 full-cans suffered serious damages. In 'Regional' Pina-San Luis 122,000 full-cans went to the ground.
In the Yara region the coffee crop was 50% destroyed; the coffee beans had been ready for harvest and therefore easily shaken off by wind.

In Buey Arriba, Regional Cauto-Bayamo-Jiguani, 500 women picked up about 10,000 full-cans of coffee.

FRUIT

Pinar del Río Province: In 'Guane-y-Manta' 1,000 banana plants were damaged.

In 'Regional' Pinar del Río 5,700 banana stubs were destroyed. In 'Regional' Pá-2 the guava plantations were damaged by the winds.

Havana Province: None.

Matanzas Province: None.

Las Villas Province: In Valle de Trinidad, the banana plantations and the fruit crop were completely destroyed.

In El Nájano 120,000 banana stubs were destroyed.

Ciego Provinces: None.

Oriente Province: Between the 80 and 90% of the fruit crop was destroyed. In 'Regional' Baracoa 40,000 banana stubs were destroyed.

In 'Regional' Palma-San Luis 14 'caballerías' of bananas were damaged.

In 'José País' farm 90% of the 80 'caballerías' of bananas were destroyed.

In Buey Arriba, 'Regional' Cauto-Bayamo-Jiguani, 300 'caballerías' of bananas were damaged, only 70 were destroyed.

All fruit in the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba suffered serious damage.

Near Holguín banana plants were leveled by wind.

Near Yara, banana plants had been broken.

In 'Regional' Guantánamo 35 'caballerías' of coconuts were destroyed.

VEGETABLES & "VIANDS"

Pinar del Río Province: None.

Havana Province: In 'Regional' Ariguánabo, losses in the agricultural specially vegetables seed beds.
Matanzas Province\footnote{1}: Malanga fields were covered with water which will rot most of the plant root. Complete loss of corn crops were observed in the Malanga area.

Las Villas Province\footnote{2}: ‘Viandas’ crops were destroyed.

Camagüey Province\footnote{3}: 2% of the plantain, yuca and sweet potatoes crop were destroyed.

Oriente Province\footnote{4}: In ‘Habas’ 1,400 bags of sweet potatoes and 160 quintals of yuca were collected. All vegetable crops in the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba suffered serious damage.

**BEANS AND RICE**

Pinar del Río Province\footnote{5}: 15 ‘caballeras’ of rice were damaged from the wind and the heavy rains in ‘Patricio Lumumba’ farm.

Havana Province\footnote{6}: None.

Matanzas Province\footnote{7}: None.

Las Villas Province\footnote{8}: In the zone of Jatibonico to Sancti-Spiritus, serious damages in rice plantations.

Camagüey Province\footnote{9}: In El Négano, 8 ‘caballeras’ of beans were destroyed.

Oriente Province\footnote{10}: 20% of beans crop were damaged.

Rice fields near Yara had been leveled to the ground.

**CATTLE, POULTRY AND DAIRY**

Pinar del Río Province\footnote{5}: 56 calves dead.

Havana Province\footnote{6}: None.

Matanzas Province\footnote{7}: None.

Las Villas Province\footnote{8}: Numerous animals were drowned.

Camagüey Province\footnote{9}: None.

Oriente Province\footnote{10}: 30 poultry shelters were destroyed, and 9 were af-
22 dairies were partially affected, and 9 were destroyed.
Several goats-barns were damaged.
2 poultry yards were damaged.
In Bayamo, in Bautista, "Regional" Damián de la Peña was a serious loss.
30,000 steers were seriously affected.

TRANSPORTATION

Pinar del Río Province: None.
Havana Province: Several portions of the highways running parallel to the railway had been washed away.
Matanzas Province: None.
Las Villas Province: None.
Camaguey Province: None.
Oriente Province: In "Regional" Palma-San Luis, 3 bridges were damaged. The railways bridge at Central Los Rincón, Alto Songo is impassable. From Santiago de Cuba to Camaguey, railways were damaged.

NON-SPECIFIED INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES

Pinar del Río Province: None.
Havana Province: The "Fico Lópes" refinery (former Reso-Belot), was seriously affected, when the line of 100,000 volts went down. Outside of the Capital there was a two day power failure.
Matanzas Province: None.
Las Villas Province: In El Négrano, 6 workshops were damaged.
Camaguey Province: None.
Oriente Province: In "Regional" Guantánamo 1 food store was destroyed. In "Regional" Guantánamo, 7 workshops were damaged.

OTHERS

Pinar del Río Province: In "Regional" Pinar del Río, 14,800 houses were
damaged, 3 warehouses were damaged in 'Regional' FR-2.

Havana Province: Many houses were completely under water, crops and farm land were flooded.

Matanzas Province: None.

Las Villas Province: 2 warehouses of fertilizers were damaged in El Mejano.

Carmagne Province: Jucaro, Quince y Medio and Central Venezuela, 'Regional' Ciego de Villa, inundations and damages in Venezuela sugar mill.

Oriente Province: In 'Regional' Quintana 77 kms. of fences were destroyed, and 8 pastures were damaged. Other damages caused by the rains were: 200 tons of hay and several pig pens, plus 3 warehouses, 250 bags of fertilizer, and 115 'quintales' (*) of cotton seed. In 'Regional' Palmza San Luis 60 houses were destroyed and 10 farm houses were also destroyed. Heavy rains affected 67 tons of fertilizer.

(*) One "quintal" equals 100 lbs., or 4 'arobas'.

Note: All other crops suffered the regular damage caused by a hurricane, i.e., broken branches, scattered fruits, plants destroyed, and the known damage caused by heavy rains, strong winds, and flooding.
BULGARIA REJECTS CUBAN SUGAR SHIPMENT

Last month the Economic Research Bureau (ERB) reported the establishment of a Soviet-Cuban quality control organization to undertake steps to maintain the quality of Cuban sugar. This organization, which incidentally has been patterned along the administrative guidelines and regulations of the Soviet Union, has been made necessary by the increasing difficulties the Soviet refineries are having with Cuban sugar. The phenomena of declining quality of Cuban sugar is further pointed up by Bulgaria's rejection of the first Cuban sugar shipment to that country from the 1966 harvest. This rejection, which occurred last August, was due to the high moisture content of the Cuban sugar. The source of this information is the Cuban Institute for Sugar Research.

CUBAN CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER RECOGNIZES MISTAKES

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, one of the key figures of the Partido Socialista Popular (now under which the Cuban Communist Party operated from 1959 to 1962), former Head of ENRA (Castro's National Agrarian Reform Institute), and presently a member of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, was interviewed by Joseph Timmer, correspondent for Budapest's NEPSZAVA, on September 16, 1966. The Economic Research Bureau has considered Timmer's statement a sound explanation of the real economic situation existing in Cuba. Therefore, we believe our readers will be interested in excerpts from NEPSZAVA's story of its interview with Timmer:

"Sugar:

"We exert our greatest efforts in the sugar industry. Despite this—unfortunately—we failed to attain our objectives this year and did not even come close to the 1965 results. Primarily because of natural disasters, particularly a great drought. We would like to harvest 6.5 million tons of sugar cane next year and attain a record output by 1968." (*)

Industrial and agricultural productivity:

"Industrial and agricultural productivity diminished after the revolution. Many people think that one must work less under socialism than under capitalism and, consequently, do not fulfill the legal working time. It is also true that this is partly due to the fact that work is not organized with sufficient care, particularly in agriculture. Moreover, serious problems are caused by the fact that the working people are not paid according to their output. Remuneration according to output, is, nevertheless, applied in agriculture, but we have not managed to introduce it in industry yet."

Skilled personnel:

"The shortage of experts is a very great problem. Imagine what tremendous

(*) ERB note: This constitutes a contradiction of Castro's stated goals. The Perspective Sugar Plan called for a 7.5 million-ton mark for 1967 and Castro has stressed this figure in his speeches over and over again."
difficulties we must overcome in this respect when, for example, an aptitude test carried out in over 2,000 state farms two years ago revealed that 60 percent of the heads of farms and 80 percent of the heads of work brigades did not even have three years of elementary schooling."

**Textile Industry**

"Cuba is a country badly off in raw materials, which are also very difficult to procure. The position of industry is closely linked to the disengagement of the United States. The Americans established factories and also provided raw materials before the revolution in Cuba. The factories belong to us today, but we must fend for ourselves with respect to raw materials. What this means is faithfully reflected by the fact that raw materials constitute 50 percent of our overall imports. Not even in this way can we meet our requirements, and, therefore, 40 to 50 of the capacity of our factories and plants lies idle."

**Agrarian reform**

"We have not distributed land among the peasants but we have established state farms, so-called people's farms."

The ERB's comment is that a Cuban Communist talks more honestly to a Communist Hungarian correspondent than the regime talks to the world.

**FREE WORLD SHIPPING TO CUBA DOWN 65.8%**

A total of fourteen Western vessels called on Red Cuban ports during the month of August.

The August 1966 total represents a drop of 11.5% in Western shipping to Red Cuba when compared with the August 1963 total, and a drop of 65.8% when compared with the August 1964 total (*).

In August's list, Great Britain continued to lead the maritime fifth column into western ports with eight vessels, followed by Greece with three, and Lebanon, France and Italy with one vessel each.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Vessels</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 1963</td>
<td>24 vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1964</td>
<td>41 vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1965</td>
<td>22 vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1966</td>
<td>14 vessels (all time low for August)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**878 FREE WORLD VESSELS FLESHED OUT OF CUBA SEA TRADE**

The Maritime Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce said on October 5, 1966, that ninety-six ships have been removed from MA's "Cuba Blacklist" on promises by controlling parties to keep out of the Cuba sea trade a total of 878 vessels, which are either owned or operated by these parties.

There are presently 254 ships in the MA's "Cuba Blacklist", representing 1,813,855 gross tons.
FRANCO SHIPPING CONTINUES IN THE CUBA SEA TRADE

Franco Shipping Company has been responsible for 18.1% of the total Free-World sea trade with Communist Cuba for the January-September 1966 period.

The EMB denounced the operations of Franco Shipping Co. and its nine subsidiaries in Greece and Great Britain in August 1966 (*) and now it wants to stress that FRANCO SHIPPING has continued engaged in the Cuba trade as EMB's statistics show:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Trips</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Free World vessels</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franco Shipping vessels</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Breakdown of Franco Shipping Co.'s vessels by registry:

a) Greek: 17
b) Lebanese: 9
c) 11,749 GRT Tanker Sword under Italian and Finnish flags: 5
d) AGETI under Cypriot flag: 1

Total: 32


BRAND NEW 9,500 TON CUBAN FREIGHTER GOES AROUND

The brand new 9,500-ton Cuban freighter MAFFO went aground on September 26th 1966 half-an-hour out of Casilda port in Cuba while en route to the southeastern Cuban port of Quayabal where she was scheduled to have loaded sugar for Japan. This was the first commercial voyage of the N/V MAFFO as she had made only one trip prior to this voyage which trip had been to deliver her to Cuba after her construction in Cadiz, Spain, on February 9, 1966.

Hurricane Inez, which hit this area with full force, probably contributed to the accident. By October 18, 1965, it was reported that the N/V MAFFO had been re-floated.
During the last months, the Cuban government has had difficulty in keeping its vessels afloat. The M/V ARACELLO IGLESIES suffered severe damages after crashing into the Norwegian M/V MIDAREID in the Panama Canal last June 11, 1965.

On April 8, 1966, the M/V ORIENTE was sunk after colliding with the Norwegian M/V ESTORFORT off the coast of Holland. And, on April 27, 1966, another newly-built Spanish vessel, the M/V LA PLATA, while on a trip to Japan, was involved in an accident, also in the Panama Canal, with the M/V RONG RONG AMBER of Liberian registry.

The ERB might comment that comrade Rodriguez's remarks to the Hungarian correspondent of problems affecting Cuban industry and agriculture might well have been applied to Cuban shipping as well.

Sources:

The above information has been obtained from reliable sources, both from Cuba and the Free World. For additional details address yourself to:

Economic Research Bureau
UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA
10 S.E. 9th Street
Miami, Fla. 33131, U.S.A.

Miami, Fla., October 27, 1966.
Miami, Fla., Oct. 28 (AP) — Cuba's vital, dollar-producing sugar crop was reduced by some 320,000 metric tons by Hurricane Inez, a report released today by exile economists.

The estimate was contained in an "Economic Intelligence Report" by Revolutionary Unity (UR), which keeps an eye on Cuba's economy.

The Cuban government has not announced Hurricane Inez's path.

It had set a 1967 sugar production goal of 7.5 million metric tons. This year's harvest yielded 4.5 million. A metric ton is 2,205 pounds.

The survey, which is based on information from inside Cuba, estimated Inez destroyed 1,083,000 tons of ratoon, a cane that sprouts again after having been cut. This damage represents a 156,000-ton raw sugar loss, the report said.

In addition, it estimated the hurricane destroyed 1,269,000 tons of left-over, uncut cane, known in Cuba as "cana video." This means a loss of 171,000 tons of sugar, it calculated.

Inez seriously damaged the quality of tobacco, Cuba's No. 2 crop, the report said. In one province, Las Villas, Central Cuba, most growing tobacco was destroyed, it reported. In addition, it said, more than 2,500 tobacco curing houses were demolished.

Coffee crop damage was extensive, the report said, without making an over-all estimate. The hurricane hit during the harvest season, and much coffee bloom off received rot damage before being recovered, it said.
LOBSTER EXPORTS CONTINUE TO CAUSE PROBLEMS FOR CUBA

Commercial sources in Canada and confirmed by information obtained in New York report that the Canadian and French authorities have launched investigations into the receipt of bad lobster in both Canada and France. The ERB has now learned that a shipment of more than eight thousand cases of Cuban lobster arrived in France on October 6th aboard the C.S. K.THERMA. This shipment was consigned to "Fouchette et Cie." and was inspected in its entirety by the French customs authorities who observed that this shipment contained swollen tails. Upon investigation, impurities were discovered, the lobster was found to have been overheated, and in some cases gray spots were observed.

"World Seafood Distributors", a Montreal firm that imports Cuban lobsters for sale in Canada and for transshipment to Europe, continues to have its difficulties with CUBA-EXPO. The ERB Cuban commercial sources in Europe report that Sam Beiner, an officer of "World Seafood", is complaining to CUBA-EXPO that CUBA-EXPO is unreasonably dissatisfied with the deliveries of "Halleyck", "Halleyck" appears to be a major European account for "World Seafood" and in order to protect this business Beiner was forced to tell CUBA-EXPO that "World Seafood" may be forced to quote "Halleyck" cost prices for direct shipment of lobsters from Brazil unless CUBA-EXPO and Cuban commercial representatives in Paris and The Hague cease these antics. This dispute involves more than two thousand cartons of lobster.

"World Seafood" maintains a stock of Cuban lobsters in Antwerp. The ERB has learned that Cuban commercial authorities in Europe have issued written instructions that in effect claim that more than one thousand cartons of lobster in this stock are under the control of CUBA-EXPO. Upon learning this "World Seafood" informed CUBA-EXPO in Havana that it will cause the arrest of any person removing these lobsters without pre-payment. The person concerned with attempted removal of these lobsters is a Mr. J. H. Schuss who appears to be releasing "World Seafood"'s lobsters by giving promissory notes which are not guaranteed by any bank or other institution. "World Seafood" is understandably seeking pre-payment or at least a guaranteed note of payment. By late September this dispute reached the point where "World Seafood" refused to assume responsibility for a sale of more than one thousand cartons of lobster made by Schuss acting on CUBA-EXPO instructions. CUBA-EXPO counter-claims that Schuss is "World Seafood"'s agent in these sales which, of course, "World Seafood" denies.

As if these were not enough problems, "World Seafood" realizes that it can buy similar lobster in New York at lower prices and is therefore insisting upon an additional discount from CUBA-EXPO in order to compensate for this difference.
One of the trade names being used in Europe is "Caribbean Queen". This particular label is for canned Cuban lobster and is being marketed by the firm of Jacques Fourchette which is also having its difficulties in this business.

The ERB has looked into the background of Mr. Sam Beiner and of his company, "World Seafood Distributors". Regarding the company, little can be found other than the fact that its office is in Beiner's home in Montreal. The address is 890 Fraser Avenue, Montreal, PQ, Canada. Trade directories of Canadian firms and similar sources available here and in New York do not list this firm. Regarding Beiner, the ERB can state that Beiner has been engaged, at least since 1962, in commercial activities involving Cuba. Over the years his interests have been purchasing frogs' legs, lobster, shrimp, fruits, candies, and vegetables. He is known to think favorably of the Cuban regime and in late September 1962 Beiner was openly discussing economic and social progress being made in Cuba while on a visit to Miami. Beiner is characterized by people now in Miami and who have known him in the past in Cuba as being an opportunist who was active in the Havana black market.

Note: For additional information on this matter see Economic Intelligence Report, Vol. II, No. 2, dated September 25, 1966.

U.R. Economic Research Bureau,
A total of seven (7) Western vessels called on Red Cuban ports during the past month of October, U.R. learned from its underground and international maritime sources.

The October 1966 total (7) represents an all-time-low for the November 1962-October 1966 period. The previous all-time-low was the February 1965 total, when eleven (11) Western vessels called on Red Cuban ports.

The October 1966 total also represents a drop of 73.1% in Western shipping to Red Cuba when compared with the October 1963 total: a drop of 69.6% compared with the October 1964 total; and a drop of 66.7% when compared with the October 1965 total. (*)

In October's list, Cyprus continued to lead the maritime fifth columnists with three (3) vessels, followed by Great Britain and Greece with two (2) vessels each.

The following is the complete list for October:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME OF VESSEL</th>
<th>FLAG</th>
<th>PORT</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FREE NAVIGATOR</td>
<td>Cypriot</td>
<td>Cárdenas</td>
<td>October 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUTHY ANN</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Havana</td>
<td>October 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EL TIRO</td>
<td>Cypriot</td>
<td>Havana</td>
<td>October 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VENICE</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Stgo. de Cuba</td>
<td>October 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIVIERA MARIA</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Isabela de Sagua</td>
<td>October 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRENA</td>
<td>Cypriot</td>
<td>Havana</td>
<td>October 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEWFOREST</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cárdenas</td>
<td>October 31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) October 1963: 26 vessels
October 1964: 23 vessels
October 1965: 21 vessels
October 1966: 7 vessels (all-time-low for this month and for the whole period).

Miami, November 10, 1966

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

REF.: 216
BAJA RECORD

CUINTA COLUMNA MARITIMA

Total de Octubre de 1966 representa baje de un 73.1%.

Un total de siete (7) buques del Mundo Occidental tocaron en puertos cubanos durante el pasado mes de octubre, UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA supo hoy por sus fuentes en la clandestinidad cubana y en círculos marítimos internacionales.


El total de Octubre de 1966 también representa una disminución de un 73.1% en buques del Mundo Occidental que atracaron en puertos de Cuba Roja, cuando se compara con el total de Octubre de 1963; un 69.6% cuando se compara con el total de Octubre de 1964, y un 66.7% cuando se compara con el total de Octubre de 1965. (*)

En la lista de Octubre, Chipre encabeza los quinta columnistas marítimos con tres (3) buques, seguida de Gran Bretaña con sólo dos (2) buques y Grecia también con dos (2) buques.

A continuación la lista completa del mes de Octubre:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOMBRE DEL BUQUE</th>
<th>BANDERA</th>
<th>PUERTO</th>
<th>FECHA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FREE NAVIGATOR</td>
<td>Chipriota</td>
<td>Cádiz</td>
<td>9 Octubre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUTHY ANN</td>
<td>Británica</td>
<td>Habana</td>
<td>12 Octubre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EL TTCO</td>
<td>Chipriota</td>
<td>Habana</td>
<td>21 Octubre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VENUE</td>
<td>Británica</td>
<td>São Paulo, Cuba</td>
<td>22 Octubre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROUE MARIA</td>
<td>Griega</td>
<td>Isabela de Sagua</td>
<td>27 Octubre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TREPAS</td>
<td>Griega</td>
<td>Habana</td>
<td>30 Octubre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW CREST</td>
<td>Chipriota</td>
<td>Cádiz</td>
<td>31 Octubre</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Octubre 1963: 26 buques
Octubre 1964: 23 buques
Octubre 1965: 21 buques
Octubre 1966: 7 buques (baja record para este mes y para todo el período).

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

Miami, 18 de Noviembre de 1966
REF.: 221
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE

WUX CD NEW YORK DATELINE COLLECT

6/600 SCLAMPETE SIETE BUQUES ABANDERADAS MUNDO OCCIDENTAL VISITARON OCTUBRE 1
CUBA DURANTE PASADO SIEMPRE SIENDO ESTA CIFRA HAS BAJA REGISTRADA DESDE
EXIGIOSE BOICOT MARITIMO REGIMEN CASTRO STOP ORGANIZACION ANTICRISTISTA
MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA QUE MENSUALMENTE OFRECE NOMBRES BUCOS
VISITAN ISLA OBTENIENDO INFORMACIONES DE CIRCULOS MARITIMOS INTERNACIONALES
AND FUENTES CLANDESTINAS CUBA DICE ESTA CIFRA ES MENOR REGISTRADA DESDE
ELLOS LLEVAN ESTADISTICA 1962 STOP AMBIENTADO OCTUBRE PRIMERA VEZ
GRAN BRETAÑA NO FIGURA CABEZA TRAFICO MARITIMO CON CASTRO STOP SIETE BUQUES
TOCARON CUBA ESE MES TRES ERAN CHIPRIOTAS DOS BRITANICOS
AND DOS GRECOS STOP COMPARANDO ISOL AL MAS RECENTE 77% DE ANTERIORES AÑOS

ARROTO

21 NW 9TH AVE.
FR 9-8261
AGENCIA FRANCE PRENSA
MIX CD NEW YORK DAYLESTER COLÁN
6/700

AIRADA PROTEGA OCASIÓNADO EXILIO CUBANO NEGATIVA AUTORIDADES ESPAÑOLAS CONCEDER ASILÓ POLÍTICO ESPAÑA CUATRO CUBANOS LLEGARON LAS PALMAS MÁS COMO POLIZONES ABORDÓ BARCO GRECO FREE NAVIGATOR CUBANOS FUERON OBLIGADOS HIZO ENBARCAR NAVE GRECA ENCUENTRA ACTUALMENTE NAVEGANDO REDIB ALEJANDRIA EGIPTO STOP PRINCIPALES ORGANIZACIONES CUBANOS ANTICASTÍSTAS DIRIGIDOS AUTORIDADES BOICOTANÉSTICAS PEDIENDO INTERPOSICIÓN BUENOS OFICIOS EVITAR CUBANOS POLIZONES SEAN DESEMBARCADOS ALGO PUERTO CONTIENGA NAVE ALEJANDO ESTO OÜRRIERÁ QUÉ 9 SERÍAN DESVUELOS CUBA DONDE CONTARÍANASES TREINTA AÑOS CÁRCEL O FUSILAMIENTO ANTE PAIDÓN ENJUICE STOP NUEDA UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA REPORTE MENSUALMENTE MOVIMIENTO BARCOS TOCAR PUERTOS CUBANOS ASEGURA FREE NAVIGATOR ENBAROLANDO BANDERA CHIPIOTI ESTUVO PUERTO CARDENAS COSTA RICA CUBA PASADO 9 OCTUBRE NAVIGATOR 8161 TOWELADAS OPERALO PACIFISTO CHIPING COMPANY SUBSIDIARIA TELÉFONOS PSA MADRICA GRECA Y LONDRES AGOSTO PASADO AÑO EN BARCO ENBAROLABA BANDERA MANTENIENDO HAITÍANO CUANDO FUE DENUDIO TRATAR CARGAR TRIGO AGENTES PARA LLEGAR CURA ARROJO 21 NW 9th Ave.
FR 9-2261
MIAMI, FLA., NOV. 19 (AP) - A sharp decline in shipping from non-Communist countries to Cuba was reported today.

Only seven vessels from these areas touched Cuban ports last month, said Revolutionary Unity (RU), an exile organization which watches such movements. RU noted this is the smallest number since it began keeping count four years ago.

Listed as visiting Cuba in October were three ships from Cyprus, two from Great Britain and two from Greece. This compares with 17 ships the previous month. Other October totals were 21 in 1965, 23 in 1964, and 36 in 1963.

RU said it did not know what caused the drop.
Micronoticias
Por SALOMON
Ariasno Jr.

***

En estos tiempos, los buques del mundo occidental entran en puertos cubanos en el período para de octubre, según informa la Universidad Revolucionaria, que lleva la estadística de que inverteban partidas.

El total de octubre representa una norma revestida, a partir de el año 1952, a la fecha, para el valor más alto y está en profesión cuando el hombre es uno en Cuba en septiembre del año pasado.

Este representó una disminución del 75.1 por ciento en el buque del mundo occidental que atravesó en puertos de Cuba este comparación con octubre de 1952, un 25 por ciento con 1951 y un 85 por ciento con 1950.

Cubanos evolucionan la lista de los países que permiten a sus buques convertirse con Cuba, según se informa por Gran Bretaña y Gran sesión.

Sin embargo, esta instrucción alivian del tráfico naval del mundo libre con Cuba resulta de las medidas tomadas por el Gobierno de EE.UU, y las nuevas librarán de tablas de varios países, muchas están en gran parte por la remisión construcciones de buques en España para la flota mercante de Cuba.

***
MIAH, FIA, NOV. 23 (AP) - A CUBAN DIPLOMAT WHO REPORTED LAST WEEK THAT CUBA'S ECONOMY IS "MILK ON THE ROAD TO REACHING A CLIMAX" AFTER SUFFERING THE "ECHS" LAST WEEK, SAID THE "CUBAN ECONOMY 12047 GOD" TO THE "UNITED STATES FOR AID", TOLE VOLTA. VOLTA, WHO STEPPED DUTIES AS AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES LAST NIGHT, SAID "CUBAN ECONOMY REFFED TO THE "CUBAN ECONOMY" FOR AID".

WHEN HE LEFT CUBA, VOLTA SAID, IT WENT HIM TO THE "CUBAN CHANCE" THERE. VOLTA, 36, SAID THE FOURTH PERSON TO REFLECT FROM THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN LONDON SINCE Fidel Castro's TAKEOVER IN 1959.
By the press as editor

ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER

In a 15-page Nov. 24, 1965, article, President Nixon, who traveled to the southern United States, was depicted as seeking to cut tobacco and restore it to the tobacco industry, according to an official of the Cuban Tobacco Industry.

Raul Volta, a department store executive, called his former company, "Fidel," a product.

"The industry needs serious in order to recover due to disrupted markets," Volta, former chairman of the Tobacco Exporting Company, told newspaper yesterday.

Cuban cigars are scarce in Cuba and scarce again, Volta said, adding that efforts are being made to arrive from London, where he gave up his post as trade counselor in the Cuban Embassy.

The quality, extent and production volume of Cuban cigars, Volta said, have fallen victim to things such as:

- Use of less tobacco and tobacco leaves,
- Scarcity of material such as alabaster, aluminum, rings and cedar boxes used in packaging,
- A high percentage of poorly colored tobacco,
- Alterations of the traditional blends that give character to cigars,
- Use of inexperienced personnel in classifying top-quality cigars, resulting in reproduction of undersized, oversized or too heavy cigars.

Volta reported the production has declined from the pre-Castro average of 45,000 tons annually to 15,000 tons in 1965.

He added that tobacco in the valley region, which is said to have declined, was more than 70,000 tons in 1964.

He said tobacco leaves in tobacco leaves have been replaced by a new position in Cuba's No. 1 crop, with a product being to bolster that No. 1 crop.

The executive added that due to the poor quality, tobacco growers by the state, few of the most expensive products have diverted their lands to other crops.

In addition, the state of the Cuba-Cuba organization, revolutionary unity, reported after the Cuban revolution has been seriously damaged this season's tobacco crop.
SEGUNDO ULTIMO REGIMEN CASTRO STOP VOLTA 35 FUÉ PRESENTADO POR ORGANIZACION ANTICASTRISTA MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA REGULARMENTE PRESENTADO TODOS DIPLOMATICOS DEPENSIONADO CASTRISTA STOP ADemas DE SEñALAR FRACASO INDUSTRIA AZUCARERA VOLTA ASENTAR IGUAL CAMINO PARA INDUSTRIA TABACALERA CUBANA SEGUNDA IMPORTANCIA DRA HEVELANDO PASADO AÑO REGIMEN QUITE APERAS LOGRO COLOCAR Europa OCCIDENTAL DOSUEL TOQUELEDAS METRICAS TABACO CON INGRESO APROXIMADO MILLON MEDIO DOLARES ST-P IGUALMENTE SEñALO DIFICULTADES SUPRIMIDAS POR CASTRO SUS EXPORTACIONES LANGOSTA INCLUYENDO GRAN BRETAÑA ENTRE PAISES COMO CANADA FRANCIA AND POLONIA QUE HABIAñ DEVUELTO MERCANCIA POR ESTAR MAL ESTADO STOP QUITE SI DIFERIDO DIJO VOLTA ESA MERCANCIA DEVUELTA FUÉ PUESTA LUEGO VENTA MERCADO DOMESTICO CUBANO PRACTICA ESTA SEGURIDAD INGLO COMO LANGOSTA SINO CON TODOS PRODUCTOS EXPORTACION RECHAZADOS DESTINADO CONSUMO PUEBLO CUBANO UNQUE ST-P EHDIPOLIMATICO CUBANO FINALIZO ENTREVISTA ASENTANDO QUOTE POLITICA AGRESIVA CASTRO IDO AUMENTO AND SIGUIRA POR ESE CAMINO HASTA ESTE SEA ELIMINADO UNQUOTE

ARBITRO
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE

WUX CD FESTORK DAYLETTER COLLECT

3/15/62

RECIDEN CASTRO UTILIZA POcos ORGANISMOS INTERNACIONALES DONDE
TIENE REPRESENTACIÓN PARA SUS DELEGADOS LÍEVEN POLÍTICA SUSPENDIENDO
MEJORES RELACIONES POSIBLES CON DELEGADOS OTROS PAÍSES ESPECIALMENTE CON
LATINOAMERICANOS STOP ESTAS INSTRUCCIONES FUERON IMPARTIDAS DELEGACIÓN PARTICIPÓ
CONFERENCIA CAFE CELEBRADA EL SALVADOR DONDE CUBA PODÍA CONCURRIR POR MAINTENIR ELE
ASIGNADA UNA CUOTA 194,000 SACOS CAFE PESAR AÑOS CUBA CARECE ESE PRODUCTO
PARA EXPORTACIÓN REVELÓ HAY NAVE VOLTA LÁNDIA QUEMA HASTA HACE Pocos DÍAS ERA
CON EL JER COMERCIAL EMBAJADA CUBA LONDRES AND REPRESENTANTE GOBIERNO CASTRO ANTE
ORGANISMOS INTERNACIONALES AZUCAR CAFE AND TACO AND DELEGADO OBSERVADOR ANTE
GRUPO INTERNACIONAL DELA LANA STOP CONFERENCIA PRENSA CELEBRADA AQUÍ VOLTA
ASEGURÓ QUEM ECONOMICAMENTE RECIDEN COMUNISTA CASTRO ESTÁ LLEGANDO CLIMAX
DESPUÉS SUPONER UN FRACASO ECONÓMICO TRAS OTRA IDENTIFICACIÓN PARA
BÉNER AÑO VENIDERO NUEVO FRACASO PRODUCCIÓN AZUCAR QUE RECIBIR CURAMO DÍO
INICIO HASTA ANUNCIAR INICIO ZAPRA
ESTA ALCANZARÍA SIETE MILLONES TONELADAS STOP SIGUE ARROYO

21 NW 9na ave.
FR 9-4261
On November 22, 1966, Mr. Raúl VOLT, Landa, met with representatives of the press in Miami in order to discuss Cuban trade problems abroad and Cuban economic problems within. The ERE has felt that Mr. Volta's information will be of interest to all our readers, so therefore this issue of the Economic Intelligence Report contains the verbatim account of Mr. Volta's words.

STATEMENT

My name is Raúl VOLT, Landa, and until a few days ago I held the posts of Trade Counselor to the Cuban Embassy in London, Representative to the International Sugar Council, Representative to the International Coffee Organization, to the International Wheat Council, and Observer-Delegate to the International Wool Group.

On November 14th my wife and I were interviewed by the press in New York at which time we discussed the reasons that prompted our defection. The results of this conference have appeared in the press and therefore today I would like to discuss in some detail economic problems confronting Cuba today with which I am personally familiar and which, I hope, will be of interest to you gentlemen. In an effort to be brief and not take too much of your time, my friends here have been kind enough to reproduce some technical and detailed information on the following subjects: sugar, tobacco, the problem of convertible currency, problems of the hoarders, exports, and usurpation of registered trade marks. There is also attached a resume of positions held since 1955.

From the economic point of view Castro's communist régime is well on the road to reaching a climax after having suffered one economic set-back after another. Today Cuba's leading cash crop, sugar, can be termed a failure in the sense that due to a number of factors and particularly mismanagement in Cuba plus the low world price, it is unable to support the Cuban economy. The second most important cash crop, tobacco, similarly has been so mismanaged that today it is an unimportant earner of critically needed foreign exchange.

This economic chaos has forced the Cuban régime to increasingly desperate measures in order merely to survive. For example, meat, tobacco, eggs, fruit, vegetables, coffee, preserves, and shoes are some of the products that today are exported from Cuba in an attempt to earn the hard currency to purchase heavy machinery, locomotives, fishing boats, and all the rest necessary to maintain any semblance of an economy. An unfortunate result of this is that today there is a serious shortage of the proper foods throughout all of Cuba. There is rationing. The people have insufficient rice. Even citrus fruits have had to be rationed. Milk is in critically short supply. There are not enough shoes to go around. Coffee, long considered a necessity by the people, is sometimes unobtainable and is always in short supply. Our beer, famous for years, is now hardly drinkable when it is available. These problems, which before the communist régime were totally unknown to Cuba, were brought painfully home to me each time I returned to Havana from my post in London.
For example, I was in Havana in July after hurricane 'Ira' hit Western Cuba last June. A number of buildings and houses had to be repaired all over the city of Havana. Debris from demolitions and subsequent reconstructions was piled on the streets. Time passed, but the streets were still full of debris that gave the city the looks of a bomber target. This caused considerable disgust among the population of Havana.

Another example is that the food quota on the ration book is largely a "paper" reality. What I mean is that the food on the book is rarely available, and whole months pass without any meat, lard, oil, rice, beans, being distributed. At this precise time, in Havana, there are no seasoning ingredients available to the consumer. When the product is available again, the meager book quota is what each one gets, without any compensation for the time during which he could not even get that.

As a result of this, queues are longer every day, with people standing in line since the early morning hours to make sure that they won't be left out. There are often fights and even minor riots at the queues on account of the irritation that this situation causes.

Also I have seen that the regime is opening many new restaurants, allegedly to make recreation facilities available to the people. In reality, however, what they seek is to extract money from circulation, as the prices at these new places are extraordinarily high. Hence, only the members of the ruling "new class" may enjoy the new spots, as the working people could never afford them.

I will be happy to attempt to answer any questions that you may have regarding those areas of life or of events in Cuba today with which I am familiar.

Thank you.
As the Cuban representative to the International Sugar Council I was able to observe at first hand some of the problems facing the Cuban sugar industry. Some observations follow:

International Aspect

It is well known that all countries that import or produce sugar are making efforts towards reaching a long-term Sugar Agreement that would stabilize and solve the critical situation in the world market of over-supply and low price. Castro's stand to that respect has been to boycott and undermine such efforts.

This has been clearly reflected in Castro's refusal to participate in the various work groups that have been created for that purpose under the sponsorship of the Secretary General of UNCTAD, Dr. Raúl Prebisch.

Castro believes that by not participating in efforts to reach a Sugar Agreement he can cause the collapse of the sugar industries in the less efficient producer countries in order to bring economic hardship to those countries in Latin America to which sugar exports are important. Castro's ultimate end, of course, is to cause internal disturbances in these countries and thus to ripen them for Castro-communist subversion. This has been a boomerang to Cuba. The hoped-for economic disaster in the Latin American nations has not occurred. Instead, it is occurring in Cuba. The régime is unable to meet its announced goals (the goal for the sugar year 1966 was 6,500,000 tons whereas 4,655,255 were actually harvested). To move its sugar, Cuba has been forced to grant special discounts, for example to Japan, and to Great Britain. This further compounds the chaotic economic situation in Cuba as the country obtains even less per pound than the current low price of 0.014 $.

Internal Aspect

The blows received by Cuba's sugar economy from the hurricanes and droughts are nothing compared to the damage caused by the improvisation and incompetency of those who today mismanage our country's affairs. The shortage of manpower for cutting the cane, the enlistment of inexperienced "volunteer" cane cutters, the failure of combine machines from the USSR, and the deteriorating situation in the transportation of the cane crown the existing economic anarchy.

The régime has been committed by Castro to produce 10,000,000 tons of sugar in 1970, which figure sugar economists in and out of Cuba agree is most unlikely. However, the attempt to reach this goal is resulting in activities that amount to economic suicide. Cuba is buying generators in England costing more than one million dollars which will be used to provide power for the "Centros de Acopio" (reception centers). The concept of these centers was tried many years ago in Cuba and discarded as both inefficient and uneconomical. There is no reason to believe that anything has happened that will change this. So, what to do with the generators?

One might conclude a discussion of Cuba's sugar problems with the observation that never before in Cuba's economic history has so much discussion, so many speeches, and so much activity resulted in such a loss of effectiveness.
TOBACCO

I was associated with the tobacco exporting enterprise (Empresa CUBANA-BR-CA) for four years including three years as Assistant Manager. I am happy to make my first hand knowledge available.

Agricultural Aspect.

This industry is another example of the administrative clumsiness of the Communists. Once the second industry of Cuba, and the source of great prestige for our country, it seems to be doomed to total destruction since the Communist régime took control of it.

Leaf tobacco production has declined by over 30% comparing the 1965 figure (32,000 M.T.) with the traditional production of over 45,000 M.T. yearly. The best tobacco fields of the famed Viñales zone, which gave the best wrapper in the world, have experienced a sharp decline of over 70% in yield and quality, due to lack of fertilizers and the necessary care.

About 20% of the plantations are affected by the bug, as the fields and curing sheds are not sprayed. The D.H.I. policy of very low prices paid and lack of incentives given to the most efficient producers has forced the producers to divert their lands to less risky and more profitable crops. This is particularly true of the Remedios and Cabaiguán zones. Peasants trained in tobacco growing have been absorbed by cane growing areas in order to remedy the critical manpower situation in the latter, but at the expense of inflicting grave damage to the tobacco economy. This has brought the incorporation of "volunteer" workers to the cropping of the leaf, which workers, due to their inexperience in such a specialized work, break the leaf, with the resulting damage to its quality.

Industrial Aspect.

The industrial phase of the tobacco industry has not been better off, and in our opinion it has been the one that has suffered most from the incompetency of the régime. The quality, presentation, and production volume of Cuban cigars has been seriously affected, not only as far as production for national consumption is concerned, but also as regards the portion designed for export. It would be endless to list the wrongs that have been done, but they may be outlined thus:

1) Loss of quality due to the use of raw leaf tobacco and without the necessary aging.

2) Failure to deliver to foreign customers due to the lack of intermediate materials to finish the product, such as aluminum tubes for packaging these cigars, aluminum cases, holders, rings, cedar boxes, etc.

3) Continuous complaints are received from foreign importers, due to the detection of high percentage of wormed cigars.

4) The traditional blends that gave character to each of the traditional brands have been changed and altered, which has resulted in the imaginable loss of quality and prestige.
5) Incorporation of inexperienced personnel to the preparation of "Alta Regalia", (top-quality, hand made) cigars, which affects the finish of the handcrafting cigars with the result that undersized, oversized, or too heavy cigars are produced.

These and many other irregularities take place today in our industry, without failing to mention that the climax of all this situation is caused by the lack of cigars for national consumption, something definitely unprecedented in the history of our country.

Trade Aspects:

The Cuban Communist régime faces great difficulties in its efforts to make dollars through tobacco exports, and some of them have been pointed out already.

Nevertheless, I believe that the chief trouble is represented by the market limitations suffered by Cuban tobacco today. Castro has been unable to convince his Iron Curtain "friends" to purchase the volume that was formerly absorbed by the U.S. He has only persuaded the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany to buy a total of approximately 5,000 M.T. The truth, however, is that these exports have been made with distrust, as there have been reports that Cuba's "friends", after buying this tobacco, re-export it to hard-currency countries at lower prices than those established by the "Empresa CUBATABACO" for the free world market.

I may cite a specific instance of this. Late in 1962, the Polish enterprise ROLIMPEX bought approximately 600 tons of tobacco. The contract specifically prohibited re-exportation by the Poles, and provided that any legal difficulties that might arise would be submitted for arbitration. After the deliveries were made to ROLIMPEX, reports began to arrive from the Free European market that Cuban tobacco leaf was being offered at a much lower price than that established by the Cuban exporting enterprise in its sale of tobacco to Free Europe. At first, it was thought that this was only a maneuver for lower prices by the European importers, but, as time passed and CUBATABACO could not place any sales, the reports, which were still coming in, were given more credence. As a result of this, I was sent to conduct an on-the-spot investigation in Europe, and, sure enough, I discovered that the Poles were indeed re-exporting our tobacco, with complete disregard of their signed agreement with Cuba. The violation was reported to the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Trade, which instructed CUBATABACO to institute proceedings to recover damages from the Poles. Cuba sued for $3 million and the Poles, having been caught red-handed, offered a settlement of $500,000 which was accepted. The payment was made in dollars, out of the Polish-Cuban clearing.

This "international solidarity" practiced by Communist countries kept Cuba for a long time (1962-1963) from entering Western European markets.

Dumping as practiced by these countries, the lack of adequate stocks for the Europeans' taste, difficulties and delays in deliveries (due to shortage of ships) have made the Europeans shy away from buying larger quantities of Cuban leaf, and many European importers have learned that Cuba is not a reliable source of supply.

Due to the above stated reasons, the Communist régime can barely place 2,000 M.T. in Western Europe, for an annual revenue of about U$1,500,000.
PROBLEMS WITH THE LOBSTER EXPORTS

Upon my arrival here I was surprised to learn the extent of the detailed information possessed by UNIDO REVOLUTIONARIA and its Economic Research Bureau. This information is accurate and I am able to add more information to that known by the U.R.

Cuba had been exporting lobster through Sam Beiner, of the Montreal firm "World Seafood Distributors". These exports were made by the Cuban concern ALIMEX to "World Seafood", and the latter re-exported the lobster to European firms such as the Belgian "Hallowick" and the British "Young Seafood".

When ALIMEX was replaced by CUBAEXPORT, the new Cuban concern tried to grab the European lobster market from Beiner and his Canadian firm. This was the objective for which CUBAEXPORT Director Rodolfo Sheing was working during a recent European tour, and, to this end, he made contact with the British firm "Young Seafood", the French firm "Jacques Fourchtein et Cie.", and others in Western Europe. CUBAEXPORT was to a large extent successful in this effort to cut out Beiner.

The troubles of CUBAEXPORT and of all other Cuban foreign trade enterprises with free-world firms are due to the fact that Cuban concerns have no respect for international trade ethics. They take recourse to all sorts of maneuvers, as selling is their only concern; this is the long run alienates customers. In the case of the lobster exports lack of quality has been apparent. Through my office in London I learned of complaints of improper cooking, packing, and even crating of lobster exported to France, Poland, and England. Hundreds of cases have been rejected by health and customs authorities and by the importers themselves. The problems Beiner has encountered in Canada have been duplicated in Europe.

Naturally, the poor quality of the lobster has been the cause of probes by Canadian, French and British health authorities. Even the authorities of Communist countries such as Poland and Czechoslovakia have been forced to look into the matter. These countries have returned lobster to Cuba as "unfit for human consumption". This merchandise, however, was subsequently placed in the Cuban domestic market, a practice that has been followed not only with the lobster, but also with all other exports that have been turned down by Cuba's customers abroad.

Perhaps less serious cases, but which also illustrate the regime's contempt for the Cuban people, are good instances of this policy. I refer to products which, although not quite unfit for human consumption, do not meet foreign quality standards, such as fruit preserves that have been turned down abroad because of their excessively high contents of sugar, and rum that was returned because of impurities. These items were retailed to the Cuban people after being rejected abroad.

There also are complaints about the presentation of the product and the packing, all of which has caused stern protests by the affected free-world firms, such as "Jacques Fourchtein et Cie.", which complained to ALIMEX last year and to CUBAEXPORT this year.
INFRINGEMENT OF REGISTERED TRADE-MARKS

As is known, the Castro régime, after monopolising foreign trade and seizing private industries, arbitrarily decreed that all Cuban trade-marks had become the property of the government. However, with the lawful owners of these trade-marks scattered as exiles over the free world, Castro has met considerable legal difficulties in using the stolen brand names for his exports. Abroad, Castro has been unsuccessful, in most cases, in assigning these trade-marks to the régime's export enterprises, as, in most countries, the brands are registered in the names of their lawful owners.

This Castro violates international trade-mark regulations. This situation is particularly true with respect to the world-famous trade-marks of Cuban cigars. One of the best-known cases is the continued exportation of cigars bearing the "La Corona" and "Henry Clay" brands, which are the property of the American Tobacco Company. This firm was forced to take direct action in England, France, and Switzerland, countries to which Castro has had to halt exports.

Another example is the much-debated case of the "BACARDI" brand, which is now being contested and which will be brought before the courts of Great Britain by February or March next year.

In 1963, British authorities seized a shipment of Bacardi rum which was recently returned to Cuba, and, therefore, the régime has been unable to export this brand to England. The régime faces similar problems with Canada and Japan.

The first complications rising from this case took place right in Cuba, where there were even dismissals in juridical direction of the Ministry of Foreign Trade early this year. Presently, Cuba is facing the following difficulties in this case:

1) Legal contradictions due to Cuba's very laws of expropriations and to the perennial "reorganisations" and "creations" of Cuban foreign trade concerns.

2) Restricted opportunities for the Cuban régime to present witnesses, as it fears that such witnesses will take the chance to defect.

3) Troubles between the Cuban régime and the very solicitor of the London "Gelfert and Seddeley" case.

4) Financial limitations, as the Cuban régime has only US$42,000 to finance the expenses of the case through the London law firm "Clark Russel".
NAME: Raúl VOLTA Landa  Married, three children  Age: 35

Professional Information


3. 1954: Member of the Trade Delegation to Spain, Tobacco Advisor.

4. 1952: Member of the Trade Delegation to Spain, Tobacco Advisor.

5. 1952-1953: Operative Assistant Manager, "Empresa CUBATABACO".

6. 1951: Chief of the Leaf Tobacco Section of the "Empresa Cubana de Exportaciones".

7. 1950-1951: Sales Manager "Hispano Televisión Co." and "Fedena".

8. 1956: Sales Manager, Electronic Dept., "Electro Sales Co." (Sylvania)

U.S. Economic Research Bureau
10 S.E. 9th Street,
Miami, Fla., U.S.A.

On 15 October Jose R. Mercado, President of the Colombian Confederation of Workers (CTC), discussed with AMWORD-3, the Secretary General of AMBROA, the CTC's plans to do what it can to discourage Japan-Cuba trade by bringing influence to bear on the trade seminar in Tokyo that was to have begun on 29 October. Upon his return to Bogota, Sr. Mercado wrote a letter to the Japanese Ambassador to Colombia, a copy of which we forward together with a translation.

PHILIP G. ELMAARD

Attachments: h/w
1. Letter (copy) as stated
2. Translation of letter

Distribution:
3. COS/Bogota, w/atts. h/w  
2. COS/Tokyo, w/atts. h/w  
2. C/WH, w/atts. h/w  
2. WH/C; w/atts. h/w

DATE TYPED: 26 Oct 66
DATE DISPATCHED: UL 5 1966
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-2677
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 14-120-26/3
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
CONFEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE COLOMBIA
PERSONAL JURÍDICO NO. 377 DE 1967
P.M. DE C.I.O. S.L. O.P. 17.

Dagoce, 1 de octubre 17/66

Sr. Director
UNIÓN DEL JAPÓN
M. COLOMBIA

Excmo. Señor Trabajadores:

Con ocasión a que durante los días 19 y 21 del presente mes se realizará un Simulacro en la ciudad de Tokio, con la participación de algunos países de América Latina, la CONFEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE COLOMBIA C.T.C., quiere notificarle por su contenido al gobierno democrático de Japón la solicitud que en otras ocasiones hemos formulado referente a que como lo más próximo posible, el permutante consulado con ese país, el Japón, tiene establecido con el gobierno comunista de Cuba, al recordar que los intrusos con el gobierno en Cuba lo que la venta de sus productos, es utilizada para financiar la subversión y el terrorismo de la América Latina.

Nuestra solicitud la formulamos con miras a salvaguardar los intereses del Simulacro Libre y Democrático y la Integridad institucional de nuestro país, ya que Colombia como otros países de América está comprendida dentro del programa de Infiltraciones que desde Cuba ha planteado el gobierno internacional, como lo confirmó el Periódico "EL TIEMPO" en uno de sus editoriales del 12 de octubre.

Loscitamos en hacer esta petición porque consideramos que al esclarecer el Japón conocer la situación de Cuba Comunista, es tanto como contribuir a sostener un régimen en el que se está terminando con los liberal democráticos, como lo demostró el asesinato en masa y el apedrejamiento de Alianza de Dirigentes y Trabajadores Liberados, al continuar esta situación nos veríamos en la obligación de organizar con otros países de América el boicoteo de los productos japoneses como la herencia que nos dejan las heridas de los países que están negociando con Cuba.

En espera de sus gratos noticias suscribimos de Ud. atentamente,

CONFEDERACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE COLOMBIA C.T.C.

(Nota: Firma del Director)

(Nota: Firma del Asesor)

APUNTADO MARZO 1966, TELEGRAFO Y CARTAS I.C.E.T.C. BOGOTA, COLOMBIA.

CS COPY
Bogotá, D.E., October 17, 1966

Excmo. Sr.
Embajador del Japón
en Colombia
E.
S.
D.

Excellence:

On account of the forthcoming Trade Seminar that will take place from the 16 to the 20th of this month in the City of Tokyo, with the participation of some Latin American countries, the CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS OF COLOMBIA, CTM, wishes to reiterate through you to the Democratic Government of Japan, the request we have formulated in other occasions, referent to the continuance of the co-operative trade that Japan has established with the Cuban Cooperative Movement, considering that the currency obtained from the selling of coconut is used by the Government of Cuba to finance the subversion and terrorism in Latin America.

We formulate our request in the hope of saving the interests of the free and democratic workers and the institutional integrity of our country, since Cuba, like other American countries, form part of the international program that has been planned from Cuba by the International Government, as was confirmed in the newspaper "El Tiempo" in one of its editorials of October 12.

I insist in this petition because we consider that if Japan continues to trade with Communist Cuba, it would be the same as to contribute to the promotion of a regime in America which has put an end to the democratic freedom, has promoted the mass murder and the imprisonment of thousands of democrats and workers. If this situation persists, we would be forced to inform, together with other countries of America, the boycott to all Japanese products as we have done with the ships of those countries that are holding trade with Cuba.

Hoping to hear from you soon, we remain

Sincerely yours,

JOSE B. MERCADO
PRESIDENT

Eugenio Molina Barrios
SECRETARY GENERAL IN CHARGE

CC COPY
1. Forwarded herewith are Progress Reports for the First Quarter of FY 67 concerning eight Political Action programs of the Station; these programs are listed under the Covert Action sector of the FY 67 budget:

- AMSROLL
- ANCHROW
- AMBASAL
- AMIRA
- ANSTRUT
- ANWSAP
- ANKNOT
- ANMOP

2. The first quarter of FY 67 was a period of readjustment in the political action field, all of the above programs having been reduced in size and cost in the last quarter of FY 66. That the P Section has succeeded in reaching the initial projected goals with respect to economy of political action operations in FY 67 is demonstrated by the following tabulation of expenses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Projected 1st Quarter Cost</th>
<th>Actual 1st Quarter Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMSROLL</td>
<td>36,750</td>
<td>33,872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCHROW</td>
<td>3,750</td>
<td>6,077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMBASAL</td>
<td>11,500</td>
<td>12,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIRA</td>
<td>16,250</td>
<td>16,434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSTRUT</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>16,185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANWSAP</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>4,228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANKNOT</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1,986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANMOP</td>
<td>3,750</td>
<td>2,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>105,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>93,234</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Attachment: h/w Progress Reports, w/IDENS U/S/C(56/66)

Distribution: 2 - WH/C, w/att.
3. In the second quarter the Station will continue its cost reduction action aimed at achieving a substantial reduction in Covert Action costs prior to the end of FY 67, and at reaching by the beginning of FY 68 a level of expenditure much below that projected for FY 67.

Philip G. Elmard
MEMORANDUM

TO: Chief of Station, JMNAVE

FROM: PW/MARCHBANK

SUBJECT: TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
AMSCROLL Progress Report,
1 July - 30 September 1965

19 October 1966

WPW-1297

Distribution

4-COS
1-PW/MARCHBANK
1-PW/Chrono
1-REG

A. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

1. This quarter opened with an internal reorganization of AMSCROLL becoming effective. The reorganization had been undertaken in the interests of efficiency and economy. The Departments of Labor, Women, Foreign Affairs, Coordination, and Youth were abolished. This action got rid of largely ineffective people who had been receiving salaries and will prevent dissipation of AMSCROLL funds and energies. The new, streamlined organization is better able to concentrate upon the field it knows best: economic action. With its present staff it is also able to undertake action in political, youth, and the other fields should this be desirable.

2. The major activities of AMSCROLL during this quarter fell into four categories. They are economic activities, Free World shipping to Cuba, dissemination of propaganda, and the AMSCROLL radio program.

a. In the economic field AMSCROLL continued its analysis of the 1965 sugar harvest that officially ended at 11:00 p.m., of 27 June--although wind-up activities continued into this quarter. The point of the post-mortem was to publicize why Cuba fell so far short (2,044,747 tons) of its announced goal of 6,500,000 tons, which goal was set by Castro in his May Day, 1965 speech. Sources of information were the daily production figures of Radio Havana; analyses conducted by other experts such as F. O. Licht, Czarnikow-Kionsa, the Merrill Lynch Weekly Sugar Letter, etc.; information the Station was able to pass; and the background of such experts as AMNAKE-1, AMRAIN-1, and AMWASP-1. The Station has seen stories based upon these releases in the Miami Herald; the Miami News; the Economic Intelligence Unit, a London publication; Alerta, a publication in Guatemala; the American Marine Engineer; the Times of America; and Diario Las Americas. In addition appropriate Station assets such as AMNIM replay much of this information. The point of this was to demonstrate to Free World commercial circles and to the Cuban radio audience that Cuban economic promises are not reliable and hence that Cuba is an unreliable nation with which to trade. In support of this theme this quarter also marked the beginning of the campaign.
against Cuban lobsters that are being sold in Canada and Europe.

The first public surfacing known to the Station of this study was a story that appeared in the Miami News on 28 September. This story was prepared from an AMSCOLL press release that was mailed to the AMSCOLL list of business people, bankers, and traders in the U.S., Europe, and Japan. In addition, the local AFP correspondent filed a story based upon this release.

Also during this quarter AMSCOLL released other studies
of an economic nature on such subjects as Cuban trade with Spain,
the status of the Cuban oil industry, and the failure of mechaniza-
tion of the Cuban sugar industry. The bases of these studies were
provided by the Station, often from information provided by qualified
refugees arriving via the air lift. In other cases, AMSCOLL
personnel—particularly AMFRAME—were interviewing some of these
refugees.

b. A continuing effort was made during the quarter to
publicize Free World shipping with Cuba. Each month a list
is compiled by the Station of those ships from the Free World that
visited Cuba during the previous month which is passed to AMSCOLL
for release to the press. In addition, a special study was made
regarding the Greek firm Franco Shipping Company. The wire services
regularly carry this information and 27 published stories on this
subject in U.S., Canadian, and English publications came to the
Station's attention during this period.

c. During this period 16,000 pieces of printed material
were mailed to Cuba. This included 7,500 copies of AMSCOLL's
miniature newspaper which contained condensed stories of such items
as Castro's 26th of July Speech, quotations from earlier Castro
speeches making promises that were not kept, the sugar deficit, and
defections of Cuban seamen. Also, 7,500 copies were mailed to Cuba
of a notice that publicizes the AMSCOLL radio program and which
requests readers of the miniature newspaper to leave it in public
places for others to read. AMSCOLL still has a supply of the
soap sheets which carries an imprinted message for the recipients
not to lose hope. One thousand of these were mailed to Cuba and
we anticipate continuing mailings until the supply of these soap
sheets is exhausted. About 4,350 copies of the economic studies
described in 2.a. above were mailed to a carefully compiled list
of banks, business firms, etc. in the U.S., Europe, and Japan.
About 1,600 copies of these releases translated into Spanish were
also distributed.

d. The AMSCOLL radio program is on the air over AMTHIGH
for ten minutes each day of the week except Sunday. This program
is increasingly addressing itself to the economic failure of
communism in Cuba, the economic failure of Cuba abroad, and to the
increasing political and economic isolation of Cuba from both the
Free and Communist worlds. To these ends, prominence was given to problems with the sugar crop, statements prepared especially for AMSCROLL by such defectors as AMBRAY-1, AMHINO-1, and selected defectors from the Cuban merchant marine. The program ran a series of quotations from earlier Castro speeches that were pitted against official government statistics of a current nature that gave the lie to Castro's earlier promises. Also, the program sought to exploit such specific items as selling Cuban beef to Spain which increased the shortage in Cuba, sending medical equipment and drugs to the Congo though these are desperately needed in Cuba, etc. During this period the program received 11 letters from Cuban listeners as follows: July, 2; August, 4; and September, 5. With one exception these letters were favorable in their response. As in the past AMSCROLL continued to front for AMHADV-l's radio program over JNHOF and AMTHUR. Also, AMSCROLL continued to front for a musical program which it does not produce.

B. ADMINISTRATION

3. The amount budgeted for the quarter under review was $36,750.00; whereas, $33,873.00 was spent. Of this amount $11,217.00 was for salaries and $22,630.00 for operational expenses which included office maintenance. A determined and successful effort has been made to keep actual expenses under the budgeted amount. Important to this was the reorganization described in A.1 above which in salaries alone amounted to a monthly reduction of $1,100.00. Operational and housekeeping expenses have also been reduced over previous months with, the Station believes, an improved operational result.

C. PROBLEMS

4. The Station believes that it has overcome a source of potential trouble by pressing the reorganization of AMSCROLL that became effective 1 July in that persons who in the past had been trouble makers were eased out. The only remaining problem is the ever-present one of AMFRAME-1 who is capable of earning considerably more than the Station is paying. As an intelligent, aggressive person with a growing family he will sooner or later have to face up to this personal problem of his. He prefers to remain in the work he is now doing for WOFAC which, coupled with a recent salary increase to $450.00 a month should combine to retain him at least for the near future. His wife has recently received an impressive monetary prize of an academic nature and AMFRAME-1's family in Venezuela is currently supplementing his WOFAC pay, which factors also help.

D. PLANS FOR NEXT QUARTER

5. Administratively we expect AMSCROLL to continue as reorganized and we are hopeful that we can effect additional
economies. Operationally the Station has these specific projects in mind which are in addition to the normal activities:

a. AMSROLL will attempt to push further the Station-developed story of the spoiled Cuban lobster with the goal in mind of having it branded of dubious quality in Canada, France, and other countries.

b. The Station has begun its utilization of AMSROLL to analyse the 1967 sugar harvest. As for the 1966 harvest, AMSROLL's final projection of the results of the harvest was made on 23 May, some five weeks in advance of the 20 June official Cuban announcement. AMSROLL predicted a harvest of 4,486,400 tons, only 41,145 tons over the actual figure. We know of no one who came this close. We have observed with interest how such forecasters as Merrill Lynch offered figures that came even closer to the AMSROLL projections as the final harvest date approached. We hope to repeat this performance for the coming year.

c. At the close of this reporting period the Station began a campaign to discourage Japan-Cuban trade in favor of expanded Japanese trade with other Latin American nations. This campaign has the concurrence of Headquarters and Station Tokyo (DIRECTOR-38498 and TOKYO-8595). AMFRAME-1 and AMSNAKE-1 are being utilized to implement this campaign insofar as Latin American business organizations are concerned.
SECRET 2618072 CITE JMWAVE 3819

KINGSTON INFO DIRECTOR 26W... 23061

TYPIC AMSROLL

1. ON 24 OCTOBER REV. HENRY MUIR, WHO SAID HE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED LIBERAL PARTY, CALLED UPON IDEN A WHO SECRETARY GENERAL OF AMSROLL (IDEN B). MUIR ASKED FOR ASSISTANCE FOR HIS PARTY’S FIGHT AGAINST COMMUNIST FORCES IN JAMAICA. MUIR SAID HE FRIENDLY WITH CHIEF LINGOLD IN JAMAICA AND EXPLAINED HE HAS INSUFFICIENT "MEANS" FOR HIS PARTY. IDEN A RESPONDED THAT AMSROLL HARDLY HAS MEANS FOR ITS OWN EFFORTS AND THAT IT UNABLE RENDER SUPPORT OTHER GROUPS. IDEN A SHOVED MUIR AROUND AMSROLL PREMISES AND GAVE HIM SAMPLES AMSROLL PUBLICATIONS. MUIR EXPRESSED INTEREST IN AT LEAST ONE PUBLICATION AND SAID IN FUTURE HE WOULD LIKE ADDITIONAL COPIES FOR DISTRIBUTION IN JAMAICA.

2. ON 25 OCTOBER MUIR TELEPHONED IDEN A TO ASK FOR "A FEW HUNDRED DOLLARS" TO FINANCE TRIP TO CALIFORNIA WHERE MUIR SAYS HE HAS JAMAICAN CONTACTS WHO WILL PROVIDE FUNDS IF MUIR CAN ONLY GET THERE. IDEN A DECLINED., MUIR SAID HE UNSUCCESSFUL RAISING FUNDS THUS FAR IN JMWAVE AREA AND
SECRET

UNLESS HE HAS IMMEDIATE SUCCESS HE WILL RETURN JAMAICA

27 OCTOBER.

3. STATION PLANS NO FURTHER ACTION MUIR'S REQUESTS

UNLESS ADDEES REQUEST OTHERWISE.

4. INDEX MUIR. NO JMWAVE TRACES.

SECRET
SECRET 2618872 CITE JM WAVE 3815
KINGSTON INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMSCROLL

1. On 24 October Rev. Henry Muir, who said he President of the United Liberal Party, called upon IDEN A who Secretary General of AMSCROLL (IDEN B). Muir asked for assistance for his party's fight against Communist Forces in Jamaica. Muir said he friendly with Chief Lingold in Jamaica and explained he has insufficient "means" for his party. IDEN A responded that SMCROLL hardly has means for its own efforts and that it unable render support other groups. IDEN A showed Muir around AMSCROLL PREMISES and gave him samples AMSCROLL PUBLICATIONS. Muir expressed interest in at least one publication and said in future he would like additional copies for distribution in Jamaica.

2. On 25 October Muir telephoned IDEN A to ask for "a few hundred dollars" to finance trip to California where Muir says he has Jamaican contacts who will provide funds if Muir can only get there. IDEN A declined. Muir said he unsuccessful raising funds thus far in JM WAVE AREA and

SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 3815 SECRET

UNLESS HE HAS IMMEDIATE SUCCESS HE WILL RETURN JAMAICA

27 OCTOBER.

3. STATION PLANS NO FURTHER ACTION MUIR'S REQUESTS

UNLESS ADDEES REQUEST OTHERWISE.

4. INDEX MUIR. NO JMWAVE TRACES.

SECRET

BT
**DISPATCH**

**CLASSIFICATION:** SECRET

**TO:** Chief of Station, Paris

**FROM:** Chief, WH

**INFO:** Chief, WH

**SUBJECT:** TYPIC/WIVIPER/AMSCROLL

**C:** Cuban Lobster Sales

**ACTION:** See Paragraph 2.

**REFERENCE:** JNWSR-3309

1. As indicated in the reference the AMSCROLL study on Cuban problems in marketing its lobsters in France and Canada as well as a clip of local press play were airmailed to the Paris Station on 29 September. The APP account which was filed with its New York office is a much shorter and less complete version than the clip already airmailed you.

2. We are planning a follow-up story on Paragraph 3 of the reference and will very much appreciate being informed of any French reaction that may grow out of the AFP story or Station efforts. It would be particularly helpful if we could indicate that the French health authorities have found it necessary to inspect these shipments due to the inferior quality and improper cooking of the lobsters.

**PHILIP G. ELMAN**

**Distribution:**
- 3- COS/Paris
- 2- C/WH
- 2- C/WE dec H.E.F.
- 2- WH/C

**CLRE Crew:**

**CLASSIFICATION:** SECRET

**DATE Typed:** 3 Oct 66

**DATE Dispatched:** 5 Oct 1966

**DISPATCH Symbol and Number:** UFGA-26099

**HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER:** 19-120-26/3
ACTION REQUIRED: For COS, Ottawa to determine

REFERENCE: JIWA-3309

1. We forward by separate cover the AMSCROLL report, page 4 of which contains the study on Cuban-Canadian lobster trade discussed in the reference as well as one of the AMSCROLL treatment of this study. It may be of interest to know that the mailing list for this and similar studies of this nature contains the following Canadian firms:

2. As part of the follow-up play Station of course would appreciate any reaction from the Canadian press or other sources. We will particularly appreciate being informed if it comes to the attention of Station Ottawa that the health authorities inspect, condemn, or otherwise take any action on these shipments.

PHILIP G. ELIARD

Attachments: USC
1. Report
2. Clip

Distribution:
3- COS/Ottawa, w/atts, USC
2- C/VH, w/o atts.
2- VH/C, w/o atts.

CS COPY

DATE TYPED
DATE DISPATCHED
30-Sep 66  OC. 5 996

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UPGA-26091
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

19-120-36/3
SECRET

BEFORE READING THIS MESSAGE PLEASE DETERMINE IF IT CONTENTS INFORMATION THAT IS CLASSIFIED TO YOU.

DISSEMINATION: 04/C8

ACTION: 1. OFFICE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FILE:

SECRET

Ottawa Info Director, Paris

Typic M Huiper AMS Scroll

References:

A. JMWAVE-3359 (N 11/19)
B. JMWAVE-3332 (N 9/7 X 55)
C. UFGA-3359 (30 Sept)

1. North American Newspaper Alliance (NANA) wishes distribute feature article based upon AMTAFFY-I story described ref A. Prior releasing article NANA has asked AMTAFFY-I check further for more facts. In attempting this AMTAFFY-I unable reach Sax Beiner though has spoken to Mrs. Beiner at ref B number who confirms Beiner home also world seafood distributors' office. She says Beiner not available. As consequence both NANA and AMTAFFY-I believe they on to big story and NANA has decided sit on material it now has until more background info on Beiner, world seafood, and their methods of operation can be developed.

2. Request hos and stiava traces Beiner and world seafood with indication what can be passed AMTAFFY-I. From Ottawa also request any additional info on this subject.
SECRET

especially any observed local reaction (Ref 2 lists seven Canadian firms and agencies that received original AmScoll release about 23 Sept which may have generated Canadian publicity). This info will be included in follow-up story mentioned para 3 Ref A. For obvious reasons please do not check with liaison.

3. For Paris: I will be happy include any angle you provide re Jacques Fourchtein & Cie., or others that may be dealing in Cuban lobsters.

SECRET
SECRET 3020252 CITE OTTAWA 3739
30 Sep 66 11:07286
IMMEDIATE INFO DIRECTOR 3739
TYPIC HR/PER AMSCROLL
REF JMWAVE 3320 (N 07053)

CHECK OF CANADIAN INDUSTRIAL REGISTERS, FRASERS TRADE DIRECTORY,
DOMINION BUREAU OF STATISTICS COMPANY LISTINGS, FOOD PROCESSORS,
SEAFOOD DISTRIBUTORS, PACKERS 1965-1966 AS WELL AS TELEPHONE
DIRECTORIES INDICATE NO LISTING WORLD SEAFOOD DISTRIBUTORS. CHECK
INCLUDED ALL ONTARIO AND QUEBEC.

SECRET REQUEST ADDRESS
WORLD SEAFOOD DIST.
SECRET

SECRET 362212Z CITE JHWAVE 3332

OTTAWA INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC NHVIPER ANSCROLL

REFERENCE: OTTAWA 375X (IN072856)

WORLD SEAFOOD OFFICE LOCATED IN MONTREAL HOME OF

SAM GE I N H E R WHO IS AN OFFICIAL OF FIRM. TELEPHONE 748-7014.

SECRET

SECRET
SECRET 301600Z CITE JWAVE 3328

IMMEDIATE OTTAWA INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC RAVPER AND SCROLL

REFERENCE: WAVE-3309

REQUEST BY IMMEDIATE CABLE EXACT BUSINESS ADDRESS WORLD SEAFOOD DISTRIBUTORS WHICH WE BELIEVE TO BE IN MONTREAL AREA OR POSSIBLY TORONTO. FYI MONTREAL TELEPHONE OPERATOR HAS INFORMED LOCAL NEWSPAPER ATTEMPTING TO CHECK REF STORY THAT THERE NO FIRM WITH THAT NAME IN MONTREAL.

SECRET

BT ERE CUBAN SELLING OF LOBSTERS.
SECRET 29 Sep 66

DIRECTOR INFO OTTAWA, PARIS

TYPIC NAVIPER ANSCROLL

1. USING DISGUISED SENSITIVE SOURCE INFO AND OVERT DATA STATION PREPARED STUDY OF CUBAN MISADVENTURES IN SELLING TINNED AND FROZEN LOBSTERS TO WORLD SEAFOOD DISTRIBUTORS OF MONTREAL AND JACQUES FOURCHETTIN & CIE OF FRANCE.

ARTICLE STRESSED LATE DELIVERIES, SHODDY CUBAN BUSINESS PRACTICES, IMPROPERLY COOKED MEAT, AND ENDED ON NOTE THAT LATEST SHIPMENT OF FROZEN LOBSTER TO WORLD SEAFOOD CONTAINED QUANTITY ROTTEN LOBSTER WHICH DISCOVERED ONLY AFTER SIX OR SEVEN HUNDRED CARTONS HAD BEEN DISTRIBUTED THROUGHOUT CANADA.

2. STUDY RELEASED BY ANSCROLL 26 SEPT. AFP FILED STORY 26 SEPT. AND ALTAFFY-1 PROVIDED EXCELLENT COVERAGE 29 SEPT. BELIEVE ADDITIONAL PUBLICITY THESE FACTS ESPECIALLY ABROAD WILL FURTHER EXACERBATE AT LEAST CUBA/CANADA TRADE. RELEASE AND CLIP forwarded HQS. ALSO AIRMAILING PARIS, POUCHING OTTAWA.

3. FOLLOW-UP STORY IN PREPARATION.

SECRET
SECRET 292114Z CITE JMWAVE 3321. M Swider
DIRECTOR Cohen Forsythe
TYPIC WHPAWN Gonzales
REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 37778 29SEP66 11:06358

1. ANSCROLL RADIO ON 21 SEPTEMBER REPORTED CUBAEXPORT
WAS NEGOTIATING TO SELL CUBAN BEEF TO COMISARIA GENERAL IN
TWO UNITS OF ONE THOUSAND TONS EACH. BROADCAST RECALLED
DECEMBER SALE BEEF TO SPAIN WHICH UPON ARRIVAL WAS FOUND TO
BE SHORT BY 135 PIECES. BROADCAST FOR 29 SEPTEMBER WILL
UPDATE THIS REPORT USING INFO CONTAINED REF.

2. JNHOPE AND OTHER RADIO ASSETS WILL HIT THEME OF GOC
EXPORTS OF MEAT WHILE CUBAN PEOPLE SUFFERING SEVERE SHORTAGE.
WILL POINT OUT THAT HARD CURRENCY OBTAINED BY GOC IN TRADE
WITH SPAIN AND OTHER FREE WORLD NATIONS USED BY GOC TO EXPORT
SUBVERSION AND VIOLENCE ABROAD AND TO STRENGTHEN INTERNAL
POLICE STATE MECHANISMS, THUS SUBSANS LOSE BEEF AND GAIN MORE
CONTROLS.

SECRET

SECRET
SECRET 192151Z CITE JMWAVE 3106 (INGHURST ACTING)
DIRECTOR INFO TOKYO

REFERENCE: TOKYO 9840 (IN 97101)

SUGGEST AMSROLL THROUGH IDEN WRITE TRADE ORGANIZATIONS
WITH WHICH IDEN IN CONTACT IN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, COLOMBIA,
MEXICO, AND PERU SUGGESTING THEY BRING PRESSURE THEIR
GOVERNMENTS TO INCLUDE JAPAN-CUBA TRADE ITEM ON GROUNDS THIS
TRADE PROVIDES CUBA WITH FUNDS FINANCE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES
THOSE COUNTRIES. PLS ADVISE.

SECRET
SECRET 1971512 CITE JMWAve 3107 (Inghurst Acting)
DIRECTOR INFO TOKYO
TYPIC MHVIPER
REFERENCE: JMWAve 3106 (IN 99162)
IDENTITY: MANAGEMENT BOYCOTT COMMITTEE.
SECRET

SECRET
ACTION REQUIRED: For Kingston to determine.

1. For COS, Kingston's recent request we forward by separate cover twenty-five copies of the publication, Economic Intelligence Report. This is issued monthly in English and until we are informed otherwise, we shall forward twenty-five copies under a transmittal manifest. This publication is issued infrequently in Spanish; we shall forward five copies of these as they appear.

2. Station JNWave will appreciate any local reaction to this publication as well as suggestions for the inclusion of material that might be useful to a Kingston audience. As indicated by the edition being forwarded, we attempt to keep the items in each Report factual, on the grounds that in a publication of this nature facts constitute the best propaganda.

PHILIP G. ELMARD
Act: For your information
Ref: UFOA-25559, 21 July 1966

1. Madrid Station appreciates the excellent support which JMWA VE Station has provided in referenced operation. It may be of interest that the publication of the articles cited in reference cost approximately $200.00.

2. Through QUSPOT-2 Madrid Station made contact with Identity in an effort to establish an outlet for the publication of economic reports concerning Spain and PBRUMEN. It was agreed with the directors of Identity that the articles would be paid for at the same rate as paid advertisements; however, they would appear as exclusive reports of Identity and bear no resemblance to a paid advertisement. Because of various legal ramifications, Identity agreed to publish only those articles which were signed.

3. QUSPOT-2's approach to Identity was made ostensibly under the auspices of a PBRUMEN exile group with whom he said he was affiliated, the headquarters of which are ostensibly in the JMWA VE area. It was agreed that the JMWA VE exile group would furnish the material directly to Identity, with a copy to QUSPOT-2, who, after receipt of the article, would then approach the directors of Identity to ascertain the price of the article and push for its publication. In this regard Madrid would appreciate continuing with this practice for the mailing of articles intended for publication (with a copy pouched to Madrid) as was established.

Attachment: UNDER SEPARATE COVER
Identity
B/S ATT'D BY RT/AN
Dated 8/8/66

Distribution:
2-COS, JMWA VE, w/att, USC
L-2-C/EUR, w/att, USC
L-12/WH/C, w/att, USC

Group I - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Date: 19-126-26

CROSS REFERENCE TO
OSMA-21448
DATE
10 August 1966

CLASSIFICATION
CS COPY
SECRET
MC5 FILE NUMBER
19-120-26/3
4. With a view toward economy it should be noted that Madrid Station took the liberty of excluding some of the material which was included in the first report. We suggest that the reports be limited to one or two pages if feasible. In this manner we feel we will have a better chance at publication.

5. In the last several issues Identity has published various articles of a favorable nature towards the PRRUKEN economy. Station has reason to believe the primary purpose of the favorable articles is that the director of Identity is attempting to ingratiate himself with the PRRUKEN Government so that he will be well received by PRRUKEN officials if the Spanish Government nominates him as the Spanish commercial representative to PRRUKEN.

Leslie H. Hendriques
ACTION REQUIRED: None

1. A result of QUSPOT-2's recent holiday in the JMWAVE area has been to establish a correspondence between him and AMFRAME-1, the editor of the Suplemento Especial of the ANSCROLL Economic Bureau, a copy of which is forwarded by separate cover. QUSPOT-2 has indicated that he could use ANSCROLL economic studies and that he could arrange for publication of at least some of these in Identity A. He suggested that the original of such publications be sent to Identity B with a copy to him. This was done in the case of a recent economic report which was shortly thereafter published in Identity A.

2. We wish that the article being forwarded by separate cover also be surfaced in Identity A. The original has been airmailed this story to AMFRAME-1 which arrived at about the same time as the copy the Madrid Station airmailed to the JMWAVE overt address.

3. Studies similar to the one being forwarded are regularly prepared in English on a number of economic subjects. They are distributed to shipping firms, certain banks engaged in international commerce, international trade organizations, international commodity houses, etc. They are translated into Spanish solely for use in Identity A; thus, in this sense, these reports are an "exclusive".

Attachments: use
1. ANSCROLL Article
2. Identity Sheet

Distribution:
3. COS/Madrid, w/atts. use – 19-120-26
2. C/WF, w/atts. use – 19-120-26
1. PHILIP G. ELMARD

DATE TYPED 18 July 66
DATE DISPATCHED 21 July 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
HEADQUARTERS
19-120-26/3
LA CALIDAD ACTUAL DEL AZÚCAR CUBANO

Por el Ingeniero Radi Espinosa Tabares
ex-Director de Investigaciones Tecnológicas del Ministerio del Azúcar (MINAZ) de Cuba Comunista

Este breve análisis de la calidad actual del azúcar cubano va dirigido tanto al público en azucarera como al lector ordinario, ya que en Cuba, el azúcar es casi un símbolo de prosperidad económica, y así, la calidad del azúcar desempeña un papel de gran importancia en la situación económica global del país (1).

Sin más comentarios o notas de introducción, ofrecemos a continuación el análisis de la calidad actual del azúcar cubano:

1. Materiales Externos:

a) Azúcar crudo: La industria azucarera cubana se caracteriza por recibir para su procesamiento, la mejor calidad de caña de azúcar en cuanto a su contenido de materias extrañas (menos del 3%). Actualmente, y por causa de los trabajadores voluntarios, la mecanización de la cosecha de la caña, las materias extrañas que acompañan a la caña al llegar al Central para su procesamiento, ha aumentado al 6% en el caso de los voluntarios y al 1% en el caso de las máquinas de cortar caña soviéticas. Es de señalarse que dentro de la composición de estas materias extrañas está incluida la tierra, y como quiera que las tierras de Cuba tienen en su composición un alto contenido de arcillas, estas son muy difíciles de eliminar en el proceso tecnológico de purificación y afectan grandemente la calidad del azúcar crudo.

b) Azúcar Refino: Las materias extrañas, principalmente arcillas de las tierras llegan hasta el azúcar refino dándole color al mismo y dejando residuos insolubles al ser disueltas esta azúcar. Esto disminuye la calidad del azúcar refino no solo para el consumo humano directo, sino que ocasiona graves perjuicios en las industrias de alimentos que utilizan el azúcar refino. Lo mismo sucede con las industrias de refrescos.

(1) No es necesario ensalzar la calidad del azúcar cubano que produce antes de Castro, ya que su prestigio en el mercado mundial es un hecho de sobra conocido. Lo mismo puede decirse de los técnicos cubanos en azúcar, con quienes el respeto de los expertos internacionales han tenido amplia oportunidad de discutir los asuntos azucareros e intercambiar ideas e sugerencias libremente. Esta situación ya no existe.
2.- Polarización:

a) Azúcar Crudo: En épocas anteriores al régimen comunista, Cuba no producía azúcares crudos con polarizaciones menores de 97,0 o 97,5%, y para muchos mercados extranjeros se producían azúcares crudos con polarizaciones superiores a 98,0%. En la actualidad un porcentaje significativo de la producción no alcanza esos valores, dado que en casos de azúcares crudos con polarizaciones de 96,0 y 95,0%.

b) Azúcar Refino: Las calidades mayores de azúcares refinados o blancos se miden en los mercados internacionales principalmente por su grado de polarización, el cual deberá ser como mínimo 99,9%. Los azúcares refinados en la actualidad bajo el régimen comunista no alcanzan esa cifra, manteniéndose entre 99,70 y 99,80%.

3.- Humedad:

a) Azúcar Crudo: Los azúcares crudos cubanos siempre se caracterizaban por su bajo contenido de humedad, lo cual les hacía de magníficas condiciones para resistir al almacenamiento prolongado y manipulación segura a estos azúcares. Actualmente el contenido de humedad ha aumentado hasta un 200%, debido a varios factores como son, contenido de coloides producidos por las arcillas de las tierras, condiciones deficiente de las centrífugas de azúcar, mayor contenido de miele en el azúcar, etc. Además, en muchas ocasiones, azúcares producidos en buenas condiciones se deterioran debido a la humedad existente a causa de deficiencias en el almacenaje en centrales y puertos de embarque.

b) Azúcar Refino: La deficiente tecnologa y el mal estado de los equipos apropiados de los refinerías, son alterados por el mal estado de los almacenes.

4.- Materiales Insolubles:

a) Azúcar Crudo: El contenido de materiales insolubles en el azúcar crudo ha aumentado de aproximadamente en un 250% debido a la mala purificación de los jugos de caña durante el proceso tecnológico, y a la introducción de materiales extraños junto con la caña que van a pasar hasta el azúcar.

b) Azúcar Refino: El uso de azúcares crudos de baja calidad, la deficiente calidad del ácido fosfórico, la Tierra de Infusorios, y el Carbón Activado, productos estos enviados por los países comunistas, han tenido como consecuencia un aumento del porcentaje de materiales insolubles en los azúcares refinados de aproximadamente el 200%, reduciendo considerablemente la calidad de estos azúcares refinados.

5.- Color:

a) Azúcar Crudo: El índice de color de los azúcares crudos ha aumentado casi en un 300%, lo que reduce proporcionalmente la calidad de estos crudos como material prima en las refinerías.

b) Azúcar Refino: Esta es uno de los factores importantes en la calidad de los azúcares refinados o blancos, y en los años recientes, debido a deficiencias tecnológicas, a la ausencia casi total de técnicos con experiencia, y a la baja calidad de los materiales decolorantes tales como el Carbón Activado suministrado por Polonia y la Unión Soviética, el índice de color, medido en Unidades ICUNSA, ha aumentado en un 200%. Es de señalar que ninguna refinería del país cumple las especificaciones en cuanto al índice de color establecidas por los Métodos Internacionales de Control de Calidad.
6.- Problemas Específicos del Azúcar Crudo

a) Filtrabilidad; El índice de filtrabilidad que mide las propiedades precisamente de refinación del azúcar crudo, ha bajado en un 25% en los años recientes, afectando seriamente los costos de producción de las refinerías que emplean este azúcar crudo como materia prima.

b) Uniformidad del grano de Azúcar. Como consecuencia de la total ausencia de equipos automáticos para controlar la cristalización del azúcar, ya que la gran mayoría ha sido destruido y no reparado, la uniformidad de los cristales o granos del azúcar crudo ha disminuido a niveles inusuales. Es casi imposible observar azúcares crudos actuales que no tengan un alto índice de "conglomerados", "gemelas", y "falso grano", lo que hace que la uniformidad de los cristales no se mantenga, ocasionando parcialmente a las refinerías que emplean este azúcar como materia prima por la cantidad de mieles e impurezas que contienen. Esto reduce la capacidad de los refinerías y aumenta considerablemente su costo de producción.

c) Aspecto Sanitario; La falta de cuidado en cuanto a la higiene con que debe ser producida el azúcar, así como las calidades de las aguas que se emplean para el lavado de los azúcares en las centrífugas, el poco cuidado y esmero con que son tratadas en los almace nes, han producido un descenso en cuanto al aspecto sanitario de los azúcares acusándose un aumento considerable en el contenido de hongos, bacterias, y levaduras. Todos estos elementos extraños afectan la calidad y producen fermentaciones secundarias en el azúcar destruyéndose parte de la sacarosa de las mismas, lo cual reduce los rendimientos en las refinerías de azúcar y aumenta considerablemente el costo de producción.

d) Envases; Los envases que viene utilizando el régimen comunista en los azúcares crudos, son en parte elaborados en la Unión Soviética. Estos envases de yute son de infima calidad y además como no tienen las medidas estándar, el azúcar se compaca dentro de los sacos, produciéndose muchas roturas de los mismos.

e) Azúcar Endurecido; Como consecuencia de la deficiencia de la tecnología de producción, las materias extrañas, y las malas condiciones de los almace nes, el índice de azúcares endurecidos en almacenamiento ha aumentado casi un 200%. Esto trae como consecuencia grandes dificultades en las refinerías al disolver el azúcar y sacarla de los sacos. Además al aumentar el costo de manipulación, se aumenta el costo de producción.

7.- Problemas Específicos del Azúcar Refinado

a) Azúcares Invertidos; Debido a la deficiencia tecnológica y a la baja calidad de los azúcares crudos utilizados, el contenido de azúcares invertidos ha aumentado en un 150% en los últimos años con el resultado de la baja de calidad de este tipo de azúcar.

b) Centzas; Como consecuencia de la gran cantidad de materias extrañas y la baja calidad de los azúcares crudos, así como la deficiencia calidad de los Carbones Activados empleados en las refinerías, el contenido de centzas ha aumentado en los últimos años en un 50%, afectando la calidad de estos azúcares.

c) Contenido de Azufre (SO₂); El contenido de azufre en los azúcares refinados debe ser extremadamente bajo ya que afecta la salud del consumidor y crea grandes dificultades en las industrias que usan el azúcar. Como consecuencia de la baja calidad del Ácido Fosfórico Soviético que tiene un alto contenido de azufre, los azúcares en los últimos años han sufrido un aumento del 100% en su contenido de azufre, lo que afecta la calidad de los mismos.
d) Contenido de Arsénico: El Arsénico es una de las contaminaciones que más afectan la calidad de cualquier producto alimenticio, y mucho más significativo es en el azúcar. Los productos auxiliares usados en la refinación del azúcar tales como ácido fosfórico, suministrados por países comunistas, tiene un alto porcentaje de Arsénico, los que contaminan el azúcar, habiéndose elevado esta cifra en un 70% sobre los valores normales.

e) Contenido de Plomo: La presencia de Plomo en los azúcares refinados debe ser significativo, pero en los últimos años el empleo de Tierras de Infusorio y ácido fosfórico de países comunistas que tienen baja calidad y están contaminados con este elemento, ha producido un aumento del contenido de plomo en los azúcares refinados de un 50% sobre los valores normales.

f) Contenido de Cobre: Los azúcares de Cuba se caracterizaban por su ausencia de Cobre, sin embargo al usarse los productos contaminados y de baja calidad suministrados por los países comunistas, y por otro lado el mal estado de los equipos que tienen partes de Cobre, han dado como resultado un aumento en el contenido de Cobre llegándose a obtener valores de 2 a 3% de Cobre en el azúcar refinado.

Conclusiones:

1.- Bajo el presente régimen, la calidad del azúcar cubano ha sufrido un tremendo deterioro.

2.- La industria azucarera cubana no ha sido una excepción el principio de que "el Comunismo es sinónimo de baja calidad".

3.- Los gobiernos, los pueblos y los firmantes de los países que aún adquieren azúcar de Cuba deben tomar nota de este breve análisis.

Por el Buró de Investigaciones Económicas de U.R.

DR. Rafael Rivas-Vázquez
Director

Miami, 7 de Julio de 1966
IDENTIFICATION

A. "B-5" ECONOMIA ESPAÑOLA Y EXTRANJERO.

B. José Ramón Aparicio Nunez
   Director, "B-5"
   Paseo de la Castellana 22
   Madrid, Spain
ACTION REQUIRED: Response from Headquarters to Reference Requested.

REFERENCE: UFGE-25367

We forward by separate cover a copy of a cable received by AMRAIR-1 from Professor Torsten Gardlund. This is in response to the interim reply sent the Professor by AMRAIR-1 after receipt of the questionnaire. We request a reply to the reference as soon as feasible in view of the considerable interest expressed in this cable.

PHILIP G. ELMARTE
1026P EST JUN 30 66 AA010
A CDBU03 WUT0245 RMB3806 SWN07Q2 M014454 31 PD INTL CD MALMÖ
VIA RRCA 30 1300
LT ING RAUL ESPARZA MADERA
290 VAPP 3 CORALCABLES (FLO)
MANY THANKS YOUR KIND LETTER OF JUNE 14 STOP WE ARE LOOKING
FORWARD TO YOUR
REPORT WITH GREAT EXPECTATIONS SINCERELY
TORSTEN GAARDLUND

CFM 290 3 14

(10)

HIGH SECURITY VIOLATION
CS FIELD DISTRIBUTION

ATT # 1 TO YF6A 25445 CS COPY

19-120-2654

200-120-55
CUBAN MERCHANT MARINE OFFICIALS, OFFICERS AND CREWMEMBERS WHO HAVE ABANDONED THEIR POSTS DURING RECENT MONTHS

The "Free Cuban Merchant Marine Committee" releases the "score" of Cuban merchant marine officials, officers, and crewmembers who have abandoned their posts during recent months, thus increasing the lack of qualified personnel in the merchant fleet, another problem presently faced by the Castro-Communist regime.

The "Free Cuban Merchant Marine Committee" has up-date the "score" since the first one it released the "score" contains full names of merchant fleet officials, officers, and crewmen, ranks, names of vessels, port where the defections occurred and dates.

I.- SCORE.

NUMBER OF VESSELS: 16
NUMBER OF PERSONNEL: 29

Captain: 3
Chief Engineer: 9
First Officer: 2
Second Engineer: 1
Helmman: 2
Radio Operator: 1
Others: 6
Supervisor: 3

29

* Attached is the statement of Raul de la Rua Castro, former Chief Engineer of the MV SIERRA MAESTRA, who jumped ship in Muroran, Japan, on March 20, 1966.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>POST</th>
<th>VESSEL</th>
<th>PLACE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Raul de la Rua Castro</td>
<td>Chief Engineer</td>
<td>SERRA MAESTRA</td>
<td>Marcora, Japan</td>
<td>March 21, 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armando Gil Lopez</td>
<td>Asst. Supervisor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bilbao, Spain</td>
<td>March 24, 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Sánchez</td>
<td>First Official</td>
<td>NATANZAS</td>
<td>Barcelona, Spain</td>
<td>March 24, 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Guzman</td>
<td>Chief Supervisor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Madrid, Spain</td>
<td>March 24, 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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(1) Naval construction supervisors stationed at Spanish shipyards.

(2) Chief General Inspector for Hambisa (Official Cuban shipping enterprise) stationed in Spain.
STATEMENT OF RAUL DE LA RUA CASTRO.

My name is Raúl de la Rúa Castro, and I was the Chief Engineer aboard the Cuban MV SERRA MESTRA until March 20, 1966, when I jumped ship in Kuroran, Japan.

Working conditions in the Cuban Merchant Fleet also influenced my decision. I could not stand the intensified espionage on board by members of the G-2. It is worth mentioning that the plan to indoctrinate Cuban merchant crews was a complete failure. The regime has abandoned the project altogether, and is now trying to place loyal Communists as officers and crew members, even if they are not qualified for their jobs.

As a matter of fact, the lack of qualified personnel is an increasing problem, and another source of trouble aboard Cuban vessels. During the last months a total of twenty-nine officers, engineers and crew members of the Cuban Merchant Marine have defected (data of up-to-date merchant marine score). After I quit the SERRA MESTRA, for instance, there was not a single certified engineer on board, although there were several young fellows getting on the job training. This is a fact that should be taken into consideration by the insurance firms that underwrite Cuban vessels.

Most of the vessels are faced with all sorts of mechanical difficulties, due to lack of spare parts and a very faulty maintenance, situation that gets worse when consider the scarcity of qualified personnel just mentioned.

I am very happy to have joined those of my fellow Cuban officers who preceded me in this decision. I wish to thank the "Free Cuban Merchant Marine Committee" for all the attentions accorded me, and I hope to rejoin our merchant fleet soon, when our vessels again sail under the flag of a free country.

FREE CUBAN MERCHANT MARINE COMMITTEE
830 SOUTH MIAMI AVENUE
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33130

Miami, April 1st, 1966.
COMITE PRO BOICOT EMPRESARIAL
Management Boycott Committee
P. O. Box 3909
Miami, Fla. 33101 U.S.A.

MIEMBRO DE DOTACIONES DE LA MARINA MERCANTE CUBANA QUIENES HAN ABANDONADO SUS BUQUES RECIENTEMENTE

El "Comité de la Marina Mercante Cubana Libre" da a conocer el total de funcionarios, oficiales y tripulantes de la Marina Mercante Cubana que han abandonado sus cargos durante los últimos meses, aumentando con ello la falta de personal calificado en la flota mercante, otro problema que el régimen Castro-Comunista afronta en el presente.

El "Comité de la Marina Mercante Cubana Libre" ha puesto al día el total de funcionarios, oficiales y tripulantes de la flota mercante desde la primera que se dio a conocer. Este total contiene los nombres, el rango, nombre del buque, puerto en el cual lo abandonó y fechas.

I.- SOSTEN.-

Número de buques: 16
Miembros de las dotaciones: 29

| Capitán | 5 |
| Jefe de Máquinas | 9 |
| Primer Oficial | 2 |
| Segundo Maquinista | 1 |
| Timonel | 2 |
| Radio Telegrafista | 1 |
| Otros | 6 |
| Supervisor | 3 |
| **Total** | **29** |

NOTA:

Adjunto se encuentran las declaraciones de Raúl de la Rúa Castro, ex-Jefe de Máquinas de la Potonave SIERRA MAESTRA, quien abandonó el barco en Fukuoka, Japón en Marzo 20 de 1966.
<table>
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<th>HOMBRE</th>
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<td>Jose Maria J.</td>
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(1) Supervisor de construcciones navales, prestando servicios en España.
(2) Inspector General de la Empresa de Navegación Humbía.
DECLARACIONES DE RAUL DE LA RAU CASTRO.

Mi nombre es Raúl de la Rúa Castro y hasta el 20 de marzo de 1966 desempeñé el cargo de Jefe de Máquinas de la Potonave SIERRA MAESTRA, cargo este que abandoné en Harada, Japón.

Las condiciones de trabajo en la Marina Mercante Cubana fueron uno de los motivos que me llevaron a tomar mi decisión. También podía continuar soportando el espionaje y la vigilancia a bordo por miembros del G-2. Vale la pena mencionar que el plan de adoctrinamiento para los marineros de la flota mercante cubana ha fracasado completamente. El régimen ha abandonado dicho plan y lo único que hace ahora es sustituir a los que abandonamos los buques por personal "políticamente apto", pero carencio de capacidad técnica para desempeñar los cargos.

De hecho, el régimen confronta un serio problema ante las escases de personal técnico capacitado y titulado, y esto constituye otra fuente de problemas a bordo de los buques cubanos. Durante los últimos meses un total de veinte y nueve funcionarios, oficiales y tripulantes de la flota mercante cubana han abandonado sus cargos. Para que se tenga una idea sobre la gravedad de este problema resulta necesario que desembolsar que yo abandoné el SIERRA MAESTRA no quedó a bordo un solo mecánico con título, a pesar de que varios muchachos jóvenes se encontraban allí recibiendo entrenamiento, pero por supuesto, aún sin el debido título. Esta es una realidad que debe ser considerada seriamente por las firmas aseguradoras de buques cubanos.

La mayoría de los buques confrontan dificultades en lo referente al funcionamiento debido principalmente a la falta de piezas de repuesto y el mantenimiento defectuoso y poco eficiente y como es natural este problema se acentúa con las escases de personal técnico capacitado en las dotaciones.

Deseo manifestar que estoy contento de encontrarme junto a tantos otros compañeros de la Marina Mercante que no han procedido y quiero agradecer públicamente al "Comité de la Marina Mercante Cubana Libre" las atenciones que ha tenido conmigo, así como la ayuda que me están prestando, y sinceramente espero poder volver a la Marina Mercante en un futuro próximo; cuando una vez más podamos navegar bajo el pabellón de una patria libre.

COMITE MARINA MERCANTE CUBANA LIBRE
630 SOUTH MIAMI AVENUE
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33130

Miami, lro. de Abril de 1966.
CONFIDENCIA DE PRENSA DE RAÚL ESPÍRZEA TABÁREZ

MI nombre es Raúl Espírza Tabárez y hasta hace escasamente un mes me encontraba presidiendo la Delegación Cubana a la Conferencia Internacional de Expertos en Azúcares de la FAO (Food & Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) que se celebró en Londres del 1ro. al 3 de Marzo de 1966, al mismo tiempo que ocupaba el cargo de Director de Investigaciones Tecnológicas Azucareras del MINAZ y formaba parte de la "Comisión de Estudios del Plan Perspectivo Azucarero".

A mi lado se encuentra mi señora Josefina Reus y nuestros hijos Roberto, de 21 años, y Raúl, de 22 años, ambos estudiantes de Ingeniería de la Universidad de La Habana.

Antes de hacer un breve relato de la odisea de mi familia para abandonar el país, deseo agradecer a los compañeros de UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA las atenciones que han tenido para con nosotros y al mismo tiempo por darme esta oportunidad de hacer estas declaraciones a los periodistas del mundo libre.

Desde hace dos años todos nos encontrábamos tratando de abandonar el país pero nos había sido imposible-no se me permitía salir debido al cargo que ocupaba y mi señora se lo daba esta oportunidad al resto de mi familia. Cuando lo de Camarioca nos fué a recoger un barco y las autoridades cubanas ni nos avisaron de que dicha embarcación se encontraba allí. La única salida era abandonar el país en bote por la vía clandestina. La oportunidad se presentó durante mi estancia en Londres. Yo había salido de Cuba el 23 de febrero de 1966 dejando atrás a mi señora y a mis dos hijos, uno de los cuales, Raúl, se encontraba enfermo de hepatitis en La Habana.

Mi señora tuvo que tomar la decisión sin encontrarme yo a su lado, pero había aprovechado la oportunidad que se presentaba y salir por la vía clandestina del país. De la odisea pueden dar detalles ellos mucho mejor que yo y posiblemente los miembros de la prensa desearan hacerles algunas preguntas al final de mis palabras.

Muy brevemente les diré que ellos se sometieron al mismo proceso que tantos otros cubanos se han sometido, es decir, lanzarse en bote a cruzar el "corredor de la muerte" con la confianza que Dios los ayudaría a arribar a tierras de libertad. Dos intentos fallaron pero por fin, el tercer intento fué un éxito y al menos el grupo completo, unas veinte personas, se montaron en el bote y pusieron proa a los Estados Unidos, el motor se rompió y la travesía fué la mayor parte del tiempo en velero al cabo de casi dos días el agua y la escasa comida se habían agotado y en
tonces apareció un buque griego que después de facilitarles agua y algunos alimentos lo comunicó al Servicio de Guardacostas de los Estados Unidos y poco después un avión sobrevoló sobre el lugar y marcaba el sitio para facilitar la tarea a una de sus unidades navales que ya se encontraba en camino.

La llegada del buque del Servicio de Guardacostas Norteamericano fue realmente providencial, pues mi familia y los otros tripulantes del bote observaban aterrorizados como por la noche acercaba velozmente una lancha patrullera cubana, que al ver el buque norteamericano viró en redondo y regresó a Cuba.

Yo me encontraba en el hotel en Londres y una llamada de larga distancia me puso al corriente de la situación. Ellos se encontraban a salvo y ahora me toca- ba el turno a mí.

La llamada informándome del arribo de mi familia a los EE.UU. llegó precisamente cuando me encontraba reunido con el resto de los miembros de la Delegación. Estos me observaban atentamente, como queriendo adivinar lo que se me decía desde el otro lado de la línea. Por tanto, tuve que desplegar mis escasas dotes de actor teatral y simular que la llamada era oficial desde Cuba.

Ante esta situación, opté por informar, falsamente, a los restantes delegados que el gobierno cubano me había encargado el cuidado de otros asuntos, por lo que tendría que demorarme algunos días más donde se encontraban los demás.

Les dije también que me reservarían pasaje a bordo del vuelo de la semana si giente y les entregué una carta para mi familia. Llegué a Madrid el 4 de Mar- zo. Las autoridades españolas me brindaron toda clase de facilidades, incluso posteriormente la de ofrecérme hasta protección personal, puesto que cuando en el MINEL se conoció mi desaparición, el gobierno notificó a las embajadas cubanas en Londres y Madrid que me encontrarían y que me llevaran de regreso para La Habana aunque tuviera que ser a bordo de un buque cubano y por supuesto, en contra de mi voluntad.

No deseo tomar más tiempo para anécdotas personales y si lo he hecho ha sido porque estimo que ayudan a comprender la verdadera situación que se vive en Cuba. La situación de los funcionarios que como en mi caso, desean la libertad de nuestra Patria, y que nos encontramos sujetos a vigilancia, a represión, mis hijos expulsados de la Universidad y sujetos a las mismas privaciones que el res- to de nuestro Pueblo.

Pasemos ahora al tema principal de esta conferencia, que es a la vez la es- pina dorsal de la economía cubana y por tanto el factor determinante de la es- tabilidad o de la caída del régimen de Fidel Castro: el AZÚCAR.
En relación con el estado de la industria azucarera en la actualidad es necesario comenzar por esbozar la situación en la que se encuentran los ingenios. Debido a la escasez de piezas de repuesto, la falta de materiales y la baja calidad del trabajo, los ingenios enfrentan una situación que es necesario calificar de "caótica". La falta de personal técnico capacitado y de obreros especializados hacen que la operación de producción de los ingenios sea altamente deficiente. Por otra parte, la falta de abastecimiento de caña no permite que los ingenios funcionen a su capacidad normal, trayendo como consecuencia poca eficiencia en el trabajo y un alto consumo de combustible adicional, que ocasiona un aumento considerable en los costos de producción del azúcar. En relación con los medios de transporte, principalmente los ferrocarriles azucareros, deseamos aclarar que se encuentran también en pésimas condiciones, a pesar de la adquisición de locomotoras soviéticas, inglesas y francesas, pues las vías férreas no permiten el aprovechamiento de este material rodante. Por ejemplo, durante 1965 se debían de haber cambiado seis millones de traviesas en las vías férreas, mas sin embargo sólo habían disponibles ochenta mil. El resultado es el incremento de los descarrilamientos que durante la zafra de 1965 alcanzaron un promedio de tres des carrilamientos diarios, produciéndose diez accidentes mortales.

Muchos me preguntan cuál será la producción final de la zafra de 1966 y sobre este punto debo hacer los comentarios siguientes: Fidel Castro anunció que la meta azucarera de este año serían 6,5 millones de toneladas y ese anuncio no sólo fue hecho durante su discurso del 1ro. de mayo de 1965, sino que lo repitió durante su discurso del 7 de junio del mismo año. Sin embargo, se admite que dicha meta no será alcanzada. Ahora bien el estimado actual no excede de 5,1 millones de toneladas. ¿Por qué?

Primero se debe mencionar la falta de abono. Este año la aplicación de abono fue insignificante, pues el gobierno no tenía las divisas necesarias para adquirirlo, principalmente en Italia. El año pasado, sin embargo, se aplicó...
ron aproximadamente 450,000 toneladas.

En segundo lugar, resulta necesario hacer referencia a las siembras de caña. Las nuevas áreas sembradas de caña no han sido de forma deficiente y además se han utilizado áreas destinadas con anterioridad a la siembra de otras cosechas para sembrar caña, como lo constituye, por sólo citar un ejemplo, el caso de la zona situada en los alrededores de Manzanillo y Bayamo, las cuales eran zonas arroceras y ahora han intentado convertirlas en zonas cañeras, resultando todo esto en un fracaso pues la caña es de baja calidad al no ser adecuado el suelo. Otro factor menos importante pero digno de darse a conocer es la falta de cuidado en las tareas de cultivo y atención de los cañaverales debido a la escasez de mano de obra.

Con estos antecedentes es que hay que analizar el monto de la presente zafra. Durante 1965 el día 7 de abril se alcanzó el cuarto millón, pero este año el tercero millón se alcanzó el día 3 de abril lo cual ya significa un atraso de cerca de 900,000 toneladas. Creo que hay caña para llegar a 5,1 millones de toneladas ahora bien, lo que hay que preguntarse es si dicha meta, que ya está bastante por debajo de los 6,5 millones anunciados por Fidel Castro será alcanzada o no. El Partido está realizando una movilización masiva recordando los cañaverales con el propósito de intentar cortar toda la caña pero eso hay que ver si en definitiva se logran hacer.

Cabe hacer referencia en este momento a lo que se conoce en Cuba por el nombre de "Plan Perspectivo Azucarero", que es el único plan económico que tiene en estos momentos el gobierno de Cuba.

¿Qué es el "Plan Perspectivo Azucarero"? comprender tres puntos básicos que son los siguientes: primero, la "rehabilitación" de la capacidad industrial a nivel pre-Castró; segundo, la "ampliación" de la capacidad industrial; y tercero, la "concentración" de la industria azucarera en 70 modernos centrales.

Vamos a revisar brevemente los tres puntos a la luz de la presente situación. En relación con el primero, o sea, la "rehabilitación" de la capacidad industrial instalada, es necesario destacar que en 1952 la capacidad de producción de la industria azucarera era de siete millones de toneladas, pero debido a la escasez de piezas de repuesto, falta de materiales para las reparaciones, baja calidad de las reparaciones y la eliminación de seis ingenios - que fueron precisamente desmantelados para utilizar las piezas como repuestos lo cual se ha comprobado ha sido un error más - la capacidad industrial se ha reducido a sólo seis millones de toneladas, es decir, que la actual política ha resultado en la presente mera de la producción (¿qué progreso? Fidel Castro no ha podido ni alcanzar la capaci-
dad de producción azucarera que Cuba tenía hace quince años.

El segundo punto, que en cierto sentido debe atemperarse al primero, es ampliar la capacidad industrial instalada y además construir un nuevo ingenio. Esto significaría, o sea, para alcanzar esto sería necesario la importación de un número considerable de equipos para los ingenios, cosa totalmente imposible de llevarse a cabo debido a la escasez de divisas -de por sí escasas para la adquisición de oleas de repuesto- y la falta de técnicos para hacerse cargo de supervisar y ejecutar dicha ampliación - también se debe decir que tampoco son suficientes los técnicos para realizar de por sí las labores ordinarias de la zafra con la actual capacidad. Este parte del plan supone una coordinación entre el INRA - que siembría la caña - y el MINAZ, pero lo que sucede en la realidad es que no están en coordinación ambos organismos y por consiguiente el INRA manda a sembrar caña en donde no existe capacidad industrial y por su parte el MINAZ está "rehabilitando" ingenios en donde a lo mejor ya no hay suficiente caña. Esto es sólo una muestra de la desorganización existente, desorganización que unida a los factores mencionados imposibilitan el éxito del "Plan Perspectivo". Esto es una prueba más de la incapacidad de la planificación económica de las altas esferas en dicho gobierno.

(Por cierto que la construcción del nuevo ingenio es vital para el éxito del "Plan" y hasta el momento presente sólo una firma francesa ha hecho ofertas para dicha construcción, dicha firma es nada menos que la FIVES-LILLE, bien conocida en los círculos azucareros).

La tercera fase del "Plan", es decir, la "concentración" de la capacidad industrial azucarera en setenta ingenios después de 1970 es sólo un sueño en la mente de los planeadores. La regresión constante de la industria azucarera no puede permitir, económicamente hablando, el modernizar y automatizar plantas y equipos, hasta que los problemas económicos básicos de la producción no estén resueltos.

Los equipos soviéticos no son aptos para realizar estas tareas agrícolas en Cuba y su diseño y difícil operación impiden que cumplan su cometido. Además estas "cortadoras" introducen un 15% de materias extrañas en el ingenio, lo cual ocasiona gran desgaste a las máquinas y equipos del ingenio. Y es precisamente con estos equipos soviéticos con los cuales se contaba para cosechar 83 millones de toneladas de caña que serían necesarias para producir los 10 millones de toneladas de azúcar anunciadas por Fidel Castro como los "10 megatonos de azúcar" con los que iba a derrotar al "imperialismo" en 1970.

Las metas de producción del "Plan" son las siguientes: Para 1965: 6 millones de toneladas; para 1966: 6.5 millones; para 1967: 7.5 millones; para 1968: 8 millones; para 1969: 9 millones; y finalmente, para 1970: 10 millones de toneladas...
de azúcar. Estimo que el único en Cuba que aún cree en el "Plan" y en sus metas

es Fidel Castro.

Me gustaría hacer una breve referencia en relación con otro problema básico
- la baja calidad del azúcar cubano, tanto crudo como refinado, actualmente en proceso de empeorarse. Esto no ha sucedido de casualidad sino como consecuencia de la falta y mala calidad de las piezas de repuesto, la ineficiencia en la operación de los ingenios, la falta de eficiencia de los trabajadores, y la baja calidad de los productos químicos auxiliares procedentes de países socialistas. Estos problemas están resultando en una decreciente polarización del azúcar, el envase deficiente del azúcar de exportación, el aumento de impurezas en el azúcar embarcada a granel, y las dificultades en cumplir los compromisos de entregas de azúcares.

Otro tema de interés lo constituye la presencia de los "técnicos azucareros" soviéticos en Cuba. El régimen cuenta en la actualidad con unos 300 técnicos azucareros soviéticos quienes se supone que sean los sustitutos de los técnicos cubanos que han abandonado el país. Los técnicos soviéticos tienen muy poca experiencia en azúcar de caña y la forma en que dicha industria opera en Cuba. Además muy pocos hablan español y este les hace aún más difícil su labor. Por lo tanto ni los técnicos soviéticos ni los equipos soviéticos constituyen una solución para el quebradero de cabeza azucarero de Fidel Castro.

Con esto deseo dar por terminada estas declaraciones. Dejo ahora la palabra a los miembros de la prensa para contestarles cualquier pregunta en relación, no sólo a mis palabras, sino a la situación política interna que es un interesante fenómeno de desintegración, la odisea de mi familia, el problema de la Universidad en donde desempeñaba una cátedra, así como cualquier otro tema que resulte de interés.

Muchas gracias.

Miami, 5 de Abril de 1966.
CURRICULUM VITAE

Nombre: RAUL ESPARZA TABARES  Casado  Edad: 46 años

Información Profesional:

* Químico Industrial (1938).
* Ingeniero Químico Azucarero (1943).
* Ingeniero Agrónomo (1943).
* Jefe de la Delegación Cubana a la Conferencia Internacional de Expertos Azucareros de la FAO (Naciones Unidas) celebrada en Londres, Inglaterra, del 1 ro. al 3 de marzo de 1966.
* Director de Investigaciones Tecnológicas del Ministerio de Azúcar (MINAZ) de Cuba (1964-1966).
* Jefe del Departamento Químico de la Estación Experimental de Santiago de las Vegas, Habana, Cuba (1948-1949).
* Miembro del "International Society of Sugar Cane Technologists" (1963).
* Vice-Presidente de la "Asociación de Técnicos Azucareros Cubanos" (1966).
* Ex-Presidente del "Rotary Club" de Santa Lucía, Oriente, Cuba.
* Autor de varios artículos técnicos azucareros publicados en revistas azucareras cubanas e internacionales.
ACTION REQUIRED: Headquarters' Approval Requested per Paragraph 2.

REFERENCES: A. DIRECTOR-05058
B. STOCKHOLM-7068

1. Per reference A we forward by separate cover the draft of the proposed AMRAIN-1/AMFRAME-1 answer to the questionnaire sent AMRAIN-1 by Professor Torsten Gardlund requesting information on the Cuban sugar industry. The time was taken to prepare these answers carefully and to provide additional information of Cuban sugar export commitments in order to point up the problems facing the regime in reaching its 1970 goal. In addition, we hope that an exchange of correspondence will ensue as Professor Gardlund could be a useful European contact for AMSCROLL.

2. Please cable Headquarters comments. The station is retaining the originals which need only to be dated and signed prior to mailing. We shall pouch COS, Stockholm a copy of what we mail Professor Gardlund.

Attachments: usc (Adv.)
1. Letter from AMRAIN-1
2. Answer to Questionnaire with Appendix I
3. Letter from AMFRAME-1

Distribution:
3 WH/C, w/atts. usc

Classified
19-120-26/3
Miami, June 10, 1966

Professor Torsten Gardlund
Svenska Sockerfabriks Aktiebolaget
Huvudkontoret
Post Box 17050
Malmo
Sweden.

Dear Prof. Gardlund:

I am pleased to enclose the information that you requested in your kind letter of 5/5/66, which I hope will be useful to you in your studies of price and cost trends in the cane sugar industry.

As you probably know, the Cuban sugar industry ranked first place as a producer of cane sugar, not only with regards to large production volumes, but also as concerns high technical efficiency and low production costs.

Before 1959, the maximum production cost was of 3.5 cents a pound, excepting, of course, the smaller and more inefficient sugar mills that had not developed any technological advances since World War II. However, in 1965 the cost of production was as high as 5.25 cents a pound, even though, of course, this latter figure is carefully concealed by the Communist régime that rules my country.

I would like to acquaint you with the Economic Research Bureau of the UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA Movement. This organization is made up of true Cuban economists in exile. I am sure that you will find this a very valuable source of information concerning Cuba’s economy.

I thank you very much for the kind and humane phrases that you have had for my family and for myself. Thank Heaven, after three long years we were able to escape, even if at the risk of our own lives, from the Communist hell. We have come to this free land in the hope that we can start our lives all over again under the kind hospitality of this great Nation, the free and democratic United States of America.

Please be assured, my dear Professor, that I am pleased to place myself at your service. Should you desire any information concerning the Cuban sugar industry, I will be more than glad to furnish it to you. I also hope that, very soon, a régime of liberty, justice and democratic economic development will prevail in my suffering Fatherland.

Sincerely yours,

Ing. Radl Espasa Sr.
1. **Technicians in Cuban Sugar Industries**
   - Before Castro: 400
   - In 1966: 50

2. **Training of Cuban Sugar Technicians of the University of Havana**
   - Before Castro:
     - Agricultural Engineer (4 years)
     - Sugar Chemical Engineer (5 years)
     - Sugar Chemist (3 years)
   - In 1966:
     - Agricultural Engineer (5 years)

**Questions Pertaining to a Possible French-Cuban Long-Term Sugar Agreement**

A. **Present Cuban export arrangements**
   I. **Total Exports**: 4,800,000 MT (1966 sugar commitments)
   II. **Thereof under long/term agreements** (*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Price</th>
<th>Number of Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>600,000,000 MT</td>
<td>Free Mt.</td>
<td>On a yearly basis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>130,000,000 MT</td>
<td>2.5 cts. lb.</td>
<td>1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>270,000,000 MT</td>
<td>L.P.</td>
<td>1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>100,000,000 MT (est.)</td>
<td>Free Mt.</td>
<td>1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>30,000,000 MT (est.)</td>
<td>Free Mt.</td>
<td>1966</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) - Breakdown of Eastern Europe and additional information enclosed in Appendix I.

B. **Facts about the Cuban sugar production**

I. **Production**

- Average sugar content in cane % 14.6%
- Yield sugar in bag/ton cane % 12.0%
- 1966 4,642,656 acres
- 1970 (planned) 4,642,656 acres
- 1966 994,860 acres
- 1970 (planned) 1,989,720 acres
- 1966 37,500,000,000 MT
- 1970 83,000,000,000 MT
- 1966 4,500,000,000 MT
- 1970 10,000,000,000 MT
- 1966 14.6%
- 1970 (planned) 14.6%

---

CS COPY

---
II. Methods to reach the goal for 1970:

a. Increase in acreage:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Acreage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>563,910 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>664,268 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>563,754 acres</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Increase in yield ton. of cane/acre
   The project has taken into consideration an increase in the yield of metric tons per hectare from 24.924 MT in 1966 to 49.420 MT in 1970. This represents a 24% yield increase in only four years.

c. Increase in yield sugar in lb/ton of cane:
   The project calls for an increase from the 12.8% in 1966 to 12.6% in 1970.

d. Increase of installed milling capacity in factories
   ton/24 hrs.
   An increase of 50,300.0 MT of cane/24 hrs., equivalent to 6,300.0 MT of sugar/24 hrs. is planned.

e. Increase in days of sazra:
   The days of sazra (harvest) will increase from 120 to 140 days.
f.- Number of new factories:

A new sugar mill is programmed for 1970. This new mill will have a capacity of 13,800.0 MT of sugar cane per 24 hours and a total production of 250,000.0 MT of sugar in 120 effective days of satcha.

III.- Fertilizers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1970 (planned)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.- Import of fertilizers</td>
<td>450,000.0 MT</td>
<td>400,000.0 MT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The plan calls for the use of 400,000.0 - 450,000.0 MT of fertilizers for the following years: 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970.

b.- Domestic production of fertilizers: 50,000.0 MT 100,000.0 MT

IV.- Cost of production:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1970 (planned)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.- Raw sugar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw materials incl. cane</td>
<td>45.00</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of production ex factory excl. of depreciation and interest</td>
<td>51.00</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depreciation - interest</td>
<td>21.00</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= by-products</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= price ex factory</td>
<td>115.00</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.- Refined sugar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price ex factory</td>
<td>0.0625</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ marketing costs and profits</td>
<td>0.0175</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= retail price</td>
<td>0.0800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.- Cane</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average price of cane at factory</td>
<td>6.00 pesos per 1.15 MT of sugar cane</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### d. Labour

Average working minutes per ton sugar produced
(or per ton cane crushed) 30,00 metric tons of sugar per minute.

Average labour wage per 8 hrs. 6.50 pesos per man.

### e. Methods of depreciation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% for buildings (average)</th>
<th>% for machinery (average)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On original value</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On recovery value</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix I

**Breakdown of Eastern European Commitments and Additional Information on Cuban Sugar Exports Commitments, Consumption, and Production**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Price</th>
<th>Number of years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>100,000,000 MT</td>
<td>Free Mkt.</td>
<td>1966 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>200,000,000 MT</td>
<td>Free Mkt.</td>
<td>1966 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>220,000,000 MT</td>
<td>Free Mkt.</td>
<td>1966 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>3,000,000,000 MT</td>
<td>5 cts. lb.</td>
<td>1966 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist China</td>
<td>600,000,000 MT</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>1966 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea and North Viet Nam</td>
<td>30,000,000 MT</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>1966 (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>150,000,000 MT</td>
<td>2.5 cts. lb.</td>
<td>1966 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>270,000,000 MT</td>
<td>L.D.P.</td>
<td>1966 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>100,000,000 MT</td>
<td>Free Mkt.</td>
<td>1966 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>30,000,000 MT</td>
<td>Free Mkt.</td>
<td>1966 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other free world commitments</strong></td>
<td>120,000,000 MT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Export Commitments</strong></td>
<td>4,880,000,000 MT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic Consumption</strong></td>
<td>650,000,000 MT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total 1966 Commitments</strong></td>
<td>5,330,000,000 MT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966 Sugar Production</td>
<td>4,500,000,000 MT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible 1966 standout</td>
<td>500,000,000 MT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar available for 1966</td>
<td>5,000,000,000 MT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deficit</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>330,000,000 MT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Bulgaria: 180,000.0 MT for 1966 at current free market prices under barter agreements in exchange for Bulgarian electrical and industrial equipment and plants. A 1967-1970 agreement calls for an increase in deliveries to 200,000.0 MT.

2. Czechoslovakia: 200,000 MT for 1966 at current free market prices under barter agreement originally signed in June 1960 and revised during 1965.

3. East Germany: 220,000.0 MT for 1966 at current free market prices under barter agreement signed early in 1965 which calls for an increase in Cuban sugar deliveries on a yearly basis until 1970.

4. R.F.C.P.: 3,000,000.0 MT for 1966 at an original price of 6 cts. per lb., which is considered to be at the present time of 5 cts. per lb. under the January 20, 1964 barter agreement. Cuban sugar deliveries will increase as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sugar Deliveries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>4,000,000.0 MT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>4,000,000.0 MT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>5,000,000.0 MT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>5,000,000.0 MT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Communist China: 600,000.0 MT under barter agreement in exchange for rice, foodstuffs, and machinery.


7. Spain: 130,000.0 MT for 1966 at a new price of 2.5 cts. per lb. under the new trade agreement for 1966-1969 compared to 5.0 cts. per lb. paid by Spain under the previous agreement. Cuban sugar and tobacco will be exchanged for Spanish vessels, vehicles, electrical equipment and industrial plants, foodstuffs (wine, brandy, nougat, oil), and textiles. Cuban sugar deliveries for the period (1966-1969) will be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sugar Deliveries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>130,000.0 MT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>140,000.0 MT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>150,000.0 MT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>160,000.0 MT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Morocco: 270,000.0 MT for 1966 at L.O.P. 35% of 1966 deliveries will be paid in convertible currencies. Cuban sugar deliveries will increase to 295,000.0 MT in 1967.

9. Egypt: 100,000.0 MT for 1966 at free market prices. Agreement originally signed in October 1959 for an indefinite period of time.

10. Syria: 30,000.0 MT for 1966 at free market prices. No other details available.
Miami, June 1966

Prof. Torsten Gärlund
FEMERAInvalid text
Huvudkontoret
Box 7800
Malmö 17, Sweden.

Dear Prof. Gärlund:

We had the opportunity of cooperating with Ing. Raúl Esparsa in filling out the questionnaire you enclosed with your May 5, 1966 letter. The "Economic Research Bureau" is a branch of UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA, which is an exile Cuban organization born in the underground and presently fighting to free our Homeland, both inside Cuba and in exile.

One of our weapons in this effort is what we have labeled as an economic offensive to deny the Castro regime the hard currency it so desperately needs. For this reason the "Economic Research Bureau" was organized. It puts out a monthly economic newsletter, the "Economic Intelligence Report", and whatever other information we feel will aid our cause and at the same time provide accurate and reliable data to Free World countries and firms that still consider trading with the present Cuban regime.

Enclosed you will find some of our past newsletter which we expect will be of interest to you. At the same time, they will serve as an example of the type of research work we have undertaken, its objectivity, and its accuracy.

It was our pleasure to cooperate with Ing. Esparsa in filling out the questionnaire you sent and we avail ourselves for any additional information you could desire in the future, besides placing you in our regular mailing list.

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Dr. Rafael Ríos-Vásquez
Director URB

Economic Research Bureau

PRV/21/3

S/c act. 3 UFCG-25367

CS COPY

19-12-0-26
ACTION REQUIRED: None; FYI
REFERENCE: UFGW-6034

1. Station JWAVE appreciates the reference and in implementation thereof AMFRAME-1 has written Jaime Lozano of the Colombian National Association of Sugar Cane Growers as suggested in paragraph 1 of the reference. AMFRAME-1 also enclosed certain statistics developed by ANSCROLL which we hope will be of use to Lozano. Copies of the letter and of the translation are forwarded by separate cover.

2. We shall keep the addressees informed of any developments.

[Signature]

Philip G. ELMARD

Attachments: usa 3
1-Letter
2-Memo of Statistics

Distribution:
3- WH/C, w/atts, usa
2- COS/Bogota, w/atts
2- C/WH, w/o atts...

DATE TYPED: 17 June 66
DATE DISPATCHED: JUN 2 1 1666
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-25349
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 19-120-28/3
Miami, 13 de Junio de 1966

Sr. Jaime Lozano
Presidente,
Asociación Nacional de Cultivadores de Caña de Azúcar
Edificio Suramericana de Seguros
Calle 12, Carrera 36, 10º piso,
Col., Colombia.

Estimado Sr. Lozano:

Nos dirijimos a Ud., en esta oportunidad con motivo del fracaso de la presente zafra azucarera cubana, fracaso del cual Ud. ya debe tener noticias, no sólo a través de nuestras hojas de información económica ("Economic Intelligence Report") sino a través de fuentes propias.

Por ejemplo, el boletín de la casa Merrill-Lynch de fecha 10 de Junio de 1966 fija el monto de la presente zafra cubana en 4,400,000 TM, es decir, más de dos millones de toneladas métricas por debajo de la meta anotada por Fidel Castro (6,500,000 TM). Esto se traducirá en unas escaseces que harán muy difícil que el presente régimen pueda cumplir sus compromisos azucareros con países del mundo libre tales como España y Marruecos y al mismo tiempo pueda copar un porcentaje considerable del mercado azucarero del Japón. El memorando adjunto contiene datos que le resultarán de interés.

La reciente operación en la cual el Brasil vendió 530,000 TM es una prueba palpable de la oportunidad existente para los países libres de la América en los actuales momentos debido al fracaso de la zafra cubana.

Sería sumamente oportuno para Colombia el explorar las posibilidades existentes en esos tres mercados de inmediato pues seguramente se podrían realizar algunas operaciones que redundarían en beneficio para su país al mismo tiempo que bloquearían operaciones del régimen Castro-Comunista de por sí difíciles en vista de la escasez producida por el fracaso de la zafra de 1966.

Es muy posible que nuestros pudásemos cooperar en este empeño, tanto a través de informaciones que pudásemos obtener de la situación de dichos mercados (España, Marruecos y Japón), así como a través de alguna gestión personal al ser nos presentara la oportunidad.

GS Copy
Así mismo agradecemos que si Ud. tienen alguna publicación de su Asociación que nos pudieran enviar con regularidad nos la hicieran llegar y si logró utilizar las declaraciones del Ing. Espersa y del Dr. Tarrab en algún artículo nos interesaría obtener algunas copias.

Esperando tener noticias suyas y seguro que cualquier gestión suya representará una victoria tanto para Colombia como para los cubanos libres, que somos de Ud.

Muy atentamente,

Dr. Rafael Rivas-Vázquez
Secretario de Sectores Económicos y Profesionales

P.D. Díganos si está recibiendo con regularidad nuestras informaciones.

RRV/amb.
MEMORANDUM

AL: Sr. Jaime Lozano
Presidente
Asociación Nacional de
Cultivadores de Caña de Azúcar,
Cali, Colombia.

DEL: Dr. Rafael Rivas-Vázquez
Secretario de los Sectores,
Económicos y Profesionales,
Unidad Revolucionaria,
Miami, Florida.

REF.: Análisis Estadístico de los compromisos azucareros de Cuba para 1966. La producción y los mercados de España, Marruecos y Japón.

CUADRO N° 1

COMPROMISOS AZUCAREROS DE CUBA PARA 1966

1.- En base de acuerdos existentes:
   A) Países Comunistas:
      U.R.S.S.: 3,000,000 TM
      Bloque Comunista: 690,000
      China Roja: 600,000
      Corea del Norte y Viet Nam del Norte: 30,000
      TOTAL: 3,320,000 TM
   B) Países del Mundo Libre:
      630,000
      TOTAL: 750,000 TM
   2.- Consumo Doméstico:
      450,000
      TOTAL: 450,000 TM
   TOTAL: 5,420,000 TM

(*) Estimado conservador de compromisos con países tales como España, Marruecos, Ceylón, la República Arabe Unida y otras.

CS CUBA
CUADRO NO. 2
DEJIT AZUCARERO CUBANO PARA 1966

1. - Azúcar necesaria para cubrir compromisos de acuerdo con Cuadro No. 1: 5,420,000 T

2. - Azúcar disponible para 1966:
   A) Producción de 1966 (estimada): 4,450,000 T
   B) Sobrante de 1965 (estimado): 920,000 T
   **TOTAL:** 5,370,000 T

3. - Déficit: (5,420,000 T - 5,370,000 T) = 40,000 T

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CUADRO NO. 3
EXPORTACIONES DE AZÚCAR DE CUBA A MERCADOS SELECCIONADOS: ESPAÑA, MARRUECOS Y JAPÓN
(1961 - 1966)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ESPAÑA</th>
<th>MARRUECOS</th>
<th>JAPÓN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>53,208</td>
<td>157,267</td>
<td>325,000</td>
<td>535,495 T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>56,312</td>
<td>265,124</td>
<td>522,727</td>
<td>844,163 T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>102,737</td>
<td>285,028</td>
<td>163,662</td>
<td>551,427 T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>275,704</td>
<td>323,259</td>
<td>228,409</td>
<td>927,572 T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>112,542</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>260,000</td>
<td>792,542 T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>695,203 T</td>
<td>1,235,698 T</td>
<td>1,512,489 T</td>
<td><strong>3,465,531 T</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966 (*)</td>
<td>130,000 T</td>
<td>270,000 T</td>
<td>(hasta el momento no se ha cerrado negociación alguna)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) España y Marruecos son compromisos de convenio, Japón de acuerdo con negociaciones anuales.

Fuentes: "Sugar Year Book" de 1964, Convenios Comerciales de Cuba Comunista y estimados por el "Buro de Investigaciones Económicas" de UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA.

Miami, 14 de Junio de 1966.
Miami, June 13, 1966

Mr. Jaime Lozano

We address you now on account of the failure of the current Cuban sugar harvest, of which failure you must have heard not only through our "Economic Intelligence Report", but also from your own sources.

For example, the June 10, 1966 Merrill-Lynch bulletin, sets the amount of the current Cuban sugar harvest at 4,400,000 MT, that is, over 2 million metric tons below the goal announced by Fidel Castro (4,500,000 MT). This will result in a scarcity of Cuban sugar, which scarcity will make it very difficult for the regime to fulfill its sugar commitments to free-world countries, such as Spain and Morocco, and at the same time to cope with a significant percentage of the Japanese sugar market. The enclosed Memo contains data that may be of interest to you.

The recent transactions whereby Brazil sold 530,000 MT is tangible evidence of the opportunity that exists for free countries in the Americas at this time, thanks to the failure of the Cuban sugar harvest.

It would be extremely rewarding for Colombia to explore the immediate possibilities that exist in these three markets, as surely some transactions could be made that would benefit your country, and which, at the same time, would block some of the Castro-Communists' own transactions. The latter are in themselves difficult because of the scarcity brought about by the failure of the 1966 sugar harvest.

It is quite possible that we could cooperate with this Colombian endeavor, by informing you of facts we learn concerning the situation in such markets (Spain, Morocco and Japan), markets as well as by any personal undertaking, which we could be capable of.
Likewise, if you have any publication issued by your Association that you could mail to us regularly, we would appreciate your doing so, and if you were able to use the statements by Eng. Espeiza and Dr. Terrab in some article, we would like to obtain a copy of it.

Looking to hear from you soon, and with the certainty that any action on your part will mean a victory for Colombia as well as for the free Cubans, we are,

Yours very sincerely,

Dr. Rafael Rivas-Vázquez
Secretary for Economic and Professional Affairs

P.S.: Please tell us whether you are regularly receiving our publications.

Encl.

RRV/amb
MEMORANDUM

TO: Sr. Jaime Lozano  
    President  
    National Association of  
    Sugar Cane Growers  
    Cali, Colombia.

FROM: Dr. Rafael Rivas-Vázquez  
    Secretary for Economic  
    and Professional Affairs  
    Unidad Revolucionaria  
    Miami, Florida.

RFF.: Statistical Analysis of Cuban Sugar  
Commitments, Production, and the  
Spanish, Moroccan and Japanese Markets.

TABLE NO. 1
CUBAN SUGAR COMMITMENTS FOR 1966

1. Commitments under existing agreements:

   A) Communist Countries:

   U.S.S.R.: 3,000,000 MT
   Communist Bloc: 690,000
   Red China: 660,000
   North Korea and  
   North Viet Nam: 30,000

   4,320,000 MT

   B) Free World Countries*: 650,000

   650,000 MT

   2. National Consumption: 450,000

   450,000 MT

   TOTAL: 5,420,000 MT

(*) Conservative estimate with countries such as Spain,  

**TABLE NO. 2**

**CLEAN SUGAR DEFICIT**

(1966)

1. Sugar needed to keep commitment according to Table No. 1: 4,420,000 MT

2. Available sugar for 1966:
   A) 1966 Sugar Production (estimate): 4,450,000 MT
   B) Carry over from the 1965 harvest (estimate): 300,000 MT

**TOTAL:** 4,750,000 MT

3. Deficit: (4,420,000 MT - 4,750,000 MT) = 470,000 MT

**TABLE NO. 3**

**CLEAN SUGAR EXPORTS TO SELECTED MARKETS: SPAIN, MOROCCO AND JAPAN**

(1961 - 1966)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SPAIN</th>
<th>MOROCCO</th>
<th>JAPAN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>53,208</td>
<td>157,287</td>
<td>325,000</td>
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<td>323,259</td>
<td>328,609</td>
<td>927,572 MT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>115,542</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>715,542 MT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL:** 605,543 MT 1,330,688 MT 1,719,298 MT 3,655,529 MT

1966 (*) Spain and Morocco are commitments under existing agreements. Japanese market subject to yearly negotiations.

**Source:** "Sugar Year Book of 1964", Communist Cuba's Trade Agreements, and estimates by U.S.'s "Economic Research Purse".

Miami, June 14, 1966.
REFERENCES -
A. DIRECTOR 11606
B. UFGT-15216
C. JMWAVE 1420

1. PER REFERENCE A REQUEST PARAGRAPHS BELOW GIVE BRIEF
STATUS REPORT STATION'S MHS/PHN PROJECTS. REFERENCE B SHOULD BE
USED AS SUPPLEMENTAL PAPER IN HEADQUARTERS REVIEW. BASIC PROPAG-
ANDA LINES HAVE CONTINUED WITHOUT CHANGE, BUT WITH INCREASED
EMPHASIS ON PERSONAL DENIGRATION AND HARASSMENT OF FIDEL CASTRO AND
ON PROPAGANDA DESIGNED ENCOURAGE MILITARY AND OTHER POWER CENTERS
IN CUBA TO CARRY OUT COUP D'ETAT AGAINST CASTRO. EMPHASIS IN
PROJECT MANAGEMENT HAS BEEN ON CLOSER SCRUTINY AND CONTROL IN
ORDER TO ACHIEVE INCREASED EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY OF OPERATION.
ONE MARGINAL PROJECT /AMRUSTY/ HAS BEEN TERMINATED AND TWO PROJECTS
/AMSPELL AND ANCMROW/ ARE BEING SHARPLY CURTAILED DUE TO MARGINAL
PERFORMANCE. THERE HAS BEEN OVERALL CUTBACK IN DISTRIBUTION
PRINTED PROPAGANDA, ESPECIALLY TO LATIN AMERICA. PROPAGANDA
MAILED TO CUBA HAS PLACED MORE EMPHASIS ON MILITARY TARGET IN
PLACE OF MORE GENERAL PROPAGANDA THEMES TREATED. AMT/LONG RADIO
PROGRAMMING HAS BEEN CUT FROM TWO HOURS DAILY TO ONE AND ONE HALF
/THIS SHOULD ACHIEVE REDUCTION OF $60,000 - $70,000 PER YEAR IN
OUR RADIO BUDGET/. HOWEVER RADIO CONTINUES TO BE SINGLE MOST
IMPORTANT MEDIUM FOR HITTING CUBAN TARGET.

2. AMSCROLL PROJECT CONTINUES BE STATION'S MAIN PROPAGANDA
MECHANISM IN MWH/PERP AND DEFECTOR-SURFACING OPERATIONS AS
DESCRIBED IN REFERENCE B. PROJECT PUBLISHES MONTHLY ECONOMIC
BULLETIN IN SPANISH AND ENGLISH AND UNDERTAKES SPECIFIC ACTIONS
TO DISCOURAGE TRADE WITH CUBA, E.G., IT IS CURRENTLY CORRESPONDING
WITH COLOMBIAN SUGAR GROWERS GROUP IN ATTEMPT ENCOURAGE SALE OF

DISTRIBUTION
BY TAPE
3 - WH/C

/CONTINUED/
COLOMBIAN SUGAR TO JAPAN, MOROCCO AND SPAIN IN COMPETITION WITH COMMUNIST CUBA. PRODUCES TEN-MINUTE DAILY PROGRAM ON AMTIGHT SIX DAYS PER WEEK. PERIPHERAL ACTIVITIES SUCH AS EXTENSIVE MAILINGS TO CUBA HAVE BEEN SHARPLY CURTAILED AND AMSROLL EXECUTIVE BOARD HAS BEEN REDUCED FROM 13 TO 3 PERSONS AND PAID EMPLOYEES FROM 21 TO 16 AS OF 1 JULY 1956.

3. AMWASP-1. SEE REFERENCE B. HE IS A VALUABLE ELEMENT OF THE AMSROLL PROJECT AND IS USED IN CONNECTION WITH APPROACHES TO DEFECTION AND RECRUITMENT TARGETS. WE EXPECT TO TERMINATE HIM 31 DECEMBER 1966.

4. AMFRAME-1. SINGLETONE AGENT WHO IS MAIN DRIVING FORCE BEHIND AMSROLL OPERATION AND TOGETHER WITH AMASK-1 RUNS AMHOT ACTIVITY.

5. AMHOT. A NEW COMMITTEE FORMED AT HEADQUARTERS REQUEST TO HIT ZRWSHON DEFECTION TARGET. AMFRAME-1 AND AMASK-1 ARE WORKING VERY EFFECTIVELY AS PRINCIPAL AGENTS FOR THIS PROJECT AND LATTER HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY EFFECTIVE IN SECURING JOBS FOR ZRWSHON DEFECTORS.

6. AMCROW. PROJECT IS BEING SHARPLY CURTAILED. WE EXPECT TO REDUCE BUDGET TO APPROXIMATELY $1,000-1,500 MONTHLY IN FY 67. PROJECT LACKS AGRICULTURAL PRINCIPAL AGENT, AND THE COMBINATION OF INTERNAL PERSONNEL PROBLEMS IN AMCROW GROUP AND ITS MARGINAL PERFORMANCE HAVE LED TO DECISION TO CURTAIL. PROGRAM ON ZHOP WATCH TERMINATED 31 MARCH AND AFTER 31 JULY WE EXPECT TO REDUCE AMCROW STAFF TO THREE PERSONS. WE BELIEVE IT WILL BE USEFUL TO PRESERVE AMCROW NAME AND CERTAIN AMCROW CONTACTS IN LATIN AMERICA AND TO CONTINUE AMCROW MAILING OPERATIONS IN MORE LIMITED BASIS.

7. AMMOP. NO MAJOR CHANGES. OPERATION IS VIEWED AS DEVICE FOR MONITORING AND INFLUENCING CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND IS OF LONG-TERM INTEREST FOR ITS POTENTIAL AS A POLITICAL FORCE IN CUBA. HOWEVER PRINCIPAL AGENT LACKS MANY QUALITIES NEEDED TO MAKE HIM EFFECTIVE POLITICAL LEADER OR INTELLIGENCE PRODUCER AND WE ARE ASSESSING OTHER AMMOP MEMBERS AS POSSIBLE REPLACEMENT. AMMOP YOUTH SECTOR HEADED BY AMCROW-1 MAINTAINS EXCELLENT CONTACTS WITH ITS COUNTERPARTS THROUGHOUT HEMISPHERE AND HAS BEEN USEFUL AS PRESS PLACEMENT MECHANISM.

8. AMSTRUT-2. NO CHANGES. SEE REFERENCE B FOR PROJECT DESCRIPTION.

9. AMHRA. NO CHANGE. SEE REFERENCE B FOR DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT ACTIVITIES. MONTHLY MAGAZINE STARTED JANUARY 66 WELL RECEIVED BY READERS AND EFFORTS TO MAKE MAGAZINE SELF-SUSTAINING HAVE RESULTED IN PAID ADVERTISEMENTS AND SUBSCRIPTIONS WHICH ARE EXPECTED TO INCREASE AS MAGAZINE BECOMES MORE WIDELY KNOWN. AMHRA GROUP PREPARED TARGET STUDIES ON CUBAN ATHLETES ATTENDING REGIONAL OLYMPIC GAMES IN PUERTO RICO IN JUNE 1966 AND AMHRA AGENTS ARE CURRENTLY WORKING WITH KUBAK TASK FORCE AT PUERTO RICAN GAMES.

10. AMBASAL-1. NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES FROM REFERENCE B. AMHRA-1 "CARTA CIRCULAR" NOW SENT ONLY TO CUBA AND MONTHLY BULLETIN SENT ONLY TO INTERNATIONAL ADDRESSES. IN PAST BOTH PUBLICATIONS HAD BEEN SENT TO CUBA AND TO LATIN AMERICA. AMBASAL-1 PROGRAM ON AMTIGHT HAS BEEN DROPPED AS OF 1 JUNE BUT CONTINUES ON ZHOP WATCH ONCE WEEKLY /SUNDAYS/.

11. YOYARD/JHOP. NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES. MORE EMPHASIS HAS BEEN PLACED ON NEWS PROGRAMS AS RESULT OF REFUGEE DEBRIEFS INDICATING DESIRE FOR MORE NEWS. JHOP NOW GIVES FIVE MINUTE NEWS SUMMARIES EVERY HALF HOUR AS COMPARED PREVIOUSLY HOURLY REPORTS. MANAGERIAL CONTROL OVER PHILCO TECHNICALS AT JHOP SITE HAS BEEN IMPROVED, AND PLANS ARE NOW UNDERWAY FOR CONSTRUCTION OF NEW UNITS TO REPLACE SUBSTANDARD HOUSING AT SITE. /CONTINUED/
12. AMCORE-2. EMPHASIS IN THIS PROJECT IN PAST HAS BEEN CHIEFLY ON AMCORE-2 DAILY HALF-HOUR PROGRAM ON AMTHIGH AND JHOPE. THESE PROGRAMS CONTINUE, ALTHOUGH REDUCED TO 23 MINUTES DAILY FOR TECHNICAL PROGRAMMING REASONS. WE ARE EXAMINING POSSIBILITY OF ADDING MORNING PROGRAM ON JHOPE TO EXPLOIT HIS HIGH AUDIENCE RATING AS REFLECTED IN REFUGEE AND JHOPE REPORTS. WE ARE ALSO ATTEMPTING TO EXPLOIT MORE FULLY AMCORE-2'S AGGRESSIVE PERSONALITY AND HIS LEADERSHIP POTENTIAL IN EXILE COMMUNITY AND TO EXPAND HIS PROPAGANDA EFFORTS BEYOND THE RADIO PROGRAMS NOTED ABOVE. ONE RESULT OF THIS WAS HIS HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL EFFORT TO ORGANIZE THE DISPARATE REBEL ARMY ELEMENTS IN A UNIFIED APPEAL TO REBEL ARMIES IN CUBA, AS REPORTED IN JNMAE 1397. HE HAS ALSO ARRANGED FOR FREE AIR TIME FOR A TWELVE MINUTE DAILY PROGRAM ON STATIONS IN VENEZUELA, PERU AND PANAMA - AND HAS OBTAINED SPACE IN DIA A RIO LAS AMERICAS TO PUBLICIZE LETTERS HE RECEIVES FROM LATIN AMERICAN LEADERS IN SUPPORT OF THE ANTI-CASTRO CAUSE.

13. AMRPT/AMPAHM-4. AMPAHM-4 ONE AND ONE HALF HOURS ON JHOPE HAVE BEEN CUT TO ONE HOUR DAILY. DISTRIBUTION OF PRINTED PROPAGANDA TO LATIN AMERICA HAS BEEN TERMINATED. SELECTIVE MAILINGS ARE MADE TO CUBA; WITH EMPHASIS ON MILITARY TARGET. SPECIAL STUDIES BY AMPAHM-4 ARE NOW BEING PUBLISHED BY AMTBM IN PLACE OF TERMINATED AMPAHM-4 BULLETIN. AS OF 1 MAY DIRECTION OF ANTIHIST PROGRAM HAS BEEN PLACED UNDER AMPAHM-4.

14. AMTBM, AS NOTED REFERENCE B, THIS PROJECT WAS A MARGINAL EFFORT DUE LARGELY TO LACK OF AN EFFECTIVE PRINCIPAL AGENT. THE TWO AMTBM AGENTS HAVE BEEN PLACED UNDER AMPAHM-4'S DIRECTION AS OF 1 MAY AND ACTIVITY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A DEVELOPMENTAL OPERATION. AMTBM RADIO PROGRAM IS CARRIED ON AMTHIGH/TEN MINUTES DAILY AND ON JHOPE /15 MINUTES DAILY.

15. AMSHADY-1. UNTIL MID-FEBRUARY 66 AMSHADY PROJECT CONSISTED OF RADIO PROGRAM ON AMTBM AND JHOPE AIMED AT EXPOSURE AND DENUNCIATION OF CUBAN AGENTS IN CUBA. IN FEBRUARY SCOPE OF RADIO PROGRAM WAS BROADENED TO INCLUDE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF CUBAN ACTIVITIES AND AGENTS IN LATIN AMERICA, AND OCCASIONAL DISCUSSION OF OTHER POLITICAL TOPICS NOT SPECIFICALLY RELATED TO CUBAN TARGET. AMSHADY BOOK ON CUBA HAS RESULTED IN WIRE SERVICE REPORTS, PRESS INTERVIEWS, AND INCREASED PRESS COVERAGE AND LETTERS FROM AMSHADY AUDIENCE. ARRANGEMENTS HAVE NOW BEEN MADE FOR SALE OF BOOK IN LATIN AMERICA THROUGH LEGITIMATE COMMERCIAL CHANNELS.

16. AMRAZOR-1. NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE. SEE REFERENCE B FOR DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT ACTIVITIES. AMRAZOR HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY EFFECTIVE OUTLET FOR OUR INCREASED ACTIVITY AGAINST MILITARY TARGET AND SEVERAL AMRAZOR ARTICLES ON THIS TARGET HAVE BEEN PUT IN LEAFLET FORM AND MAILED INTO CUBA.

17. AMRYC-1. NO CHANGE. SEE REFERENCE B.

18. AMSCREAM-1. NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE. SEE REFERENCE B. AMTHIGH PROGRAMMING, HANDLED THROUGH AMSCREAM-1, HAS BEEN REDUCED FROM TWO HOURS DAILY TO ONE AND ONE HALF HOURS DAILY PER REFERENCE C.

19. AMRUSTY. TERMINATED 31 DECEMBER 1965. SEE REFERENCE B.

20. AMBASE. NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE. SEE REFERENCE B. MONTHLY AVERAGE OF MAILINGS INTO CUBA HAVE BEEN REDUCED. SEPARATE REPORT ON AMBASE STATISTICS WILL BE FORWARDED.

21. AMTHIM. SEE REFERENCE B. STATION IS PLACING INCREASING EMPHASIS ON AMTHIM AS MAIN MECHANISM FOR PRESS PLACEMENT AND MASS DISSEMINATION OF PRINTED PROPAGANDA. AMTHIM BULLETIN NOW INCORPORATES MATERIAL FORMERLY PRODUCED AND DISTRIBUTED BY OTHER STATION ASSETS SUCH AS AMPALM-4 AND AMBASE-1.
22. AMRUBY. NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE. SEE REFERENCE B.
PROJECT CONTINUES TO PRODUCE AVERAGE OF ONE PONY EDITION /30,000
COPIES/ EVERY THREE MONTHS FOR MAILING INTO CUBA. AS OF 1 JUNE
TWO OF FIVE AMRUBY-SPONSORED SATIRE PROGRAMS ON AMTHIGH HAVE
BEEN DROPPED.

23. AMICE. NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES. AMICE CONTINUED EFFECTIVE
BOYCOTT PROPAGANDA OPERATIONS AND SERVED AS A VEHICLE FOR LAUNCHING
THE QUMALT-I "DOLCE VITA" SERIES. REVIEW OF PROJECT ACTIVITIES
RESULTED IN ECONOMIES ACHIEVED BY MODEST PERSONNEL CUTS, USE OF A
MORE SELECTIVE MAILING LIST AND ELIMINATION OF TWO FOREIGN-
LANGUAGE EDITIONS OF THE MONTHLY AMICE BULLETIN.

24. AMSPELL. AS REPORTED IN REFERENCE B FINANCIAL SUPPORT
TO AMSPELL HAS BEEN CUT SHARPLY AND IS NOW LIMITED TO $1,000
MONTHLY. THIS PROVIDES FUNDS FOR BI-MONTHLY BULLETIN, PRESS
RELEASES AND SPECIAL PRINTED PROPARGANDA. AMSPELL HAS BEEN ACTIVE
IN STATION CAMPAIGNS REGARDING POLITICAL PRISONERS AND LATIN
AMERICAN STUDENT MOVEMENT /CLAE/ AND PRINCIPAL AGENT HAS CONTINUED
TO BE RESPONSIVE TO STATION GUIDANCE.

25. AMNON. NO MAJOR CHANGES IN PROJECT ACTIVITY. AMNON
CARRIED OUT SPECIAL RADIO AND PRESS CAMPAIGN IN CONNECTION WITH
FORTHCOMING CLAE MEETING IN HAVANA. SPECIAL PAMPHLET ON THIS
SUBJECT IS BEING PREPARED BY AMNON FOR PUBLICATION BY AMHIM. AMNON
IS ALSO STATION'S MAIN ASSET FOR AMBASE PROGRAM AND HAS TAKEN
OVER AMBASE PERSONNEL FROM TERMINATED AMRUSTY PROJECT.

PHILIP G. ELHARD
Reference: JWAVE 1032

Action Required: See Below

1. The information which Honorio Viray supplied AMSCROLL about himself is substantially correct. He has been in PEBPRIME for nearly a year on a World Press Institute grant, undergoing practical training in different periodicals. Prior to this grant, he was provincial news editor of the Manila Times. He will probably rejoin the Times on his return to the Philippines in July, 1986. He was a director of the National Press Club, but he was defeated when he ran for reelection in February 1986.

2. Viray is a native of Tarlac and is about 30 years old. He is a graduate of the University of Santo Tomas. He studied for one year in Australia, working with a paper in Brisbane while going to school. He is a bachelor. He has no known leftist sympathies, and he appears to be popular with his fellow journalists.

3. Manila Station may be interested in contacting Viray once he returns to Manila and his job status in certain. Assuming that AMSCROLL will correspond with Viray, as suggested in reference, we would like to reserve for future determination a means whereby AMSCROLL could assist in arranging a contact with a Station officer. The Station anticipates the assignment here of an officer (Raymond E. Onofray) within the next ninety days whom we should want to place in contact with Viray. We will forward a dispatch suggesting a contact proposal when this becomes appropriate.

Caroline R. KOCERHAN

Distribution:
2 - COS, JWAVE
1 - C/FE

CROSS REFERENCE TO DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER 18451 DATE 6 June 1966

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

FILE NO. 174-72
To: Chief of Station, Manila  

From: Chief of Station, JMWAVE  

SUBJECT: TYPIC/THOMPSON/AMSCROLL  
O. Forwarding of Economic Intelligence Report  

ACTION REQUIRED: None; FYI  
REFERENCE: JMWAVE-1092  

1. We forward by separate cover the latest edition of the AMSCROLL economic report that paragraph 3 of the reference indicated would be pouches. Copies of this and prior issues as well as supporting statistical material were given Honorio J. Viray during the visit described in the reference.  

2. This Station will appreciate receiving Manila's overt mailing address for direct mailing of material similar to this in the future. JMWAVE's address is identity.  

Philip G. ELMARD  

Attachments: usc(s.a.e.)  
1. VOL I No. 10: Economic Intelligence Report  
2. Identity(s.a.e.)  

Distribution:  
3. COS/Manila, w/atts. usc  
4. WH/C, w/atts. usc  
2. C/FE, w/atts. usc  

CLASSIFICATION  
SECRET  

DATE TYPED: 19. 120-26  
DATE DISPATCHED: 26 May 66  
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-25198  
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 19-120-26
IDENTITY

P. O. Box 1767
Coral Gables, Florida

CS COPY

S/CWG: UFSA-25198

19-120-26
SECRET T3425132 CITE JSTAVE 1972
MANILA INFO DIRECTOR
TYPIC KH3P2Y

1. ON 19 MAY-67, HONORIO L. VIRAY CALLED UPON KUBARK CONTROLLTED ANSCROLL (IDEN A) SEEKING INFORMATION ON CUBA REFUGEE PROBLEMS AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS FACING CUBA. SAID HE EMPLOYED BY MANILA TIMES AND CURRENTLY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL PRESS CLUB OF PHILIPPINES, IN STATES WITH GROUP IS OTHER NEWSMEN STUDYING WAR IN POVERTY AND THAT HE BECAME INTERESTED IN REFUGEES WHILE PASSING THROUGH MIAMI. SAID WOULD USE INFORMATION ON REFUGEES IN ARTICLES HE WILL PREPARE FOR TIMES AFTER RETURN TO MANILA IN JULY.

2. ANSCROLL BRIEFED VIRAY ON AND 21 MAY ON CASTRO'S SUGAR DIFFICULTIES INCLUDING PROBLEMS JAPAN HAVING IN DEALINGS WITH CUBA. ANBASP-1 (IDEN B) MADE AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW 22 MAY WHO MADE POINT JAPAN IS NATURAL MARKET FOR PHILIPPINE SUGAR. VIRAY TOOK EXTENSIVE NOTES AND ACCEPANTED DOCUMENTATION OF STATEMENTS. HE ALSO BRIEFED ON RASH OF CUBAN MERCHANT MARINE DEFECTIONS AND MEANING OF THIS TO CASTRO AND ANSCROLL ARRANGED FOR 21 M. TO MEET A FORMER SHIP CAPTAIN WHO DEFECTED (CUBAILOR 12). SECRET
3. Viray said he wished stay in touch with Amscroll and receive their publications. Next step will be for Amscroll to write Viray after his return to Manila. Request by pouch traces and any suggestions Manila may have since outlet for Amscroll Economic Information in Manila would be useful. Pouching copy latest Amscroll Economic Report for Info Station.

4. Index Viray.
SECRET 240313Z CITE JNMVAVE 1933
MANILA INFO DIRECTOR
TYPIC NPNAME
REF: HAVE 0192 (W 03837)
IDENS:
A. UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA
B. GILBERTO R. ALEMAN, CUBAN TRADE UNIONIST, TOKYO, WHO
DEFECTED AUGUST 1965.
The letter is addressed to the Chief of Station, Bogota, from the Chief of Station, JINWAVE. The subject is "Letter from the National Association of Sugar Cane Growers, Cali, Colombia". The action required is for addressees to determine.

REFERENCE: DIR-03229

1. We forward by separate cover a copy of a letter (with translation) from Jaime Lozano, President of the National Association of Sugar Cane Growers of Cali, Colombia, that was recently received by AMSCROLL which was in response to AMSCROLL's mailing the Association the text of public statement made by AMRAIN and AMSNAKE. Needless to say, AMSCROLL will continue the Association on its mailing list and has responded to this letter with its own letter of appreciation.

2. It occurs to WAVE that this organization might be useful in implementing the reference, particularly in view of the fact that Colombia might have as much as 200,000 tons of sugar available for export this year (per paragraph 4 of the reference). WAVE will be happy to undertake any action requested of it by the addressees if this should be an exploitable lead.

3. There are no WAVE traces for either Lozano or his organization.

Attachment: USC Letter and translation

Distribution:
3 - WH/C, w/att. usc
2 - COS/Bogota, w/att. usc
2 - C/WH, w/o att.

DATE TYPED: 16 May 66
DATE DISPATCHED: MAY 8 1956
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-25153
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 19-120-26/3
ASOCIACION NACIONAL DE CULTIVADORES DEL CAÑA DE AZUCAR

CALI - COLOMBIA

Cali, Mayo 2 de 1.966

Señor
Director del Economic Research Bureau
Box 3940
Miami (Florida).

Muy estimado amigo:

Por intermedio del Centro de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales que funcionan en Cali, tuvimos la oportunidad de recibir los Boletines N.os 9 y 9-A de ustedes que contienen las declaraciones de los señores Espasa Tabares y Tarrab Miranda sobre los problemas económicos de Cuba.

Estas declaraciones nos hemos considerado de la mayor significación y les estamos dando amplia publicidad por medio de uno de los Boletines de nuestra Asociación que circula tanto entre la industria azucarera y medios económicos de este país, como en la prensa y radio nacionales.

Esperamos que esta publicidad cuente con el agradecimiento de su organización y mucho apreciaríamos si incluyen el nombre nuestro para que nos sean enviados los Boletines o publicaciones de ustedes que tengan especial relación con las actividades cubanas en materia de azúcar. Nosotros representamos en Colombia la industria azucarera y somos la organización que integra las actividades de tan importante sector de nuestra economía.

Les damos nuestras gracias anticipadas por la atención que estas líneas les merecían y los saludamos de la manera más cordial.

Atentos amigos,

[Signature]

Salmo Losano
Presidente.
Translation:

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SUGAR GROWERS - CALI, COLOMBIA

Cali, May 2, 1966

Director
Economic Research Bureau
Box 3940,
Miami (Florida).

My very dear friend:

Through the Center for Economic and Social Research that operates in Cali, we had the opportunity to receive your Bulletins Nos. 9 and 9-A, which contain the statements made by Mrs. Esparza Zabares and Tarrebl Miranda regarding the economic problems of Cuba.

We have considered these statements of the utmost significance, and we are giving them wide publicity through one of the Bulletins of our Association that circulates among the sugar industry and the economic circles of this country as well as among the national press and radio.

We hope that this publicity will be to the liking of your Organization and we would appreciate it very much if you would include our name so that we are sent those of your Bulletins or publications that are especially related to Cuban activities in matters of sugar. In Colombia, we represent the sugar industry and we are the organization that integrates the activities of such an important sector of our economy.

We thank you in advance for your kind attention to these lines and convey to you our most cordial greetings.

Your friends,

NATIONAL ASSN. OF SUGAR CANE GROWERS

(sgd.) Jaime Losano, President
Under separate cover we are forwarding the tapes of the Press Conference held by AMRAIN on 5 April 1966 under the auspices of AMSCROLL.

[Signature]

Philip G. ELMARD

Attachments: USC(2021)
3 tapes

Distribution: 3- WH/C, w/atts. use

19-120-26

DATE TYPED DATE DISPATCHED
12 April 66 APRIL 66

UFGA-24955

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

19-132-49/3
SECRET 161808Z
DIR OTTA CITE WAVE 9650
TYPIC AMSCROLL MNIVER

1. ON 15 MARCH WAVE ASSET AMSCROLL (IDEN) RECEIVED TELEPHONED CALL FROM PERSON IDENTIFYING HIMSELF AS JOHN WIES, AN OFFICIAL OF DELHI EXPORT AND SERVICE, LTD., DELHI, ONTARIO. SAID THAT DELHI HAD TRACED FOR TWO AND ONE HALF YEARS WITH CUBA UNTIL DECEMBER 64 WHEN TRADING SUSPENDED AS UNABLE TO COLLECT AMOUNTS DUE. WIES SAID HE THEN WENT TO CUBA IN ATTEMPT TO COLLECT. INSTEAD JAILED UNTIL FEB 65. AMONG CHARGES WAS MELKARK AGENT. UPON RETURN CANADA HE UNSUCCESSFULLY SOUGHT TO INTEREST CANADIAN GOVT HIS CASE. THEREAFTER RETAINED LAWYER AND NOW PREPARING SUIT. SAID HIS LAWYER ALSO REPRESENTS OTHER CANADIAN FIRMS WITH OUTSTANDING CLAIMS AGAINST CUBA AND HIS SUIT BEING PREPARED IN CONJUNCTION OTHERS. OBJECT IS TO IMPOUND CUBAN ASSETS TO OBTAIN SATISFACTION CLAIMS.

2. WIES SAID HE HAD BEEN CONSIDERING APPROACHING KUBARK OR OTHER 00YOKE AGENCY OFFICE IN CANADA TO FILE THIS CASE BUT DID NOT KNOW WHERE TO TURN. HE DECIDED INSTEAD TO CALL AMSCROLL AS HIS FIRM IS RECIPIENT ITS ECONOMIC BULLETIN.
ADDED THAT AS ANTI-CASTRO, AMSCROLL WOULD KNOW WHAT TO DO WITH INFO HIS EXPERIENCES. OFFERED TO GIVE FACTS TO AMSCROLL IF REP WOULD COME HIS OFFICE OR HE WOULD COME AMSCROLL OFFICE IF EXPENSES PAID. AMSCROLL CHIEF NON-COMMITTAL AND SAID WOULD DISCUSS MATTER WITH COLLEAGUES AND TELEPHONE WIES.

3. DELHI FIRM IS ON AMSCROLL MAILING LIST FOR ITS BULLETIN. SUGGEST WIES CLAIMS WORTH EXPLORING FURTHER. REQUEST TRACES AND ADDRESSES INFORMATION BY 18 MARCH IF POSSIBLE DUE FACT WIES EXPECTING CALL FROM AMSCROLL.

4. WAVE TRACES INDICATE WIES CANADIAN WHO MADE TRIPS HAVANA IN FEB, MARCH, APRIL, MAY AND APPARENTLY NOV 63 (AMLIST-1 AND AMCOVE REPORTS). IN FEB 64 SIGNED CONTRACT TO PROVIDE TWENTY FIVE MILLIONS DOLLARS WORTH OF CHEMICALS (N50237) TO CUBA. CITA 2207 OF 24 DEC 64 REPORTED WIES ATTEMPTING OBTAIN LETTER FROM GOVT OFFICIALS EXONERATING HIM FROM BLACKMAIL CHARGES.

5. INDEX WIES.

SECRET
CFN 9658 15 MARCH AMSCROLL JOHN WIES DELHI EXPORT AND SERVICE LTD DELHI ONTARIO CUBA DECEMBER 64 FEB 65 CANADA NOT KNOW AMSCROLL 18 MARCH NOV 63 AMLIST-1 AMCOVE FEB 64 2207 24 DEC 64
SECRET 161807Z
DIR OTTA CITE WAVE 9651
TYPIC AMSCRROLL MHPVIPER
REF WAVE 9650 C 1W 76425
IDEN MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA
SECRET
CFN 9651 9650 MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA
BT

19-120-26
16 Mar 1966
ACTION REQUIRED: Please provide Radio Free Europe study.

The Station has read the attached article from The Wall Street Journal with considerable interest. If readily available we will appreciate a copy of the RFE report on this subject which is mentioned in this article. Material of this nature is most useful in the AMSCROLL effort (via radio and written analysis) to support its thesis that if after forty-two years the Soviets have not solved their industrial and agricultural problems how can the Cubans hope to do so in less?

Philip G. Elmard

Attachment: h/w article

Distribution:
3- WH/C, w/att.
Commodities

Soviet Grain Imports Expected to Continue Despite Big Plans to Boost Farm Output

BY RAY YETTER

Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal

A drastic revision of the Soviet Union's agriculture is getting under way aimed at lifting farm production by improving the lot of the peasant. For 1964, Russian leaders are deliberately slowing industrial growth to the smallest increase in the postwar period, while they count on a sharp upsurge in agriculture to propel the economy forward.

Between 1960 and 1970, the Russians plan to pour an average of $15.5 billion a year in investments into agriculture, up from $11 billion in 1964 and slightly more last year. They're encouraging free marketing of fruits and vegetables from small private plots held by peasants. Farm pay is being increased. In summer or fall, the first Farmers' Congress since 1922 will be held to plan fresh ways of stimulating production.

Evidence indicates the Soviets have a tough job on their hands. The hitch is that the Communist world will continue as a major importer of grains over the next few years.

The scope of the Russian agricultural overhaul is being analyzed in Munich by Soviet specialists of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which beam anti-Communist programs into Soviet bloc countries, and by authorities in foreign ministries in Western Europe and by American Government officials.

May Have Important Side Effects

The success or failure of the Soviet campaign may have an important bearing on world grain trade. American farm programs, the cold war and Soviet political attitudes toward the U.S.

Agriculture is the Achilles' heel of the Communist world. The Soviet government reported last week that grain output dropped 25% last year to 129.8 million metric tons from 152.1 million in 1964. The result is a continuing need for big grain imports. In the crop year ending June 30, more than 35% of the world's commercial movement of wheat—about 19 million metric tons—is expected to go into Communist lands. A metric ton is 2,205 pounds.

The U.S. has only a small portion of that trade. Canada, Australia, Argentina and France are major Communist bloc suppliers. But these bloc sales deplete their export stocks, reducing competition elsewhere for the U.S. Wheat stocks of major exporters may be under 50 million tons at the end of the current crop year, just over half the 150-160 average. So the anticipated continuation of Communist grain purchases could lift world export prices, it also may result in a rise in use of production goals in U.S. farm programs.

How does the Soviet farm-relief campaign fit into the future world trade picture for grain? Only time will tell. But there are signs that the Soviet Union, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, and possibly Bulgaria, will need imports, predicts Carl R. Ezeh, Radio Free Europe's top agricultural economist. A U.S. Department of Agriculture official says, "It should come as no great surprise if the Communist countries remained in the grain market, perhaps up and down, but in, for some years to come."

Outlook for 1964 Cloudy

Even as the new drive starts, the outlook for the 1964 crop is cloudy. Not long ago, Kholostov, a member of the Voronezhd region.
the Soviet Ministry of Agriculture, warned that smaller wheat harvests through the country were expected as a result of the dry fall. Banker Radio Free Europe report: "This, it seems conservative to submit that only if extreme weather conditions prevail throughout the Soviet Union could the ambitious 1964 harvest be achieved, which is highly unlikely." At the Institute for the Study of Soviet Russia and the U.S.S.R.'s Economic Development, there is no possibility of the Soviet Union "using their main labour". Targets call for an increase in total farm output of nearly 10% this year alone. Yet Party secretary Leonid Brezhnev himself admitted that gross farm output increased by only 10% in the last two years.

Such a degree of stagnation is even greater than many Western observers had projected, says one Radio Free Europe report.

**Evidence of Stagnation**

Stagnation is evident. Fears of a blight have been raised in 13,000 collective and 10,000 state farms last December, and since they receive only one-third of all state receipts, wheat in grain and livestock is outdated. Decisions are made by distant bureaus.

On the wide plains of the Ukraine, rotted wagon tracks connect isolated collectives, where the horse is still common. In Siberia, farmland carved from the endless forests lies under snow most of the year. In Kazakhstan, where land stretches to horizons like the steppe country of the American West, trees and cacti blow toppled from "virgin lands" agriculture plots.

Statistics for 1969 show the Soviets harvested only 11.6 bushels of wheat an acre compared with the U.S. average of 24 bushels an acre. Yields haven't changed much since, and similar yields exist for corn, sugar beets, rice, barley and other products. Farming still employs a third of Russian families. Crop land totals about 600 million acres, some 80% more than in the U.S., yet Russia must import grain.

This is promoting considerable soul searching in the USSR. Ills from industrial officials are increasingly candid.

In Volgograd, one official complains: "On the farms in the region there exists an acute shortage of field tractors and grain combines. For every 2,500 acres of corn we have two Swede-type tractors, and for every 2,500 acres of grain crops, only three combines."

From Kazakhstan, a productive farm republic in the Urals, comes another complaint: Of 626 collective farms in the republic, only 150 are fully electrified. Of the inhabited centers in the republic, which has a population of more than 8 million, 60% don't use electricity at all.

Vasily F. Gartsev, Soviet minister of finance, recently reported in a confidential document: Agricultural capital in the Soviet Union averages $2.200 a man, whereas in the U.S. it averages $11,000 a man, or five times larger.

**Flight From the Land**

A flight from the land currently is accentuating problems. From all parts of the country come reports of peasants abandoning farm life for the supposedly gay life of cities, even though the cities may be only Novosibirsk or Baku.

In the Pskov region, I. S. Gatsel, party secretary, complains that in the last seven years the number of able-bodied farmers in his area has been halved from 200,000. Says he: "If the losses continue at the same rate, in 10 years there will be no able-bodied farmers left." He complains that in his area, wages
ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

1. Beginning with the broadcast for 19 October 1965 the Station at its request began receiving a summary of each AMSCRoll ANTHIGH program. We forward by separate cover these summaries through the evening of 20 January 1966 (with the exception of the periods of 28-30 November and 2-4 January for which no summary was prepared). Henceforth these summaries will be forwarded on an at least bi-weekly basis.

2. The Station is attempting to improve both the punch and the quality of these programs. We believe, for example, that more emphasis should be placed upon regime failures and upon the needless economic mess. Further, we are trying to refine the "irritability" factor as far as Castro and the regime are concerned due to the sensitivity of Castro to this type of attack. Calling Castro (on 19 January) the "Soviets' barking hound dog" is a sally in this direction.

3. As usual with programs of this nature the size and reaction of the audience is most difficult to ascertain. It is some comfort to be able to record that during this period 10 letters have been received by AMSCRoll that have been inspired by this program. The President's uncle, Carlos Dorticos, told AMSCRoll-3 that he had been a frequent listener to this program and that he had listened to this program at his home the night before he left Cuba.

[Signature]

Philip G. ELMARD

Attachment: USC (add) Broadcast summaries

Distribution:
3- C/WI, w/att., USC
2- WR/C, w/o/att.
November 1, 1965: "There will be no change in the blockade of Red Cuba". A comment on the rumors that U.S. policy on Cuba will "soften". It is indicated that Washington, for humanitarian reasons, accepted Castro's parley to evacuate the spiritually wounded. We also comment on the statement of a Washington official who said that "the fear that the U.S. may alter its relations with Cuba is unfounded (and) there is no prospect for a change in our relations". We arrive at the conclusion that U.S. policy on the subject will not vary: Castro will be economically strangled and there is no future for Communism in this Continent.

"What About Political Prisoners?".- Fidel Castro has taken a series of steps that limit, by several means, the offer he made to allow dissatisfied Cubans to leave the Island. Even though no public statement has been made about the political prisoners, it may be expected that this matter has been considered in the negotiations, and that Fidel Castro must be forced to play fairly in order that he may not trade with the agony and the hope of 70,000 political prisoners and with the hope and the anguish of their relatives.

November 2, 1965: "Bureaucracy and Red Tape can be done away with".- A comment on the 20-year term given the "Responsible" of "Collective" 17, of Regional 2-33 of the Cuban Consolidated Enterprise of Grocery Stores, one Roberto Montes de Oca Ramos, and on the creation of the Ministry of Food Industries, as the typical Stalinist system to imprison officials in times of famine, and to create more bureaucratic agencies in an attempt to solve the problem. Cuba's administrative apparatus is a complicated spider-web: the Ministry for the Sugar Industry, the Industrial Dept. of the INRA, the Ministry of Domestic Trade, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the National Bank, the Ministry for Agricultural and Cattle Affairs, the Consolidated Enterprise of Grocery Stores, the "Collectives", the Regionals, and now the Ministry of Food Industry. Lots of bureaucrats. Tons of paper. Miles of Red tape. But, still, no food!
"Intrigue about the Tri-Continental Conference".—Ben Barka, the mastermind of the Tri-Continental Conference scheduled for Havana, mysteriously disappeared in Paris. We remember that, when it was thought that this conference would be held in Algeria under Chinese sponsorship, its masterminds, Che Guevara and Ben Bella, disappeared. The character who took up Che's role in this Conference, Ben Barka, now vanishes in Paris. Could it be that what happened to Ben Bella is about to happen to Fidel?

November 3, 1965: "How About Can Castro Hold".—In his recent statement to three American and one Spanish journalists, Castro appears arrogant and acts as though he didn't care for an "aggiornamento" with the U.S. However, from the context of his statements it is quite obvious that he would like nothing better than being re-admitted to the Latin American community and getting the blessing of the U.S.

His attitude must have been a terrible disappointment to his followers, who must necessarily see it as evidence that the U.S.S.R. is in full retreat in its economic war with the U.S. over Cuba.

"Reticence That Reveal Insecurity, Caution and Fear".—At last, the Old Guard has spoken out through Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, following the devastating "purge" that it underwent in the hands of Fidel Castro. But fear of a second, bloody phase of the purge has kept Carlos Rafael Rodriguez from openly attacking Fidel Castro. Instead, he has taken recourse to veiled reticence and references to Fidel Castro's "pulser peer eco" past, mixed with insincere praise, in order to make it known that the "classics" of Marxism-Leninism still distrust Fidel. If their differences with the "new wave" are really a thing of the past, why does Old-Guard man Carlos Rafael now bring up the fact that Fidel was not one of them at the beginning, and that he was not a true Marxist-Leninist?

November 4, 1965: "The Reaction to Camaro's: Castro's Resentment and Bitterness".—Castro's vow to let dissatisfied Cubans out was his own empty gesture of appreciation. President Johnson took the challenge and then Castro tried to sound out the U.S. for co-existentialist overtures. Hence his rejection of the Red Cross to mediate in the matter. His bitter reaction forbidding the departure from Camaro shows the extent
of his frustration. All these developments allow us to predict that Castro is in such bad shape that radical changes may soon be expected in Cuba.

"More on Carlos R. Rodrigues' Statements." In his statement, Carlos R. Rodrigues has uncovered that Fidel Castro has created the objective conditions for fractional work within the Party with the exclusion of the Old Guard and of the Students Directorate from the executive bodies of the Party. This reveals a state of internal rift and decomposition, and such revolution, coming from a significant Old Guard source such as Rodrigues, foretells rather unpredictable consequences.

November 5, 1965: "Sitting Bull (Carlos Rafael) Has Spoken!" Emphasis on Carlos Rafael Rodrigues' personal features, his ambition to become the Cuban Revolution's "Lenin", all of which dreams have been born to pieces by Castro. Likewise, Carlos Rafael, strengthened by Moscow's backing, has pointed out, though in a rather subtle manner, the action of the unknown men of the Party in the struggle against Castroism. This he did when he indirectly charged that Castro was a petty-bourgeois.

"Castro Caught his Finger on the Poor and the Poor Clamped on his Nose." Because his situation is more difficult every day, Castro hinted that his conversations on the Cuban exodus meant the beginning of deeper negotiations with the U.S. This is false. Cuban Communism is not negotiable. When President Johnson opened the doors of the U.S. to all Cubans, he left it well established that this was done because of humanitarian reasons, and that Cubans would be welcomed here until they could "return to their homeland and find it free from fear".

November 6, 1965: "Stop this Nonsense...Where is Che Guevara?"—Where is Che Guevara? This is a question that constantly hammers on Fidel's ears, whenever journalists, diplomats, etc., ask it to him. Besieged by this question, Castro one day told a correspondent for the Madrid daily "Pueblo": "I think that Guevara may never return to Cuba. He may be somewhere in Argentina". Castro, like Stalin did before him, begins by stating that Guevara will not return to Cuba. Such a question may only be answered by the murderer when he speaks of his victim. On the other hand, he is pro-
paring the setting for the "discovery" of Guevara's corpse: it will be said that asthma killed him, or the imperialists, or the head-hunters of South America.

"The Second Host of Marcro Rodriguez' Trial." In his statements to American journalists, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez has dug out the issue of the trial against an informer, which trial was regarded as one against the "Old Guard." This trial has something more to it: the "doxier" on Joaquin Cardoqui, which Fidel keeps hidden in his sleeve in order to produce it whenever it may suit his purposes. Perhaps Carlos Rafael has disinterred this issue to signify that internal rifts are more acute than ever before.

November 8, 1965: "The Red Tyrant in Beyond Himself with Fuego." Com-ments on Castro's TV appearance yesterday. Castro is furious over the Cubans' rush to get out of the Island, and over the fact that technicians and doctors are about to desert him. He reacts by pretending to dismiss the doctors: "the grapes are sour." We remember Mutuy, the Indian chieftain who rejected conversion because he said that if his Spanish tormentors were going to Heaven, then he didn't want to go to Heaven. Similarly, if Heaven is Castro's Red paradise, the doctors and technicians want out of it.

"What About the Tri-Continental Conference?" The abduction and disappearance of Ben Barka seems to have suspended preparations for the Tri-Continental Conference that the Reds had scheduled for January in Havana. Judging by the kidnapping of the chief organizer, this Conference, which is rejected by China, is given the same treatment that forced the suspension of the Algiers' Conference that the Chinese sponsored. Let's wait for the second chapter and we will see whether the Conference is held after all or not.

November 9, 1965: "What Goes From One Nov. 7th to the Other." We recall that on Nov. 7, last year, Castro was interviewed by a correspondent for the New York Times. At the same time, he said that he would down whatever American U-2 planes he could with his surface-to-air antiaircraft missiles. He also said that he would use Soviet troops in the defense of his Communist regime, and that he would welcome a
military alliance with the U.S.S.R.. Now, a year later; his heart bleeding over his parting with Red China, and under brutal Soviet pressure, Castro's Nov. 7 speech inaugurating a hospital sounds like that of a "constructive" ruler whose concern is for the welfare of the people, and who asks that same people "to march up the (socialist) path". He is no longer arrogant. He belatedly begs for the people's support.

"What About Latin American Communist Parties?" - Castro dismissed the fact that China did not greet the reorganization and change of the Cuban Communist Party, but spite and concern were obvious in the tone of his voice. Castro knows that he has betrayed China. On the other hand, the Communist Parties of Latin America have not addressed Castro any congratulatory messages either, which indicates that they are beginning to turn their backs on him on account of his "purging" of the old guard. Under such conditions, Castro's subservience to Moscow is greater every day. Castro has entered the most unsurmountable phase of his crisis.

* November 10, 1964: "The Reason and Nature of the Economic Blockade". - From Castro's Nov. 7th speech it may be deducted that the U.S.S.R. has only been able to supply him with weapons, bullets and cannons. We state the reasons why the U.S.S.R. will not be able to invest more in Cuba, and that, at the same time, the nations of this Hemisphere will continue their economic boycott of Castro's Cuba. There can be no economic coexistence between Red Cuba and the rest of the Continent.

"Continental Resistance to Aggression". - Even though the Lima meeting of military chiefs from 17 American countries did not take up the question of the Inter-American Army, the assembled chiefs unquestionably took a step towards its establishment, which will be ultimately decided on by the O.A.S. Aggression to the Dominican Republic, and persistence in Cuba-drafted subversive plans against the rest of the Hemisphere, urgently demand that adequate continental security plans be adopted in order to face up to the threat and put an end to aggression.
November 11, 1962: "Coexistence Dream Gone Tumbling Down".- Thesis: There can be no coexistence between Castro and the U.S. After Castro returned from Moscow in 1963, and under pressure from Khrushchev, he began his first conciliatory overtures with the United States. Nikita had pleaded geographical and economic impossibility to maintain his commitments with the Castro tyranny. Result: The Soviet Union cannot continually support Castro and the U.S., on their part, reject Castro-Communism. In face of this situation, the men in the Cuban armed forces and in the government have only one dignified course of action: to remove the despot from power in order that Cuba may emerge from chaos and tragedy.

"The O.A.S. Should Not Postpone Its Meeting".- The same Castroite aggression that earlier forced the postponement of the O.A.S. Conference now warrants that the Conference no longer be postponed. The said aggression has created a situation that demands new instruments and agencies to put the O.A.S. in shape to face up to the subversive threat planned and executed in Cuba. The process that started at Punta del Este must be brought to a successful end: the re-establishment of democracy in Cuba so that the Pearl of the Antilles may rejoin the Inter-American system.

November 12, 1962: This program was entirely devoted to reading Dr. Sciglié's article entitled "There Will Never Be Coexistence Or 'Waking Up' between Castro-Communism and the Free Peoples of the Hemisphere".

November 13, 1962: "Cuba's Internal Economic Front is Disastrous".- Castro, seeing that he'll never accomplish "coexistence" with the U.S., and that the U.S.S.R. is gradually withdrawing its assistance to his regime, seeks refuge in the internal economic front, and tries to increase the agricultural production of the peasants. The open failure of said purposes became evident ever since Castro took 150,000 men from the countryside and
turned them into soldiers, militiamen, informers, etc. There is no way to replace this rural labor force. If these men were returned to the country, they would plot against Castro. If they are not returned, they cannot work.

"The Fate of Communist Puppets".— The fate of Ben Bella in Algeria and of Sukarno in Indonesia show what Communist puppets can expect. Both men were intimate friends of Fidel Castro, both visited Cuba, and both served the same Red master whom Fidel Castro serves. The outcome in their cases constitute a writing on the wall for the bearded tyrant.
November 15, 1965: "Fidel Castro’s Grave Sugar Problem".— Following Moscow’s promises and instructions, Castro plunged deep into overproduction of sugar in the hope that he would be able to sell the whole crop. Last year he turned out over 6,000,000 tons of sugar and about half of it is still in the warehouses. The Russians never purchased it. This year Castro is blowing his top in face of his dilemma: If he turns out 6.5 million tons, the USSR will not buy it. If he cuts production down, the cane crop will be lost. In face of such a dilemma, he escapes to the Sierra Maestra with the doctors and, from there, he puts the blame for all his woes on the U.S.

"Storm Aire Blowing on the Turquino".— The rally atop Mt. Turquino became a kind of a requiem for the tyrant’s aspirations. He hoped that the negotiations aimed at evacuating disaffected Cubans to the U.S. would pave the way for an ‘aggiornamento’ with the Americans, but his maneuver has turned on him like a boomerang. So, besides himself with rage, he lashed at the U.S. On top of all this, Cuban patriots showed that they are still active, and that the Malecón Drive is vulnerable to successful commando action.
November 16, 1955: "The Rio Meeting of Foreign Ministers". - A comment on the II Extraordinary Meeting of Inter-American Foreign Ministers, which will convene tomorrow, Nov. 17, in the city of Río de Janeiro, Brazil. The main points in the agenda: economic development, the Alliance for Progress, the strengthening of the Inter-American system, the improvement of instruments for the peaceful solution of controversies, and the strengthening of representative democracy. Lastly, and even though this is not a concrete point in the agenda, special attention will be devoted to the struggle against communism throughout the Americas. To this respect, the VI Meeting of American Armies has just taken place in Lima, Peru, and in it concrete decisions, plans and formulas were adopted.

"Another O.A.S. Step". The subject of subversion is unavoidable in the Rio meeting. The Punta del Este declaration, the diplomatic isolation and the July, 1964, trade blockade sanctioning the aggression against Venezuela, put the Communist regime on the verge of collective military intervention. Subversion has continued, and sustained Castro-Communist interference in the Dominican Republic will force the O.A.S. to take further steps in sanctioning the aggressor.
November 17, 1965: "War Drums on the Sino-Soviet Border".- On the basis of long-time difference between Red China and Russia, we agree with Vice-President Humphrey who, during a recent TV appearance, disclosed that Soviet and Chinese border garrisons were being beefed up lately. The motto "more cannons and less butter" is becoming fashionable again, with the consequent decrease of production and increase of military budget appropriations, as well as with a decrease of foreign aid to countries such as Cuba. From this, we may conclude that Castro's situation worsens day by day. Cuba's only solution is to get rid of Castro in order that it may once again enjoy peace and prosperity.

"Aspects of an Unresolved Riff".- The Communist Parties of the Americas are worried over the situation of their old Cuban comrades who live under a Damocles' sword in the hands of Fidel Castro. They have been unable to keep the trial of Marcos Rodriguez from having a second part in Ordoqui's case-file, which is also the second part of the "trial" against Cuba's old Comissar. Latin Communists are having a clash with Fidel and with the Castroites of their respective countries, and they are engaged in fractional work to undermine Castro's designs and put their old comrades back in the leadership of the Cuban Party.
"HAVIA... UNIDA... protectoral..." (U.P.U.L.)

November 18, 1961: “What Can Castro Get From The Russians?”- An analysis of Fidel’s new stand, whereby he abandons neutrality between the USSR and Red China.

In return for his “pledge of allegiance”, the Kremlin has offered Castro an increase in economic and military aid. Perhaps the Russians will in fact give him guns, tanks and rockets once again in exchange for Cuban sugar. But as far as economic aid is concerned, Castro should know that Soviet-bloc countries are firm about halting further investments in the Cuban failure. What is more, they are talking of demanding political, financial and economic reforms from the bearded despot that would permit minute inspection and guidance of Cuban affairs by his sponsors overseas. Will Castro tolerate such intervention? No one knows.

“The O.A.S. IN RIO”- The O.A.S., which convened yesterday in Rio, faces a continent-wide situation whose gravest problem is still Communist Cuban subversion and aggression. The process that began in Punta del Este and continued with the July 1962 meeting, must be brought to a successful end by taking more severe steps against the focal point of subversion and aggression: Communist Cuba,
"November 19, 1967: "How the Anti-Communist Fight Goes". A summary in wake of the anti-Communist struggle in Asia, which is synthesized in the Indonesian events. Therefore, anti-Communism is gaining force day by day. And in South Viet Nam, where the U.S. Army has just gained a great victory, reasserting the principle of "defending the integrity of South Viet Nam. In the American, we can quote from the brave speech delivered by Brazilian President Marshal Castello Branco, who called for a revision of the old concepts of political intervention and creating that of counter-intervention against Communism.

Lastly, we point out that the voice of arms rang out in Cuba with an attack against the Cuban coast line, which evidenced the Cubans' fighting spirit against Communism.

"Back to Popular-Front Tactics". It is announced that the Kremlin is returning to its policy of popular fronts, which were in vogue back in the 30s. Some of the results of this policy were Stalin's 'entente' with Hitler and Mussolini to put an end to the Spanish Republic. In France, after undermining its institutions and demoralizing the French People by means of the Popular Front, the Kremlin concocted the Nazi-Soviet agreement that unleashed the Second World War. This time, the whole thing is aimed at the Americans and the change is announced in Havana. This is the new wrapping of continent-wide confusion and the purpose is to create an atmosphere of confidence and, eventually, to betray the (Communist) democratic and Catholic allies, as well and everyone else who is naive enough to join the Popular Fronts.

November 20, 1967: "A Tribute to Cuban Heroes". A political, moral, military and revolutionary evaluation of the Cuban patriots' attack against the Eighth Police Precinct, the Riviera Hotel and the house of puppet President Porico. In the article, it is indicated how Castro, even though he spends hundreds of millions of dollars to accomplish invulnerability, found out overnight that he is far from invulnerable to a naval attack perpetrated by a group of Cubans who wielded nearly inefficient weapons. Castro wrath over the failure of his espionage network knew no limits. We pay homage to the heroes who, with their action on Cuba, related the other heroes: the ones that
shed their blood in Viet Nam.

"Counter-Intervention is Equivalent to Legitimate Self-Defense".— The stubborn, unwarranted interpretation of the doctrine of non-intervention has made it possible for the Communists to intervene themselves in the affairs of other countries, even militarily and on a large scale, as did the Castro forces in the Dominican Republic. The concept that hangs around the halls where O.A.S. meetings are held is that which allow for counter-intervention as a means of legitimate self-defense. This is equivalent to preventive action against subversion originated in Communist Cuba.

November 22, 1966: "Castro Lied About His Spanish Trade".— On the 21, Radio Havana told the Cuban people how beneficial trading with Spain was being. The bunch of Castrotrots lies must be exposed with facts and statistics in order to show that Spain's trade with Cuba, during the first eight months of 1965, has diminished by 31% as compared with 1964. On the other hand, Spain has withdrawn its ships from the Cuban run, and does not seem very interested in Cuban orders for tuna fishing boats, since the productive capacity of its shipyards is already committed in advance till 1967. With false data, Castro tries to show that he has floated the blockade, but the truth is that the blockade is floating his own designs.

"Counter-Intervention: a Supplement to the Johnson Doctrine".— In Rio, Dean Rusk has proposed that the O.A.S. adopt what measures may be necessary to prevent another Communist regime from being established in this Hemisphere. This, essentially, was the doctrine that President Johnson stated when the aggression started against the Dominican Republic. Besides, among the Foreign Ministers, the concept of counter-intervention is gaining momentum as a way counter-attacking the aggressive forces. This means that the blockade and isolation imposed by the O.A.S. against the Communist regime, and the newly-issued Johnson Doctrine, are being supplemented in a manner that may be definitive towards ending the subversive threat that emanates from the focal point
November 30, 1961

"The Great Maneuver of the Tri-Continental Conference."-- The Kremlin leaders that boast the Tri-Continental Conference as a triumph over China, are using it at the same time for a far more dangerous maneuver against the American continent. Subversive plans have failed, and now they are planning a tactical about-face to continue their subversive tactics through other means, i.e., the Latin American Popular Fronts. But the memories of that political epoch back in the 30's and of its European consequences, are very much alive in the memory of the people for the new tactic to yield any fruits in the Americas.
December 1, 1965: "The Soviets Order the Sugar Harvest To Start". While Raúl sought military and economic aid in the USSR, Fidel Castro defiantly warned that the sugar harvest would begin as late as Jan. 7, but back came Raúl from Moscow, not with a pledge of substantial aid, but with instructions to have the harvest begin immediately. That is why Castro changed his strategy and launched the harvest right away.

"What Is The Tri-Continental Conference?". In the first place, the Tri-Continental Conference does not represent the countries of three continents, as its organizers claim, but rather the Communists and terrorists from the so-called "vanguard of national liberation" in those countries. In the second place, the Conference is a setting for the Sino-Soviet struggle for the leadership of the African and Asian Communist Parties, and the struggle goes on amidst intrigue, maneuver, abductions and murders.

December 2, 1965: "Cuba Cannot Return To The Latin American World". Once more Dean Rusk has clearly stated that, in order to be admitted back into the Inter-American community, Cuba must first sever its ties with the USSR and quit subversion and infiltration in this Continent. Castro's friends inside the O.A.C., who harboured hopes of bringing Cuba back into the Organization, should abandon them. Those "holier-than-thou" characters who pretend to defend self-determination and non-intervention in public, privately charge Castro-Communism and its aggressions.

"A Double-Play Against Peking And Castro". By means of the Tri-Continental Conference, which summarizes a phase of maneuvering and counter-manoeuvring within the Sino-Soviet rift, the Kremlin has managed to outwit the Chinese, take control of African, Asian and Latin American Communist Parties, and deal a death blow to Castro's dream of becoming the role leader of the Latin American Conrder.
December 3, 1965: "France and Castroism." - Misfortunes never come alone, especially for Castro. Now, in view of his horrible financial crisis, his relations with France are obviously deteriorating. As evidence, we point out the French cancellation of a $75 million contract to build a quicklime, insecticide and fertilizer plant in Cuba.

"Castro Raises His Volume Again." - Castro's failure in his attempt to get the U.S. to change policy of extreme agitation, and he is providing arms to the subversive forces throughout the Americas. But there is one more reason: the Tri-Continental Conference, of which Castro wanted to be the center. However, he has been displaced to a secondary role. That is why his approach to subversion is closer to that of the Chinese than to that of the organizers of the Conference.

December 4, 1965: "Latin America Excludes Cuba From Its Plans." - As has been said, some characters in Latin America publicly encourage Castro's Cuba, but privately desire it and exclude it from their plans. An example is the Spanish plan for the Latin American's industrialization, and its exclusion of Cuba. The 19 Latin American nations also banned Cuba from their U.S. plans for industrialization.

"Castro Is Moved by Dispair." - Rather than strength, Castro's speech of Dec. 2 denotes weakness and despair. His bragging about arsenals with which he counts to help subversive forces throughout the continent is a desperate provocation. There are three key points which concern Fidel Castro: One is the doctrine that subversion is aggression; the other one in the Johnson Doctrine, which became effective in the Dominican Republic, followed by Dean Rusk's Rio de Janeiro statement that the U.S., whether alone or accompanied, will intervene wherever aggression occurs.

December 6, 1965: "Castro's Economic Woes Grow: Now It's Mexico and Russia." - Recently, we talked of Cuba's difficulties in its relations with France. Now, we echo a report that Cuba's trade with Mexico is steadily dwindling. On the other hand, Russia's huge sales of gold to the world market in order to be able to pay for the wheat it has
laughed, brings the U.S.'s foreign exchange reserves down low, and this will mean further trouble for Castro.

"The Working Mances Against The Communist Regime".— With the dock workers of the U.S., Canada and Puerto Rico joining up, the labor boycott action is completed. Ships flying the flags of countries that trade with Castro will have a tough time at American ports, and the noose around Castro's neck is tightening.

December 7, 1955; "Death of Antonio Maceo".— This article was devoted to the glorification and remembrance of Gen. Antonio Maceo, the Supreme Commander of the Cuban Army of Liberation in the 1895 War of Independence, who was shot and killed in action on Dec. 7, 1896, near Punta Brava, Finar del Rio. The Communists have attempted to erase the memory of this hero because Maceo was a half-bred, of humble origin, and, nevertheless, Cuban No. 1 soldier. Hence, to sustain their theories on class struggle, the Communists had to destroy the memory of the working-class hero of a bourgeois nation.

"The Tri-Continental Challenge".— Aside from the meaning of the Tri-Continental Conference within the Sino-Soviet rift, the said meeting is a challenge to Inter-American law and security which comes from puppeteers and Communist agents from three continents. Cuba, a satellite and the focal point of subversion and aggression to American countries, will be the setting.

December 8, 1955; "American Victory, Soviet Defeat".— We comment on America's great feat with the Gemini 7, while Russia's space thrust has suffered a severe set-back with its Luna-8.

"Castro Charged With Che Guevara's Murder".— Felipe Alvaume, in the Mexican daily "El Universal", charged that Castro murdered Che Guevara on Soviet orders. Of course, the cheap novel concocted by Castro on Guevara can convince no one, and, in 9 months, no evidence has been produced that point to its truthfulness. Alvaume's charge, therefore, is more acceptable than "El Castro's version."
December 9, 1965: "Cinkiang: Russians and Chinese on the Warpath" — Chinese-Soviet skirmishes near Cinkiang, while disguised as territorial differences, really respond to the ideological rift. The USSR increased its military budget by 5% at the expense of education, foreign aid, and agricultural and industrial development, on the grounds that "American aggressiveness" force her to do so, but the truth is that it is the Chinese threat that prompts such a move. On the other hand, we can expect larger shipments of Soviet arms to Cuba, but a cut in economic aid.

"The Gemini 7" — The Gemini 7 flight and its scheduled mating with the Gemini 6 will break all space flight records. The Soviet total of flying hours is tripled, and a similar advance is reached over Soviet launchers. This is the exponent of the degree of development achieved by the West towards which the Communist world is not even approaching. Besides, it is a warning to Soviet leaders who seek to destroy the accomplishments of the West. If they were to attempt such destruction, they would be destroyed instead.

December 10, 1965: "A New Collapse of the Cenotic World" — The Marxist maxim that history is "irreversible" has collapsed once again, this time, in the Congo, Algeria, Indonesia and, more recently, in the Sudan. The African peoples are being reborn to political life, rapidly waking up from the Communist spell and taking an anti-Communist stand. The last country to do so is the Sudan, which has just outlawed the Sudanese Communist Party and warned all other parties having connections with the Reds that they may suffer the same fate.

"What's in and Behind the Aces of the Tri-Continental Perley" — In the Tri-Continental Conference, the USSR will show off its triumph over the Chinese with respect to "liberation movements" in Africa. Taking advantage of Castro and Che Guevara, the Soviets managed to penetrate and divide several parties in Latin America. There are several phases in the Kremlin's counter-maneuvers: the coup against Ben Bella, the suspension of the Algiers Conference, the vanishing of Che Guevara, the total submis-
tion of Castro and the change in Indonesia. Castro and his have been defeated by the Kremlin.

December 11, 1965: "We Forecast The Failure of the Forthcoming Sugar Harvest".- We go back to the subject of the Cuban "sugar" on the basis of Castro's June 8th statement, when he pledged the reconstruction of the Cuban sugar industry, the erection of a modern new sugar mill in the Cauto River valley, and a 6.5 million ton sugar harvest. What has been accomplished? The Cuban sugar industry is still in shambles, there is no new mill in the Cauto valley, and Castro, with protests and lies, is already attempting to justify that there will be no 6.5 million tons of sugar.

"The Bankruptcy of Cuba's Foreign Credit and the boycott.".- Coinciding with the news issued by French fertilizer company was cancelling its Cuban contract due to Cuba's failure to pay for over $3 million's worth of merchandise, it was reported that the boycott would be extended. The dockworkers of Canada, the U.S. and Puerto Rico have joined the Latin American workers' boycott of vessels flying the flags of countries that trade with Red Cuba.

December 13, 1965: "A Explosive Power Struggle in Russia".- We analyze how the power struggle between Khrushchev and Brezhnev is known through the stands taken by the Russian papers "Izvestia" and "Pravda", respectively the organs of the government and of the Communist Party. The Prime Minister's stand consists of pointing at the economic debacle and at the need to maintain the current level of military expenditure, while Brezhnev's position is one of advocating a strong-armed Red Army by increasing the military budget. The Army, in turn, has rewarded Brezhnev's support by causing the retirement of Mikoyan, so that 2nd Party Secretary Nikita Khodorenko could be kicked upstairs to the Presidency of the USSR. More changes are to come within the framework of this rift.
"Subversion in Uruguay and Vicious Terror in Venezuela."—The blueprint for violence in Uruguay is part of the general plan for Latin American subversion drafted in Cuba. The steps taken by the Uruguayan Government have checked the early dangers of Castro-Communist subversion, but it is significant that the Communists should have moved their target more to the south in order to provoke a Dominican-style civil strife. The atrocity character taken by Venezuelan Red terror is also meaningful: a young housewife murdered by a bomb placed inside a Christmas present consistent of an image of the Virgin Mary.

December 14, 1965: "President Johnson: The Will of Freedom."—A comment on the statement made by President Johnson, who has reasserted U.S. determination to defend the freedom of South Viet Nam regardless of all possible consequences. We stress the sacrifice, in terms of wealth from the earth and human lives to which Red China forces North Viet Nam, while the Chinese themselves laugh at peace efforts. This case is presented as an example to all other peoples, and what is bound to happen to Fidel Castro is also pointed out.

"They Talk Peace But Practice War."—Peace is a favorite subject of Communist propaganda. It is also one of the most deceitful ones, since, while the Commissars talk of peace, they systematically reject all bona fide proposals to accomplish peace, such as in the case of Viet Nam. The Tri-Continental Conference scheduled for Jan. 3 bears the germ of violent conflict to create new Viet Nams in America and Africa.
December 15, 1965: "Why the Cuban Syrians Think Related Country."— We publish an editorial published by the Havana newspaper "El Mundo" whereby the communist editorialists attack those Cuban whose leave for exile. We point at the real causes of the Cuban exodus, which we confirmed with the words of Mr. Sergio del Valle, a prominent Castro officer, who in Ciudad Libertad, on Dec. 13 spoke of the harsh life of the peasants.

"SOUTH TRAINING SCHOOLS AND ITS IMPACT."— It has been announced in Cuba that the number of students from the terrorist training schools of Yirey del Frio will be increased to 8,000. This is the school where the Castroites trained Latin-American guerilla and terrorists in order to use them later in their respective countries. In Venezuela, one of Castro's favorite terrains, a monstrous deed has just been perpetrated by the Communists, in the murder of M.s. Panuel, who received a bomb mailed by some of the graduates from those Cuban schools.

December 16, 1965:

1) U.S. bombers destroy huge power-plant in North Viet Nam.
2) Castro steps-up marijuana harvests for export.

"THE COMMUNISTS HAVE LOST THE CUBAN YOUTH."— In this article, we analyze how Cuban youth, because of its natural thirst for knowledge, as first became interested in the scientific principles of Communism, thinking of the possibility of finding the answer to man's quest for happiness there. However, young Cubans are now disillusioned with the theory and practice of Marx-ist-Leninism, and they are obviously disassociating themselves from Castro-Communism. That is precisely why, a few days ago, the regime thought it convenient to call a national meeting of the Communist Youth. In this Red event, those leaders that failed in their task to indoctrinate the young were surged, and it was agreed that brain-washing would be a prerequisite of the political police of the State. Castro has lost the young. The young are fighting Castro. They must be helped.
"GEMINI 7 ARE 4".- New records and goals have been accomplished by the U.S. with the recent-voew of the Gemini 7 and 6 space capsule, specially in regard to accuracy. We are inclined to think that there is no limit to scientific development in the conquest of space. The clean cut clarity of American reports on the space flight, contrasts with the obscure and nebular secret surrounding Soviet experiments.
U.R.- WRUL Radio Scripts Summaries.

"HABILITATION PROGRAM IN TUNISIA" (U.N.O.L.)

December 17, 1965

1) 11 Cubans sail to exile; 5 were arrested; 1 drafted.
2) U.S. to build more industrial centers in North Viet Nam.

"Why Mr. Nol Killed Himself" - The story of Mr. Apolin suicide on account of the Soviet-East German Trade Agreement.

"The Bug in His Ear" - Carlos Rafael's new trip to Moscow, which has no official justification whatever, following a new article published in London, but put bug in Fidel's ear. Through articles and statements made abroad, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez seems to have been charged with the 'task of turning Communist parties against Fidel and for the 'Old Guard'.

December 18, 1965

1) Multinational Efifures Effect of U.S. Aid on North Viet Nam Power Plant.
2) Ecuadorian Youth Congress Concerns Communism.

"Why Mr. Nol Killed Himself" - Continuation of above editorial. This part deals with similar difficulties confronted by Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Cuba.

"Precautions on the Eve of the Tri-Continental Parley" - The Cuban regime has ordered a number of preventive arrests in order to head off the possibility of assassination attempts or kidnappings among the foreign delegations to the Tri-Continental parley. There are tales of anti-DP Chinese military. Castro, for his part, fears that something may happen to his, as "something" happened to Ben Bella two days before the Algiers Conference, which then had to be called-off.

December 26, 1965

1) 28 New Refugees Sneak Out Of Cuba Aboard Smuggled Vessel.
2) Spain To Send Medical Corps As Token Of Support to Viet Nam War.
COMMUNISTocrat Must Fail In Cuba."— We echo reports by recent refugee arrivals concerning Castro's purchase of defective farming equipment. These purchases indicate why Communistism is failing in Cuba thanks to the attitude of crooked merchants that still trade with Fidel, to the regime's own stupidity, and to the resistance of the Cuban people.

"The Reds Want No Peace."— North Viet Nam has rejected all peace offers and made mockery of every approach attempted to put an end to the war. Moscow as well as Peking keep their puppet from signing any truce and force him to maintain a war for which they give him no aid. Communism would have several more Viet Nams in other continents, in order to extend the conflict at the expense of the peoples.

December 21, 1965:

NEWS:

1) Four More Cubans Slip Away To Freedom: Three Draft-Aged Youths And The Father Of One.

2) Juanita Castro And Fr. Carlos Portico, Relative of Cuban President, Talk About Cuban Situation In Miami.

SPECIAL:

"Not Even Castro's And Portico's Relatives Want To Stay In Cuba."— Castro's efforts to prevent the Cuban exodus are in vain. Not even the close relatives of the Cuban President and Premier want to stay on the Red Island. Carlos Portico, an uncle to Pres. Ortega, has echoed the failure of the regime's back-to-subs economic planning. We stress his words that Cuban foreign-exchange reserves are low because sugar production uses more dollars than it will yield.

"The Unsolved Conflict And The Tri-Continental Parley."— The still unsolved crisis of the Dominican Republic has bounced back in too serious a manner as to have caused 40 dead in Santiago, and Carribean violence continues because the forces of subversion want to use a banner for agitation in the Tri-Continental Conference. The masterminds of subversion in Cuba provoke these acts of violence in the Dominican for this purpose.
December 23, 1965:

HEAD:

1) Russia Suffers In International Students' Union Parley Must Be Moved From Soviet to Czechoslovakia.

2) U.S. Troops Authorized To Pursue The Enemy In Cambodian Territory.

EDITORIAL:

"The Struggle Within the Communist Movement." - A continuation of the preceding article on Dr. Carlos Paredes' statement concerning internal rifts among the Cuban Communists. According to Dr. Paredes, the "old guard" is persecuted and the Army is growingly dissatisfied.

"How the Soviet Grip On Cuba Group 'Victor All The Time'." - With the arrival in Cuba of 227 Soviet technicians to be assigned directly to the sugar mills, Russia gets direct control of Cuba's sugar production. The same thing happens with the minerals and the exploitation of the mines, whose products go directly to Russia since the mines came under the control of Soviet technicians. Politically, Russia has chosen Havana as the setting for its anti-Chinese "Tri-Continental Conference" in order to show off its triumph over Mao from the Cuban capital.

December 23, 1965:

HEAD:

1) Venezuelan Police Capture Gang of Robbers Who Raised Funds Through Blackmail.

2) Skipper of Cuban Freighter 'Camilo Cienfuegos' Makes Statement After Defecting; Ship Was Japan-Bound With a Cargo of Sugar.

EDITORIAL:

"Now Stoned By the U.S., Against North Viet Nam." - A corollary on the activities of the U.S. in North Viet Nam, and on China's policy and Hanoi's inability to draw its own course, which has forced the U.S. to take one further step in the war by destroying North Viet Nam's economic complex.
"Fidel's Star Rapidly Declining"— Castro's about to enter his seventh year in power under bad omen. Dictator Castro and Batista fell precisely on their seventh year, and Castro's situation shows that his star is rapidly declining and that he's heading straight for the abyss.

December 24, 1959

NEW:


2) Britain, U.S. Approve $400 Million Arms of Anti-Aircraft Artillery to Saudi Arabia to Defend Red Aggression.

EDITORIAL:

"Russia 'Intervenes' The Cuban Sugar Industry"— Under the guise of "technical assistance", the USSR will send 227 "sugar technicians" to the one country whose own technicians know all there is to know about sugar. The real purpose is clear; the Soviets want to take complete and final control of the Cuban sugar industry, as a new limitation to Castro's power.

"There Will Be No Merry Christmas For Cubans"— With its crimes and with the desperate situation to which it has taken the people, Communism has made it impossible for the Cubans to enjoy any happier this Christmas. But amidst an environment of sadness, there will be faith and hope there too. Communism has been unable to kill either of these blessings, and there lies one of the weaknesses of Communist materialism.

December 25, 1959

NEW:

1) Venezuela Moves To Prevent Entry of Dollars To Pay For Subversion.

2) Inter-American Bank President Felipe Herrera Presents Development Plan for Latin America; Cuba Is Excluded.

EDITORIAL:

"The Effects of the Maritime Blockade of Cuba"— A variant on the maritime blockade against Red Cuba, which is now reinforced by the dockworkers of Canada, the U.S. and
Puerto Rico. As a result of the choking effect of the blockade, Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany had to meet in Potsdam in order to discuss means of helping Red China survive said effects.

**Algeria, Indonesia and Cuba**— China's main strongholds in Asia and Africa were Sukarno's Indonesia and Ben Bella's Algeria. The Afro-Asian conferences were an important point of Chinese-Soviet clash. Two days before the Algiers Conference was inaugurated, Ben Bella was ousted. Then, as a result of another coup, Sukarno staged an about face.

Chins thus lost her two main points of support in the two continents. Now Russia is undermining the "Tri-Continental" and we wonder what Red China will do about it.

**December 27, 1965**

**News**

1) The U.S. For Not Considered Using Nuclear Weapons Against North Viet Nam, Says Ambassador Goldburg at the U.N.

2) Soviet Artists Demand Freedom of Thought and Expression Through Art Critic Alexei Chibisov.

**Editorials**

**Wave of Defections Create Tri-Continental Conference**— The Cuban Communists have sent hundreds of thousands of self-addressed telegrams in which they congratulate themselves for the Tri-Continental Conference of Red panace that will convene in Havana.

Yet, the Cuban people have not been told of a more democratic and manly greeting; the wave of defections by officers of the Cuban merchant fleet, such as Cesar Llervio Garcia, from the SS "Camilo Cienfuegos"; Gonzalo González Duque de Estrada and Francisco López Surroa, from the SS "Uncle"; and, lastly, today, four officers, among them the skipper of the SS "Aracelio Iglesias", in Osaka, Japan.

**Cardinal Spellman In Viet Nam**— The Christmas visit to Viet Nam by Cardinal Spellman gives American Catholicism a militant force in defense of democracy and the spiritual values of the Western World. Cardinal Spellman's words before the combatants put the
Viet Nam struggle in its proper place: one made necessary by Communist aggression that has the same characteristics as it has elsewhere, in Asia and the Americas and wherever Red subversion takes place.
December 26, 1965

NEWS:

1) U.S. Grants Political Asylum to Four Defecting Officers from the Cuban Freighter "Arrecife Surinam".

2) Defecting Skipper and Three Officers Explain Their Decision.

EDITORIAL:

"Moscow Grappling Over Indonesian Failure"—A comment on Pravda's recent editorial threatening Indonesia over its proscript of the Communist Party. These Pravda threats show how Moscow violates the principle of self-determination and non-intervention. Of course, Moscow's dirty is understandable, as it has lost the platform it used for aggression in S.E. Asia.

"Gangsters From Three Continents"—Gangsters and agents for International Communism who spread violence and terror throughout three continents are beginning to arrive in Havana, Cuba, the focal point of subversion for Latin America, will provide the setting for that meeting. The Sino-Soviet rift is being ventilated as part of this meeting, and Fidel Castro will be the luring party. The Chinese won't forget that Castro betrayed them.

December 30, 1965

NEWS:

1) Havana Reds Shaky Over Tricontinental Farley, Take Steps To Prevent Physical Attacks Between Coloregues.


EDITORIAL:

"Czechoslovakian Communism"—This article is based on newspaper reports on a document released by the Czech Communist Party, whereby the misery and disaster wrought over the Czech nation by Communist are admitted. Communist leaders would like to take resource to the "Capitalist" world in order to escape from such a dead-end alley.
"Viet Nam, Congo and the Dominican Republic"—There are the topics of world-wide
Communist agitation. In all three countries, the plans of the Communists met failure,
and China and Russia may be seen licking the wounds of their failures. In the Congo,
2,000 lives were saved from Communist savagery. In Viet Nam, plans for aggression and
dominance of South Eastern Asia have been held in check. And in the Dominican Republic,
Inter-American forces guarantee the security of the Hemisphere.

December 30, 1965

ITEM:

1) "Price of Sugar To Stay Down In '66", Says Brokerage Firm B.M. Dyer.
2) Red China to Boycott Tricontinental rally; Violent Clashes Expected During
Conference.

Editorials:

"Cuban Senator Who Walked Out Of '56 "Aracelio Ibarria" Speak in Miami".—We run the
highlights of the statement made by Capt. Francisco Cohen and comment thereon.

"The Year That Ends".—During the year that ends, all the woes of the Communist regime
have been increased. Russia has tightened the screws of exploitation of its Caribbean
colony. And Fidel Castro has stressed his terrorist methods and concentrated on his
personal despotic power by "purging" the Party.

December 31, 1965

ITEM:

1) Cuba Refused Credit By Non-Communist Countries.
2) Cuban Refugee peasant Charget That Reds Forced Him Out Of The Country To Seize
His Little Farm.

Editorials:

"Cuban Women Forced to Hard Labor In Farms".—Reports reaching U.S. indicate that the
Cuban tyranny is secretly resuming to create women's auxiliary corps similar to U.S.
"NACI", but with a compulsory character and for the purpose of forcing Cuban women to
perform hard labor in State farms. We call on Cuban decency to do something to prevent
this outrage from taking place.

"Questions To The "Tricontinental Conference".- The Chinese delegation could be asked the whereabouts of Hua Korka. The Russians might be questioned as to Che Guevara's. They could all be asked about the Algerian "coup" and why it took place two days before the date set for the opening of the "Tricontinental Conference." They could be asked what they think of the Indonesian about-face, and about Sukarno's fate, and about Chinese support, since the Bandung Conference, in helping its Afro-Asian policy.

January 1, 1966:

EDITORIALS:

"Synthesis of The Down-Hill Course of Communism in Cuba."- A summary of the most important developments that took place during the past year and that marked it as an awful one for the Commiss.

"The Year That Regime".- The year that brings little hope that anything good will happen to Fidel Castro and his thugs. Caught in the web of the "Sino-Soviet rift," he will be the great loser in the game. On the other hand, the internal situation, discontent in the armed forces and the total collapse of his economy depict a horizon that is no better to Fidel Castro as it is promising to the Cuban people.
Radio Scripts Summary

"HACLA... UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA" (W.R.U.L.)

JANUARY 5, 1966:

NEWCAST:

1) VENEZUELAN MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR AIMS STRONG MEASURES AGAINST COMMUNIST SUBVERSION.

2) COMMUNIST CHINA ALLOWS CITIZENS TO GO TO BED ON EMPTY STOMACH.

EDITORIALS:

"Steps: Signs Over the Tri-Continental".- The secret character of the Tricontinental Conference constitutes evidence of the rift and troubles within the parley structure. On the other hand, Castro's and Dorticos' speeches calling for unity and quoting the example of North Viet Nam as a need for such unity, are further proof of the above assertion. We forecast the failure of the Tricontinental parley as a means to unify Communism in its projections for international struggle. We further forecast that the Sino-Soviet rift will become all the more violent.

"The Workers of the Americas and the Tricontinental".- The workers of this continent have announced that the boycott against Red Cuba will be intensified as a reply to plans for Hemispheric subversion being drafted at the Tricontinental parley in Havana. The sensibility of the workers of the Americas is hurt by the fact that the Red terrorists of the Congo, the murderers of women and children from three continents, meet in the heart of the Americas to plot more bloodshed and destruction. The workers of the Americas are against Communist totalitarianism, as is the people of Cuba, by whose side they stand.

JANUARY 6, 1966:

NEWCAST:

1) NEWLY ARRIVED EXILES TALK OF EXPANDING SLUMS IN CUBAN CITIES.

2) UNDISTURBED U.S. STEP UP PEACE OFFENSIVE.

EDITORIALS:

"What's Behind the Sino-Cuban Crisis".- Upon practically severing its economic rel-
lations with Cuba, Red China has shown up at the Tricontinental Parley for a three-fold purpose: a) to frustrate all attempts at unity around the USSR; b) to charge the USSR with "treason" to Marxism-Leninism; and, c) to initiate the Chinese's revenge against Fidel Castro. On this basis, we forecast a tough offensive against Fidel by pro-Chinese Communists in the Americas. First, they will seek to destroy the image that they had built up of Castro, or what's left of it.

"The Venezuelan Gvt. on the Alert".— Through the Minister of the Interior, the Venezuelan gvt. has issued a timely and accurate statement on the significance of the Tricontinental Conference in terms of serious threats to continental security. The Venezuelan gvt. points out that it is time to take resource to force to counter aggression and subversion. It is indeed time to reactivates the 5th Resolution of the O.A.S. meeting of 1964, whereby intervention is authorized in self-defense against aggression and to guarantee the security of the Hemisphere.

JANUARY 7, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

1) RED CHINA BLASTS SOVIETS AT TRICONTINENTAL PARLEY.

2) REFUGEE TOTS CELEBRATE ADOPTION OF MAGI IN MIAMI.

EDITORIALS:

"China's Stand: A Threatening War-Monger".— Recent press reports tell us of movements of Chinese troops near the Soviet border, and of probable skirmishes between the Red Armies of Moscow and Peiping. This new sort of 'cold war' with occasional ringing of firearms forces the USSR to increase its military expenditures, to slow down its agricultural and industrial production, and to cut its foreign aid. Cuba will be one of the big losers.

"The Tricontinental and the Sino-Soviet Dispute".— All efforts to prevent the Sino-Soviet rift from coming out to the surface at the Tricontinental Conference have been to no avail: the Chinese delegate blasted the Soviets mercilessly. These, on the
other hand, availed themselves of their Cuban puppet to present to the delegates a view of the breach of Cuban-Chinese trade relations. The Chinese were made to appear as the "villain" who wants to starve the Cuban people of their rice rations.

JANUARY 8, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

1) CHE'S FATHER REPORTED CLAIMING SON'S BODY.

2) RED GUERILLA CHIEF CAPTURED IN PERU.

EDITORIALS:

"We'll Tell the Reds What They Want To Know".— Cubans seeking to leave the country are subject to veritable "third degrees" by the O-2. They are asked whether or not they sympathize with the gvt., why they want to leave, whether or not they approve of State control of all education, etc. The unfortunate applicants manage to give answers that will not jeopardize their chances of leaving. Yet, their interrogators are apparently satisfied with the outcome of the questioning. The reason for this is that Castro feels the need to give some explanation to the Communist world for the growing exodus of Cubans. However, if the Communists are really interested in knowing why the Cubans want to go, we will be glad to oblige... They are just running away from hunger, terror, oppression, and from the execution wall.

"A Strange Soviet Mission in Viet Nam".— After the British proposal for peace in Viet Nam was welcomed with seeming interest by Kremlin leaders, these have sent a strange mission to Viet Nam whose purpose is not known. Maybe they have gone to vouch for peace, or maybe, on the contrary, they have gone to Hanoi to pledge further Soviet aid to the puppet Ho Chi Minh. At any rate, the terms of the conflict remain unchanged. Rusk has stated that everything may be subject to negotiations except withdrawal of American forces from S. Viet Nam. And the Communist powers, on the other hand, far from accepting the peace overtures, step up their campaign of aggression, totalitarianism, etc.
JANUARY 10, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

1) RED CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICAN CAPITAL BOMBED.

2) THREE MORE CUBAN SEAMEN DEFECT IN SPAIN.

EDITORIALS:

"Sino-Soviet Differences Over N. Viet Nam."— Sino-Soviet differences over North Viet Nam have become evident lately. Nowadays, Russia is just as much interested in China's loss of prestige in Viet Nam as China is interested in Russia's loss of prestige in Cuba. Hence the "rice" economic aggression. We wonder whether the Soviet mission to Viet Nam, rather than pledge unlimited aid to Ho, may have gone there to tighten the screws of their Vietnamese puppet. This is indicated by recent Yugoslavian statements—which is tantamount to speaking of Russian statements—charging China with keeping North Viet Nam from considering peace offers.

"The Tricontinental Conference: Action and Reaction."— The actions to coordinate plans for subversion, aggression and terror in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The reactions, particularly in Latin America, and as recommended by the Venezuelan Minister of the Interior: the use of force against Communist aggressors; the use of force against the focal point of aggression in Communist Cuba.

JANUARY 11, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

1) CHINA SCOLDS FIDEL OVER RICE ISSUE, CALLS HIM "LIAR".

2) PERUVIAN GNT. RAISES SOVIET AGGRESSION FOLLOWING RUSSIAN STATEMENT AT TRICOCONTINENTAL PANLEY.

EDITORIALS:

"Castro Goes Berserk, Helps Aggression Against South Viet Nam."— We comment on Castro's shameless intervention in the internal affairs of South Viet Nam by lending his transport vessels to transport war supplies for the Viet Cong. By doing this, he is trying
to pose as a powerful warlord before the peoples of Latin America. He would like to be asked to take part in peace negotiations. Therefore, he is after a naval catastrophe that would put him in the headlines throughout the world as a victim of an "imperialism" that has attacked one of poor little Red Cuba's ships. So, he risks the lives of Cuban crews for this purpose. This wickedness explains the wave of defections by Cuban seamen.

"Soviet Aggression".- The Govt. and press of Peru have labelled the statements made by the Soviet delegate to the Tricontinental Conference as aggression. Likewise, the Venezuelan Govt. advised the use of force against Communist aggression. The aggressions are not just against Peru or Venezuela, but against the Continent as a whole. Therefore, the whole Continent should mobilize by declaring all Communist Parties illegal and by applying the ultimate sanctions foreseen by the Inter-American system of self-defense against the Cuban Communist regime.

JANUARY 12, 1966:

NEWCAST:
1) WASHINGTON, HANOI IN DIRECT CONTACT.
2) YUGOSLAVIAN PAPER BLAST TRICONTINENTAL PARLEY.

EDITORIALS:
"Chinese Reds Call Castro "A Liar".- On the eve of the Tricontinental Parley, Fidel Castro sought to strike a hard blow at the Chinese Communists. On Moscow's orders, he charged Red China with "economic aggression" against Cuba. With characteristic Asian phlegm, the Chinese have replied to Castro's perfidious attacks by calling him a liar. They claim that they never agreed to a long-term barter of rice for Cuban sugar. They only agreed, they say, to exchange these products in 1965. For once, we must agree with the Chinese Reds: Castro is indeed the biggest liar the world has known. Trade agreements are written, clarified and specified. We are inclined to believe the Chinese and to reject Fidel's candid explanation of a "misunderstanding".
"Sorcerer's Apprentice Ain't Nothin' But a Hound Dog". From his dream role as the Lenin of the Americas rising high over the Andes, Castro has fallen down a long way. Today, he is nothing but the Soviet's barking, yelping hound dog in the Sino-Soviet rift. His opium dreams, which were once encouraged by a Peking-oriented Chd, led him to act as a sorcerer's apprentice in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The result: the Chinese regard him as a traitor and to the Soviets he ain't nothin' but a hound dog.
"HABLA... UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA" (N.R.U.L.)

January 13, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

1) SOVIET NAVY INSTRUCTOR DEFECTS IN SWEDEN.

2) U.S. FEES CHANGES FOR WAR WITH CHINA, SAYS WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT.

EDITORIALS:

"Words of Hope for a Suffering Cuba." - In his State of the Union message, L.B.J. said that the U.S. is committed not to abandon Viet Nam because doing this would be tantamount to unleashing war in S.E. Asia. L.B.J. is obviously committed to defend democracy in general, and this includes the American Continent and, of course, Cuba. The President's speech is, therefore, a warm New Year's greeting to the struggling people of Cuba.

"Timely Restatements By L.B.J." - After carrying his peace offensive to every corner of the world, to no avail because of the Communists' insistence in prolonging the war, L.B.J. has made a timely restatement of U.S. policy in Viet Nam: before Congress, the President repeated that the U.S. will not abandon Viet Nam, and he also reminded the legislators that the U.S. are committed to defend freedom in Cuba.

January 14, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

1) LUNAR NEW YEAR MAY BRING VIET NAM PEACE-FIRE.

2) CASTRO TURNS DOWN GUYANA RICE, HAS NO DOLLAR TO PAY IT.

EDITORIALS:

"Deep-Sea Drafts in the Tricontinental." - The Tricontinental was planned to have ended Jan. 12 and accomplish a common, united line of revolutionary policy, with common direction and funds. The Conference, however, has been extended, because things have not come out the way the Reds expected.
"Turmoil in the Armed Forces".— Castro is worried over the obvious discontent that is rampant in the Armed Forces, where a document that criticizes the regime and calls for open rebellion has been secretly but widely circulate. Fidel Castro is doubling his precautions and shifting officers and units, but he is doing so somewhat blindly, as he does not know exactly where the focal point of discontent may be, nor what effects it may eventually have.

January 15, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

1) 50,000 NEW MEN TO BE ADMITTED BY ARMY.

2) VIII LATIN COUNCIL OF WORKMEN BLASTS TRICONTINENTAL CONFERENCE.

EDITORIALS:

"Cuban Reds Moan Over Bitter Rice".— Pressed by the USSR, Castro denounced the Chinese Jan. 2 over the rice issue. The megalomaniac Castro went beyond all limits when he said that he would give up rice from the Cuban diet. But the Soviet advisors were frightened, and they forced the Cuban press to back out and apologize to China. In brief: the rice issue has been another Castroite failure in the propaganda field, as well as in the economic one.

"The Tricontinental Conference charged with 'Divisionism'".— Tito, by means of his organ "Borba", said that the Tricontinental marked a new division of World Communism, as Yugoslav and Western European Parties had been excluded. A result of maneuvering within the Sino-Soviet rift, the Havana parley has provoked a new clash, that between Tito and the fool Fidel Castro, the clown who gets all the punches at the circus arena: he is punished by China, despised by Russia and ignored by the Communists' "Third Front".
January 17, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

1) MEXICAN MEETS CUBAN COMMUNISM, RETURNS HOME DISAPPOINTED.

2) CUBANS SNEAK OUT OF ISLAND, COAST GUARD PICKS THEM UP IN CAY SAL.

EDITORIALS:

"A summary of Castro's speech at the Tricontinental".-- Castro's speech revealed the deepening of the division between the Chinese and the Russians, whom he called on to unite. He violently charged the C.P. of Latin America with getting lost in a "sea of theories", interpretations and tactics, and with unwillingness to go out into the battlefield to face the dangers of open war. He attempted to answer charges that he had abandoned the revolutionists of Santo Domingo after exciting them to revolt, and justified himself with the fact that Cuba "is a small nation" lacking in nuclear weapons. Lastly, he acknowledged the deep effect of anti-Communist propaganda in Cuba and in Latin America, which propaganda he charges of slandering his regime.

"Fidel Castro at the closing of the Tricontinental".-- Fidel Castro's desperate tone had defeatist overtones when he admitted what he had never admitted before: the possibility that he may lose all or part of Cuba's territory. This was a defeatist warning, perhaps made to insure a retreat without personal risks. As to Che, he added further confusion to the issue. He was not really replying to the "imperialists", as he said but to some of the delegates to the Tricontinental, who demanded a clarification of Guevara's mysterious disappearance.

January 18, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

1) British Catholic Cardinal blasts Polish Reds.

2) Latin Christian unionists denounce Castro Regime.
EDITORIALS:

"It's Not Propaganda, Fidel, It's The Truth".- We answer Castro's complaints against democratic propaganda, pointing out that it consists not merely of propaganda, but of the whole infamous truth about his regime. We avail ourselves of the circumstances to connect the above with the statements made in Miami by Capt. Augusto M. Consales, the skipper of the Cuban merchant flagship "Uvero", and the Chief Engineer, Roberto Furroco, who defected in Ceylon because of the circumstances that prevail in Cuba.

"A Rival Within The Politburo".- Sergio del Valle, a Major of his Army and a member of the Politburo, delivered a speech on Dec. 26th before the Provincial Committee of the Party in Matanzas, and he openly contradicted what Castro constantly affirms. He criticized extensively and enumerated the many failures of the regime. He took a role as a national "guidance counselor" and pointed at that which he said should be the political guiding principle of the Party, thereby overlooking Secretary General Castro, who was hardly even mentioned. Few reports on this speech were carried by the Cuban press, as del Valle seems to be becoming a rival to Fidel Castro.

January 19, 1966;

NEWSCAST:

1) RED CUBA, TRICONINENTAL PARLEY CRITICIZED BY PEIPING.

2) TWO MORE INTELLECTUALS TO BE PUNISHED IN THE USSR.

EDITORIALS:

"Rusk Answers the Threats of the Tricontinental".- In his speech last Saturday, Castro summarized the "accomplishments" of the Tricontinental, stressing the unanimity of the Communists in their will to conquer South Viet Nam. In the Philippines, Dean Rusk then said that if the U.S. peace offensive failed, the Americans would find themselves in the need to "crush North Viet Nam". This statement duly replied the Tricontinental threats. Fidel might do well to reconsider his offers of arms and "vol-
unteers to Viet Nam, as he might get in the way of American determination and suffer the consequences.

"The Daggers Hidden Behind the Tricontinental"—The sessions of the Tricontinental had hardly come to an end when the intrigues and rifts between the Communists came out to the surface. In their official press, the Chinese have charged the Soviets with having turned the Conference into an anti-Chinese plot. Castro, two days earlier, had taken the dagger out of his sleeve and acted as the Soviets' barking hound.

January 20, 1966:

NEWSCAST:

1) RED PLOT AGAINST COSTA RICA UNVEILED.

2) RED CHINESE ARMY POLITICAL BOSSES CALL FOR WAR READINESS.

EDITORIALS:

"The Americas Answer The Tricontinental Threats"—At the Tricontinental Conference, Castro challenged the stability of the Americas and took an open war path by accusing the Communists in a manner which he thought would go unchallenged. Yet, representatives of Latin govt's, such as Cabinet Minister Barrios, of Venezuela, have shown the way to counter Castrolite aggression. Precisely yesterday, it was Mr. Lincoln Gordon, the new Asst. Secy. of State for Latin American Affairs who said that Cuba constitutes a great threat to all American countries. This pronouncement may be said to represent American though in the struggle against Communism.

"A Great Threat"—When Ambassador Gordon took office as Asst. Secy. of State for Latin American Affairs, he reiterated that Cuba under Red domination means a grave menace to the countries South of the border, and that this is a primary concern for the U.S. This is still more the case after the Tricontinental Conference, and the peoples of Latin America are determined to shake off this menace once and for all, in order to put an end to aggression, terror, subversion, etc., all of which are played and financed by Red Cuba.
"HABLA... UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA" (W.R.U.L.)

October 19: "The Indonesian People Against the Communists". This article breaks Cuban deadly silence concerning Indonesian events, and summarizes and comments on such events, emphasizing that the people and the armed forces have performed the miracle of recovering democracy for Indonesia. HISTORIC DETERMINISM turns against Communism, first in the Dominican Republic, next in Algeria, now in Indonesia, and tomorrow in Cuba.

"Why Doesn't Fidel Talk of the Party's Reorganization?". Right after the news on the reorganization of the Party were confirmed, Castro offered to let all dissatisfied Cubans out of the country. Among other things, this offer served as a smoke screen to cover the purge which he had carried out. Then, complete silence on the subject, so that no one would realize that the Party has been placed under his absolute personal control. He fears the reaction of the purged old Commies.

October 20: "Latin America Against Communism". The Venezuelan Dockworkers' Convention in Caracas, which had an international character, put out Resolutions in which the workers of the Americas confirm their determination to fight communism.

"The Arrival of the Pro-Consul". Gromyko's trip to Cuba is more than just a visit by the Soviet Foreign Minister; it is an unexpected inspection tour by the Pro-Consul to his Caribbean colony. Of course, this trip can bring nothing good for Fidel.

October 21: "Why is Gromyko in Havana?". Gromyko, breaking all rules of democracy, showed up in Havana. What for? Among the other problems faced by Cuba, he showed up to solve the crisis undergone by the Cuban Communist "Old Guard", who have been politically executed by Castro.
"The Fudged Cheat". - Castro's "open-door" offer, which was just a bluff which he hoped would not be accepted, has caught Fidel in a series of traps which he has laid himself. He has had to take resource to a thousand gimmicks and buts in order to keep Cuba from losing its entire population, but he has been unable to keep Camarioca from becoming a plebiscite of hostility against his regime.

October 22: "Fidel Castro's Despair". - After he was abandoned by the officers and soldiers of the Rebel Army, by the militia and by the people of Cuba in general, Castro tries to seek refuge in the support of the youth, which he flatters constantly to that end. If it is true that Cuba's young people support Castro, we challenge him to allow draft-age youths to leave the country if they wish.

"Che's Letter in Cuban Schools". - Castro has ordered that Che's letter be read and re-read in Cuban schools. The letter, which seems to have been dictated by Fidel while his victim stood with a foot in the grave, is a carbon copy of Stalin's procedures. Stalin also demanded that the "purged" leave letters which he himself dictated, in order to instill the cult to his personality in the minds of children and form the myth of his own genius. Castro forgets that such Stalinist methods are still too recent and much discredited.

October 23: "Gromyko and Castro's Woes". - This article emphasizes Castro's deep concern over Gromyko's sudden appearance in Cuba, which indicates that the Soviet Pro-Consul dropped in to tighten Castro-Communist screws economically as well as politically.

"Corvalan is Still Castro's Top Foe Within Fan-American Communism". - Traditionally, the Chilean Communist Party has been the center of op-
position to Castro's brand of Communism among the old-line Parties in this Continent. While Castro has invested millions in subversion, Corvalan has patiently waited to capitalize on such investments and on Fidel's own activities. Today more than ever, the old-line Communist Parties throughout the Americas are in a hurry to displace Castro completely, and stage a counter-coup right in Cuba, where Fidel has made a devastating purge of the Old Guard.

October 25: "Castro's Memo to the Soviet Union".-- A comment on the memo presented by Castro to Gromyko concerning Cuba's needs with respect to economy, oil, currency, sugar, transportation equipment, industrial units, etc., in order that Cuba's economy may get rolling again. Gromyko's crisp, cold reply was that he would forward the demands to the Soviet government.

"Mikoyan-Gromyko".-- Soon it'll be three years since Mikoyan, in his capacity as the Kremlin's Pro-Consul, travelled to Cuba to impose Soviet decisions on the notorious "missile crisis". Three years later, another Pro-Consul, Gromyko, shows up in Havana, also to impose Soviet decisions on the puppet. The Kremlin is making it plain for Fidel to understand that he can't last a week longer unless he fully abides by Moscow's orders.

October 26: "Not Even the Soviet Union Can Save Castro".-- This article comments the internal situation of Cuba and Castro-Communism at the time of Gromyko's departure from the Island. Mention is made of growing discontent, of restlessness and dissatisfaction among Cubans, plus the destruction of Cuba's light industry and agriculture. Other woes of the Castroites are elaborated on, and, in the end, we call on those who form part of the Castro government, but who nevertheless love Cuba, to help put an end to the Red monster and to the anguish of the people.
"When the Present is Unbearable..." - In view of the unbearable, desperate reality faced by the people of Cuba under the Castro regime, the tyrant promises paradise in 20 years. In such vertigo, he goes as far as to promise laurel crowns for Cuban sportsmen in the 1972 Olympic Games. He has annihilated all the sports in Cuba and the country has been eliminated from all international competitions because it makes a means for subversion out of sports. Fortunately, by 1972 Fidel Castro will be mean no more to the Cubans than the bitter memory of a tyrant who no longer exists.
October 29, 1965: "Oil Worries the Havana Communist Regime". A comment on the statement by Engineer Alberto Queralt, who just arrived from Cuba, who, in his capacity as a technician who held a high post in the Petroleum Consolidated, deduces the possibility that Soviet deliveries of oil to Cuba may decrease. These statements are confirmed by the interpretation of President Dorticos' own words, and by the presence of a Cuban mission in Great Britain.

"A Concentration of Gorillas, Thugs and Informers". In the reorganization of the Party, Fidel Castro has undertaken the biggest concentration of gorillas, ever to have taken the political leadership of any country in the world. Besides, he has raised a good number of thugs and gorillas to leadership positions. Such are the men that Castro has found to lead the Party which he has made in his own likeness in order to exert absolute, despotic, personal power over a nation.

November 1st, 1965: "There Will Be No Changes in the Blockade of Red Cuba". A comment on the rumors that U.S. policy on Cuba will "soften". It is indicated that Washington, for humanitarian reasons, accepted Castro's parley to evacuate the spiritually wounded. We also comment on the statement of a Washington official who said that "the fear that the U.S. may alter its relations with Cuba is unfounded (and) there is no prospect for a change in our relations". We arrive at the conclusion that U.S. policy on the subject will not vary: Castro will be economically strangled and there's no future for Communism in this Continent.

"What About Political Prisoners"? Fidel Castro has taken a series of steps that limit, by several means, the offer he made to allow dissatisfied Cubans to leave the Island. Even though no public statements have been made about the political prisoners, it may be expected that this matter has been considered in the negotiations, and that Fidel Castro must be forced to play fairly in order that he may not trade with the agony and the hope of 70,000 political prisoners and with the hope and the anguish of their relatives."
"HABLA... UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA" (V.R.U.L.)

October 29, 1965: "Russia Rebuffs Castro".- A comment on the news that Cuba and the USSR have signed an agreement to send 7 engineers and 50 technicians to the Caribbean Island. It is pointed out that, substantially, such is the Soviet Union’s reply to the request for technical and financial assistance for Cuba’s reconstruction and for the sugar crop.

"Brazil and the Dominican Republic".- The situation in Brazil and the Dominican Republic shows that it is not enough to face up to Communist aggressions, but that energetic, precautionary measures must be taken as well to neutralize the subversive threat and guarantee democratic stability. On the other hand, the Hemisphere’s problems must be focused in their entirety, and action must be taken against the source of subversion in Communist Cuba.
Cuba Aid
Given to
N. Viets
Ship Weapons,
Defector Says

By CARLOS MARTINEZ
of the Latin America Post

A Cuban sea captain who walked off his ship with three of his officers at a Japanese port four days ago charged Thursday in Miami that Cuban vessels take weapons to North Viet Nam "three or four" times every six months.

The captain, Francisco Cobas Osio, 46, told a press conference called by Cuban exiles that "all Cuban ships have orders to carry war material to North Viet Nam to help the North Vietnamese effort."

The Cuban Embassy in Japan, said Cobas, is acting as coordinator for all Viet Nam-bound shipments taken at Communist ports in Asia.

The four Cuban defectors of the 28-ton freighter Aracelio Iglisias were flown to San Francisco last Thursday. There they gave U.S. agents their account of how Fidel Castro's ships carry Red Chinese arms to the Viet Cong. They arrived in Miami Wednesday.

Shortly before Cobas' press conference, the Aracelio Iglisias sailed three days behind schedule for Communist China, reportedly to pick up military hardware for the North Vietnamese. It was being skippered by the second mate, on orders from Cuba.

The Cuban Embassy in Tokyo had secretly arranged for the Aracelio Iglisias to take a shipment of war material from North Korea to North Viet Nam, charged Cobas.

Nevertheless, he said plans were changed at the last minute and he was "hastily ordered" to pick up the shipment of weapons in Shanghai instead. It was then when the four decided to defect.

"The ships that sail from Cuba with sugar are ordered to pick up the weapons after unloading the sugar at Japan," said Cobas, adding that the pickups take place only at North Korean and Red Chinese ports "because of their geographical situation."

The sharp, articulate seaman also charged that the Cuban government keeps a small intelligence detail on each of its merchant ships. They are members of the G-2, Castro's dreaded secret police.

"For some reason, the G-2 men on board are usually the radio and telegraph operators. In the Aracelio Iglisias we had a second G-2 man disguised as the fourth engineer, even though he had no training or ability to perform his duty."
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

DEFECTING CUBAN SEAMEN EXPLAIN THEIR DECISION HERE.

Skipper, three officers left Cuban Freighter in Japan. Cuban logistical support of Viet Nam Roda denounced. Crewmen reluctant to transport war materials to North Viet. Role of Castro's Embassy in Tokyo. Cuban Roda withholds' ship's itinerary to deceive the Japanese. (Spying on board. Bureaucratic chaos results in damage to Cuba's foreign supplies.

A Cuban skipper who left his ship in Japan Dec. 26 confirmed today in Miami that Castro's logistical support of Viet Nam Roda was the main reason for his defection. In a press conference held at the Biscayne Room of the Hotel McAlister, Francisco Cobas, the defecting captain of the Cuban freighter "Arancelo Iglesias", told newsmen why he and three of his fellow officers decided to seek asylum in the United States.

The press conference was arranged by UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA, a Miami-based Cuban group whose Cobas approached upon his arrival from Japan. Cobas said that he had asked the U.R. to help him get in touch with the press so that he and his shipmates could announce Cuban maneuvers to help the Viet Cong.

During the conference, Cobas was flanked by Antonio Arias, Mario Pérez and Humberto Ferández, the three other defecting officers of the "Arancelo Iglesias". Cobas, introduced by U.R. Secretary General Mario Siguilo, spoke for the group. Said Cobas that he and his shipmates had refused to turn the risks of transporting war materials to North Viet Nam, particularly since they were convinced that such transportation was wrong. Cobas added that all Cuban vessels have been ordered to take military supplies to North Viet Nam from other Asian Communist ports, and that the Cuban embassy in Tokyo serves as coordinator for all such shipments.

Referring to his former ship, Capt. Cobas explained that the Embassy had ordered the "Arancelo Iglesias" to sail to a North Korean port and to await further instructions there. The Cuban diplomats withheld the ship's itinerary and declared that the "Arancelo" would return to the Japanese port of Yahata before proceeding to North Viet Nam. By pretending that the ship would come back to Japan, they hoped to deceive the crew and measure the Japanese as to the cargo and the use to which the ship was being put. The truth was, however, that, while in North Korea, the "Arancelo" was to receive orders to load a cargo of war supplies and sail directly from there to North Viet Nam.

According to Cobas, this could not be done in the end because the Tokyo Embassy was warned at the last moment that the North Korean port of Chinnampo was blocked by ice. The "Arancelo" was now ordered to pick up another military shipment at Shanghai and take it to North Viet Nam. It was then that Cobas and his shipmates decided to walk out.

Cobas went on to explain that logistical support to the North Vietnamese was one of the two tasks assigned to the new Cuban envoy in Tokyo, a fanatically loyal Commu-
nist named Manuel Jorge Cuervo Mendez, whose previous job was to run concentration camps in the Isle of Pines.

The Cuban skipper referred to ill-treatment of Cuban seamen by the Castro regime, mentioning among other instances the constant spying on board by G-2 men; preferential Customs treatment given Communist-Bloc sailors; and the ridiculously low local-currency allowance of $5 per week given to the Cubans while in foreign ports. Elaborating on the issue of espionage, Capt. Cobas revealed that the radio and telegraph operator is usually the G-2 man on board. As captain of the "Aracelio," Cobas himself was forced to surrender the mail of supposedly "disloyal" seamen to one of the spies assigned to his ship.

As regards operation conditions of the Cuban merchant fleet, Cobas told newsmen that the two basic problems confronted by Cuban shipping are the obsolete Soviet equipment installed in most boats and the excessive bureaucratic red tape and disorganization. As example of the latter, he mentioned the fact that the Cuban buying agency seldom informs the shipping coordinating office of the dates on which the merchandise is to be picked up at a foreign port. Last-minute notices and subsequent efforts to find ships usually result in failure, with the result that the seller must pay higher warehouse costs. This has caused many foreign firms to either refuse to trade with Castro or to impose extremely harsh terms to protect themselves from the costly effects of the Communists' unreliability.

Capt. Francisco Cobas then revealed that he understood that a vast "reorganization" of the Cuban Navy was undertaken early this fall. Most officers, he said, were discharged on the grounds of suspected "disloyalty" to the government. Incidentally, added Cobas, some retired Army officers who have had no naval experience, have also been assigned to the merchant marine. Cobas assured his audience that their decision to quit was made of their own free will and that no one had pressured them into it. He denounced Communist oppression of his homeland and said that he and his three shipmates refused to keep serving under it.

Following Capt. Cobas' statement, the newsmen asked him numerous questions. Most of these referred to the issue of Cuban boats being used to carry war supplies to Viet Nam, which was quoted by the Cuban seamen as the chief reason for their defection. All journalists present showed great interest in this matter, as such Cuban assistance to Viet Nam Red more or less directly results in the loss of American lives in that Asian country.

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

Ref.: 205

NARANOS CUBANOS QUE DESERTARON EXPLICAN SU DECISION EN MIAMI


Un capitán cubano que abandonó su nave en Japón el 26 de diciembre confirmó hoy en Miami que el apoyo logístico de Castro a los rojos de Viet Nam había sido el principal motivo de su desertión. En una conferencia de prensa celebrada en un céntrico hotel de esta ciudad, Francisco Cobas, capitán del carguero cubano "Aracelio Iglesias" explicó a los periodistas por qué él y sus compañeros de oficialidad decidieron solicitar asilo en los EEUU.

La conferencia de prensa fue convocada por UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA, organización cubana radicada aquí a la que se dirigió Cobas a su llegada del Japón. Cobas dijo que había solicitado la ayuda de U.R. a fin de ponerse en contacto con los periodistas y denunciar las maniobras de Cuba Roja en favor de los rojos vietnamitas.

Durante la conferencia, se encontraban junto a Cobas los otros tres oficiales asilados, nombrados Antonio Ruiz Arias (Primer Oficial), Mario Julio Pérez Giron (Jefe de Máquinas), y Humberto R. Formández (Sobrecarg). El capitán Cobas fue presentado por el Dr. Mario Seiglie, Secretario General de UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA.

Dijo Cobas que tanto él como sus compañeros de tripulación se negaban a correr el riesgo que supone transportar material bélico a Viet Nam del Norte, máxime cuando a briganaban la convicción de que dicha actuación del gobierno cubano es altamente condenable. Añadió Cobas que todos los buques cubanos tienen órdenes de llevar suministros de guerra a Viet Nam del Norte desde otros puertos comunistas del Asia, y que la Bahía Jada cubana en Tokyo funge como coordinadora de tales embarques.

Refiriéndose al "Aracelio Iglesias", que capitaneaba, Cobas reveló que la Embajada cubana en Japón había dispuesto que el "Aracelio" zarpara rumbo a un puerto norcoreano y aguardara allí nuevas órdenes. Los diplomáticos castristas retuvieron el itinerario del buque y declararon que el mismo volvería al puerto japonés de Yohata antes de seguir rumbo a Viet Nam del Norte. Al hacer ver que el buque regresaría al Japón, los comunistas se proponían engañar a la tripulación y tranquilizar a las autoridades japonesas respecto del cargamento del buque y del uso que se iba a dar al mismo. La realidad, empero, era que, durante la estancia del "Aracelio" en Corea del Norte, el mismo habría de recibir la orden de cargar un embarque de material bélico y zarpar.
directamente hacia Viet Nam del Norte.

Según Cobas, esto no pudo hacerse debido a que, a última hora, la Embajada recibió el aviso de que el puerto norcoreano de Chinnampo estaba bloqueado por el hielo. En vista de ello, se ordenó al "Aracelio" levar anclas rumbo a Shanghai para recoger allí otro cargamento de material de guerra y conducirlo al Viet Nam. Fué entonces que Cobas y sus compañeros decidieron abandonar el buque.

A continuación, Cobas pasó a explicar que el apoyo logístico a los Viet Cong —constituye uno de las tareas encomendadas al nuevo embajador cubano en Tokyo, un comunista fanático nombrado Manuel Jorge Guerro Menéndez que tuvo a su cargo la administración de varios campos de concentración en Isla de Pinos—.

Refiriéndose a los malos tratos que reciben los marineros cubanos, Cobas mencionó la constante vigilancia a que están sometidos a bordo por el G-2 comunista, así como a las consideraciones especiales de aduanas que se dan a los tripulantes de buques de otros países comunistas y a la ridícula cantidad ($5 semanales) en moneda local que se da a los marineros cubanos para sus gastos en puertos extranjeros. Detallando la cuestión de la vigilancia, reveló el capitán Cobas que en la mayoría de los buques cubanos el G-2 de a bordo suele ser el radiotelegrafista. Como capitán del "Aracelio Iglesias", el propio Cobas se vio obligado a entregarlo a otro agente policíaco destacado a bordo toda la correspondencia de ciertos tripulantes supuestamente desleales al régimen.

También dijo Cobas a los periodistas que los principales problemas que confronta la navegación cubana: los constituyen los equipos soviéticos anticuados instalados en muchos buques y las complicaciones y confusiones burocráticas. Como ejemplo de esto último, señaló Cobas que la agencia oficial de compras del régimen cubano casi nunca comunica a la coordinadora de fletes (CUFLET) la fecha en que deberá cargarse alguna mercancía en puerto extranjero. Dicha fecha no se avisa hasta última hora, fracasando así los intentos de CUFLET para conseguir buque. Como consecuencia de esto, el vendedor extranjero ve notablemente aumentados sus costos de almacenamiento, y esto ha hecho que muchas firmas extranjeras bien se abstengan de comerciar con la tiranía roja o impongan términos exorbitantes de venta para prevenirse de estos costosos efectos de la irresponsabilidad comunista.

El capitán Cobas reveló que, según tenía entendido, la Marina de Guerra de Cuba Roja sufrió una amplia "reorganización" a principios del otoño. Según dijo, muchos oficiales fueron licenciados por su supuesta "deslealtad" al régimen. Los más afortunados fueron transferidos a la marina mercante, a la que también se ha incorporado a muchos oficiales retirados del Ejército que carecen por completo de experiencia naval. Los restantes oficiales licenciados de la Marina de Guerra han sido enviados a reclusión o recluidos en prisión.

El Capitán Cobas aseguró a los presentes que su decisión y la de sus compañeros era el producto de su libremente voluntad, no habiéndose ejercido sobre ellos la menor presión. Cobas denunció la opresión comunista en su patria y añadió que ni él ni sus tres compañeros podían seguir sirviendo a la causa roja.
Luego de estas declaraciones, los periodistas presentes formularon al Capitán Co bas numerosas preguntas, la mayoría de las cuales se referían al uso de las naves de Cuba Roja para llevar suministros a los comunistas del Viet Cong. Todos los reporteros asistentes se mostraron vivamente interesados en este asunto, por cuanto dicha ayuda cubana se traduce más o menos directamente en la pérdida de vidas norteamericanas en ese país del Sureste asiático.

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.)

Miami, Diciembre 31, 1965
Ref: 210
My brother and I have requested political asylum from the United States because we are convinced that Cuban support of the Communist war in Vietnam is wrong and we refuse to run the risks of transporting war material to North Vietnam.

All Cuban ships have orders to carry cargo to North Vietnam to help the North Vietnamese war effort. The Cuban Embassy in Japan is acting as the coordinator for all shipments of war material to North Vietnam via Cuban ships from Communist ports in Asia. The Cuban Embassy in Tokyo had secretly arranged for the Aracelio Iglesias to take a shipment of war materials from North Korea to North Vietnam. In order to hide their intentions, the Embassy arranged that the Aracelio itinerary be kept up in the air until the last possible moment, then to fool the crew and the Japanese they gave the story the ship would return to Japan to load tin cargo at Yahata and then proceed on route to North Vietnam. In reality, we were to receive instructions on itinerary while in North Korea telling us to proceed directly to North Vietnam after loading the war supplies.

At the last moment, however, the Embassy was informed that the port of Chinnampo was blocked by ice. The Cuban Embassy then hastily arranged for us to pick up a shipment of arms in Shanghai previously scheduled for another Cuban boat about the end of January.

Logistical support to the North Vietnamese is one of the two tasks assigned to Mr. Manuel Jorge Cuervo, the new Cuban Ambassador to Japan. His other function is to erase the bad effects on Japanese-Cuban trade caused by the defection of the former trade Counselor to Japan, Gilberto Ulemany. The Cuban government is very concerned about the prospect of declining trade since already some companies that formerly traded with Cuba, will no longer do so openly.

In general, I may say that members of the Cuban merchant marine live under unbearable conditions. The treatment we receive is so bad that no one feels like cooperating with the marine purposes of the regime, even in the few cases where there might be no ideological incompatibility involved.

As examples of this treatment I may mention the constant spying on board by members of the "G-2". For some reason, the "G-2" man on board is usually the radio and telegraph operator. In the "Aracelio" we had one by the name of Eduardo Sánchez who was a notorious spy. Abroad we had another man called Manuel Rda Rodrigues who was imposed as the Fourth Engineer, even though he had no training or ability to perform such duties. As Captain of the "Aracelio", I was ordered
by the government shipping concern "Vastitas" to give Ria all possible cooperation in the fulfillment of his functions. Ria then came to see me and asked, among other things, that I surrender to him the incoming and outgoing mail of certain specific crewmen who were suspected of being against the government.

Another instance of ill-treatment which Cuban seamen resent is the discrimination to which we are subject by the Cuban Customs as compared to the preferential treatment they accord to foreign sailors, particularly those from behind the iron curtain. Most everything we bring from abroad to alleviate the scarcity suffered by our families is confiscated at the Customs House.

Still other reasons for disgust are the many cuts and discounts made from our already low pay and, very especially, the ridiculously low amount of foreign currency that we are allowed when we sail abroad. For spending money in foreign ports, all we get in local currency is the equivalent of $5 per week which, of course, are deducted from our basic salaries. In applying this restriction, no distinction is made between the crewmen or the various officer ranks. It is $5 for everyone.

Because of all this, and because of the terrible conditions under which Communism keeps our homeland, most Cuban sailors and officers are staunch anti-Communists. The Government knows this, but nevertheless they must employ what they call "the reactionaries" because of the scarcity of other trained personnel to man Cuban boats. Their only choice is to spy on us constantly, as I have just explained.

As to the operating conditions of the Cuban merchant fleet, it is worth mentioning that Polish ships, which make up a sizable proportion of Cuban shipping, are supplied with Soviet-made equipment which the Russians have long discarded as obsolete. Again, my own ship is an example. The "Arcelia" was completed as recently as 1953 in a Polish shipyard. Yet, its radar equipment is so obsolete that it is simply not used, since we could never find the parts to repair it when it broke. A German technician told my Chief Mate here that it must have been a World-War II unit.

Excessive bureaucratic red tape and disorganization is another serious problem confronted by Cuban shipping and which often results in considerable damage to those firms that trade with the Castro tyranny. I will illustrate this. The Cuban government agency responsible for arranging maritime transportation for merchandise bought abroad is the "Empresa Cubana de Flotes" (CUFLEIT).
The government purchasing organization buys merchandise from foreign companies, but fails to inform CIFLET of the date on which the cargo is to be loaded. All attempts to establish this are to no avail. Then one day the buying agency serves last-minute notice that the merchandise will be ready for loading. CIFLET takes pains to find a vessel in time but, more often than not, its hasty efforts are in vain. In the meantime, the seller abroad grows impatient, as he has long fulfilled his part of the deal and must continue to pay warehouse costs because of a delay that is no fault of his.

This happens all the time, to the extent that many foreign firms refuse to deal with such an undependable customer as the Cuban government, or, foreseeing the damage they may come to them because of such inefficiency they impose the harshest rolling terms.

The unrest and chaos that I have described is not peculiar to the merchant fleet. I do not know many details about this because I have been out at sea most of the time since I first heard of it, but I understand that the Cuban Navy was also in such turmoil that practically all its officers were discharged early this fall. It is said that some of the dismissed naval officers were assigned to the merchant marine, and my men and I know a few instances. It is even true that Army officers with no naval experience are being appointed to high naval positions. However, it is most likely that many of the purged officers will have been shot or imprisoned. Such is the Cuba of today.

Lastly, we wish to emphasize that our decision to seek asylum in the United States has been made of our own free will. We have been pressured into this decision by no one. Our consciences no longer permit us to serve the cause of a Communist Cuba. Like hundreds of Cubans before us, we who love Cuba deeply cannot longer endure the tyranny with which she is afflicted.

We appreciate with all our heart the help received from UNIDAD REVOLUCINARIA and we also wish to thank the gentlemen of the Press assembled here, for the attention given us.

Francisco Cobas.

Miami, 30 de Diciembre de 1965.
SECRET 3/2349Z

WHOIS

31 DEC 65

21377

DECEMBER 3, 1965

SECRET

INFO TOKYO CITE WAVE 8166

TYPIC ZRZAGON

REF WAVE 8122:

PRESS CONFERENCE PER PARA 1 REF HELD AS SCHEDULED

WITH THUS FAR FAVORABLE RESULTS. APPROX TWENTY REPS ALL MEDIA
PRESENT INCLUDING AP, UPI, ABC AND TWO LOCAL TV STATIONS, VOA,
AFP AND APPROPRIATE STATION ASSETS. TONE OF CONFERENCE FRIENDLY.

WITHIN TWO HOURS STORY ON LOCAL RADIO WHICH STRESSED
THREE POINTS: OFFICERS BROUGHT TO POINT

OF DEFECTION DUE FACT IGLESIAS CARRYING MILITARY CARGOS TO NORTH
VIET NAM, PRESENT MORALE AND CONDITION CUBAN NAVY VERY POOR DUE
IN PART TO WHOLESALE OFFICER PURGE AND REPLACEMENT THESE OFFICERS
BY "LAND-LUBBER" ARMY OFFICERS, MERCHANT MARINE IN SAME STATE
DUE G-2 HARASSMENT OF CREWS AND POOR CONDITION OF SHIPS. THESE
AND OTHER POINTS INCLUDING PARA 2 READ INCLUDED IN PREPARED
STATEMENT WHICH HANDED PRESS REPS. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING
CONFERENCE OFFICERS MET IN PRIVATE WITH VOA REP TO TAPE AN

19-120-26

DEC 65
2. Text of statement also included in AMSCROLL press release being issued this date and which will be aired mailed its list. Via AMLYRIC-1, press interview and editorial comment arranged for radio coverage via AMTHIGH. AMBROTH, AMTUMOR evening 30 Dec. AMHIM preparing special press release for 31 Dec. AMSTRUT-2 will prepare taped interview for 2 Jan program.

3. Local and international press coverage should appear 31 Dec as AFP, UPI and AP have filed stories. Will forward clips available here for replay.

SECRET

CFN 8166 8122 1 AP UPI ABC TV VOA AFP IGLESIAS NORTH VIET NAM CUBAN NAVY G-2 2 VOA AMSCROLL via AMLYRIC-1 via AMTHIGH AMBROTH AMTUMOR 33 AMHIM 31 AMSTRUT-2 2 31 AFP UPI AP

ET

NNNN
SECRET 291931Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO TOKYO CITIE WAVE 9129

TYPIC IPHMAGN

REF: DIR 33111 29 Dec 55

1. RE PARA 1 REF BELIEVE AMSOCLL SPONSORSHIP MORE SUITABLE AND LOGICAL IN VIEW ITS DAILY EMPHASIS UPON MVIPER ACTIONS, ITS BEING KNOWN TO DEFECTING OFFICERS, AND ITS EXPERIENCE WITH PRESS CONFERENCES AND PUBLIC EY. AMSOCLL PARTICIPATION TO BE LIMITED TO ORGANIZING CONFERENCE AND PRESENTING OFFICERS. IT WILL NOT TAKE CREDIT FOR DEFECTIONS. AMWORD-1, -2 AND -3 HAVE BEEN BRIEFED RE AMSOCLL ROLE IN SURFACING AND HAVE ARRANGED FOR SPACE FOR PRESS CONFERENCE AT 1130 HOURS 32 DEC. LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL PRESS, RADIO AND TV (INCLUDING WAVE MEDIA ASSETS SUCH AS AMHIM, AMICE, AMLYRIC-1)

TO BE ALERTED EVENING 29 DEC A HIGH LEVEL DEFECTOR TO BE AVAILABLE. IDENTITIES WILL BE HELD UNTIL CONFERENCE.

2. RE PARA 2 REF PRESENT PLAN CALLS FOR AMSOCLL REPS TO MEET WITH ONSAILOR-42 TO WORK OUT DETAILS STATEMENT TO BE READ AND GIVEN TO PRESS WHICH TO SOME EXTENT WILL HAVE TO FOLLOW STATEMENT ISSUED JAPAN. WILL USE MILITARY CARDOS RATHER THAN ARMS WHICH CONSISTENT WITH LOCAL PRESS COVERAGE THUS FAR. ASSUMING ONSAILOR-42 CONCURRENCE WILL

19-12-26

29 Dec 66
FROM CUBAAN HABANA

SECRET

REDUCTION

CIN: 81008 65111 1 AMSCROLL HAVANA NOT TAKE AXORD-1 -2 -3

1105 05 DEC TV AMHE AMIFE AMLYRIC-1 99 DEC A 2 CUBAAN HAVANA

JAPAN -42 3 A -42 CUBAAN HAVANA

BT
SECRET 2919342

DIR INFO RIOD CASE WAVE 8123

TYPIC WHEAT

REFS: A. DIR 67579

B. TM 772926

C. UFCA 24163

PER PARA TVO REF A REQUEST, JMWAVE POUCHEO REF B BULKY
MATERIALS TO HOS FOR FORWARDING TO RIOD, SPECIAL AMSCROLL STUDY
AND OTHER SELECTED MATERIALS POUCHEO RIOD REF C.

SECRET \ REQUESTED WATER CABOE MATERIAL

CFN: 8123 67579 772926 24163 A JMWAVE B HOS AMSCROLL C

SECRET


19-120-26

29 PDS
SECRET 2723552

PRIORITY DIR INFO PRIORITY TOKY SITE HAVE-8397

NO NIAC

TYPIC TXMACON

REF A. TOKY 5227 (IN 21439)

B. TOKY 5241 (IN 21678)

1. HAVE PLANS MEE SUBJECTS REF A UPON ARRIVAL HAVE AREA AND REMOVE TO SAFE HOUSE FOR APPROX ONE DAY PRIOR SURFACING. PURPOSE TO GIVE TIME ORGANIZE PROPER SURFACING AND DETERMINE SUITABILITY AND WILLINGNESS MEET WITH PRESS, TV, ETC UNDER AEGIS ANSCROLL. DEPENDING ON NATURE PRESS COVERAGE IN SAN FRANCISCO, PLAN HAVE ANSCROLL SPONSOR SURFACING IN MANNER GIVE IMPRESSION IGLESIAS SUCCESS PART OF OVERALL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST CURB MERCHANT MARINE. WILL TIE IN WITH OTHER RECENT MARITIME DEFECTIONS AND WILL INDICATE OTHERS TO FOLLOW. MET-

2. FOR TOKY, PLEASE ADVISE IF REF OFFICERS AWARE OF ANSCROLL ACTIVITY THIS CD. DID THEY MEET ANGRACE-1 AND IF SO IN WHAT ROLE AND UNDER WHAT NAME? ARE THEY AWARE OF THE ANSCROLL PAMPHLETS? ALSO REQUEST YOUR ESTIMATE THEIR WILLINGNESS COOPERATE IN PROP PLAY.
SECRET

CFN 8097 5937 5941 WAVE A TV ETC AERIS ANSROLL SAN FRANCISCO
IGLESIAS CUBAN ANWASP-1 CP AMFRAME-1

BT

SECRET
SECRET 230710Z

PRIORITY WAVE DIR CITE TOKY 5955

LOCAL 22050

TYPIC ZRVAQON

REF WAVE 3397 (0000)

1. BELIEVE REF SUGGESTION GIVE IMPRESSION ARACELIO IGLESIAS (AI) OP PART OF OVER ALL OPERATION AGAINST CUBAN MERCHANT MARINE WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE VIEW GIST PSYCH PLAY HERE. WE ATTEMPTING PUBLICIZE FACT AI CREW MEMBERS DEFECTED DUE OPPOSITION ORDERS CARRY MATERIAL NORTH VIETNAM AND CUBAN EMBASSY TOKYO IS FAR EAST COORDINATOR ALL SHIPMENTS WAR MATERIAL ON CUBAN VESSELS, THIS ACTING TO IMPLEMENT CASTRO PROMISE AID NORTH VIETNAM WAR EFFORT. BELIEVE ANY INDICATION THEY PREVIOUSLY IN TOUCH AMSROLL OR OTHER GROUP WOULD CAUSE DOUBTS VERACITY THEIR PRESS STATEMENT. REQUEST THEREFORE YOU NOT IMPLEMENT REF.

2. SUBJECTS AWARE AMSROLL ACTIVITY BUT HAVE NOT MET AMFRAME 1 AMSROLL PAMPHLETS NOT USED. BELIEVE SUBJECTS WILL COOPERATE FULLY IN ANY TYPE PROP PLAY DESIRED. PLEASE ADHERE LINE TOKY 5949.

SECRET

CFN 5955 2307 ARACELIO IGLESIAS AI OP CUBAN AI NORTH VIETNAM CUBAN FAR EAST CUBAN CASTRO NORTH AMSROLL NOT IMPLEMENT AMSROLL NOT MET
MESSAGE FORM

TO: JUNAVE WAVE TOKYO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO VR F FILE 0 RID COPY FE 8 C1 CP/CA, FL FL4

TOTAL COPIES: 36

SECRET

DATE: 28 DEC 63

FILE IN CB FILE NO.

191324485

TYPIC ZRNAG0

REFS: A. WAVE 8097 (IN 21994)
B. TOKYO 5953 (IN 22080)

1. HQS CONCURS TOKY REQUEST THAT IGLESIAS DEFECTIONS CONTINUE APPEAR SPONTANEOUS AND WAVE NOT GIVE IMPRESSION DEFECTIONS PART OF OVERALL EXILE ORGANIZATION OP AGAINST MERCHANT MARINE, SINCE AMSCROLL WIDELY KNOWN ASSOCIATION WITH MHIVER ACTIVITIES, SUGGEST WAVE RECONSIDER USE AMSCROLL, AMICE MIGHT BE MORE SUITABLE GROUP TO SPONSOR WAVE SURFACING. SINCE WE NOW HAVE AT LEAST SEVEN RECENT MARITIME DEFECTORS, PULLING ALL TOGETHER IN NEAR FUTURE FOR FURTHER PSYCH ACTIONS WHEN CURRENT PSYCH EXPLOITATIONS COMPLETED MIGHT BE MORE EFFECTIVELY ACCOMPLISHED UNDER AEGIS AMICE. ALL SURFACINGS SHOULD CONVEY IMPRESSION WIDESPREAD DISSATISFACTION IN MERCHANT MARINE.

2. ODACID EXPRESSING SOME CONCERN OVER DEFECTORS' STATEMENTS RE "ARMS" SHIPS'MENTS TO NORTH VIETNAM AND DESIRES ASSURANCE STATEMENTS CAN BE SUPPORTED AT LEAST BY LOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS, IF NOT OUTRIGHT FACT, OTHERWISE FEAR ENTIRE EFFORT, WHICH THEY FEEL IS MOST DESIRABLE, MAY BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. WAVE SHOULD REVIEW STATEMENTS CAREFULLY WITH SUBJECTS AND BE CERTAIN THEY CONSISTENT AND CONVINCING SINCE IT ANTICIPATED THIS WILL BE SUBJECT TO SEARCHING QUESTIONS IN FORTHCOMING COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

PROHIBITED TO REPRODUCE BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
PRESS CONFERENCE. SUGGEST MIGHT BE DESIRABLE TO CITE MILITARY CARGOS RATHER THAN ARMS PER SE. PER NISTERN-1 STATEMENT MADR 6593, CARBIDE SHIPMENTS CLEARLY IN THIS CATEGORY. WOULD APPRECIATE TOKY COMMENT.

3. FURTHER SUGGEST WAVE HAVE Q-42 AND OTHERS INDICATE THAT GROWING SECURITY CONTROLS OVER CUBAN SHIPS MADE LIFE INTOLERABLE, EXCEPT FOR PRESENCE OF TWO OR THREE DSE MEN (HE MIGHT NAME A FEW) ON EACH SHIP, UNDOUBTEDLY MANY MORE EZALEN WOULD DEFECT. Q-42 COULD FURTHER SUGGEST HE KNOWS OF AT LEAST ONE SECURITY TYPE (NOT NAMED) WHO HIMSELF THINKING OF DEFECTING. ANOTHER FACTOR HINDERING MORE DEFECTION: IS FEAR OF REPRISES AGAINST FAMILIES.

END OF MESSAGE
AP STORY FILED VIENNA AND PRINTED MIAMI HERALD 23 DEC REPORTING

CZECH ADMISSION OF DISASTER IN ECONOMIC EFFORTS BEING USED BY
AMSCROLL RADIO AS ONE MORE EXAMPLE OF MONISTED WEAKNESSES COMMUNITY
ECONOMIC THEORIES. COMBINING WITH RECENT ROMANIAN AND SOVIET ADMISSIONS
AS PART OF BASIC THEME TO AMSCROLL AUDIENCE THAT FUTURE CZECH ECONOMY
BLEAK INDEED IF AFTER ALL THESE YEARS SOVIETS, SATELLITES AND
CHINESE UNABLE SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS. IF AVAILABLE WILL APPRECIATE
PRECIS OF CZECH DOCUMENT.
SECRET

CFII

3562 AP VIENNA MIAMI HERALD 23 CZECH AMSCROLL ROMANIAN CHINESE
PRECIS

SECRET

Howard Bowman 9321
Czech report if
call slant
will call slant
copy of newspaper
article or receive

[Signature]

Date: 7 Jan 66

[Signature]

23 Dec 29854

ACTION
SECRET 232153Z

PRIORITY ATHE INFO DDR NAOR CITY WAVE 2975

TYPIC MHSAPAVN THUNIFORM

REF: A. ATHE 9031 (W7113)
B. WAVE 7921 (W16238)

1. MEETING WITH ECONOMIDES DID NOT RESULT ANY QUOTABLE MATERIAL.

WHILE MEETING NOT EXPLICITLY STIPULATED CONFIDENTIAL IT WAS PRIVATE
IN NATURE AND PURPOSE WAS TO RECEIVE "CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS" FOR

19-120-26
23 Dec 65
2. HOWEVER AMSROLL WILL RELEASE AN ACCOUNT 24 DEC SAYING AMSROLL WAS PRESENTED ITS STUDY OF SHIPPI NG AND CALBE CASES TO GREEK DIPLOMATS WHO MEMBERS TSIRIMOKOS UN ENTOURAGE. WILL REPORT DIPLOMATS STATEMENT GREEK GOVT IS AWARE SHIPPING PROBLEM BUT BELIEVES THIS WILL DECLINE AND DISAPPEAR IN FUTURE. RE GELBE, WILL SAY DIPLOMATS ACKNOWLEDGED GELBE BEHAVIOR AND STATED THIS A MATTER BEING CAREFULLY EXAMINED BY GREEK GOVT. THIS RELEASE WILL BE SEPARATE FROM THAT DESCRIBED PARA 7 REF B AND WILL BE AIRMAILED ADDRESSES PROVIDED BY ATHE.

3. FOR DIR AND MAJR. RE PARA 6 REF B, RECHECK INDICATES ALABART WAS SPEAKING OF MINISTER OF INDUSTRIES LOPEZ BRAVO RATHER THAN COMMERCE MINISTER DEL BRAVO IN THIS CONTEXT.

SECRET

CFN: 8075 8031 7921 ECONOMIDES NOT RESULT NOT EXPLICITLY TSIRIMOKOS AMSROLL 24 DEC GELBE GREEK A 7 B 6 B ALABART LOPEZ BRAVO DEL BRAVO ET
SECRET 101613Z

ATHE INFO MADR DIR CITE WAVE 7960
TYPIC MHSPAWN THUNIFORM

REF A. ATHE 7960
  C1W6 10666
B. WAVE 7793
  C1W6 10801

RE PARA 5 REF A AMSROLL WILL WRITE LETTER SUGGESTED PARA 4
UPON RECEIPT CLIPS. SEE PARA 6. SEE REF B.

SECRET

CFN 7819 7960 7793 RE 5 A AMSROLL 4 CLIPS RE 6 B
BT

SECRET

LETTER AIRMAILED 8 DEC
MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL COPIES: 36

TO: JMWAVE MADRID ATHENS
FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C
INFO: MADR, ATHENS

MESSAGE

TYPICAL MSHAWN THUFORM

REF: WAVE 7921 (IN 16238)*

1. CONCUR PROP PROPOSAL PARAS 6 AND 7 REF. CONSIDER ALABART RESPONSE HIGHLY REVEALING AND UNDERSCORES PROPOSAL GIVE SPANISH/CUBAN TRADE THEME WIDEST AND CONTINUING PLAY L.A. PRESS AND RADIO AND ALSO EUROPEAN AREA. SUGGEST AMHIM CABLE SUMMARY AMSROLL PRESS RELEASE PER PARA 7 REF TO SEVERAL OF ITS MORE RESPONSIVE OUTLETS INCLUDING ATHEN, IN ORDER ASSURE FULLEST COVERAGE.

2. FOR MADR: REQUEST STATION CABLE HQS WAVE ANY GOS REACTION RESULT PROP PLAY ABOVE ALSO ANY STATION SUGGESTIONS FOR AMSROLL USE IN PREPARATION PRESS RELEASE AND PAPER TO BE FORWARD DEL BARRIO

END OF MESSAGE

* Concerns interview with Spanish Consul-General in N.Y.

DC/WH/CA
WH/C/MO
WE/C Les Raty (Phone)
WE/S Les Raty (Phone)
EE/X Bob Stevens

WILLIAM V. BRONE
C/VH

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SOCY:

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
SECRET 1715512

PRIORITY WAVE INFO DIR MADR CITÉ, ATHE 3931 (BACHMAN ACTING)

TF IC K9SPDN THUNIFORM
REF: A. ATHE 3321 (216292)
    B. WAVE 7921 (216238) 17 Dec 65 in 17131

1. REF B DOES NOT INDICATE WHETHER MARKOS ECONOMIDES DISCUSSED PARA 2 REF B SUBJECTS IN QUOTABLE, OFF-THE-CUFF, OR UNFICIAL STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL MANNER.

2. IF EONOMIDES DID NOT STIPULATE REF B DISCUSSION A "CONFIDENTIAL" ONE, THEY SUGGEST PARA 2 REF B ANSCROLL PRESS RELEASE ALSO INCLUDE STATEMENT FROM "OFFICIAL GREEK GOVT (GOG) REPRESENTATIVE OF TSIRIMOKOS' UN ENTOURAGE INDICATED HIS DISAPPROVAL OF GALE AND LISTENED SYMPATHETICALLY TO ANSCROLL PRESENTATION", ALSO, GOG OPPOSED TO GREEK SHIPPING TO CUBA.

3. WE HAVE CONSIDERED POSSIBILITY TSIRIMOKOS REACTION TO ABOVE. ALTHO TSIRIMOKOS MAY DENY PERSON IN HIS ENTORAGE MADE STATEMENT IT UNLIKELY HE WILL DENY GOG DISAPPROVAL OF GALE CONDUCT. FURTHERMORE, IN EVENT A DENIAL IS ACTUALLY ISSUED, THIS WOULD SERVE AS USEFUL PEG KEEP STORY ALIVE AND ALLOW FURTHER EDITORIAL CRITICISM OF GOG INACTION IN

SECRET 19-120-26

17 Dec 65
SECRET

DECLARING GALBE AS PERSONA NON GRATA

4. NO INDEX.

SECRET

CFN 8031 8021 7921 B NOT INDICATE MARKOS ECONOMIDES 2 B
ECONOMIDES NOT B A ONE 7 B ANSCROLL GOG TSIRIMOKOS UN GALBE
ANSCHROLL GOG GREEK GUBA TSIRIMOKOS TSIRIMIKOS GOG GALBE A
PEG GOG GALBE PERSONA NON GRATA NO INDEX

BT
SECRET 171819Z

PRIORITY TOKY INFO DIR CARA CITE WAVE 7938

RYBAT TYPIC ZRAWON

RF WAVE 7892 (in 14727) +

AMFRAME-1 VENEZUELAN DOCUMENTATION COMPLETED. ARRIVING

TOKY ALITALIA 772 AT 2248 ON 19 DEC TOKYO TIME.

SECRET

VFN: 7938 7892 AMFRAME-1 VENEZUELAN ALITALIA 772 2248 19

SECRET
SECRET 161828Z
DIR INFO ATHE MADR CITE WAVE 7921
16DEC65 DA 16238
TYPIC MHSPAWN THUNIFORM

REF WAVE 7852 (w 19973)

1. GEF DELEGATION UNABLE SEE TSIRIMOKOS DUE PRESS UN BUSINESS.

HOWEVER RECEIVED FOR HOUR AND A HALF 12 DEC BY MARKOS ECONOMIDES
WHO DESCRIBED SELF AS GREEK DIPLOMAT WHO AIDE TO AND TRAVELING
WITH TSIRIMOKOS.

2. DELEGATION RAISED TWO SUBJECTS;
   A. GALBE
   B. CREEK SHIPPING TO CUBA

3. RE 2A ECONOMIDES INDICATED HIS DISAPPROVAL OF GALBE AND
   LISTENED SYMPATHETICALLY TO AMSROLL ARGUMENTS. MADE NO PROMISES
   BUT SAID WOULD GIVE AMSROLL PREPARED PRESENTATION OF CASE TO
   TSIRIMOKOS. (THIS INCLUDED LATEST AMSROLL LETTER DESCRIBED
   WAVE 7793.) ECONOMIDES DID NOT INDICATE ANY ACTION BEING TAKEN
   TO P.N.G. GALBE.

4. RE 2B SAID HE AND GREEK GOVT WELL AWARE PROBLEM AND OPPOSED
   TO THIS SHIPPING. EXPLAINED CONTINUATION DUE GREEK SHIP OWNERS
SECRET
SECRET

WELTHY AND POWERFUL. EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR AND COMMENTED
ON THOROUGHNESS OF AMSROLL FILE THIS SUBJECT PREPARED FOR TSIRIMOKOS
AND LEFT WITH ECONOMIDES.

5. IN CONCLUSION ECONOMIDES SAID HE MOST SYMPATHETIC WITH AMS
AMSCROLL AND ADDED THAT PREVIOUS LETTERS TO TSIRIMOKOS ON GALBE
HAD BEEN HELPFUL. URGED THAT AMSCLOLL KEEP HIM AND TSIRIMOKOS
INFORMED FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS PARA 2 SUBJECTS. WILL POUCH AMWORD-3
REPORT THIS MEETING WHEN PREPARED.

6. FOR MADR. WHILE IN NEW YORK AMSROLL DELEGATION CALLED UPON
SPANISH CONSUL-GENERAL MANUEL ALABART (WHO RELATED TO AMBLEAK-1)
SEEKING ENTREE TO TSIRIMOKOS. CONVERSATION LED TO SHIPS BEING BUILT
IN SPAIN FOR CUBA. POINT WAS MADE TO ALABART THIS ACTIVITY COULD
BACKFIRE ON SPAIN PARTICULARLY IN VIEW RECENT INTERNATIONAL LONG-
SHOREMEN ASSOC (ILA) RESOLUTION TO BOYCOTT FREE WORLD SHIPS THAT
TRADE WITH CUBA. ALABART RESPONDED THIS SUBJECT OF GREAT INTEREST
TO SPANISH MINISTER COMMERCE LOPEZ DEL BARRIO ESPECIALLY IF TRADE
WITH CUBA WOULD REFLECT UNFAVORABLY UPON SPAIN'S ANNOUNCED ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR BALANCE LATIN AMERICA. SAID DEL BARRIO
HAD LEFT NEW YORK FOR MADRID TWO DAYS PREVIOUSLY AND HAD DISCUSSED
WITH ALABART PROBLEM OF CUBAN TRADE AS IT RELATES TO PLANS FOR REST
SECRET

OF CONTINENT. IN CONCLUSION ASKED FOR AMScroll STUDY THIS MATTER
PLUS INFO ON SHIPPING BOYCOTT AND COPIES ILA RESOLUTIONS IN
ORDER FORWARD THEM TO DEL BARRIO. IDEN C OF REF NOW GATHERING
MATERIAL TO COMPLY WITH REQUEST.

7. WAVE SUGGESTS AMSscroll PREPARE PRESS RELEASE ON STUDY OF
SPAIN/CUBA TRADE AND ITS POTENTIALLY ADVERSE EFFECT ON SPAINISH
HOPES FOR REST OF LA. COULD ARRANGE PICKUP BY AMHIM AND POSSIBLY
WIRE SERVICES FOR SUBSEQUENT REPLAY BY OTHER STATIONS. PURPOSE
TO NEEDLE SPAIN TO DISCOURAGE ITS TRADE WITH CUBA. REQUEST DIR,
MADE COMMENTS.

SECRET
CFN 7921 7852 TSIRIMOKOS 12 MARKOS ECONOMIDES GALBE 2A EMSCROLL
NG PROMISES 7993 NOT INDICATE P N G 2B 2 AMWORD-3 MANUEL ALABART
AMB LEAK-, ILA LOPEZ DEL BARRIO ILA C LA AMHIM
BT

SECRET
SECRET 1615002

WAVE MADR INFO DIR CITE ATHE 8018, (BACHMAN ACTING)
THURSFORM

REF A. WAVE 7819 (4/2365)
B. ATHE 6219, 28 MAY 65

1. ATHE AFTERNOON PAPER VRADYNI IN FRONT-PAGE ARTICLE 16143
15 DEC HEADLINED AMSCROLL REF A REQUEST TO FONMIN TSIRIMOKOS FOR
DEPORTATION GALBE. PRINTED GIST AMSCROLL LETTER.

2. THUPRISE/12 (T/2) WILL NOW APPROACH TSIRIMOKOS UPON
LATTER'S RETURN FROM U.S. AND CALL ATTENTION TO T/12'S 27 MAY
INTEPELLATION IN PAPLIAMENT PER REF B. T/12 WILL ASK WHAT
ACTION TSIRIMOKOS INTENDS TAKE. IF TSIRIMOKOS ANSWER UNSATIS-
FACTORY, T/12 WILL ADVISE HIM OF INTENT RE-RAISE ISSUE FROM
FLOOR PAPLIAMENT. WILL KEEP ADDEES ADVISED OF T/12 PROGRESS.

3. AIRMAILING CLIPS AND TRANSLATION TO WAVE AND HGS.

4. NO INDEX.

SECRET

CFN

: 8018 7819 6219 28 65 VRADYNI 15 DEC REF A TSIRIMOKOS GALBE
THUPRISE/12 (T/2) 15 SEPT 65 T/12 PROGRESS NO INDEX
SECRET

TOKYO INFO DIR CARA CITE WAVE 7892
RYBAT TYPIC ZPWAQON

REF WAVE 7843 (NOT SENT CARA) (W/2663)*

1. AMFRAME-1 (IDEN) BOOKED ALITALIA FLIGHT 772 DEPARTING CAPACAS-18 DEC TO ARRIVE TOKY 2200 ON 19 DEC. DELAY DUE JAPANESE EMBASSY REFUSAL ACCEPT PRESENT DOCUMENTATION THUS NECESSITATING HIS OBTAINING VENEZUELAN PASSPORT.

2. AMFRAME-1 IS CHIEF ECONOMIC WARFARE SECTION AMSROLL AND HAS COLLABORATED WITH STATION AND AMWASP-1 ON JAPAN/CUBA TRADE OPS. HE PREPARED DISCUSS WITH OSCAR OR OTHER C/O HOW AMSROLL MIGHT BETTER SUPPORT EFFORT REDUCE THIS TRADE.

3. FOR DIR: WAVE WILL T.A. CHARGES THIS OP TO YOPOLL/41.

4. FOR CARA: AMFRAME-1 ENROUTE TOKY ON SENSITIVE OP. ORIGINATING TRIP CARACAS TO HIDE WAVE AREA ORIGIN. AS NOTED ABOVE IT NECESSARY FOR HIM OBTAIN VENEZUELAN DOCUMENTATION WHICH HE ARRANGING THROUGH FATHER AND UNCLE WHO VENEZUELAN CITIZENS AND SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

SECRET
CFN

7892 7843 NOT SENT AMFRAME-1 ALITALIA 772 CARACAS 18 TOKY 2200 19
JAPANESE AMFRAME-1 AMSROLL AMVASP-1 JAPAN/CUBA OPS OSCAR C/O
AMSCROLL T.A. OP YOPOLL/41-1 OP VENEZUELAN.

BT

SECRET
SECRET 14234BZ
TOKY INFO DIR CARA CITE WAVE 7893
PYBAT TYPIC ZMWAGON
REF WAVE 7892 (WY22N)
IDEN: RAFAEL RIVAS VAZQUEZ
SECRET
CFN 7893 7892 RAFAEL RIVAS VAZQUEZ
GT

N

NNN
SECRET 1118312

DIR INFO ATHE MADR CITE WAVE 7853

TYPIC RHSPAWN THUNIFORM

REF: WAVE 7852 (N/2973)

IDEN A. DR. MARIO SEIGLIE MONTORO, UR SECRETARY GENERAL.

IDEN B. DR. FERNANDO FERNANDEZ CAVADA, UR SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

IDEN C. DR. JOSE R ALVAREZ DIAZ, RECOGNIZED ECONOMIST,
FORMER CUBAN CABINET MINISTER (OF HACIENDA).

SECRET

CFN 7853 7852 A DR MARIO SEIGLIE MONTORO UR B DR FERNANDO FERNANDEZ CAVADA UR DR JOSE R ALVAREZ DIAZ HACIENDA

BT

NNN

SECRET
SECRET

11 Dec 65 12999

DIP INFO TOKY MADR CARA CITE WAVE 7859

TYPIC MHSPAWN

REF: A. WAVE 7685 (\0077753 \00705876)
B. WAVE 7631 (NOT SENT TOKY)

1. HEADLINE STORY 11 DEC DIARIO LAS AMERICAS FEATURED FRONT PAGE WAVE-INSPIRED AFP ARTICLE STATING JAPAN AND SPAIN TO BE PRINCIPAL TARGETS OF CONTINENT-WIDE BOYCOTT. ARTICLE REFERS TO BOYCOTT AGREEMENT BY PORTWORKERS OF US, CANADA AND PUERTO RICO AND TO EXPECTED INCREASE IN EFFECTIVENESS DUE TO ILA AND GLEASON SUPPORT.

2. IN ARTICLE, SPAIN CHARACTERIZED AS ONE OF MAJOR SUPPLIERS AND JAPAN AS PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF CUBAN FUNDS WHICH USED TO PROMOTE HEMISPHERIC SUEVERSION. FIGURES FOR JAPAN/CUBAN TRADE PROVIDED BY UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (UR). ARTICLE ALSO PROMINENTLY MENTIONS CORREA AND FORDC.

3. AIRMAILING CLIPS TO ADDRESSES.

SECRET

CFH 7859 7625 7631 NOT SENT 11 DIARIO LAS AMERICAS AFF US CANADA
SECRET 10 DEC 51

PRIORITY HAVE INFO DIR CITE TOKY 5725

RYBAT TYPIC ZRVAGON

REF: DIR 63721 \✓

1. PLEASE HAVE AMFRAME ONE COME TOKY TO ARRIVE 15 DECEMBER. PLEASE ADVISE AIRLINE AND FLIGHT. ASK AIRLINE RESERVE ROOM TOKYO HILTON HOTEL. HE WILL BE CONTACTED AT AIRPORT BY PERSON USING NAME OSCAR.

2. IF AIRPORT CONTACT ABORTS AMFRAME ONE SHOULD GO TO LOBBY OF TOKYO HILTON HOTEL AT 10 AM OR 10 PM WHERE HE WILL BE CONTACTED BY OSCAR.

3. PLEASE CABLE DESCRIPTION AMFRAME ONE.

4. ABOVE CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS REPLACE \✓ CONTACT CITED TOKY 5684.

SECRET

CFN: 5725 63721 / W OSCAR 10 AM 10 PM 5684

BT \✓ HAS CONCLUDED USING AMFRAME-1 TO ASSIST IN DEFECTION OPS

SECRET
SECRET 7514322

PRIORITY pap. save info mark city acta 77799

SYNDICATE TURKISH

REFS: A. "NAF 7703 (106/25)"
B. "NAF 7703 (178/1801)
C. "NAF 7703 (106/15)"

1. DESK B AND C CROSSED IN TRANSMISSION.

2. RE PARA A REF C, BELIEVE IT MAY BE HIGHLY

PROBABLY FOR A FOREIGN DELEGATION TO HAVE SAW SEND
DELEGATION FROM ANCROLL OR OTHER SUITABLE "GOVERN
GUIDED GROUP, POSSIBLY FROM NEW YORK, TO SEE DEPUTY
PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER ILIAS TSIRIMOKOS
WHO NOW IN NY FOR UN CYPRUS DEBATE. GROUP CAN USE PARA JA
REF G ARGUMENT AND OTHERS AGAINST GHADE TO DEMAND GHADE'S
EXPISION FROM GREECE, BREAKING CUBA-GREEK DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS, ETC. ALTHOUGH WE HIGHLY DOUBT TSIRIMOKOS WILL
ACCEPT THEIR DEMANDS AT THIS TIME BECAUSE HIS FEAR OF
ALIENATE THE COOKE VOTE ON CYPRUS ISSUES, WE CAN EXPLOIT
ISSUE THRU KHEPAP ASSETS. ALSO, TSIRIMOKOS, KNOWN FOR
SECRET

HIS PERSONAL WIT AND SARCASM, MAY MAKE RELEASING STATEMENT SIMILAR TO PARA 1 REF A. FYI: TSIRIMOKOS
SCHEDULED DEPART US O/A 12 DEC. PLS ADVISE IF ACTION TAKEN.

3. NO INDEX.

SECRET

CFN 7970 7662 7793 7960 B C RE 4 C PSYCH AMSROLL, KUBARK NEW YORK
ILIAS TSIRIMOKOS NY UN CYPRUS NA REF C GALBE GALBE'S GREECE
CUNA-GREEK ETC TSIRIMOKOS UN COMMIE CYPRUS MH SPAWN TSIRIMOKOS
IREF A FYI TSIRIMOKOS US O/A 12 DEC ADVISE NO INDEX

BY

SECRET

MENTIONS PARA 2 ATHE 76(2 in 65/66) AY

MARKED 8 DEC.

Y V RYBAT
SECRET 10230Z

PRIORITY TOKY INFO ROUTINE DIR CITE WAVE 7843

ACTION

1. AMFRAME-1 DEPARTING FOR CARACAS 11 DEC. BRIEFED PER REF. WILL CABLE ETA WHEN CONFIRMED.

2. PER PARA 3 REF AMFRAME-1 APPROX FIVE FEET EIGHT AND HEAVY SET, COMPLEXION FAIR. THOUGH FLUENT IN ENGLISH, ACCENT DISCERNABLE. AT AIRPORT WILL BE CARRYING UNDER ARM CURRENT ISSUE NEW YORKER OR READING SAME IF CONTACT ATTEMPTED IN HOTEL LOBBY.

SECRET

CFN 7845 5725 CARACAS 11 DEC ETA 3 AMFRAME-1 ENGLISH NEW YORKER

REQUESTED AMFRAME-1 GONE TOKY 16 DEC.
SECRET 8809392

PRIORITY WAVE INFO DIR CIE TOKI 5654

TYPIC ZRVAGON

REF: WAVE 7755 (O 9/120)

ACTION 1 Dec 65 K 10108

1. HOTEL RESERVATION WILL BE MADE FOR AMFRAME/1 AT
   ROYAL HOTEL, JAPAN. AMFRAME/1 WILL BE CONTACTED
   AT HOTEL AFTER ARRIVAL BY PERSON USING NAME OSCAR.

2. ADVISE AMFRAME I'S ETA OSAKA.

SECRET

CFN: 5654 7755 AMFRAME/I OSCAR I'S ETA

BT

* Requested contact instruction plus
  Hotel by return cable in order
  pass AMFRAME/1 prior departure.

SECRET

NNNN

Canacas.
SECRET 0880472

PRIORITY TOKYO INFO DIS CITE WAWE 7755
NO RIGHT ACTION

TYPIC ZVRHVRH

REF:
A. TOKY 5603 (IN 09090)
B. WAWE 7714 (IN 08803)

1. AMFRAME-1 IS AN SCROLL (DEN) OFFICIAL IN CHARGE THEIR ECONOMIC WARFARE PROGRAM MEETS REF A REQUIREMENTS.

SUBJECT TO AVAILABILITY VISA AMFRAME-1 WILL BE PREPARED DEPART FROM JAPAN 13 DEC OR OTHER DATE AS DESIRED BY TOKYO. IF ADDRESSES CONCUR PRESENT PLAN IS FOR AMFRAME-1 DEPART WAWE AREA FOR CARACAS 9 TO 10 DEC WHERE HE WILL OBTAIN JAPANESE VISA, TICKETS, AND DOCUMENTATION ATTENDING TO VENEZUELAN BUSINESS CONNECTIONS.

WILL NOT DEPART CARACAS FOR TOKYO UNTIL WAWE 80 INSTRUCT.

2. REQUEST CONTACT INSTRUCTION PLUS HOTEL BY RETURN CABLE IN ORDER PASS AMFRAME-1 PRIOR DEPARTURE FOR CARACAS.

SECRET CONCERN AMFRAME-1 JAPAN WAWE LEGITIMATE DEN SCROLL (DEN) 7755 5603 7714 AMFRAME-1 AMSCROLL A AMFRAME-1 JAPAN 13 DEC AMFRAME-1 CARACAS 9 TO 10 DEC JAPANESE VENEZUELAN HOS DEPART AMFRAME-1
SECRET 038472

PRIORITY TOKYO INFO DIR CITE WAVE 7756

NO NIGHT ACTION

TYPIC ERWAGON

REF: WAVE 7755 (IN9926)

IDENT: MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (UR)

SECRET

CMF: 7756 7755 MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA UR

BT

SECRET

Chavez

30
SECRET 091530Z
WAVE INFO MADR DIR CITE ATHE 7960
TYPIC MHSPAWN THUNIFORM
REF WAVE 7226 (AF4157)

1. 1 DEC GREEK DAILY VRADYNI IN FRONT PAGE
ARTICLE ENTITLED "GREEK COMPANIES JOIN STRUGGLE
AGAINST THE REDS" PUBLISHES LETTER FROM "DR.
RAF. RIVAS VAZQUEZ OF ANTI-CASTRO ORGANIZATION
MOVIMENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (MUR)" (SIC).
LEITEN PRAISES AND THANKS UNIDENTIFIED GREEK
FIRMS, SHIPPING COMPANIES, AND PEOPLE WHO
TRADITIONALLY DEFEND DEMOCRATIC AND ANTI-COMMIE
CAUSES FOR PROVIDING VALUABLE INFO TO MUR
"ECONOMIC RESEARCH OFFICE." ALSO, "VERY FEW",
SUCH AS TSAVLIRIS SHIPPING CO., DISHONOR GREEK
FLAG AND PEOPLES RE ACTIVITIES TOWARDS CUBA.

2. 3 DEC COMMIE FRONT DAILY AVGI IN FRONT
PAGE EDITORIAL "SPIES PRAISED IN PUBLIC" ANSWERS
ABOVE VRADYNI ARTICLE. ACCUSES "COOPERATING"
GREEK FIRMS OF SPYING AGAINST CUBA, CALLS MUB
"UNIL SPY RING SERVING IMPERIALISTS PLANS
AGAINST CUBA," CHASTISES MUB FOR NOT NAMING
GREEK FIRMS, EIC, SPYING AGAINST CUBA, AND STATES
CIA'S CUBAN AGENTS DOING THEIR WORK. EDITORIAL
ENDS AS FULL SPYING AGAINST THOSE WHO OPEN
THEIR COUNTRY AND PORTS TO GREEK SHIPS IS COMPLETELY
IN CONTRAST WITH MORALS OF GREEK MERCHANT NAVY
AND OPPOSED TO GREEK NATIONAL TRADITIONS."

3. PARA 1 ABOVE PLAYED BY OUR UNILATERAL
MINISPAWN AGENT THANIFORMS5 WHO WILL ANSWER AVG.
EDITORIAL IN FULL VEIN:
A. FAIL COMMIE ORGAN AVG DEFENDS
COMMIE CUBA ETC BECAUSE OF COMMUNISM'S
DESIRE MAINTAIN MINORITY DICTATORSHIP (WITNESS
RECENT EXODUS FROM CUBA). HOWEVER, AVG HAS
FAILED MISERABLY IN DEFENDING GREEK HONOR,
TRADITIONAL DEMOCRACY ETC BY FAILING TO ASK FOR
RECALL GAGLE WHO VIOLATED MOST ELEMENTARY BASES
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN DIGNITY, FREE SPEECH, ETC.
B. AVGI HAS CRITICIZED "IMPERIALISTS PLANS AGAINST CUBA" SINCE BEGINNING CASTRO REGIME, ESPECIALLY DURING PREZIDENT KENNEDY'S TENURE IN OFFICE. YET, ON 21 NOV 65 AVGI PRAISED KENNEDY, STATED WARREN COMMISSION REPORT UNTURE USING OBVIOUSLY FALSE PICTURES AND STATEMENTS, AND CLAIMED KENNEDY KILLED BY "UNDEMOCRATIC DARK FORCES." HOW CAN AVGI TAKE THIS STAND UNLESS IT IS ACTING ON ORDERS FROM MOSCOW OR POSSIBLY PEKING TO DISCREDIT U.S.?

4. HAVE NO OBJECTION REPLAY PARA 1 AND 2 ITEMS BUT SUGGEST WAVE, THROUGH AMSCROLL OR OTHER SUITABLE ASSETS, REPLY TO AVGI EDITORIAL VIA LETTER TO ENTIRE GREEK PRESS (PER EKAA 13886) USING PARA 3 ABOVE ARGUMENTS PLUS ANY OTHER DEROG INFO PERTAINING TO THIS THEME, PARTICULARLY USE OF CASTRO BY INTL COMMUNISM TO SPREAD GERM OF TOTALITARIAN COMMUNISM TO OTHER DEMOCRATIC LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES ETC.

5. AIRMAILING ABOVE CLIPS WITH TRANSLATIONS.

SECRET
PLS ADVISE WHETHER PARA 4 ACTION AGREEABLE TO ALL.
IF SO, REQUEST DIR FORWARD 21 NOV AVG1 MATERIALS
TO WAVE AND MADR ASAP.

6. TOP WAVE HAS REF ACTION OCCURRED?

7. NO INDEX.

SECRET WAVE PREV 26 PAGE
CFY 750 7228 1 VPADYN DR RAF RIVAS VAZQEZ ANTI-CASTRO
MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (MUR) SEC MUR ISAVLIRIS RE CUBA
3 DEC AVG1 VPADYN MUR NOF NAMING ETC CIA'S 1 MHSPAWN THUNIFORM/15
AVG1 AVG1 FET AVG1 ETC GALBE ETC AVG1 CASTRO KENNEDY'S 21 65
AVG1 WAPEN AVG1 MOSCOW PEKING U.S. NO OBJECTION 12 AMSCROLL
AVG1 EKAA 07386 3 LATIN AMERICAN 4 21 AVG1 NO INDEX

BT
SECRET TO 654Z

PRIORITY HAVE INFO DIR CITE TOKY 5663

REFS: A. TOKY 5639 (IN 07142)
B. HAVE 7714 (08903) *

CONFIR AMFRAME ONE IF HE CUBAN AND CAN LEGITIMATELY REPRESENT
SELF AS OFFICIAL CUBAN EXILE ORGANIZATION. IF POSSIBLE WOULD PREFER
REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE. IF AMFRAME ONE MEETS THESE NEEDS SUGGEST
HE MAKE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS DEPART FOR JAPAN 13 DEC. PLS
AWAIT FURTHER WORD FROM US HOWEVER BEFORE DISPATCHING HIM.

SECRET

CFN: 5663 5639 7714 AMFRAME 13 DEC PLS

BT

SECRET

STATION MONT
RESPONSIVE TO
KIN WALK DIRECTION.
MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL LINES: 24

TO: JMWAVE TOKYO

FROM: DIRECT

CONF: ]

INFO: VR FILE BID COPY ADD P C/F/S

DATE: 8 DEC 65 17:49

SUBJECT: TYPIC ZRAGON

REF: WAVE 7714 (IN 08803)

NOTE:

1. HQS CONCURS USE AMFRAME-1.

2. FOR TOKYO STATION MAY WISH CONSIDER USE ADDITIONAL CASE OFFICER

WITH PAKISTAN BACKGROUND SUCH AS HENRY P. REBOTTI.

END OF MESSAGE

- V.J2 proposes sending AMFRAME-1 to assist TOKYO in defection ops of Cuban serum.

WILLIAM V. BORE
C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE: 6-19

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
Third, December 7, 1965

Mr. Ioannis Theodorakis
Foreign Minister
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Athens, Greece

Excellency:

In the past, we have addressed several letters to Greek Government officials concerning the case of José Luis Calbo, the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires in Athens. We have informed the representatives of the Greek people of Calbo's notorious background as a gangster and Communist agitator, a background to which he lived up recently when he shot at a Greek bus driver at Thessaloniki over a trivial traffic argument and, instead, shot his wife.

We are, and proudly so, relentless enemies of the régime that Calbo represents in Greece. However, when we regret the indignity wrought over the Greek nation by its Government's failure to expel him, we are not acting out of political passion. Surely, you will agree that when the head of a diplomatic mission publicly fires his gun on the citizens of the country where he is accredited, he is acting with utmost disrespect for the laws of that country and, hence, for the country as a whole. The least he deserves is to be declared "persona non grata", and that only if the offended government is so benevolent as to overlook the fact that the insult is really coming from the régime that selects the criminals inasmuch as its representatives abroad.

We, as Mediterraneans of Mediterranean origin, have always felt somewhat akin to the Greek people, when we also admire as the direct descendants of the ancient fathers of Civilization. Therefore, we were honestly saddened to see that the past government of your country placed the personal friendship of two gangsters -Calbo and Andreas Papandreu- above the age-old dignity of the Hellenic nation. And we are saddened even more when those actions are described in detail in the press.

On the other hand, our insistence on the subject, earnest though it may be, from the protocol standpoint, is definitely inspired by the friendliest sentiment, while Calbo's failure to observe the most elementary diplomatic rules has been evident in a most hostile-and dangerous—manner.

Therefore, we are confident that you will excuse us if we provide further evidence of the Castro régime's and Calbo's personal contempt for free nations such as Greece. Immediately following is a summary of the 'dossier' that we have compiled on José Luis Calbo.
He is a naturalised Cuban of Spanish origin. He left Spain because of the Spanish Civil War where he was organiser and Prosecutor of the Red Popular Tribunals.

He moved to Havana, Cuba in 1941 and worked on several newspapers and radio stations. He has always been outstanding for his violence and political scandals in favor of the Communists and lost several jobs due to his explosive, violent nature. He was named Professor of Penal Law in the University of Oriente in 1947, and became associated with a group known as "The Communist professors of the Santiago University".

The Castro brothers, Fidel and Raúl, began the final phase of their revolt in 1957 from the Sierra Maestra mountains. During this time, and from his home in Santiago de Cuba, Galbo was in clandestine contact with the revolt. His home was an essential link in the communication channel with the low-lands. During this period Wilma Engin (Raúl Castro's feministically oriented wife) and even Raúl himself were secret visitors to Galbo's home.

And what was Galbo's reward for all of this support? Immediately after Castro occupied Havana (January 1, 1959) Galbo was named Havana's Director of Prisons—an office training ground for the future diplomat. Next, Galbo was named Agroca's Cultural (Cultural Attaché) in the Cuban Embassy to Rome and from there to his present position in Athens.

Galbo is a known schizophrenic and there is a history of mental disorder in his family. His brother, Pascual, committed suicide. His mother, who died in Cuba in 1958, was insane. Her brother, a former Canon of the Cathedral de la Seo de Zaragoza, also was insane.

On the point that concerns Galbo's role in the organisation and functioning of the Communist "Popular" Courts during the Spanish Civil War, it is interesting to note that his name is listed in the "Crusas Generales" (General Cause), the Spanish Government's mass indictment of the most outstanding Red perpetrators of atrocities during the conflict. For the same reason, Galbo is among the few Spanish exiles who have been forever banned from his homeland by the authorities.

Yet, in a characteristic display of nerve, the Castro government last February issued a special diplomatic passport to Galbo so that this former undesirable Spanish citizen could enter the country that had banned him and attend a conference of Cuban Heads of Diplomatic Missions that met in Madrid.
Another Castroite astray in a Western European nation in which Colbe was instrumental!

Lastly, we wish to call your attention on the fact that the more decent and stable of Cuba’s diplomatic representatives have shown that they cannot stand Castro’s mockery of diplomacy and international law.

As examples, we can cite the very recent defections of José Luis García Padrón, Cuban Ambassador to Great Britain; Alberto Alcántara Villar, Second Counselor of the Cuban Embassy in France; Luis Alvarez de la Campa, Second Counselor of the Cuban Embassy in Spain; and Alberto Cabrera Infante, Second Attaché at the Cuban Embassy in Spain.

Individually and collectively, the decent peoples of the world are disassociating themselves from the infamy of Castroism. Just now, the cream of Cuba’s own population — professional men, businessmen, intellectuals, etc. — is about to join the second part of the greatest mass exodus recorded by History since World War II.

Let us assume that the fact that a given régime is undemocratic and totalitarian is not reason enough for the nation with the oldest democratic tradition to break all ties with it. By any standard, Colbe’s preposterous behavior at Thermopylae is more than reason enough. And his continuing affronts to the Greek people give even more reason.

Confident that this time, our advice, which is the advice of reasoned affection, will not go unheard.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]
Mr. Mario Seigle, Acting Secretary General
SECRET 061882

DIR INFO TOKY CITE WAVE 7714
RYPAT TYPIC ZRMGON
REF TOKY 5639 (IN07192)

ACTION

1. WAVE PROPOSES AMFRAME-1 FOR REF OP IN VIEW ABILITY.
   JUDGMENT, FLUENCY ENGLISH AND IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY. HE HAS
   PARTICIPATED IN PREPARATION LEAFLETS SENT TOKY. DUE IMPORTANT
   FAMILY CONNECTIONS IN CARACAS (FATHER AND UNCLE ARE SENIOR
   VENEZUELAN GOVT EMPLOYEES) IT POSSIBLE AMFRAME-1 COULD OBTAIN
   VENEZUELAN PASSPORT AND AS MINIMUM SHOULD BE ABLE EASILY OBTAIN
JAPANESE VISA IN CARACAS THUS ON SURFACE ORIGINATING TRIP THERE.
WOULD TRAVEL AS TOURIST/BUSINESSMAN. THIS WOULD ADD TO
PLAUSIBILITY DENIAL REQUIREMENT DESCRIBED REF. IF ADDEES CONCUR WILL
NEED NAME HOTEL IN TOKY PLUS CONTACT PLAN.

2. FOR TOKYO: AMFRAME-1 (IDEN) IS STATION AGENT RESPONSIVE
TO KUBARK DIRECTION.

SECRET
CEN 7714 5639 AMFRAME-1 OP CARACAS -1 JAPANESE -1 KUBARK

REQUESTED APRIOPRIATE EXECUTIVE OF CUBAN EMBASSY
ORIGIN READY FOR PROMPT DISPATCH TO JAPAN TO CONDUCT
CONTACTS WITH DEPORTEE FROM SHIP.
SECRET 0122892

DIRECT WAVE 7627

TYPE: MNSPAWN AMWASP

REF: DIR 60778

PREFER JOURNAL REQUEST INTERVIEW THROUGH AMSROLL IN VIEW AMWASP-1

OVERT CONNECTION. LETTER SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO AMWASP-1 CARE OF

IDEN. AMWASP-1 AVAILABLE TO NEW YORK ANY TIME.

SECRET

CFN 7627 60778 AMSROLL AMWASP-1 -1 -1 NEW YORK

BY

SECRET

STATE JOURNAL OF COMMERCE HAS NO REPRESENTATIVE

WILL AREA AMWASP MUST TRAVEL NEW YORK
SECRET 012209Z

DIRECT WAVE 7628

TYPIC MHSPAWN ANWASP

REF: WAVE 7627 (W 05849)

IDENT: C/O DR. MARIO SIEGLIE MONTORO, SECRETARY GENERAL,
UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA
10 SE 9 ST
MIAMI, FLORIDA

SECRET

C/O 7628 7627 C/O DR. MARIO SIEGLIE MONTORO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA
10 SE 9 ST MIAMI FLORIDA

SECRET
SECRET

EFC-RST 262/252

INFO TOKYO
CITE WAVE 4:00

TYPIC MIVIPER ZRWAGON

PEPS:
A. DIR 60144
B. TOKY 55801
C. DIR 37771

1. PER REF A JAVE DECIDED AMSCROLL MOST LOGICAL ORG. IT NOW
PREPARING 200 SMALL XEROGRAPHED FOLDED HANDOUT UNDER ITS NAME
"MARINE ADDRESS". FTC NRT SAYS "MESSAGE TO OUR COMPATRIOUS
ACROSS THE SEA." INSIDE TWO PAGES SAY "YOUR SHIP WHEN REPAIRED
WILL SAIL FOR FRIGID AND ICHOSPIABLE WATERS OF NORTH KOREA
FOR MILITARY CARGO TO CARE TO NORTH VIETNAM. THESE ARE DANGEROUS
AND UNFRIENDLY WATERS AND NO MAN'S SAFETY CAN BE GUARANTEED HERE
WHAT WOULD YOU DO IF YOUR SHIP RAN AMOONG IN NORTH KOREA OR
HIT A MINE IN NORTH VIETNAM? WHAT TO DO? FOLLOW PATH YOUR
COUNTRYMEN. LEAVE WHILE YOU HAVE CHANCE. HOW TO DO THIS?"

PACK PAGE FOLLOWS LINE PARA

2. A REF B AND ENDS "IN THIS WAY
YOU WILL AVOID CERTAIN AND UNNECESSARY DANGER."

2. WILL CABLE WHEN HANDOUTS POUCHED. LETTERS (IN ENGLISH
REQUESTED PARA 2 B, REF B WILL BE READY FOR MAILING WEEK 2 NAT
WILL NOT MAIL UNTIL ADVISED BY TOKYO TO DO SO. HOWEVER, WILL POUCH
SECRET

CEN: 75-06 10144 5502 5797
HAMSORL ORG 200 NOT ADDRESS
IGLESIAS NORTH KOREA NORTH VIETNAM NO MAN'S A 2 A B ENGLISH
2 B 29 NOV NOT MAIL TOKY

SECRET
SECRET 152323Z

DIR INFO TOKY CITE WAVE 7263 (INGHURST ACTING)

MHOPER AMSROLL

REF: TOKYO 5400 (33257) *

AMWASP-1 NOW WORKING WITH AMSROLL TO PREPARE REF MATERIAL WHICH
WILL BE FORWARD ED ON AMSROLL LETTERHEAD TO REACH TOKY BY 15 DEC.
ANY ADDITIONAL INFO THAT MAY HAVE SHOULD BE POUCHED FOR INCLUSION
THIS PAPER.

SECRET * RE. MATERIAL ON JAP.-CUBA

TRADE

CFN 7263 INGHURST 5400 AMWASP-1 AMSROLL 15 DEC

BT

SECRET
As Headquarters is aware, JMWAVE is refuting on a con-
tinuing basis and via all appropriate assets commentaries
similar to that discussed in the reference. As for this
particular GOMEZ broadcast the Station prepared a guidance
for AMSROLL use, primarily its radio, the point of which
was that GOMEZ had become eligible for the "Foot 'n Mouth
Club" due his admission on 21 October that Camarioca was a
plebiscite and his statement on 22 October, no doubt as a
result of a prod from his Communist superiors that "I think
I made excessive concessions ..." explaining that the people
are really leaving due to economic reasons. We agree and
say that the economic reasons are to obtain three meals a
day, to be able to walk into a market and buy eggs and milk.
The guidance ends with this: "You may take your foot out of
your mouth now, GOMEZ".
SECRET 032222Z

DIR INFO ATHE MADR CITE WAVE 79C
CAT TYPIC MINISTRO THUNIFORM
REF A WAVE 6792 (NOT SENT MADR)
3 ATEH 7523 (NOT SENT MADR)
(79233)
(76239)

1. REF PARA 2 REF A AMBLEAK-1 HAS DEVELOPED FOLLOWING INFO FROM
IDENTITY A WHO RADIO SCRIPT WRITER FOR AMSGORB AND WHO FORMERLY
WORKED IN SPAIN ON SAME PAPER AS GALBE. GALBE BORN ZARAGOZA, SPAIN
OF PROMINENT AND WEALTHY PARENTS. MOTHER WAS INSANE AT TIME OF HER
DEATH IN 1954 IN CUBA. HER BROTHER WHO AT ONE TIME CANCELLO (CANCNIO)
OF THE CATHEDRAL DE LA SEO DE ZARAGOZA ALSO INSANE AT TIME MOTHER'S
DEATH. GALBE IS KNOWN TO HAVE INHERITED INSANITY TRAITS FROM
MATERNAL SIDE AND IS SCHIZOPHRENIC.

2. GALBE EDUCATED AS LAWYER. DURING SPANISH CIVIL WAR HE
ACTIVE IN CREATING "POPULAR COURTS" AND WAS PROSECUTOR (FISCAL DE
LOS TRIBUNALES POPULARES) OF THOSE OPPOSED TO SPANISH REPUBLIC,
BECAUSE FAMOUS DUE FEROCITY OF ATTACKS AGAINST DEFENDANTS. DUE THIS
AND HIS COMMIE ACTIVITIES AT THAT TIME NOW LISTED IN THE CAUSA
GENERAL REPEAT CAUSA GENERAL AND THEREFORE NOT PERMITTED RETURN
TO SPAIN.
6. After civil war Galde went France and married Frenchwoman. Both moved Havana where she prospered owning a beauty shop. He lived off family wealth and held jobs on a number of newspapers. Never stayed long any one job due explosive nature and actually fired from information repeated information. In early forties turned to radio work and in 1944 fired from radio station of Cuban Ministry of Education due violent attack Pope Pius XII. Circa 1952 Galde obtained job as professor of penal law at University of Oriente (in Santiago) where he associated with leftists. Began indoctrinating students in communism. Among attendees was Villa Espin (Raúl Roa's wife). Galde's Santiago home was relay center for messages to and from Fidel Castro then fighting in the Sierra Maestra.

4. In Jan 59 named prison director and thereafter cultural attache to Rome.

5. Identity B, a Cuban national who knew Galde during Cuba period confirmed para 2 statements and told Ambleak-1 that Galde participated in fake trials of anticommunists and as prosecutor always demanded death penalty. Identity B is an informant of AM-
SECRET

SECRET

SECRET
Chief of Station, JNWA

(subject)

AMSCROLL/Publication on Cuban Sugar Problems

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

1. We forward under separate cover subject publication which was recently sent to AMSCROLL mail recipients interested in economic material. In producing this study a particular effort was made to keep it objective and factual on the theory that in the case of sugar the facts speak for themselves and need only to be pulled together. We also believe that objective material similar to the attached should over a period of time enhance the reputation of the AMSCROLL economic section as a serious and objective outfit that seeks to discredit the Castro regime by publicizing the truth.

2. The Station would appreciate Headquarters' reaction to this publication. Additional copies are available should distribution via KMFORGET or other means be desired.

3. It may be of interest to report that a copy of the attached report has been mailed to Identity, currently in Geneva where he is representing his company at the sugar conference. This was done directly under the AMSCROLL economic section letterhead and via AMWORD-1's brother, an employee in the research department of Identity's company.

---

Philip G. ELMARD

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Attachments:
1. Publication, USC
2. Identity, USC

Distribution:

WH/C, w/att., USC

19-132-49

SECRET
ACTION REQUIRED: For use as Headquarters determines

REFERENCES:
A. WAVE-5942
B. DIR-45158

1. We forward by separate cover the article described in the references. It is the first item in the AMSROLL economic report which can and should be attributed to AMSROLL research. It may be of interest to record that the first paragraph of this item was developed from 0/27839-65 of 17 September as authorized by reference B. The second paragraph was developed from a lead obtained from 0/27842-65 of 22 September which sent us to two publications by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith. The last sentence of paragraph 3 was developed from information in the Wall Street Journal of 22 and 28 September.

2. The Station of course will be interested in any replay generated by Headquarters via AMPATRIN-1 or other asset.

Philip G. ELMARD

Attachment:
AMSCROLL Economic Intel Report, USC(no'd)

Distribution:
3-WH/C, w/att., USC
1.- Cuba continues desperate attempts sell sugar.- The Cuban sugar monopoly, CUBA-SUGAR, on September 6 concluded a sale of 5,000 tons of raw sugar for October 1965 delivery to the Iranian sugar organization. The origin of this sugar was hidden in that it was declared to have originated in the Caribbean, including Peru, except for Brazil. Market reports were correct in stating that the country of origin was in fact Cuba. The price agreed to was 18 pounds sterling per ton (C and F) less 5 shillings per ton to cover the expenses of the tenderer. This deal was engineered by Nestle of Dortmund, an organization also selling Cuban sugar to Jordan and which wishes to keep its name out of these sales.

Another interesting development in Cuba's sugar selling activities during the month of September was quoting sugar for future delivery at or under the London spot price on the day the offer was made. In other words, Cuba is offering sugar under the world market value.

Example of this were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date of Sale</th>
<th>Amount (in Sterling)</th>
<th>Market Price</th>
<th>Delivery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq/Ceylon</td>
<td>Sept 9</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Sept 11</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>15-15-0</td>
<td>22.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavia</td>
<td>Sept 7</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>18-2-0</td>
<td>21.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavia</td>
<td>Sept 12</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>18-0</td>
<td>21.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Sept 9</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>16-16-0</td>
<td>22.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Sept 9</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>18-10-0</td>
<td>21.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>18-15-0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is difficult to explain this curious behavior in terms other than Cuba’s desperate need for foreign exchange. These sales at these prices can only result in a net loss to Cuba due to Cuba's inefficient sugar production. This loss will be compounded should the present upward trend of world sugar futures continue (the New York price for world sugar on Caribbean port basis has gone from $1.60 on September 1 to $2.10 on September 27).

2.- Free World Shining door S12.- Twenty Western vessels called on Red Cuban ports during the past month of August. The trend continues downward: the August 1965 total was 24, and the one for August 1964 was 41, which means a decrease of 54% when August 1965 (29 vessels) is compared to August 1964.

Great Britain led the "maritime fifth columnists" with 11 vessels, followed by Lebanon, Greece, France, and Italy with 2 vessels each, and Cyprus with one.

Already 852 vessels are being kept out of the Red Cuba trade by its owners or operators. The most recent example is "Roderic" to Palatgot Salty" of Mariemont, Finland.
which firm withdrew 11,691-ton tanker, W.LUX, and the other vessels it owns and/or operates.


From a total of 17 vessels, TSAALIRIS has been using 12 in the Red Cuba trade. The 12 vessels are: FREE ENTERPRISE, FREE MERCHAND, HERI FORREST, HERI GATE, HERI GROVE, HERI GLADE, HERI HEATH, HERI HILL, HERI LANE, HERI MAID, JUDELL HILL, CLAIR, FREE TRADER, and FREE NAVIGATOR. TSAALIRIS operates its vessels under British, Lebanese, or Belgian flags, the last action being illegal according to a July 6, 1965 Haitian law. The FREE NAVIGATOR has changed its name seven times. The NEH HEATH has delivered two shipments of Cuban sugar to Japan, which have not been accepted by Japanese refineries, because stain and rust from vessel's hold has spoiled cargo. In mid-August the Lebanese 7,260 ton SAN APRILON had arrived in the United Kingdom with 1,600 tons of Cuban sugar spoiled by sea water.

TSAALIRIS' vessels have made 50 trips to Red Cuba during the last two years.

4. Cuban Management Boycott Committee receives support. - Reports reaching this bureau indicate that the Cuban Management Boycott Committee has already received several letters support from Free World Chambers of Commerce. Details are expected to be known shortly.

5. Free World dockworkers' boycott to receive boost. - The announcement of a Continental Dockworkers Congress to be held in Venezuela during the first two weeks of October confirm last month's report that an increase in boycott activities against vessels flying the flags of countries still trading with Communist Cuba.

6. Japanese Trade Mission gets "chilly" reception in Latin America due to Red Cuba deal. - A Japanese Trade Mission, headed by Mr. Kazue Kitagawa, President of "Sumitomo Electrical Industries" came under fire while touring Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and Peru. Latin Americans brought up matter that Japan was indirectly financing subversion by providing Castro with an average of $1 million dollars a month for the last 4 years. Japanese were told to choose between the Red Cuban market and the Latin American market.


7. Cuban exiles block Castro's attempt to sell "treasure". - Cuban exile Committee for the Recovery of the artistic and Cultural Heritage of their country was able to block Castro's attempt to sell art works and raise $2 million dollars. Cuban exiles
inspected 104 cases containing art treasures during August 23, 24, and 25, in Milan, Italy, identifying 45 pieces as their own.

Although 103 cases were only worth US$16,000, the contents of case #107 were said to be worth US$600,000. The first 103 cases delivered to Castro's "partner" Mahmoud Mowlasadeh, contained religious and funeral pieces, but case #107, forwarded from Switzerland, contained solid gold and silver objects.

Italian Customs have impounded Castro's "treasure".

8. - Castro's missions abroad "shaky" while rumors plague Island. - After the "defections" of Luis Ricardo Alonso - ambassador to England - , Gilberto R. Alemany - Trade Counsellor in Japan - , and several members of the Cuban "Music Hall" playing in Paris, the regime recalled its Ambassador to Prague, Armando Flores Ibarra, and the following members of the Cuban Embassy in London: Maria Fernandez, Osmani Martinez Vasquez, Moises Dias, Mario Garcia, and Armando Lobeto.

Meanwhile, different rumors plagued Cuba (many of them stemming from official statements): attempts on Castro's life, internal dissonance resulting from the "ultimatum" given to militiamen to return weapons; new boatloads of Cuban refugees arriving to Floridian shores; and Security Police Chief Valdes' statements zeroing-in against "terrorism, sabotage, and resistance".


Sources: The above information has been obtained from reliable sources, both from Cuba and the Free World. For further details related to the above items please address your correspondence to:

Economic Research Bureau
UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA
10 S.E. 9th Street
Miami, Fla., U.S.A.

Miami, October 1st., 1965.-
ACTION REQUIRED: Request comment

We attach herewith a reproduction of an article from the Caracas newspaper El Universal of 10 September describing the organization of a committee of European shippers to fight the discrimination these shippers fancied they suffer in Latin America. We are curious why such a group should be organized and to what purpose. Could this, for example, be a reaction to the efforts to boycott ships that trade with Cuba? The Station will appreciate Headquarters' comment if it appears that this group may become important and if it is or will be concerned with attempts to influence shipping to Cuba.

Philip G. Elmand

Attachment:
Newspaper article, USC

Distribution:
3- WH/C, w/att., USC
2- COS, Caracas, w/att., USC
2- C/WH, w/o/att.
Armadores Europeos Constituyen Comité Contra Discriminaciones que les Hacen en Latinoamérica

EL UNIVERSAL 18/10/61

[Signature]
MEMORANDUM

TO:     Mr. Andrew C. McElhaney
        Inter-American Representative
        AFL-CIO
        Washington, D.C.

FROM:  Dr. Infanz Rivero-Vázquez
        Secretary for Economic and
        Professional Affaires,
        Unidad Revolucionaria,
        Miami, Fla., U.S.A.

REF:    CONSIDERATIONS OF THE JAPAN-
        CUBA TRADE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
        THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA.

I. - INTRODUCTION.

The Japanese People, its businessmen, and its government have been able to
Favor Japan: occupy a leading place among the industrial countries of the Free World.
In 1954, Japan was the leader in Free World shipbuilding, contributing 40% of the
Tonnage; in the electronic field, Japan came in second; in steel production and
Chemicals, Japan was able to occupy third place; and in automobile production, Ja-
pan was fourth, with 1.7 million vehicles produced.

The free-loving and democratic-oriented Cuban People are sympathetic with this
effort the Japanese People are making; an effort which is well known and admired
throughout the whole world. At the same time, the free-loving and democratic-orien-
ted Cuban People—the ones within Cuba, and the ones living in exile—are aston-
sioned to watch Japan very much involved in trade relations with Communist Cuba, al-
though Japan is aware that by so doing it is directly aiding a tyranny, and at the
same time, providing this regime with the necessary funds to subvert its neighbors
throughout Latin America.

It should be pointed out that Japan, based on its concern for human rights
would very well consider that its present trade relations with Communist Cuba are
completely negative, but this is not the only reason. Japan must be aware that—
its trade relations with Communist Cuba will eventually, in a very near future,
jeopardize Japan's trade relations with Latin America, and this is already begin-
ing to happen.

II. - JAPAN-COMMUNIST CUBA TRADE RELATIONS.

A.- Trade Balance.

Japan has always had a deficit in its trade balance with Cuba, i.e., not
only in its present trade relations, but also during its trade prior to the estab-
ishment of the Castro-Communist regime.
B.- Japan provides Castro of hard currency.

It is estimated that Japan provides Castro with 30% of its hard currency, due to the previously mentioned fact of a deficit in its trade balance with Cuba. The hard currency has averaged during the last four years the amount of US$ 48 million a month, in the following manner (estimates):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (in US$ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: US$ 48 million.

The hard currency is used by Castro for two things:

1. Finance subversive activities throughout Latin America.

2. Pay short term credits in European markets, thus remaining in business with countries other than Japan.

C.- Japan is leading buyer of Cuban sugar.

Japan, together with Spain and Morocco, is one of the three leading Third World buyers of Cuban sugar, although Japan is the country that has become Castro's main source of foreign exchange.

1. Cuban sugar purchased:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (in million tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>397.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>210.272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>325.539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>522.277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>163.162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>328.609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>500,000 (estimate)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Japanese firms involved:

The leading buyers of Cuban sugar are:

- Imai & Co., Ltd.
- Toyo Hanke Kaisha, Ltd.
- Kameyama & Co., Ltd.
- Kojii Trading Co., Ltd.
- Coara Trading Co., Ltd.
- Notski & Co., Ltd.
- Sumitomo
- Nichiman Co., Ltd.
D. Other trade operations.

Besides the said sugar purchases, Japan is very active in its trade relations with Communist Cuba; trade relations that totaled US$ 87 million for 1964, which represented an increase of 22% over 1963.

Just to mention a few examples, the names of some of the other Japanese firms actively involved in trade operations with Communist Cuba follow:

- Hitachi through its “Dunay”, the Toho Bussan Kaisha.
- C. Ichih through its “Dunay” the Kyodo Trading Co., Ltd.
- CT Electric: until recently through Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha’s “Dunay”, the Moira Trading.
- Toyo Rayon
- Hitachi
- Yawata Iron
- Toyo Kenka Kaisha: through the “Dunay” Aho Trading Co., Ltd.

III. JAPAN-LATIN AMERICA RELATIONS.

A. Japan’s economic and trade interests in Latin America.

1. Japan has 72% of its foreign investment placed in Latin America.

2. Proof of Japan’s increasing interest in Latin America has been the visit of two Japanese Trade Missions to this Hemisphere in less than one year — (March and September 1963).

3. Japan has a deficit in its trade balance with Latin America, and although the trade volume with Latin America amounted to US$ 433.4 million for the period January-July 1964, Japan lost US$ 174.8 million for mentioned period due to the deficit in its trade balance.

Jan-Jul. 1964: Japan exports: US$ 179.3 million
Jan-Jul. 1963: Japan imports: US$ 354.1 million
Jan-Jul. 1964: Deficit for Japan in its trade balance: US$ 174.8 million

4. Breaking down Japan’s trade balance with each Latin American country the results are the following:

a. Favorable trade balances: 8
   - Bolivia
   - Brazil
   - Colombia
   - Costa Rica
   - Dominican Republic
   - Honduras
   - Panama
   - Venezuela
b. - Unfavorable trade balances: 12

Argentina
Chile
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Haiti
Mexico
Nicaragua
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay

5. - The economic analyst has to conclude that the deficit in its overall trade balance plus the importance of Latin America with regards to Japan's foreign investment will make Japan increase its interest in this Hemisphere.

B. - Consequences of the Japan-Communist Cuba trade throughout Latin America.

The consequences of the Japan-Communist Cuba trade are beginning to be felt throughout Latin America, due to maintained "agite-prop" and subversive activities by the Castro regime, financed, partially, with foreign exchange resulting from its trade with Japan.

A highly illustrative example is the case of Venezuela.

1. - Venezuela: Trade Relations with Japan and Communist attacks.

a. - Japan was able to obtain US$ 133.5 million for the period 1962-1963 from its favorable trade balance with Venezuela. The favorable result in the trade balance for the Jan-Jul 1964 period totaled US$ 12.4 million.

Recently, C. ITOH and HITACHI closed important agreements with the Venezuelan Phone Co., and C. ITOH was able to get an important contract with "Corporation Venezolana de Petróleo".

b. - On the other hand, Venezuela is considered by all experts as a price target of Communism. The important arms cache discovered in Paraguay towards the end of 1963, prompt the Venezuelan government to accuse the Castro-Communist regime during the IX Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Americas, on July 26, 1964. Since this incident, numerous subversive activities have caused great losses to both the People and the government of Venezuela, and to foreign firms as well.

Less than a month ago, another important arms cache was discovered in Los Teques, Miranda State; and once more the hand of Castro-Communism was traced and found.

c. - Then, when the situation is fully analyzed, it is a fact that -- Venezuelan hard currency goes to Japan, and from there it goes to Castro, in order
to aid terrorism against the Venezuelan People, the democratic government, its businessmen, and even Japanese interests in that country. Isn't this a complete logic operation?

2.- The Organization of American States (OAS).

On July 26, 1964, the OAS, during the IX Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Americas, held in Washington, D.C., condemned the Castro-Communist regime and requested from its member-countries, and from all free world countries outside the Hemisphere, to cease diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba.

3.- The Inter-American Workers Organization (CIT).

During its VI Continental Congress, held in Mexico City, on February 6, 1965, recommended the maritime boycott which was already in progress under the leadership of the Venezuelan dockworkers.

Recently, after 17 vessels have suffered the boycott, a statement made by international labor leaders during the IV Congress of Venezuelan Dockworkers, held in Caracas from October 9 to October 13, 1965, reaffirmed the boycott. Japanese vessels have been boycotted due to this defensive measure of the workers of this Hemisphere.

4.- The Management Boycott.

The Chamber of Commerce of the Americas, during its XV Annual Convention held in Miami, Fla., U.S.A., adopted a resolution on June 16, 1965, along the same lines of the OAS and CIT recommendations. Since then, a Management Boycott Committee has been formed, and already about three dozens of Latin American Chambers of commerce support this campaign.

5.- Public Opinion.

The Japanese Trade Mission that toured Latin America left behind the following reaction:


Article "Japan and Latin America" by Mircea Hudeșcu, published by "Diario de Notícias", on September 9, 1965.

c.- Peru: Congressman Ricarda Tocachi Bunites pointed out Japan's attitude, due to its trade relations with Communist Cuba during a speech made in Congress on September 1st, 1965. Congressman Tocachi's statements received ample coverage in the local press and were object of an "Agence France Presse" wire.

d.- Chile: The leading "El Mercurio" newspaper devoted one of its editorial articles during September 1965 to point out the same thing.
C.- Colombia: Mr. José R. Morcado, President of the Confederation of Colombian Workers (CTC) delivered a memorandum to His Excellency the Japanese Ambassador to Colombia, dated October 29, 1965 on the same subject.

An increase of this reaction may be expected.

IV.- CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS.

A.- Conclusions:

1.- Japan is presently aiding Castro-Communism.

2.- Japan is highly dependent on Latin America in order to achieve further economic prosperity.

3.- The Japan-Communist Cuba trade and the Japan-Latin America trade are in contradiction.

4.- Japan may suffer considerable losses in its Latin American markets if trade relations with Communist Cuba continue.

B.- Suggestions:

1.- The benefits derived from Cuban sugar purchases are no longer available to Japan, because, due to the drop of prices in the World Sugar Market, Castro cannot continue to give firms privileges that resulted of high prices, with enough margin to maneuver and still receive benefits. After prices hitting a post-World War II low, Castro has no margin for those operations.

2.- Japan could very well substitute its purchases of Cuban sugar by increasing its purchases to Taiwan and Australia, and even better, to Latin American countries like Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Peru, as it used to do previously to the concentration of dealings with Castro-Communists. Purchasing more sugar from democratic Latin America would improve Japan's image and at the same time it would eliminate its present trade dangers due to its dealings with Cuba.


* Copy of Memorandum sent to all Japanese Ambassadors to Latin America attending November-meeting in Tokyo.
TO: JMWAVE CARACAS
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH/C  INFO: VR  FILE:  RID COPY: 1/2  CT: CA  F: 60  WH: F1

DATE: 1 OCT 65

SECRET

FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-58

4 OCT 65 15 34 E

TO: WAVE CARA

REF: WAVE 6207 (IN 62333)*

1. NO OBJECTION PLANS OUTLINED PARA 2A REF.

2. AS BACKGROUND, RNLEPTONE (R) IN DIFFICULT POSITION VIS-A-VIS CORREA SINCE R UNABLE BROADEN U.S. BOYCOTT ON SHIPS IN CUBAN TRADE DUE CAVEATS IMPOSED ON APL-CIO BY ODACID. ADDITIONALLY, LACK OF FUNDING FROM APL-CIO AND CONFLICT OF SCHEDULE WILL PRECLUDE R ATTENDANCE AT REF CONVENTION.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C Comment: #Request approval send AMSCROLL and AMICE reps to boycott convention.

DC/WH/C/CA - 

WH/C/MO - 

WH/3 - 

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
ACTION REQUIRED: For Athens to determine

REFERENCE: WAVE-5769 (15 September 1965)

1. We attach under separate cover a copy of the press release on Joso Luis Calbo that the reference indicated would be forthcoming. Also attached is a list of the newspapers and other organizations and individuals that were mailed a copy of the release. The so-called "Black List Firms" are those Greek firms that according to ANSCHROLL have had or do have commercial contact with Cuba. The letters that were mailed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and to the Home Minister were, of course, originals and these two gentlemen were not provided with a copy of the press release itself.

2. WAVZ is anxious to keep the Calbo pot boiling and we welcome any further suggestions to this end.

PHILIP G. ELMARD
press release

U.S. LETTER TO GREEK GOVERNMENT ONCE AGAIN GALBE CUSTER

Cases of real diplomat Alemany and Alonso cited as contract to preposterous behavior of the Castro Galbe...

Here is text of letter sent to the Foreign Affairs and Interior Ministers of Greece:

Excellency:

"You may recall that, in mid-May this year, the Communist Cuban -- Charge d'Affaires in Athens, Jose Luis Galbe, was the object of world attention after he shot a Greek bus driver over a trivial traffic argument near the town of Thermopylae. Newspapers throughout the world carried the story and it would not be exaggerated to label the incident as an international scandal -one which may be said to have damaged Hellenic dignity to the same extent to which the Castro regime ignores it by accrediting gangsters such as Galbe as its diplomatic representatives before the Greek people."

"On that occasion, we wrote the Greek government calling their attention to the need to save the honor of Greece by severing all ties -- diplomatic and commercial-- with the Red government of Cuba. At that time, we warned that the gangster Galbe was typical of the new promotion of Red Cuban "diplomats"--mostly undesirable Communists trained to perform tasks of espionage and agitation-- and substantiated our assertion with a quote from Odon Alvarez de la Campa, a defecting Cuban diplomat--who had charged Galbe by name during a press conference in Madrid."

"Today, two new defections from the Cuban Foreign Service prompt us to re-open the Galbe case. We refer to those of Maers, Gilberto R. Alemany Vilar, until recently, Trade Counselor to the Cuban Embassy in Tokyo, and Luis Ricardo Alonso Fernandez, until recently, Cuban Ambassador to Great Britain."

"Both former diplomats had always been regarded as competent, serious men even by us, the relentless opposers of the Castro-Communist tyranny. Before he took office as Cuban Ambassador to the United Kingdom in 1963, Luis R. Alonso Fernandez had also performed ambassadorial duties in Peru and Norway. A scholarly, well-mannered man, he is well remembered by all who knew him in his diplomatic office, even if they may have disapproved of the totalitarian regime that he represented. Eventually, he became disenchanted with Communism and publicly resigned his post in London only a few days ago. (In connection with Mr. Alonso's resignation, the Greek newspaper 'Tragyni', in its September 6 issue, wonders precisely why Red Cuban Ambassador Galbe has not been ousted yet)."

"Gilberto R. Alemany, an equally able and well-bred trade specialist, held his Counselor's position for three years in Tokyo. His recognition of the true nature of the Red Cuban government led him to defect secretly and become our own secret agent in Japan. Late last month, after fulfilling his dangerous mission, he made his feelings public in Miami."

"As you can see, those decent people, who are still active in Castro's diplomatic corps cannot stand it for a long time. These new defections show that the few that remain are abandoning the sinking ship to the "new wave" of Castroite diplomats --gangsters, spies and agitators in Galbe's fashion."

"But there is more: shortly after his defection, in an interview with a leading Miami newspaper, Mr. Alemany made statements that confirm our assertions to this respect. The following are quotes from this interview:"

"The Fidel Castro government chooses unemployed, uneducated young men to be trained and assigned to Cuban embassies abroad as spies. The..."
young spies are given a two-year course at a special Ministry of the Interior school to get them ready. The Minister of the Interior goes so far as to favor young boys from low social levels to work as agents in embassies. He dresses them up, teaches them a few things, gives them a gun and sends them overseas. The system is diabolic, but it works. These boys, whom they have made into powerful men, are proving to be the most fanatical agents. They never defect. "The two-year course on spying, Alemany said, includes a "little of everything, even elementary English. The graduates are assigned to Cuban embassies as untitled attaches."

"Mr. Alemany has further told us, his workmates in UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA, that he has knowledge of the Galbe case, and that he knows the Cuban Charge in Athens to be just the type of person of which he speaks in his interview -- a definitely undesirable sort by any standard. He adds that, while in Japan, Galbe's preposterous behaviour was widely commented within Tokyo diplomatic circles. The unanimous impression was one of shock and concern, and it was expected that the Greek Government would react promptly and energetically."

"We all know, Cubans and Greeks alike, that Galbe is no credit to the Cuban people and is an insult to the Greek nation. Thus, we write with the thought that the facts forwarded in this letter will further unmask Galbe and show what he really is."

Sincerely,

Dr. Mario Seiglie Montoro
Secretary General

Miami, September 16, 1965

Ref: 195
U.P. LETTER TO GREEK GOVERNMENT AGAINST CALBE CUSTER

Cases of real diplomat Alemany and Alon so cited as contrast to preposterous behavior of the gangster Calbe.

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Sincerely,

Dr. Mario Seiglie Montoro
Secretary General

Miami, September 16, 1965

Ref: 195
NEWSPAPERS:

Mr. G. Grigoriadis
Editor,
ACROPOLIS
Athens, Greece.

Editors
AEGORRATINI
Athens, Greece.

The Editor
ATHENA MURAL
Athens, Greece.

Mr. G. Skouras
EDITOR
ATHENS DAILY POST
Athens, Greece.

Mr. John Bourn
EDITOR
ATHENS NEWS
Athens, Greece.

Mr. E. Baklatzis
EDITOR
ATHINAI
Athens, Greece.

Mr. P. Kokkas
Editor,
ELEFTHERIA
Athens, Greece.

The Editor,
ESTHERINOS TYPOS
Athens, Greece.

Ath. Patsakis
Editor,
ATENIKOS KINIK
Athens, Greece.

The Editor
ELEIA
Athens, Greece.

Mr. C. Economides
Editor,
ENIKOS
Athens, Greece.
The Editor
HIMERISSIA
Athens, Greece.

Mr. N. Filachou
Editor.
KATHIMERINI
Athens, Greece.

The Editor
MESSAGER D'ATHENS
Athens, Greece.

Mr. Ch. Lambakis
Editor.
TA NEA
Athens, Greece.

Mr. A. Demakos
Editor.
TO VIMA
Athens, Greece.

Mr. L. Bortolos
Director.
VARDI
Athens, Greece.

Mr. Dimitrios Doulakis
6 Seironi Sts.
Ilioupoli
Athens, Greece.

The Editor
"The Atlantis"
521 W. 23rd St.
New York 11, N.Y.

The Editor
"National Herald"
140 W. 26th St.
New York 1, N.Y.

The Journal of Commerce
11 Zoumi Karatassou St.
Makryganni
Athens, Greece.
BLACK LIST FIRMS:

Konstantinos Pinokloskis
6 Polytechniou St.,
Athena, Greece.

Iacovitis Trianthosfylis
9 Patission St.,
Athena, Greece.

Nikolaos Reinepes and Son
1 Street St.,
Athena, Greece.

Dimitiriades Textile Co.,
27 Praxitelous St.,
Athena, Greece.

Salus Sazon
C/o Transstokos
9 Aristotelous St.,
Athena, Greece.

Hew Arhip Co.,
28 Egeofisitou St.,
Athena, Greece.

Micheas and Co.,
1 Karyotli St.,
Athena, Greece.

Textiles Eleftheria
28 Emmanuel Benaki St.,
Athena, Greece.

Pothia Patiti
91 Aminadibio St.,
Athena, Greece.

Franco Shipping Agency
65 Patission St.,
Athena, Greece.

Karayianni Travel Agency
11 Akil Madali St.,
Athena, Greece.

Euse Martini Agency
3 Dimitriio Comnari St.,
Piraeus, Greece.

Michael Karagorgis
Plateia Loudovikou,
Piraeus, Greece.
Hellenic Shippera
4 Akadimias St.,
Athens,
Greece.

Livone Company
Neaeris Typoldou
Piraeus,
Greece.

GOVERNMENT:

Greek Delegation
United Nations
United Nations Bldgs.,
New York City, N.Y.

Chamber of Deputies
House of Parliament
Athens, Greece.

H.K. Ambassador of Greece
Greek Embassy
Washington, D.C.
NEWSPAPERS:

Mr. S. Grigoriadis
Editor,
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Athens, Greece.

The Editor
ATHENAR KURIER
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Mr. G. Skoumas
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Athens, Greece.

Mr. E. Baklatsis
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ATHINAIKI
Athens, Greece.

Mr. P. Kokkas
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ELLINERGIA
Athens, Greece.

The Editor,
ESTERINOS THIPOS
Athens, Greece.

Ath. Parnaschos
Editor,
ATHENOS KINIX
Athens, Greece.

The Editor
ESTHEIA
Athens, Greece.

Mr. C. Bicosmidis
Editor,
ETHNOS
Athens, Greece.
The Editor
HIMERISSIA
Athens, Greece.

Mr. H. Vlahou
Editor,
KATHIMERINI
Athens, Greece.

The Editor
MESSENGER DIATHES
Athens, Greece.

Mr. Ch. Lambrakis
Editors
TA NEA
Athens, Greece.

Mr. A. Doukas
Editor,
TO VIMA
Athens, Greece.

Mr. E. Bortolos
Director,
YIAONI
Athens, Greece.

Mr. Dimitrios Doukas
S. Zeounti St.,
Iatios
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Athena, Greece.

Nikolaos Rosporas and Son
1 Street St.,
Athena, Greece.

Zlatiades Textile Co.,
27 Praxitelous St.,
Athena, Greece.

Felix Sales
2/5 Translkom
9 Aristidou St.,
Athena, Greece.

Eva Agrex Co.,
26 Zografou St.,
Athena, Greece.

Kavakleni and Co.,
1 Keryvi St.,
Athena, Greece.

Yassilis Kleisleria
28 Evmenoul Benaki St.,
Athena, Greece.

Potis Reptis
51 Ladasias St.,
Athena, Greece.

Franco Shipping Agency
65 Patission St.,
Athena, Greece.

Karagiannis Travel Agency
12 Kalli Kodouli St.,
Athena, Greece.

Zeita Maritime Agency
3 Dimitri Cournari St.,
Piraeus, Greece.

Michael Karageorge
Plateia Loukoumou,
Piraeus, Greece.
Hellenic Shipyards
4 Akadimias St.,
Athens,
Greece.

Livano Company
Negaron Typoldou
Pireaus,
Greece.

Greeks Deligation
United Nations
United Nations Bldg.,
New York City, N.Y.

Chamber of Deputies
House of Parliament
Athens, Greece.

H.E. Ambassador of Greece
Greek Embassy
Washington, D.C.
DISPATCH

SECRET

TO
Chief, WH

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMWASP/AMSCROLL/Operational

AMSCROLL Report of AMWASP-1 Defection

REF: WAVE 5450, 31 August 1965

1. Subject report prepared by AMSCROLL presents a roundup of preparatory activities and subsequent publicity of the AMWASP-1 defection as sponsored by the AMSCROLL organization. Due to the number of MISPAYN assets which interplayed in the particular operation, the report is attached under separate cover No. 1 in true names and identities without reference to the MISPAYN assets involved.

2. Under separate cover attachment No. 2 contains samples of propaganda and an AMSCROLL mailing list.

3. Also forwarded under separate cover, attachment No. 3, are the Spanish and English tapes of the AMWASP/1 statement.

Attachments:
1. Report, u/sc
2. Prop and Mailing List, u/sc
3. Tapes, u/sc

Distribution:

1. WH/C, w/attaches
2. WH, w/No. 1 attach
3. C/FE, w/No. 1 attach
4. COS, Tokyo, w/No. 1 attach
5. COS, Mexico, w/No. 1 attach
6. COS, Caracas, w/No. 1 attach

PHILIP O. ELMAR

DATE TYPED: SEP 17 1965
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: LFGX-5Y
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 19-120-26/3
Unidad Revolucionaria Memorandum

The following steps have been taken in the defection and subsequent publicity of Gilberto Alemany, Trade Counselor of the Cuban Embassy in Tokyo, Japan:

1. A press conference was held on August 27th at 7 p.m. in the Biscayne Room of the McAllister Hotel, which was attended by most of the members of the Miami area press, (approximately 50 persons in total) in response to Unidad Revolucionaria (UR) invitation. Mr. Alemany read a statement prepared by him and by members of the UR, which was also mimeographed and distributed both in English and Spanish to the persons present at the Conference. Photos of the event were taken, to be later published in the UR publications. A recording of the proceedings was made.

2. Coverage by the press included the following items:
   a. A front-page article by Mary Louise Wilkinson in the Miami News of August 28th. (Both editions),
   b. An article by Don Bohning in the Miami Herald of August 28th,
   c. A front-page story in the "Diario de las Americas" of August 29th by Benjamin de la Vega,
   d. An editorial in the Miami News of August 30th,
   e. An article by Humberto Morran in the "Diario de la Americas" of September 1st,
   f. A story in the "El Universal" of Caracas, Venezuela, of September 1st,
   g. TV stations Channel 4 and Channel 7 broadcast filmed stories of the press conference on August 27th and 28th,
   h. Radio stations WRUL and Radio Americas taped interviews with Mr. Alemany on August 31st,
   i. Radio program "La Voz de Cuba" also taped an interview on August 31st,
   j. ABC interviewed Mr. Alemany (Jose M. Illan) on September 1st for a cover story in that publication,
   k. The "Voice of America" taped an interview on September 2nd (Manolo de la Torre).
SECRET

Radio Tropical of Caracas, Venezuela also broadcast the story on September 1st.

3. Mr. Alemany's defection statement was sent to the following addresses:

a. On August 28 and 31, to the attached list of Japanese newspapers in Tokyo;

b. On August 31st, to 110 Japanese firms on the UR blacklist;

c. On September 1st, to the UR economic mailing list in the United States and Canada, which includes sugar brokers, business concerns, economic publications such as "Journal of Commerce", etc.

d. On September 2nd, the Spanish version was sent to 148 addresses in Spain, which includes Spanish firms, newspapers and government offices;

e. To 100 Latin American newspapers and Japanese embassies, including the Japanese embassy in Washington;

f. To 150 shipping firms in the United States and Canada;

g. To economic publications throughout Europe;

h. To the members of the Japanese Trade Mission which toured Latin America during March, with personal letters from Dr. Cavada;

i. The UR is currently completing the mailings to the other addresses on its blacklist in other countries.

4. The UR has prepared a summary of Alemany's original statement which is being sent to the addresses not yet covered. (Copy attached)

5. Dr. Rivas-Vasquez of the UR propaganda section contacted Mr. Martin Correa, Secretary General of the Venezuelan Dockworkers for further steps in that area. Rivas-Vasquez also spoke to Mr. Salvador Romani, of the Movimiento Anti-Comunista Femenino de Venezuela, and Mr. Carlos Andres Perez, former Venezuelan Cabinet member and future presidential candidate. Mr. Martin Correa also requested, and was granted, a private interview with Mr. Alemany on Saturday, August 28, which was also attended by Dr. Seigle, president of the UR.

6. Additional follow-up action is listed below:

a. Mr. Enrique Lindner, the UR delegate in Washington, D.C., was instructed to try to get Mr. Alemany's statement into a leading national magazine or publication, for which he was sent copies plus photostats of the confidential documents brought by Mr. Alemany during his press conference. Mr. Lindner was hopeful of arranging insertion of the statement in the magazine "U.S. News and World Report."
SECRET

b. The NBC television program, "The Today Show", was approached and offered an interview with Mr. Alemany through Mr. Paul Cuningham, associate producer of that program.

c. Mr. Alemany has drawn up a plan which includes the writing of personal letters by him to a number of directors of Japanese firms with which he dealt in Tokyo.

d. Mr. Joso Alvarez Diaz, a trade specialist and Cuban economics professor at the University of Miami is preparing an analysis of Mr. Alemany's defection statement, which he will try to have published in a leading economic publication.

e. An attempt is being made to arrange for a television panel show on one of the local stations.
DIR INFO CARA CITE WAVE 5625

TYPIC MHPAWHN WHUPE

MARTIN CORREA, VEN\(N\) DEPUTY PRES OF PORTWORKERS FEDERATION
OF VEN, MEMBER CUBAN TRADE BOYCOTT COMMITTEE, AND CLOSE COLLABORATOR
AMICE AND AMSROLL, NOW ORGANIZING CONTINENTAL CONVENTION OF
PORTWORKERS TO BE HELD CARACAS 8-10 OCT 65. IN ADDITION, REGULAR
CONVENTION AGENDA WHICH INCLUDES ELECTION OF NEW EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF NATIONAL FEDERATION AND REVISION FEDERATION STATUTES, MAIN
PROGRAM OF CONVENTION AIMED AT OBTAINING UNIFIED INTERNATIONAL
ACTION RE CUBAN TRADE BOYCOTT. DURING CORREA VISIT 8-31 AUG 65
IN WAVE AREA, CORREA DISCUSSED CONVENTION PLANS WITH AMICE AND AMSROLL
AS FOLLOWS:

A. CONVENTION AND ITS AGENDA APPROVED AND SUPPORTED BY CTV
AND LABOR SECTION OF AD.

B. WILL INVITE INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION AND CONVENE
ROUND-TABLE MEETING OF MEMBERS OF POLITICAL COMMISSION AGAINST COMMUNIST
TYRANNY OF CUBA FOR PURPOSE CLARIFY AND APPLY COORDINATED CUBAN TRADE
BOYCOTT ACTIONS.
C. COSTS OF INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CONVENTION WILL TOTAL APPROX $12,000, IN ORDER TO PAY ROUND-TRIP TRAVEL AND LODGING EXPENSES 25-30 INTERNATIONAL DELEGATES, RADIO/TV COVERAGE, AND COSTS OF SPECIAL PUBLICATIONS, PRESS, ETC.

2. CORREA PLANS ATTEMPT RAISE PORTION NECESSARY FUNDS FOR CONVENTION FROM LOCAL VEN SOURCES SUCH AS CTV, AD, AND SPECIAL LOTTERY AND FUNDRAISING CAMPAIGN AMONG VEN/CUBAN EXILE PUBLIC. SIMILARLY, AMICE AND AMSCROLL HAVE BEEN ASKED ATTEMPT RAISE PARTIAL FUNDS BY PUBLIC FUNDRAISING CAMPAIGN IN JMWAVE EXILE COMMUNITY.

3. ACCORDING AMICE, CORREA HAS OBTAINED RNPINO'S AND RNLEPTOME'S APPROVAL RE PARA 1 ABOVE PLANS. WHILE NO COMMITMENTS OF CLOSE COLLABORATION OR FINANCIAL SUPPORT FORTHCOMING FROM EITHER, RNLEPTOME WILLING PARTICIPATE IN CONVENTION AND PLANS ARRIVE CARACAS 7 OCT.

4. IN VIEW NEED INTRODUCE MORE COORDINATED HEMISPHERE EFFORTS AND COMMON VITALITY IN BOYCOTT CAMPAIGN, ABOVE MEETING WOULD APPEAR ABLE SERVE USEFUL PURPOSE STIMULATE MHS VIPER PROGRAM. IT ALSO MAY BE POSSIBLE GAIN ADDITIONAL MHS PAWN MILEAGE DUE ITS TIMELINESS AND TIE-IN RECENT AMWASP-1 DEFECTION AND CURRENT HEMISPHERE TOUR JAPANESE TRADE DELEGATION. STATION FEELS CONCENTRATION OF CUBAN
EXILE SUPPORT AT MEETING MAY DETRACT ITS OVERALL IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS, THUS PREFERABLE TO STIMULATE MORE APPROPRIATE SUPPORT FROM AMONG THOSE ORGS WITHIN CUBAN BOYCOTT/IPHODCAP FRAMEWORK. STATION WOULD, THEREFORE, APPRECIATE HQS VIEWS AND POSSIBLE OPERATIONAL PLANS RE ABOVE MEETING IN ORDER PROVIDE GUIDANCE AND POSSIBLE SUPPORT THROUGH LOCAL ASSETS.
SECRET
GHN 5655 MARTIN CORREA VEH AD AMICE AMSCROLL 8-10 OCT 69 18-31
CTV AD ORIT 6.2.003 25-30 IV CTX AD RANGING'S RNL REPONE'S 1
7 OCT ANWASP: 1 IPHODCAP
BR

SECRET

Question re of ANWASP - to op.
TYPIC MINVIPER MISPAWN

REF: WAVE 5061 (IN 34271) *

HQ'S HAS NO OBJECTION ANMSCROLL PLAY REF "FREE NAVIGATOR" STORY. HOWEVER, KUCLAN REPORT 16 AUGUST STATES SHIP LEFT FOR ROTTERDAM 11 AUGUST.

END OF MESSAGE

* Requested approval ANMSCROLL play of "Free Navigator" story.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM NO.</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>USE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.R. Memo #109G-SovFishingBase</td>
<td>Ref: WAVE 4039</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hold for Chacoua

26 July 65
MEMORANDUM

TO: Dr. Mario Seiglie Montoro
FROM: Dr. Rafael Rivas-Vasques

REF.: News Coverage of Press Release on Soviet "Fishing" Base.

Press Coverage on U.K.'s press release regarding Soviet "Fishing" Base follows:

JULY 20, 1965:
Norman Diaz
W.M.E.T.

Manolo Reyes
W.T.V.J. Channel 4

Wayne Ferris
W.C.K.T. Channel 7

Tony Solar
"Noticias en Espanol"
Miami News p. 9-A

JULY 21, 1965:
Radio-Hora
W.M.E.T.

JULY 22, 1965:
Diario Las Americas
"Micronoticias" p. 16

JULY 24, 1965:
Agencia de Informaciones Periodisticas
(A.I.P.) No. 324
"Novedades" (will forward date)
Mexico, D.F.,
Mexico

Vida del Litoral (will forward date)
"El Universal"
Caracas, Venezuela

Miami, July 22, 1965
U.R. REPORTS

SOVIET "FISHING" BASE IN HAVANA

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (UR) has learned from its underground sources in Cuba the following information:

The Russians are constructing docks, warehouses, freezers, dry docks, buildings with communication equipment and other necessary installations for the operation of a fishing fleet in the east coast of the port of Havana, according to the Cuban-Soviet agreement of September, 1962.

These constructions are directed and supervised by Soviet technicians with the collaboration of Cuban "slave work". The Soviet Union furnishes all the necessary equipment and machinery, in addition to the above mentioned supervision and technical assistance; Cuba offers the labor as well as the basic construction materials.

It was stipulated that the Soviet Union and Cuba would share in equal parts this fishing terminal which original cost was $12 million "passos" but now it has come up to $30 millions and is expected to be finished by the beginning of 1966.

However, it has been learned that due to the large sum owed by the Castro-Communist regime to the Soviet Union, the Russians have decided that these facilities will be for their exclusive use once they are concluded.

All the fish caught will be taken to this terminal, processed and exported to the Soviet Union and Europe in Russian vessels, without any profit for Cuba, nor the Cuban fishing vessels will be allowed to use said installations.

This area of the east coast of the port of Havana will be closed as soon as installations are finished and only Soviet personnel will have access to that zone.

This absolute control of the Soviets in the same port of Havana has led many to think that said installations will not only serve for operating Soviet trawlers - which activities in espionage, infiltration and subversive and terrorist agents are well known - but that it might hide military constructions, submarine pens, and other installations that could threaten the security of the hemisphere.

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (UR)

Miami, July 19, 1965
Ref: 190
U.R. Informa:

BASE "PESQUERA" SOVIÉTICA EN LA HABANA

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (UR) ha podido conocer a través de sus fuentes clandes tinas en Cuba los siguientes informes:

Los rusos están construyendo muelles, díques secos, naves refrigeradas, plan tas de comunicaciones y demás instalaciones necesarias para las operaciones de una flota pesquera en la costa este del puerto de La Habana, conforme a lo estipulado en el acuerdo Soviético-Cubano de Septiembre de 1962.

Estas construcciones se llevan a cabo bajo la dirección y supervisión de técnicos soviéticos, con la colaboración de "trabajo esclavo" cubano. La Unión Soviética facilita todos los equipos y maquinarias, además de la mencionada supervisión y asistencia técnicas, y Cuba pone la arena, piedras y materia les básicos de construcción, aparte de la mano de obra.

Se había estipulado que la Unión Soviética y Cuba usufructuaran a partes iguales esta terminal pesquera de vastas proporciones, cuyo costo original era de $12 millones de "pesos", pero que ya asciende a $30 millones y que se espera estará terminada para principios de 1966.

Sin embargo, se ha podido conocer que debido a la cuantiosa suma que el régimen Castro-Comunista adeuda a la Unión Soviética, los rusos han determinado que estas instalaciones serán para su uso exclusivo una vez terminadas.

Toda la pesca será llevada a esta terminal, procesada y exportada para la Unión Soviética y Europa en mercados rusos, sin que se derive provecho alguno para Cuba y sin que los pescadores cubanos puedan hacer uso de dichas instalaciones.

Esta área en la costa este del puerto de La Habana será cerrada en cuanto se terminen las instalaciones y sólo el personal soviético tendrá acceso a esta zona.

Este control absoluto soviético en el propio puerto de La Habana ha hecho pensar a muchos que dichas instalaciones no sólo servirán para las operaciones de los "pescadores" rusos—cuyas actividades de espionaje, infiltración de agentes subversivos y terroristas son harto conocidas—sino que pueden acender construcciones militares, bases para submarinos y otras instalaciones que amenacen la seguridad del Hemisferio.

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (UR)

Ref.: 194

Miami, 19 de Julio de 1965
SECRET 162345Z

DIRECT WAVE 3048 (CINHURST ACTING)

TYPIC M6VIPER

1. AMSCROLL SC3GEN REPORTS FINAL SESSION CHAMBER COMMERCCE OF AMERICAS UNANIMOUS PASSAGE RESOLUTION DRAFTED BY AMSCROLL DENOUNCING CASTRO REGIME AND RECOMMENDING MEMBER NATION FIRMS DESIST TRADE WITH CUBA DIRECT OR INDIRECT, AND USE INFLUENCE OTHER FREE WORLD FIRMS DO SAME. CURACAO, SURINAM AND ARUBA ABSTAINING LACKING AUTHORITY FROM DUTCH-POOP BUT EXPRESSED SYMPATHY.

2. MOTION INTRODUCED BY MANUEL CASTILLO, FORMER PANAMANIAN CONSUL MIAMI, WHO ALSO TAPEING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT PANAMA TO CUBAN PEOPLE FOR AMSCROLL RADIO PROGRAM. AMSCROLL ISSUING PRESS RELEASE, CARRYING RESOLUTION AMONG HIGH 17 JUNE. POUCHING DETAILS.

SECRET

OFN
1. Forwarded under separate cover is a copy of a letter received by ANSCROLL from an individual who claims to be a reporter for Nation, and who says that he is planning to visit New York and Miami in the near future. He expresses sympathy with the cause of Cuban freedom, based on his following of the ANSCROLL publicity in the Galbe affair, and asks to meet ANSCROLL principals to work out some ideas presumably for a subsequent anti-Castro campaign.

2. Please advise if you have any specific operational interest in this individual, or if you have any preferences in the matter of ANSCROLL's dealing with him. ANSCROLL is replying with thanks for the writer's interest and with anticipation of future close and friendly cooperation.

PHILIP G. ELWAND

Attachment:
Letter, xerox copy, u/sec (att'd)

Distribution:
3 = COS, Athens, w/attach, u/sec
2 w/C/E, w/attach, u/sec
2 = 0/w/CW, w/attach, u/sec

14 June 65
DATE TYPED
19-120-26
DATE DISPATCHED
14-120-26
UPGA 22,012
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

SECRET
Mr. Seigle,

First, sorry for my bad English.

In the Athenian newspapers I read your letter you sent to the Greek prime minister Mr. Papandreou. I agree that the Greek premier must set out of this country, Mr. Gallo, the Cuban Charge d'affaires in Athens. Many readers of the Athenian newspapers asked to take your address. They want to express your feelings. Many of them wrote that they want to go to Cuba a long time. Fidel Castro.

Anyway, this is the preface of my letter. What I want to tell you is that I am a reporter of a great and old Athenian newspaper. I should like very much to be in touch with you, since I intend to come in a couple of months to the World's Fair of New York - as I went again last year - and then, to come in spring. So, I want very much to meet you and have an interesting interview with you and your revolutionary party, for my newspaper.

16 June 1965
Att. #1 to UFGA-2012
So, I am writing you letter and details about our address there, so that I can find you easily. I will write you then some interesting suggestion about our meeting, interview, etc. I feel that you always have good ideas, good story, until, I will have news from you. Thank you very much.

Sincerely yours,

Dimitrios Troumbaktis

Journalist

Member of the Union of Athenian Press.

My address: G. Troumbaktis
8 Seramou Str.
Athens
Greece
A. OPERATIONAL

1. During the reporting period AMSCROLL continued to function as Station JNWAVER's MINIPER action and propaganda vehicle. Toward the end of March AMSCROLL also assumed the bulk of the heiflom operation which is now being taken over by a separate committee. Some of the more significant activities, which have been covered in other correspondences, were "black list" letters to specific firms in Japan and Greece sent at the behest of and according to guidance from Tokyo and Athens Stations. AMFRAK-I's "truth squad" tactics against the Japanese trade mission touring Latin America and the initiation of regular reports to Spanish officials, in a list provided by Madrid Station, on the anti-Spanish contents of broadcasts from Havana by the Cuban-Spanish Friendship Association.

2. Although there were some petty disagreements among AMSCROLL personnel, reported in detail by our unilateral penetration, AMFRAK-I, there was relative calm during the period, and occasional manifestations of esprit de corps were noted in AMSCROLL despite the general flagging of morale in the exile community at large.

3. The only change in the AMSCROLL executive committee took effect in March when the Secretary of Finance, Identity, resigned to take a position in an Ecuadorian commercial firm. Other personnel changes were made with only minor significance.

B. PRODUCTION

4. Propaganda to Cuba (samples in Attachment 2) included the ponsized monthly bulletin; a leaflet on personal security, this being a new issue showing that the greatest danger to self and family is to do nothing while Castro-Communism tightens its grip on the whole of Cuban

Attachments:
1. Identity, USC
2. Prop Samples, Cuba, USC
3. Prop Samples, LA, USC
4. Press Release, USC

Distribution:
1. WH/C
2. WH/C
3. WH/C
4. WH/C

CLASSIFICATION:
SECRET

DATE DISTRIBUTED:
28 May 65

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER:
UFRA 21797

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER:
19-120-26/3
society; "handwritten" cover letters, which are actually printed script
to make the propaganda envelopes appear to contain personal letters
when put to the light test by censors; and receipt acknowledgement forms,
a simple slip of paper now attached to all propaganda mailings
requesting the recipient to send the form back to ANSCROLL's post office
box, or to any other address in the free world for forwarding to
ANSCROLL, as a check on how much propaganda is getting through. During
the period ANSCROLL sent out 58,000 envelopes containing 130,000 items.

5. To Latin America primarily, with a scattering of items to
Europe, Asia and the United States, ANSCROLL sent out 30,000 items
including its tabloid house organ (which is now cut down to 4 pages
from its former 8, and is published only once a month instead of twice),
several booklets rewritten by continued request of correspondents (one
of the largest orders having come from Dominican General Wessin y Wessin
shortly before the rebellion) and a map showing training sites in Cuba
for Latin American guerrillas (samples in Attachment 3).

6. News releases were issued on a number of current topics,
ANSCROLL as usual taking the economic warfare angle on the news of the
day as it affected Cuba. The 17 releases of this period were sent to
newspapers, wire services, magazines, radio and TV stations throughout
the free world in approximately 350 copies each. The local public
media made use of approximately 65% of ANSCROLL's press releases.
Although occasional indications are received that ANSCROLL materials
are used in other newspaper and magazine articles, radio programs and
the like, there is no way of making a good estimate of the amount of
such replay. Among the more important titles were the following
(copies in Attachment 4):

a. Free-World Ships Continue Aid to Cuban Economy
b. Cuban Budget Includes Proof Economy Crumbling — an Analysis
c. Possible Soviet Curtailment of Cuban Aid Seen
d. Greek Firm Bilked in Cuban Trade Negotiations
e. Japan Socks Expansion of LA Trade While Defying QAS in
Cuban Traffic
f. Sovbloc Undermining Castro Sugar Markets
g. Castro Auctioning Heirlooms Taken from Fleeing Refugees

7. Other political action and propaganda moves noted in paragraph
1, above, were reported separately in detail, and a full set of
"black list" correspondence was forwarded to Headquarters in UFGA 21616
with a request for any further WHEELEAZ loads which might contribute to
the further effectiveness of this campaign.

8. ANSCROLL radio programs, 15 minutes daily over both WMIE and
AMTHIGH, carried much the same themes as the ANSCROLL press releases,
but with adjustments as necessary for the Cuban audience, e.g., while
ANSCROLL press releases might complain about continued free-world
trade with and shipping to Cuba, the radio program would emphasize any
decreases in the number of ships.

9. Reactions to ANSCROLL propaganda continue to arrive from Cuba,
but at a slow pace. The 24 letters received during the past period
contained 7 newspaper clippings and three pages torn from telephone
books, as requested in ANSCROLL radio programs. Nine of the letters
mentioned the AMTHIGH broadcasts, one noted receipt of the pony-sized
bulletin and two remitted the small acknowledgement forms which accompany
all ANSCROLL propaganda mailed into Cuba. Detailed statistics on these
are submitted in a separate report from JNMAR.

C. FINANCIAL

Salaries (January - March) $15,360.00
Operational Expenses (January-March 36,500.00
TOTAL $51,860.00
D. FUTURE PLANS

No substantive changes are contemplated in the handling of this activity. Efforts will be continued to judge the efficacy of current programs, and to adjust the amount and type of propaganda produced as necessary.

[Signature]

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN
IDENTITY: Reinaldo MIYARES Lopez
9 Oct 1962

UFGA-216/6
20 May 65
17-120-26

9 Oct 1968

REMOVAL SLIP
DOC. SERIAL & NUMBER UFGA-21552
DOC. DATE 19 May 1965

BY RFD AND RPU ON _______ AND FORWARDED TO RFD FILES
RFD AN
RFD MIS
RFD PS

1. It was LABOR and unprocessed.
2. It was RIVER and unprocessed.
3. It was EYES AHOE and unprocessed.
4. It was DEFERRED.
5. It was classified into file 19-126-3/3
6. It is an indexed document.

O For filing with att 1,2,3+4.
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TO: JMWAVE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: CIO/C
INFO: WE 6
FILE

TO: WAVE
INFO: MADR

CITE DIR 05230

TYPIC KEYWAY NHVIPER

REF: DIR 04886

PARA 2 REF SHOULD READ: "HOPE AMSROLL CAN SET UP NON-POLITICAL COMMITTEE OF REPUTABLE CUBANS AND ACT AS ITS EXECUTIVE AGENT."

END OF MESSAGE

Desmond Fitzgerald
G/CWD

John L. Hart
DCWHDC/C

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
TO: JN WAVE MADRID
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONS: UW/C 8
NOTE: FILE, DDP, WE 6, C/OPS, C/LOA, CA 2, CA/PRP.

TO: WAVE
NOTE: MADR

TYPIC KEYWAY MIVIPER

REFS: A. MADR 3922 (IN 52779)
B. WAVE 1064 (IN 51819)

1. CONCUR REF A. DO NOT DESIRE COMMITTEE BE SET UP MADR;
   FOR MAXIMUM CONTROL, FEEL THIS BEST DONE WAVE AREA.

2. MOST PLEASED EFFECTIVE ROLE PLAYED BY AMSCHOLL TO DATE.
   HOPE AMSCHOLL CAN SET UP NON-POLITICAL COMMITTEE OF REPUTABLE
   CUBANS WHICH WOULD ACT AS ITS EXECUTIVE AGENT.

END OF MESSAGE

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH

WE/5 L. PATT

JOHN L. HART
DCWHID/C

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
SECRET 242049Z
MADR INFO DIR CITE WAVE 1064

TYPIC KEYWAY MHVIPER

REFS:
A. WAVE 3150 (1N35MC)
B. DIR 04279
C. MADR 3910 (1N45141)
D. WAVE 1049 (1N51462)

1. VIEW APPARENT SENSITIVITY RE USE AMSROLL

NAME THIS OP, SUGGEST MADR HAVE MUSSO REPLY TO AMSROLL LETTER AS
SUGGESTED PARA 7 REF A, STATING HE SETTING UP INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE AND ASKING AMSROLL PARTICIPATION. MUSSO COULD THEN
PLACE ADS PER REF B WHICH WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE COMING FROM
EUROPEAN LOCATION.

2. IF ABOVE NOT FEASIBLE PLS ADVISE AND WAVE WILL ESTABLISH
COMMITTEE AND PLACE ADS.

SECRET

CFN
**DISPATCH**

**TO:** Chief of Station, San Jose  
Chief, WH Division

**FROM:** Chief of Station, JWAVE

**SUBJECT:** TYPIC/OPERATIONAL  
Forwarding of Counterrevolutionary Handbook Studies

**REFERENCE:** UFGA-18641, para 3, dated 17 November 1964

**ACTION:** See paragraph 2.

1. Forwarded herewith is one copy of each of the following Counterrevolutionary Handbook Studies:

- **AAM** - Asociacion Amigos del Mar (AAM) and Fraternidad de las 90 Millas
- **ACCE** - Asociacion de Colonos Cubanos en el Exilio
- **ANAC** - Alianza Nacional Anti-Comunista
- **ANC** - Asociacion Nacionalista Cubana
- **FJC** - Frente de Juventudes Cristianas
- **FJR** - Frente de Juventudes Revolucionario (The FJR, being a newly formed organization, is not listed in the Index to the Counterrevolutionary Handbook. It is suggested that it be "written in" until a new Index can be completed.)
- **JURE** - Junta Revolucionaria Cubana
- **MAPA** - Movimiento Accion Patriotica Americana
- **MIRR** - Movimiento Insurreccional de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
- **MN** - El Movimiento de Resistencia Nacional
- **MRTN** - Movimiento Revolucionario 30 de Noviembre
- **OAS** - Operacion "Alpha 66"
- **RCCE** - Radio Club de Cuba en el Exilio
- **RDR** - Rescate Democratico Revolucionario
- **SFNE** - Segundo Frente Nacional de Escambray
- **UND** - Union Nacional Democratica "Movimiento 20 de Mayo"

2. The above listed studies should be filed alphabetically in Part II of the Counterrevolutionary Handbook forwarded under reference.

Attachment: CR Handbook Studies, h/w

**Distribution:**  
Orig & 2-COS, San Jose w/att.  
2-Chief, WH, p/C Rett

**DATE TYPED:** 13 April 65  
**DATE DISPATCHED:** 19-9-12  
**UFGA-21009**
SECRET 1001412
DIR CITE UAVE 037A
TYPIC MHVIPER

IN REPLY CASTRO CLAIMS REPORTED LOCAL NEWSPAPERS AND RADIO
CUBAN SUGAR PRODUCTION GOALS BEING REACHED, AMSGROLL PREPARING
PRESS RELEASES AND RADIO PROGRAMS 12-14 APR USING FOLL THEMES:
SUGAR DISCRETION STILL STRICTLY ENFORCED, WHY NECESSARY IF SITUATION
ACTUALLY GOOD AS CLAIMED? CASTRO PROHIBITION PUBLICATION ANY STATIS-
TICS DURING HARVEST GAVE AMPLE WARNING BIG LIE TO COME. AMSGROLL
UNDERGROUND REPORTS WIDESPREAD CANE BURNING, SABOTAGE MILLS AND
TRANSPORT FACILITIES, SHORTAGE JUTE BAGS, ADMINISTRATIVE DILIGENCE,
LOW WORKER MORALE COMBINING PUT 65 CROP IN JEOPARDY, GOC
REFUSAL CANE CUTTER TRADITIONAL HOLY WEEK VACATION INDICATES
PANIC MORE THAN CONFIDENCE. CONCERN PROBABLY HEIGHTENED BY CONSID-
ERATION REGIME'S SLIM MARGIN PROFIT EVEN FROM FAIRLY GOOD HARVEST
AT CURRENT WORLD PRICES AND COMPETITION FROM NEW SUGAR PRODUCING
NATIONS. FINAL CRITERION CASTRO DRAMADO, HE ALWAYS TALKS BIGGEST
WHEN IN TROUBLE.
SECRET
CFN
SECRET
SECRET 131948Z

DIR INFO MEXI CITE WAVE 0663

TYPIC MHVIPER

REF A DIR 06693
B MEXI 3082 (W43463)

1. AMSROLL WILL DISTRIBUTE ENGLISH LANGUAGE HANDBILL SIX

MAJOR THEATERS WAVE AREA 15-17 APR. EXPECT RADIO PRESS AND TV

COVERAGE. JMHOP AND OTHER RADIO ASSETS WILL PLAY STORY INTO
CUBA AND AMNH WILL INCLUDE IN REGULAR BULLETIN FOR LATIN AMERICA.

2. MEXI: PARA 3 REF A PLS ADVISE IF WAVE PRINTING DESIRED.

YCAN PRINT SPANISH LANGUAGE HANDBILLS ATTRIBUTED AMSROLL. ASSUME
ANONYMOUS HANDBILLS WOULD CREATE PROBLEMS WITH MEXICAN AUTHORITIES.

ALSO ADVISE FASTEST METHOD MAILING MATERIAL TO MEXI AND ANY
CENSORSHIP PROBLEMS IF OPEN MAIL USED. RE PARA TWO REF B

WAVE TRYING ARRANGE COMMERCIAL TV AND NEWSREEL COVERAGE OF PARA 1

ACTIVITY THROUGH IDENTITY. IF SUCCESSFUL, SUGGEST MEXI ASSETS

TELEPHONE IDENTITY AND PURCHASE CLIPS. WILL ADVISE MEXI WHEN

IDENTITY SHOULD BE CONTACTED.

3. INDEX IDENTITY.

RE WAVE ASSETS PROVIDING 00000

SECRET

PLAY SECRET

19-120-26

13 APR 05
SECRET 070015Z

DIR INFO HAMB BRBN FRAN GMYN CITE WAVE 0415

TYPIC MNVIPER

REF DIR 95999

AMSCROLL SENT LETTER 5 MAR TO WIXING, COPIES TO GERMAN FORMIN
BONN, GERMAN EMBASSY WASH, GERMAN DELEGATION TO UN, US SECY OF
COMMERCE. CONTENTS LETTER IN PRESS RELEASE 6 MAR DELIVERED LOCAL
MEDIA OUTLETS AND SENT LARGE NUMBER EUROPEAN PRESS REPS INCLUDING
JOURNAL OF COMMERCE CORRESPONDENTS NEW YORK AND EUROPE AND GERMAN
NEWSPAPERS.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET
SECRET 0622252
DIR CITE WAVE 0397
TYPIC MIVIPER
REF A DIR 95219
B DIR 98577

AMSCROLL ISSUING RELEASE TO LOCAL PRESS RADIO AND WIRE SERVICES
6 APR AND BROADCASTING TO CUBA. RELEASE BASED REFS SUMMARIZES AS FOLLOWS: ONE OF OUR UNDERGROUND UNITS REPORTS SPECTACULAR CONTINUING SUCCESS SABOTAGE AGAINST RICHARD CONTINENTAL TRACTORS IMPORTED FROM FRANCE. SINCE SUMMER 64 WHEN TWO SHIPMENTS TOTAL 30 TRACTORS VARIOUS MODELS CONTAMINATED WITH ABRASIVES, THIS GROUP PLAYING NAVOC CUBAN HEAVY DUTY MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT. ONE ACTION AUG 64 PUT 70 OF 150 RICHARD TRACTORS OUT OF USE, 7 BEYOND REPAIR, THROUGH SPECIALLY PREPARED LUBRICATIONS WHICH MINCONS INVESTIGATORS DISCOVERED TOO LATE. DESPITE INCREASED SURVEILLANCE, SAB GROUP USING NEW MORE SOPHISTICATED METHODS REGULARLY SABOTAGING EARTH MOVERS ETC, GIANT BULLDOZERS, ETC.
REFS:  
A. WAVE 0397 (IN 39527)  
B. DIR 95219  
C. DIR 98577

Regret misunderstanding derived from refs B and C.  
Primary importance in such propaganda is not to bring scrutiny to lubricants which are basis of large and sensitive NIFASH operation. Also imperative that exploitation of sabotage make it appear to have been done inside PBRUMEN. Request WAVE cancel all uncompleted action which may have bearing on this problem.
FRENCH FIRM RICHARD FRERES HAS SUPPLIED SEVERAL HUNDRED TRACTORS TO CUBA IN LITTLE OVER ONE YEAR. THESE INCLUDED FOUR OR FIVE TYPES OF WHICH CD10 PROBABLY HEAVIEST. MAIN UNLOADING PORT FOR THESE TRACTORS APPEARS TO BE HAVANA. TWO SHIPMENTS INVOLVING ABOUT 30 TRACTORS OF DIFFERENT TYPES WERE CONTAMINATED WITH ABRASIVES IN MAY AND JUNE 1956.

END OF MESSAGE
TO: JINWAVE
FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF. DC/MHC 5 000D2P, A0DP A/C1, 0/F1 7/0/F/D 04 C/CA 2/1/504
0/W2 3/2, FILE

TO: WAVE

Rybafi, Pdrum, Khrviper, Zrperusal

1. FOLLOWING MESSAGE RELAYED: 15 MAR 65, FROM DOSQUE, MINCON, HAVANA TO RICHARD CONTINENTAL, FRANCE. SEND IMMEDIATELY HIGHLY QUALIFIED PERSONNEL FOR BULLDOZERS C-D10. CONSTANTLY BREAKING DOWN DUE TO DEFECTS IN MANUFACTURE.

2. WAVE PLEASE EXPLOIT. SEVERAL ACTS OF SABOTAGE WERE CARRIED OUT AGAINST RICHARD TRACTORS IN 1964 USING ABRASIVE IN ENGINE BLOCKS. SINCE ABRASIVE WAS DISCOVERED BY CUBANS, LINE SHOULD NOW BE, "HOW DO YOU LIKE OUR MORE SOPHISTICATED METHOD? TRACTORS OUR SPECIALTY, THE HATER THE BETTER."

3. IMPLICATION SHOULD NATURALLY BE THAT ACTS ACCOMPLISHED BY ANTI-CASTRO GROUP WHOSE STRENGTH LIES BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CUBA.

END OF MESSAGE

RAFAEL W. HERBERT
AC/WHD

JOHN L. HART
DCWHD/C

RELEASE OFFICER
AUTOMATIST OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
DIR INFO MADR BERN GNVA HAGU ZURC CITE WAVE 0158

TYPIC MHVPER

REFS: A. WAVE 9987 (NOT SENT INFO ADDRESSEES)
B. DIR 91885
C. MADR 3677
D. BERN 4931

1. PRIOR RECEIPT REF B HAD ASSIGNED AMSROLL (IDEN) TASK OF SPEARHEADING WAVE AREA PROP ACTION RE CUBAN ART SHIPMENTS IN EUROPE. AMSROLL WELL SUITED FOR THIS ROLE IN WAVE AREA DUE TO ITS ESTABLISHED PRESS OUTLETS, REPUTATION FOR ACCURATE REPORTING AND FACT IT CENTER ORIENTED POLITICAL GROUP WITH EASY ACCESS TO WAVE EXILE CIRCLES OF CONSERVATIVE PERSUASION WHO OWNED ART OBJECTS WHICH CONFISCATED BY GOV. INTEND CONTINUE USING AMSROLL IN THIS OP PARTICULARLY DURING FORMATIVE STAGES.

2. REF A PRESS RELEASE 27 MAR BY AMSROLL CALLED FOR ALL EXILES WAVE AREA TO FORWARD ALL INFO RE CONFISCATED ART OBJECTS TO AMSROLL FOR CATALOGING AND USE IN ATTEMPTS TO IMPLOT ART CASES IN EUROPE BEFORE IT GOES ON SALE. LOCAL RADIO STATIONS PICKED UP THIS

SECRET
PLEASE AND GAVE IT FULL COVERAGE. AFP WIRED STORY TO NEW YORK.
ALSO PICKED UP BY UPI AND AP.

3. AMSROLL NOW IN PROCESS PLACING ADS IN ABC, MADRID;
JOURNAL DE GENEVE, GENEVA; DAILY TELEGRAPH, LONDON; LE MONDE,
PARIS; IL CIVISCE, ROME; POST, WASHINGTON (DC); LA PRENSA & TIMES,
NEW YORK; EL MUNDO, PUERTO RICO; EXCELSIOR, MEXICO, AND EL UNIVERSAL,
CARACAS ASKING EXILE ART OBJECT OWNERS TO FURNISH AMSROLL
COPIES SUPPORTING DOCS SHOWING WHAT ITEMS OWNED AND CONFISCATED.
AMSROLL STATES IT WILL CATALOGUE THESE CLAIMS AND TAKE ACTION TRY
STOP SALES IN EUROPE. SHOULD THIS FAIL AMSROLL POINTS OUT IT
INTENDS WARN ART DEALERS AND POTENTIAL BUYERS AROUND WORLD THAT
CATALOGUED ITEMS WILL BE RECLAIMED BY FREE CUBAN GOVT.

4. AMSROLL SENT CABLES SWISS EMBASSY WASHINGTON AND SWISS
DELEGATION UN WITH COPIES MAJOR SWISS DAILIES AND INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION JURISTS PROTESTING SHIPMENT HEIRLOOM CARGO TO EUROPE
FOR SALE UNDER GENEVA CONVENTION PROHIBITION LOOTING OR PLUNDERING
IN WAR OR PEACE.

5. AMSROLL WILL START CABLE CAMPAIGN ALONG LINES SUGGESTED
BY REF D PARA 2 ON 2 APRIL.

6. INITIAL WAVE AREA EXILE RESPONSE TO ART OBJECT CAMPAIGN

SECRET
SECRET

Indicates individuals who owned art objects more than willing.

Let AMCscroll run with ball as individual exiles don't want get involved in publicity actions, possible litigation, etc.

7. Request MADR cable address where Musso can be reached in Spain. Suggest AMCscroll contact Musso by airmail at this address and offer work in coordinated fashion with Musso on ART shipment problem. Musso could counter with offer set up international committee if MADR feels AMCscroll continuation in OP would significantly affect sensibilities of exile leaders in Europe who have something to contribute to this OP.

SECRET. Apparently wrong but, possibly OK. 96555.
SECRET 102334Z
RIOD INFO SAOP DIR TOKY CITE WAVE 9486 (INGHURST ACTING)
TYPIC MNAVIPER PSYCH
REFS:
A. RIOD 7545 (NOT SENT SAOP) (1/18/75)
B. DIR 93763
C. WAVE 9256 (NOT SENT SAOP) (1/17/75)

1. REF A, AMSOCC (IDEN) SENDING CABLE IN MAR COB FINANCE, COMMERCE AND INDUSTRIES MINISTRIES, GENERAL BRAZ BRANCAO (WHO ONCE WROTE AMSOCC FROM PORTO ALLEGRE WITH FAVORABLE COMMENTS ON PROP LEAFLETS), GOVERNOR LACERDA OF GUANABARA, INDUSTRIAS REUNIDAS F. MATARAZZO (SAOP); S.A. VOITRAHITIN (SAOP); FUDICAO TUPY S.A. (SANTA CATARINA); AMERICA FABRIL S.A. (RIOD); FABRICA TECIDOS BANGU (RIOD), MESBLA S.A. (RIOD), JORNAL DO BRAZIL, JORNAL DO COMERCIO, O BLOBO, O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, GAZETA ESTADO SAO PAULO, FOLHA DE SAO PAOLA, O CRUZEIRO, CONJUNTURA ECONOMICA AND TRIBUNA DA IMPRESA.

SUMMARY CONTENTS FOLLOW: CONNECTION VISIT JAPANESE TRADE MISSION WISH CALL ATTENTION SEVERAL ASPECTS CURRENT JAPANESE TRADE POLICIES WHICH SHOULD INFLUENCE ANY DEALINGS: JAPAN-CUBA TRADE AMOUNTED 87 MILLION DOLLARS LAST YEAR FOR INCREASE 340 PERCENT; THIS YEAR JAPAN
BOUGHT 185,000 TONS CUBAN SUGAR AND WILL BUY 200,000 TONS MORE.

JAPAN ALSO DELIVERING LARGE NUMBER FISHING VESSELS AND PROVIDING
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CUBAN FISHING INDUSTRY. DETAILS ABOVE MEXICO'S
EXCISIOR, NEW YORK JOURNAL OF COMMERCE AND JAPAN'S OWN ECONOMIC
JOURNAL. THESE ACTIVITIES DIRECT OPPOSITION TO OAS RESOLUTION JULY
54 WHICH BROKE DIPLOMATIC AND COMMERCIAL TIES BETWEEN CUBA AND
AMERICAN STATES AND URGED ALL OTHER COUNTRIES OF SIMILAR IDEALS ACT
ACCORDINGLY. THEREFORE OBVIOUS THAT INCREASE JAPAN'S TRADE WITH
COMMUNIST CUBA UNFRIENDLY ACT TOWARD OAS MEMBER NATIONS AND JAPAN
AIDING AND ABETTING ENEMY BY SUPPORTING MAINTENANCE BASE FOR
COMMUNIST AGGRESSION AND SUBVERSION OUR HEMISPHERE. SINCE BRAZIL
ONLY RECENTLY AVERTED NEAR DISASTER COMMUNIST TAKEOVER, BRAZILIANS
NOW FULL AND ACTIVE COOPERATION NEEDED IF OUR CONTINENT TO REMAIN
FREE COMMUNIST TOTALITARIANISM. WE EXPECT BRAZIL'S PEOPLE, PUBLIC
MEDIA, BUSINESS MEN AND GOV'T TO INSIST THIS TRADE MISSION
WHICH SPONSORED BY JAPANESE GOV'T PROMISE CURTAIL TRAFFIC WITH
COMMUNIST CUBAN ENEMY AS PREREQUISITE FOR NEGOTIATIONS BRAZIL.

2. AMSROLL ALSO RELEASING CONTENTS LOCAL PRESS AND WIRE REPS.
SECRET
CFM
SECRET

SECRET 102334Z
RIOD INFO SAOP DIR ID OXY CITE WAVE 9407 (INGHERSI ACTING)
TYPIC MHVIPER PSYCH
REF: WAVE 9408 (IN 70321)
IDEN: UNLOAD REVOLUCIONARIA
SECRET
CFN
SECRET 232332
DIR INFO TONY CITE WAVE 3659
TYPIC MVIPER
REF UCG4 4774

1. ANSCROLL SENT LETTER 17 FEB BASED REF GUIDANCE REQUESTING ASSURANCES FROM NIGATA THAT SPARE PARTS WILL NOT BE SOLD IF ORDERED BY GOIC.

2. ANSCROLL USUALLY ISSUES PRESS RELEASE TO COINCIDE WITH RECEIPT SUCH LETTERS BY ADDRESSES, BUT THIS CASE WILL ALLOW AMBLE TIME FOR REPLY AND AID PUBLICITY ON TONE OF RESPONSE.

3. POUCHING LETTER.
Under separate cover is the latest AMSCORD propaganda item in support of the MINVIPER program. It exploits an actual case of a firm which literally laughed in the face of AMSCORD protestations, and shortly thereafter fell afoul of ODMARK with the result that it lost its import-export license. AMSCORD reproduced the pertinent correspondence in sequence with the comment that this is one of several things which can happen to those who trade with Communist Cuba.

[Signature]

Attachment:
Propaganda, USC

Distribution:
3 - DC, WH/SA, w/att., USC
UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA continues its research in reference to the firms that are still trading with Communist Cuba. We are making a thorough investigation in order to avoid mistakes, but as soon as completed, the "Black List" will be published and distributed throughout the Free World.

Many firms have already realized what trading with Communist Cuba means, and have also taken into consideration Cuba's credit unworthiness - ONE BILLION DOLLARS of foreign debt. Therefore, these firms have backed away from this shameful and irksome market.

Besides, the people of the Countries of the Free World are sympathetic with our cause; take as an example the boycott started by the Venezuelan Federation of Dock-workers in accordance with the first resolution of the "Fifth Congress of Venezuelan Workers". Labor unions of other nations have already followed suit.

Or take the case of Mr. Shepherd, from Great Britain, which is illustrated in this pamphlet.
UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA sent Shepherd this letter regarding the "Black List".

UR
MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA

Shepherd Export & Trading Company

Date: [unreadable]

To: Shepherd Export & Trading Company

Subject: Black List

Dear Sirs,

We refer to our letter of [unreadable], and in response thereto, we wish to confirm that the list of restricted persons has been revised, and that the said list now only includes [unreadable] names, and that no one on the list is engaged in International Commerce.

Yours truly,
[Signature]

[Company Letterhead]

SHEPHERD continued trading with Castro...
SECRET 032152

DIR INFO PARI COPE LOND CITE WAVE 7986

TYPIC: MI7SPN

REF: A. DIR 82382
B. DIR 78938

1. ASSUMPTION PARA I REF A CORRECT. SUMMARY RELEASE FOLLOWS:

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (UR) IN RECEIVED CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE FROM
NUMBER SOURCES THAT SOVIETS MAY ANNOUNCE WITHDRAWAL ECONOMIC AID
TO CUBA AFTER PARTY MEETING 1 MAR MOSCOW AND THAT SOVBLOC OFFICIALS
STUDYING WAYS DISENGAGE ASAP SINCE CUBA NOW COSTS BLOC 12 BILLION
YEAR WHICH MORE THAN IT WORTH. RUSS LEADERS HAVE TO CONSIDER
(1) SOV UNION INTERNAL PROBLEMS WHICH NEGATIVE TO CASTRO SINCE
ACCORDING STATEMENTS BY KOSYGIN, MIKANIN AND BREZHNEV DEC 64 USSR
FAR FROM REACHING FARM, CATTLE AND INDUSTRIAL GOALS; (2) ATTITUDE
EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITES WHICH ALSO UNFAVORABLE TO CASTRO JUDGING
FROM ARTICLES IN CZECH "LITERARNI NOVINY" AND "KULTURNI ZIVOT"
AND BRITISH "FINANCIAL TIMES" WHICH INDICATE COMECON CONSIDERS
FURTHER AID TO CUBA BEYOND BLOC CAPABILITIES; (3) CASTRO'S OWN
PROBLEMS, E.G. LACK DOLLAR CREDITS AND DEPRESSION IN WORLD SUGAR
MARKET WITH PRICE DROPPING FROM DEC 63 PEAK 12.6 TO 2.35 CENTS POUND
On 25 Jan 65.

2. Local play limited to Miami News Spanish-language Section, Norman Diaz (WQET) and Manolo Reyes (Channel 4 TV), but Time Magazine's J. Mallin requested copy of release and asked us to keep him posted developments this field.

3. Airmailing copies per Refs.

SECRET

4. Indicated sentiment re Stil Disenchantment Cuba.
SECRET 041533Z

DIR INFO THE PARI LODR MADD CITE (WAVE 7922) KINHURST ACTING

TYPIC MHVIPER

REF: A. DIR 77508
B. DIR 81029

1. ANSROLL PRESS RELEASE IN ENGLISH AND SPANISH SURFACING REF A MATERIAL ISSUED 3 FEB ALL LOCAL OUTLETS INCLUDING WIRE SERVICES. UNDER TITLE "GREEK FIRM LEARNS LESSON FROM TRADE WITH COMMUNIST CUBA" WITH SUBHEAD "LOSES $182,000 AND HELD FOR DAMAGES BESIDES," RELEASE ATTRIBUTED "HIGHLY RELIABLE UNDERGROUND SOURCES."

2. BEING MAILED 17 ATHE NEWSPAPERS, 2 GREEK PAPERS NEW YORK CITY AND SEVERAL HUNDRED FREE WORLD FIRMS TRADING WITH CUBA. LOCAL AFP STRINGER ADVISES HE CABLED GIST HIS NEW YORK OFFICE.

3. POUCHING PRESS RELEASE ALL ADDRESSES. WILL AIRMAIL CLIPS HOS.

SECRET

CFN

4/4/65

P-126-26
A. OPERATIONAL

1. During December there was considerable pressure on AMSCROLL to join political groupings being formed by ex- Presidents Urrutia and Prio. Fortunately, AMSCROLL was able to stay out of both without incurring the wrath of either.

B. PRODUCTION

2. Although a number of new propaganda ideas were submitted by AMSCROLL for approval, the only new item for Cuban consumption actually printed during the month was the pony bulletin. This and other items already on hand, including 5,000 Christmas cards, totalled 47,000 pieces which were sent in 20,000 covers to Cuba. Another 10,000 items were distributed to Latin America and Spain, and 19,700 to addressees in the U. S. Most of the two latter categories were based on requests from religious, social, and civic organizations. Samples of the items and a breakdown of the actual numbers of each distributed are in the attached AMSCROLL Propaganda Section report.

3. AMSCROLL broadcasts continued as scheduled. Chief among the themes, which also pervaded the two issues of the AMSCROLL house organ published during the month and the above-mentioned pony bulletin for Cuba, were as follows:

   a. The Congo in lurid detail with outrage at the Communist hand behind the atrocities, and with scorn for the so-called neutralists for their attitude for the rescue mission. AMSCROLL editorialized that except for the cannibalism, Congo tactics including ravage and wanton murder are what brought Stalin, Tito, Mao, and Fidel to power.
b. AMSCORD optimistically sees the start of a counter offensive against the rampages of Communism in Latin America. Examples cited were Castello Branco’s action in Goiás Province, Brazil; Venezuelan Army operations in the Andes; Panamanian preparations to control insurrection on the anniversary of the Canal riots; Argentine Foreign Minister Zavala’s public denunciation of Soviet colonialism in Cuba; Japen’s defeat at the polls in Guinea; and “Operation Ayacucho,” a seven-nation military maneuver against an “imaginary” target which has Latin American Communists screaming “foul!”

c. “Che” Guevara’s statements before the UN and during his television interview contrasted with quotations from previous speeches, especially his current whining for trade openings with the U.S., as opposed to past claims that U.S. sugar purchases kept Cuba in a state of colonialism. Much was made of the remark of the Nicaraguan delegate to the UN that Guevara’s address on behalf of Cuba was a Russian speech with an Argentine accent. It was also noted that “Che” admitted Cuba’s support of the terrorism in Venezuela.

d. Cuba’s worsening economic situation was, as heretofore, a constant theme. Featured this month were the obvious failures of the foraging trips of Carlos Rodrguez and “Che” Guevara, and a host of specific examples of material shortages admitted by Cuban public media.

e. The Martinez Sanchez suicide and the lack of precise details, especially in its aftermath, got considerable attention in AMSCORD propaganda, along with other notes on OGC strife.

f. The Sino-Soviet rift was expected to continue, according to AMSCORD, and the situation does not bode well for Castro’s relations with the new Kremlin leaders. Examples taken from press clippings.

g. The CTV boycott against free-world ships trading with Cuba was favorably noted as another facet of the tightening of the noose around Fidel’s neck.

h. End-of-year broadcasts centered on the decline of Communism after a half century it still fails to improve the living standards of the peoples engulfed, but instead increases terror and oppression to forge the populations into automatons for use in the realization of its mad dream of world conquest.

4. Among letters received during the month was a request from Palo Alto, California for a complete set of AMSCORD publications for the Hoover Institute’s archives on world revolutions.

5. AMFRAME-1, who is now second man in the AMSCORD Propaganda Section by dint of his demonstrated imagination and initiative, came up with a proposal during the month to test reaction to printed materials being sent to Cuba. Implemented immediately, it consists of a small coupon which accompanies each item mailed to 15,000 addressess on a rotating basis each month. The total is divided into four groups for sample purposes, each group being asked to respond to requests for general, readily available information on the basis of different stimuli, either to have the respondent’s code name announced over the radio or just listed among the “many” others who are contributing to the effort to overthrow the Castro regime. Theoretically, the assistance would be more fully acknowledged after the liberation. On the basis of results achieved during the first few months, the system will be refined until the most successful method for testing Cuban audience reaction is found. A report will be submitted when sufficient returns are in. The AMSCORD Propaganda Section report, attached, contains further details and a sample of the coupon.

6. We were pleased to receive EGFA 43043 which credited AMSCORD propaganda with a minor MINVIPER score on a West German firm which was doing business with Cuba. Evidently a number of free-world firms are disturbed in the same way by AMSCORD’s rattle-rattling letters on the possibility of a blacklist. A report is being prepared analyzing replies from target firms.
III. FINANCIAL

Salaries........................... $4,745.00
Operational expenditures ......... 9,180.75

TOTAL $14,925.75

IV. FUTURE PLANS

7. In process at month's end were a two-year analysis of the campaign against free-world shipping to Cuba, noting gains made and the job still to be done. For publication in booklet form; a new leaflet for Cuba showing how personal and family security are endangered more by not doing anything than by taking whatever steps against the regime are possible depending upon the opportunities which arise; and a leaflet for Latin American distribution showing on a map of Cuba the reported sites for the training of terrorists. A new departure in propaganda to Cuba will be the printing of the backs of all future leaflets in script form so that they will appear to be handwritten letters if viewed through the envelopes. Heretofore AMSCROLL has been unfolding other printed material in a simulated handwritten wrapper, but now each item will have its own "personal letter" built in to save valuable weight and bulk in the covers while still hopefully deceiving Cuban postal authorities.

[Signature]

Andrew K. Reuteman