

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Current Status of Cuban Exile Reactions to the Resignation of Dr. Jose MIRO Cardona

REFERENCE : Memo to DCI, dated 11 April 1963;
Subject: Cuban Exile Reactions to the Resignation of Dr. Jose MIRO Cardona

1. This memorandum is for your information and is in response to your request for an updating of reference memorandum.

2. Our Station in Miami reports that Dr. MIRO has called a meeting of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) for today to reiterate his intention to resign and actually go through with his resignation if he does not receive word that the President wants to discuss the matter with him or if he receives no indication from Washington that there is a definite plan for the liberation of Cuba. The final decision may be postponed until 18 April, at which time it is expected that Dr. MIRO's resignation will be formally accepted. MIRO would accept a military man, such as General Maxwell Taylor as an emissary from the President, but does not want to deal with a "Harvard Professor." MIRO would expect this emissary to be able to point to specific United States policies and programs for the overthrow of the CASTRO regime.

3. Our Station in Miami further reports that Dr. MIRO has decided not to release his entire 25 page resignation statement to the press in its present form as it is too long to be published in the newspapers except as a paid advertisement. MIRO does intend, however,

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

- 2 -

to delete quotes from high level United States Government officials and issue instead a "hard hitting" statement based on the substance of the 25 page document.

4. It is Dr. MIRO's opinion that when he resigns the CRC will liquidate itself. He feels that the United States Department of State had planned the liquidation of the CRC as one of the last steps in the development of a co-existence policy with the CASTRO regime. When his resignation becomes effective, Dr. MIRO feels it will be impossible for him to continue living in the United States after all the furor created by this incident. It has previously been reported that Dr. MIRO might leave the United States to form an organization similar to the CRC in another friendly country.

5. Meanwhile, there appears to be sharp differences of opinion within the CRC and among other independent exile groups and individuals as to the wisdom of Dr. MIRO's precipitous action in threatening to publish his letter of resignation, thus causing the alienation of the United States Government and the probable collapse of the CRC itself. Dr. MIRO is confident that the CRC will support his action and its members will, in turn, use his resignation as an occasion for denouncing current United States policy on Cuba. According to Dr. MIRO, the Revolutionary Students' Directorate (DRE) and the Association of Cuban Lawyers in Exile have pledged their support to him and will make public statements in his behalf. He claims that he is receiving messages of support from Mexico, Brazil and Chile, some requesting copies of his 25 page resignation statement. A plan to create a Hemisphere-wide organization to begin a campaign to free Cuba is allegedly underway.

6. Dr. MIRO claims that the United States Government is now taking the line of insulting and attacking him and he has declared that he "will not stand for being insulted" by the U. S. Government in addition to the followers of BATISTA and CASTRO. He added that CASTRO's announced support of United States Government treatment of him tends to support his suspicion that the U. S. Government is following a line of peaceful co-existence.

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

He states that he has heard from "friends," whom he did not further identify, that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee might request him to testify before that committee. Although reluctant to get involved in a political situation in which certain questions would be asked which he feels probably should not be answered, he would, of course, comply, if subpoenaed. He has sent word to Cuban trainees in the U. S. Army not to abandon their training, having heard that a number of Cuban exiles undergoing officer training had their bags packed ready to leave Fort Benning as a result of the incident concerning him.

7. The Miami Herald of 12 April, speculated that MIRO may be using the United States anti-raid decree and threatened resignation in order to win support from exile groups not affiliated with the CRC. A spokesman for one such group claimed that Dr. MIRO was displaying to exile leaders a letter from President Kennedy purportedly pledging United States aid to exiles in their fight to liberate Cuba. According to The Miami Herald, opposition to United States anti-raid policy has brought about exile unity not seen since April 1961. UPI correspondent Adolfo Merino is preparing a campaign in favor of Dr. MIRO, according to Dr. MIRO. Merino allegedly told Dr. MIRO that there appears to be a campaign in Washington to denigrate Dr. MIRO, and he intends to counter this campaign. Merino also stated that he knew the contents of Dr. MIRO's 25 page resignation statement although he had not personally seen the document itself.

8. A Miami Station source reports that the present crisis between Dr. MIRO and the United States Government has caused great and wide-spread pessimism in exile groups. This is not due to any popular support which Dr. MIRO has among the exiles, but because of the issue involved, i.e., the restrictions imposed upon Cuban exile efforts to defeat CASTRO, and upon this issue the exiles are compelled to support Dr. MIRO whether they like him or not.

9. It is noteworthy that Manuel Antonio de VARONA Loredó, a leading member of the CRC and one of the most outspoken critics of the United States policy on Cuba, privately believes that Dr. MIRO has gone too far and too fast in his dispute with the Kennedy administration.

SECRET

SECRET

-4-

VARONA understands that MIRO was asked by Washington officials to wait 30 days before taking a definitive position and thus be able to view the crisis more calmly, but MIRO refused. VARONA believes that the abruptness of this action was an error on MIRO's part. VARONA said that he is opposed to the publication of MIRO's resignation because the document touches upon sensitive and confidential areas and would be prejudicial to the Cuban cause. He hopes that a middle course can be found as a way out of the present crisis. There appears to be some sentiment in the CRC to continue the organization with a new president. Enrique HUERTAS Pozo, head of the Cuban exile doctors' association, has hinted that he would be prepared to step into the vacant presidency of the CRC.


10. Dr. MIRO's rivals and enemies in the Cuban exile community are reportedly making plans to exploit the political vacuum which they expect will be created by the resignation of Dr. MIRO and the anticipated collapse of the CRC. Followers of Manuel RAY Rivero are reported to be pleased with the crisis between the CRC and the United States Government and hope that the split becomes irrevocable. If Dr. MIRO resigns they believe that RAY, with the backing of liberal Latin American leaders, will become the principal Cuban exile leader. Although Manuel ARTIME Buesa, secretary general of the MRR and former political chief of the Brigade, has extended his support to Dr. MIRO in the present crisis, it is known that ARTIME has nothing but contempt for MIRO. This may, therefore, be a political tactic to encourage MIRO to break relations between the CRC and the United States Government and thus place ARTIME in a more advantageous position, vis a vis, the Cuban exile community and the United States Government. One group, the Peoples' Revolutionary movement (MRP), which had recently decided to join the CRC, changed its plan when Dr. MIRO's controversial resignation was publicized. The MRP leaders came to the conclusion that the CRC was finished and they thereupon entered into negotiations to amalgamate with the ALPHA 66 and the Second National Front of the Escambray (SNFE). Followers of former President Fulgencio BATISTA are reported to be delighted with MIRO's difficulties and they now feel that MIRO is getting what he deserves for having played the role of a U.S. puppet.

11. In another development, related to, but not


SECRET

directly a result of the MIRO situation, there appears to be a movement within the Cuban Brigade to organize a formal request for the return of the Brigade flag, which was presented to President Kennedy at the Orange Bowl ceremony for the Brigade on 29 December 1962, An attempt will be made to obtain the support of those members of the Brigade who are stationed at Fort Jackson and Fort Benning who will be on leave in Miami over the Easter weekend. Subsequent to this, it is planned to circulate a letter to all local Miami radio and T.V. outlets announcing the intention of the Brigade to demand the return of their flag.

12. We conclude from the foregoing that Dr. MIRO's usefulness to the U.S. Government and to the Cuban exile community has come to an end, even if he should reconsider at the last moment his decision to resign. His resignation and the probable disintegration of the CRC is likely to usher in a period of intense political maneuvering and jockeying for status among the various political groups and the many self-styled leaders in the Cuban exile community. It is not likely that this process will result in any greater degree of genuine unity and cohesiveness in the Cuban exile community than has existed in the past. More than ever, the prime target of these exile leaders in their efforts to gain support and patronage will be the United States Government, without whose assistance, they are convinced, no effort to unseat the CASTRO regime can be successful.



Desmond Fitzgerald
Chief, Special Affairs Staff



SECRET

13 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Summary Analysis of Funds Granted to the Cuban Revolutionary Council for the Period 1 May 1961 through 31 March 1963

1. A budgetary analysis has been prepared covering U.S. Government financial support to the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) for maintenance of its organizational entity and operational activity and for payments to and on behalf of the Brigade.

2. Period covered: The analysis covers payments made from 1 May 1961 through 31 March 1963.

3. Organization: The CRC was formed early in 1961 and worked in conjunction with the Frente Revolucionario Democrático (FRD). The latter organization provided the "front" for the Brigade forces before and after the Bay of Pigs in addition to conducting propaganda and political action activities. Although the CRC was not designated the focal point for Cuban exile activities until September 1961, no distinction has been made in this analysis since the CRC absorbed many of the FRD activities.

4. Funding of CRC: Each month the CRC submits a request for funds which is based on general purpose: administrative support of the Council, propaganda activities, underground activities, special expenses of the Latin American delegations, subsidy support of the Judicatura Cubana Democrática (Jurists), and Brigade compensation payments.

5. Financial reports: Monthly the CRC Comptroller prepares a detailed financial report on the use of funds granted the Council. This report is sent to the CIA representative in Miami and is then forwarded to Headquarters.

6. Summary: During the period 1 May 1961 through 31 March 1963 the CRC received \$3,000,000 from the U.S. Government for administrative and operational expenses. (Note: This figure does not include Brigade payments which totaled \$8,300,000 for this same period.) Dr. Miro Cardona, President of the CRC, receives compensation of \$600 a month (\$7,200 annually) plus travel and related business expenses.

7. Attached are (A) Description of Funds Granted; and (B) Resume of the CRC financial report for October 1962, a report which is representative of the Council's expenses.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

**DESCRIPTION OF FUNDS GRANTED
CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
1 May 1961 - 31 March 1963**

ADMINISTRATIVE AND OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY: \$3,000,000

Administrative funds are used for salaries, travel, office expenses, and related costs of the Council. At the present time \$83,333 is granted each month (\$1,000,000 a year) for these costs.

Operational activity funds are used for the Council's propaganda and underground operations, special expenses of the Latin American Council delegations, and subsidy to the Jurists. At the present time, the Council receives \$55,400 a month for these activities.

BRIGADE SUPPORT: 8,300,000

April 1961 returnees:

Payments to Brigade members who returned from Cuba in April 1961 were continued through July 1961. Compensation (including bonus) payments amounted to \$1,000,000.

Non-returnees:

Brigade support payments for non-returnees (includes 60 prisoners paroled in April 1962, returnees in December 1962, and members missing or killed in action) amounted to \$7,300,000 for compensation, bonuses, and medical expenses.

TOTAL FUNDS GRANTED TO CRC 11,300,000

SECRET

**GROUP 1
Excludes from automatic
downgrading and
declassification**

SECRET

**RESUME OF CRC FINANCIAL REPORT
October 1962**

Council President's office: Includes rent and related office expenses, travel, and discretionary fund.	\$5,121
Executives: Compensation to 13 Council members at \$350 a month.	4,550
Delegations: Salaries of delegations to Latin American countries and in the United States. Delegations are located in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Santo Domingo, Uruguay, Venezuela, Washington, D.C., and New York.	15,444
Payroll: Salaries of Council employees. The highest paid employee receives \$400 a month.	27,782
	No. of employees
Dr. Miro's office	12
Comptroller's office	11
Office employees	41
Mov. Rescate Revolucionario Democratico	15
Mov. Democrata Cristiano	13
Mov. Agrupacion Montecristi	16
Mov. Recuperacion Revolucionaria	9
Mov. 30 de Noviembre	8
Mov. Triple A Independiente	5
Dr. Enrique Huerta's office	1
Ing. Carlos Hevia's office	1
Sergio Carbo's office	1
Newspaper men	6
Dr. Antonio Maceo's office	2
Propaganda office	6
Total employees on payroll	147
Travel: Travel expenses of Council members and employees.	1,078
General Expenses: Office rent, telephone, supplies and equipment, utilities, translation services, insurance, etc.	11,431
Military Committee: Salaries of 16 employees and expenses.	3,865
Heroes and Martyrs: Assistance to widows and dependents of Cubans killed or imprisoned by Castro and to other appropriate individuals.	3,381

SECRET

<p>GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification</p>
--

SECRET

Social Work: Salaries of 7 employees and expenses.	\$4,360
Visa Waiver: Salaries of 5 employees and expenses.	3,160
Organizations: Salaries of 9 employees.	2,250
Brigade: Salaries of 3 employees and expenses for the Council's activities in connection with the Brigade. This does not include U.S. Government payments passed through the CRC to Brigade members and dependents.	1,627
TOTAL COUNCIL ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES	84,049
Propaganda: Production and distribution of written material, radio time, posters, etc.	21,629
Underground: Payments to member groups of the Council for underground activities in Cuba.	16,500
Latin American Delegations: Operational expenses of the Council's delegations.	4,204
Judicatura Cubana Democratica: Subsidy to Jurist group which is affiliated with the CRC.	5,000
TOTAL COUNCIL OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY EXPENSES	47,333
Brigade compensation (payments to dependents)	297,377
Returnee (April 1962) medical expenses	6,867
TOTAL BRIGADE SUPPORT	304,244
TOTAL CRC FINANCIAL REPORT FOR OCTOBER	435,626

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

16 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President - 5:30 - 15 Apr 1963
In Palm Beach, Florida

98
1. [Mr. Lundahl gave a complete briefing on the latest satellite photography of the Soviet Union and both satellite and U-2 photography of Communist China.]

98
2. [Reviewed with the President the details of the Helms/Angleton papers covering their counter-intelligence work in the French effort to penetrate certain U.S. scientific areas. I recommended to the President that we initiate a program of misinformation, which the President approved, and Helms and Angleton were instructed to proceed. The justification for the Helms/Angleton activities were based upon intelligence received from which was confirmed by the French intelligence sources, of a plan on the part of the SDECE to penetrate certain US scientific and nuclear installations.]

3. Discussed in some detail the Donovan negotiations in Cuba. Gave the President a copy of Miskovsky's summary of the Donovan discussions and a copy of my memorandum of April 15th on Cuba. President raised the question of Miro Cardona, stated that Cardona had misrepresented the facts. I urged that the President not involve himself personally in a public argument with Miro Cardona.

I raised the question of the possibility of working on Castro with the objective of disenchanting him with his Soviet relations causing him to break relations with Khrushchev, to effect the removal of Soviet troops from Cuba, reorient his policies with respect to Latin America, and establish in Cuba government satisfactory to the rest of the Hemisphere. I explained to the President that the Cuban problem must be solved in one of two ways; either the manner outlined above or alternatively, by bringing consistent pressure of every possible nature on Khrushchev to force his withdrawal from Cuba, and then to bring about the downfall of Castro by means which could be developed after the removal of the Soviets troops (but not before) and thereafter establish a satisfactory government in Cuba. I stated to the President that we were studying both courses of action and I had not made up my mind concerning the feasibility of either plan. The President thought both approaches should be carefully examined and suggested the possibility of pursuing both courses at the same time. In any event it was decided that we should

2/mc

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

keep the Donovan channel open. I advised the President that Donovan has to return to Havana at the end of the week and that I will see him privately prior to his departure.

4. The President and I talked at some length concerning sabotage in Cuba. I expressed grave doubts and pointed out the hazards from his standpoint in view of the stand-down of the hit-and-run exile operations, the danger of attribution, etc. The President seemed to question whether active sabotage was good unless it was of a type that could "come from within Cuba." I said this was very difficult and that the initial operations conceived were from the sea. I said I thought a program should be engaged in only if it was an essential building block in an agreed program to remove the Soviets from Cuba and to take care of Castro.

98

5. [Advised the President of my plans for a brief trip to Europe. Also advised him that I had delayed my departure for a few days in order to meet with the Killian Board on April 23rd. I repeated my very strong objections to the Killian Board report and that I felt the report should either be withdrawn from the Board or amended. The President urged that I not engage in a controversy over this report, he had decided not to circulate it, that only one copy was in existence, and as far as he was concerned he had dismissed the entire matter. I told the President I had not discussed the Board's report with the Board, but if they brought it up I intended to urge its amendment but would not engage in a controversy with the Board.]

98

6. [Discussed briefly the problems of Soviet leadership in the USSR and gave the President a copy of the paper on this subject.]

98

7. [Advised the President of the study of future satellite photography which I had initiated. It was obvious from our brief discussion on this subject that the use of the OXCART over Soviet territory was of great concern to him and he was most hopeful of improving satellite photography to a point where it would suffice our intelligence needs.]

98

8. [Briefly discussed the views of Mr. Kelly Johnson on the TFX and the Navy's plans to install a submarine research center on Andros Island in the Bahamas.]

JAM/mfb

4/mc

SECRET
EYES ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

*Read by the
Pres 4/10 at
1:00 PM
Not returned*

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

SUBJECT: Donovan Negotiations with Castro

1. James Donovan returned from Cuba yesterday after a four-day visit. As a result of talks with Castro, the Americans imprisoned on the Isle of Pines are to be released on 22 April. During the intervening period Castro will observe closely American policy toward Cuba and make sure that the Red Cross deliveries are being concluded in good faith.

2. The main thrust of Donovan's discussion, however, was political and can best be evaluated by a very confidential statement made to Donovan by Doctor Vallejo, a close personal advisor of Castro who was present at the meetings. Vallejo said Castro knew that relations with the United States are necessary and Castro wanted these developed. However, there are certain Cuban Government officials, communists, who are strongly opposed, even more than certain people in the United States. These officials are under close surveillance. They have no great following in Cuba; but if they rebelled at this time, Cuba would be in chaos. He believed that Donovan and Castro could work out a plan for a reasonable relationship between the two countries.

3. Donovan had two sessions with Castro, one for five hours, the other for fourteen hours. A variety of subjects were covered including the role of Red China in world politics, the Cuban economy, and Cuba's role in Latin America. In discussing any subject Castro came around to relating it to Castro's plan for developing Cuba. Castro finds the Soviet Union useful, but Cuba under Castro he claims will never become a Soviet satellite. He emphasized that the Cuban role in Latin America depended upon Cuba's viability rather than the export of subversion.

4. Donovan has the confidence of Castro, who believes that Donovan is sincere and direct with no official ties to the United States Government. Our debriefing of Donovan is continuing.

John A. McCone
JOHN A. McCONE
Director

SECRET
EYES ONLY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
EYES ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

15 APR 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

SUBJECT: Donovan Negotiations with Castro

1. James Donovan returned from Cuba yesterday after a four-day visit. As a result of talks with Castro, the Americans imprisoned on the Isle of Pines are to be released on 22 April. During the intervening period Castro will observe closely American policy toward Cuba and make sure that the Red Cross deliveries are being concluded in good faith.

2. The main thrust of Donovan's discussion, however, was political and can best be evaluated by a very confidential statement made to Donovan by Doctor Vallejo, a close personal advisor of Castro who was present at the meetings. Vallejo said Castro knew that relations with the United States are necessary and Castro wanted these developed. However, there are certain Cuban Government officials, communists, who are strongly opposed, even more than certain people in the United States. These officials are under close surveillance. They have no great following in Cuba; but if they rebelled at this time, Cuba would be in chaos. He believed that Donovan and Castro could work out a plan for a reasonable relationship between the two countries.

3. Donovan had two sessions with Castro, one for five hours, the other for fourteen hours. A variety of subjects were covered including the role of Red China in world politics, the Cuban economy, and Cuba's role in Latin America. In discussing any subject Castro came around to relating it to Castro's plan for developing Cuba. Castro finds the Soviet Union useful, but Cuba under Castro he claims will never become a Soviet satellite. He emphasized that the Cuban role in Latin America depended upon Cuba's viability rather than the export of subversion.

4. Donovan has the confidence of Castro, who believes that Donovan is sincere and direct with no official ties to the United States Government. Our debriefing of Donovan is continuing.

[[Signature]] JOHN A. McCONE

JOHN A. McCONE
Director

SECRET
EYES ONLY

OLC/GC/M. Miskovsky (15 APR 63)
ORIGINAL TO PRESIDENT - 15 APR 63

