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CUBA

EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE AMONG OAS COUNTRIES ON COMMUNIST  
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN THE HEMISPHERE

I. Nature and Scope of the Problem

A. While there is some information available in certain countries, the illegal movement and clandestine activities of Communists in Latin America, particularly those who have been trained in Cuba, are not adequately covered by existing intelligence sources.

B. The level of competence of most Latin American intelligence services, whether military or civilian, is low. Efforts are being made by CIA, AID and the U.S. military services to improve this situation, but the progress has been slow in most cases and nonexistent in others. It has been found that the existing government in some countries, of which Guatemala is a good example, have no desire to build a competent career security service. There is apparently a fear that the existence of a competent service would interfere with future political activities of the members of the existing government in the event that they should find themselves on the outside looking in. There is no unity of viewpoint among the various existing intelligence services, and many of them have a tendency to yield to the temptation to label as "subversives" those of their own nationals resident in neighboring countries who are opposed to the present government. Nevertheless, existing services of the Latin

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American countries can produce much useful intelligence on this subject with an increased effort.

C. Intelligence available to United States agencies on this subject is generally derived either from truly covert operations or has been obtained through liaison with another intelligence or security service. In either case, this inhibits the ability of U.S. agencies to pass the information to agencies of a third country. There is, however, a substantial amount of intelligence available to U.S. agencies from either overt or nonsensitive sources which could be passed to other countries.

D. The only secure and rapid communications facilities in Latin America are those of the U.S. Government and while these are being improved, the presently authorized augmentation of facilities has not yet been completed.

E. CIA has working liaison arrangements in every country in Latin America where it has been found fruitful to establish and maintain such arrangements. U.S. military representatives have contacts with their counterparts.

F. U.S. experience in the matter of intelligence exchange in other areas has led to the conclusion that in almost all instances, bilateral arrangements are more fruitful than such multilateral arrangements as have been established within the framework of NATO, CENTO, and SEATO. Nevertheless, experience has shown that such multilateral arrangements can be useful, particularly in creating an awareness of the need for the exchange of intelligence. In the case of the OAS, active

participation by the United States in order to provide guidance would appear to be highly desirable.

## II. Recommended Courses of Action

Certain Courses of Action already recommended by this Committee and approved by higher authority in connection with the control of travel to Cuba have a direct bearing upon the matter of intelligence exchange. These include (1) the undertaking of an immediate study of the feasibility and desirability of establishing intelligence centers at Caribbean Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier; (2) an intensification of our action in making available to each country selected intelligence concerning the extent, nature and insidious implications of Cuban subversive activities, as consistent with the requirements to protect our own intelligence system; (3) the utilization of appropriate bodies of the OAS for multilateral exchange of information.

Additional Courses of Action recommended are:

A. Intensify and increase existing AID, CIA and Military programs for the training and equipping of Latin American internal security and intelligence services. Establish such assistance programs in additional countries where it is found to be desirable from our point of view and acceptable to the country concerned.

B. Increase and refine the existing flow of counter-intelligence information from CIA and other elements of American Embassies in Latin America to Caribbean Command as well as to CIA headquarters, from both of which points further appropriate

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dissemination can be made.

C. Encourage Latin American countries to engage in bilateral exchange of intelligence on Communist activities.

D. Undertake appropriate actions in the O.A.S. to bring about the creation, with U.S. participation, of a standing committee of senior representatives of intelligence and security services with a view to their establishing and guiding the activities of an appropriate mechanism for the multilateral exchange of intelligence and counterintelligence information regarding Communist subversive activities.

E. Continue and intensify current efforts to improve U.S. communications facilities throughout Latin America.

F. Increase the dissemination to Latin American governments, by all U.S. agencies concerned, of unclassified studies, reports and other information concerning Communist subversion.

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