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(5) What reporting was there from the field in response to Headquarters' requirements?

SECTION I

Responses to the cables listed under Question (1) above are given below under each cable.

DIR 84608, 22 November 1963

Response: On 23 November the London Station stated that Headquarters' alert had been passed to the British (services<sup>24</sup> - MI-5 and MI-6). The (latter service<sup>24</sup>) told our London Station it was alerting its field stations. [LOND-6038 (IN 67061)]

Comment: This response was the only one which specifically made reference to DIR 84608; however, the latter cable undoubtedly sparked Headquarters components, Headquarters personnel on TDY abroad, and field units to react immediately. Examples are to be found in a separate section to this question.

DIR 84886, 23 November 1963

Response: Mexico City Station sent three cables on 23 November containing the texts of seven telephone calls believed to be relative to OSWALD. (Later it was determined that two of the telephone calls believed to have been made by OSWALD had been made by some other unidentified person.) [MEXI-7023 (IN 67108), MEXI-7025 (IN 67188), and MEXI 7033 (IN 67232).]

DIR 84914, 23 November 1963

Response: The three cables cited above may be considered as a response to this cable.

DIR 84920, 24 November 1963  
live

Response: The only source of information on the reasons for OSWALD's trip to Mexico City was Silvia DURAN, a Mexican employee of the Cuban Consulate, who was detained on 23 November and questioned by Mexican authorities from 23 to 25 November. Mexico City Station had already alerted Headquarters to DURAN's arrest and had forwarded information in several cables, particularly MEXI-7046

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on 24 November 1963. Mexico City responded to DIR 84920 with MEXI-7054 on 24 November 1963. This cable contained additions or amendments to MEXI-7046. (In addition to information obtained from Silvia DURAN contained in her file, see also the review of selected items in the Lee Harvey OSWALD file regarding allegations of the CASTRO Cuban involvement in the John F. Kennedy assassination, dated 23 May 1975.)

DIR 84926, 25 November 1963

Response: Mexico City Station cabled all Station held information regarding Silvia DURAN in MEXI-7065.

DIR 84938, 25 November 1963

DIR 85133, 26 November 1963

a. On 27 November, <sup>14-1</sup>(Helsinki) reported on OSWALD's presence in Helsinki from 10 to 15 October 1959. <sup>19-1</sup>[(HELS)-2299 (IN 68739)]

b. On 27 November, Rome reported on Station traces: <sup>24</sup>(liaison) traces were to follow. [ROME-1233 (IN 68802)]

16  
- 15 -

- c. On 27 November, Ottawa reported no traces in Station or <sup>24</sup>(liaison) files. [OTTA 1275 (IN 69005)]
- d. On 27 November, <sup>14-6</sup>(Copenhagen) forwarded a negative report, <sup>19-6</sup>[(COPE) 3469 (IN 69011)]
- e. On 27 November, London Station reported that the "Traffic Index" showed that OSWALD had arrived in Southampton on 9 October 1959; he left the following day by air for Helsinki. [LOND 6097 (IN 69100)]
- f. On 27 November, Ottawa Station sent a second cable containing information on the initial reaction of the Cuban Ambassador CRUZ and his staff to the report of the assassination. After further information was received (by the Cubans) that OSWALD had connections with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, there was some apprehension concerning possible United States reaction. [OTTA 1277 (IN 69233)]
- g. On 27 November, <sup>14-4</sup>(Oslo) Station cabled a response that there were no traces on OSWALD in Station or <sup>24</sup>(liaison) files. <sup>19-4</sup>[(OSLO) 4490 (IN 69290)]
- h. On 28 November, the Madrid Station replied that there was no information in Station or <sup>24</sup>(liaison) files. (MADR 9789 (IN 69328))
- i. On 29 November, the Brussels Station stated there were no traces on OSWALD. [BRUS 8739 (IN 69852)]
- j. On 29 November, the Rome Station reported no <sup>24</sup>(liaison) traces on OSWALD. (ROME 1258 (IN 70111))
- k. On 5 December, the Paris Station reported that Station and <sup>24</sup>(liaison) traces were negative. [PARI 1770 (IN 74234)]
- l. On 10 December, the Paris Station reported that the French press was giving sensational coverage to the possibility that the assassination was "a many-angled plot". [PARI 1853 (IN 77148)]

DIR 85817, 29 November 1963

DIR 85973, 29 November 1963

9/12/63

- 17 -

DIR 86077, 2 December 1963

a. On 4 December, the Bonn Base forwarded information regarding Marina OSWALD's entry into Germany at Helmstedt on 3 June 1962. She left Germany the same day at Bentheim. Marina OSWALD was traveling on a West German visa no. 694/62, issued by the West German Embassy in Moscow. [BONN-5579 (IN 73338)] (Copies of the documents referring to Marina OSWALD were forwarded to Headquarters as an attachment to EGNT-1400, 9 December 1963.

b. On 6 December, the Munich Base cabled a negative reply. [MUNI-8316 (IN 75065)]

c. On 4 December, The Hague Station cabled information that M(arina) OSWALD entered the Netherlands on 3 June 1962 at the Oldenzal border point. [HAGU-5110 (IN 73378)]

d. On 9 December, the Stuttgart Base replied that the Base had no confirmatory information relating to OSWALD's travel. [STUT-5545 (IN 76758)]

## SECTION II

In addition to specific action taken by the Agency as given above, Headquarters components, Headquarters personnel on TDY, and field units reacted as shown below:

a. On 22 November, Mexico City Station directed Headquarters' attention to previous traffic relating to Lee Harvey OSWALD and asked for a photograph of OSWALD in order to compare it with available photographs in the Station which might be of the assassin. The Station indicated that it was forwarding as soon as possible copies of a photograph of the only visitor to the Soviet Embassy on 28 [sic - 1] October who could [might] be identical with OSWALD. [MEXI-7014 (IN 66781)]

A subsequent cable sent the same day from Mexico City indicated that the Station had photographs of the same unidentified American (referred to in the above cable) who is possibly OSWALD entering the Cuban Embassy on 15 October. [MEXI-7019 (IN 66846)]

b. On 22 November, the Agency's Station in Miami reported

that OSWALD of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee had participated in a debate in August 1963 on the New Orleans radio station, WDSU.

OSWALD was a former Marine who had gone to Moscow in 1959 where he renounced his American citizenship. [WAVE-8049 (IN 66782)]

c. On 23 November, the Chief, SR/CI forwarded a memorandum to the Assistant Deputy Director, Plans, in which the latter's attention was drawn to the fact that OSWALD had been in contact on 28 September 1963 with Soviet Consul Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV. According to current information available to SR/CI, KOSTIKOV was a known KGB officer and considered to be a member of the KGB's Thirteenth Department/ of the First Chief Directorate. According to the FBI liaison officer, the FBI had reason to believe that OSWALD's visit was to get Soviet support for a United States passport or visa matter. Chief, SR/CI closed by saying that he had reported OSWALD's connections with a known member of the Thirteenth Department to the FBI liaison officer at 1030 hours on 23 November 1963.

[Memorandum for ADDP, 23 November 1963 (file no. SX-25550)]

d. On 23 November, the Mexico City Station forwarded to Headquarters the names of three persons who had flown from Mexico to the United States, during the first twelve days of November, who might have been identical with Lee Harvey OSWALD. [MEXI-7020 (IN 66891)]

e. On 24 November, the Mexico City Station reported to Headquarters that the United States Consulate in Nuevo Laredo had information that OSWALD had entered Mexico at Nuevo Laredo on 26 September traveling on Mexican Tourist Card no. 24085 and had left Mexico by auto [sic] on 3 October 1963 at Nuevo Laredo. [MEXI-7040 (IN 67261)]

f. On 24 November, the Chief, SR/CI, forwarded a memorandum to the Assistant Deputy Director, Plans, in which he quoted a cable sent by Chief, SR Division, who was, at that time, in Frankfurt. The latter asked the question if OSWALD was not unwittingly or wittingly a part of a plot to murder the President in Dallas as an attempt to exacerbate further sectional strife and render the United States Government less capable of dealing with Soviet initiatives

over the next year. The Chief of SR continued by suggesting that if AELADLE's (Anatoliy Mikhaylovich GOLITSYN) views on (Harold) WILSON and the information noted in paragraph 1c below have any substance (and they cannot be ignored), this suggests that we can expect major Soviet pressures over the next several months, for which the Soviets have made careful, long-range preparations.

Paragraph 1a:

"Within minutes of the first news, Moscow radio statements as heard in London attributed the assassination to 'right-wing elements'. Only as the true identity of the believed assassin became known did Moscow begin to complain that United States reactionaries were using OSWALD as a pawn."

Paragraph 1b:

"Should not the assignment of 13th Department officers to the KGB Residency in the United Nations in New York be considered in a new light?"

Paragraph 1c:

"I discovered from <sup>06, 29</sup> [Arthur MARTIN (MI-5)] during our long and exceptionally valuable discussions, that one of Harold WILSON's principal scientific advisers is Captain Ian MAXWELL, who has a long Soviet intelligence background. This may shed new light on AELADLE's report, i.e., that Harold WILSON may be a Soviet agent."

Chief, SR/CI, pointed out that the SR Chief's comments come without benefit of traces passed earlier to the ADDP showing that OSWALD had contact with a 13th Department representative in Mexico City. Chief, SR/CI, ended by indicating that another recently arrived cable suggests that OSWALD's business with the Soviet Consul was connected with his own visa to the USSR and Cuba and may, therefore, have been . . . innocent. [Memorandum for ADDP, 24 November 1963 (file no. SX-25598)]

g. On 24 November, the Agency's Station in Miami reported information received from the local FBI representative. The latter

had received a request from his Headquarters to ascertain the veracity, including sources, of a statement made by DRE leader, Jose LLANUSA Gobel, to the effect that Fidel CASTRO had threatened lives of United States leaders in the event of United States aggression against Cuba. LLANUSA attributed the above threats to Fidel CASTRO who made these remarks during a reception in early September 1963 at the Brazilian Embassy in Havana. [WAVE-8133 (IN 67394)]

h. On 25 November 1963, the Mexico City Station also called Headquarters' attention to an AP story datelined Havana, 7 September 1963. At a reception held at the Brazilian Embassy, CASTRO is quoted as haveing said: "We are prepared to fight them and answer in kind. United States leaders shouldthink [sic - consider ?] that if they are aiding terrorist plans to eleminate the Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe." [MEXI-7055 (IN 67620)]