

Agency Information

AGENCY : ARMY
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10006-10010
RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : CUBA - EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE AMONG OAS COUNTRIES

DATE : 00/00/0000
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :
KRULAK COMMITTEE
CUBAN SUBVERSION
INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE
OAS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 11/28/1997

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Califano Papers; Box 3, Folder 10. Paper of unknown origin on the possibility of sharing intelligence among OAS members to combat Cuban subversion.

JFK Review
Department of the Army EO 13526
 Declassify Exclude Exempt
Authority _____
 Refer To _____
Review Date 8/12/2015 By [Signature]

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION
TO DECLASSIFICATION

MAR 2016

DATE: _____

SECRET

FIRST WORKING DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENT

CUBA

EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE AMONG OAS COUNTRIES

Nature and Scope

General:

Exchange of intelligence among OAS countries on Communist subversive activities.

As has been repeatedly demonstrated throughout the contents of the related reports a most basic and fundamental requirement is that for relevant and high quality intelligence. This requirement is as true for the US itself as it is for each of the other American countries, and the problem becomes increasingly complex as the requirement for cooperation and coordination among two or more states arises. Few things in political and diplomatic life are more difficult than the problem of combining the assets of all participating nations in a unified effective pattern.

The very title of this section demonstrates the anomalous nature of the problem by suggesting that the OAS countries should exchange secrets. From a strict view of this it could follow that exchanged secrets are no longer secrets; and that since national secrets in most cases must remain secret the best thing to do with this proposal is to avoid or blunt it. This would be an extremely dangerous and regressive course.

SECRET

SECRET

The fact is that the great portion of gross intelligence is simply information of one kind or another which has been collected, collated, verified, analyzed, etc. Only a small portion is secret intelligence which has been acquired through clandestine means. All would agree that secret intelligence may be impossible to share, and similarly all would agree that the sharing of useful and organized information is highly desirable -- especially when the subject can be refined as it is here to cover communist subversive activities in the hemisphere.

Although the culture and political identity of most of the countries of the Americas is built upon centuries of national existence the Western Hemisphere is only a geographical unity. As a political fact it is made up of many completely separate and parochial states. Therefore, as a first step much can be done to publish, transmit, communicate, and circulate information of value on a common basis. Initially by means of bilateral activities between the US and other states; and wherever possible in a similar direct manner between other pairs of states. Then as progress is made this process will be enlarged on a regional basis, on an OAS basis, and hopefully on an hemispheric basis. The intial success of the SCCS serves as an example of the projects which lie before us.

SECRET

SECRET

II. The Current Situation:

At the present time, there are a number of resources available to the US in furthering this effort.

a. Diplomatic channels are available to and within each of the American nations. These provide a number of information channels on their own merit.

b. USIA exists to further this endeavor.

c. Military attaches, missions, and assistance programs of long standing provide abundant means to increase the scope and volume of information and intelligence exchange.

d. CIA has working liaison arrangements in every country in Latin America where it has been found fruitful to establish and maintain such arrangements. This channel is available to transmit and protect intelligence information of a more secretive nature, and provides a mechanism to reach any depth desired and authorized.

e. Numerous other US government agencies such as Agriculture, Treasury, FAA, etc. have valuable contacts for information exchange throughout the hemisphere.

f. Any such compilation would suffer from the omission of the contribution which can be made by

SECRET

SECRET

business, educational institutions, religious groups, news media, and other non-governmental agencies which have a close association with our Latin American neighbors.

The important point here is to note that any positive and constructive steps taken to further the exchange of information/intelligence by all means will, even in its least regimented form provide some means of assistance in counteracting the flow of subversive agents and their supporting assets from Cuba to Latin America.

Vital Considerations:

The path to success in the pursuit of this goal lies in an area of cooperation, understanding, and mutual trust. The beginnings of a truly cooperative effort are evidenced already. Hopefully this trend will continue and its pace increase. An increase in understanding of the problem may prove to require much more effort. Nations, like individuals, are prone to respond most to basic emotions. Communist inspired subversion will strike home as a threat when it becomes directly related to fear in these nations and in their people. And as long as it remains unnoticed and misunderstood it will not strike fear at least to the proper degree

SECRET

SECRET

in these countries. Here we must turn to education. We must provide information and we must track our fellow Americans to know the beginning of subversion when it is there.

The first basic step in this area will be to initiate a vast program of education on an hemispheric scale. News media -- the press, radios, magazines, TV -- all must be exploited not only for basic propaganda purposes; but as a means of exchanging as much intelligence as can be released to such means. Beyond this, more selective training programs must be established some of these to reach into the depths of professional intelligence collection and dissemination.

The third and perhaps most vital of these requirements involves that delicate fabric of mutual trust among nations which only comes from true cooperation and understanding. This too is based upon the fact that moral influence creates harmony among nations, their leaders, and their people. Fortunately, the growth and cohesion of such moral influence is nurtured by a common cause such as that threatening these nations from Havana.

Proposed Program:

Since the ability to exchange intelligence among OAS countries on communist subversive activities is predicted

SECRET

SECRET

upon the interaction of two intangible and rather delicate factors -- the degree or depth of the intelligence, and the existence of and quality of mutual trust between the countries involved -- none of the proposals below can be considered as building blocks or as chronological steps independent of each other or in a pre-determined series. Rather they are to be considered as piano keys to be used to sound the desired melody.

a. Broadcast information, especially that pertaining to communist subversion (always making clear the distinction between true Castro-communist inspiration -- and the label of subversion which is not too infrequently used by those in power to smear their political rivals), on a common basis throughout the hemisphere via all available news media. This will be enhanced through the use of local columnists or other trusted voices as the means when available. The development of a wholly American viewpoint with respect to the Communist menace, as distinct from the present local and parochial view, is the goal of this mass educational process which is intended to encompass all media, especially the newspapers which can be read, passed on to others, and re-read.

SECRET

SECRET

b. Increase the scope and nature of all means of bilateral exchange between all paired groupings of countries especially to those which feel an immediate need for securing intelligence on specific problems affecting their immediate security and interests.

c. Through the SCCS and other controlled means broaden and deepen intelligence exchange.

d. Develop a communications net, available to all participants, which will be capable of accommodating requirements which are impossible on an area-wide basis today. Open feeder lines to areas which are presently overlooked. Such a development should not overlook the broadest facility of communications to include the establishment and maintenance of a national, even international, presence in areas which are remote and under-developed today. This concept envisages transportation means as well as wires, radio, etc.

e. On a broad basis train Latin American nationals to be aware of subversion, to detect subversion, to understand subversion, and to eliminate it with the aid of the exchange of information and intelligence.

f. Train the intelligence community of Latin America in hard core established intelligence techniques.

Standardize these techniques wherever possible.

SECRET

7