# OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

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Remarks: Passed 50% Returned

Sandige/Classify

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

LEAP

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce
TO: CI/EXO
ROOM NO. 2039
BUILDING
REMARKS:

BARRATA:
As per our conversation.

FROM:
ROOM NO. 120420
BUILDING AOS
EXTENSION 9173

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Shepanek  
O/SA/DO/O

FROM: Mr. Rodger S. Gabrielson  
OLC/C&R

SUBJECT: Sanitization of HSCA Researcher Notes

1. (S) Attached for your review, appropriate sanitization, and classification is a copy of the notes taken by HSCA researcher Harold Leap concerning CIA personnel at Japan Station.

2. (U) Please use black grease pencil to excise and directly above the excised information please write in a sanitized description of the information excised, for example: employee, asset, etc.

3. (U) Please send us a copy of the notes after your sanitization and we will forward to the Committee. All original notes will be kept in this office under the name of the particular researcher involved.

Rodger S. Gabrielson

Attachment
interview

Name: William Crawford

D.O.B: 19 Sept 24

SSN: 429-26-4954

Address: 4944 Pers St, Apt 806;
San Diego, Ca 92109

Telephone: 714-272-2770

at 9:30 A.M. on 5-14-78 Staff

investigator Harris has interviewed
William Crawford, former executive officer
of the CIA station at Atsugi, Japan
concerning his knowledge of UNO and
the military intelligence that UNO may
have possessed from his military assignment
as Radio-radar operator at the Atsugi
Naval Airbase.

Crawford advised that he did not
know UNO and never heard the name
until after the assassination of F.D.R.
The U-2 program administered by
the CIA at Atsugi did not have
their own radio-radar facilities, the
U-2 planes utilized the naval base
communications for only for take-off
and landing clearance.

The CIA employees at Atsugi
had no clandestine activity other than
the U-2 program. All human
intelligence were handled by case officers stationed elsewhere in Japan.

The cover story for the U-2 plane at Abuyjí was that it was used to monitor radio activity in the atmosphere. In fact, the plane actually housed equipment installed to measure radio activity. To facilitate this cover story, it should be noted that Oswald would have seen the U-2 take-off and land at the base, however, he would have no other information. Radar operators would not be able to trace the U-2 over flights. The plane would take off in the opposite direction. The U-2 would fly to a staging area (Cuba, Labrador) before going into the flight plan for its over flight. However, the Russians were aware of the over flights from the beginning of the program 1955.

The Russians didn't have the ability to shoot the U-2 down at the altitude of the U-2 flight. CIA recruited personnel for the program from the military reserves. The pilots would resign from their respective service units with the understanding that at the completion...
of the program they would go back without losing service time and at a rank comparable to their contemporaries. All program employees were paid by CIA. General maintenance on the U-2 was provided at Chengi; however, major overhaul was made only in U.S.

Although the program was directed and administered by the CIA, the commander of the Chengi program was Col. Marion "Sheb" Mixon from the Air Force.

The program was terminated in 1960.
Herald:

Can you add the following statement:

Crawford said that had not been associated with the station, he, as an officer, would’ve known about it.

Furthermore, he would not have

because of his experience.
Contact Report

Request to Carla, applicant, and specific information from CIT employee James McCall that HCO was a CIA agent, shall investigate Harold H. Kip's involvement in the following cases:

1. Robert C. McCall, DOB 4/02/15, SSR 2/8/1909, 6600 Melwood Rd., Bethesda, Maryland, telephone no. 239-6368. Position with CIA, was deputy chief of station, Tokyo, Japan, June 59. Interviewed at CIA Office, 9/13/78, Subject is retired.

2. Lee Kinshan, DOB 2/23/53, SSR 1/23/1971, 1815 Atlee Ave., N.W., Wash., D.C., telephone no. 236-5263. Position with CIA for the period February 60 to August 61 was chief of Counter Intelligence, ER Branch, Tokyo, Japan. Interviewed at CIA Office, 4/10/78. Subject is retired.

3. Nelle Diane Mason, DOB 1/24/53, SSR 4/10/1978. Subject presently employed at Civil Service and has.crime. Interviewed at the CIA in 1963 at Tokyo, Japan, was intelligence assistant for the SE Section. Interviewed at CIA Office on 4/27/78

4. Frederick C. Randall, DOB 2/18/1954, SSR 2/8/1908, presently employed at Civil Service and has crime. Interviewed at the CIA in 1962 at Tokyo, Japan, was chief of intelligence at the Tokyo, Japan. Interviewed at CIA Office.


9. George A. Field, DOB 29 May 21, SSN 275-12-4777, address 21 Bay Tree, North Myrtle Beach, South Carolina 29582, telephone # 903-249-3193. Presently retired. Field was Chief of the Soviet Branch at the Tokyo Station from June 1960 to June 1965. Interviewed 4-29-78.

10. Jerome Fox, DOB 9 Oct 21, SSN 102-22-9186, address 3663 NW 21st St., Miami, Fla. Telephone 305-634-2997. Former CIA intelligence analyst at Tokyo Station from Jul 1959 to Dec 62, worked in program involving military intelligence, interviewed 5-1-78.


CIA employees

The above individuals were selected for interview because of the position they held at the time with the CIA at the Tokyo station during the time frame of 1959 to 1964.

Jenkins Wilson testified in a closed hearing before the SCA that

in a CIA case officer that was stationed at Tokyo, Japan, told him that LHO was a CIA agent and was also mentioned in notes contained in John's cryptograph. The verification took place in the Tokyo station shortly after the word of the JFK assassination was received on 23 Nov 63. Wilson stated that he could not recall the name of the case officer or the cryptographer. Wilson also advised that considerable conversation took place among CIA employees concerning the Oswald-CIA agent issue.

The basic questions asked of the CIA employees selected were as follows:

(a) Have you ever seen written documents which indicated that LHO was a CIA agent or source of information?
(b) Did you ever become advised orally that LHO was a CIA agent?
(c) Have you ever heard conversation or heard in conversation that LHO was a CIA agent or intelligence source for any government agency?
(d) Were you in a position to know if LHO was recruited as a CIA agent during his tour of duty with the military in Japan?
Subject Jerome E. Fox was identified as one person who Wilson could remember having had conversation with concerning the speculation that LHO was an agent for the CIA. The conversation supposedly took place in Japan after the information that LHO was the assassin of JFK. Fox advised investigator that he was in the U.S. at the time of assassination on 23 November 63. Fox's CIA personnel reflect that he was transferred from the Tokyo station to the U.S. in 1962.

Subjects 2, 7, 9, 11 all thought they would have known if LHO had been recruited as a CIA agent while he was in Japan. All the subjects worked within the SR Branch of the Tokyo station, and theoretically would have handled or had knowledge of the recruitment. All thought if Oswald had been recruited with out their knowledge it would have been a rare exception to the working policy and guidelines of the station.