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 CHARGE TO

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EYES ONLY

Forrestal

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Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON 570

SS

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JOINT CIA-DEFENSE-STATE MESSAGE.

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1. Deptel 534 para 9 referred only to those MAP and CAS supported airborne ranger units under Tung's command and situated in or near Saigon. Support will no longer be provided such units unless they are placed under JCS control and committed to field operations.

2. As separate matter, CAS is in process of transferring responsibility for certain of its paramilitary activities to MACV, many of which are conducted through Col. Tung. This transfer is contributory to the objectives of bringing these Ops under JCS control and reducing Col. Tung's independent power. Coordinated interagency paper which supplements Deptel 534 states as follows and should be used as guidance in implementing actions listed para 3 below:

The recommended transfer from CAS to MACV of border surveillance and mountain scout forces is desirable in its own right. Funding through FY 1964 will continue to be supplied through CAS under the

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TELETYPE TRANSMISSION

FE Roger Hilsman

DOD-Sec. McNamara (in draft)
CIA - Mr. Colby

White House - Mr. Forrestal (substance)
S/S - Mr. Rowe

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same procedures now used for CIDG forces.

Furthermore, MACV and CAS should urgently consider whether it is wise and feasible to transfer to MACV wholly or in part certain CAS activities; combat intelligence teams and operations into south Laos and North Viet-Nam.

Such recommended or possible transfers from CAS responsibility would result in the loss of some CAS liaison connections in high military circles. Hopefully, this slack could be taken up by U.S. military advisors.

3. With regard to items one through eight of ref. request, the following actions be taken: (payments to these units can be continued unless specifically noted to contrary as in G. and H. below).

A. Transfer of support to mountain scouts to MACV has been approved and should proceed.

B. Transfer of support to border surveillance personnel to MACV has been approved and should proceed.

C. Joint CAS/MACV review should be undertaken to recommend to Ambassador whether support/in-combat intel teams should be continued by CAS; transferred to MACV or otherwise disposed of.

D. CAS and MACV should jointly recommend to the Ambassador whether support Laos and NVN Ops should be transferred wholly or in part from CAS to MACV.

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E. British Malayan Team. Same as C above.

F. Transfer support of CIDG strike forces to MACV has been approved and is understood to have been completed.

G and H. Special forces high command HQS and elements of 31st and 77th Special Forces group should not repeat not be paid if they remain in vicinity of Saigon and are not under JGS control. Suggest MACV reraise its previous suggestion that Special Forces HQS be moved to Nha Trang.

4. Request CAS and MACV review question of placing NVN and Laos Ops under JGS, submitting their recommendations to Ambassador for his comments and forwarding to Washington.

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