

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG-2/75

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1 604753 EIA836 PAGE 01 IN 795558
 TOR:151902Z JAN 76 LOND 68796

SECRET 151705Z JAN 76 STAFF
 CITE LONDON 68796
 TO: DIRECTOR,
 RYBAT PLKMBALL
 NELSON FROM MEYER
 REF: ROGER CHANNEL 09548

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AC/102

4086

Did a copy of this ever go to the Paris Staff?
please see...
Scott Buchanan
which Hart?

1. REFERENCE FROM DEPARTMENT INFORMS EMBASSY THAT SENATOR HART OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE WILL BE ATTENDING CONFERENCE AT DITCHLEY 30 JANUARY TO 1 FEBRUARY. HE HAS REQUESTED THAT EMBASSY ARRANGE WITH DEREK TONKIN FOR BRIEFINGS ON SERIES OF SUBJECTS OF INTEREST TO HIM AND SELECT COMMITTEE. THEY ARE THE DIVISION OF LABOR BETWEEN A. SECURITY AND THE SECRET SERVICE AND B. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. HE GOES ON TO REQUEST BRIEFINGS ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR COVERT OPERATIONS AND POLITICAL CONTROL OF POLITICAL OPERATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE. IN ADDITION HE WANTS BRIEFINGS ON INTELLIGENCE BUDGET ALLOCATION AND COORDINATION AND SYSTEM FOR APPROVAL OF MAJOR INTELLIGENCE PROJECTS. SENATOR HART ALSO WANTS A BRIEFING ON THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT AND HOW IT WORKS.

2. TONKIN HAS BEEN CONTACTED BY EMBASSY OFFICER AND TONKIN HAS

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**Not Renewed*

7-71 MFG. 2/75

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PAGE 02-02

IN 795558

TOR:151902Z JAN 76

LOND 68796

ADVISED THAT BRITS WILL DO THEIR BEST TO PROVIDE INFORMATION SENATOR HART WANTS BUT THAT SOME OF THE INFORMATION COULD NOT BE MADE AVAILABLE, HE IS PROPOSING A JOINT MEETING WITH SIR LEONARD HOOPER AND RICHARD SYKES FOR GENERAL DISCUSSIONS ON THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND WITH MR. ROBERT ARMSTRONG AT THE HOME OFFICE ON THE WORKINGS OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT. THERE WILL BE CHANGES IN THE SCHEDULE AND EMBASSY WILL BE ADVISED BY MR. TONKIN AT A LATER DATE.

3. THERE IS NO INDICATION IN THE DEPARTMENT TRAFFIC THAT CIA HAS BEEN INFORMED BUT WE PRESUME THAT OFFICIALS OF THE AGENCY HAVE OR WILL BE CONTACTED BY SENATOR HART OF HIS STAFF ON THE MATTER.

4. NO FILE. E2, IMPDET.

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C/EA 3

T 602263

EIA 422

PAGE 01

IN 794546

TDR11500522 JAN 76

21033

SECRET 142302Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE [] 21033

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT TAPPER PLMHCONGA CODEL ADDABBO

File Senate/Staff

1. UPON ARRIVAL OF THE CODEL ON THE EVENING OF THE 12TH GEORGE CARY CONTACTED COS AND ARRANGED FOR STATION BRIEFING AT 0830/13TH (THE CONTRY TEAM BRIEFING WAS SCHEDULED FOR 0930). CARY MENTIONED THAT THE INTEL BRIEFS HAD BEEN GIVEN "TAIL END" TREATMENT AT PREVIOUS STOPS, AND CONGRESSMAN ADDABBO HAD INDICATED THAT HE WANTED TO BE SURE AND REMEDY THAT ON THE CANBERRA STOPOVER.

2. CONGRESSMEN ADDABBO, ROBINSON AND EDWARDS, ACCOMPANIED BY STAFFERS SNODGRASS, PRESTON AND GEORGE CARY ARRIVED AT THE EMBASSY AT 0830, WITH [] PRESENT, COS GAVE THEM DETAILED BRIEFING AS OUTLINED BY HEADQUARTERS. DISCUSSION COVERED THE MAKE-UP OF THE STATION AND BASES, OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVES IN [] THE OVERALL MANAGEMENT SCHEME USED BY HQS IN MANAGEMENT OF STATION AND ITS ACTIVITIES, OUR USE OF [] STRESSING OUR USE OF THEM TO SUPPLEMENT OUR LIMITED RESOURCES, OUR INTELLIGENCE CYCLE FROM VALIDATION OF REQUIREMENTS TO

SECRET

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T 602263

EIA422

PAGE 02

IN 794546

TOR:150052Z JAN 76

21033

PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE, SPECIFIC DETAILS^L OF HOW WE ACCOMPLISH OUR OPS TASKING- SPOTTING, ASSESSMENT, DIRECT CONTACT WITH TARGETS AND USE OF [] STATION BUDGET, ETC., ACTUAL EXAMPLES WERE USED WHENEVER POSSIBLE TO MAKE THE POINT. FOR EXAMPLE, THE PDWHIZ CASE WAS USED TO SHOW HOW THE STATION FOCUSES ON AN INDIVIDUAL, PRIMARY TARGET. IT WAS A LIVELY SESSION, WITH CONGRESSMAN ROBINSON AND SNODGRASS' THE "LIVE WIRES" OF THE GROUP. QUESTIONS WERE OF A ROUTINE NATURE PRIMARILY RELATED TO INCIDENTAL OPS DETAILS. FOR EXAMPLE, CONGRESSMAN ROBINSON NOTED THAT HE FELT IT RATHER EASY TO IDENTIFY

[]

COS RESPONSE WAS THAT SUCH IS OFTEN TRUE, BUT THAT STATIONS AND HQS MANAGEMENT ARE FOCUSING ON THAT SPECIFIC PROBLEM, AND THAT THE [] INCIDENT HAS CERTAINLY ACCELERATED OUR EFFORTS IN THAT REGARD.

3. ALL BUT A FEW MINUTES OF THE ENTIRE HOUR WAS SPENT IN DISCUSSING STATION OPS. GEORGE CARY CERTIFIED THAT THE GROUP WAS "WITTING" AND A FEW QUESTIONS AND ISSUES WERE ADDRESSED ON THE SPECIAL S AND T SUBJECT.

7-71.MFG. 2/75

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EIA422

PAGE 03

IN 794546

TDR150052Z JAN 76

21033

SNODGRASS WAS THE FOCAL POINT OF THAT EXCHANGE, AND IT IS REPORTED IN SEPARATE CABLE [REDACTED] 21027). AT (IN 793209) SNODGRASS' REQUEST STATION HAD ARRANGED A SPECIAL MEETING WITH A SELECT GROUP OF [REDACTED] OFFICIALS, THE DETAILS OF THAT MEETING AND AN ADDITIONAL ONE EARLIER IN THE AFTERNOON OF THE 13TH WITH DEFENSE ARE ALSO DETAILED IN [REDACTED] 21029. ON)* BECAUSE OF SOME RATHER UNUSUAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THESE MEETINGS, SUGGEST [REDACTED] REVIEW REFERENCED CABLE. THE CABLE WAS GIVEN RESTRICTED HANDLING BY STATION BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVITY OF ITS CONTENT.

4. THE MEETING LASTED THE FULL HOUR AND THE CONGRESS^S-MEN INDICATED THAT THEY WERE WELL-SATISFIED WITH WHAT HAD BEEN COVERED. CDS STRESSED THAT WE WERE AVAILABLE TO CONTINUE ON THE SUBJECT AFTER THE FORMAL AGENDA OF THE DAY WAS COMPLETED, BUT THEY INDICATED THE SUBJECT HAD BEEN ADEQUATELY COVERED. THERE WAS NO FURTHER STATION CONTACT WITH THE CONGRESSMEN DURING THEIR VISIT. THE STAFFERS DEPARTED ON THEIR "VISIT" IN THE EMBASSY CONVAIR ON SCHEDULE, AND WILL RETURN DIRECT TO [REDACTED] BY CONVAIR ON THE 14TH, ARRIVING AT ABOUT 2300. E2, IMPDET.

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T 595025

EIA412

PAGE 01-01

IN 791659

TOR:122154Z JAN 76.

21007

S E C R E T 122040Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE 21007

TO: INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CODEL RANDALL AND ADDABBO

REFS: A. 35606 (*iw787635*)

B. 35661 (*iw790579*)

 STATION MUCH APPRECIATES ADVANCED REPORTING
ON CODELS. WAS HELPFUL WITH THE RANDALL GROUP, AND AM SURE
WILL BE VALUABLE WITH ADDABBO GROUP AS WELL. REGARDS. E2 IMPDET.

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T 593616

EIA024

PAGE 01

IN 791004

TOR:121111Z JAN 76

35674

SECRET 120939Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE 35674

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLMHCUNGA CODEL ADDABBO

REF: 35661 (1790579)

1. AT RECEPTION AT HOME OF CHARGE NIGHT OF 11 JANUARY, REPRESENTATIVE ADDABBO MADE POINT OF TELLING COS THAT STATION BRIEFING AS PER REF WAS "DAMN GOOD" AND THAT HE APPRECIATED THE FRANK ANSWERS TO THE DELEGATION'S QUESTIONS.

2. MR. SNOUGRASS ALSO VOLUNTERED THAT THE BRIEFING HAD IMPACTED FAVORABLY ON THE DELEGATION AND THAT THEY WERE SURPRISED AND PLEASED TO GET SUCH STRAIGHTFORWARD ANSWERS TO THEIR QUESTIONS. HE ADDED THAT WHAT OFTEN GAVE HIM TROUBLE WAS STATEMENTS BY AGENCY OFFICERS THAT THEY HAD BEEN PURSUING SOVIET OFFICIALS FOR TEN YEARS OR MORE AND HAD NOT YET RECRUITED ONE. HE ALLUDED TO THIS AS THE BUREAUCRAT'S DREAM, BEING PERPETUALLY PAID FOR SEEKING THE HOLY GRAIL WITHOUT EVER FINDING IT. COS POINTED OUT TO MR. SNOUGRASS THAT SOVIETS WERE BEING RECRUITED AND THAT THE WORK OF ONE STATION WHICH MIGHT NOT RESULT IN RECRUITMENT WOULD BE THE VERY BASIS ON WHICH ANOTHER STATION IS ABLE TO MAKE A SUCCESSFUL

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7-71 MFG. 2/75

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T 593616

EIA024

PAGE 02

IN 791004

TOR:121111Z JAN 76

35674

RECRUITMENT APPROACH, IN COST EFFECTIVENESS TERMS, ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE RECRUITMENT OF A SINGLE SOVIET COULD AND DOES RESULT IN A MORE ACCURATE APPRAISAL OF THE SOVIET THREAT AND THUS A MORE RELISTIC ALLOCATION OF FUNDS TO MEET IT. MR. SNOGRASS ADMITTED THAT THIS WAS SO BUT ADDED HIS OPINION THAT MORE RATHER THAN LESS CONGRESSIONAL CONTACT WITH CIA FIELD PERSONNEL AS IN [REDACTED] WOULD BE A PLUS FOR THE AGENCY AND GIVE THE CONGRESS A BETTER FEEL FOR OUR ENDEAVORS AND PROBLEMS.

3. MR. CAREY ALSO SAID THAT ON THE BASIS OF HIS TALKS WITH MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION IT APPEARED THAT THE BRIEFING HAD GONE DOWN WELL AND THAT THEY FELT THEY WERE BEING GIVEN AN ACCURATE AND INTERESTING INSIGHT.

4. THUS IT SEEMS THAT STATION DID GET THROUGH TO THE DELEGATION DESPITE THE INITIAL IMPRESSION THAT THEY WERE GENERALLY LETHARGIC ABOUT IT.

5. NEW SUBJECT: DOES HEADQUARTERS HAVE ANY SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR HANDLING OF CODEL DIGGS? E2, IMPDET.

S E C R E T

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 2/75

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Waller
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T 592728 EIA152 PAGE 01 IN 790651

TOR:112233Z JAN 76

21000

S E C R E T 112220Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE 21000

TO: IMMEDIATE INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REF: WELLINGTON 15837 (*in 787572*)

1. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD DESIRES REFERENCED MEETING AT 0800 AND WILL EXPECT CONTACT FOR DETAILS UPON HIS ARRIVAL.

2. HE IS VERY EASY TO TALK TO AND AM SURE YOU WILL ENJOY THE MEETING. HE MET HERE WITH HEADS OF LIAISON SERVICES, ABOUT 45 MINUTES WITH EACH. HIS PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS ARE WHAT THEY THINK OF THE CURRENT INVESTIGATIONS, WHAT IMPACT HAVE THEY HAD ON FOREIGN INTEL RELATIONS, ETC.

3. HE HAS A MINOR HEARING PROBLEM, SO SHOULD ARRANGE TO HAVE HIM SEATED AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO

4. BEST REGARDS. E2, IMPDET.

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CS/RF, DDO, SADD, D/OLC

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T 592741

EIA165

PAGE 01

IN 790652

TOR:112313Z JAN 76

21001

SECRET 112305Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE [] 21001

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA RTBUSHEL (DUCKETT)

SUBJECT: MILFORD VISIT

1. COS SPENT ABOUT EIGHT HOURS WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ON 10 JANUARY, AND BELIEVE HE WENT AWAY TOTALLY SATISFIED THAT HE HAD ACCOMPLISHED HIS OBJECTIVES HERE. HE MET WITH

[] EACH FOR ABOUT 45 MINUTES AND ALL MEETINGS WENT WELL. ALSO WORKED THE MEETING IN WITH THE NASA REP AND THAT ALSO APPEARED TO GO WELL, AS DID THE MEETING ON THE SPECIAL S AND T SUBJECT.

2. INCIDENTAL CONVERSATIONS HELD WITH WILSON AND DICKINSON, DEALING WITH TERRORISM QUESTION. ENTIRE DELEGATION WAS VERY FRIENDLY AND A PLEASURE TO DEAL WITH. JACK MAURY'S PRESENCE WAS AN ASSET.

3. DETAILED SUMMARY OF DAY'S ACTIVITY BEING FORWARDED THIS DATE. E2 IMPDET.

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T 592369 EIA799 PAGE 01 IN 790579

TOR:111013Z JAN 76

35661

S E C R E T 110937Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE [] 35661

TO: DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE []

NIACT []

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CODEL ADDABBO

1. COS BRIEFED REPS ADDABBO, EDWARDS AND ROBINSON AND MESSERS PRESTON, SNODGRASS AND CARY ON 11 JAN IN COS OFFICE. ONE HOUR SESSION WAS BASICALLY QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD CONCERNING TARGETS, OVERALL BUDGET, FIELD PORTION OF BUDGET, ALLOCATION OF COSTS TO COMMUNIST TARGETS VS INTERNAL TARGETS, RELATIONSHIP WITH LIAISON, ASSESSMENT OF GOVT. STABILITY AND INSURGENCY POTENTIAL, MEANS OF ACQUISITION OF SECRET INFORMATION, MOST IMPORTANT REPORTING OVER PAST YEAR, AMOUNT OF []

[] , MALAYSIAN INSURGENCY,
 []

AND CONSTRAINTS OF COS SPENDING.

2. QUESTIONS WERE NOT PERSUED WITH MUCH VIGOR AND GROUP SEEMED NOT TOO DIFFICULT TO SATISFY. EXCEPTION WAS SNODGRASS, A YOUNG AGGRESSIVE STAFFER WHO OBVIOUSLY WANTED TO DELVE IN MORE DETAIL BUT WAS RESTRAINED BY TIME LIMITATIONS (THE

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EIA799

PAGE 02-02

IN 790579

TOR:111013Z JAN 76

35661

CONGRESSMEN WERE HUNGRY AND WANTED TO GET OFF TO LUNCH).

3. THE DELEGATION IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM CODEL RANDALL.

NONE HAD THE INTENSITY OR INTEREST OF REP MILFORD OR THE TOUGH
POLITICAL PERCEPTION OF REPS WILSON/DICKENSON. MR. CARY WAS QUITE
HELPFUL IN ORGANIZING THE GROUP AND PROVIDING CLUES TO THEIR
OUTLOOK.

4. OVERALL, BELIEVE DELEGATION WAS SATISFIED THOUGH THEY
PROBABLY DO NOT CONSIDER THIS AN IMPORTANT PART OF THEIR TRIP.
E2, IMPDET.

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EIA313

PAGE 01-01

IN 789314

TOR:091229Z JAN 76

20992

SECRET 090033Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE [] 20992

TO: [] INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REF: [] 15837 (787572)

1. COS WILL TAKE MATTER UP WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ASAP ARRIVAL CANBERRA AND ADVISE.
2. REGARDS. E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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TO: PRIORITY [] INFO []

RYBAT PLMHCONGA 4

REF: [] 35600 |IN 787573*| 4

Mr. Waller copy

1. STATION APPEARS TO HAVE HANDLED VISIT OF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD IN FINE FASHION. REF WILL BE HELPFUL IN FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSIONS HERE. 4

2. PARAGRAPH NINE, REFERENCE GIVES US SOME PROBLEMS. OBVIOUSLY, EVEN FACT THAT HE WAS BRIEFED BY CIA STATION CHIEF [] SENSITIVE SINCE THAT FACT ^{IF PUBLISHED} WILL CAUSE US EMBARRASSMENT

WITH [] PLUS CALLING UNWANTED ATTENTION TO STATION. FURTHER, STATION ACTIVITIES IN INTERNAL OPS FIELD AND FOCUS ON ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN [] WILL, IF PUBLISHED, CAUSE US DAMAGE IN [] ANOTHER PROBLEM IS THAT WE HAVE PLEDGED TO LIAISON THAT WE WILL PROTECT OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THEM. MEETING WITH YOGA, IF PUBLISHED, WILL BE INTERPRETED BY YOGA AS A BREACH OF FAITH. 4

3. THEREFORE REQUEST STATION FORWARD "NON-CLASSIFIED" VERSION OF BRIEFING AND YOGA MEETING BY CABLE. HEADQUARTERS

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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WILL HANDLE HERE WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD SO THAT STATION OPERATIONS INCLUDING LIAISON EQUITIES ARE PROTECTED.4

4. FOR [REDACTED] IF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD MAKES REQUEST FOR UNCLASSIFIED VERSIONS OF MEETING AND BRIEFINGS WITH/ BY STATION AND LIAISON STATION SHOULD AGREE FORWARD TO HEADQUARTERS AND WE WILL HANDLE IN SIMILAR FASHION [REDACTED] E2, IMPDET.

DATE: 8 JAN 76
 ORIG: B.J. HOUSTON
 UNIT: DCEA
 EXT: 9373

William E. Nelson

WILLIAM E. NELSON DDO
 RELEASING OFFICER

OLC MR. WHITE {DRAFT}
 SA/DDO MR. WALLER {TELECOORD}
 CEA/PMI UNFD *R.P. [Signature]*

Theodore G. Shackley

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA
 AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION **S E C R E T** REPRODUCTION OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT. E 2 IMPDET CL BY: 058913

7-71 MFG. 2/75

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EIA351

PAGE 01

IN 787635

TOR:080559Z JAN 76

35606

SECRET 080352Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE [] 35606

TO: DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE [] ROUTINE []

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

REF: [] 035600 (IN 787573)*

*felt in
senator /
congressman
travel*

1. CONGRESSMEN WILSON AND DICKINSON BRIEFED AT COS RESIDENCE NIGHT 7 JANUARY FOLLOWING A RECEPTION AT CHARGE'S RESIDENCE. THEIR INTERESTS LAY PRIMARILY IN GENERAL INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION OF SITUATION IN [] PARTICULARLY STABILITY OF GOVERNMENT AND ROLE OF [] MILITARY. THEY ASKED NO QUESTIONS CONCERNING ORGANIZATION, TARGETS, PERSONNEL OR BUDGET OF STATION. THEY WERE OPENLY CRITICAL OF YOGA BRIEFING, WHICH THEY HAD ATTENDED EARLIER IN THE DAY AS PER REF, AND FELT THAT YOGA HAD BEEN EVASIVE AND GENERALLY UNRESPONSIVE. THEY ASKED COS TO SUM UP WHAT YOGA HAD SAID. COS'S ANSWER WAS THAT YOGA HAD APPEALED FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE BUT HAD STRESSED THAT THIS WAS ONLY ONE ELEMENT OF THE TOTAL [] PLAN, WHICH INCLUDED ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AS A DEFENSE AGAINST COMMUNIST ENCROACHMENT. THE CONGRESSMEN AGREED THAT THIS WAS THE BASIC MESSAGE. SAID THAT IT COULD HAVE BEEN CONVEYED IN FIVE MINUTES

SECRET

7-71 MFG. 2/75

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PAGE 02

IN 787635

TOR:080559Z JAN 76

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RATHER THAN ONE HOUR PLUS,

2. THE TWO WERE ALSO INTERESTED IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY AND WHAT WAS BEING DONE ABOUT IT IN [REDACTED] THEY APPEARED HIGHLY INTERESTED WHEN COS REPORTED THAT THE STATION HAD PENETRATED WHAT APPEARED TO BE AN ACTIVE TERRORIST GROUP WHICH APPARENTLY HAD CONNECTIONS WITH THE JAPANESE RED ARMY. NEITHER HAD EVER HEARD OF THE JRA AND WERE INTERESTED IN A SHORT BRIEFING ON IT. BOTH MADE MENTION OF [REDACTED] CO-SPONSORSHIP OF THE U.N. RESOLUTION CONDEMNING U.S. MILITARY BASES IN GUAM. ONE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION IS REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO WONPAT, WHO IS THE REPRESENTATIVE FROM GUAM. THEY SAID MR. WONPAT HAD AGREED FOR THE SAKE OF DIPLOMACY NOT TO BRING UP THIS MATTER DURING THE VISIT, BUT THAT HE HAD CONFESSED TO SOME DIFFICULTY IN CONTAINING HIMSELF IN THIS MATTER. COS REPLIED THAT AS A PERSONAL OPINION HE SOMEWHAT REGRETTED THAT MR. WONPAT DID NOT EXPRESS HIMSELF ON THIS ISSUE SINCE WE HAD TAKEN SOME PAINS TO LET OUR [REDACTED] COUNTERPARTS KNOW THAT WE WERE NOT HAPPY AT THIS GRATUITOUS REBUFF. IT WAS ALSO POINTED OUT THAT STATION HAD MADE SURE THIS ISSUE WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF [REDACTED] WHO HAD REACTED BY INSTRUCTING THE [REDACTED] U.N. DELEGATION TO SEEK INSTRUCTIONS FROM [REDACTED]

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7-71 MFG: 2/75

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PAGE 03

IN 787635

TOR: 08 0559Z JAN 76

35606

BEFORE ACTING ON ANY SUCH ISSUE AGAIN. WE ALSO NOTED THAT

_____ HAD BEEN DEEPLY UPSET AT THE _____ UN.
DELEGATION VOTE ON THIS ISSUE AND HAD MADE HIS DISPLEASURE KNOWN
TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

3. DURING THE COURSE OF THE YOGA BRIEFING, SEVERAL OF THE
CONGRESSMEN HAD RAISED THE ISSUE OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF PRESIDENT
MARCOS AND "THE KING OF THAILAND" DEMANDING THE REMOVAL OF U.S.
MILITARY BASES FROM THEIR COUNTRIES. YOGA HAD RESPONDED THAT
THESE STATEMENTS WERE FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSUMPTION AND DID
NOT REPRESENT THE TRUE POLITICAL BELIEFS OF THE THAI AND PHILIPPINE
LEADERSHIP. AS YOGA PUT IT, THESE WERE POLITICAL STATEMENTS AND
NOT STATEMENTS OF POLICY, BOTH CONGRESSMEN FELT THAT THIS ANSWER
REPRESENTED HIGH DEGREE OF POLITICAL NAIVETE SINCE SUCH PUBLIC
STATEMENTS WERE HEADLINED IN THE U.S, AND NATURALLY AFFECTED
CONGRESS. CONGRESSMAN WILSON COMMENTED THAT IT WAS EXTREMELY
DIFFICULT TO FIGHT FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR THESE COUNTRIES
WHEN THEY WERE TELLING THE WORLD THAT THEY DIDN'T WANT IT. HE
ADDED THAT THAT GOES FOR THE GUAM RESOLUTION ALSO, HE ASKED FOR
COS'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON WHETHER TO KEEP QUIET ON THIS OR LET
HIS FEELINGS BE KNOWN. COS SUGGESTED THAT HE MIGHT WISH TO

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7-71 MFG. 2/75

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DISCUSS THIS WITH THE CHARGE, BUT OFFERED AS A PERSONAL OPINION THAT IT WOULD DO NO HARM AND MIGHT DO SOME VERY REAL GOOD FOR CONGRESSMEN TO LET THEIR FEELINGS BE KNOWN ON THIS SUBJECT.

COS ADDED THAT HE HAD FREQUENTLY TOLD HIS

THAT IT DID NO GOOD FOR ASIAN LEADERS TO SAY PRIVATELY THAT THEY DIDN'T REALLY MEAN WHAT THEY DID SAY PUBLICLY SINCE THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS WERE ON THE RECORD AND THE PRIVATE ONES WERE NOT.

4. THESE GENTLEMEN ARE HARD BITTEN, PROFESSIONAL POLITICIANS. GENERALLY THEY APPEARED TO FAVOR A CONTINUING ROLE FOR THE U.S. IN ASIAN AFFAIRS, INCLUDING CONTINUING MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THEY ARE, HOWEVER, DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF ASIAN LEADERS, THEIR WILL AND ABILITY TO SURVIVE AGAINST DETERMINED COMMUNIST SUBVERSION, AND THEIR PERSONAL INTEGRITY, CONGRESSMAN WILSON RECOUNTED THAT HE HAD BEEN PRESENT WHEN ADDRESSED A JOINT SESSION OF THE CONGRESS AND WAS HAILED AS A GREAT NATIONALIST LEADER. HE ADDED, "LOOK AT WHAT THAT (EXPLETIVE DELETED) DID TO US!" THEY EXPRESSED VERY LITTLE OF THEIR OPINIONS CONCERNING THE AGENCY, ALTHOUGH BOTH SEEMED TO ATTEMPT TO ELICIT STATEMENTS FROM COS CRITICAL OF MR. HELMS. IN THIS, OF COURSE, THEY WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. BOTH EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR THE CONDOR OF MR. COLBY.

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7-71 MFG. 2/75

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TOR:080559Z JAN 76

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5. GENERALLY IT APPEARED THEY WERE SATISFIED WITH THEIR CONVERSATION WITH COS, ALTHOUGH GENERALLY DISAPPOINTED WITH THE RESULTS OF THEIR VISIT UP TO THAT TIME, SINCE THEY SAID THEY HAD NOT FOUND OUT MUCH FROM THE [] THAT THEY DIDN'T KNOW BEFORE. STRONGLY ENDORSE HEADQUARTERS ADVICE TO TREAT WITH THESE GENTLEMEN SEPARATLEY FROM CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, WHOSE INTERESTS SEEM QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THEIRS'. E2, IMPDET.

*Advised of contact with Congressmen Milford, Wilson and Dickinson to arrange briefings, and forwarded a report of the separate 3 hour briefing of Milford on 7 January.

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T 584283 EIA894 PAGE 01 IN 787573

TUR:080007Z JAN 76 35600

S E C R E T 070944Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE [] 35600

TO: DIRECTOR INFO []

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

- REF: A. DIRECTOR 788143
- B. DIRECTOR 788139
- C. DIRECTOR 788390
- D. DIRECTOR 785722

1. MADE CONTACT WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ^S SHORTLY AFTER HIS ARRIVAL AND ARRANGED TO BRIEF HIM ON MORNING 7 JANUARY. ALSO CONTACTED ^C CONGRESSMEN WILSON AND ^D DICKINSON AND LATER MR. TED LUNGER, AND WILL BRIEF WILSON AND DICKINSON NIGHT 7 JANUARY.

2. MILFORD BRIEFING COMPRISED THREE FULL HOURS AND GENERALLY FOLLOWED FORMAT OUTLINED REF/D. THIS WAS LIBERALLY INTERSPERSED WITH THEORETICAL EXAMPLES WHICH WERE ^V VERY CLOSE TO ACTUAL CASES.

3. MILFORD WAS ^V SERIOUS, ATTENTIVE AND INTERESTED LISTENER. HE WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN CHECKS AND BALANCES, COMMAND AND CONTROL, FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY, AND SECURITY AND MORALE OF STATION PERSONNEL. HE DID NOT ASK NUMBERS OF STATION PERSONNEL, OVERALL BUDGET, OR OTHER SENSITIVE DETAIL. HE WAS VERY INTERESTED

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PAGE 02

IN 787573

TOR:080007Z JAN 76

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IN STATION'S [] PROGRAM AND AN EVALUATION OF THE STABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE [] GOVERNMENT. HIS ATTITUDE WAS POSITIVE THROUGHOUT AND HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD HIGH ADMIRATION FOR THE AGENCY AND BELIEVED THAT NEGATIVE CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES WERE LARGELY BASED ON IGNORANCE. HE SAID ALSO THAT THE CONGRESS SO FAR HAD BEEN LOOKING AT THE AGENCY'S "OLD CATS" AND THAT EVEN SOME OF THE "RAVING LIBERALS" WOULD TAKE ANOTHER VIEW OF THE AGENCY IF THEY TOOK THE TIME TO INFORM THEMSELVES OF THE MANY POSITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY THE AGENCY, AND PARTICULARLY BY THE DDO. HE ALSO EVIDENCED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE, SAYING THAT HE FELT THIS TO BE AN IMPORTANT MISSION OF THE AGENCY AND NEEDED TO BE EMPHASIZED MORE. COS OUTLINED A FEW STATION ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN THIS FIELD THAT SEEMED TO PLEASE HIM.

~~PAGNS2 JAKARTA 35600 SECRET~~

OFF THE RECORD, CONGRESSMAN MILFORD SAID HE HAD IN MIND PREPARING A MINORITY REPORT AND SPONSORING A BILL WHEREBY A SINGLE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON AGENCY OVERSIGHT WOULD BE FORMED. THIS COMMITTEE WOULD HAVE MEMBERSHIP FROM THE ARMED SERVICES, FOREIGN RELATIONS, APPROPRIATIONS, TREASURY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AND

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7471 MFG. 2/76

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THE PRESENT SELECT COMMITTEE. UNLIKE OTHER COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS, ITS MEETINGS WOULD ALWAYS BE CLOSED AND ONLY OPEN AS A SPECIFIC VARIATION FROM THE NORM AND WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE. ALSO, UNLIKE OTHERS COMMITTEES, COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS WOULD NOT BE ACCESSIBLE EXCEPT ON A STRICT BIGOTED BASIS AND ^{COULD NOT BE} MCWD NRLNYE DECLASSIFIED WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE MAJORITY OF THE COMMITTEE, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE AND ^{THE} ~~O G~~ SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE. HE ADMITTED THAT THIS BILL MIGHT HAVE SOME ROUGH GOING IN THE ^{RE} ~~PRESENT~~ CONGRESS. HE ~~POOH-POOHED~~ THE IDEA OF A JOINT COMMITTEE ^{YI} ~~SAYING~~ THAT IT WOULD HAVE ^{NO} ~~LEGISLATION~~ AUTHORITY AND WOULD THUS SIMPLY BE ANOTHER DOG BITING AT OUR HEELS.

5. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ASKED FOR COS' VIEWS ON THIS LEGISLATION AS WELL AS ANY RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH COS WOULD CARE TO MAKE ON OR OFF THE RECORD. COS MERELY COMMENTED THAT CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S PLANNED LEGISLATION SEEMED EXCELLENT AND NOTED THAT THE AGENCY WAS NOT ATTEMPTING TO AVOID RESPONSIBLE OVERSIGHT BY THE CONGRES^S, BUT ADDED THAT A SECRET SERVICE MUST HAVE ^{SOME} ~~SOME~~ SECRETS, AND WITHOUT THIS ESSENTIAL ELEMENT WE WOULD BE OUT OF BUSINESS. COS OFFERED NO RECOMMEND^{ATI} ~~ATIONS~~ ON THE BASIS THAT THE REQUEST WAS UNEXPECTED AND DID NOT GIVE HIM SUFFICIENT

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TIME TO THINK THROUGH A RESPONSIBLE RECOMMENDATION.

6. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ALSO INQUIRED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ON STATION ACTIVITIES. COS POINTED OUT CERTAIN OBVIOUS SECURITY AND BUREAUCRATIC DIFFICULTIES, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE.

7. FOLLOWING STATION BRIEFING, COS ACCOMPANIED CONGRESSMAN MILDORD, TOGETHER WITH CHARGE [REDACTED] AND THE ENTIRE DELEGATION, TO A MEETING WITH GENERAL YOGA IN THE LATTER'S OFFICE. IN THE COURSE OF THIS MEETING CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ASKED [REDACTED] IF [REDACTED] FELT HE WAS RECEIVING ADEQUATE INTELLIGENCE ASSISTANCE FROM U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND IF HE HAD ANY CRITICISM OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE INTERFERENCE IN [REDACTED] AFFAIRS. [REDACTED] REPLIED THAT ALTHOUGH HE FELT THE NEED TO DEVELOP [REDACTED] SOMEWHAT FURTHER, THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES OF [REDACTED] ARE CLOSE TO SUFFICIENT. IN CERTAIN CASES IT IS POSSIBLE TO COOPERATE WITH FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, BUT THIS WAS ALWAYS DONE WITHOUT INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS IN EITHER SIDE. [REDACTED] CONTINUED THAT [REDACTED] IN CASES OF MUTUAL INTEREST, SUCH AS THE SOVIETS. THIS IS A LIMITED COOPERATION DIRECTED TO A SPECIFIC GOAL. [REDACTED] ADMITTED ALSO THAT HE HAD OTHER LIAISON

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RELATIONSHIPS ITH THE BRITISH, THE [REDACTED] AND ALL OF THE ASEAN NATIONS. HE SAID SPECIFICALLY THAT HIS RELATIONSHIPS [REDACTED] WERE EXCELLENT. HE DID NOT ADDRESS HIMSELF TO ANY INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

8. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD HAS AN ACTIVE, VIVACIOUS WIFE NAMED MARY WHO WAS WELL TAKEN CARE OF BY EMBASSY ESCORT FSO [REDACTED] SHE EVIDENCED INTEREST IN THE CASINOS, SAILING SHIPS AND SHOPPING FOR NATIVE HANDICRAFTS. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD IS AN AVID PHOTOGRAPHER AND ASKED TO BE TAKEN ON A MINI-TOUR OF THE CITY FOR THIS PURPOSE. HE WEARS A HEARING AID AND IS SLIGHTLY HARD OF HEARING, AND IT IS WELL TO SPEAK DISTINCTLY AND DIRECTLY AT HIM.

9. MILFORD ASKD FOR A NON-CLASSIFIED VERSION OF STATION BRIEFING AND OF MEETING WITH ZOGA TO BE SENT TO AGENCY AND PASSED ON TO HIM. THIS WILL BE A LITTLE DIFFICULT BUT HE INSISTED IT HAVE NO CLASSIFICATION SINCE IT WOULD GO INTO THE OFFICIAL RECORD. WILL PREPARE AND FORWARD SOONEST.

10. OVERALL BELIVE THIS WAS A PLUS. MILDORD EXPRESSED COMPLETE SATISFACTION WITH HIS BRIEFING AND AGAIN REPEATED THAT IF OTHERS OF THE CONGRESS WOULD ONLY INFORM THEMSELVES THEY TOO WOULD BE IMPRESSED.

7-71 MFG, 2/75

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PAGE 06-06

IN 787573

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11. WILL REPORT ^PSEPARATELY ON WILSON/DICKINSON BRIEFING ^P
WHEN IT IS COMPLETED LATER TONIGHT. E2, IMPDET.

7-71 MFG. 2/75

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PAGE 01-01

IN 787506

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20980

S E C R E T 072100Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE [] 20980

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REF: DIRECTOR 787555

1. APPOINTMENTS WITH LIAISON HAVE BEEN TENTATIVELY
ARRANGED. CONG. MILFORD WILL MEET WITH []

2. COS [] DISCUSSIONS TENTATIVELY SET FOR
0830-1000. ANTICIPATE APPROXIMATE 30 MINUTES MEETING WITH
EACH LIAISON OFFICER, SO SHOULD BE COMPLETED IN AMPLE TIME
FOR MILFORD TO REJOIN GROUP FOR AFTERNOON ACTIVITIES. CAN
EXTEND DURATION OF MEETINGS IF HE DESIRES. E2, IMPDET,

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IN 787572

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SECRET 070240Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE [] 15837

TO: [] INFO DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 787959

B. DIRECTOR 787555

*file
Senator travel*

PLS ADVISE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD THAT COS [] CAN ARRANGE
15 JANUARY 0800 HOURS BREAKFAST MEETING []

[] AT CONGRESSMAN
MILFORD'S HOTEL. ALTHOUGH EMBASSY [] BRIEFINGS ON OPERATION
DEEPFREEZE SCHEDULED FOR MORNING OF 15 JAN. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD MAY
PREFER TO MEET WITH COS []
CONCURS WITH THIS ARRANGEMENT. TRANSPORTATION TO AIRPORT FOR
FLIGHT TO [] WILL BE AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY AFTER MEETING WITH
[] PLS ADVISE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S PREFERENCE SO COS CAN
CONFIRM ABOVE ARRANGEMENT [] E2IMPDET

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TO: [Redacted]

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD Y

REF: DIRECTOR 787555 |*|

CONGRESSMAN MILFORD DOES DESIRE MEETINGS WITH SENIOR LIAISON OFFICIALS. REQUEST STATION'S PROCEED TO SCHEDULE MEETINGS WITH LIAISON. E2, IMPDET.H

*TRANSMITTED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S SCHEDULE.

OLC *Rel*
CEA/PMI *h [unclear] telecord*

DATE: 2 JAN 76
 ORIG: B.J. HOUSTON
 UNIT: DCEA
 EXT: 9373

Shackley
 THEODORE G. SHACKLEY CEA
 RELEASING OFFICER

Houston
 BILL J. HOUSTON DCEA
 AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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DIRECTOR

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DDO/DO, SA/DDO, C/EA3

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TO: [] INFO TOKYO.Y

RYBAT PLMHCONGAY

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 785722 (NOT NEEDED TOKYO) |*|

B. DIRECTOR 787555 (NOT NEEDED TOKYO) |**|Y

1. BASED 3 JANUARY DISCUSSION WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, HE EXPECTS MEETINGS WITH ACTION ADDEES AS FOLLOWS:Y

[] - MORNING 7 JANUARY

[] - 10 JANUARY

[] - EVENING 14 JANUARY Y

2. AT 3 JANUARY MEETING, MILFORD REAFFIRMED HE, AS MEMBER HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (PIKE COMMITTEE), HAS BEEN MOST INTERESTED IN OUTCOME OF COMMITTEE'S INVESTIGATIONS AND IS CONCERNED ABOUT DIRECTION IN WHICH COMMITTEE HEARINGS HAVE GONE. FYI, ONLY MILFORD PLANS FILE SEPARATE VIEWS OR MINORITY REPORT WHEN COMMITTEE DRAWS UP ITS RECOMMENDATIONS. HE HAS VISITED HQS ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS AND HAS BEEN BRIEFED BY VARIOUS AGENCY OFFICIALS. HE RECENTLY VISITED SEOUL WHERE HE SPENT DAY IN COS HOSPITAL ROOM JUST TALKING. MILFORD ANXIOUS SOAK UP AS MUCH KNOWLEDGE AGENCY ACTIVITIES

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 058088

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AS POSSIBLE TO ASSIST HIM WRITE MINORITY REPORT. ACCORDINGLY, HE WANTS MEET OUR FOREIGN LIAISON COUNTERPARTS TO GET FEEL FOR IMPORTANCE THIS SOURCE AND NEED PROTECT IT FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURES. RECOGNIZE SHORT NOTICE, BUT REQUEST ACTION ADDEES MAKE SPECIAL EFFORT ARRANGE LIAISON CONTACTS.4

3. FOR [REDACTED]: PLS HANDLE MILFORD AND WILSON/DICKINSON CONTACTS SEPARATELY AND AVOID OBVIOUS SITUATION OF SINGLING MILFORD OUT FOR SPECIAL TREATMENT.4

4. FOR [REDACTED]: MILFORD DOES EXPECT MEET AND DISCUSS HIS ACTIVITY WITH [REDACTED] IN CANBERRA. HE WILL DEVOTE DAY OF 10 JANUARY TO STATION AND NASA. REQUEST STATION COORDINATE WITH NASA REP WHO PLANS TAKE MILFORD VISIT [REDACTED] IF SO, SUGGEST STATION ARRANGE HAVE MRS. MILFORD TOUR NEARBY ZOO. IF ANY CONFLICT SCHEDULING WITH NASA, MILFORD SAYS HE WANTS AGENCY TO TAKE PRIORITY.4

5. FOR [REDACTED] MILFORD UNDERSTANDS HIS STAY [REDACTED] SHORT AND WILLING DEVOTE EVENING TO STATION.4

6. FOR TOKYO: TOKYO IS RESTSTOP AND MILFORD EXPECTS NO

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CONTACT.Y

7. REQUEST ACTION ADDEES COORDINATE STATION PLANS WITH EMBASSY SCHEDULING FOR GROUP TO GIVE MILFORD OPPORTUNITY MEET SENIOR FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IF CONFLICT CAN BE AVOIDED. MILFORD HAS STRESSED, HOWEVER, AGENCY BUSINESS HAS PRIORITY. HQS HAS PROVIDED MILFORD NAMES COS'S IN [REDACTED] REQUEST STATION'S CONTACT MILFORD AS SOON AFTER ARRIVAL AS POSSIBLE SO MILFORD CAN PLAN NON-AGENCY PART OF SCHEDULE. SUGGEST STATION OFFICER ASSIST MRS. MILFORD SINCE SHE MAY NOT WISH TO TAG ALONG WITH LARGER GROUP WITHOUT HER HUSBAND. E2 IMPDET.H

*GAVE DETAILS ON CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S TRIP.
 **CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S REVISED SCHEDULE.

DEP. DIR/DDS&T - C. DUCKETT (DRAFT)
 OLC - R. CHIN (DRAFT)

DATE: 3 JANUARY 76
 ORIG: R. CHIN
 UNIT: OLC
 EXT: 9010

Theodore G. Shackley
 THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA
 RELEASING OFFICER

Bill J. Houston
 BILL J. HOUSTON, DCEA
 AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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T 572990 EIA882 PAGE 01 IN 782959

TOR1020840Z JAN 76 35549

S E C R E T 020756Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE 35549 ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN

REFS: A4 DIRECTOR 787555

B4 DIRECTOR 785722

1. [REDACTED] HAS BEEN ADVISED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S REQUEST FOR STATION BRIEFING PER REF A, WILL ARRANGE BRIEFING AFTER CONGRESSMAN'S ARRIVAL.

2. ON 2 JANUARY [REDACTED] TELEPHONED STATION TO SAY THAT CABLE HAS BEEN RECEIVED BY [REDACTED] FROM [REDACTED] WE PROPOSED MEETINGS WITH MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, [REDACTED] PARLIAMENT AND CALL ON [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HE ALSO PROPOSED THAT [REDACTED] BRIEF THE GROUP ON GENERAL SECURITY SITUATION. [REDACTED] HAS SENT CABLE TO [REDACTED] EARLY NEXT WEEK TO PARTICIPATE IN BRIEFINGS. BRIEFING OF CONGRESSMEN AND THEIR STAFF MEMBERS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD AT [REDACTED] HQS ON 7 JANUARY. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD WILL PARTICIPATE IN THIS

BRIEFING. STATION ARRANGED [REDACTED] BRIEFINGS BASED ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM CHARGE.

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CS/AF DDO SA/DOO
DDO/AD D/OLC

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TO: [REDACTED] Y

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD Y

REF: DIRECTOR 785722 |*| Y

1. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD REVISED SCHEDULE: Y

ETD	[REDACTED]	1200	8 JAN	FOR	[REDACTED]
ETD	[REDACTED]	0800	9 JAN	FOR	[REDACTED] Y
ETA	[REDACTED]	1740	9 JAN	Y	
ETA	[REDACTED]	1515	14 JAN	Y	
ETD	[REDACTED]	1000	15 JAN	FOR	[REDACTED]
ETD	[REDACTED]	1400	15 JAN	FOR	[REDACTED] Y
ETA	[REDACTED]	1500	15 JAN	Y	
ETD	[REDACTED]	2330 09 16	15 16	JAN	FOR HAWAII Y

NOTE: THIS SEPARATE TRIP TO THAT OF SNODGRASS, PRESTON, CARY MENTIONED DIRECTOR 778574.Y

2. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD HAD PREVIOUSLY REQUESTED MEETING WITH COS, [REDACTED] 10 JANUARY, COS, [REDACTED] 13 JANUARY AND WITH COS, [REDACTED] 15 JANUARY. REVISED SCHEDULE WILL ALTER HIS DESIRES THIS CASE. MEETING WITH HIM ON 3 JANUARY AND WILL FORWARD NEW

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SCHEDULE FOR MEETINGS WITH COS' AT THAT TIME.4

3. FOLLOWING ARE RESULTS CEA AND OLC (MR. ROBERT CHIN) BRIEFING OF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD 19 DECEMBER 1975:4

A. NINETEEN DECEMBER MEETING LAID ON IN ORDER THAT REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD COULD BE GIVEN A BRIEFING IN OVERVIEW TERMS ON WHAT THE CIA STATIONS [] AND [] WERE DOING IN TERMS OF OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS.4

B. [] THERE WAS CIA PRESENCE IN CANBERRA, [] THIS REPRESENTATION CONSISTED OF ABOUT SIX OFFICERS CHARGED WITH BASIC MISSION OF PURSUING SOVIET, CHINESE AND EAST EUROPEAN TARGETS AVAILABLE IN [] IT WAS STRESSED THAT THESE DENIED AREA TARGETS WERE PURSUED BOTH UNILATERALLY [] WITH THE [] LIAISON SERVICE. THERE WERE []

[] IT WAS STRESSED THROUGHOUT BRIEFING THAT PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IN BOTH UNILATERAL [] OPERATIONS WAS THE RECRUITMENT OF SOVIET, CHINESE OR EAST

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EUROPEAN TARGETS AS IN-PLACE AGENTS WHO WOULD WORK FOR US NOT ONLY IN [] BUT UPON THEIR RETURN TO THEIR COUNTRY OF ORIGIN. ALSO STRESSED CIA'S INTEREST IN OBTAINING NATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE FROM RECRUITED PENETRATIONS OF THE SOVIET, CHINESE OR EAST EUROPEAN PRESENCE IN [] HE WAS INFORMED OF OUR DESIRE TO RUN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS OR ARRANGE THE DEFECTION OF KNOWLEDGE-ABLE SOURCES. OUR INTEREST IN BUILDING UP PERSONNEL INDICES ON THOSE INDIVIDUALS FROM TARGET COUNTRIES WHO WERE IN [] BUT WHO WERE NOT RECRUITABLE IN THE CURRENT CONTEXT OF THEIR RELATIONSHIPS WITH THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT ALSO WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS UNDERSCORED THAT THE INDIVIDUAL WHO NOT RECRUITABLE TODAY MIGHT BE RECRUITABLE IN FUTURE IF WE CAN LEARN TO UNDERSTAND WHAT MOTIVATES THE TARGET AND WHAT MAKES THEM TICK AS HUMAN BEINGS. THE BRIEFING OF REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD ON [] ALSO TOUCHED LIGHTLY ON THE BROAD ASPECTS OF CIA'S []

C. []: HE WAS ADVISED THAT CIA HAD [] PEOPLE IN [] WHO WERE FOCUSED ON RUNNING [] WITH [] AGAINST THE SOVIET, PRC

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AND EAST EUROPEAN PRESENCE IN [] HE WAS GIVEN RUNDOWN
ON NUMBERS OF SOVIETS, CHINESE AND EAST EUROPEAN WHO WERE CURRENTLY
IN [] THE SCOPE OF OUR OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS WAS ALSO
DISCUSSED IN TERMS SIMILAR TO WHAT WAS OUTLINED IN PARA 3B ON

D. [] CIA MAINTAINED A PRESENCE IN []

[] CIA HAD APPROXIMATELY [] IN []

THESE FIGURES WERE COMPARED AGAINST THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE PRESENCE

IN [] A DISCUSSION OF THE PRC TARGET AS SEEN FROM PER-
SPECTIVE OF [] FOCUSED ON LEGAL TRAVEL []

[] AS WELL AS SCREENING OF []

[] THERE WAS ALSO BRIEF DISCUSSION OF NORTH KOREAN AND
VIETNAMESE TARGETS IN [] THE BRIEFING ALSO FOCUSED ON

[] AS AN INTELLIGENCE TARGET IN TERMS OF HOST COUNTRY
ACTIVITIES, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND
NARCOTICS TRAFFIC INTO AND OUT OF [] A BRIEF COMMENT

WAS ALSO MADE ON TOPIC OF CIA [] THE []
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. THE TOTALITY OF

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STATION'S EFFORTS IN [] WAS DESCRIBED IN BROAD MANAGEMENT TERMS AND SOME EXAMPLES WERE CITED OF TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED FROM CIA ACTIVITIES IN [] CEA ALSO FOCUSED BRIEFLY ON OUR ABILITY TO USE AGENTS OF INFLUENCE TO PURSUE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS IN [] .4

E. COMMENT: REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD TOOK NOTE OF ABOVE BRIEFINGS, ASKED LIMITED NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ON THE TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE THAT WAS PRODUCED BY THE VARIOUS STATIONS AND INDICATED THAT BRIEFINGS HAD COVERED ALL OF THE ISSUES THAT HE HAD WANTED TO DISCUSS.4

F. REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD EXPRESSED GREAT DEAL OF INTEREST IN THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS AND ASKED THAT IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, PARTICULARLY IN [] HE WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH MEMBERS OF [] LIAISON SERVICES. REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD MADE POINT THAT SUCH MEETINGS WOULD BE USEFUL TO HIM IN CONTEXT OF HIS PIKE COMMITTEE DUTIES BECAUSE HE COULD THEN COMMENT ON LIAISON SERVICES' REACTIONS TO CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES INTO CIA. REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD WAS ADVISED THAT ATTEMPTS WOULD BE MADE TO ARRANGE MEETINGS.

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PARTICULARLY IN WITH ONE OR TWO SENIOR LIAISON PERSONALITIES.4

4. REGARDING REFERENCE PARA THREE F, SINCE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD SPECIFICALLY WISHES DEAL WITH LIAISON SERVICES ATTITUDES IN HIS MINORITY REPORT, HAVE NO OBJECTION GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF OUR DEALINGS WITH LIAISON SERVICES. STATIONS CAN ALSO ARRANGE MEETING WITH SENIOR LIAISON OFFICIALS ON DISCREET BASIS IF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD REQUESTS. E2, IMPDET.H

* GAVE DETAILS ON CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S TRIP.

DATE: 31 DEC 75
 ORIG: B.HOUSTON
 UNIT: DCEA
 EXT: 9373

OLC *Rehan*
 DDS&T
 SA/DDO
 EA/PMI

Shackley
 THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA
 RELEASING OFFICER

Houston
 BILL J. HOUSTON, DCEA
 AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Tracy

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STAFF 242143Z DIRECTOR 755722

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TO: PRIORITY [REDACTED]

RYBAT PLNHCONGA 4

REFS: A. [REDACTED] 20866 [IN 774560*] {RELAYING [REDACTED]}

B. DIRECTOR 784159 [**] {RELAYING [REDACTED]} 4

1. *LARGE NUMBER* THIRTEEN MEMBERS OF HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,

ACCOMPANIED BY WIVES, WILL BE MAKING TRIP TO [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], AND [REDACTED]. GROUP WILL USE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

AIRCRAFT. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WILL BE MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR TRIP. THEREFORE, NO NEED FOR STATION TO MAKE HOTEL OR RELATED TRANSPORTATION ARRANGEMENTS. TWO REPRESENTATIVES, PRICE AND

the only WILSON, ARE MEMBERS OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE *WHO? NONE*
 ARE GOING AT THIS TIME. *NONE* OF ABOVE HAVE ASKED TO MEET WITH STATIONS. *FRANK SLATINSHEK*
Chief Counsel of Committee solicited and travelling
 BY HEADQUARTERS TO MEET WITH GROUP CONTACT CAN BE MADE THROUGH
 WITH GROUP AND RESPECT TO MAY CONTACT YOU IF
 COMMITTEE STAFF ASSISTANT SLATINSHEK WHO TRAVELLING WITH GROUP 4
 INTEREST DEVELOPS.

2. HOWEVER, CONGRESSMAN DALE MILFORD {DEMOCRAT, TEXAS} WHO IS A MEMBER OF THE PIKE COMMITTEE {HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE} WILL ACCOMPANY THIS GROUP AND DOES DESIRE BRIEFINGS.

CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S WIFE WILL TRAVEL WITH HIM. CONGRESSMAN

DATE: 24 DEC 75
 ORIG: B.J. HOUSTON
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MILFORD'S INTEREST AS STATED BY HIM WILL BE IN SEEING HOW THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS WORKS FROM THE GROUND UP. HE WANTS TO ACQUIRE BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE ON THIS PROCESS SO THAT WHEN THE FINAL COMMITTEE REPORT IS MADE HE CAN USE HIS INFLUENCE TO SEE THAT IT IS A BALANCED ONE. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD DOES NOT LIKE FORMAL BRIEFINGS AND DOES NOT WANT CHARTS.4

3. SINCE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE IS VERY INTERESTED IN COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF HOW THE AGENCY FUNCTIONS, IT IS LIKELY THAT CONGRESSMAN MILFORD WILL FOCUS ON THIS ASPECT OF STATION ACTIVITIES DURING HIS VISIT.

A. MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES: STATIONS PROBABLY CAN DEAL WITH THE CONGRESSMAN'S DESIRE TO UNDERSTAND THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS FROM THE GROUND UP BY BRIEFING HIM ON HOW MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES FUNCTIONS. STATION CAN OUTLINE OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE PROCESS I.E., HOW STATION RECEIVES OD FROM HEADQUARTERS AND COMMENTS ON IT. ONCE AGREEMENT REACHED ON OD DIALOGUE FOLLOWS ON AG'S WHICH RELATE TO SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES. THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO FOCUS ON KEY OBJECTIVES IN GENERAL AND THEN NARROW DISCUSSION

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DOWN TO AG'S OF SPECIFIC INTEREST. THIS PHASE OF BRIEFING SHOULD INCLUDE COMMENTARY ON FUNDING OF FAN'S, ETC.4

B. AGENT ACQUISITION: STATION COULD THEN OUTLINE HOW TARGET STUDIES OF KEY INTELLIGENCE REPOSITORIES ARE CONDUCTED, POTENTIAL TARGETS FOR RECRUITMENT IDENTIFIED AND HOW SPOTTING, ASSESSMENT AND RECRUITMENT PROCESS UNFOLDS. IN DISCUSSION OF RECRUITMENT PHASE OF OPERATIONS, THERE SHOULD BE EXAMINATION OF NAME TRACE AND POA PROCESS.4

C. AGENT AUTHENTICATION: DIALOGUE WITH CONGRESSMAN SHOULD ALSO OUTLINE HOW AGENT ^{AUTHENTICATED} AUTHORIZED ONCE RECRUITED. STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED ON CONTINUING ASPECTS OF AUTHENTICATION, SECURITY OF MEETINGS, ETC.4

D. POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION: ACQUISITION OF INTELLIGENCE FROM IN-PLACE AGENT, TURNING IT INTO INTEL DISSEMINATION, REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM, AND REPORTS EVALUATION CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE REVIEWED. ~~FOR REPRODUCTION PURPOSES REPRODUCED-REPRODUCED~~

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FOR [] AND [] SHOULD MAKE POINT THAT COLLECTION ON INTERNAL TARGET IS BY PRODUCT ACQUIRED THROUGH ELICITATION FROM [] {FYI: OBJECTIVE K HAS BEEN DROPPED FROM [] OD AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE ADDRESSED IN THIS BRIEFING.} THRUST OF PROGRAM IS RECRUITMENT OF SOVS AND CHINESE, USING []

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EXTENSION OF CIA, FOR COLLECTION OF INFO ON PRC AND USSR. POINT
 OUT DO NOT RECRUIT [REDACTED]

E. OPERATIONAL REPORTING SYSTEM: STARTING WITH RECRUITMENT OF AGENT, STATION SHOULD OUTLINE TYPES OF REPORTING REQUIRED BY AGENCY FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL PURPOSES I.E., PRQ PART I AND 2, CONTACT REPORTS, INTEL REPORTS, PERIODIC ASSET REPORTS, PERIODIC PROGRESS REPORTS, OPACTS AND FIELD PERFORMANCE REPORTS. ON LATTER, STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED ON FEED BACK FROM MID-YEAR AND FY REVIEWS WITH DDO. FY BUDGET CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE TOUCHED ON.

F. CASE HISTORY: IT ESSENTIAL WE NOT IDENTIFY ANY ACTIVE SOURCES OR LIAISON SERVICES BY TRUE NAME TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. IN VIEW OF THIS WISH POINT OUT HQS HAS FOUND IT USEFUL TO DRAW ON CASE HISTORY SCENARIO TO UNDERSCORE ALL POINTS PREVIOUSLY MADE IN BRIEFING. IN SUCH CASE HISTORY ONLY IDENTITY OF AGENT AND POSSIBLE TARGET HAS BEEN ALTERED FOR SOURCE PROTECTION. THIS APPROACH HAS WORKED EFFECTIVELY FOR HQS AND ASSUME IT WILL BE USEFUL TECHNIQUE FOR STATIONS.

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4. WHERE APPLICABLE (SUCH AS [] BRIEFING SHOULD ALSO DEAL SPECIFICALLY WITH STATION COORDINATION ROLE UNDER DCIDS FOR CLANDESTINE MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPERATIONS.4

5. FOR [] AND []: IT PROBABLY WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL TO PROVIDE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD WITH ANALYSIS OF THE RECENT ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS IN [] AND []. HE WOULD ALSO BE INTERESTED IN STATION'S ESTIMATE OF HOW NEW GOVERNMENTS WILL CONDUCT FOREIGN POLICIES, VIS-A-VIS UNITED STATES.4

6. FOR [] IN ADDITION TO STABILITY OF [] REGIME THE CONGRESSMAN MIGHT APPRECIATE A REVIEW OF THE PORTUGUESE TIMOR SITUATION AND HOW THAT WILL INFLUENCE THE STABILITY OF THE REGION.4

7. THIS VISIT IS SEPARATE FROM TRIP OF PRESTON, SNODGRASS, CALLOWAY AND CARY DISCUSSED IN DIRECTOR 778574.4

8. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE.4

9. SEPARATE CABLE FOLLOWS TO CANBERRA ON SENSITIVE ASPECTS OF VISIT. [] ITINERARY AS FOLLOWS: 4

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- 9 JAN, ETD 11 JAN Y
- 11 JAN, ETD 14 JAN Y
- 14 JAN, ETD 16 JAN E2, IMPDET-d

* INQUIRY CONCERNING CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION.

** HQS CONTACT WITH D. MILFORD ON TRIP TO

DDS&T/OEL *[Signature]*

OLC *[Signature]*

SA/DDO

~~EA/PMI~~ *[Signature]*

DATE: 24 DEC 75
 ORIG: B. J. HOUSTON
 UNIT: ACEA
 EXT: 9373

[Signature]
 DAVID BLEE, A/DDO
 RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

[Signature]
 BILL J. HOUSTON, ACEA
 AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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S E C R E T 280348Z NOV 75 STAFF
CITE SEOUL 25948
TO: DIRECTOR.
RYBAT PLMHCONGA
REF: SEOUL 25761 (736898)

*File in
Congressman's
travel folder*

1. FOLLOWING LETTER WAS PREPARED BY GENERAL RICHARD G. STILWELL, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, AND FORWARDED TO DOD CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON FOR REVIEW AND PASSAGE TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. THE LETTER WAS PREPARED IN RESPONSE TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S REQUEST TO BOTH GENERAL STILWELL AND LT. GENERAL JAMES HOLLINGSWORTH, COMMANDER, I CORPS, CAMP RED CLOUD, FOR LETTERS SIMILAR TO HIS REQUEST OF AMBASSADOR SNEIDER. GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH PREPARED A LETTER WHICH WAS REWORKED INTO THE FOLLOWING LETTER WHICH WAS SENT BY GENERAL STILWELL AS REFLECTING BOTH GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH'S AND HIS OWN VIEWS. THE LETTER WAS FORWARDED TO WASHINGTON AS AN SSO BACK CHANNEL MESSAGE AND HAS SINCE BEEN CLEARED BY DOD FOR RELEASE TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. THE TEXT OF THIS LETTER WAS GIVEN TO COS BY GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH.

2. QUOTE " DEAR MR. MILFORD:

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IN 754484

TOR:280501Z NOV 75

SEOU 25948

GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH AND I WERE EXTREMELY PLEASED AT THE INTEREST YOU SHOWED IN THE PROBLEMS WE FACE HERE IN KOREA. I AM ONLY SORRY THAT OUR SCHEDULES DID NOT PERMIT US TO EXPLORE THE CHALLENGES WE FACE HERE AND OUR CAPABILITIES TO DEAL WITH THEM IN GREATER DETAIL. THIS LETTER INCORPORATES BOTH GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH'S AND MY VIEWS.

AS FIELD COMMANDERS, WE ARE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THE AREA OF INTELLIGENCE - AND FOR GOOD REASONS. A COMMANDER HAS A FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST IN PROTECTING HIS COMMAND AND ASSURING THAT, SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR, HIS COMBAT RECOURSES ARE EMPLOYED IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE MANNER POSSIBLE.

ORGANIZATIONALLY, THE US INTELLIGENCE SETUP IN KOREA IS VIABLE. THE RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, I.E., CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA), DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA), AND NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA) WORK EFFECTIVELY IN CONCERT WITH OUR INTELLIGENCE STAFFS AND THOSE COLLECTION ELEMENTS WHICH ARE UNDER OUR CONTROL TO PROVIDE AN INTEGRATED AND EFFICIENT FLOW OF INTELLIGENCE. WE HAVE BEEN MOST IMPRESSED WITH THE DEDICATION AND PROFESSIONALISM OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO THOSE NATIONAL AGENCIES; AND WE HAVE EQUALLY HIGH RESPECT FOR OUR

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FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 2/75

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PAGE 03

IN 754484

TOR1280501Z NOV 75

SEOU 25948

OWN PEOPLE. THIS TEAM IS RESPONSIVE AND GIVES US A GREAT DEAL OF QUALITY INTELLIGENCE.

LIKE ALL COMMANDERS, HOWEVER, WE ARE NOT FULLY SATISFIED WITH ALL ASPECTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE EFFORT. THE PRIMARY NEED IS FOR RELIABLE WARNING INTELLIGENCE. BECAUSE OF OUR PROXIMITY TO THE ENEMY'S AIRFIELDS, AND THE FACT THAT MANY OF OUR TROOPS LIVE WITHIN THE RANGE FANS OF HIS EMPLACED WEAPONS SYSTEMS, WE MUST CONSTANTLY BE ALERT FOR THOSE ANOMALIES IN HIS BEHAVIOR WHICH WOULD TIP US OFF TO IMPENDING ATTACK. UNFORTUNATELY, BECAUSE OF HIS READINESS AND THE FORWARD DISPOSITION OF HIS FORCES, INCLUDING FORWARD POSITIONING OF SUPPLIES, WE DO NOT HAVE A HIGH DEGREE OF ASSURANCE THAT WE WILL HAVE MUCH WARNING. WHILE WE MIGHT HAVE DAYS OR WEEKS, IT IS MORE PROBABLE THAT WE WOULD HAVE ONLY HOURS. TO PARTIALLY OFFSET THIS, US AND ROK FORCES MAINTAIN A HIGH DEGREE OF ALERT, PREPARED TO QUICKLY ENGAGE THE FORCES OF THE NORTH SHOULD THEY INITIATE AN ATTACK. CONCURRENTLY, WE AND THE NATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ARE SEEKING WAYS TO IMPROVE OUR SYSTEMS AND METHODOLOGIES TO INCREASE OUR ASSURANCE OF TIMELY WARNING.

NATIONALLY MANAGED COLLECTION PROGRAMS GIVE US INVALUABLE INTELLIGENCE ON THE DISPOSITIONS OF THE POTENTIAL ENEMY. YET WE

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PAGE 04

IN 754484

TOR:280501Z NOV 75

SEOU 25948

STILL HAVE SIGNIFICANT GAPS IN OUR HOLDINGS ON THE ACTUAL LOCATIONS AND IDENTITIES OF HIS UNITS, HIS COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE AND HIS WAR PLANS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WHILE THE EXCELLENT TECHNICAL COLLECTION PROGRAMS IN PHOTOGRAPHY AND ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE ^{EMIC SU} SUPPLY A GREAT DEAL OF INFORMATION ON THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITIES, WE ARE STILL LACKING INTELLIGENCE ON HIS INTENTIONS. UNFORTUNATELY, INTELLIGENCE ON WHAT HE IS THINKING AND PLANNING WOULD COME LARGELY FROM HUMAN SOURCES, AND GIVEN THE CLOSED NATURE OF HIS SOCIETY AND HIS STRICT AND EFFECTIVE SECURITY MEASURES, IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO COLLECT THIS KIND OF INFORMATION.

THE PREPONDERANCE OF REQUIREMENTS FOR HUMAN SOURCE CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE FALL WITHIN THE PROPER PURVIEW OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; AND THAT AGENCY IS UNIQUELY QUALIFIED TO PERFORM THIS VITAL FUNCTION. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE IS A NEED FOR A CAREFULLY MANAGED, LIMITED MILITARY EFFORT TO FOCUS ON STRICTLY MILITARY REQUIREMENTS. A PRIMARY MILITARY TARGET OF THIS NATURE IS THE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THIS IS A LABOR INTENSIVE EFFORT, AND EXPLOITATION OF CLANDESTINE TECHNIQUES WOULD BE A MEANS OF

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T 494891 EIA755 PAGE 05 IN 754484

TOR:280501Z NOV 75 SEOU 25948

_____ BEFORE THEY ARE USED AGAINST US.
 IN THE AREA OF ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE WE HAVE REQUESTED _____

TO GIVE US A DEEPER AND MORE EFFECTIVE LOOK INTO THE ENEMY'S

_____ THE REQUESTED _____ INCLUDES A _____
 CAPABILITY WHICH WOULD GIVE US A _____ OF _____

_____. OUR PROPOSAL HAS RECEIVED STRONG SUPPORT FROM DIA AND
 NSA. WE ALSO HAVE HIGH INTEREST IN INSURING THAT WE WILL HAVE _____

_____ TO NATIONALLY MANAGED _____ SYSTEMS,
 WHICH ARE NOT YET OPERATIONAL.

WE ARE AWARE OF THE COSTS INVOLVED IN FIELDING MODERN COLLECTION
 SYSTEMS AND THE UPGRADING OF CURRENT ONES. NONETHELESS, GENERAL
 HOLLINGSWORTH AND I SHARE THE VIEW THAT, GIVEN OUR MISSION AND OUR
 PROXIMITY TO POTENTIAL BELLIGERENT, WE MUST HAVE THE BEST
 INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE. I AM SURE THAT YOUR TRIP TO KOREA GAVE
 YOU A FEEL FOR THE SENSE OF URGENCY THAT WE LIVE WITH HERE,
 AND WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE YOUR COLLEAGUES
 IN THE CONGRESS WITH A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION AND HELP
 TO INSURE THAT OUR FORCES CONTINUE TO GET THE KIND OF SUPPORT
 NEEDED TO DO THE JOB TO WHICH WE ARE DEDICATED.

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7-71 MFG. 2/75

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T 494891 EIA755 PAGE 06-06 IN 754484

TOR:280501Z NOV 75 SEOU 25948

SINCERELY YOURS, "UNQUOTE
E2, IMPDET.

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T 448045 EIA080 PAGE 01-01 IN 736898
 TOR:100349Z NOV 75 SEOU 25761

SECRET 100322Z NOV 75 STAFF

CITE SEOU 25761

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

REF: SEOU 25730 (IN 732789)

*File under
 travelling
 Secretaries &
 Congressman*

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATE 264382 (ROGER CHANNEL)

10 NOVEMBER 1975: QUOTE SUBJECT: LETTER TO CONGRESSMAN
 MILFORD. REF: SEOU 8531. 1. LETTER HAS BEEN FORWARDED
 TO MILFORD AS RECOMMENDED, ONLY CHANGE IN TEXT PROPOSED
 PARA 5 REFTER WAS DELETION OF FINAL SENTENCE, OWING TO
 SENSITIVITY OF REFERENCE TO "CLANDESTINE OPERATION" IN LETTER
 LIKELY TO BECOME PART OF PUBLIC RECORD. UNQUOTE,

* NO RECORD IN CABLE SEC.

10 NOV 75 13 48
 SA/DDO

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T 424247 EIA337 PAGE 01 IN 728294
TOR:310345Z OCT 75 SEOU 25687

S E C R E T 310314Z OCT 75 STAFF
CITE SEOUL 25687
TO: DIRECTOR.
RYBAT PLMHCONGA
REF: SEOUL 25649 (724591) *

*Serials
unclassified
travel
file*

31 OCT 75 08 39

1. REGRET DELAY IN REPORTING FOLLOWUP DISCUSSION WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. HE MET WITH COS FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR MORNING OF 28 OCTOBER PRIOR TO DEPARTURE. DCOS BROUGHT THE CONGRESSMAN TO COS RESIDENCE AND THEN EXCUSED HIMSELF TO MEET WITH CONGRESSMAN LUCIEN NEDZI (SEOUL 25657).

2. AS IT TURNED OUT NOTHING OF PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE DEVELOPED AT THIS MEETING. * R SPROVIDED BOTH AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW VARIOUS POINTS DISCUSSED IN THE PREVIOUS SESSION WITH COS EMPHASIZING THE AEZFCY COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES FOR FOREIGN OPERATIONS PLUS THE MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE AND COST EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW PROCEDURES.

3. COS PERMITTED THE CONGRESSMAN TO READ A STERILIZED COPY OF SEOUL 25388 LESS THE FINAL PARAGRAPH AND THEN DISCUSSED HIS PROPOSAL TO TRY TO DEVELOP A MINORITY REPORT AROUND THIS TYPE 1-83 94 23 78B REVIEW

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 2/75

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T 424247 EIA337 PAGE 02-02 IN 728294
TOR:310345Z OCT 75 SEOU 25687

STUDY AND EXPLAINED WHY DID NOT BELIEVE THIS WAS FEASIBLE. THE CONGRESSMAN CONCURRED BUT RESTATED HIS DESIRE TO NOW FOLLOW UP HIS KOREA INQUIRIES AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL AND SOMEHOW INCORPORATE VARIOUS ASPECTS INTO HIS REPORT. HE REINTERATED HIS STRONG DESIRE TO MEET WITH GENERAL WALTERS. COMMENDED MR. SHACKLEY TO THE CONGRESSMAN FOR SPECIFIC DISCUSSIONS ON THIS AREA.

4. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS QUITE PLEASED AND APPRECIATIVE OF THE DISCUSSIONS HERE AND WOULD LIKE TO BE HELPFUL. HIS PROBLEM REMAINS ONE OF FOCUS AND STAFF ASSISTANCE. E2, IMPDET.

CS COMMENT:*COS forwards a resume of points covered during more than six hours of off the record discussions with Congressman Dale Milford (D-Texas) on 25 October 1975.

* Bonus Src'D

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T 414520

EIA827

PAGE 01

IN 724591

TOR:280440Z OCT 75

SEOU 25649

SECRET 280300Z OCT 75 STAFF

CITE SEOU 25649 SECTION 1 OF 4

Sec 1-4 of 4

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

REF: A. SEOU 25646

(72313P)

B. DIRECTOR 759641

FOLLOWING IS A RESUME OF POINTS COVERED DURING MORE THAN SIX HOURS OF OFF THE RECORD DISCUSSIONS WITH CONGRESSMAN DALE MILFORD (D-TEXAS) ON 25 OCTOBER 1975. BECAUSE OF FEVER COS HAD NOT BEEN RELEASED FROM HOSPITAL AND DISCUSSIONS WERE THEREFORE HELD AT THE HOSPITAL SITTING ROOM.

1. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD OPENED THE DISCUSSION BY REITERATING CONCERNS SURFACED THE PREVIOUS AFTERNOON. IN ADDITION TO HIS REFERENT A ASSESSMENT, HE STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE FIRST PHASE OF THE COMMITTEE REPORT WILL STATE THAT:

A. DUPLICATION OF INTEL MISSIONS RESULTED IN MULTICHANNEL FORWARDING OF INFORMATION.

B. BUREAUCRATIC INEFFICIENCY RESULTED IN DELAYS

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PAGE 02

IN 724591

TOR: 280440Z OCT 75

SEOU 25649

IN FORWARDING OF INTELLIGENCE,

C. NEW LEGISLATION AND NEW PERMANENT, PREFERABLE JOINT OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ARE REQUIRED.

2, THE CONGRESSMAN STATED THAT THE COMMITTEE INQUIRIES ARE POLITICAL IN NATURE AND IN HIS OPINION THERE IS NO PRETENSE OF OBJECTIVITY. TIME FACTORS DID NOT PERMIT HIM OR OTHER MEMBERS TO PERSONALLY OR SERIOUSLY ADDRESS THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED SO THAT FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES, MOST MEMBERS WERE "PRISONERS OF THE COMMITTEE STAFF". HE HAS NOT BEEN HAPPY WITH THIS SITUATION AND HAD INITIALLY PROPOSED THAT EACH COMMITTEE MEMBER BE PERMITTED TO PERSONALLY SELECT ONE STAFF MEMBER FOR ASSIGNMENT TO THE COMMITTEE, HE HAD LINED UP A TOTAL OF SIX MEMBERS TO BACK THIS APPROACH, WHEN THE CHAIRMAN AGREED TO LET HIM SELECT ONE STAFF MEMBER IF HE IN TURN WOULD DROP HIS SPONSORSHIP OF THIS PROPOSAL, HE AGREED, BUT SAID THAT HE HAD AS YET BEEN UNABLE TO IDENTIFY AN APPROPRIATE CANDIDATE. HE DISMISSED THE CURRENT COMMITTEE STAFF AS STARRY-EYED LIBERALS OUT TO MAKE A NAME FOR THEMSELVES. HE IS

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PAGE 03

IN 724591

TOR:280440Z OCT 75

SEOU 25649

ACTIVELY SEEKING A CANDIDATE FOR EMPLOYMENT AS HIS STAFF ASSISTANT ON THE COMMITTEE, BUT DID NOT APPEAR SANGUINE THAT HE WOULD COME UP WITH THE RIGHT MAN,

3. COS NOTED THAT DIRECTOR COLBY WOULD BE THOROUGHLY DELIGHTED WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE SINCE HE WAS NOW OBLIGED TO REPORT TO SIX SEPARATE COMMITTEES. COS EVIDENCED SOME SKEPTICISM THAT A JOINT OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE WOULD BE ESTABLISHED. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC IN THE SHORT TERM BUT BELIEVED THAT A JOINT COMMITTEE WILL EVENTUALLY BE ESTABLISHED. HE SAID THAT RIGHT NOW THE AGENCY IS ESSENTIALLY IN AN UNDERDOG POSITION AND IS GOOD COPY, HOWEVER, OVER THE LONGER TERM, INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP SCORES NO POINTS WITH THE FOLKS BACK IN HOMETOWN USA SO THAT IN TIME CONGRESSMEN WILL NAMEUVER TO AVOID THE ASSIGNMENT.

4. THE REAL PROBLEM AS HE SEES IT IS TO FORM A COMMITTEE THAT WOULD HAVE CREDIBILITY IN THE EYES OF THE HOUSE AND HAVE PROCEDURES THAT WOULD PERMIT EFFECTIVE

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IN 724591

TOR1280440Z OCT 75

SEOU 25649

OVERSIGHT FUNCTION TO BE EXERCISED AND IN A SECURE MANNER. THE CONGRESSMAN IS PUSHING A PROPOSAL THAT THE HOUSE COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP BE COMPOSED OF ONE MEMBER NOMINATED FROM THE ARMED FORCES COMMITTEE, ONE FROM THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, ONE APPOINTED BY THE SPEAKER, WITH THE REMAINDER OF THE COMMITTEE TO BE NOMINATED BY THE SPEAKER WITH CONCURRENCE BY THE HOUSE MEMBERS.

5. THE PRESENT HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE (HSC) IS TO BE PHASED OUT AS OF 31 JANUARY, THE CONGRESSMAN WAS OF TWO MINDS AS TO WHETHER THE COMMITTEE'S LIFE SHOULD BE EXTENDED. IF TERMINATED ON SCHEDULE, THE SPOTLIGHT WOULD FADE AWAY BUT THE RESULT WOULD BE VARIOUS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR "BAD" LEGISLATION, IF CONTINUED, THE POLITICALLY INSPIRED MANIPULATION OF THE COMMITTEE WILL CONTINUE SEEKING SENSATIONAL HEADLINES. HE SAID THAT HE FRANKLY DID NOT KNOW WHICH WAS WORSE.

6. THE CONGRESSMAN'S STATED INTENT, WHICH HE SHARES WITH CONGRESSMAN DAVID C. TREEN IS TO FILE

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TOR:280440Z OCT 75

SEOU 25649

A DISSENTING MINORITY REPORT FOCUSING IN A POSITIVE MANNER ON THE CONTEMPORARY SITUATION RATHER THAN THE HISTORICAL ISSUES THAT THE COMMITTEE HAS FOCUSED IN A NON-OBJECTIVE MANNER, HOWEVER, SINCE DECEMBER IS FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES NOT A WORKING MONTH, THIS GIVES HIM ONLY THIRTY DAYS TO PUT TOGETHER A REPORT. SINCE HE IS A MEMBER OF THREE HOUSE COMMITTEES AND CHAIRMAN OF ONE SUB-COMMITTEE WITH NOT EVEN ONE STAFF ASSISTANT ON THE SELECT COMMITTEE HE IS FINDING IT ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO DEVELOP A MINORITY REPORT. HE TURNED ASIDE THE SUGGESTION THAT FAVORABLE WITNESSES BE CALLED AS IMPRACTICAL. HE SAID, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IF HE ASKED GENERAL WALTERS OR PRESTIGIOUS AND KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONALITIES WITH INTELLIGENCE BACKGROUNDS TO APPEAR, THEY WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO MAKE AN OBJECTIVE AND BALANCED PRESENTATION, THE COMMITTEE'S LINE OF QUESTIONING WOULD BE CONFINED TO THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE "DEAD CATS" OF TEN TO FIFTEEN YEARS AGO. HE ALSO FORESAW NO POSSIBILITY OF MODIFYING THE MAJORITY VIEWS OR THE MAJORITY REPORT, HE WAS CLEARLY CONCERNED THAT SAM ADAMS'

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IN 724591

TOR1280440Z OCT 75

SEOU 25649

ALLEGATIONS ARE BEING ACCEPTED AS FACT WITHOUT REBUTTAL PERMITTED, HE WAS PUSHING FOR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF ALL INDIVIDUALS CITED BY ADAMS BUT WAS UNCERTAIN WHETHER HE COULD OBTAIN COMMITTEE AGREEMENT, IF NOT, HE INTENDED TO EMPHASIZE THIS POINT IN THE PROPOSED MINORITY REPORT.

7. THE CONGRESSMAN IS TENTATIVELY CONSIDERING A MINORITY REPORT THE THRUST OF WHICH WOULD BE THAT HE

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PAGE 01

IN 724594

TOR:280502Z OCT 75

SEOU 25649

S E C R E T 280300Z UCT 75 STAFF

CITE SEOUL 25649 SECTION 2 OF 4

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

HAD TAKEN A CURRENT LOOK AT THE INTEL COMMUNITY IN A CRITICAL AREA (KOREA) AND FOUND IT ALIVE AND WELL, AND HAD FOLLOWED THE INTEL FLOW THROUGH THE CYCLE "ALL THE WAY TO THE FORTY COMMITTEE". HE STATED THAT WHAT HE NEEDED WAS SOME "VEHICLE" TO TIE THIS ALL TOGETHER FOR PURPOSES OF HIS REPORT. COS NOTED THAT USIB IN WASHINGTON HAS RECENTLY COMPLETED A COMPREHENSIVE ALBEIT HIGHLY CLASSIFIED REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF THE KOREAN TARGET IN A EFFORT TO IDENTIFY ANY PROBLEM AREAS AND TO TAKE PROPER REMEDIAL ACTIONS. COS NOTED THAT HAVING ONLY RECENTLY ARRIVED HERE HE HAD OF COURSE UNDERTAKEN A THOROUGH IN-COUNTRY REVIEW IN ORDER TO ASSURE HIMSELF OF THE ADEQUACY OF OUR IN-COUNTRY PROGRAMS. THE CONGRESSMAN SEIZED ON THESE REVIEWS AS THE POSSIBLE BASIS OF HIS REPORT, HOWEVER, HE WANTED TO DEAL

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IN 724594

TOR1280502Z OCT 75

SEOU 25649

WITH "UNCLASSIFIED ASPECTS" OF THE REVIEW. (HOW ONE RECONCILES THIS CANNOT BE SUGGESTED FROM THIS VANTAGE POINT, IT MERELY EMPHASIZES THE LACK OF FOCUS AND THE CONGRESSMAN'S DESIRE TO DO SOMETHING CONSTRUCTIVE, BUT HIS INABILITY TO FIND A "HANDLE".)

8. THE CONGRESSMAN COMMENTED THAT THE SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL IN THE COMMITTEE'S HANDS IS A MAJOR PROBLEM, THE HSC RULES STATE CLASSIFIED MATERIAL MUST NOT BE RELEASED BUT THESE RESTRICTIONS DIRECTLY CONTRAVENE HOUSE REGULATIONS ON THIS POINT AND WOULD NOT BE SUSTAINED IF CHALLENGED, HOWEVER, SINCE THE HARRINGTON EPISODE HE DOUBTED THAT THE HSC'S SPECIAL RULE WOULD BE CHALLENGED (ACCORDING TO THE CURRENT HOUSE RULES ANY MEMBER CAN ASK FOR A COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF ANY CLOSED COMMITTEE HEARING AND USE IT ALMOST WITH IMPUNITY).

9. COS WAS PREPARED TO PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF REFERENT B GUIDANCE IF WE SENSED THAT THE CONGRESSMAN WOULD BE RECEPTIVE TO THIS LINE OF PRESENTATION. GIVEN THE UNORTHODOX MANNER IN WHICH THIS HAD

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SEOU 25649

DEVELOPED, AND UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT WAS BELIEVED BEST TO GIVE THE CONGRESSMAN THE OPPORTUNITY TO CHART THE COURSE. IN SO DOING IT BECAME ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT HIS INTEREST LAY IN THE AGENCY'S ROLE VIS-A-VIS THE INTEL COMMUNITY IN THE FIELD. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW COORDINATION AND CONTROL WAS EXERCISED IN THE FIELD. COS EXPLAINED THE CHIEF OF STATION'S RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY IN THE COORDINATION OF CLANDESTINE COLLECTION PORGRAMS. IN DISCUSSING COORDINATION OF MILITARY COLLECTION AGENCIES COS IN DUE COURSE SUGGESTED THAT MILITARY REPRESENTATIONS MIGHT PROFITABLY BE INVITED TO JOIN IN THE DISCUSSION. TELEPHONE CALLS BROUGHT THE 8TH ARMY J-2, CAPTAIN ALBERT M. HUNT, THE DEPUTY J-2 COLONEL ARTHUR W. LONG AND THE SENIOR NSA REPRESENTATIVE MR. DELMAR C. LANG INTO THE DISCUSSION. THE COMMAND AND COORDINATION CHANNELS WERE OUTLINED, AND THE STATION'S ROLE WAS ENDORSED BY THE MILITARY REPS TO ALMOST AN EMBARRASSING DEGREE. COS EXPLAINED THE DCID'S, AND IN THIS INSTANCE DCID 5/1, EXPLAINED HOW THE FIELD CLEARANCE,

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IN 724594

TOR1280502Z OCT 75

SEOU 25649

REGISTRATION, APPROVAL AND IF NECESSARY, RECLAIMOR
PROCESS WORKS AND SUGGESTED THAT THE CONGRESSMAN
OBTAIN COPIES OF THE DCID'S UPON HIS RETURN TO
WASHINGTON. NOT SURPRISING, THE CONGRESSMAN HAD
NEVER HEARD OF THE DCID'S, HE NOTED THE SUGGESTION
AND WILL IN ALL PROBABILITY FOLLOW UP UPON HIS
RETURN.

10. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS CONCERNED THAT THERE
WAS A DUPLICATION OF EFFORT AND INTENTLY QUESTIONED
THE MULTICHANNEL NATURE OF REPORTING WHEN ONLY ONE
DECISION COULD BE TAKEN. COL. LONG, THE DEPUTY
J-2, WAS PARTICULARLY ELOQUENT IN DEFENSE OF
MULTIPLE REPORTING CHANNELS, POINTING OUT THE
SPEED AND ASSURANCE OF COVERAGE WHEN SUCH WERE
EMPLOYED. HE ADDED THAT PLACING A UNIFYING LAYER
OF BUREAUCRACY ON TOP WOULD TEND: TO DELAY THE
MORE RAPID TRANSMISSION OF INTELLIGENCE; TO STIFLE
DISSENTING VIEWS; AND TO CREATE A MONSTROUS SIZED
SUPER-AGENCY WHICH MIGHT PROVE LESS SUSCEPTIBLE
TO CONTROL AND REVIEW. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS PARTICULARLY

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PAGE 05

IN 724594

TOR: 280502Z OCT 75

SEOU 25649

STRUCK WITH THIS LATER POINT WHICH HE CONSIDERED A PARTICULARLY PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT FOR MULTICHANNEL REPORTING. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE EVEN MORE PERSUASIVE ON HIS "WILD-EYED" LIBERAL PEERS.

11. COS REVIEWED IN DETAIL AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER SYSTEM AS A DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS AND DEVELOPED BY THE DCI TO FURTHER REFINE THE COMMUNITY EVALUATION SYSTEM AS WELL AS TO ENSURE EVEN MORE EFFECTIVE COORDINATION AND UNDERSTANDING WITHIN THE COMMUNITY. IT WAS NOTED THAT THE NIO FOR NORTH ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, MRS. EVELYN COLBERT, IS A SENIOR CAREER STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICER, WHILE COL. LONG'S PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT HAD BEEN AS THE DEPUTY NIO FOR LATIN AMERICA. IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT THE SYSTEM PERMITS THE DCI TO ESTABLISH AN ORDER OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND TO EXAMINE THE PRODUCT OF AN ENTIRE MISSION, AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, OR A SERVICE COMPONENT TO SEE HOW WELL IT IS ADDRESSING THE KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS. THE EVALUATIONS OF THE NIO SYSTEM REPRESENTS

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SEOU 25649

A MAJOR ADDITIONAL STEP IN MANAGEMENT OF THE COMMUNITY. COS ALSO NOTED THAT PERHAPS AN EVEN MORE IMPORTANT STEP TAKEN BY THE DCI IN EFFECTING COMMUNITY CONTROL WAS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTER-AGENCY RESOURCES ALLOCATION COMMITTEE (IRAC) WHICH PERMITS THE DCI TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE BUDGETS OF THE RESPECTIVE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS QUICK TO PERCEIVE THE USEFULNESS OF IRAC.

12. COS REVIEWED THE AGENCY SYSTEM OF MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE AND THE FIELD INTEL PROCESS IN SOME DETAIL NOTING THE AUTOMATIC SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE TO CUSTOMERS IN WASHINGTON AS WELL AS THE FIELD. LOCAL COORDINATION WAS EXPLAINED AND THE ABSOLUTE INTEGRITY OF STATION'S REPORTING WAS STRESSED. COS STATED THAT HE WAS UNAWARE OF A SINGLE INCIDENT DURING HIS CAREER IN WHICH AN AMBASSADOR OR GENERAL OR ANY OFFICER HAD PREVENTED THE DISSEMINATION OF A SINGLE REPORT FOR POLITICAL OR OTHER REASONS. LOCALLY, COS

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IN 724581 ⁹¹

TOR:280423Z OCT 75

SEOU 25649

S E C R E T 280300Z OCT 75 STAFF

CITE SEOU 25649 SECTION 3 OF 4

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

NOTED THAT WE DO NOT PRECLUDE REQUESTING THE AMBASSADOR'S OR THE CINCUNC'S OR ANY OTHER SPECIALIST OPINION OR COMMENTS IN THOSE INSTANCES WHERE THE SUBJECT MATTER IS OF A NATURE THAT THEIR COMMENTS WOULD PLACE THE INFORMATION IN CONTEXT AND THEREBY MATERIALLY ADD TO THE VALUE OF THE REPORT. IT WAS NOTED THAT SUCH COMMENTS ARE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED AS SUCH IN THE REPORT AND SUCH REVIEW IS NOT PERMITTED TO DELAY ITS TIMELY DISSEMINATION, E.G., THE OFFICE OF THE CINCUNC IS PERMITTED 24 HOURS IN WHICH TO COMMENT ON CERTAIN MILITARY REPORTS IF THE SUBJECT MATTER IS OF A MILITARY NATURE AND THE TIMELINESS OF THE INFORMATION IS NOT AFFECTED BY A 24-HOUR DELAY. COS EMPHASIZED THAT NO ONE REPEAT NO ONE IN THE FIELD CAN PRECLUDE A CHIEF OF STATION FROM EXERCISING HIS RESPONSIBILITY AND PREROGATIVE TO DISSEMINATE SUCH

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IN 724581 ^{9/}

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SEOU 25649

INTELLIGENCE AS HE, IN HIS CONSIDERED JUDGMENT, CONSIDERS WORTHY OF DISSEMINATION INTO THE NATIONAL LEVEL SYSTEM,

13, THE COS'S RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY FOR COORDINATION OF MILITARY CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS WERE ALSO REVIEWED IN DETAIL IN THE PRESENCE OF THE DEPUTY J-2, COLONEL LONG, WHILE DEFENDING THE SERVICES SEPARATE NEED FOR A COLLECTION CAPABILITY, STRONGLY ENDORSED THE NEED FOR THE COORDINATION PROCESS UNDER DCID 5/1.

14, THE CONGRESSMAN NOTED THAT ONE PROBLEM THAT HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO THE COMMITTEE'S ATTENTION AND WHICH HAD SURFACED DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE WAS THAT FOUR DIFFERENT INTEL ORGANIZATIONS HAD BEEN USING THE SAME SOURCE IN VIETNAM. COS NOTED THAT IF TRUE THE INCIDENT WAS THE EXCEPTION NOT THE RULE AND EXPLAINED THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE INTER AGENCY SOURCE REGISTRY AND HOW IT SERVES THE NEEDS OF THE ENTIRE COMMUNITY. THE PROBLEM OF FABRICATION WAS DISCUSSED AND THE COMMUNITY'S USE OF BURN NOTICES

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SEOU 25649

TO IDENTIFY AND NEUTRALIZE SUCH PEOPLE WAS EXPLAINED.

15, ALTHOUGH COS HAD PREVIOUSLY BRIEFED THE CONGRESSMAN PRIOR TO HIS ARRIVAL, SUSLAK DELMAR LANG BRIEFED THE CONGRESSMAN ON THE STATUS OF COMINT COVERAGE OF THE NORTH KOREAN TARGET. HE ALSO STRESSED THE DESIRABILITY AND COST EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROPOSED U-2R DEPLOYMENT, PROPOSED [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] AND ADDING A [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ALSO MADE A STRONG PITCH FOR THE COST EFFECTIVENESS OF THE THIRD PARTY PROGRAM, AND THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL FUNDING OF [REDACTED] COUNTERPART ORGANIZATION. THE CONGRESSMAN AT THIS POINT INTERJECTED THAT HE SAW NO REASON FOR THE SEPARATION OF NSA AND CIA. COS ADDRESSED TO THIS AND THE NSA REPRESENTATIVE LATER STATED HIS VIEWS WHICH WERE GENERALLY IN ACCORD. COS EXPLAINED NSA TASKING RESPONSIBILITY AND FIRST AND THIRD PARTY PROGRAMS NOTING THAT ON THE SURFACE HE COULD NOT PERCEIVE ANY ADVANTAGES THAT WOULD ACCRUE TO THE GOVERNMENT IN TERMS OF GREATER

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TOR1280423Z OCT 75 SEOU 25649

EFFICIENCY OF COST EFFECTIVENESS BY COMBINING THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS. INDEED THE UNIQUE NATURE OF NSA RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH ARE HIGHLY TECHNICAL AND SOMEWHAT ESOTERIC ARGUED AGAINST FUNCTIONAL MERGER OF THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS. IT WAS NOTED THAT THE RESULTANT SPAN OF MANAGEMENT CONTROL COULD IN FACT RESULT IN A LESS COST EFFECTIVE OPERATION. BOTH COS AND MR. LANG NOTED THAT PRESENT PROCEDURES PRECLUDE UNDESIRED DUPLICATIVE TASKING AND ENSURED MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY EXPLOITATION IRRESPECTIVE OF WHICH AGENCY HAD THE LOCAL COMINT RESPONSIBILITY. MR. LANG COMMENTED THAT HE HAD WORKED CLOSELY WITH CIA IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES, AND SAW NEITHER MAJOR PROBLEMS NOR ANY ADVANTAGES THAT WOULD NECESSARILY ACCRUE IF THE AGENCIES WERE COMBINED.

16. DCOS BRIEFED THE AMBASSADOR ON THE EVENING OF 25 OCTOBER ON THE NATURE OF THE CONGRESSMAN'S INTERESTS AND THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DAY'S DISCUSSIONS. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO DISCUSS THESE CONCERNS WITH THE CONGRESSMAN ON SUNDAY OR MONDAY. THE AMBASSADOR SAW CONGRESSMAN

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		TOR1280423Z OCT 75	SEOU 25649

MILFORD THAT NIGHT AT DINNER AND INVITED HIM TO THE RESIDENCE AT 1100 HOURS ON THE 26TH. THE CONGRESSMAN LATER STATED THAT THE DISCUSSIONS WERE QUITE HELPFUL AND THE AMBASSADOR AGREED TO FORWARD A LETTER ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LOCAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT WHICH WOULD BE OF ASSISTANCE TO HIS PROPOSED MINORITY REPORT.

17. IN A STATION-ARRANGED ONE HOUR MEETING WITH LT. GEN. HOLLINGSWORTH ON 26 OCTOBER IN WHICH DCOS PARTICIPATED, THE CONGRESSMAN RESTATED THE NATURE OF HIS CONCERNS IN SEEKING POSITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO A MINORITY REPORT. HE THEN ASKED GEN. HOLLINGSWORTH WHAT INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT HE NEEDED AS A FIELD ARMY COMMANDER AND HOW HE WOULD CHARACTERIZE THE SUPPORT HE WAS CURRENTLY OBTAINING FROM THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. HOLLINGSWORTH RESPONDED WITH A CRUSTY BUT IMPASSIONED LECTURE ON THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT TO CIA AND NSA. HOLLINGSWORTH TOLD THE CONGRESSMAN THAT HE NEEDED MORE TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND HE NEEDED IT IN A TIMELY FASHION, WHICH WAS EXACTLY WHAT HE HAD RECENTLY TOLD SECRETARY

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SCHLESINGER WHO HAD POSED THE SAME QUESTION. THE GENERAL STATED THAT HE WANTED MORE NORTH KOREAN TACTICAL, PHOTO, AND EVEN ECONOMIC COVERAGE AND HE DEPENDED ON NSA AND CIA TO GET IT FOR HIM. HE COMPLETELY DISCOUNTED U.S. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS SAYING THE ARMY DID NOT PUT HIGH CALIBER MEN INTO INTELLIGENCE AND DID NOT DEVELOP INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS. HE NOTED THAT HIS SPECIAL FORCES COMMANDER HAD JUST BEEN TRANSFERRED TO DIA IN AN INTELLIGENCE ASSIGNMENT. HE SAID HE WAS A GOOD SPECIAL FORCES COMMANDER BUT NO INTEL OFFICER, WHEREAS HIS FORMER G-2 HAD BEEN REASSIGNED TO HONOLULU IN A PERSONNEL SLOT, AND THEN THE ARMY HAD BEEN UNABLE TO PROVIDE A QUALIFIED COLONEL AS A REPLACEMENT, HE SAID THAT IN CONTRAST CIA AND NSA HAVE CAREER PROFESSIONALS WITH WHOM THE FIELD COMMANDER CAN WORK, AS HE FORMERLY DID IN VIETNAM AND AS HE IS NOW DOING IN KOREA. HOLLINGSWORTH ALSO ADDED KUDOS FOR STATION MILITARY REPORTING, NOTING THAT KOREA IS A MILITARY-ORIENTED SOCIETY

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IN 724585 ⁹

TOR:280427Z OCT 75

SEOU 25649

S E C R E T 280300Z OCT 75 STAFF

CITE SEOUL 25649 FINAL SECTION OF 4

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

AND THAT HE HAD FOUND OUR MILITARY/POLITICAL REPORTING QUITE HELPFUL, THE GENERAL DECLINED TO BE SPECIFIC AS TO THE NATURE OF ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL SUPPORT HE REQUIRED BECAUSE OF UNCERTAINTY REGARDING ITS SECURITY CLASSIFICATION, BUT HE VOLUNTEERED TO PUT HIS REQUIREMENTS AND COMMENTS IN A LETTER TO THE CONGRESSMAN WHICH HE WOULD FORWARD VIA STATION CHANNELS AND "THEN LET THE PEOPLE BACK HOME WORK OUT THE CLASSIFICATION PROBLEM"; CONGRESSMAN SAID THAT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL AND WOULD REPRESENT A REAL CONTRIBUTION TO HIS REPORT,

18. IN A SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH DCOS, THE CONGRESSMAN REQUESTED THE ASSISTANCE OF THE DDCI BY NAME IN DRAFTING HIS MINORITY REPORT AS WELL AS IN REVIEWING THE USIB STUDY ON KOREA

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IN 7245²¹~~85~~

TOR1280427Z OCT 75

SEOU 25649

REQUIREMENTS, HE STATED THAT HE PROPOSED TO BASE HIS REPORT ON THE USIB AND COS REVIEWS OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM AND TO INCLUDE EXTRACTS OF THE LETTERS FROM THE AMBASSADOR AND GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH. ALTHOUGH STILL UNCERTAIN AS TO METHODOLOGY, HIS INTENT IS TO DEVELOP A POSITIVE REPORT REFLECTING THE HIGH DEGREE OF LOCAL COOPERATION THAT HE HAS PERSONALLY OBSERVED BUT STRESSED THAT THE REPORT MUST BE UNCLASSIFIED BECAUSE THE REPORT MUST BE DESIGNED FOR PRESENTATION ON THE HOUSE FLOOR. HE BELIEVED THE DDCI WOULD BE OF PARTICULAR ASSISTANCE IN PULLING TOGETHER A REPORT OF THIS NATURE.

19. THE CONGRESSMAN STATED THAT HE AND REPRESENTATIVE DAVID C. TREEN WERE IN THE VANGUARD ON THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE EFFORT AND THEY HAVE THE SUPPORT OF REPRESENTATIVES MCCLARY AND JOHNSON ON THE COMMITTEE. HE SAID THE BIPARTISAN NATURE OF THIS MINORITY, ALBEIT THREE REPUBLICANS TO ONE DEMOCRAT, WOULD ASSIST ITS ACCEPTANCE. HE ALSO STATED THAT HE MUST NOW MOVE RAPIDLY TO RECRUIT HIS OWN STAFF ASSISTANT ON THE

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IN 724585²¹

TOR:280427Z OCT 75

SEOU 25649

COMMITTEE STAFF.

20. ADDITION DISCUSSION IS SCHEDULED WITH
 CONGRESSMAN MILFORD FOR 28 OCTOBER. WILL ADVISE,
 E2, IMPDET.

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
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CONF: C/LA3 INFO: FILE DCI (REVIEW STAFF), CS/RF,
 DDO, DDC/DO, SA/DDO

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TO: PANAMA CITY.4
 RYBAT PLMHCONGA 4
 REF: PANAMA CITY 34339 | IN 723135|4

1. HQS AWARE OF AND HANDLING REF CASE. NO NEED FORWARD WALKER LETTER AND OTHER THAN POUCHING COPIES OF MEMOS. NO FURTHER STATION ACTION NECESSARY AT THIS TIME. PLS ADVISE BY CABLE IF ANY FURTHER INFO THIS MATTER COMES TO STATION ATTENTION.4

2. FILE: DEFER. E2 IMPDET.H

LA COMMENT: REQUEST HQS GUIDANCE ON 1972 CASE OF MAIL INTERCEPTS INADVERTENTLY SENT TO PANAMA.

OCT 29 6 57 AM '75

SA/DDO - NORM SHEPANEK {TELECOORD}

DATE: 28 OCT 75
 ORIG: BARBARA GRAHAM: EMEP
 UNIT: C/LA/CAM/PA
 EXT: 1805

Michael Hensley
 C/LA
 RELEASING OFFICER

Barbara Graham
 C/LA/CAM
 AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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 CL BY: 054524

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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CLASSIFICATION
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DATE-TIME GROUP
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DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

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CONF: C/EA 3 INFO: FILE DCI/REVIEW STAFF, CS/RF,
 DDO, DDO/DO SA/DDP

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TO: PRIORITY



RYBAT ADMIN PLMHCONGA 4

REF: DIRECTOR 759843 4

1. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY ALL CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO IDENTITY MUST BEAR THE SENSITIVITY INDICATOR RYBAT AND THE CRYPTONYM [REDACTED] PLMHCONGA. 4
2. FOR UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE CASES, CHIEFS OF STATION MAY AT THEIR DISCRETION USE THE DIVISIONS {PLMPTACT} PRIVACY CHANNEL. 4
3. ALL INFORMATION RELATING TO IDENTITY MUST REPEAT MUST BE SENT TO HQS VIA CABLE REPEAT CABLE. E2, IMPDET.H

CEA/OEM: R.E. RUSSELL {IN DRAFT}
 EA/DDO: MR. PECHOUS {TELECOORD}

DATE: 24 OCTOBER 1975
 ORIG: CEA/ESEC
 UNIT: S.M. LABAR
 EXT: 1709

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA
 RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
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DATE-TIME GROUP
 242332Z DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
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CONF: *C/EA3* INFO: FILE *DCI/RENEW STAFF CS/RF*
DDO, DDO/OO, SAT/DDO

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TO: PRIORITY

RYBAT ADMIN PLMHCONGA Y

REF: DIRECTOR 759842 Y

- IDENTITY IS: CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE AGENCY.
- NO FILE. E2, IMPDET.H

CEA/OEM: R.E. RUSSELL {IN DRAFT}
 EA/DDO: MR. PECHOUS {TELECOORD}

DATE: 24 OCTOBER 1975
 ORIG: CEA/ESEC
 UNIT: S.M. LABAR
 EXT: 1709

Theodore G. Shackley
 THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA
 RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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CLASSIFICATION
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 DATE-TIME GROUP: 241922Z
 CITE: DIRECTOR
 MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 759641

CONF: *C/EA-3*
 INFO: FILE *DCI/REVIEW STAFF, CRF, 200, 200/00, 200/00, 200/00*

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IMMEDIATE SEOUL. Y
 RYBAT PLMHCONGA Y

REF: A. SEOUL 25645 | IN 722803 |
 B. SEOUL 25646 | IN 723138 | Y

1. IN VIEW OF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S INTENTION AS EXPRESSED IN REF A TO SPEND ONE IF NOT SEVERAL DAYS IN DISCUSSION OF FIELD STATION ACTIVITIES, BELIEVE SEOUL STATION SHOULD APPROACH THIS TASK WITH FOLLOWING DATA IN MIND: Y

A. BACKGROUND. HOUSE COMMITTEE IN ITS ENTIRETY IS KEENLY INTERESTED IN COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF HOW CIA FUNCTIONS. IT MOST LIKELY CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S WILL BE FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF FIELD STATION ACTIVITIES DURING HIS VISIT TO SEOUL. Y

B. MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE. BELIEVE MUCH OF WHAT CONGRESSMAN MILFORD CALLS "START OF THE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROCESS IN THE FIELD" CAN BE DEALT WITH IF STATION STARTS ITS BRIEFING WITH PRESENTATION ON HOW MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS. SUGGEST STATION OUTLINE

DATE: 24 OCT 75
 ORIG: TGSHACKLEY:DCM
 UNIT: C/EA
 EXT: 1428

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE PROCESS I.E., STATION RECEIVES OD FROM HQS AND COMMENTS ON IT. ONCE AGREEMENT REACHED ON OD DIALOGUE FOLLOWS ON AG'S WHICH RELATE TO SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES. THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL, IN KOREAN CONTEXT, TO FOCUS ON KEY OBJECTIVE IN GENERAL AND THEN NARROW DISCUSSION DOWN TO AG-4 OR AG-7. THIS PHASE OF BRIEFING SHOULD INCLUDE COMMENTARY ON FUNDING BY FAN'S, ETC. ¶

C. AGENT ACQUISITION. WITH FOCUS OF BRIEFING BEING ON AG-4 OR AG-7, STATION COULD THEN OUTLINE HOW TARGET STUDIES OF KEY INTELLIGENCE REPOSITORIES ^{ARE} CONDUCTED, POTENTIAL TARGETS FOR RECRUITMENT IDENTIFIED AND HOW SPOTTING, ASSESSMENT AND RECRUITMENT PROCESS UNFOLDS. IN DISCUSSION OF RECRUITMENT PHASE OF OPERATIONS, THERE SHOULD BE EXAMINATION OF NAME TRACE AND POA PROCESS. ¶

D. AGENT AUTHENTICATION. DIALOGUE WITH CONGRESSMAN SHOULD ALSO OUTLINE HOW AGENT AUTHENTICATED ONCE RECRUITED. STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED ON CONTINUING ASPECTS OF AUTHENTICATION, SECURITY OF MEETINGS, ETC. ¶

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E. POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION. ACQUISITION OF INTELLIGENCE FROM IN-PLACE AGENT, TURNING IT INTO INTEL DISSEMINATION, REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM, AND REPORTS EVALUATION CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE REVIEWED. Y

F. OPERATIONAL REPORTING SYSTEM. STARTING WITH RECRUITMENT OF AGENT, STATION SHOULD OUTLINE TYPES OF REPORTING REQUIRED BY AGENCY FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL PURPOSES I.E., PRQ PART I AND 2, CONTACT REPORTS, INTEL REPORTS, PERIODIC ASSET REPORTS, PERIODIC PROGRESS REPORTS, OPACTS AND FIELD PERFORMANCE REPORTS. ON LATTER, STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED ON ^{FEED BACK} ~~FEED BACK~~ FROM MID-YEAR AND FY REVIEWS WITH DDO. FY BUDGET CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE TOUCHED ON. Y

G. CASE HISTORY. IT ESSENTIAL WE NOT IDENTIFY ANY ACTIVE SOURCES BY TRUE NAME TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. IN VIEW OF THIS WISH POINT OUT HQS HAS FOUND IT USEFUL TO DRAW ON CASE HISTORY SCENARIO TO UNDERSCORE ALL POINTS PREVIOUSLY MADE IN BRIEFING. IN SUCH CASE HISTORY ONLY IDENTITY OF AGENT AND POSSIBLE TARGET HAS BEEN ALTERED FOR SOURCE

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PROTECTION. THIS APPROACH HAS WORKED EFFECTIVELY FOR HQS

AND ASSUME IT WILL BE USEFUL TECHNIQUE FOR SEOUL. Y

2. BRIEFING SHOULD ALSO ZERO IN ON STATION'S COORDINATION ROLE UNDER DCID'S FOR CLANDESTINE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPS. ALSO THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE PART OF BRIEFING CONCENTRATE ON IMMINENCE OF HOSTILITIES INDICATORS WHICH NOW BEING WORKED ON BY AMERICAN INTEL COMMUNITY IN CONSULTATION WITH [] THIS MIGHT WELL SHOW COMPLEXITY OF ISSUES INVOLVED IN MEASURING INTEL SUCCESS OR FAILURES. Y

3. HQS HAS HAD LIMITED EXPOSURE TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, THUS UNABLE TO SHED ANY LIGHT ON QUESTION POSED IN REF B PARA 2. BASIC GUIDELINE FOR THIS BRIEFING MUST BE FULL CANDOR WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY PROTECTING SOURCES AND METHODS. Y

4. PLEASE USE ABOVE INDICATORS ON FUTURE TRAFFIC DEALING WITH BRIEFINGS OR TRAVELS OF CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS WHO INVOLVED IN INVESTIGATION OF INTEL COMMUNITY. E-2, IMPDET.H

AC/EA/JK [Signature]
 DC/EA [Signature]
 C/EA/COPS [Signature]
 A/DDO [Signature]
 C/REVIEW STAFF [Signature]
 C/OLC [Signature]

DATE: 24 OCT 75
 ORIG: TGS Shackley:DCM
 UNIT: C/EA
 EXT: 1428

DDO

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

[Signature]
 THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, C/EA
 AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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T 408492 EIA951 PAGE 01 IN 722803

TOR:240650Z OCT 75 SEOU 25645

SECRET 240620Z OCT 75 STAFF

CITE SEOU 25645

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR,

NIACT DIRECTOR

RYBAT CODEL

REF: A. DIRECTOR 758492

B. DIRECTOR 758427

1. CODEL MURPHY ARRIVED SEOUL EVENING 23 OCTOBER AT ROKG INVITATION. DUE HOSPITALIZATION OF COS, DCOS CONTACTED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD AND OFFERED SEPARATE BRIEFING IF DESIRED. IN BRIEF CONVERSATION AFTER COUNTRY TEAM BRIEFING ON MORNING OF 24 OCTOBER IN WHICH DCOS PARTICIPATED, REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD REITERATED POINTS COVERED IN REFERENT A MESSAGE AND STATED HE HAD BEEN CHARGED BY HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN TO MAKE A DETAILED STUDY OF THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS IN THE FIELD. HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO BREAK OFF FROM DELEGATION SCHEDULE AS OF 0900 OCTOBER 25 TO COMMENCE DISCUSSIONS. WHILE PARAMETERS OF HIS^S INTERESTS NOT FULLY COVERED IN INITIAL CONVERSATION, HE ANTICIPATES DEVOTING ONE^S/F NOT

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T 408492 EIA951 PAGE 02-02 IN 722803
TOR:240650Z OCT 75 SEOU 25649

SEVERAL DAYS TO DISCUSSION OF FIELD STATION ACTIVITIES.

2. REP. LUCIEN NEDZI WAS ALSO CONTACTED WITH OFFER OF STATION BRIEFING WHICH WAS RECEIVED IN FRIENDLY FASHION. REP. NEDZI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND SAID THAT HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH LATER DURING THEIR FIVE DAY STAY.

3. COS MAY BE RELEASED FROM HOSPITAL MORNING OF 25 OCTOBER. WHETHER HE IS OR NOT, COS PREPARED TO TALK WITH REP. MILFORD EITHER AT HOSPITAL OR AT RESIDENCE WHERE HE WILL NEED BE CONFINED FOR ONE WEEK RECUPERATION. THIS OFFER BEING CONVEYED TO CONGRESSMAN, AND IF AGREEABLE TO HIM, ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE FOR HIM TO MEET DIRECTLY WITH COS.

4. WOULD APPRECIATE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE BY 0800 LOCAL 25 OCTOBER AS REP. MILFORD'S INTERESTS OBVIOUSLY EXTEND TO DETAILED PROCEDURES AND REQUIREMENTS BEYOND NORMAL SCOPE OF FIELD BRIEFINGS.

E2 IMPDET



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758926

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INFO: FILE *DCI/REVIEW STAFF, C/RF, DDA, DDO, DDO, SA, DDO*

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TO: TEHRAN,

ADMIN 4

1. ALL SIGNIFICANT CABLE TRAFFIC RELATING TO THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF CIA SHOULD CARRY IDEN SLUG.4
2. IN CASES OF UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY ADDRESSEES MAY USE PLARGYLE RATHER THAN IDEN SLUG. IN SUCH INSTANCES, NE DIVISION WILL ASSURE THAT APPROPRIATE HQS COMPONENTS ARE APPRISED OF PERTINENT PORTIONS OF THOSE MESSAGES. E2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 23 OCTOBER 1975

ORIG:

UNIT: NE/COPS

EXT: R-1562

[Signature]
C/NE

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
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DDO DDO/DO, SA/DDO

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DATE: 23 OCTOBER 1975


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TO: ROME.Y

RYBAT PLMHCONGA Y

FOR ACOS AND OZGA Y

1. HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE PLANS HOLD HEARINGS ON DESTRY PROJECT 29 OCTOBER. REQUEST MR. OZGA PLAN REVIEW PLDEFINE MATERIAL WITH CHIEF EUROPE ON 27 OCTOBER AND ARRANGE BE HEADQUARTERS NOT LATER THAN AFTERNOON 28 OCTOBER. Y

2. PLEASE USE ABOVE SLUG FOR FUTURE SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC RELATED TO THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS. IN CASES OF UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY, YOU MAY USE PLKMBALL SLUG FOR SUCH TRAFFIC AT YOUR DISCRETION. E2, IMPDET.H

DATE: 21 OCTOBER 1975
ORIG: PHILIP F. FENDIG
UNIT: DC/EUR
EXT: 1283

DC/EUR

RELEASING OFFICER

SA/DDO, CIN DRAFTY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

DC/EUR, CIN DRAFTY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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DATE-TIME GROUP 211745Z DIRECTOR

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 CS/RF, DDO, SA/DDO.

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
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RYBAT PLMHCONGA Y


MANY THANKS FOR YOUR REPORTING ON VISIT MR. DAVID AARON.
 PLEASE USE ABOVE SLUG FOR FUTURE SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC RELATED
 TO THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS. IN CASES OF
 UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY, YOU MAY USE PLKMBALL SLUG FOR SUCH TRAFFIC
 AT YOUR DISCRETION. E2 IMPDET.H



DATE: 21 OCTOBER 75
 ORIG: PHILIP F. FENDIG
 UNIT: DC/EUR
 EXT: 1283



PHILIP F. FENDIG
 DC/EUR



PHILIP F. FENDIG
 DC/EUR

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DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS
ROUTING SHEET

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2 ADDO				
3 C/PLANS				
4 C/OPS				
5 C/SS				
6 C/CCS				
7 C/CI				
8 C/AF				
9 C/DCD				
10 C/DIVD				
11 C/EA				
12 C/EUR				
13 C/FR				
14 C/NE				
15 C/SE				
16 C/LA				
17 SA/DDO CT-5				

10 NOV 1975

SUSPENSE DATE

REMARKS

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Senator Church?

17 OCT 75 13 49

SIGNATURE

SA / ADDO

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17 OCT 1975

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
MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO Division and Staff Chiefs

SUBJECT : The Director's Greeting Card List

1. It is requested that you provide recommendations as to whom the Director should send holiday greetings. Please submit your list to the SA/ADDO in Room 7E22 by the close of business 10 November 1975.

2. Your list should be prepared on a very selected basis. You may include the names of chiefs of foreign security and intelligence services and the names of non-intelligence personnel abroad who are of special interest or significance to the Agency mission. In most cases, these names should be those of persons whom the Director has met here or abroad.

3. After the Director has reviewed the lists of recommended names, the greeting cards will be prepared and sent to the appropriate Division or Staff for pouching or mailing.


Peter V. Raudenbush
SA/ADDO

Distribution:

C/AF	C/SE
C/EA	C/CCS
C/EUR	C/CI
C/DCD	C/OPS
C/DIVD	C/PS
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C/NE	SPG/DDO

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
17 OCT 1975

DWO 75-7

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO Division and Staff Chiefs

SUBJECT : DDCI's Greeting Card List

Addressees are requested to prepare a Christmas card list for the DDCI. It should include, where security permits, all significant contacts hosted by him at Headquarters or visited in the field. Please submit your list to the SA/ADDO by close of business 10 November 1975.



Peter V. Raudenbush

SA/ADDO

Distribution:

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SUBJECT: (Optional)

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Philip F. Fendig
DC/EUR

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TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)



DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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SAY DDO



FYI

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T 389706 EIA620 PAGE 01 IN 716119
TOR:161931Z OCT 75 LOND 66194

S E C R E T 161650Z OCT 75 STAFF
CITE LONDON 66194
TO: DIRECTOR,
RYBAT PLKMBALL
REF A. DIRECTOR 752556
B. DIRECTOR 754586

C/eur
DC/E/NW
C/E/BC
Add name of [unclear]
I send copy ESA/DDO.

1. AT DAVID AARON'S REQUEST, COS BRIEFED HIM FOR AN HOUR AND FIFTEEN MINUTES ON THE AFTERNOON OF 16 OCT. IN RESPONSE TO HIS QUESTIONS, COS BRIEFED HIM IN GENERAL TERMS ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE FUNCTIONING OF THE JIC. COS ALSO DESCRIBED, WITHOUT OPERATIONAL DETAIL, THE INTERFACE WITH THE BRITISH AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STATION AND OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE EMBASSY. AARON DID NOT ASK FOR FINANCIAL DETAILS OR PERSONNEL FIGURES.

2. IN A WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION AFTER THIS BRIEFING, AARON PURSUED THE FOLLOWING MAIN LINES OF QUESTIONING:

A. HE ASKED IF A RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT COORDINATED WITH THE BRITISH WOULD BE CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR, COS REPLIED THAT THIS COULD BE A MATTER OF JUDGMENT, BUT CERTAINLY

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IF THERE WAS ANY POLITICAL RISK OR SENSITIVITY HE WOULD PROBABLY ALERT THE AMBASSADOR. COS POINTED OUT THE FACT OF COORDINATION WITH THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES REDUCED THE RISK CONSIDERABLY.

B. HE ASKED IF A LARGE SCALE ACTION TYPE PROGRAM COORDINATED WITH THE BRITISH SUCH AS MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN PORTUGAL WOULD BE CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR. AFTER HE HAD REPHRASED THE QUESTION TO LEAVE OUT ANY MENTION OF PORTUGAL, COS STATED THAT HE WOULD SEEK AUTHORITY FROM WASHINGTON TO INFORM THE AMBASSADOR OF ANY SUCH SITUATION.

C. HE ASKED IF COS WOULD APPROACH THE FOREIGN OFFICE DIRECTLY OR THROUGH GNGRAPH IN ORDER TO COORDINATE SUCH A PROGRAM. COS REPLIED THAT NORMALLY HE WOULD GO DIRECTLY TO GNGRAPH AND THAT THEY WOULD INSURE COORDINATION WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

D. HE ASKED IF GNGRAPH HAD TO CLEAR BOTH INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ACTION OPERATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE U.K. AMBASSADOR IN THE FIELD. COS REPLIED THAT ACTION OPERATIONS HAD TO BE CLEARED WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE, BUT THAT HE IS NOT SURE AS TO HOW MUCH COORDINATION WAS REQUIRED ON

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IN 716119

TOR:161931Z OCT 75

LOND 66194

COLLECTION OPERATION, AARON WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PURSUE THIS POINT IN HIS MEETING THIS AFTERNOON WITH SYKES AND HOOPER AND WE WILL REPORT ANY PLAYBACK WE GET. HE ASKED WHETHER IN COS'S JUDGMENT IT WOULD BE AN IMPROVEMENT ON PRESENT PROCEDURES FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO REQUIRE PRIOR CLEARANCE WITH OUR AMBASSADORS OF ALL INTELLIGENCE AND ACTION OPERATIONS. COS REPLIED THAT IF ALL THE AMBASSADORS WERE AS ABLE AND AS INFORMED AS THIS ONE AND SOME OTHERS HE HAD KNOWN, THAT THIS MIGHT WORK. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT MANY AMBASSADORS HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OR ACQUAINTANCE WITH THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD AND NO BASIS FOR MAKING INFORMED JUDGMENTS, AND THE RESULT, THEREFORE, OF SUCH A RULE MIGHT BE TO SERIOUSLY INHIBIT AND PREVENT MANY OPERATIONS THAT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN.

E. IN ANSWER TO ANOTHER QUESTION, COS CONFIRMED THAT BOTH THE AMBASSADOR AND THE BRITISH WERE PERIODICALLY BRIEFED ON THE STATUS OF ANY [REDACTED] TAKING PLACE IN [REDACTED]

3. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE DISCUSSIONS, COS TRIED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. THE BRITISH WERE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BY THE LEAKS AND

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IN 716119

TOR:161931Z OCT 75

LOND 6615

CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON. THE PAD BEEN REASSURED BY US THAT WE WOULD PROTECT THE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP AND THE PRODUCT, AND TO DATE THERE HAD BEEN NO DIMINUTION OF THHE INTELLIGENCE THEY WERE PRPARED TO GIVE US. AARON SAID HE WOULD ALSO REASSURE SYKES AND HOOPER ON THIS POINT AS FAR AS THE SENATE COMMITTEE IS CONCERNED.

B. COS POINTED OUT BRITISH INTELLIGENCE ENJOYED AN ENVIABLE DEGREE OF PROTECTION AS A RESULT OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT, THE ABSENCE OF PARLIAMENTARY INVESTIGATIONS AND THE VERY EFFECTIVE [REDACTED] FOR GNGRAPH REPRESENTATIVES SERVCING OVERSEAS. COS TOLD AARON THAT ONE OF THE USEFUL THINGS THE SENATE COMMITTEE MIGHT DO WOULD BE TO CALL FOR NEW LEGISLATION THAT MIGHT OFFER SOME PROTECTION SIMILAR TO THE KIND THAT THE BRITISH ENJOY. AARON SAID THAT THE COMMITTEE WAS IN FACT LOOKING INTO THIS PROBLEM.

C. COS REVIEWED THE PUBLIC EVIDENCE AVAILABLE AS TO WHAT PHIL AGEE HAS BEEN UP TO AND POINTED OUT THE KIND OF DAMAGE THAT CAN BE DONE IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS. COS DUCKED A QUESTION FROM AARON AS TO HOW MUCH

*He asked
the question*

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IN 716119

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COVERAGE ON AGEE JAGUAR WAS PROVIDING FOR US.

4. IN CONCLUSION, COS STATED THAT WE HAD EVIDENCE THAT THE CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON IS BEGINNING TO AFFECT OUR ABILITY TO RECRUIT AND MAINTAIN OUR AGENTS. AARON REPLIED THAT IF SECSTATE KISSINGER HAD BEEN WILLING TO PROVIDE THE CHURCH COMMITTEE WITH THE INFORMATION THEY REQUESTED THE HEARINGS WOULD HAVE BEEN OVER IN SEPTEMBER. HE SPECULATED THAT THE WAY THINGS WERE NOW GOING, THE CHURCH COMMITTEE WOULD FINISH UP NEXT FEBRUARY. THE ENTIRE MEETING WAS CARRIED OUT IN A COURTEOUS TONE AND NO CONFRONTATIONS OCCURRED. E2 IMPDET

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S E C R E T

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS
ROUTING SHEET

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IN-716059

CITE BONM 43387

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

REF: DIRECTOR 752556

1. MR. DAVID AARON OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE BRIEFED BY STIGGINS [REDACTED] AND DEUTINGER FOR TWO HOURS MORNING 15 OCTOBER. AARON HAD LUNCH WITH [REDACTED] AND NEWLY ARRIVED ARMY ATTACHE COLONEL OLIVER RAY. HE MET FOR OVER HOUR WITH AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND AFTERNOON 15 OCTOBER BEFORE DEPARTING FOR LONDON.

2. LARGE PART OF MORNING BRIEFING DEVOTED TO MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AFFAIRS IN GERMANY. AARON ASKED FOR DEFINITION OF HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT COS SUPERVISED MILITARY INTELLIGENCE EFFORT WHICH EXPLAINED TO HIM IN SOME DETAIL. AARON ASKED NUMBER QUESTIONS ABOUT COORDINATION PROCESS AND HOW THIS IMPLEMENTED. HE WANTED KNOW IF THE COORDINATION PROCESS EXTENDED TO A REVIEW OF REQUIREMENTS AND OF THE VALUE OF MILITARY COLLECTION ACTIVITIES AS REFLECTED IN ITS PRODUCT AND TOLD THAT OUR COORDINATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES GENERALLY CONFINED TO INSURING THAT MILITARY TRADECRAFT MET OUR STANDARDS, AND THAT POLITICAL RISKS ACCEPTABLE; IN PRACTICE, WE DID NOT REVIEW PRODUCTION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS. WE MENTIONED THAT MILITARY COLLECTION IN RECENT YEARS WAS ON RELATIVELY MODEST SCALE AND THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO FLAPS IN RECENT YEARS.

3. MR. AARON SAID THAT THE SENATORS ON HIS COMMITTEE HAD BEEN SURPRISED TO FIND THAT MILITARY WAS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN COLLECTION ACTIVITY SINCE THIS NOT COVERED IN ANY LEGISLATION, BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SUCH ACTIVITY AUTHORIZED IN NONSKIDS. STIGGINS MADE POINT THAT MILITARY IN GERMANY STRUCTURED ALONG COMBAT INTELLIGENCE LINES AND IN EFFECT ENGAGED IN MILITARY COLLECTION OF TACTICAL NATURE AS TRAINING EXERCISE APPROPRIATE TO THEIR POTENTIAL WARTIME MISSION. MR. AARON SEVERAL TIMES SUGGESTED MILITARY OPS AND PERSONNEL COULD BE ASSIGNED TO CIA OPERATIONAL

CONTROL IN FIELD. WE OPINED THIS IS TO SOME EXTENT DIRECTION IN WHICH COORDINATION HAS TRENDED OVER THE YEARS BUT LOCAL COMMANDERS PROBABLY FEEL HIS CONTROL UNDERMINED THEREBY.

4. TURNING TO BKHERALD OPS, MR. AARON SAID HE RECALLED FROM WASHINGTON BRIEFING THAT GERMAN STATION HAD SIZEABLE ALLOTMENT FOR OFFICER ENGAGED IN POLITICAL COVERT ACTION ON REGIONAL BASIS. WE EXPLAINED THAT MONIES IN THIS PROJECT ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY FOR SALARY AND EXTENSIVE TRAVEL OF OFFICER (HERZFANZ NOT MENTIONED BY NAME) AND NOT USED FOR AGENT PAYMENT OR OTHER PURPOSES. THIS SEEMED TO SATISFY AARON.

5. HE ASKED NUMBER QUESTIONS ABOUT "FANCY" POLITICAL SOURCES, ALONG LINE THAT THESE COULD PERHAPS BE HANDLED AS NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS AND ASKED WHETHER THESE CONTACTS DID NOT REPRESENT HIGH RISK IF EXPOSED. STIGGINS EXPLAINED AT SOME LENGTH THAT THESE SOURCES VERY FEW IN NUMBER, AND WERE PRODUCT OF SEVERAL FACTORS, INCLUDING MANY YEARS CONTACT WITH SPECIFIC CIA OFFICERS, MAKING POINT THAT AGENTS CONFIDENCE IN CIA BASED ON MANY YEARS ASSOCIATION. WE ESTIMATED FLAP POTENTIAL SLIGHT THESE LONG-STANDING CONTACTS, WHICH COULD BE EXPLAINED AS OLD FRIENDSHIPS. FOR REASON THAT THEY WERE, IN FACT SUCH, THESE RELATIONSHIPS COULD NOT BE TRANSFERRED TO STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS. WE MENTIONED THAT SOME OF THE LOWER-LEVEL DEVELOPMENTAL OPERATIONS ACTUALLY REPRESENTED HIGHER RISK AND CITED GENERAL OUTLINE OF "HILTON AFFAIR" (WITHOUT NAMES) AS EXAMPLE HOW DEVELOPMENTAL CASE COULD BE TROUBLESOME. EMPHASIZED THERE HAD BEEN FEW OF THESE OVER YEARS.

6. AARON ASKED SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT FEDREP REACTION IN EVENT OUR INCOMPATIBLE SOURCES EXPOSED. WE RESPONDED THAT IN GENERAL GERMANS WERE NOT INTERESTED IN EMBARRASSING US AND THAT THIS KEY ELEMENT, PLUS FACTOR THAT WE HANDLED ALL INCOMPATIBLE ACTIVITY VERY CAREFULLY, LED US TO CONCLUSION THAT WE WERE NOT RUNNING RISK MAJOR EMBARRASSMENT BY CONDUCTING LIMITED NUMBER OF THESE OPERATIONS. POINTED OUT THAT A CERTAIN NUMBER OF THESE OPERATIONS ESSENTIAL TO PROVIDE COVERAGE THOSE AREAS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND SOME ECONOMIC FIELDS WHERE GERMANS NOT COMPLETELY CANDID WITH US EMBASSY RE THEIR ACTIVITIES.

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7. MR. AARON ASKED ABOUT EXTENT WE KEPT AMBASSADOR INFORMED ON OUR ACTIVITIES IN [REDACTED] FIELD. WE REPLIED THAT AMBASSADOR SAW VIRTUALLY ALL REPORTING AND THEREFORE KNEW WHERE SOURCES LOCATED BUT THAT AS RULE WE DID NOT CLEAR WITH HIM ON INDIVIDUAL CONTACTS, MAKING REFERENCE TO "SOURCES AND METHODS" PROVISION OF OUR REGULATION AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. POINTED OUT THAT EACH CASE TREATED SEPARATELY BUT THAT AMBASSADOR AND EMBASSY/CONSULATES HAVE NOT HAD INTEREST IN DEVELOPMENTAL CONTACT WITH YOUNGER POLITICAL FIGURES OUTSIDE BONN AREA. ON OTHER HAND HE CLEARLY QUITE CONCERNED WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY WITH RESULT THAT WE GENERALLY ASSUMED HANDS-OFF ATTITUDE ON FONMIN.

8. MR. AARON INQUIRED RE STATION CASE OFFICER STRENGTH AND GIVEN FIGURES CITED IN POSITION REPORT DATED OCTOBER 74 (FORWARDED HQS BY TM DATED 25 SEPT 74.) WE EXPLAINED THAT BREAKDOWN SOMEWHAT ARBITRARY AND SAID THAT FOR NUMBER OFFICERS (THOSE ENGAGED IN LIAISON, SUPPORT, ANALYSIS, FOR INSTANCE) IT NOT ALWAYS EASY TO CATEGORIZE THEIR EFFORTS.

9. HE PROBED IN SOME DETAIL ON OUR [REDACTED] STRENGTH AND WE ANSWERED CANDIDLY. MR. AARON SEEMED SURPRISED AT SMALL NUMBERS [REDACTED] OFFICERS IN STATION AND SAID HAD HEARD OPINION FROM SOME CIA OFFICERS THAT [REDACTED] PREFERABLE TO [REDACTED]. WE SAID FELT THIS DEPENDENT ON LOCATION AND CIRCUMSTANCES AND THAT HERE IN [REDACTED] READILY AVAILABLE, GENERALLY QUITE SATISFACTORY AND COST CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN [REDACTED]. AARON ASKED SEVERAL QUESTIONS RE REASONS WE WOULD PUT OFFICER IN [REDACTED] UNDER [REDACTED]. WE EXPLAINED [REDACTED] PRIMARILY USED FOR PERSONNEL WE PLANNED KEEP ASSIGNED [REDACTED] SEVERAL YEARS AND WHERE [REDACTED] PROBABLY MORE SECURE AND FOR INSTANCES WHERE IT PROVIDED BETTER ACCESS. WHEN HE PUSHED FOR FURTHER EXAMPLES WE MENTIONED HAD RECENTLY CONSIDERED PUTTING OFFICER UNDER [REDACTED] IN [REDACTED] WHERE OFFICIAL CHINESE [REDACTED] SIGNIFICANT TARGET REPRESENTED BUT THAT THIS PLAN DROPPED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REASONS. WE MADE NO MENTION USE [REDACTED] AND DID NOT IDENTIFY ANY [REDACTED] BY NAME.

10. AARON ASKED STIGGINS WHICH OF WHAT AARONS ENVISAGED AS THREE PRINCIPAL DUTIES TOOK MOST TIME. AARON OUTLINED COS DUTIES AS MANAGEMENT OF STATION, [REDACTED] AND COORDINATION OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. STIGGINS SAID MANAGEMENT OF

PAGE 4 BONN 43387 S E C R E T
STATION CLEARLY REQUIRED MOST TIME AND EFFORT THAT WITHIN STATION,
THE EFFORT AGAINST THE HARD TARGETS CONSUMED THE MAJOR PART OF HIS
TIME AND EFFORT.

11. AMBASSADOR BRIEFED ON OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH AARON PRIOR
TO HIS SESSION WITH HIM. E2 IMPDET.

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BONN 43389

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CITE BONN 43389

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

REF BONN 43387 (IW716059)

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Para 5

1. AMBASSADOR BRIEFED COS AFTERNOON 16 OCT ON HIS HOUR AND ONE-HALF SESSION WITH MR. AARON ON 15 OCT. DISCUSSION COVERED THREE MAIN TOPICS: (A) RISKS AND NEED FOR "FANCY POLITICAL SOURCES" IN BONN; (B) COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS; AND (C) DEGREE TO WHICH AMBASSADOR COGNIZANT OF STATION ACTIVITIES.

R

2. ON POINT ¹MA. AMBASSADOR STATED THAT MOST STATION POLITICAL SOURCES WERE OF LONG-STANDING AND COMMENCED IN THE EARLY POSTWAR/OCCUPATION ERA. THEY WERE BASED ON PERSONAL FRIENDSHIPS AND UNIQUE CHARACTER OF THE EARLY POSTWAR YEARS AND WERE IN HIS BELIEF LIKELY TO PROVE IRREPLACEABLE. THAT IS, AMBASSADOR OPINED THAT SIMILAR CLOSE ASSOCIATIONS COULD NOT BE ESTABLISHED BY STATION IN TODAY'S POLITICAL CLIMATE AND IMPLIED THAT HE EXPECTED COVERAGE TO GRADUALLY WITHER AWAY. BECAUSE OF THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIPS, AMBASSADOR BELIEVED RISK WAS VERY LOW AND STATED THAT.

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THE COVERAGE PROVIDED BY THESE SOURCES WAS OF DEFINITE VALUE SINCE THE INFORMATION WAS NOT OBTAINED BY OFFICIAL EMBASSY CONTACTS.

3. REGARDING PARA 1.B., AMBASSADOR CONFIRMED TO AARON THAT IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT STATION WAS NO LONGER INVOLVED IN LARGE-SCALE COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS AND THAT HE ASSUMED EXPLANATION PER PARA 4 REF WAS IN ACCORD WITH FACTS. COS EMPHATICALLY ASSURED THE AMBASSADOR THAT THERE WERE NO COVERT ACTION FUNDING OPERATIONS BEING UNDERTAKEN BY THE STATION, AND THAT WE HAD BEEN MYSTIFIED BY MR. AARON'S REFERENCE TO THE LARGE BUDGET FOR SUCH ACTIVITIES BUT HAD CONCLUDED THAT IT MUST APPLY TO SALARY AND EXPENSES OF HERZFANZ WITH WHICH AARON SEEMED TO AGREE.

4. WITH RESPECT TO THE AMBASSADOR'S KNOWLEDGE OF SPECIFICS OF STATION ACTIVITY, THE AMBASSADOR STATED FIRST THAT HE OF COURSE "HAD A PRETTY GOOD IDEA" ABOUT THE IDENTITY OF SOME OF OUR SOURCES BUT HAD NOT BEEN SPECIFICALLY ADVISED OF THE IDENTITIES OF ANY OF THEM, HE FOUND THE SITUATION ACCEPTABLE HOWEVER, FIRST BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH COS PERSONALLY FOR THE LAST TWENTY YEARS AND HAD CONFIDENCE THAT

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COS WOULD ADVISE HIM OF ANYTHING HE OUGHT TO KNOW. LOOKING BACK ON THE RECORD OF THE PAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE CONCLUDES THAT IN FACT THE AMBASSADORS IN BONN HAD BEEN KEPT APPROPRIATELY ADVISED AND THE ABSENCE OF FLAPS WOULD SUBSTANTIATE THE JUDGMENT EXERCISED BY THE RESPECTIVE STATION CHIEFS OVER THE YEARS.

5. MR. AARON DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH WITH THE AMBASSADOR THE FEASIBILITY OF CHARGING THE AMBASSADOR WITH GREATER DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPERVISION OF THE CLANDESTINE EFFORT. AMBASSADOR STATED THAT IF IT WERE ASSIGNED TO HIM AS A MISSION HE WOULD MANIFESTLY HAVE TO DISCHARGE IT AND WOULD AS HE SAW IT PROBABLY NEED A STAFF OF AT LEAST TWO COMPETENT OFFICERS TO CARRY OUT THE PRACTICAL STAFF WORK ON HIS BEHALF. MR. AARON THEN RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE BRITISH SYSTEM ABOUT WHICH THE AMBASSADOR MADE THE PERTINENT OBSERVATION THAT IT WAS A QUESTION FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE. IF IT WAS DECIDED TO SUBORDINATE CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN THE FIELD DIRECTLY TO THE AMBASSADOR, ANY APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENT COULD AND WOULD BE MADE. THE AMBASSADOR WAS LEFT WITH THE IMPRESSION BY MR. AARON THAT AT LEAST A NUMBER OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ARE

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GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE BRITISH SYSTEM AS A MEANS OF INVESTING AMBASSADORS WITH DIRECT AUTHORITY OVER CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. E2 IMPDET.

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 TO: DIRECTOR.
 RYBAT PLKMBALL

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1. MR. AARON MADE FOLLOWING COMMENTS AT LUNCHEON 15 OCTOBER, SAID HE WAS STAFF EMPLOYEE OF SENATOR MONSDALE AND WAS HEAD OF SELECT COMMITTEE TASK FORCE FORMERLY CALLED WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE BUT RENAMED COMMAND AND CONTROL TASK FORCE. MR. AARON SAID HE FELT COMMITTEE WOULD CONCLUDE ITS WORK IN FEBRUARY AS CURRENTLY SCHEDULED.

2. AARON SAID IT HIS OPINION THAT AS CONCERNED WRONGDOINGS CIA'S RECORD WAS PROBABLY BETTER THAN SOME OF THE OTHER INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. HE MENTIONED THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION IN THIS CONTEXT. HE SAID IF WE FELT THAT CIA HAVING DIFFICULT TIME WITH CHURCH COMMITTEE WE SHOULD WAIT AND SEE WHAT HAPPENS TO FBI WHO WERE "GOING TO HAVE THEIR CLOCKS CLEANED." SAID FBI HAD GONE 50 YEARS WITHOUT REVISION AND VAST AMOUNT OF WRONGDOING HAD RESULTED FROM THIS SITUATION.

3. ALSO OF INTEREST, COLONEL SMITH, DEPUTY TO DCSI USAREUR GENERAL DILLARD, WHO WAS PRESENT DURING AARON'S SESSIONS WITH ARMY

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COMPONENTS, INFORMED US 15 OCTOBER THAT HIS IMPRESSION BASED ON TALKS WITH MR. AARON, LATTER WOULD LIKE SEE CIA TAKE OVER POSITIVE COLLECTION ELEMENT OF THE 66TH MIG. MR. AARON MADE SIMILAR COMMENTS TO US, AS WE REPORTING SEPARATELY. E2 IMPDET.

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IN 716119

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S E C R E T 161650Z OCT 75 STAFF

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TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLKMBALL

REF A. DIRECTOR 752556

B. DIRECTOR 754586

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1. AT DAVID AARON'S REQUEST, COS BRIEFED HIM FOR AN HOUR AND FIFTEEN MINUTES ON THE AFTERNOON OF 16 OCT. IN RESPONSE TO HIS QUESTIONS, COS BRIEFED HIM IN GENERAL TERMS ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE FUNCTIONING OF THE JIC. COS ALSO DESCRIBED, WITHOUT OPERATIONAL DETAIL, THE INTERFACE WITH THE BRITISH AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STATION AND OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE EMBASSY. AARON DID NOT ASK FOR FINANCIAL DETAILS OR PERSONNEL FIGURES.

2. IN A WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION AFTER THIS BRIEFING, AARON PURSUED THE FOLLOWING MAIN LINES OF QUESTIONING:

A. HE ASKED IF A RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT COORDINATED WITH THE BRITISH WOULD BE CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR, COS REPLIED THAT THIS COULD BE A MATTER OF JUDGMENT, BUT CERTAINLY

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IF THERE WAS ANY POLITICAL RISK OR SENSITIVITY HE WOULD PROBABLY ALERT THE AMBASSADOR. COS POINTED OUT THE FACT OF COORDINATION WITH THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES REDUCED THE RISK CONSIDERABLY.

B. HE ASKED IF A LARGE SCALE ACTION TYPE PROGRAM COORDINATED WITH THE BRITISH SUCH AS MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN PORTUGAL WOULD BE CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR. AFTER HE HAD REPHRASED THE QUESTION TO LEAVE OUT ANY MENTION OF PORTUGAL, COS STATED THAT HE WOULD SEEK AUTHORITY FROM WASHINGTON TO INFORM THE AMBASSADOR OF ANY SUCH SITUATION.

C. HE ASKED IF COS WOULD APPROACH THE FOREIGN OFFICE DIRECTLY OR THROUGH GNGRAPH IN ORDER TO COORDINATE SUCH A PROGRAM. COS REPLIED THAT NORMALLY HE WOULD GO DIRECTLY TO GNGRAPH AND THAT THEY WOULD INSURE COORDINATION WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

D. HE ASKED IF GNGRAPH HAD TO CLEAR BOTH INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ACTION OPERATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE U.K. AMBASSADOR IN THE FIELD. COS REPLIED THAT ACTION OPERATIONS HAD TO BE CLEARED WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE, BUT THAT HE IS NOT SURE AS TO HOW MUCH COORDINATION WAS REQUIRED ON

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COLLECTION OPERATION, AARON WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PURSUE THIS POINT IN HIS MEETING THIS AFTERNOON WITH SYKES AND HOOPER AND WE WILL REPORT ANY PLAYBACK WE GET. HE ASKED WHETHER IN COS'S JUDGMENT IT WOULD BE AN IMPROVEMENT ON PRESENT PROCEDURES FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO REQUIRE PRIOR CLEARANCE WITH OUR AMBASSADORS OF ALL INTELLIGENCE AND ACTION OPERATIONS. COS REPLIED THAT IF ALL THE AMBASSADORS WERE AS ABLE AND AS INFORMED AS THIS ONE AND SOME OTHERS HE HAD KNOWN, THAT THIS MIGHT WORK. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT MANY AMBASSADORS HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OR ACQUAINTANCE WITH THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD AND NO BASIS FOR MAKING INFORMED JUDGMENTS, AND THE RESULT, THEREFORE, OF SUCH A RULE MIGHT BE TO SERIOUSLY INHIBIT AND PREVENT MANY OPERATIONS THAT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN.

E. IN ANSWER TO ANOTHER QUESTION, COS CONFIRMED THAT BOTH THE AMBASSADOR AND THE BRITISH WERE PERIODICALLY BRIEFED ON THE STATUS OF ANY [REDACTED] TAKING PLACE IN [REDACTED]

3. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE DISCUSSIONS, COS TRIED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

THE BRITISH WERE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BY THE LEAKS AND

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CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON. THE PAD BEEN REASSURED BY US THAT WE WOULD PROTECT THE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP AND THE PRODUCT, AND TO DATE THERE HAD BEEN NO DIMINUTION OF THE INTELLIGENCE THEY WERE PREPARED TO GIVE US, AARON SAID HE WOULD ALSO REASSURE SYKES AND HOOPER ON THIS POINT AS FAR AS THE SENATE COMMITTEE IS CONCERNED.

B. COS POINTED OUT BRITISH INTELLIGENCE ENJOYED AN ENVIABLE DEGREE OF PROTECTION AS A RESULT OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT, THE ABSENCE OF PARLIAMENTARY INVESTIGATIONS AND THE VERY EFFECTIVE [REDACTED] FOR GNGRAPH REPRESENTATIVES SERVCING OVERSEAS. COS TOLD AARON THAT ONE OF THE USEFUL THINGS THE SENATE COMMITTEE MIGHT DO WOULD BE TO CALL FOR NEW LEGISLATION THAT MIGHT OFFER SOME PROTECTION SIMILAR TO THE KIND THAT THE BRITISH ENJOY, AARON SAID THAT THE COMMITTEE WAS IN FACT LOOKING INTO THIS PROBLEM.

C. COS REVIEWED THE PUBLIC EVIDENCE AVAILABLE AS TO WHAT PHIL AGEE HAS BEEN UP TO AND POINTED OUT THE KIND OF DAMAGE THAT CAN BE DONE IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS, COS DUCKED A QUESTION FROM AARON AS TO HOW MUCH

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COVERAGE ON AGEE JAGUAR WAS PROVIDING FOR US.

4. IN CONCLUSION, COS STATED THAT WE HAD EVIDENCE THAT THE CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON IS BEGINNING TO AFFECT OUR ABILITY TO RECRUIT AND MAINTAIN OUR AGENTS. AARON REPLIED THAT IF SECSTATE KISSINGER HAD BEEN WILLING TO PROVIDE THE CHURCH COMMITTEE WITH THE INFORMATION THEY REQUESTED THE HEARINGS WOULD HAVE BEEN OVER IN SEPTEMBER. HE SPECULATED THAT THE WAY THINGS WERE NOW GOING, THE CHURCH COMMITTEE WOULD FINISH UP NEXT FEBRUARY. THE ENTIRE MEETING WAS CARRIED OUT IN A COURTEOUS TONE AND NO CONFRONTATIONS OCCURRED. E2 IMPDET

6.02875 1658

Review Staff: 75/3149/aDate 6 October 1975*Marge File*

TO : CIA Task Force
 FROM : The Review Staff, Walter Elder
 SUBJECT : SSC/HSC Request
 RECEIVED: Date 3 October Time 1905

The attached letter requests an orientation briefing for David Aaron who is travelling again, this time to Switzerland, West Germany, and the United Kingdom.

Comments:

*1st Meeting - Briefing
 on 8 Oct 1975 by Det. E. v. Fendig
 2nd Briefing - 10 Oct 75 by Fendig*

	Action	Info
SC/DCI		X
A/DDA		X
A/DDI		X
A/DDO	<i>SHC</i>	
A/DDS&T		X
OGC		X
OLC		X
IG		X
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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 5, 1975

Mr. Seymour Bolten
Assistant to the Director
Room 6D0120
Central Intelligence Agency
Langley, Virginia

Dear Mr. Bolten:

This letter is to request an orientation briefing for a visit to the Federal Republic of Germany which a member of the Select Committee staff, David Aaron, has been asked to make this month.

Although plans are not yet precise, it is expected that he will be in Geneva Sunday, October 12; in the Federal Republic of Germany October 13-15; and in London October 16 and 17.

The primary purpose of this travel is to discuss State-CIA and military intelligence relations in the field with the Ambassadors, [redacted] officers and military commanders. As appropriate, past Agency programs may also be reviewed. In Geneva, Mr. Aaron plans to interview Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson on the broad issue of the role of the Department of State in the control of intelligence activities.

Sincerely,

William G. Miller

copy to Mr. Hyland, State Department

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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
 STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
 RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 3, 1975

REVIEW STAFF
75-3150

Mr. William G. Hyland
 Director
 Bureau of Intelligence and Research
 Department of State
 Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Hyland:

This letter is to request an orientation briefing for a visit to the Federal Republic of Germany which a member of the Select Committee staff, David Aaron, has been asked to make this month.

Although the plans are not yet precise, it is expected that he will be in Geneva Sunday, October 12; in the Federal Republic of Germany October 13-15; and in London October 16 and 17.

The primary purpose of this travel is to discuss State-CIA and military intelligence relations in the field with the Ambassadors, [redacted] officers and military commanders. As appropriate, past Agency programs may also be reviewed. In Geneva, Mr. Aaron plans to interview Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson on the broad issue of the role of the Department of State in the control of intelligence activities.

Sincerely,

William G. Miller

copy to Mr. Bolten, CIA

Oct 3 7 05 PM '75

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SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: *John Walker*
2B-1415

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~~*9078*~~

NO.

DATE

26 September 1975

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. *Mr. Rogers*

10/6

WC

2. *John Walker*
File

Notes:
Attached is
worth reading.
I report on a
trip of Daniel
Caron and Bill
Trichard (both SSE)
to Latin America.
Notes page 18,
BRIL 24723.

Thanks!
W

Stigman

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TOR:242029Z SEP 75 21403

SECRET 241945Z SEP 75 STAFF
CITE [] 21403 SECTION 1 ⁷⁸² OF 2

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TO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR.
NACT BUENOS AIRES
RYBAT PLVWCADET

1. COS HAD TWO-HOUR SESSION WITH TRUEHART AND AARON LATE MORNING 24 SEPTEMBER, GENERAL IMPRESSION IS THAT BOTH WERE BUSINESS-LIKE; QUESTIONS WERE INCISIVE AND DESIGNED TO ASCERTAIN HOW A STATION FUNCTIONS IN AN EMBASSY, PARTICULARLY VIS-A-VIS THE AMBASSADOR, RATHER THAN HOW [] STATION IS FUNCTIONING IN [], HENCE MANY QUESTIONS WERE HIGHLY HYPOTHETICAL. MOST IMPORTANT IMPRESSION WAS THAT FORMER AMBASSADOR TRUEHART (WHOM COS HAD MET IN NIGERIA YEARS AGO) FEELS THAT AN AMBASSADOR SHOULD BE FAR MORE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT ALL REPEAT ALL STATION OPERATIONS IN ORDER TO JUDGE POSSIBLE "FLAP POTENTIAL".

2. COS DID NOT SHOW OD TO VISITORS SINCE THEY DID NOT ASK TO READ IT BUT INSTEAD READ PORTIONS OF IT TO THEM AND DISCUSSED IT WITH THEM.

3. THEY ASKED INITIALLY WHAT THE AMBASSADORS INJUNCTIONS WERE WITH RESPECT TO PROHIBITED OPERATIONS, COS SAID

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AMBASSADOR DOES NOT WANT COVERT OPERATIONS OF A POLITICAL NATURE IN [REDACTED] WITHOUT HIS PRIOR APPROVAL NOR DOES HE WANT US TO MOUNT "ELECTRONIC" OPERATIONS WITHOUT APPROVAL. COS OPINED THIS LATTER INJUNCTION MEANT UNILATERAL EFFORTS. AARON ASKED IF WE HAD ON-GOING [REDACTED] COS SAID WE DID HAVE SOME BUT THESE WERE OF ROUTINE NATURE. AARON PURSUED MATTER, ASKED IF AMBASSADOR WAS FULL Y AWARE OF THIS TO WHICH COS RESPONDED THAT HE PRESUMED SO. COS ADDED HE HAD NOT SPECIFICALLY COVERED THIS POINT WITH THE AMBASSADOR SINCE COS ARRIVAL HERE LESS THAN ONE MONTH AGO.

4. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHART QUESTIONED AT LENGTH WHAT KIND OF THINGS WE COORDINATE WITH THE AMBASSADOR AND IN WHAT DEPTH PRIOR TO INITIATION OF AN OPERATION. WHAT KIND OF AGENTS WOULD WE IDENTIFY BY NAME TO THE AMBASSADOR? COS SAID HE WOULD BE INCLINED TO REVEAL TO THE AMBASSADOR THE NAME OF ANY SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WITH WHOM THE AMBASSADOR WAS DEALING OFFICIALLY AND INTIMATELY, BUT THIS WOULD IN LARGE PART DEPEND ON THE AMBASSADORS WISHES HIMSELF. WOULD WE INFORM THE POLITICAL SECTION CHIEF OF THE IDENTITY OF ONE OF OUR AGENTS WHOM THE POLITICAL OFFICER WAS TRYING TO DEVELOP?

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TOR: 242029Z SEP 75

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COS ANSWERED WE WOULD FIRST INSTRUCT THE AGENT HOW TO HANDLE HIS OVERT CONTACT BUT, DEPENDING UPON RELATIONS, MIGHT ALSO DISCUSS THE MATTER FRANKLY WITH POLITICAL OFFICER. WHAT ABOUT DEFENSE ATTACHE? ANSWER: THE SAME,

5. THIS LED TO DISCUSSION OF INTER-AGENCY SOURCE REGISTER. HAVING JUST FINISHED WITH DEFENSE ATTACHE, AMBASSADOR TRUEHART SAID DEFATT INDICATED HE HAD MANY SOURCES REGISTERED AND THEREFORE WE WERE PROSCRIBED FROM RECRUITING THEM. COS POINTED OUT SOURCE REGISTER IS FOR COVERT AGENTS ONLY AND SINCE DEFATT HERE IS PROSCRIBED FROM RUNNING COVERT AGENTS, NONE OF HIS SOURCES ARE IN INTER-AGENCY SOURCE REGISTER. COS ADDED THAT MANY DEFENSE ATTACHES MISCONSTRUE THEIR REGISTERING OF THEIR AGENTS IN PENTAGON SERIES AS SYNONOMOUS WITH REGISTRATION IN THE INTER-AGENCY SOURCE REGISTER,

6. TRUEHART ASKED IF WE EXERTED "REAL CONTROL" OVER DEA'S OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED BY DCID. COS SAID THAT ON THE CONTRARY WE EXERTED NO CONTROL OVER DEA NOR ARE WE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO TRY TO DO SO, WE DO COORDINATE CLOSELY, REGISTER THEIR SOURCES, PROVIDE TRACES AND ASSISTANCE, ENCOURAGE [] TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THEM, ETC. IN ADDITION, WHEN A DEA OPERATIN IS

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BEING MOUNTED TO UNDERTAKE A DRUG BUY WE ARE REQUIRED TO KNOW ENOUGH ABOUT THE CASE IN ADVANCE TO ADVISE THE AMBASSADOR AS TO THE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS INVOLVED, IF THERE ARE ANY.

7. TRUEHART ASKED TO WHAT EXTENT WE WORK WITH LIAISON ON THE OSOVIET TARGET AND WHETHER WE HAVE TELTAPS. HE WAS ADVISED LIAISON [REDACTED] AND THAT LIAISON IS PREPARED TO MOUNT JOINT OPERATIONS WITH US AGAINST SOVIET TARGET, THAT WE ARE NOW INTENDING TO APPROACH THIS MATTER WITH LIAISON IN A MORE PLANNED WAY. AARON ASKED HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION WOULD WE ADVISE AMBASSADOR IN ADVANCE OF MOUNTING JOINT OPERATION WITH LIAISON TO BUG RESIDENCE OF A SOVIET OFFICIAL, WE SAID PROBABLY NOT SINCE THERE WOULD BE NO FLAP POTENTIAL. AARON WANTED TO PURSUE THIS BUT STRANGELY ENOUGH TRUEHART AGREED FULLY AND EXPLAINED THAT IF SOME ELEMENT WENT AWRY THE LIAISON SERVICE WOULD BE THERE TO SET IT RIGHT.

8. AARON AND TRUEHART SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME ANALYZING OD

[REDACTED] INVOLVING [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THIS PARAGRAPH WAS READ SEVERAL TIMES TO THEM ON THEIR REQUEST, THEY WANTED TO KNOW HOW LONG THE [REDACTED] PROGRAM HAD BEEN IN EXISTENCE, IN [REDACTED] (ANSWER: TWO OR

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THREE YEARS IN ITS PRESENT FORM THOUGH WE HAVE BEEN DOING THIS KIND OF THING FOR YEARS.) WE STRESSED THAT THIS PARAGRAPH IN TWO PLACES CONTAINED THE PHRASE "SUBJECT TO POLICY APPROVAL" WHICH MEANT THE AMBASSADOR AND WASHINGTON, WHILE THEY UNDERSOOTOOD THIS POINT THEY WANTED TO KNOW IF WE WOULD COORDINATE IN ADVANCE WITH THE AMBASSADOR OR THE DEFENSE ATTACHE ON THE RECRUITMENT OF A SENIOR [REDACTED] AS A POSSIBLE [REDACTED] ANSWER: NO. DO WE HAVE ANY RECRUITED [REDACTED] IN [REDACTED] ANSWER: NO. ARE WE WORKING ON THIS? ANSWER: YES. THEN AARON ASKED IF IT WAS TRUE THAT AT THE PRESENT TIME WE DID NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY THROUGH COVERT [REDACTED] [REDACTED] TO COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVE WHICH PRESUMABLY COULD THREATEN PRIORITY U.S. INTERESTS IN [REDACTED] ANSWER: TRUE AT THE PRESENT TIME; WE PROBABLY WOULD HAVE TO RURN TO OTHER AGENTS POSSIBLY INCLUDING LIAISON SHOULD IT BE NECESSARY IN THE NEAR FUTURE, PRIOR TO OUR ACQUISITION OF [REDACTED] [REDACTED] AARON ASKED WHY THAT PARAGRAPH IN OD SPOKE OF MAINTAINING THE CAPABILITY TO COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVES THAT THREATEN THE STABILITY OF [REDACTED] SINCE THERE IS LITTLE U.S. COMMERCIAL INTEREST IN [REDACTED] WE ANSEWEREED THAT [REDACTED] IS

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PAGE 06-8

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CLEARLY IN THE WESTERN CAMP, VOETES ANTI-COMMUNIST IN INTERNATIONAL FORUM AND IS CONSIDERED A FRIEND OF THE U.S. AARON ASKED IF SIMILAR PROVISIONS WERE WRITTEN INTO THE OD'S OF OTHER STATIONS IN [REDACTED] I.E. TO COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVES THAT THREATEN INTERNAL STABILITY. WE SAID WE DID NOT KNOW, CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS ON THE MILITARY, TRUEHART POSED HYPOTHETICAL CASE ABOUT RECRUITMENT FOR FI PURPOSES OF A PRIVATE SECRETARY TO A MINISTER. WOULD WE COORDINATE THIS

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T 333589 EIA034 PAGE 07 IN 695658

TOR:242034Z SEP 75 21403

SECRET 241945Z SEPT 75 STAFF

CITE [] 21403 FINAL SECTION OF 2

TO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR.

NIACT BUENOS AIRES

RECRUITMENT IN ADVANCE WITH THE AMBASSADOR. ANSWER: NO, TRUEHART THEN POSTULATED CASE WHERE RECRUITED SECRETARY CONFESSES TO MINISTER THAT SHE HAD BEEN FURNISHING US WITH COPIES OF THE MINISTERS CLASSIFIED CORRESPONDENCE. WOULD THIS NOT HAVE FLAP POTENTIAL HE ASKED? ANSWER: YES, TRUEHART THEN MUSED THAT AMBASSADOR SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO KNOW PRIOR TO OUR RECRUITMENT OF THE SECRETARY. HE DID NOT SEEM SATISFIED WITH THE EXPLANATION THAT WE ARE THE OPERATIONAL PROFESSIONALS WHO WOULD JUDGE THE RISK PRIOR TO RECRUITMENT AND WOULD BE MONITORING THE CASE THROUGHOUT. WE PRESUME, THEREFORE, BY EXTRAPOLATION TRUEHART WOULD WANT THE AMBASSADOR TO BE THE SUPER-CASE OFFICER MONITORING ALL OUR OPERATIONS FOR POSSIBLE FLAP POTENTIAL.

9. SOME OF THE EASIER QUESTIONS WERE ALLOCATION OF MAN POWER (ABOUT TWO OFFICERS NOW ON SOVIET/BLOC TARGET, HOPE PUSH THIS TO THREE WHILE REMAINING OFFICERS COVER OTHER

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TOR:242034Z SEP 75

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OBJECTIVES). HOW IS OVER-ALL BUDGET ARRIVED AT (DIALOGUE WITH HEADQUARTERS, SYSTEM STILL IN FLUX) AND IS BUDGET PROVIDED BY OBJECTIVES (YES) WITH SUBORDINATE LINE ITEMS CALLED WHAT (PROJECT ACTIVITIES), WAS THERE ANY FLEXIBILITY DURING THE COURSE OF THE FISCAL YEAR? ANSWER: SOME WITHIN PROJECT ACTIVITIES AND OBJECTIVES BUT NOT BETWEEN OBJECTIVES WITHOUT HEADQUARTERS APPROVAL. DO WE HAVE A REGULAR PROGRAM OF BRIEFING REGULAR EMBASSY OFFICERS ON OUR ACTIVITIES SO THEY UNDERSTAND BETTER? ANSWER: NOT IN ANY FORMAL SENSE. AARON IMPLIED THIS MIGHT BE DONE BETTER AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL.

10. IN DISCUSSIONS ON TERRORISM AND NARCOTICS, WE POINTED OUR MOST OF OUR TARGETS ARE IN BUENOS AIRES. COULD WE RUN AGENTS FROM HERE AGAINST THOSE TARGETS IN ARGENTINA? ANSWER: YES, BUT ONLY IF COORDINATED WITH AND APPROVED BY HQS AND BUENOS AIRES STATION. CONCERNING MANPOWER, WE SAID WE ARE AT PRESENT UNDERTAKING A REVIEW OF BOTH TERRORIST AND NARCOTICS TARGET TO DECIDE THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM AND THEN THE MANPOWER REQUIRED SO THESE EFFORTS ARE IN A STATE OF FLUX. WE SAID WE WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT BUENOS AIRES MAY NOT HAVE NARCOTICS IN ITS OD BUT THAT THEY HAVE A VERY FULL PLATE

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PAGE 03-03

IN 695658

TOR:242034Z SEP 75

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OF OTHER THINGS TO DO.

11. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ON [] WE ADVISED WE HAD NONE IN [] E2, IMPDET.

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TOR1231523Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723

SECRET 231409Z SEP 75 STAFF
CITE BRASILIA 24723 SECTION 1 OF 2

SAIDDO
J. WALLER

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, [] ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.
RYBAT PLVWCADET

1. HAD TWO HOUR SESSION WITH AARON AND TRUEHEART
AFTERNOON 22 SEPT, TRUEHEART AWAY PART OF TIME TO TALK TO
OTHERS IN EMBASSY AS AARON WAS CONCENTRATING ON STATION'S
ACTIVITIES.

2

2. QUESTIONS RAN ALONG LINES OF THOSE INDICATED IN
DIRECTOR 744266, PLUS QUITE A FEW EXTRAS. FOL IS HIGHLIGHT
OF FIVE AND ONE-HALF HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS HELD STAURDAY AND MONDAY.

3. AARON MOST INTERESTED IN HOW STATION RAN ITS
OPERATIONS--E.G. LINE OF COMMAND FROM HQS AND STATION'S
RELATIONSHIP WITH BASES. HE WENT OVER OD MINUTELY, THEN
PERUSED EXAMPLES OF TELENOTE REQUIREMENTS SENT FROM
STATION TO BASES INCLUDING SUCH AS HBBS 933. A NUMBER OF
QUESTIONS WERE RAISED ON HOW CONTROL WAS EXERCISED OVER
OUR OPERATIONS. BASICALLY, HE WAS TOLD THAT ALL
ACTIVITIES--CENTERED AROUND THE OD, OUR PROJECTS,
FUNDS, AND MANPOWER ALLOCATION WERE DESIGNED TO MEET

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 TOR1231523Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723

THE PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS AS ENUNCIATED IN THE OD. PERIODIC REPORTS WERE SUBMITTED TO HQS TO APPRISE THEM OF WHAT WE HOPED TO DO WITH REFERENCE TO OUR OD PRIORITIES, AND THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY REPORTS ON WHAT HAD ACTUALLY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AGAINST THESE PRIORITIES. A "REPORT CARD" SYSTEM EXISTED WHEREIN WE WERE GRADED ON THE WORK DONE. AARON WAS INTERESTED IN HOW A CASE OFFICER (THIS IS THE TERM HE USED) WORKING ON THE HARD TARGETS WAS GRADED RELATIVE TO ONE WHOSE TARGETS WERE LESS HARD, AND WHETHER LACK OF ULTIMATE SUCCESS (RECRUITMENT OF A SOV, FOR EXAMPLE) WAS HELD AGAINST THE C/O. THE EXPLANATION WAS THAT THE RECRUITMENT OF SOMEONE IN THE HARD TARGET AREAS WAS THE ULTIMATE TEST, AND FAILURE TO RECRUIT RECEIVED A ZERO SCORE. HOWEVER, IF THE C/O WORKING ON THE HARD TARGET HAD BEEN IMAGINATIVE, HAD GOTTEN A NUMBER OF ACCESS AGENTS, HAD MANAGED TO HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH ONE OR MORE TARGET PERSONALITIES, AND ALL IN ALL DID HIS HOMEWORK, WORKED HARD, WAS AGGRESSIVE, BUT WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE THE TARGET WAS IN FACT NOT RECRUITABLE, HE WAS GIVEN A GOOD GRADE. AARON MUSED WHETHER LACK OF SUCCESS IN RECRUITING A HARD TARET INDIVIDUAL EVER HELD

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TOR:231523Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723

UP A C/O'S PROMOTION, AND HE WAS TOLD THAT IN OUR EXPERIENCE THIS WAS NOT SO, SO LONG AS THE OTHER ELEMENTS THAT EARMARK A GOOD C/O WERE PRESENT.

4. THE [] PROGRAM HAD A CERTAIN FASCINATION FOR BOTH AARON AND TUREHEART. THEY WERE NOT INQUISITIVE ABOUT NAMES OR [], BUT DID WANT TO KNOW THE REASON FOR [] [] IN CASE THE STATION HAD TO BE ABANDONED), WHETHER CUTOUTS WERE USED IN CONTACTING [] (NO, DIRECT [] UNDER SCRUPULOUS SECURITY CONDITIONS), WHETHER THEY WERE WORTH THE MONEY OUTLAY (YES, IF PRODUCTIVE AGENTS WERE GIVEN THEM AND [] WERE SUFFICIENTLY EXPERIENCED AND ADEPT IN GETTING THE MAXIMUM FROM THE AGENTS BEING HANDLED).

5. AARON WAS MOST SPECIFIC IN QUERYING ABOUT THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY STATION IN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF INDIVIDUAL OBJECTIVES. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW A CO/O SPENT HIS DAY, THE PROCESS HE WENT THROUGH IN CONTACTING AN AGENT, HOW DID WE ENSURE THAT C/O'S DID NOT TRY TO RECRUIT THE SAME INDIVIDUAL (CONTACT REPORTS) AND TRACE REQUESTS ALLOWED ADEQUATE CONTROL), WITH REFERENCE TO CI, HOW MUCH TIME WAS

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TOR:231523Z SEP 75

BRIL 24723

DEVOTED TO THIS AND HOW DID WE MANGAGE IT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AND JOINT EFFORT WITH LIAISON--TELETYPE,

SURVEILLANCE, ETC.--AGAINST HARD TARGETS), DISCUSSIONS ON

COVERT ACTION TOOK UP CONSIDERABLE TIME, DESPITE HQS

BRIEFING ON THIS SUBJECT, AARON WANTED TO KNOW THE

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A [REDACTED] AND A [REDACTED] ACTION OP,

MUCH STRESS WAS PLACED ON WHETHER WE HAD ANY PLUMBING FOR

[REDACTED] OPS SHOULD WE BE REQUESTED TO GET INTO

THAT ACTIVITY, IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN IN

[REDACTED] IN [REDACTED] FOR YEARS, THAT WE HAD NO PLUMBING AS

SUCH, AND THAT IF A REQUEST WAS TO BE MADE FOR SUCH ACTION,

THE STATION WOULD LIKELY NEED TO START FROM POINT ZERO

~~PAGE 3 BRASILIA 24723 S E C R E T~~

UNLESS SOME OF THE AGENTS NOW AVAILABLE WERE USABLE. IT WAS

EXPLAINED THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL [REDACTED] AS WELL AS

AN [REDACTED] PROGRAM BUT THAT THESE IN NO WAY

RESEMBLED THE KIND OF COVERT POLITICAL ACTION OF THE

CHILEAN VARIETY.

6. AARON HAD A FASCINATION FOR TRADESCRAFT, WANTED TO

KNOW HOW LONG COS HAD BEEN IN THE BUSINESS AND APPROXIMATELY

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HOW MUCH TIME IN TOTAL COS SPENT IN TRAINING (COULDN'T HAZARD A GUESS AS TO HOW MUCH TIME SPENT IN TRAINING BUT SAID THAT THERE WAS A LONG COURSE ON ENTERING AGENCY, THAT OVER THE YARS THERE WAS TRAINING COVERING A VARIETY OF SUBJECTS INCLUDING SECRET WRITING, CLANDESTINE PHOTOGRAPHY, COMMUNISM, MANAGEMENT INCLUDING THE STUDY OF GRIDS, REPORTS WRITING, ETC. MENTION WAS MADE OF MID-CAREER COURSE, PLUS SENIOUR SEMINARS AVAILABLE TO OFFIERS, PLUS ATTENDANCE AT SAFF COLLEGES SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY STATE, ARMY, ETC.) (AARON WAS FASCINATED WITH THE REPORTS WRITING COURSE AND ASKED FOR PARTICULARS.)

7. ON INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS, BOTH AARON AND TUREHAEART WERE INTERESTED IN HOW INTEL REPORTS WERE DISTRIBUTED WITHIN THE EMBASSY, WHETHER COB HAD AUTHORITY TO SEND AN INTEL REPORT DIRECTLY TO HQS WITH INFO TO STATION (YES, ON MATTERS WHICH WERE PECULIAR TO THE LOCAL SCENE BUT THOSE IMPINGING ON BROADER GOB MATTERS WERE FIRST SENT TO BRASILIA FOR ADDITIONS, MODIFICATIONS, ETC. PRIOR TO ONWARD TRANSMISSION.) THEY WERE TOLD THAT THE AMBASSADOR SEES ALL REPORTS, THAT OTHER SECTIONS OF THE EMBASSY DID SEE

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THOSE REPORTS WHICH WERE PERTINENT TO THEM. INTEL ON MAJOR ITEMS-SUCH AS THOSE WHICH HAD A BEARING ON GOB POLICIES VIS-A-VIS THE U.S.-WAS SHOWN TO THE AMBASSADOR PRIOR TO SUBMISSION, STATION MADE IT A PRACTICE TO CHECK INTEL OUT WITH CONCERNED SECTIONS WITHIN THE EMBASSY PRIOR TO TRANSMISSION IF THIS WAS CONSIDERED NECESSARY AND BENEFICIAL BY THE STATION. THERE ARE OCCASIONS WHEREIN THE STATION IS REQUIRED TO LIMIT A REPORT TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY WHEN SENSITIVE INFO AND/OR A SENSITIVE SOURCE IS INVOLVED. THIS HAD NOT HAPPED IN THE COS'S SHORT TENURE IN

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S E C R E T 231409Z SEPT 75 STAFF
 CITE BRASILIA 24723 FINAL SECTION OF TWO
 TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, [] ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.
 RYBAT PLVWCADET

BRASILIA, BUT IN PANAMA FOR EXAMPLE, CERTAIN REPORTS
 CONSIDERED HIGHLY SENSITIVE WERE OFTEN LIMITED TO THE
 AMBASSADOR, THE CINSCO, AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE CANAL
 ZONE, OR TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY. SECURITY WAS THE
 CARDINAL FACTOR IN SUCH LIMITING OF DISTRIBUTION.

8. AARON WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF ONE OF
 THE STATION'S AGENTS WAS BEING SEEN BY A MEMBER OF THE
 POLITICAL SECTION--WOULD WE DISCUSS IT WITH THE POLITICAL
 OFFICER? (FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO TALK TO THE AGENT ON THE
 PROBLEMS THAT WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED BY SUCH ACTION ON HIS
 PART, THAT THIS NORMALLY DID SUFFICE IF IN FACT HE WAS A
 CONTROLLED AGENT. IF HIS ACCESS WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY
 SENSITIVE, HE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEE THE POLITICAL OFFICER
 SO LONG AS HE REMEMBERED WHO HE WORKED FOR AND ACTED
 ACCORDINGLY).

9. AS TO KEEPING THE AMBASSADOR APPRISED ON POSITIVE

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COLLECTION OPERATIONS, THIS WAS DONE AS A MATTER OF COURSE BUT WITHOUT SPECIFIC DETAILS UNLESS THE AMBASSADOR WAS IN FACT SEEING AN AGENT OF OURS REGULARLY AS PART OF HIS AMBASSADORIAL DUTIES.

10. THE LIAISON SERVICES WITH WHOM WE WERE IN TOUCH WERE NAMED, INCLUDING OUR JOINT EFFORTS AT TELTAPS, PLUS OUR UNILATERAL [REDACTED] FOR CI AND POSITIVE INTEL.

11. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE SHOWN THE KIGS AND THE CIRLS AND TAILORED REQUIREMENTS THAT WERE SENT PERIODICALLY. THEY BOTH REMARKED THAT THE AGENCY HAS A MORE SOPHISTICATED SYSTEM FOR GETTING REQUIREMENTS TO THE FIELD THAN SAY, STATE.

12. VERY LITTLE WAS ASKED ABOUT [REDACTED] IN [REDACTED] EXCEPT THAT THEY BOTH WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT [REDACTED] WAS RUNNING THE SHOW. THEY DID ASK ABOUT CUSTOMER REACTION TO THE [REDACTED] (AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS IS AN AVID CUSTOMER AND WE WERE OF THE OPINION THAT AGENCIES IN WASHINGTON CONCERNED WITH THE [REDACTED] PROGRAM WERE HAPPY WITH THE RESULTS.)

13. ON HEARING THAT COS HAD BEEN IN PANAMA, QUESTIONS

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WERE RAISED ON AGREED ACTIVITIES. THEY WERE BOTH SURPRISED TO FIND OUT THAT THE STATION IN PANAMA HAD TO _____ ACTIVITIES ENGAGED IN BY U.S. ELEMENTS IN THE AREA, INCLUDING GETTING PROJECT INFO MUCH LIKE THAT REQUIRED IN THE AGENCY WHICH GAVE NAMES OF _____ ETC.

14. ~~THE~~ ^{AARON} EVINCED GREAT INTEREST _____

_____ HE WAS TOLD THAT _____ COULD BE IMPROVED UPON, THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL NUMBER OF OFFICERS _____ THAT THEY GAVE _____ ON THE ACTUAL _____, THEN SPENT _____ DAY PLUS A LARGE DOSE _____ FOR WHICH THEY RECEIVED NO OVERTIME BUT DID THIS OUT OF HIGH MOTIVATION AND THE DESIRE TO GET AT OUR OBJECTIVES.

15. AARON KNEW OF THE OLD OPC AND OSO SEPARATIONS OF THE PAST AND PROBED ABOUT HOW THE FINAL AMALGAMATION AFFECTED MOST PEOPLE. (NOTHING TRAUMATIC, OPC AND OSO OFFICERS HAD A COMMON DENOMINATOR IN BASIC TRADECRAFT AND OTHER

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TRAINING. A GOOD OPC TYPE COULD DO EQUALLY GOOD WORK IN THE OSO FIELD, AND VICE VERSA.)

16. ABOVE ARE ONLY THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DISCUSSION. AARON IS IN CHARGE, HE ASKED MOST OF THE QUESTIONS, AND TOOK COPIOUS NOTES. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE ESSENTIALLY LOW-KEY BUT THE QUESTIONS WERE SHARP, PROBING, AND AARON ESPECIALLY HAS A QUIETLY INCISIVE WAY OF GETTING AT THINGS. IT'S DIFFICULT TO TELL WHETHER THE TWO ARE FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD THE AGENCY OR NOT. CERTAINLY NO ANIMOSITY WAS SHOWN, BUT NEITHER WAS THERE ANY SHOW OF GREAT LOVE FOR THE AGENCY. AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH (AT) THE MATTER AT HAND APPEARS TO BE AN APT DESCRIPTION OF HOW THEY WORKED.

17. AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE CARED FOR BY THE EMBASSY WHILE IN BRASILIA BUT ON SATURDAY IN RIO AARON SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN LEFT ALONE BY THE CONGEN. COB AND COS TOOK AARON OUT TO DINNER AFTER THE BRIEFING SESSION AND HE SEEMED TO ENJOY AND APPRECIATE THE CHURRASCO. [] AND BUENOS AIRES MIGHT WISH TO KEEP IN MIND THAT AARON IS INTERESTED IN TRYING THE BETTER KNOWN LOCAL FOODS, IS

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A WINE LOVER AND WANTS TO SAMPLE THE BEST OF THE LOCAL PRODUCT.

18. AT DINNER ON SATURDAY NIGHT, AARON WAS ASKED BY THE COS WHAT HE THOUGHT MIGHT HAPPEN TO THE AGENCY. HE OPINED THAT THE DDO MIGHT BE SPLIT OFF FROM THE MAIN BODY OF THE AGENCY, AND PUT UNDER AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MADE UP OF MEMBERS FROM STATE AND OTHER AGENCIES IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH MORE CONTROL OVER ITS ACTIVITIES. E2, IMPDET.

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CITE BUENOS AIRES 34519

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO [] BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO,

RYBAT PLVWCADET

REF BUENOS AIRES 34511

(n 69826S)*

1. VISITORS MET WITH AMBASSADOR HILL FOR ONE HOUR AND A HALF EVENING 27 SEP AT HIS RESIDENCE AND THEN WENT DIRECTLY TO AIRPORT. AFTER INTRODUCING VISITORS TO AMB, COS WITHDREW AND WAITED IN ANOTHER ROOM. (UPON DEPARTING COS HEARD AMB ASK VISITORS FOR THEIR CREDENTIALS.) AMB LATER TOLD COS HE SUGGESTED TO VISITORS THAT COS BE PRESENT DURING DISCUSSION BUT THEY PREFERRED TO TALK WITH HIM PRIVATELY. COS WAS CALLED IN, HOWEVER, TO PARTICIPATE IN LAST FEW MINUTES OF DISCUSSION. IN COS PRESENCE, MR. AARON ASKED AMB WHETHER HE THOUGH HE SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO SEE ALL INFORMATION PRODUCED WITHIN HIS MISSION, TO WHICH AMB REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY. AARON THEN ASKED AMB WHETHER HE IN FACT SAW ALL INFO. AMB REPLIED HE DID NOT KNOW, BUT HAD CONFIDENCE IN COS IN THIS REGARD. AARON THEN ASKED COS WHETHER HE WAS AUTHORIZED TO SHOW AMB ALL STATION REPORTING. ANSWER: OPERATIONAL REPORTING IDENTIFYING AGENTS OR CLANDESTINE METHODS OF OPERATION COULD NOT BE SHOWN TO AMB WITHOUT

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HQS APPROVAL. OTHER INFO COULD BE SHOWN AT DESCRETION OF COS. SUBJ OF ROGERS LETTER RE SHOWING INTEL REPORTS TO AMB PRIOR TO DISSEMINATION WAS THEN RAISED BY AMB. AMB SAID HE TOOK POSITION THIS WAS POLICY MATTER WHICH HAD TO BE SOLVED IN WASHINGTON AND HAD SO INFORMED ROGERS. (COS SAW DRAFT OF LETTER TO ROGERS TO THIS EFFECT.) AT CONCLUSION OF MEETING AMB HANDED COS A NEWS ITEM (HAVANA MERIDIANO 80 IN SPANISH 1-15 JUL 75 PP 5-6, ARTICLE BY CARLOS MARIA GUTIERREZ ENTITLED AMERICAN AMBASSADOR HILL SEEN AS CIA AGENT IN ARGENTINA) AND ASKED THAT ARTICLE BE SHOWN TO VISITORS IN CAR. AMB TRUEHEART READ ARTICLE AND COMMENTED SOMETHING TO EFFECT THAT ARTICLE DID NOT SEEM TO HIM TO BE ANYTHING TO BE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT. MR. AARON DID NOT READ IT. POUCHING COPY. (AMB SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD COS ARTICLE HAD BEEN GIVEN TO HIM IN WASHINGTON BY DEPUTY ASSISTANT RYAN.)

2. ON WAY TO AIRPORT AFTER MEETING WITH AMB, TRUEHEART MENTIONED AMB'S REQUEST TO SEE THEIR CREDENTIALS. SINCE THEY HAD NONE, THEY SHOWED THEIR PASSPQRTS. (AMB LATER TOLD COS HE HAD ASKED TO SEE CREDENTIALS SINCE HE WANTED TO SEE FOR HIMSELF EXACTLY WHAT THE LIMITS OF THEIR AUTHORITY WERE.) COS INFERRED THAT VISITORS WERE TAKEN ABACK BY AMB'S REQUEST BUT MEETING WITH AMB

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WAS NONETHELESS HARMONIOUS. (AMB LATER CONFIRMED THIS IMPRESSION.)

3. AMB TELEPHONED COS MORNING 28 SEP AND GAVE HIGHLIGHTS OF DISCUSSION WITH VISITORS. FULLER ACCOUNT GIVEN IN HIS OFFICE EARLY MORNING 29 SEP. AMB CHARACTERIZED VISITORS AS INTELLIGENT AND BUSINESSLIKE. AMB HAD IMPRESSION THEY SATISFIED WITH VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES AND WITH COOPERATION THEY RECEIVED FROM EVERYONE. HE SPECULATED THAT THEIR REPORT WOULD BE WRITTEN IN MANNER WHICH SERVES INTERESTS OF CHURCH COMMITTEE. AMB SAID HE TOLD VISITORS HE SATISFIED WITH BKHERALD OPERATION IN [REDACTED] ONLY AREA WHERE HE HAD A QUARREL WITH BKHERALD IS THAT OF [REDACTED] AMB BELIEVES STATE DEPT [REDACTED] HE HAS NO OBJECTION TO BKHERALD [REDACTED] ALSO. REGARDING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF BKHERALD ACTIVITY, AMB SAID HE TOLD VISITORS THAT BECAUSE OF TERRORIST PROBLEM HE DID NOT WANT TO KNOW ABOUT BKHERALD ACTIVITIES IN DETAIL AND TRUSTS COS TO TELL HIM WHATEVER HE NEEDS TO KNOW. VISITORS SHOWED GREAT INTEREST IN THIS VIEWPOINT. AMB SAID HE HAD HAD A PROBLEM WITH ONLY ONE STATION CHIEF WHO NOW DECEASED, WIN SCOTT, AND WITH ONE FORMER DIRECTOR, RICHARD HELMS. AMB EXPLAINED THAT BEFORE HE WENT TO SPAIN AS AMB, DIRECTOR HELMS HAD TOLD HIM SIXTY PERCENT OF MADRID STATION'S EFFORTS WERE DIRECTED AGAINST

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CUBANS. ONLY LATER DID AMB FIND OUT BY CHANCE ABOUT [REDACTED] EFFORT DIRECTED AGAINST [REDACTED]. AMB SAID MR. HELMS AWARE OF HIS SENTIMENTS AS IS GENERAL WALTERS. EVIDENTLY ON BASIS OF COMMENT BY VISITORS, AMB TOLD COS THAT AMB CRIMMINS HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF BKHERALD, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE.

4. CURIOUSLY, AARON ASKED DCOS' SECRETARY FOR DATE EVENING 26 SEP. ALTHOUGH IT TURNED OUT BE PRIMARILY SOCIAL EVENT AND HE DID NOT ATTEMPT ELICIT INFORMATION FROM SECRETARY, AARON DID MAKE FOLLOWING COMMENTS OF INTEREST:

(A) HE SAID HE HAD BEGUN TRIP WITH CERTAIN AMOUNT ANTI-BKHERALD BIAS BUT THIS HAD BEEN MUTED SOMEWHAT BY FAVORABLE IMPRESSIONS HE HAD OBTAINED OF VARIOUS BKHERALD OFFICERS IN THE FIELD WITH WHOM HE HAD SPOKEN.

(B) HE SAID HE THOUGH BUENOS AIRES' EMBASSY POLITICAL SECTION WAS "JEALOUS" OF BKHERALD.

(C) HE IMPLIED HIS EGO HAD BEEN BRUISED ON TRIP BECAUSE PEOPLE FREQUENTLY ASSUMED AMBASSADOR TRUEHEART, NOT HE, WAS SENIOR OFFICER. HE SAID HE NEXT PLANS TRIPS TO EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE, HEADQUARTERS, THEREFORE, MIGHT WISH ALERT FUTURE STATIONS HE WILL VISIT OF PECKING ORDER.

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5. VISITORS DEPARTED BUENOS AIRES 27 SEP AT 2130 HOURS ON SCHEDULE.

6. AMB SAID HE HAD A GOOD TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH MR. RICHARD SAMPSON IN WASHINGTON, MENTIONING ESSENTIALLY SAME POINTS REPORTED DIRECTOR 744995.

7. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

CS Comment: *Aaron and Trueheart's 26 September conversations with COS and DCOS.

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BUEN 34503

SECRET 252234Z SEP 75 STAFF

CITE BUENOS AIRES 34503 SECTION 1 OF 2

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO,

RYBAT PLVWCADET

REF DIRECTOR 745626

1. COS AND DCOS HELD TWO-HOUR DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR WILLIAM TRUEHEART AND MR. DAVID AARON MORNING 25 SEP AND THEN ATTENDED LUNCHEON AT WHICH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JOSEPH MONTLLOR, EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR WAYNE SMITH, AND FBI REP ROBERT SCHERRER ALSO PRESENT. EARLIER IN MORNING THE TWO VISITORS MET PRIVATELY WITH CHARGE MONTLLOR AND IN AFTERNOON TRUEHEART TALKED PRIVATELY WITH SMITH. (AARON BECAME ILL AND REMAINED IN HOTEL.) COS AND DCOS ALSO HAD DINNER ALONE WITH VISITORS EVENING 24 SEP.

2. AARON CLEARLY IN CHARGE. (AT LUNCHEON TRUEHEART EXPLAINED THAT AARON IS HEAD OF THE COORDINATION AND CONTROL WORKING GROUP, ONE OF FOUR WORKING GROUPS OF CHURCH COMMITTEE, AND TRUEHEART IS SERVING AS CONSULTANT.) AARON ASKED MOST OF QUESTIONS. BY NATURE AND TONE OF SOME OF AARON'S QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS, WE SUSPECT THAT HE HAD PREFORMED NOTIONS WHICH ANTI-BKHERALD. (E.G., ATTITUDE TOWARD SOVIET PROGRAM DISCUSSED BELOW.)

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3. IN DISCUSSING BKHERALD APPROACH TO SOVIET TARGET, AARON ASKED IF IT REALLY MADE SENSE TRY RECRUIT SOVIET IN "OUT OF WAY PLACES" WHERE SOVIET, EVEN IF RECRUITED, WOULD NOT LIKELY HAVE ACCESS TO INFORMATION OF VALUE TO USG. WE EXPLAINED THAT OUR INTERESTS NOT PRIMARILY IN LOCAL SOVIET ACTIVITIES BUT IN INTERNAL SOVIET MATTERS, POINTED OUT ACCESS SOVIETS HAVE TO THIS INFO EVEN WHILE ABROAD, SAID SOME SOVIETS RECRUITED ABROAD SELECTED FOR INTERNAL HANDLING, ALSO POINTED OUT CI VALUE OF CERTAIN TYPES INFO PROVIDED BY RECRUITED RIS OFFICERS. NONE OF THIS SEEMED IMPRESS AARON, WHO CONTINUED QUESTION VALUE OF BKHERALD SOVIET OPS IN MANY (BUT UNDEFINED) AREAS, SAID HE HAD WORKED IN WHITE HOUSE WHERE HE SAW ALL INTEL, FOUND IT HARD JUSTIFY BKHERALD SOVIET PROGRAM INPUT ON BASIS INTEL PRODUCTION. WE ARGUED THIS IS ONE PROGRAM WHERE LARGE AMOUNT CASE OFFICER TIME REQUIRED ON WORLD-WIDE BASIS IN ORDER ACQUIRE THE FEW GOOD SOURCES WHO CAN BE PICKED UP AND WHO ARE PICKED UP. TRUEHEART ASKED FOR EXAMPLES, AND WE REFERRED THEM TO HQS FOR DETAILS. TRUEHEART SAID IT HIS IMPRESSION THAT BKHERALD NOW IN A ^{of}SOVIET PHASE", WHEREAS IN EARLIER YEARS IT HAD BEEN IN COVERT ACTION OR OTHER PHASES. WE SAID SOVIETS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN MAJOR TARGET, AND OUR APPROACH TO THEM HAS BEEN REFINED OVER THE YEARS.

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4. KEEN INTEREST WAS SHOWN IN STATION RELATIONS WITH AMBASSADOR AND DEGREE TO WHICH STATION ALLOWED AMBASSADOR EXERCISE CONTROL OVER, OR AT LEAST HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF, ITS OPERATIONS. SPECIFICALLY, DEGREE TO WHICH WE WOULD COORDINATE RECRUITMENT PROPOSAL OF [REDACTED] PRIOR TO MAKING PITCH. ANSWER: AMB WOULD BE INFORMED IF UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY OR HIGH RISK INVOLVED, WHICH HAS NOT BEEN THE CASE HERE THUS FAR. ASKED WHO DETERMINES IF AMB SHOULD BE INFORMED. ANSWER: COS. ASKED WHETHER AMB HAD PLACED CERTAIN POTENTIAL RECRUITMENT TARGETS OFF LIMITS. ANSWER: HE HAD NOT. THEN ASKED WHETHER, IF SUCH INJUNCTION EXISTED, WE WOULD ADHERE TO IT OR TRY TO CIRCUMVENT IT. ANSWER: WE WOULD ADHERE TO IT. ASKED WHETHER AMB SATISFIED WITH WORK OF STATION AND ITS MISSION. ANSWER: WE BELIEVE SO, BUT DEFER TO AMB (WHO WILL RETURN BUENOS AIRES MORNING 26 SEP AND WILL TALK WITH TRUEHEART.)

5. BOTH WANTED KNOW HOW STATIONS'S REPORTING REQUIREMENTS ON LOCAL POLITICAL SCENE WERE GENERATED (I.E., PRIMARILY BY HQS OR THROUGH DISCUSSION WITH AMB AND OTHER EMBASSY OFFICERS). IT CLEAR THAT THRUST OF QUESTION WAS TO DETERMINE DEGREE TO WHICH STATION COOPERATED/COORDINATED WITH AMB AND OTHER SENIOR EMBASSY OFFICERS.

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ANSWER: WE RECEIVED REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FROM HQS ON CONTINUING BASIS, AND THESE FORM GOOD DEAL BUT NOT ALL OF GUIDANCE WE FOLLOW ON INTERNAL TARGET. WE ASSURED VISITORS WE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT REPORTING FROM OTHER EMBASSY COMPONENTS AND THEIR NEEDS. VISITORS PROBED DEEPLY INTO MANNER IN WHICH STATION COORDINATES ITS REPORTING AND FORUMS THROUGH WHICH IT RECEIVES THIS GUIDANCE. WE MENTIONED TWICE WEEKLY POLITICAL MEETING PLUS COUNTRY TEAM MEETING AND FREQUENT INFORMAL CHATS WITH AMB AND OTHER OFFICERS. WE ALSO POINTED TO OUR PROCESS OF SHOWING REPORTS PRIOR TO DISSEMINATION TO POL SECTION AND OTHER INTERESTED COMPONENTS. REGARDING VOLUME OF REPORTS, WE SAID AVERAGE IS OVER 20 PER MONTH. REGARDING DISTRIBUTION OF HQS DISSEMINATED REPORTS, WE SAID AMB RECEIVES ALL REPORTS AND, EXCEPT FOR EXTREMELY SENSITIVE ITEMS (WHICH ARE RARE), OTHER INTERESTED OFFICERS DO ALSO.

6. IN RESPONSE THEIR QUERIES, WE ACKNOWLEDGED PRODUCTIVE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP WITH LOCAL INTEL SERVICE (WHICH NOT IDENTIFIED BY NAME) BUT DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL. SAID COS AND DCOS

ASKED WHETHER WE IN TOUCH WITH BRITISH INTEL REP. ANSWER: YES, BUT THIS NOT SUBSTANTIVE RELATIONSHIP. THEY WANTED KNOW HOW WE HAD MET HIM, AND WE SAID RELATION-

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PAGE 05

IN 697014

TOR:252337Z SEP 75

BUEN 34503

SHIP HAS EXISTED FOR YEARS, AND CONTACT IS PASSED FROM ONE PERSON TO ANOTHER. ASKED WHETHER THERE [] REP IN [] ANSWER: WE NOT AWARE OF ANY. NO MENTION MADE OF ANY OTHER LIAISON CONTACTS AND SUBJECT OF LOCAL POLICE NOT RAISED.

7. SUBJECT OF [] NOT RAISED.

8. ASKED WHETHER WE HAD ANY COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS. ANSWER: NONE OTHER THAN A FEW CONTACTS [] WE STRESSED INFO COLLECTION ROLE OF THESE AGENTS AND CONTINGENCY NATURE OF CONTACT IN COVERT ACTION CONTEST. ASKED WHETHER WE RECRUITING NEW AGENTS. ANSWER: WE CONSTANTLY STRIVE TO UPGRADE CALIBER OF OUR REPORTING SOURCES AND THEREFORE ARE RECRUITING NEW ONES AND AT SAME TIME WEEDING OUR LESS PRODUCTIVE ONES. WE EXPLAINED HOW ACCESS OF GIVEN AGENT CAN CHANGE FROM ONE TIME TO ANOTHER DUE TO CHANGES IN POLITICAL SCENE.

9. FEW QUESTIONS ASKED REGARDING STATION STAFFING. WE EXPLAINED IN RESPONSE QUESTING WHETHER STAFFING ADEQUATE THAT STATION CUT BY OVER 30 PERCENT OVER LAST 18 MONTHS OR SO, INCLUDING CASE OFFICERS. WE ADMITTED THIS RESULTED IN CUTTING OF SOME LESS IMPORTANT CONTACTS BUT NO LET UP IN EFFORTS AGAINST HARD TARGETS. WE EXPLAINED FUNCTIONS OF EACH CASE OFFICER AND STRESSED TEAM

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BUEN 34503

CONCEPT IN WORKING AGAINST HARD TARGETS. OD OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES WERE IDENTIFIED BY OD INSELF NOT PROVIDED.

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BUEN 34503

S E C R E T 252234Z SEP 74 STAFF

CITE BUENOS AIRES 34503 FINAL SECTION OF 2

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO [REDACTED] BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO.

RYBAT PLVWCADET

10. CONSIDERABLE INTEREST SHOWN IN SUBJECT OF TERRORISM. WE DESCRIBED TWO PRINCIPAL TERRORIST GROUPS [REDACTED] AND STRESSED DIFFICULTIES OF PENETRATING THESE GROUPS. AARON SAID THAT CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HAD MENTIONED TO HIM THE CASE OF SOURCE FROM ANOTHER AREA WHO HAD PROVIDED COVERAGE IN THIS AREA. (AMB AWARE OF COVERAGE BY PJTENNIS-3 FROM TIME OF HIS FIRST VISIT AND HAD MENTIONED IT TO MONTLLOR.) WE EXPLAINED HOW SOURCE SUCH AS THIS CAN ESTABLISH GOOD CONTACTS AT HIGHER LEVEL AND PROVIDE GOOD INFO. WE STRESSED THAT OUR INTEREST WAS IN COLLECTING INFO BEARING ON SECURITY OF U.S. PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY. AARON ASKED WHETHER WE WOULD PROVIDE TO LIAISON INFO FROM OUR AGENT WHICH WOULD ENABLE THEM TO CAPTURE TERRORISTS DURING MEETING WITH OUR AGENT. ANSWER: NO, FOR SEVERSL (OBVIOUS) REASONS, WHICH WE SPELLED OUT.

11. EVENING 25 SEP AARON APPEARED TO HAVE RECOVERED FROM ILLNESS, WENT SHOPPING WITH TRUEHEART. BECAUSE BUENOS AIRES STORES WILL BE CLOSED 26 SEPT AND BECAUSE AARON NOT LEAVING

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T 337290 EIA660 PAGE ~~02-02~~ IN 6970

TOR:252301Z SEP 75 BUEN 34503

UNTIL NIGHT 26 SEP AND TRUEHEART NIGHT 27 SEP, WE ANTICIPATE WE WILL HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM. THESE WILL BE COVERED IN NEXT CABLE.

12. WISH THANK INFO ADDEES FOR THEIR PROMPT AND USEFUL WRAP-UPS.

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TOR: 291957Z SEP 75 BRIL 24777

SECRET 291925Z SEPT 75 STAFF

CITE BRASILIA 24777

TO: BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLVWCADET

REF: BUENOS AIRES 34519 (IN 699594)

REF PARA 3 SENTENCE "EVIDENTLY ON BASIS OF COMMENT BY VISITORS, AMBASSADOR TOLD COS THAT AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF BKHERALD, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE." FYI, AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS ON HOME LEAVE AND RICHARD JOHNSON, DCM, WAS CHARGE AT TIME OF AARON'S AND TRUEHEART'S VISIT TO BRASILIA. IN THE SHORT TIME COS HAS BEEN IN BRASILIA, CRIMMINS HAS BEEN MORE THAN COOPERATIVE AND APPEARED TO BE MORE APPRECIATIVE OF BKHERALD'S EFFORTS THAN MOST STATE OFFICERS. WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU COULD GET ELABORATION ON HILL'S REMARKS ON LOW KEY BASIS. E2. IMPDET.

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IN 694147

TOR1231523Z SEP 75

BRIL 24723

S E C R E T 231409Z SEP 75 STAFF
CITE BRASILIA 24723 SECTION 1 OF 2

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, [] ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES, RYBAT PLVWCADET

- HAD TWO HOUR SESSION WITH AARON AND TRUEHEART AFTERNOON 22 SEPT. TRUEHEART AWAY PART OF TIME TO TALK TO OTHERS IN EMBASSY AS AARON WAS CONCENTRATING ON STATION'S ACTIVITIES.
- QUESTIONS RAN ALONG LINES OF THOSE INDICATED IN DIRECTOR 744266, PLUS QUITE A FEW EXTRAS. FOL IS HIGHLIGHT OF FIVE AND ONE-HALF HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS HELD STAURDAY AND MONDAY.
- AARON MOST INTERESTED IN HOW STATION RAN ITS OPERATIONS--E.G, LINE OF COMMAND FROM HQS AND STATION'S RELATIONSHIP WITH BASES. HE WENT OVER OD MINUTELY, THEN PERUSED EXAMPLES OF TELENOTE REQUIREMENTS SENT FROM STATION TO BASES INCLUDING SUCH AS HBBS 933. A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WERE RAISED ON HOW CONTROL WAS EXERCISED OVER OUR OPERATIONS. BASICALLY, HE WAS TOLD THAT ALL ACTIVITIES CENTERED AROUND THE OD, OUR PROJECTS, FUNDS, AND MANPOWER ALLOCATION WERE DESIGNED TO MEET

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IN 694147

TOR:231523Z SEP 75

BRIL 24723

THE PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS AS ENUNCIATED IN THE OD. PERIODIC REPORTS WERE SUBMITTED TO HQS TO APPRISE THEM OF WHAT WE HOPED TO DO WITH REFERENCE TO OUR OD PRIORITIES, AND THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY REPORTS ON WHAT HAD ACTUALLY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AGAINST THESE PRIORITIES. A "REPORT CARD" SYSTEM EXISTED WHEREIN WE WERE GRADED ON THE WORK DONE. AARON WAS INTERESTED IN HOW A CASE OFFICER (THIS IS THE TERM HE USED) WORKING ON THE HARD TARGETS WAS GRADED RELATIVE TO ONE WHOSE TARGETS WERE LESS HARD, AND WHETHER LACK OF ULTIMATE SUCCESS (RECRUITMENT OF A SOV, FOR EXAMPLE) WAS HELD AGAINST THE C/O. THE EXPLANATION WAS THAT THE RECRUITMENT OF SOMEONE IN THE HARD TARGET AREAS WAS THE ULTIMATE TEST, AND FAILURE TO RECRUIT RECEIVED A ZERO SCORE, HOWEVER, IF THE C/O WORKING ON THE HARD TARGET HAD BEEN IMAGINATIVE, HAD GOTTEN A NUMBER OF ACCESS AGENTS, HAD MANAGED TO HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH ONE OR MORE TARGET PERSONALITIES, AND ALL IN ALL DID HIS HOMEWORK, WORKED HARD, WAS AGGRESSIVE, BUT WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE THE TARGET WAS IN FACT NOT RECRUITABLE, HE WAS GIVEN A GOOD GRADE, AARON MUSED WHETHER LACK OF SUCCESS IN RECRUITING A HARD TARET INDIVIDUAL EVER HELD

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BRIL 24723

UP A C/O'S PROMOTION, AND HE WAS TOLD THAT IN OUR EXPERIENCE THIS WAS NOT SO, SO LONG AS THE OTHER ELEMENTS THAT EARMARK A GOOD C/O WERE PRESENT.

4. THE [] PROGRAM HAD A CERTAIN FASCINATION FOR BOTH AARON AND TUREHEART. THEY WERE NOT INQUISITIVE ABOUT NAMES OR [] BUT DID WANT TO KNOW THE REASON FOR [] [] IN CASE THE STATION HAD TO BE ABANDONED), WHETHER [] WERE USED IN CONTACTING [] (NO, DIRECT [] UNDER SCRUPULOURS SECURITY CONDITIONS), WHETHER THEY WERE WORTH THE MONEY OUTLAY (YES, IF PRODUCTIVE AGENTS WERE GIVEN THEM AND [] WERE SUFFICIENTLY EXPERIENCED AND ADEPT IN GETTING THE MAXIMUM FROM THE AGENTS BEING HANDLED).

5. AARON WAS MOST SPECIFIC IN QUERYING ABOUT THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY STATION IN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF INDIVIDUAL OBJECTIVES. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW A CO/O SPENT HIS DAY, THE PROCESS HE WENT THROUGH IN CONTACTING AN AGENT, HOW DID WE ENSURE THAT C/OS DID NOT TRY TO RECRUIT THE SAME INDIVIDUAL (CONTACT REPORTS) AND TRACE REQUESTS ALLOWED ADEQUATE CONTROL), WITH REFERENCE TO CI, HOW MUCH TIME WAS

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BRIL 24723

DEVOTED TO THIS AND HOW DID WE MANGAGE IT [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] AND JOINT EFFORT WITH LIAISON--TELESTAPS,
 SURVEILLANCE, ETC.--AGAINST HARD TARGETS). DISCUSSIONS ON
 COVERT ACTION TOOK UP CONSIDERABLE TIME. DESPITE HQS
 BRIEFING ON THIS SUBJECT, AARON WANTED TO KNOW THE
 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A [REDACTED] AND A [REDACTED] OP.
 MUCH STRESS WAS PLACED ON WHETHER WE HAD ANY PLUMBING FOR
 [REDACTED] OPS SHOULD WE BE REQUESTED TO GET INTO
 THAT ACTIVITY, IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN IN
 [REDACTED] IN [REDACTED] FOR YEARS, THAT WE HAD NO PLUMBING AS
 SUCH, AND THAT IF A REQUEST WAS TO BE MADE F N SUCH ACTION,
 THE STATION WOULD LIKELY NEED TO START FROM POINT ZERO

~~PAGE 3 BRASILIA 24723 S E C R E T~~

UNLESS SOME OF THE AGENTS NOW AVAILABLE WERE USABLE. IT WAS
 EXPLAINED THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL [REDACTED] AS WELL AS
 AN [REDACTED] PROGRAM BUT THAT THESE IN NO WAY
 RESEMBLED THE KIND OF COVERT POLITICAL ACTION OF THE
 CHILEAN VARIETY.

6. AARON HAD A FASCINATION FOR TRADESCRAFT, WANTED TO
 KNOW HOW LONG COS HAD BEEN IN THE BUSINESS AND APPROXIMATELY

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HOW MUCH TIME IN TOTAL COS SPENT IN TRAINING (COULDN'T HAZARD A GUESS AS TO HOW MUCH TIME SPENT IN TRAINING BUT SAID THAT THERE WAS A LONG COURSE ON ENTERING AGENCY, THAT OVER THE YARS THERE WAS TRAINING COVERING A VARIETY OF SUBJECTS INCLUDING SECRET WRITING, CLANDESTINE PHOTOGRAPHY, COMMUNISM, MANAGEMENT INCLUDING THE STUDY OF GRIDS, REPORTS WRITING, ETC. MENTION WAS MADE OF MID-CAREER COURSE, PLUS SENIOUR SEMINARS AVAILABLE TO OFFIERS, PLUS ATTENDANCE AT SAFF COLLEGES SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY STATE, ARMY, ETC.) (AARON WAS FASCINATED WITH THE REPORTS WRITING COURSE AND ASKED FOR PARTICULARS.)

7. ON INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS, BOTH AARON AND TUREHAEART WERE INTERESTED IN HOW INTEL REPORTS WERE DISTRIBUTED WITHIN THE EMBASSY, WHETHER COB HAD AUTHORITY TO SEND AN INTEL REPORT DIRECTLY TO HQS WITH INFO TO STATION (YES, ON MATTERS WHICH WERE PECULIAR TO THE LOCAL SCENE BUT THOSE IMPINGING ON BROADER GOB MATTERS WERE FIRST SENT TO BRASILIA FOR ADDITIONS, MODIFICATIONS, ETC. PRIOR TO ONWARD TRANSMISSION.) THEY WERE TOLD THAT THE AMBASSADOR SEES ALL REPORTS, THAT OTHER SECTIONS OF THE EMBASSY DID SEE

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BRIL 24723

THOSE REPORTS WHICH WERE PERTINENT TO THEM. INTEL ON MAJOR ITEMS-SUCH AS THOSE WHICH HAD A BEARING ON GOB POLICIES VIS-A-VIS THE U.S.-WAS SHOWN TO THE AMBASSADOR PRIOR TO SUBMISSION. STATION MADE IT A PRACTICE TO CHECK INTEL OUT WITH CONCERNED SECTIONS WITHIN THE EMBASSY PRIOR TO TRANSMISSION IF THIS WAS CONSIDERED NECESSARY AND BENEFICIAL BY THE STATION. THERE ARE OCCASIONS WHEREIN THE STATION IS REQUIRED TO LIMIT A REPORT TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY WHEN SENSITIVE INFO AND/OR A SENSITIVE SOURCE IS INVOLVED. THIS HAD NOT HAPPED IN THE COS'S SHORT TENURE IN

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TOR:231508Z SEP 75

BRIL 24723

SECRET 231409Z SEPT 75 STAFF

CITE BRASILIA 24723 FINAL SECTION OF TWO

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, [] ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLVWCADET

BRASILIA, BUT IN PANAMA FOR EXAMPLE, CERTAIN REPORTS CONSIDERED HIGHLY SENSITIVE WERE OFTEN LIMITED TO THE AMBASSADOR, THE CINSCO, AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE CANAL ZONE, OR TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY. SECURITY WAS THE CARDINAL FACTOR IN SUCH LIMITING OF DISTRIBUTION.

8. AARON WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF ONE OF THE STATION'S AGENTS WAS BEING SEEN BY A MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL SECTION--WOULD WE DISCUSS IT WITH THE POLITICAL OFFICER? (FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO TALK TO THE AGENT ON THE PROBLEMS THAT WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED BY SUCH ACTION ON HIS PART, THAT THIS NORMALLY DID SUFFICE IF IN FACT HE WAS A CONTROLLED AGENT. IF HIS ACCESS WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY SENSITIVE, HE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEE THE POLITICAL OFFICER SO LONG AS HE REMEMBERED WHO HE WORKED FOR AND ACTED ACCORDINGLY).

9. AS TO KEEPING THE AMBASSADOR APPRISED ON POSITIVE

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 TOR:231508Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723

COLLECTION OPERATIONS, THIS WAS DONE AS A MATTER OF COURSE BUT WITHOUT SPECIFIC DETAILS UNLESS THE AMBASSADOR WAS IN FACT SEEING AN AGENT OF OURS REGULARLY AS PART OF HIS AMBASSADORIAL DUTIES.

10. THE LIAISON SERVICES WITH WHOM WE WERE IN TOUCH WERE NAMED, INCLUDING OUR JOINT EFFORTS AT TELTSAPS, PLUS OUR UNILATERAL [] FOR CI AND POSITIVE INTEL.

11. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE SHOWN THE KIQS AND THE GIRLS AND TAILORED REQUIREMENTS THAT WERE SENT PERIODICALLY. THEY BOTH REMARKED THAT THE AGENCY HAS A MORE SOPHISTICATED SYSTEM FOR GETTING REQUIREMENTS TO THE FIELD THAN SAY, STATE.

12. VERY LITTLE WAS ASKED ABOUT [] IN [] EXCEPT THAT THEY BOTH WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT [] WAS RUNNING THE SHOW. THEY DID ASK ABOUT CUSTOMER REACTION TO THE [] (AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS IS AN AVID CUSTOMER AND WE WERE OF THE OPINION THAT AGENCIES IN WASHINGTON CONCERNED WITH THE [] WERE HAPPY WITH THE RESULTS.)

13. ON HEARING THAT COS HAD BEEN IN PANAMA, QUESTIONS

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TOR:231508Z SEP 75

BRIL 24723

WERE RAISED ON AGREED ACTIVITIES. THEY WERE BOTH SURPRISED TO FIND OUT THAT THE STATION IN PANAMA HAD TO _____ ACTIVITIES ENGAGED IN BY U.S. ELEMENTS IN THE AREA, INCLUDING GETTING PROJECT INFO MUCH LIKE THAT REQUIRED IN THE AGENCY WHICH GAVE NAMES OF _____

ETC.

14. **AARON** EVINCED GREAT INTEREST _____

_____ HE WAS TOLD THAT _____ COULD

BE IMPROVED UPON, THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL NUMBER OF

OFFICERS _____

THAT THEY GAVE _____ ON THE ACTUAL

_____ THEN SPENT _____

DAY PLUS A LARGE DOSE _____ FOR WHICH

THEY RECEIVED NO OVERTIME BUT DID THIS OUT OF HIGH MOTIVATION

AND THE DESIRE TO GET AT OUR OBJECTIVES.

15. AARON KNEW OF THE OLD OPC AND OSO SEPARATIONS OF THE PAST AND PROBED ABOUT HOW THE FINAL AMALGAMATION AFFECTED MOST PEOPLE. (NOTHING TRAUMATIC, OPC AND OSO OFFICERS HAD A COMMON DENOMINATOR IN BASIC TRADECRAFT AND OTHER

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TOR:231508Z SEP 75

BRIL 24723

TRAINING. A GOOD OPC TYPE COULD DO EQUALLY GOOD WORK IN THE OSO FIELD, AND VICE VERSA.)

16. ABOVE ARE ONLY THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DISCUSSION. AARON IS IN CHARGE, HE ASKED MOST OF THE QUESTIONS, AND TOOK COPIOUS NOTES. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE ESSENTIALLY LOW-KEY BUT THE QUESTIONS WERE SHARP, PROBING, AND AARON ESPECIALLY HAS A QUIETLY INCISIVE WAY OF GETTING AT THINGS. IT'S DIFFICULT TO TELL WHETHER THE TWO ARE FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD THE AGENCY OR NOT. CERTAINLY NO ANIMOSITY WAS SHOWN, BUT NEITHER WAS THERE ANY SHOW OF GREAT LOVE FOR THE AGENCY. AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH (AT) THE MATTER AT HAND APPEARS TO BE AN APT DESCRIPTION OF HOW THEY WORKED.

17. AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE CARED FOR BY THE EMBASSY WHILE IN BRASILIA BUT ON SATURDAY IN RIO AARON SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN LEFT ALONE BY THE CONGEN. COB AND COS TOOK AARON OUT TO DINNER AFTER THE BRIEFING SESSION AND HE SEEMED TO ENJOY AND APPRECIATE THE CHURRASCO. [REDACTED] AND BUENOS AIRES MIGHT WISH TO KEEP IN MIND THAT AARON IS INTERESTED IN TRYING THE BETTER KNOWN LOCAL FOODS, IS

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TOR:231508Z SEP 75

BRIL 24723

A WINE LOVER AND WANTS TO SAMPLE THE BEST OF THE LOCAL PRODUCT.

18. AT DINNER ON SATURDAY NIGHT, AARON WAS ASKED BY THE COS WHAT HE THOUGHT MIGHT HAPPEN TO THE AGENCY. HE OPINED THAT THE DDO MIGHT BE SPLIT OFF FROM THE MAIN BODY OF THE AGENCY, AND PUT UNDER AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MADE UP OF MEMBERS FROM STATE AND OTHER AGENCIES IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH MORE CONTROL OVER ITS ACTIVITIES. E2, IMPDET.

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File under
SSC travel

S E C R E T

20 August 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, LA Division

SUBJECT : Transmittal of SSC Memo Announcing
the Intention of SSC Staffers to
Visit Latin America

1. Attached is a xerox of a letter from the SSC Staff Director (Review Staff 75-2399) describing travel plans to Latin America on the part of SSC Staffers. This is for your information. You will be alerted when this becomes firm and an itinerary is established.

2. Also attached is an agreed upon memo giving guidelines of such trips. Supplementing this should be a briefing of the travelling of SSC Staffers before they go and a notification of the stations involved as to what the guidelines are.

John H. Waller
SA/DDO

Attachment
As stated above

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee w/att
2 - SA/DDO

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 055636

S E C R E T

**SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and
Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad**

There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and talk to U.S. embassy and intelligence personnel. It is essential that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security problems. The following specific guidelines are applicable.

**I. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT PUBLICLY APPEAR TO BE
ABROAD FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATING U.S. INTELLIGENCE
INSTALLATIONS.**

Most of these installations, including all CIA stations abroad, for example, are under some form of cover, or are maintaining a low profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities behind the iron curtain. These clearly need maximum protection. The mere visit of SSC representatives could be noted as evidence of U.S. intelligence presence within the country. Even in those countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government, care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions

6/25/75

that could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposure of such liaison. Many countries that wish to cooperate with the United States in intelligence endeavors simply cannot afford public exposure of such relationships. To help maintain the discreet nature of the visit, it would be preferable if some reason other than SSC business could be given to explain any visits by SSC members and staff. No deliberate contact should be made with the local press, nor should comments on SSC matters be supplied if investigating officers are contacted by the press. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to the host government.

In sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S. intelligence activities overseas on a case by case basis, and with senior officers within the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon the SSC member not publicly declaring himself to be on SSC business at the time of the visit or upon his return, and his proceeding on a basis satisfactory to the Ambassador.

II. THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE VISIT.

All arrangements and contacts will be made by him, and because of his knowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding.

III. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS.

It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements will only discuss operations in general terms--operational priorities, the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, etc. In all cases, such discussions will only be conducted in physical surroundings which meet appropriate security standards.

Members and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to see texts of or general notes on intelligence agreements between the U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and operationally, and cannot be divulged without the consent of the host government.

IV. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT PERSONNEL.

Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage would be done to agent morale and motivation if their identity were to be revealed to Members or staff of the SSC.

V. MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES
WILL BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES.

Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with U.S. intelligence activities, the information they pass, and the cooperation extended are all most sensitive matters. Regardless what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with members or staff of the SSC. The very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause the host service to reassess the desirability of a relationship with U.S. intelligence activities.

VI. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.

In those countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S. Congressional representatives, especially where there is public knowledge of the Congressional investigating interests. If such a visit is considered essential, a special request must be negotiated with the host country in advance.

VII. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS AND STAFF, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.

This briefing will be conducted by the DCI and other representatives of the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.), as appropriate. The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the visitor with the types of activities conducted at each location, the restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case and the considerations which preclude the discussion of operational details, names and terms in an overseas environment.

Members and staff of the SSC should bear in mind at all times that they and their activities are matters of great interest to opposition intelligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly travel inconspicuously and will be easily recognized.

MURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
 JOY JR., TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
 HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
 BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
 CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
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 FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
 CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

file

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
 STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
 RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
 (PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

August 12, 1975

REVIEW STAFF
 75-2399

Mr. Seymour Bolten
 Assistant to the Director
 Room 6D0120
 Central Intelligence Agency
 Langley, Virginia

*Note: C/LA + 3 LA Affair
 completed briefing
 on 17 Sept 1975
 mly*

Dear Mr. Bolten:

This letter is to confirm an oral request by Committee staff for an orientation briefing for a visit to South America which two members of the staff, David Aaron and William Trueheart, have been asked to make next month.

Although plans are not yet firm, it is expected that they will be free to travel during the second and third weeks of September. It is proposed that they visit Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro, and

 If time permits, they might also visit another consular post in Brazil and/or Buenos Aires.

The primary purpose of this travel is to discuss State-CIA relations in the field with Embassy and Station officers. As appropriate, past Agency programs may also be reviewed.

Messrs. Aaron and Trueheart are not expected to consult with officials of the host government and, so far as the Committee is concerned, the latter need not be informed of the visit.

Sincerely yours,

Bill

William G. Miller

copy to Mr. Hyland, State Department

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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TO: PRIORITY LONDON.4

REF: STATE 137637, 30 JUNE 1975 4

DHB ✓

1. SENATOR TOWER, MEMBER OF SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE (ASC) AND VICE CHAIRMAN OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING CIA, IS TRAVELING IN EUROPE IN HIS ASC CAPACITY BY U.S. AIR FORCE JET AND ^{ITH} AIR FORCE ESCORT. STATE HAS ADVISED THAT SENATOR TOWER WILL BE IN LONDON 3-7 JULY WHERE HE WILL CALL ON MINISTER HEALEY ON 4 JULY AND CINCUSNAVEUR *ON 7 JULY. 4*

R

2. ALTHOUGH TRAVELING ON ASC BUSINESS, SENATOR TOWER MAY TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK INTO CIA AND OTHER U.S. INTEL SERVICE ACTIVITY IN U.K. IF HE REQUESTS A GENERAL BRIEFING, STATION SHOULD BE COOPERATIVE AND FORTHCOMING IN PROVIDING HIM WITH ONE. YOU MAY COVER THRUST OF OUR GENERAL INTEL EXCHANGE WITH THE BRITISH BUT SEE NO NEED TO TOUCH ON ANY JOINT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY. STATION SHOULD NOT OFFER ARRANGE CONTACT BETWEEN SENATOR TOWER AND BRITISH SERVICE CONTACTS.4

3. FOR BACKGROUND GUIDANCE, IN THE EVENT SSC BUSINESS ARISES: HQS IS CURRENTLY WORKING WITH THE SSC TO ESTABLISH GUIDLINES FOR

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DATE-TIME GROUP: DIRECTOR

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THE COS WILL PROBABLY WISH TO MAKE HIMSELF AVAILABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY BRIEFING SENATOR TOWER MAY REQUEST. 4

3. FOR BACKGROUND GUIDANCE, ^{IN THE} EVENT SSC BUSINESS ARISES: HQS IS CURRENTLY WORKING WITH THE SSC TO ESTABLISH GUIDELINES FOR ITS DEALINGS WITH ITS MEMBERS AND THEIR STAFFS. ALTHOUGH NOT FINAL HQS BELIEVES IT IS MORE APPROPRIATE THAT WASHINGTON BE THE PLACE WHERE OPERATIONAL DETAILS OF CIA ACTIVITY BE CONVEYED TO THE SSC. FIELD ELEMENTS SHOULD ONLY DISCUSS THEIR OPS AND ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL TERMS, I.E., OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES, TYPES OF OPERATIONS, PARTICULAR PROBLEMS AS EVOLVE FROM THE LOCAL OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE EMBASSY {CONSULATE} AND LOCAL MILITARY SERVICES. IN ALL CASES DISCUSSIONS WILL MEET APPROPRIATE SECURITY STANDARDS IN TERMS OF PHYSICAL SURROUNDINGS. HQS IS ASKING THE SSC TO REFRAIN FROM ASKING TO SEE THE TEXTS OF OR GENERAL NOTES ON INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND HOST GOVERNMENTS SINCE THESE ARE CONSIDERED BY THE HOST GOVERNMENTS AS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE, POLITICALLY AND OPERATIONALLY AND CANNOT BE DIVULGED WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT. E2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 1 JULY 1975
 ORIG: GALEN PEARY/HF select
 UNIT: E/G/CIL STAFF
 EXT: 1582

Peary
Knoche
SA/1000 Waller
in draft
Miller

DC/E
 W. L. MILLER

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

C/SS/CAG

3D0004

EXTENSION

R9125

NO.

DATE

28 July 1975

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

1. Mr. John Waller
SA/DDO 2B1415

29 JUL 1975

*Only shown to
President in DIRECTOR*

2.

3. Mr. Seymour Bolten
Review Staff 6 D 0120

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28 July 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Seymour Bolten
Review Staff

VIA: Mr. John Waller
Special Assistant to the DDO

SUBJECT: Summary of Covert Action Operations Targeted at
Right-Wing Governments

1. Pursuant to your request, forwarded as attachment A is a paper providing examples of covert action operations targeted at right-wing governments, which is responsive to a question from the Senate Select Committee.

2. All of the cases in the attached summary are considered sensitive by the area divisions and some are considered extremely sensitive up to today. In many ways public disclosure of some of these operations could impact more severely on our foreign policy interest than the other disclosures on our foreign involvements. For example, a disclosure of our

[redacted] With this problem in mind, we have broken the operations into two categories: Category I are those operations about which full committee could be briefed, if necessary, and Category II are those operations considered extremely sensitive about which the committee Chairman and Co-Chairman might be briefed, if absolutely necessary.

3. In addition to the attachment A summary, we also approve the use (with the full committee) of the case summary on our operations to assist [redacted] which was provided to you directly by LA Division.


4. Obviously, we would prefer to forego providing this information to the committee. However, should it be necessary to do so, we would appreciate being advised promptly regarding the time and circumstances of any use of this material outside of the Agency.

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5. We are also providing you as attachments B, C and D copies of memoranda from EUR, AF and EA Divisions which provides additional background on division attitudes and caveats concerning the provision of this material to the Select Committee.



Donald J. Purcell
Chief, Covert Action Group
Services Staff

Attachments, a/s

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28 July 1975

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Review Staff

VIA: Mr. John Waller
Special Assistant to the DDO

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[redacted] now underway. With this problem in mind, we have broken the operations into two categories: Category I are those operations about which full committee could be briefed, if necessary, and Category II are those operations considered extremely sensitive about which the committee Chairman and Co-Chairman might be briefed, if absolutely necessary.

3. In addition to the attachment A summary, we also approve the use (with the full committee) of the case summary on our operations to assist the survival of [redacted], which was provided to you directly by LA Division.

4. Obviously, we would prefer to forego providing this information to the committee. However, should it be necessary to do so, we would appreciate being advised promptly regarding the time and circumstances of any use of this material outside of the Agency.

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/s/ Donald J. Purcell

Donald J. Purcell
Chief, Covert Action Group
Services Staff

Attachments, a/s

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Covert Action Operations Concerning Right-Wing Regimes

CATEGORY I

1. [redacted] movement was first approved for FY 1965. The purpose of the support was to encourage the development of the [redacted] as a democratic force and as one of the few mass representative organizations in [redacted]. The project was terminated at the end of FY 1973. The total approved budget for this project from its inception in CY 1964 to its termination in CY 1973 was [redacted]. Covert support to the [redacted] was approved by the Special Group on 22 August 1967, on 25 March 1970, on 26 May 1971, and on 8 May 1972.

2. SOUTH VIETNAM: From 1955 to 1975, a series of projects was begun designed to build up grass social institutions as a means of strengthening the democratic foundations of the country. One of the most long-lasting of these was aimed at supporting the soundly democratic labor movement through the provision of guidance and funds to facilitate its growth among the workers and rural village peasants and tenant farmers.

3. [redacted] In 1972-73, [redacted] with access to the government succeeded in dissuading the President from military action against [redacted].

4. HAITI: As early as 1963, the Special Group discussed ways and means of influencing the Duvalier dictatorship. In 1967, a modest project was approved for the support of Haitian exile radio broadcasts for the purpose of offsetting "the inflammatory propaganda broadcasts to Haiti from Radio Habana."

5. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: In 1963, CIA was directly involved in the successful efforts to prevent the return to the Dominican Republic of General Elias Wessin y Wessin and forestall his leadership of a right-wing coup designed to prevent the holding of free elections.

6. [redacted] From 1948 to 1960, CIA exploited an asset in a neo-political movement both as a source of intelligence concerning its plans and actions and as a means of covertly sabotaging the movement and its [redacted] counterparts.

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CATEGORY II

1. [] In 1959, after consultation with the Special Group, the DCI approved an overall expenditure of [] to a leading [] political figure designed to encourage the creation of a new political party. This party was established [] The objective was to influence the liberalization of [] by having a legally constituted party in opposition [] The activity was terminated in 1962.
2. [] A project was initiated in 1962 to encourage the development of a [] which opposed [] It was funded through a [] State Department approval was received in June 1963. A total of [] was spent on this activity. The project was terminated in 1968.
3. [] In 1963, the Special Group approved a covert action project designed to encourage "emerging civilian government" vis-a-vis the military leadership following [] resignation and in anticipation of forthcoming elections; it proposed to support a group of National Assembly members.
4. [] The Special Group approved in 1967 a project designed to support a private, rural self-help organization to encourage more participation by rural farmers in local and national politics to increase their influence on the Government of the [] it involved [] It was terminated in 1970 as a project, but the movement has been continued under the auspices of the government.
5. [] Between 1950 and 1955, efforts of the CIA were directed at countering [] program to obtain wide support in Latin America for [] which was designed as one element of his campaign to expand his influence in the area. Partially as the result of CIA's efforts, the movement never caught on and it was abandoned []
6. [] From the early 1960's through the [] and the assumption of power by the conservative [], to 1972, CIA supported a [] This support was provided in spite of strong opposition to the movement first by the [] and then by [] military authorities in that area and in spite of the effect particularly after 1974 on liaison and diplomatic relations if this support by the USG were discovered. The project was terminated in 1972.

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7. NICARAGUA: During the period 1962 to 1966, CIA participated in efforts to interdict moves by General Somoza to purchase arms for military actions against his neighbors.

8. SPAIN: In 1963, the Special Group approved a program to train [redacted] a year outside of [redacted] to build an effective cadre of [redacted]. In 1966, the Special Group approved a modest program designed to strengthen the [redacted] [redacted] through supportive efforts with youth, political and labor elements.

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22 JUL 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Waller
Special Assistant to DDO

SUBJECT: Summary of Covert Action Operations
Against Right-Wing Governments

REFERENCE: SS/CAG Memorandum of 18 July 1975,
Same Subject

We have reviewed referent memorandum and have the following comments on those paragraphs which concern

13. [redacted] While this case is somewhat bizarre and does not represent a productive operation, we pose no objection to its being presented to the Senate Select Committee.

14. [redacted] We have no objection to the presentation of these programs to the Senate Select Committee for review although we share concern expressed by SS/CAG that a leak of this information would be detrimental to the base negotiations.

signed/William W. Wells

William W. Wells
Chief, European Division

DDO/DC/E/NW:MFBuell:tj (22 July 75)

Distribution:

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25 JUL 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Covert Action Group, Services Staff

SUBJECT : Covert Action Operations Against Right
Wing Regimes

1. Attached are revisions of the descriptions of the three covert action operations [redacted] cited in your memorandum to Mr. John Waller dated 18 July 1975.

2. In the case of [redacted] we understand from your discussions with Mr. Clifton Strathern that the [redacted] has not been eliminated from your list but that the Director will request that discussion of it be limited to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman only of the Senate Select Committee. The Director should be informed of the potentially embarrassing procedural errors in the presentation and review of this project before the 303 Committee, and the risks of exposure to two former assets who have been jailed by the [redacted] regime.

3. [redacted] was undertaken without 303 Committee knowledge or approval. Subsequently, the project was presented to the 303 Committee on 22 August 1967 and Mr. Walt Rostow, then Chairman of the Security Council, asked why it had not been brought before the Committee before. He was told that for projects costing [redacted] it had been the DCI's discretion to determine if a given project was sufficiently politically sensitive to warrant bringing it before the committee. Mr. Rostow directed that the 303 Committee should examine all political action projects. Nevertheless, the project was not submitted to the Committee for review in 1968, 1969 or 1973.

4. In addition to these procedural errors, the arrest in 1974 and continued detention of [redacted] who are former assets under this project, and accusations in

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the [] press that the [] received support from the U.S. Government, make any disclosure of CIA interest in the [] potentially dangerous to our former assets. Neither of the former assets was arrested because of his CIA connections, and neither of the two assets nor the [] have been accused of CIA involvement. An admission now of CIA support to [] or to the two [] in jail could be a sentence of death for them.

5. In the case of [] CIA support to a leading [] political figure to encourage the creation of a [] remains a very sensitive matter. The principal agent is still a [] for the [] and is a [] of the [] Exposure of the operation could lead to his identification which would be extremely damaging to him, to the opposition party and to our government's relations in []. For these reasons, we believe it would be desirable for the DCI to limit discussion of this operation to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Select Committee only.

6. The [] which was used to fund the development of a [] organization in [] was the [] located in []. The [] and organizations which received funds from [] were not aware that the actual origin of the funds was the United States Government and presumably do not now know of U.S. Government or CIA involvement. Aside from exposing a U.S. Government involvement where none is known to have existed, [] was used to support a number of other covert action operations in [] and elsewhere and exposure of the [] would have ramifications other than in []. The Director should be briefed on [] and its range of activities on behalf of CIA if he has not already been informed.

Clifton R. Strathern
Clifton R. Strathern
Deputy Chief, Africa Division

Attachments:
As Stated Above

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21 JUL 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. John Waller
Special Assistant to the DDO

SUBJECT : Covert Action Operations Against
Right Wing Governments

REFERENCE : Chief, SS/CAG Memorandum, dated
18 July 1975
Subject: "Summary of Covert Action
Operations Against Right Wing Governments"

1. EA Division is concerned about Reference and its possible use in briefing the Senate Select Committee. Specifically, our concern centers on describing the EA operations contained in the attachment to Reference as "were mounted against" "right wing governments". None of the EA operations -- DNSCOOP, DNSPROUT (both of which took place in [] and TUMIX (which took place in [] -- were or should be so described as being mounted against the government then in power. In fact, just the opposite is true. All of these operations, while covert in the sense that the U.S. Government had never disclosed, were primarily designed to broaden the base of the governments in power and enhance its stayability by providing advice and support to "grass root elements" in an attempt to get these elements to function as a more cohesive organization in seeking participation in the governmental process.


2. While all of the operations have been terminated, the DNSCOOP operation is perhaps the most sensitive of the three, in that it represented an initial effort by the Agency to establish contact with opposition elements in []. As noted above, the purpose of this contact was not to overthrow the ruling government but rather to assist the opposition in establishing itself as a more viable force in its effort to establish a two-party system in []. The Agency today

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maintains contact with the major opposition leaders in [redacted] and this contact is well known to and approved by the U. S. Ambassador in [redacted] as well as the Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Department of State.

3. We see no real value to be gained if any of these operations were to be raised with the Senate Select Committee.


Robert D. Brown, Jr.
Acting Chief, East Asia Division

cc: DC/Operations Staff
C/SS/CAG

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July 20

SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select
Committee and Their Staffs While
Traveling Abroad

There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious security problems from arising. The following specific guidelines are considered important:

- Members of the SSC and members of its staff should not publicly appear to be abroad for purposes of investigating CIA installations. CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under some form of cover, have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are Stations behind the iron curtain or in other particularly sensitive areas which need maximum protection. At the other extreme are Stations which enjoy close liaison with the host government and are thus less sensitive. In the first case, Stations existing under strict cover conditions in sensitive environments, the very presence of SSC members could be highly provocative by flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But even in countries in which we enjoy a good liaison with the host country's security service, there remains a need to be discreet. Many countries whose services want to be cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or parliamentary exposure of the relationship. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to a host government.

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In sum, except in the case of very sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and with senior officers within the covering Embassy provided the SSC member does not publicly declare himself to be on SSC business and maintains his Station contacts on a discreet basis.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should not question Station personnel on specific operational detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guidelines are best understood, where the most complete and authentic records are kept (many Stations finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations, have periodically destroyed their files). There is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should not discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy, the service attaches, etc.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should not interview agent personnel. Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage could be done to agent morale and motivation if they were to think their role had been revealed to members of Congress.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should not in most cases be in contact with members of host country's intelligence or security services. Many services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with CIA, the information they pass us and the sort of cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.

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No matter what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with the SSC or its staff, and the very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause them to reassess the desirability of a relationship with CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. Exceptions can perhaps be made in special cases.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should not visit foreign technical intelligence installations. Again there may be exceptions to this which can be arranged, but in most countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host service would be opposed to access by Congressional representatives.

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CITE LONDON 628897

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

REF DIRECTOR 712872

WE W
DIPS

1. IN MEETING WITH COS ON 30 JUNE, AMBASSADOR TOLD COS THAT HE HAD LUNCH WITH SENATOR MONDALE ON 28 JUNE AND ENGAGED IN BRIEF GENERAL DISCUSSION OF INVESTIGATION OF BKERALD BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE. AMBASSADOR FOUND SENATOR MONDALE ENTIRELY REASONABLE IN HIS APPROUACH AND FULLY AWARE OF DIFFICULTY OF JUDGING EVENTS AND DECISIONS OF EARLY 1960'S BY STANDARDS OF 1975.

2. AMBASSADOR REPORTED THAT SENATOR MONDALE STATED THAT HE HAD MADE SOME EFFORT TO CONTACT BRITISH ON JUNE 28 WITHOUT SUCCESS. IN LIGHT OF REF, COS DID NOT ATTEMPT TO CONTACT SENATOR MONDALE ON 28 JUNE. IN CONVERSATION WITH COS ON 30 JUNE, RICHARD SYKES, CHAIRMAN, JIC, REPORTED THAT BRITISH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEK FORWARDED REQUEST FROM SENATOR MONDALE TO MEET WITH BRITISH ON 30 JUNE. SINCE SYKES HAD TO BE IN PARIS ON 28 JUNE AND HOOPER HAD NOT YET RETURNED FROM HIS ASIAN

SECRET

FORM 100B
MAY 1974

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T 126005 EIA165 PAGE 02-02 IN 620738
 TOR1301301Z JUN 75 LOND 628897

TRIP, U.K. EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON WAS ASKED TO INFORM MONDALE THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE AT THAT TIME. THIS IS FOR YOUR BACKGROUND IN EVENT SENATOR RAISES THE POINT WITH HQS. E2 IMPDET.

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T 121509

EIA815

PAGE 01

IN 619528

TOR1271651Z JUN 75

BONN 41001

SECRET 271217Z JUN 75 STAFF

CITE BONN 41001

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT

FROM GRAVER

REF DIRECTOR 708791

1. IT WILL GREATLY FACILITATE PLANNING SCHEDULE FOR SENATOR MONDALE IF A MORE SPECIFIC ITINERARY CAN BE OBTAINED TOGETHER WITH SOME INDICATION OF HOW MUCH TIME THE SENATOR PLANS TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO US DURING HIS BONN VISIT. IN VIEW OF THE UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC THAT GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES ARE NOT CENTRALLY LOCATED IN ONE PLACE, PLUS THE SPECIAL NATURE OF

[] I AM GIVING THOUGHT TO HAVING CHIEFS OF BASE [] MUNICH PARTICIPATE BUT AS OF PRESENT TIME WE UNCERTAIN EVEN WHAT DAY SENATOR WILL ACTUALLY BE IN BONN.

2. WE ALSO PERPLEXED BY PARA 6 REF RE "SIMILAR INDEPENDENT CONTACT WITH [] SINCE, AS HQS AWARE, [] IS LOCATED IN MUNICH, WE ARE EQUALLY PUZZLED BY THE COMMENT IN PARA 7 ABOUT 'SEEING THE [] FACILITY' WHICH SEEMS TO SUGGEST RESURGENCE OF LONG-STANDING MISCONCEPTION THAT [] IS A

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PAGE 02-02

IN 619528

TOR:271651Z JUN 75

BONN 41001

PHYSICAL FACILITY HOUSING [REDACTED] THERE
IS NO [REDACTED] FACILITY AS SUCH, JUST A FEW SAFE APARTMENTS
[REDACTED] AND I PLAN TO BRIEF THE SENATOR ON [REDACTED]
ACTIVITIES AS PART OF THE BONN PRESENTATION. IF THE SENATOR
PLANS TO VISIT ANY OTHER LOCATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IN
ADDITION TO BONN WE URGENTLY REQUEST EARLY ADVICE THEREOF.

3. ASSUME SENATOR HAS BEEN BRIEFED IN GENERAL TERMS AT LEAST
ON AGENCY PROCEDURES FOR TRACING AND CLEARING OPERATIONAL SOURCES,
REPORTING ON THEIR ACTIVITIES, AND AGENCY FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
PROCEDURES, BUT WOULD PLAN USE THESE PROCEDURES AS FRAMEWORK
IN DESCRIBING EXERCISE OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION IN THE FIELD,
IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING GENERALIZED DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR AREAS
OF STATION OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY.

4. WILL GREATLY APPRECIATE ETA OF SENATOR AND PARTY BONN
AS SOON AS THIS CAN POSSIBLY BE PROCURED. E2 IMPDET.

S E C R E T

7-71 MFG. 2 70

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T 120565 EIA892 PAGE 01 IN 619109

TOR1271119Z JUN 75 LOND 62823

SECRET 271112Z JUN 75 STAFF

CITE LONDON 62823

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

REF A. DIRECTOR 708791

B. STATE 146723 DTD 21 JUNE (AC*)

C. STATE 150884 DTD 26 JUNE (AC*)

1. WE NOTE CHANGES IN SENATOR MONDALE TRIP.

2. REFS B & C INDICATE MONDALE ARRIVING ~~STOCKHOLM~~ LONDON 28 JUNE DEPARTING 29TH, TRAVELLING NORWAY THEN RETURNING TO WASHINGTON VIA LONDON ON 7 JULY. NO MENTION OF OTHER MEMBERS OF PARTY EXCEPT MRS. MONDALE. REALIZE INFO MAY BE COVER FOR TRIP, BUT WOULD LIKE CLARIFICATION. DOES SENATOR EXPECT BRIEFINGS LONDON ON 28TH VICE 30 JUNE AND 1 JULY?

3. PLS ADVISE. E2 IMPDET

* NO RECORD IN CABLE SECRETARIAT

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

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OLC, C/SS3, C/PS/EG2,
C/C/OP3

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- IF FILES #

TO: LONDON.4

RYBAT 4

- REFS: A. LONDON 62701 | IN 616087 |
- B. LONDON 62615 | IN 613590 | 4

DHB ✓
JW copy sent

AS YET WE HAVE NOT HEARD FURTHER ON THE MONDALE VISIT NOR HAS EUR DIVISION HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF ANY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CODEL. IN ANSWER TO YOUR SPECIFIC QUESTIONS, WE HAVE ALREADY FORWARDED TO LONDON BY SEPARATE CHANNEL THE CLEARANCE STATUS OF THE PARTY. WE HAVE QUERIED ABOUT THE SENATOR'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE AGEE CASE, BUT KNOW OF NO SPECIAL BRIEFING GIVEN HIM. WE PRESUME HE HAS READ THE NEWSPAPERS. SHOULD THE SUBJECT ARISE, WE ARE PREPARED TO ANSWER HIS QUESTIONS FORTHRIGHTLY. RATHER THAN DISCUSSING SPECIFIC COVERT ACTION PROJECTS AND DIVULGING SOURCE NAMES, YOU SHOULD COVER THE GENERAL IDEAS BEHIND COVERT ACTION ACTIVITIES, THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH THEY WERE DEVELOPED AND WHY THEY WERE TERMINATED. E2, IMPDET.H

DATE: 25 JUNE 1975
 ORIG: WILLIAM W. WELLS
 UNIT: C/EUR
 EXT: 1012

W. W. Wells
 WILLIAM W. WELLS, C/EUR
 RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

John Waller
 JOHN WALLER, SA/DDO
 AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

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E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

7-71 MFG. 2/75

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EIA332

PAGE 01

IN 616087

TOR:241622Z JUN 75

LOND 62701

S E C R E T 241451Z JUN 75 STAFF

CITE LONDON 62701

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT

REF A, DIRECTOR 708791

R B, LONDON 62615 (013590)

1. RE PARA 5 REF A, RICHARD SYKES, CHAIRMAN, JIC,

INFORMED COS AT LUNCH 24 JUNE THAT AS RESULT OF REQUEST FROM SENATOR MONDALE VIA MURRAY SIMONS, SYKES AND SIR LEONARD HOOPER ARE TENTATIVELY PLANNING TO MEET WITH SENATOR MONDALE ON 1 JULY TO DISCUSS BOTH HOW POLICY CONTROL IS EXERCISED OVER BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND HOW BRITISH OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT WORKS.

2. SYKES MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE AND HOOPER WERE THE ONLY ONES AUTHORIZED TO DEAL WITH SENATOR MONDALE AND THAT SENATOR MONDALE WILL NOT BE MEETING WITH GNGRAPH OR JAGUAR REPS.

3. WOULD APPRECIATE REPLY TO GUIDANCE REQUEST IN REF B.

E2 IMPDET

WEN
 DHB
 JW

SECRET

Review Staff: 75/1009
24 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Senator Gary Hart's Request to Talk
to QJWIN While Traveling in Europe

This is for your information concerning Senator Gary Hart's request to talk to a former agent while the senator is traveling in Europe.

The agent is QJWIN. He was first approached in 1958 through the head of the Luxembourg intelligence service. At first he was used mainly to spot potential agents in various European countries. Later he became the major asset under ZRRIFLE. In this capacity he made a brief visit to the Congo, but took no actions.

On the weekend of 7 June 1975, members of the Senate Select Committee staff spent many hours at Headquarters reading files, including QJWIN and ZRRIFLE, among others. QJWIN's true name contract is in the file which they read. So is a street and post office address as of 1964, the time when we ended our contract with this agent. We have not contacted him since.

We have heard that David Aaron of the Senate Select Committee staff telephoned QJWIN. This report remains unconfirmed. We have protested to Bill Miller.

It is difficult to imagine how a U.S. senator could talk to a former agent without arousing the interest of the local intelligence service (probably Luxembourg) and of the host government who might wonder about the propriety of investigations being conducted on their territory and involving one of their citizens.

In any event, an approach of this nature would be of interest to the Department of State, and the senator might wish to consult with the Department before proceeding.

Walter Elder
Walter Elder

CB: 007789
E2 IMPDET

SECRET

SECRETTalking Points For Use With Senator Gary Hart On His Proposed
Contact With QJWYN

1. Senatorial contact with a former CIA agent would run the risk of his exposure to his local government and the press. Because of his former activities and relationships he might be subjected to reprisals from abroad, possible prosecution for espionage at home from his local government and harassment from the media.
2. Active as well as former CIA agents abroad would have further cause to believe that the American intelligence service is incapable of protecting its informants from disclosure. Contacting an agent under the insecure conditions involved would violate the Agency's promise to this former informant to protect the confidentiality of the relationship.
3. Foreign intelligence services with which the CIA is in liaison would find this approach highly unprofessional and risky. It is bound to raise further questions about the dangers of continued confidential cooperation with the CIA.
4. It is possible that the local government involved might lodge a formal protest to the US mission protesting the unusual procedure of a Senate investigating committee interrogating its nationals in violation of its sovereignty without requesting formal permission.

6/24/75

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Exempt from general declassification authority of E.O. 11652 except where schedule (1), (2), (3) Automatically declassified on Date Impossible to Determine

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75-6905

Review Staff: 75/868
20 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

This is for your information concerning Senator Gary Hart's request to talk to a former agent of ours while traveling in Europe.

You should know that we have been told that the Senate Select Committee staff has already been in touch with this agent by telephone. We do not know how they learned his true name or his whereabouts. We have already advised David Aaron of the Senate Select Committee staff of a potential problem area in connection with such a proposed meeting. The agent in question is, of course, a subject of interest to the local intelligence service and we doubt that the host government or the intelligence service would agree that a United States senator, especially a member of the Senate Select Committee, may appropriately conduct such investigations within its territory without clearance to do so.

In any event, an approach of this nature would be of interest and indeed of concern to the Department of State and the senator might be well advised to consult with them before proceeding.

For your information, the agent referred to is QJWIN and we have not been in touch with him since about 1951.

/s/
Walter Elder

EB

CB: 007789
E2 IMPDET

SECRET

*Elder handcarried
orig to DCI.*

MEMORANDUM FOR:

6/25 DDO W/c
ADDO B ←
SA/DOO -

DCI

More facts, per your request, on the QJWIN matter.

Talking points for your use with Sen. Gary Hart are included.

H. Knoche 6-24-75
(DATE)

PROPOSED DOD
CHANGES SHOWN
HERE, PP 2 and 5,
WITHIN THE HEAVY
BRACKETS,

SUBJECT: GUIDELINES FOR MEMBERS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE AND
THEIR STAFFS WHILE TRAVELING ABROAD

There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and talk to U.S. embassy and intelligence personnel. It is essential that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security problems. The following specific guidelines are applicable.

I. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT PUBLICLY APPEAR TO BE ABROAD FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATING U.S. INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.

Most of these installations, including all CIA stations abroad, for example, are under some form of cover, or are maintaining a low profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities behind the iron curtain. These clearly need maximum protection. Their mere visit of SSC representatives could be noted as evidence of U.S. intelligence presence within the country. Even in those countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government, care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions that

25 June - latest version, incorporating
proposed changes by DoD.

could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposure of such liaison. [Several foreign governments or entities thereof now willing to cooperate privately with the U.S. in intelligence agreements-exchanges maintain strong^{ly} neutral or anti-U.S. foreign policies; continuation of such agreements-exchanges is therefore dependent upon avoidance of their public disclosure. In many cases termination of such agreements would result in the loss of unique strategic intelligence, and alternate collection methods are either not available or are prohibitively expensive.]

To help maintain the discreet nature of the visit, it would be preferable if some reason other than SSC business could be given to explain any visits by SSC members and staff. No deliberate contact should be made with the local press, nor should comments on SSC matters be supplied if investigating officers are contacted by the press. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to the host government.

In sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S. intelligence activities overseas on a case by case basis, and with senior officers within the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon the SSC member not publicly declaring himself to be on SSC business at the time of the visit or upon his return, and his proceeding on a basis satisfactory to the Ambassador.

II. THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE VISIT.

All arrangements and contacts will be made by him, and because of his knowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding.

Agreement
III. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS.

Bar
It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements will only discuss operations in general terms--operational priorities, the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, etc. In all cases, such discussions will only be conducted in physical surroundings which meet appropriate security standards.

Members and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to see texts of or general notes on intelligence agreements between the U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and operationally, and cannot be divulged without the consent of the host government.

IV. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT PERSONNEL.

Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members

would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage would be done to agent morale and motivation if their identity were to be revealed to Members or staff of the SSC.

V. MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES WILL BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES.

Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with U.S. intelligence activities, the information they pass, and the cooperation extended are all most sensitive matters. Regardless what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with members or staff of the SSC. The very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause the host service to reassess the desirability of a relationship with U.S. intelligence activities.

VI. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.

In those countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S. Congressional representatives, especially where there is public knowledge of the Congressional investigating interests. If such

a visit is considered essential, a special request must be negotiated with the host country in advance.

[Senate Select Committee principals and staff should understand the distinction between U.S. intelligence installations abroad and joint U.S.-foreign intelligence installations or foreign intelligence installations supported by the U.S. intelligence community. Access to the former is at the discretion of the U.S. Ambassador; access to the latter two is at the discretion of the foreign government involved.]

VII. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS AND STAFF, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.

This briefing will be conducted by the DCI and other representatives of the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.), as appropriate. The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the visitor with the types of activities conducted at each location, the restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case and the considerations which preclude the discussion of operational details, names and terms in an overseas environment.

Members and staff of the SSC should bear in mind at all times that they and their activities are matters of great interest to opposition intelligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly travel inconspicuously and will be easily recognized.

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PAGE 01

IN 613590

TORJ201921Z JUN 75

LOND 62615

S E C R E T 201745Z JUN 75 STAFF

CITE LONDON 62615

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT

REF A, DIRECTOR 707518

B, DIRECTOR 708791

D KB [Signature]

1. THANK YOU FOR ADVICE REGARDING SENATOR MONDALE'S PROPOSED VISIT, AND AMBASSADOR AND MINISTER HAVE BOTH BEEN ALERTED.

2. IN RESPONSE TO PARA 6 REF A, COS PLANS TO BRIEF SENATOR MONDALE ON STRUCTURE OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE NATURE OF OUR INTERFACE WITH IT WITH PARTICULAR STRESS ON THE GROUND RULES GOVERNING OUR RELATIONSHIP. COS WILL ALSO COVER THE STATION'S ORGANIZATION, PRIORITIES, AND THE GENERAL KINDS OF OPERATIONS BEING RUN. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE ANSWERS TO A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC QUESTIONS THAT OCCUR TO US:

- A. WHAT CLEARANCES DO SENATOR MONDALE AND HIS TWO STAFF ASSISTANTS ^{HAVE?} ~~?~~ B. TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE SENATOR BEEN INFORMED ABOUT AGEE CASE, AND IN WHAT DETAIL SHOULD THIS CASE BE COVERED WITH HIM AND HIS TWO ASSISTANTS? C. TO WHAT EXTENT SHOULD

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DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

708791

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TO: LONDON, VIENNA, BONN, PARIS

RYBATY

REF: DIRECTOR 707518 (NOT NEEDED)

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1. {REF CONCERNED VISIT OF SENATOR MONDALE TO EUROPE IN EARLY JULY ON SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES.} 4

2. SENATOR MONDALE'S ITINERARY IS NOT YET FIRM. NOW APPEARS HE WILL ARRIVE LONDON ON 30 JUNE FOR TWO-DAY STAY THEN PROCEED OSLO AND HELSINKI FOR VISITS NOT CONNECTED WITH SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES. CURRENT PLANS BRING HIM TO VIENNA 7 JULY FOR TWO-DAY STAY THEN TO PARIS {1 DAY} AND BONN {2 DAYS}. NO DECISION YET AS TO WHICH CITY WILL BE VISITED (DIRECTLY FROM) VIENNA. 4

3. MR. DAVID AARON ADVISES THAT SENATOR WISHES THE DISCUSSIONS TO BE GENERIC IN NATURE. HE WANTS TO KNOW THE STATIONS' PRIORITIES AND THE GENERAL KINDS OF OPERATIONS BEING RUN, BUT HE IS NOT SEEKING SPECIFICS. 4

4. MR. AARON STATES THERE WILL BE NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF SELECT COMMITTEE CONNECTIONS, AND IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THE SENATOR'S PARTY WILL BE TRAVELING BY AIR FORCE OR COMMERCIAL

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RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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AIRCRAFT.4

5. FOR LONDON. MR. AARON HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH MURRAY SYMONDS BUT NOT THROUGH CIA ARRANGEMENT. SENATOR MONDALE HAS ASKED FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE (AND PROBABLY MI-6) ON THE BRITISH OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT AND HOW THE BRITISH COMMAND AND CONTROL AUTHORITIES RUN WITHIN THE BRITISH SERVICE. WE ARE NOT ASKED FOR ANY ASSISTANCE IN THIS AFFAIR.4

6. FOR BONN. SENATOR MONDALE PLANS A SIMILAR INDEPENDENT CONTACT

7. IN A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE TRIP, MR. AARON SAID THAT IN VIENNA THE SENATOR WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND HOW THESE AFFECT THE OPERATIONAL PICTURE IN THAT CITY. IN BONN THE SENATOR WILL WISH TO LOOK INTO COUNTRY TEAM RELATIONS AND MAY ALSO BE INTERESTED IN SEEING THE FACILITY. IN PARIS THE SENATOR WILL EXPECT TO REVIEW THE STATION'S VARIED PROGRAM. 4

8. WE NOTED THE SENATOR'S INVESTIGATION MAY STILL BE SUBJECT TO HIGHER LEVEL EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT DIRECTION OF WHICH WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN INFORMED. E2, IMPDET.H

DATE: 17 JUNE 1975
 ORIG: WILLIAM W. WELLS
 UNIT: C/EUR
 EXT: 1012

E.H. KNOCHE

E.H. Knoche

W. W. Wells
 WILLIAM W. WELLS, C/EUR
 RELEASING OFFICER

John Waller
 JOHN WALLER, SA/DDO
 AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE AND PLACE: 17 June 1975 1000 - 1100
Room 2E-45SUBJECT: Conversation by Mr. John Waller, SA/DDO with
Mr. David Aaron, member of Senator Mondale's
staff, with Regard to the Senator's Proposed
Trip to Europe

1. According to Mr. Aaron the Senator and Mr. Aaron's itinerary, while not yet fixed, will be along the following lines:

- a. 30 June - 1 July: London
- b. Monday, 7 June: Vienna, for one day
- c. Paris and Bonn. Although the order has not yet been determined, the Bonn stop would be two days and the Paris stop, one day.

In the period between London and Vienna, the party intends to visit Oslo and Helsinki. The purpose of this part of the trip, however, has nothing to do with the SSC and the party does not want or need

2. Mr. Aaron agrees that in discussions with Stations, the party should not get into specific operational cases. They want to discuss "more generic" subjects: operational priorities, relations with the Embassy, problems, scope of liaison, operating conditions, etc. Their basic interests are related to "command and control". It had occurred to Aaron that Vienna would be a good example of a Station which concentrates on "East - West" operations (read third country, Sov and Sov Bloc operations). He recognized London was a liaison station. Mondale, however, was anxious to talk to Cord Meyer.

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CL BY 055636

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- 2 -

Paris, he felt, would provide some understanding of "third world" operations. Bonn, he felt, would be a good example of the inter-relationships of a CIA Station with the Military and the Foreign Service.

3. Mr. Aaron stated that he had already sought out Mr. Simon of the British Embassy, requesting that contacts be arranged in London with the appropriate Foreign Office or Intelligence Offices in order to discuss the British experiences in "command and control". Aaron is also interested in how the British Official Secrets Act works. He had heard that it was proving inadequate. Mr. Aaron stated that Simon had not been enthusiastic about the idea but promised to look into it. Aaron felt that it had been better to work directly with Simon, whom he claimed to know, than to involve the Agency's go-between.

4. Mr. Aaron intended to make a similar approach to the German Embassy.

5. Mr. Waller commented that such approaches to foreign governments would make our liaison services uneasy and could adversely affect their willingness to cooperate. To this reason, we did not favor involving foreign governments -- at whatever level or wherever in the bureaucracy. Moreover, contacts with foreign governments increased the likelihood that the true purpose of the Senator's trip could leak to the press. Mr. Waller mentioned that he would want to bring this to the attention of others.

6. Mr. Aaron agreed that the Senator, through press conferences or otherwise, would not make public the fact that his trip was connected with Select Committee investigations.

7. Mr. Aaron said that he and the Senator were in touch with Mr. Hyland of the State Department with regard to this trip. He also suggested that they might get in touch with military intelligence services in Washington and in the field. He made specific reference to "Naval Intelligence".

8. Mr. Aaron stressed the fact that the itinerary was still tentative and subject to change.

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9. At one point, Mr. Aaron asked if CIA had any aircraft in Europe which could be put at Senator Mondale's disposal. Mr. Waller replied negatively.

10. Mr. Aaron felt that it was unlikely that Mr. Bader would be a member of the Senator's party.

Distribution:

1 - Mr. Knoche
1 - Mr. Wells
1 - Miss Page
1 - Mr. Leader

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S E C R E T 166853Z JUN 75 STAFF

CITE VIENNA 26077

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

REF: DIRECTOR 707518

D

OMB

JW

1. ALTHOUGH WE WOULD GENERALLY PLAN BRIEF SENATOR MONDALE ON STATION'S POSITION PRIMARY TARGETS, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND DEPLOYMENT FOR OPERATIONS, CAN OF COURSE ADJUST TO SUIT HIS REQUIREMENTS, WHICH HOPEFULLY WILL COME INTO CLEARER FOCUS AFTER HQS BRIEFING MENTIONED PARA 0 REF.

2. IF POSSIBLE, WOULD APPRECIATE CONFIRMATION THAT STAFF AIDE, MR. WILLIAM BADER (PARA 2 REF) IS IDENTICAL WITH PERSON OF SAEM NAME WHO WAS FORD FOUNDATION REPRESENTATIVE IN PARIS LATE SIXTIES AND AT THAT TIME WAS NAVAL RESERVE LIEUTENANT COMMANDER.

3. NO FILE, E2 IMPDET.

ROUTING MESSAGE

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TO: PRIORITY LONDON, VIENNA, BONN, PARIS. 4

RYBAT 4

MMS

SUBJECT: THE VISIT OF SENATOR MONDALE OF MINNESOTA TO EUROPE
AT THE END OF THE MONTH. 4

1. THE SENATORIAL PARTY WISHES TO VISIT CIA FIELD STATIONS TO EXAMINE AGENCY COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE FIELD. SENATOR MONDALE WILL WISH TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT HOW STATIONS OPERATE AND THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATION AND THE EMBASSY. PRESUMABLY THE SENATOR WILL ALSO WISH TO EXAMINE OUR ■■ COUNTRY TEAM RELATIONS. 4

2. SENATOR MONDALE WILL BE TRAVELING WITH HIS PERSONAL AIDE, MR. DAVID AARON, WHO IS THE DIRECTOR OF THE TASK FORCE ON COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING CIA ACTIVITIES. MR. WILLIAM BADER, A SECOND STAFF MEMBER, MAY ALSO ACCOMPANY THE SENATOR. 4

3. HEADQUARTERS WILL ~~SUGGEST~~ ^{REQUEST OF} SENATOR MONDALE THAT HE USE OTHER REASONS THAN THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION FOR HIS TRAVEL IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESS. WE DO NOT KNOW, HOWEVER, IF HE WILL AGREE. 4

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STAFF

CONF: INFO: FILE

DIRECTOR

707518

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4. YOU SHOULD ADVISE THE AMBASSADOR OF THE SENATOR'S INTENTIONS TO VISIT HIS MISSION AND THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT. PLEASE ASK THE AMBASSADOR TO RESTRICT HIS CORRESPONDENCE TO WASHINGTON ABOUT THIS TRIP TO EITHER [REDACTED] LATER RESTRICTIONS MAY BE FORTHCOMING, DEPENDING ON HOW SENATOR MONDALE DECIDES TO HANDLE HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS. 4

5. THE CODEL'S TENTATIVE ITINERARY IS AS FOLLOWS: DEPART 30 JUNE VIA COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT, ARRIVING LONDON 1 JULY; 2 JULY - VIENNA; 3-4 JULY - BONN; 5-6 JULY - PARIS; 7-8 JULY - LONDON; 9 JULY - RETURN TO THE U.S. 4

6. REQUEST EACH COS ADVISE HEADQUARTERS OF HIS PLANS FOR BRIEFING THE SENATOR. 4

7. FOR BONN. SUGGEST YOU CONSIDER A VISIT [REDACTED]

8. HEADQUARTERS WILL OFFER A BRIEFING TO SENATOR MONDALE AND HIS PARTY AT HEADQUARTERS PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE. E2, IMPDET

9. MORE specific guidance on operational discussions to follow.

E.H. KNOCHE E.H. Knoche

LC Rob Chen

SA/DDO John J. Walker

DATE: 13 JUNE 1975
 ORIG: WILLIAM W. WELLS
 UNIT: C/EUR
 EXT: 1012

William E. Wells
 DCI
 RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

William E. Wells
 DDO
 AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
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SECRET

SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select
Committee and Their Staffs While
Traveling Abroad

There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious security problems from arising. The following specific guidelines are considered important:

- Members of the SSC and members of its staff should not publicly appear to be abroad for purposes of investigating CIA installations. CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under some form of cover, have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are Stations behind the iron curtain or in other particularly sensitive areas which need maximum protection. At the other extreme are Stations which enjoy close liaison with the host government and are thus less sensitive. In the first case, Stations existing under strict cover conditions in sensitive environments, the very presence of SSC members could be highly provocative by flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But even in countries in which we enjoy a good liaison with the host country's security service, there remains a need to be discreet. Many countries whose services want to be cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or parliamentary exposure of the relationship. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to a host government.

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In sum, except in the case of very sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and with senior officers within the covering Embassy provided the SSC member does not publicly declare himself to be on SSC business and maintains his Station contacts on a discreet basis.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should not question Station personnel on specific operational detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guidelines are best understood, where the most complete and authentic records are kept (many Stations finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations, have periodically destroyed their files). There is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should not discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy, the service attaches, etc.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should not interview agent personnel. Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage could be done to agent morale and motivation if they were to think their role had been revealed to members of Congress.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should not in most cases be in contact with members of host country's intelligence or security services. Many services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with CIA, the information they pass us and the sort of cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.

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No matter what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with the SSC or its staff, and the very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause them to reassess the desirability of a relationship with CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. Exceptions can perhaps be made in special cases.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should not visit foreign technical intelligence installations. Again there may be exceptions to this which can be arranged, but in most countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host service would be opposed to access by Congressional representatives.

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In sum, except in the case of very sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and with senior officers within the covering Embassy provided the SSC member does not publicly declare himself to be on SSC business and maintains his Station contacts on a discreet basis.

- Members of the SSC and their staff should not question Station personnel on specific operational detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guidelines are best understood, where the most complete and authentic records are kept (many Stations finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations, have periodically destroyed their files). There is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should not discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy, the service attaches, etc.

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6/18/75

SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and
Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad

There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and talk to U.S. embassy and intelligence personnel. It is essential that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security problems. The following specific guidelines are applicable.

I. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD PUBLICLY APPEAR TO BE ABROAD FOR SOME PURPOSE OTHER THAN THE INVESTIGATION OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.

Most of these installations, including all CIA stations abroad, for example, are under some form of cover, or are maintaining a low profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities behind the iron curtain. These clearly need maximum protection. The mere visit of SSC representatives could be noted as evidence of U.S. intelligence presence within the country. Even in those countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government, care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions

that could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposure of such liaison. Many countries that wish to cooperate with the United States in intelligence endeavors simply cannot afford public exposure of such relationships. Some reason other than SSC business should be given to explain any visits by SSC members and staff to help maintain the discreet nature of the visit. No deliberate contact should be made with the local press, nor should comments on SSC matters be supplied if investigating officers are contacted by the press. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to the host government.

In sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S. intelligence activities overseas on a case by case basis, and with senior officers within the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon the SSC member not publicly declaring himself to be on SSC business at the time of the visit or upon his return, and his proceeding on a basis satisfactory to the Ambassador.

II. THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE VISIT.

All arrangements and contacts will be made by him, and because of his knowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding.

III. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U. S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS.

It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements will only discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, etc. In all cases, such discussions will only be conducted in physical surroundings which meet appropriate security standards.

Members and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to see texts of, or general notes on intelligence agreements between the U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and operationally, and cannot be divulged without the consent of the host government.

IV. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT PERSONNEL.

Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be

to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage would be done to agent morale and motivation if their identity were to be revealed to Members or staff of the SSC.

V. MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES WILL BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES.

Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with U.S. intelligence activities, the information they pass, and the cooperation extended are all most sensitive matters. Regardless what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with members or staff of the SSC. The very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause the host service to reassess the desirability of a relationship with U.S. intelligence activities.

VI. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.

In those countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S. Congressional representatives, especially where there is public knowledge of the Congressional investigating interests. If such a visit is considered

essential, a special request must be negotiated with the host country in advance.

VII. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS AND STAFF, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.

This briefing will be conducted by the DCI and other representatives of the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.), as appropriate. The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the visitor with the types of activities conducted at each location, the restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case and the considerations which preclude the discussion of operational details, names and terms in an overseas environment.

Members and staff of the SSC should bear in mind at all times that they and their activities are matters of great interest to opposition intelligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly travel inconspicuously and will be easily recognized.

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