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Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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CASTRO  
OPERATION MONGOOSE

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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AS SANITIZED 8-2-98 *ew*  
(1)(A) 23-2-98 KP

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
Helms, Richard Leyland Bus Co.	1962	Castro ✓ Mongoose

OCCURRENCE: Helms testified that the aim of the Cuban operations was "to get rid of Castro or the Castro regime in Cuba; lets put it that way, and no limitations were placed on the means. In fact, I never recall having been told by anybody do not do this, do not do that, do not do the other thing." (26) (The above statements refer to Mongoose.) Helms testified that "the pressure was very intense and I remember vividly it was very intense." The pressure led to several "very nutty schemes." (26) Helms testified the pressure built up to the Bay of Pigs and then lay dormant for awhile and intensified again toward the end of 1961 and 1962. The Cuban Missile Crisis itself was the period of greatest intensity. Afterwards interest tapered off, although Helms recalled efforts in 1963 involving "economic warfare" such as turning off oil deliveries and stopping bus deliveries including an attempt to stop the sale **by the Leyland Bus Company in Spain** of buses to Cuba.

<u>SOURCE:</u> (27) Helms 6/13/75	<u>STAFF:</u> Rhea
<u>FILE:</u>	<u>DATE:</u> 6/28/75

TOP SECRET

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
(continuation)		Card 3 of 4

OCCURRENCE: CARD 3

"CIA has initiated action to contaminate POL supplies for Cuba, although visible results (stopage of some Cuban transports) is not expected until mid-1962. CIA is introducing "lubzol," a corrosive additive to Cuban locomotive diesel fuel oil [redacted]. A similar project was noted for jet fuel storage tanks in Cuba. Lansdale noted that the CIA had concluded that its realistic role should be to at least create the illusion of a popular movement, to win external support for it, to improve CIA operational capability, and to help create a climate which will permit provocative actions in support of a shift to overaction. Lansdale wanted them to reevaluate to see whether or not they could make a greater effort. An outline of what the 33 tasks are for each of the entities involved then follows in Lansdale's memo. The memorandum notes that the President directed that the Chief of Operations conduct the project through the appropriate organizations and departments of the government. In this regard the memo notes "Also, CIA apparently believes that its role should be to create and expand a popular

SOURCE:

STAFF:

FILE:

DATE:

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8-2-94 *lee*  
~~22-7-94~~ *hp* (2 cards)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

LANSDALE,

DATES:

1  
Mar 13, 1962

CATEGORIES:

Special Group Augmented  
MONGOOSE  
CUBA ✓

*Card 192*

OCCURRENCE:

The planning for Operation MONGOOSE was prepared on a format of separate planning for each department and agency involved. Revised planning along that line was submitted with this memorandum. Activities already approved were marked with an asterisk. Approved were dispatching one intelligence agent operation to a key area selected by the CIA, ("Many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba will be trained for paramilitary skills as well as intelligence collection,...However, CIA has noted that, once the agents are inside Cuba, they cannot be controlled effectively from outside Cuba, although every effort will be made to attempt such control.") (00207), Caribbean Admissions Center Cpa-Locka, Florida. Periodic intelligence estimates, continued **negotiating for British** help in contaminating locomotive lubricants, two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba approved for March 16-31, 1962, develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U.S., develop additional interrogation centers in other areas by 31 March 1962 in South America and

SOURCE:

Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented  
from Lansdale re: Institutional Planning, Operation MONGOOSE, di Genova  
13 March 1962 (00206-00213)  
FILE:

TOP SECRET  
STAFF  
DATE July 1, 1975

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 AS SANITIZED 8-2-94  
 10-23-76 *aw*

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
<del>WAINWRIGHT, William</del> LASH, A. M. <del>TERPEDINO, Carlos</del> McCONE	McNAMARA SPECIAL GRP. (AUGMENTED) August 10-11 1962	CASTRO ✓

OCCURRENCE:

CIA officer ~~WAINWRIGHT~~ and A.M. LASH-1 meet, along with ~~CARLOS TERPEDINO~~ (a Cuban exile jeweler in New York City), in Copenhagen (85). ~~WAINWRIGHT~~ reported that the term "assassinate" was used in the discussion of A.M. LASH's future role in Cuba and it visibly upset A.M. LASH, who preferred the term "eliminate." (85).

DISCOVERY LEADS: Note: This discussion of assassination is taking place at the same time that DCI McCONE lodges his objection, after the SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) meeting, to McNAMARA's information that the technique of assassination could be used against CASTRO.

**TOP SECRET**

<u>SOURCE:</u> IG REPORT, 1967	<u>STAFF:</u> Baron
<u>FILE:</u>	<u>DATE:</u> 7/2/75

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PERSONS/ENTITIES:

WAINWRIGHT, William  
WELLSAMSON, Earl  
LASH, A. M.

DATES:

August 14-23  
1962

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO ✓

OCCURRENCE:

WAINWRIGHT and EARL WELLSAMSON, a Spanish speaking case officer from Madrid give A.M. LASH-1-S/W training and supplies.

On August 17, 1962 WELLSAMSON cables CIA headquarters that "have no intention give /A.M. LASH/ physical elimination mission as requirement but recognized this something he could or might try to carry out on his own initiative." (85).

CIA headquarters replied to WELLSAMSON by cable on 18 August: "Strongly concur that no physical elimination missions be given /A.M. LASH/." (85).

(emphasis added)

SOURCE: IG REPORT, 1967

FILE:

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 7/2/75

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Kp. 23/2/98

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
<p><u>KIRKPATRICK</u> William Harvey DDP Gen. Lansdale Mr. Halpern Walter Elder <u>CHEEVER</u> DCI</p>	<p>11/14/62 Nov. 21, 1962 <u>10/30/65</u></p>	<p>Special Group Augmented Operation Mongoose Cuba</p>
<p><u>OCCURRENCE:</u> With regard to paragraph 2 of Lansdale's memorandum to SGA dated 14 Nov. 1962 Harvey states: "The statement that Operation Mongoose had had no information on this operation since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the pen ultimate paragraph and Lansdale's memorandum concerning a report for the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephonic conversation on the evening of 30 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and Cheever which is referred specifically in paragraph 2 on pages 7 and 8 of my reference memorandum. I have discussed this matter in detail with Cheever and clearly recollects that his conversation with Lansdale on that date took place as reflected in my reference memorandum. During this conversation there was no discussion of previous operations except a brief discussion of the COBRA and <u>AMORID</u> teams and Lansdale did not ask, according to Cheever's recollection, any specific questions concerning assets inside or prior operations which</p> <p><u>SOURCE:</u> would logically have led to the discussions at the time <u>STAFF:</u> Paul Wallach</p> <p>Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (01151) <u>FILE:</u> DATE: July 1, 1975</p>		

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*K. J. [unclear]*

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
Gen Lansdale Gilpatrick Don Wilson <i>Chesler</i>	Oct 31, 1961	MONGOOSE SGA CUBA ✓

OCCURRENCE:

**(Kleves)** As for psychological operations, all CIA assets **(including Lawrence)** had been turned over to USIA for operational use.

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE: Oct 31, 1962 memo for the record by Gen Lansdale  
(00744)

STAFF: Wallach

DATE: July 3, 1975

FILE:



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Kp 23/2/98

07/30/75

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
Edwards King Bannerman  Gomez Holcomb O'Connell	11/62	Castro ✓

OCCURRENCE:  
O'Connell testified that when EDWARDS was on leave, once, KING spoke to Robert BANNERMAN (Who was not witting of Castro project) and O'Connell had to tell BANNERMAN that B. was not "privy" to project. O'Connell was embarassed. (Tr. 36, 99-100). No one but KING, not Gomez or Holcombe, knew (100).

<u>SOURCE:</u> Testimony of James P. O'Connell, 5/30/75	<u>STAFF:</u> John Bayly
<u>FILE:</u>	<u>DATE:</u> 6/30/75

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Kp 23/2/98

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
William Harvey Gen. Lansdale Walter Elder DCI DDP Mr. Halpern CHEEVER	11/14/62 Nov. 21, 1962 10/30/68	Special Group Augmented Operation Mongoose Cuba ✓
<p><u>OCCURRENCE:</u> With regard to paragraph 2 of Lansdale's memorandum to SGA dated 14 Nov. 1962 Harvey states: "The statement that Operation Mongoose had had no information on this operation since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the pen ultimate paragraph and Lansdale's memorandum concerning a report for the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephonic conversation on the evening of 30 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and Cheever which is referred specifically in paragraph 2 on pages 7 and 8 of my reference memorandum. I have discussed this matter in detail with Cheever and clearly recalls that his conversation with Lansdale on that date took place as reflected in my reference memorandum. During this conversation there was no discussion of previous operations except a brief discussion of the COBRA and <del>ANTORIO</del> teams and Lansdale did not ask, according to Cheever's recollection, any specific questions concerning assets inside or prior operations which</p> <p><u>SOURCE:</u> would logically have led to the discussions at the time <u>STAFF:</u></p>		

Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (01151)  
 FILE:  
 Paul Wallach  
 DATE: July 1, 1975

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<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
William Harvey Gen. Lansdale Walter Elder DCI	KIRKPATRICK DDP Mr. Halpern CHEEVER Nov. 21, 1962 10/30/62	Special Group Augmented Operation Mongoose Cuba

OCCURRENCE:

With regard to paragraph 2 of Lansdale's memorandum to SGA dated 14 Nov. 1962 Harvey states: "The statement that Operation Mongoose had had no information on this operation since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the pen ultimate paragraph and Lansdale's memorandum concerning a report for the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephonic conversation on the evening of 30 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and Cheever which is referred specifically in paragraph 2 on pages 7 and 8 of my reference memorandum. I have discussed this matter in detail with Cheever and clearly recollects that his conversation with Lansdale on that date took place as reflected in my reference memorandum. During this conversation there was no discussion of previous operations except a brief discussion of the COBRA and ~~ANTORID~~ teams and Lansdale did not ask, according to Cheever's recollection, any specific questions concerning assets inside or prior operations which

SOURCE: would logically have led to the discussions at the time of the Matahambre operation."

STAFF:

Paul Wallach

DATE:

July 1, 1975

Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (01151)

FILE: