

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Mr. David Phillips' Manuscript

FROM:

Richard S. Sampson, C/LAD
3C2019

EXTENSION

1431

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Mr. John M. Reeves
C/External Affairs Branch

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**APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM**

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5 MAY 1976

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John M. Reeves
Chief, External Affairs Branch
Office of Security

FROM : Richard S. Sampson
Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT : Mr. David Phillips' Manuscript

1. Following are comments on chapters 2, 5 and 11 of this manuscript which have been reviewed in LA Division:

2. Chapter N

a. The portion on the terrorist kidnapping in the Dominican Republic in 1974 (pages 38-41) should be deleted for the following reasons:

(1) This incident is still fresh in the minds of most Dominicans, and it is unrealistic to assume that it will not be picked up and published in the local press. Barbara Hutchison, USIA, one of the people kidnapped, is still in the Dominican Republic, and according to two fairly recent reports, is again being considered as a target for kidnapping. The potential for terrorist acts against US citizens continues, three top leaders of terrorist-oriented groups are currently in prison, and publication of this item could propel the terrorists into action.

(2) The close link between the Ambassador and the CIA which the author portrays could be prejudicial to his public image and might even provoke the terrorists to target against him.

(3) The Station has renewed a (liaison relationship) that was suspended after a local change in command and much effort is being directed toward developing a relationship of mutual confidence. The revelation

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of this information on an obvious (joint operation)²⁴,
 by the then Chief, LA, might lead our (increasingly²⁴
 friendly liaison) contacts to wonder whether we
 might be able to maintain confidence on future
 operations, and possibly jeopardize this relation-
 ship.

(4) Although the bugging of the thermos was
 discovered and appeared in the press, the use of
 the Coca Cola case did not receive such exposure
 and therefore continues to be an option for the
 future, at least as far as the (Dominican Republic)¹¹
 is concerned. Perhaps the author should be reminded
 of a cable that was written during his tenure as
 Chief, LA with regard to this particular audio²⁴
 operation: "BOTH EMBASSY AND (LIAISON PERSONNEL) SHOULD
 BE CAUTIONED TO HOLD EXISTENCE THIS OP TIGHTLY AS
 POSSIBLE TO LEAVE OPEN CHANCE USE THIS PLOY IN FUTURE
 CASES AS WELL AS PREVENT ADVERSE ACTION BY PRESENT
 KIDNAPPERS." Reference the author's footnote (page 39)
 that "Philip Agee long ago revealed..." this technique,
 Agee's revelation is certainly no criteria for further
 disclosure.

b. The passage regarding CIA's role in countering
 terrorist activity abroad should be deleted. The author
 singles out the Agency as "Only CIA, of American agencies
 abroad, is uniquely charged with countering these activi-
 ties". This could only increase the targeting of our
 personnel by terrorists, and possibly lead to another
 Welsh-type incident.

c. The author's confirmation of Agee's identification
 of CIA personnel should be deleted as well as the author's
 information on the disruption of Agency operations which
 resulted from Agee's exposes (pages 5-6, 41-43). Undoubtedly
 Agee and his ilk would be delighted with this gratis exposure
 and derive satisfaction in having it made known to the
 public, by one with first-hand knowledge, what impact
 exposes have on CIA operations, morale, etc.

d. We fail to understand the author's purpose in his
 references to the Kennedy assassination and Watergate,
 which raises the doubt about CIA involvement in the first,
 and leaves the reader pretty well convinced that there
 was involvement in the latter (pages 5, 16, 30).

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e. The following passages should be cleared with the appropriate Agency components:

p. 36 Mr. ?

(1) SE Division: The operation against the KGB (page 36). This operation took place in (Mexico)

(2) NE Division: The Arab terrorist activity in "Costa Brava" - which is Venezuela - and follow-up information involving the Middle East, and apparently a telephone-tap operation (pages 36-38).

f. The author notes (page 4) that more is being written on Chile operations. It is requested that this item be submitted for review by this Division prior to publication.

3. Chapter 54

a. There are no passages which we can require be deleted.

b. The following passages should be cleared with the appropriate Agency components:

Review the Gulf Steamship Company

(1) Reference to the Gulf Steamship Company being used as a cover for the broadcast aspects of the Bay of Pigs operation (pages 12 and 22). When checking this passage with Mr. Gordon Wohl, CCS, he asked that a copy of the manuscript be sent to his component for review.

p. 32

(2) Use of a New York public relations firm (not identified by name) which was "responsive to CIA control" (page 32). Other books and publications have identified the Lem Jones Associates as having handled the public relations aspects, but nowhere have we found it alleged to have been CIA-controlled. Some articles indicate that there is actually a Mr. Lem Jones, who was president of the firm. Perhaps the author's allegation that it was CIA-controlled should be deleted.

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(3) The reference to the coup in Iran in 1953 (page 52).

4. Chapter 2

a. Again, no passages were found for which there is a solid basis on which we can require deletion.

b. The following passages should be cleared with the appropriate Agency components:

X (1) CIA-FBI cooperation:

X FBI assistance in arranging the author's release from jail (page 7).

-The Agency's capability to alter FBI criminal records (page 8).

X (2) The Agency's preparation/use of false identity papers, including in the US (pages 1, 2, 3, 14, 16).

SE reports claimed
X (3) CIA's payment for the (British) vessel that was sunk during the Guatemala 1954 operation (page 35). We have turned up notations that indicate no payment had been made as of August 1960.

- (4) Reference to the operation in Iran (page 43).

ME
9 (5) Use of Agency funds for what could be considered rather frivolous purposes (pages 18-19 and 21).

R.S. Sampson
Richard S. Sampson

Attachments:
Chapters 2, 5, 11

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