

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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14-00000

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS-3/505,853
SUBJECT	Status of the Anti-Castro Movement In Cuba, December 1961	DATE DISTR.	29 March 1962
		NO. PAGES	6
		REFERENCES	RD-W-2107
DATE OF INFO.	20 December 1961		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Argentina, Buenos Aires (18 January 1962)	FIELD REPORT NO.	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: An [official Argentine service.] ²⁴
Appraisal of Content: 3.

1. Anti-Castro activities in Cuba include those of the nation-wide organized movements and those of local fronts where independent guerrillas are grouped in small units. The penetration of the Cuban armed forces is insignificant.
2. The national movements which have been active in Cuba are the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR), Movimiento Democrata Cristiano (MDC), Movimiento Revolucionario 30 de Noviembre, Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP) Rescate Revolucionario, and Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE). Other groups with limited organizations are the Unidad Revolucionaria and the A.A. (Asociacion de Amigos de Aureliano Sanchez Arango). The strength of the groups by province is as follows:

- a. Southern Oriente Province (Santiago de Cuba)
 - (1) MRR. The MRR, of Nino Diaz, has members from the ranks of the 26 of July Movement and, especially, from the former regular Army. Its civilian organization is poor, almost non-existent. The men remain inactive, waiting for a serious military action of a local or national character.
 - (2) MDC. The MDC has an adequate civilian organization; from the founding of the movement Santiago de Cuba has been one of its strongholds. The military organization is extremely poor. Many of its leaders have gone into exile or are trying to do so. They remain totally inactive in hope of an invasion which will resolve the situation, and only concern themselves about a future political life, at the time when the present government falls.
 - (3) 30 de Noviembre. There are few members of the 30 de Noviembre in Santiago de Cuba, and they lack contact with their national leaders. They have practically no resources.

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INFORMATION REPORTS INFORMATION REPORTS

SI/OFS/WH	2	WH/CA/HCP	1	TFW/IM	1	WH/2/A/R	2									HABA-10518
SI/INT/RE	1	WH/CI	1	TFW/OI	1	WH/BUEN	1									(BIOGENESIS) 01
RS/ASD/RAW	1	TFW/R	2	TFW/SI	1	WH/PACX	1									CS-3/505,853
CH/R	1	TFW/INTEL	2	TFW/PA-THARPA	1	TFW/WAVE	1									
WH/SEC	1	TFW/DT/RSCH	1	TFW/SI	1											COORDINATING/RELEASING

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- (4) MRP. Until October 1961 the MRP had a good civilian and military organization. Immediately after the arrest of Rafael Gonzalez, the national co-ordinator, the local co-ordinator and almost all the members in the province sought asylum. The new co-ordinator is trying to reorganize the movement. There are still enough men of action, coming from the 26 of July Movement, but they have to re-establish contacts.
- (5) Rescate: Rescate has no members in this area.
- (6) DRE. The DRE was completely broken by the unsuccessful uprising of Alberto Muller and by the arrest in October of "El Fiera", provincial co-ordinator. The DRE still has great prestige in the area, and there are many who would follow its direction.

b. Northern Oriente Province

- (1) MRR. The MRR is practically non-existent in northern Oriente Province, with the exception of a few personal contacts of Nino Dias.
- (2) MDC. The MDC is poorly organized and inactive.
- (3) 30 de Noviembre. It has a mediocre organization, few members, and is inactive.
- (4) MRP. Even before the debacle of October the MRP had a very poor organization in this area. Fito Gomez ("Ricardo"), the co-ordinator, was arrested in the roundup at that time, but escaped and took asylum in the Ecuadorian Embassy. His successor and the military and civilian personnel are relatively capable.
- (5) Rescate. It does not exist in this area.
- (6) DRE. It does not exist in this area.

c. Caraguay Province.

- (1) MRR. At the beginning of April 1961 Caballero (fnu), the co-ordinator, whose nickname is "El Viejo", was arrested and condemned to 30 years on the Isle of Pines. Arango (fnu), who was named co-ordinator in August, has been forced to seek asylum in Habana. The movement has been destroyed.
- (2) MDC. The MDC has an excellent co-ordinator, Blanco (fnu), who is responsible, discreet, with good connections. The MDC has a very good civilian organization and at present is concerned about its military organization, for which they already have some personnel. They work effectively and are trying to carry out some military actions.
- (3) 30 de Noviembre. The civilian organization is relatively good. It has a small but effective military force.
- (4) MRP. Caraguay is practically the only province in which the MRP was not affected by the arrests of October. It has a good civilian organization and military forces of importance, which are under the command of former officers of the Rebel Army. Arquimedes Caballero ("Esteban"), its former co-ordinator, took asylum in the Brazilian Embassy; "Ricardo", his replacement, is very young (21 years old) but is considered very good.
- (5) Rescate. It has a poor organization. There are enough men, but they are inactive.
- (6) DRE. Few members of the DRE remain, and "Tronco" and Rafael Angel Quevedo, its directors, are known by G-2. The movement has been destroyed.

- d. Las Villas Province. It is estimated that no movement has an effective organization in its province. A few men in each movement maintain this fiction of the existence of their organizations.
- e. Matanzas Province. This province has been used by the movements as a route for the entrance and exit of men and military equipment. The points used are under careful watch, and the personnel doing this work has been reduced to nothing. The MRR, MDC, MRP, and, to a lesser extent, the 30 de Noviembre have civilian organizations with little or no effectiveness.
- f. Habana Province. Provincial organizations practically do not exist, since provincial work is absorbed by the national committees of the movements, all of which are in the City of Habana. The men of the first, second, and even third rank are, in almost all cases, either prisoners, in asylum, or in exile. Those who survive have succeeded because of the co-operation of those who, although not members of the movement, are opposed to the government.
- g. Pinar del Rio Province. It is estimated that no organized movements exist in Pinar del Rio.
- h. National directorates.
 - (1) MRR. "Esteban", its present co-ordinator, is very young (23 years old), and lacks the necessary capability. Although he is courageous and generous, he becomes lost in small details. The group which makes up the national committee is ineffective, since this movement was largely destroyed after 17 April 1961.
 - (2) MDC. The MDC is directed by politicians, little qualified for a clandestine fight which does not interest them. Alberto del Junco, a man of action who succeeded the inefficient Pepin Fernandez ("Lucas"), had to take asylum in the Argentine Embassy.
 - (3) 30 de Noviembre. Pedro Forcada ("Villareal"), the present co-ordinator, is the former secretary-general of the Federacion de Obreros Quimicos and has good contacts in the labor field. He knows how to work, but his attachment to women makes him forget his responsibilities frequently. In November this movement was the victim of a denunciation which resulted in the arrest of over 40 members. The consequences of the denunciation are not known. It was attributed by some to Jose Reyes, Habana provincial financial secretary, and by others to an engineer who used to work on the national committee.
 - (4) MRP. The arrest of Reinol Gonzalez has left the MRP reduced to almost nothing. National leaders held by G-2 are: Reinol Gonzalez ("Antonio"), Fernando de Rojas ("Pablo") co-ordinator of Habana; Benteria (fnu) ("Rene"), co-ordinator of Matanzas; Hery Martinez "Francisco", labor co-ordinator; Roberto Jimenez ("Pedro"), national student co-ordinator; and, in addition, 80 to 90 others were arrested. Those who took asylum are: Javier Chacon ("Saul"), co-ordinator of Santiago de Cuba, and Arquimedes Caballero ("Esteban"), co-ordinator of Camaguey, in the Brazilian Embassy; Rafael Gomez ("Ricardo"), co-ordinator of Holguin, and Jesus Rodriguez ("Gomes"), co-ordinator of Las Villas, in the Ecuadorian Embassy; Francisco Leon ("Pordano"), successor to Reinol Gonzalez, and Manuel Castro ("Yeyo"), chief of military operations, in the Argentine Embassy; "Agustin", national finance officer, in the Panamanian Embassy; Dr. Orizondo (fnu) ("El Doctor"), who was in charge of contacts with professional classes, in the Colombian Embassy. A person known by the nickname "Chicho" has been designated new national co-ordinator and is probably the most capable of those remaining. It is believed that in most cases he can regain 25 per cent of the movement's previous effectiveness.

b. Las Villas

- (1) Corralillo Front. Caspitas and Ton-Diki are the two leaders who have become well known in this zone. Caspitas is no longer mentioned, although he still operates in this area, remaining hidden with some 20 poorly-armed men. Ton-Diki gained fame in the province as the result of killing some brigadistas and militiamen. About the middle of December 1961 it was rumored that he had been captured.²
- (2) North Front (Yaguajay). For some months there have been groups which vary between 40 and 100 men, the total for the whole zone. There seems to be enough food to supply 200 men. In the last weeks (early December 1961) they have carried out some activities such as the brief capture of the towns of Meneses and General Carrillo, acts which resulted in the arrest of a great number of civilians not connected with the uprising. Doctor Armandó Delgado, who served as the contact with the insurgents and was in charge of supplies, has taken asylum in the Equadorean Embassy. His second-in-command, Jimenez (fsm), was arrested.
- (3) Escambray Front. The three best-known leaders of this front are Osvaldo Ramirez, Congo Pacheco, and Rancho Villa. There is no discipline among the groups, and the front is very disorganized. It is estimated that the number of insurgents does not exceed 300, lacking arms and having little food. Ramirez' reputation among the lower class is good but not so among anti-Castro leaders because of his notorious criminality.³ The centers of supply of food and munitions, such as Placetas, Sancti Spiritus, Trinidad, Santa Clara, Cienfuegos, and Manicaragua, have suffered many arrests. It is probable that this front will not grow because of the lack of organization of the national anti-Castro movements in Las Villas Province.

- c. Oriente Province, Sierra Maestra Front. "William", former chief of action of the 30 de Noviembre, rose in rebellion about mid-1961 with a group of 50 men in the Niquero zone. With the aid of different movements organized in Manzanillo, the help of 50 militiamen and 25 or 30 rebel soldiers, and the co-operation of a leader of the MRP whose name is unknown, he succeeded in uniting 200 men. Their lack of arms made possible the capture of 50 of them in August, and "William", who was among them, was executed.⁴ About 100 men remain at present. They have some arms but are inactive.

Penetration of Military Units of the Cuban Government.

- a. Navy. Among the officers only a few have been conspiring and those have been retired from active service and named as administrators of co-operatives. The penetration is more effective at some naval posts, through which equipment can enter. Given the little importance of the Navy and the limited penetration within it, it is not believed that the Navy would play an important part in any national anti-Castro military operation.
- b. Rebel Army. The lack of a serious plan of the anti-Castro leaders who have made contact with the officers of the Rebel Army has prevented penetration of the Army from being a significant part of the anti-Castro struggle. It is estimated that 75 per cent of those officers on active duty who fought in the hills during the struggle against Batista are now opposed to the government, but those officers now lack effective control and will not again have it. There have been some cases of officers providing arms and munitions, but it has happened only sporadically.
- c. Police. Dissatisfaction among the police can be considered of minimal importance because of the presence of militiamen in police stations and the assumption of police functions by the militias. Although some of the lower-ranking members of the police force are against the regime, their supervisors are Communists.