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REPLACES FORM 36-5
WHICH MAY BE USED.
STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR FOR USE OF THE
STAFF OF THE PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING
SUBCOMMITTEE OF SENATOR STENNIS
CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

I. Introduction

The public pronouncements of Cuban leaders, the daily record of events in Latin America, and reports from our intelligence sources within Communist and other left-extremist elements throughout this hemisphere all agree on one salient conclusion: that Fidel Castro is spurring and supporting the efforts of Communists and other revolutionary elements to overthrow and seize control of the governments in Latin America.

Even before the October missile crisis—and with increasing rancor since then—Cuban leaders have been exhorting revolutionary movements to violence and terrorism, and supporting their activities. Cuban support takes many different forms, but its main thrust is in the supply of the inspiration, the guidance, the training, and the communications and technical assistance that revolutionary groups in Latin America require.

In essence, Castro tells revolutionaries from other Latin American countries: "Come to Cuba; we will pay your way, we will train you in underground organization techniques, in guerrilla warfare, in sabotage and in terrorism. We will see to it that you get back to your homeland. Once you are there, we will keep in touch with you, give you propaganda support, send you propaganda materials for your movement, training aids to expand your guerrilla forces, secret communications methods, and perhaps funds and specialized demolition equipment." Castro is not, as far as we know, promising these other Latin Americans any Cuban weapons or Cuban personnel—either leaders, advisers, or cadres. But he probably does tell them: "If you succeed in establishing something effective by way of a revolutionary movement in your homeland, if your guerrillas come down out of the hills and confront regular armed forces, then we may consider more concrete forms of assistance."

So far, it should be noted, none of the movements in South America has reached this final stage—and in fact even Castro's Sierra Maestra guerrillas never had
to fight a pitched battle with regular military formations which might have required more advanced weapons than small arms, grenades, mines, and machineguns. In many ways, Cuba under Castro is the Latin version of the old Comintern, inciting, abetting, and sustaining revolution wherever it flourishes.

We have occasional evidence of more concrete Cuban support. Cuban nationals, for example, took part in the La Oroya disorders in Peru in December. We know that some funds move, generally in cash by courier, from Cuba to the revolutionaries in other countries. We know that Cuba furnishes money to buy weapons, and that some guerrilla forces in Peru, for instance, are equipped with Czech weapons which most probably came from Cuba.

Venezuela is apparently number one on Cuba's priority list for revolution. Fidel Castro said so to the recent meeting of Communist front organizations for Latin American women. Che Guevara and Blas Roca both emphasized the outlook for revolution in Venezuela in speeches in January. One of our established sources of proven reliability, says the Central Committee agreed in January that a "peaceful solution to the present situation in Venezuela is out of the question."

This same source reported that Communist guerrilla and terrorist operations in Venezuela were placed under a unified command in late 1962, which coordinates activities with the other militant extremist groups in Venezuela. The result has been the creation of the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). This organization is currently trying to publicize its existence by such acts as the hijacking of the freighter ANZOATEGUI, and by acts of sabotage and indiscriminate shootings. These were also designed to dissuade President Betancourt from his trip to Washington. In this, of course, they failed.

The violence in Venezuela should not be minimized. The sabotage is the work of experts, and is being done with advanced types of explosives. The shooting has reached the point in Caracas where it is not safe to go out at night in some sections of the capital. But it is the opinion both of our people and the embassy that
this level of activity is not the sort of thing that will bring down the government unless the president or other high officials are assassinated. The PALN has not reached a point where it stands up to the armed forces, or seizes and holds government buildings.

We believe that Cuba has given guerrilla training to more nationals from Venezuela than from any other country. Our estimate is that more than 200 Venezuelans received such training in 1962. Many of these are engaged in terrorism in the cities, and others were rounded up and given long prison sentences when they committed themselves prematurely last spring in a countryside where the rural population strongly supports the Betancourt administration. One of our best penetrations in Venezuela tells us that at present the unified command has less than 150 guerrillas in the field, in widely separated groups of 15 to 25 men each.

II. The Cuban Plan

For the past year Cuban spokesmen have been pushing the line that Cuba provides the example for Latin American revolution, with the implication that nothing more than guidance needs to be exported. Castro actually sounded the keynotes for Cuban subversion on July 26, 1960, when he said, "We promise to continue making Cuba the example that can convert the Cordillera of the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the American continent." In his speech on 15 January 1963 Castro said that if "Socialism" in Cuba had waited to overturn Batista by peaceful means, Castro would still be in the Sierra Maestra. For the past three months, Che Guevara and Education Minister Armando Hart, both in public speeches and in remarks to visiting Communists which have been repeated to us, have been insisting that what they call "Socialism" can achieve power in Latin America only by force.

The Cuban effort at present is far more serious than the hastily organized and ill-conceived raids that the bearded veterans of the Sierra Maestra led into such Central American countries as Panama, Haiti, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic during the first
eight or nine months Castro was in power. Today the Cuban effort is far more sophisticated, more covert, and more deadly. In its professional trade-craft, it shows guidance and training by experienced Communist advisers from the Soviet bloc, including veteran Spanish Communists.

The ideas move fairly openly in a massive propaganda effort. The inflammatory broadcasts from Havana and the work of Prensa Latina are matters of public record. It may be worth noting that the postal and customs authorities in Panama are destroying on the average of 12 tons a month of Cuban propaganda coming into their land. Another 10 tons a month comes into Costa Rica; most of it is spotted either at the airport or in the post office and destroyed.

The know-how is not only imparted to the guerrilla trainees who come to Cuba, but is exported in the form of booklets. There are thousands of copies of the texts on guerrilla warfare by Mao Tse-tung and by Che Guevara scattered over all of Latin America. Our agents have brought us, for example, a little pocket booklet, about two and a half by four inches, called "150 questions on guerrilla warfare," written by a Spanish Civil War veteran, Alberto Bayo. This was printed in Cuba, and turned up first in Peru. Another version, with 100 questions and answers, based on Guevara's and Bayo's books, has been written especially for Peruvian use and mimeographed in Peru. This is about 5 x 8, and includes drawings on how to place demolition charges as well as charts for calculating the force of various explosives. There is a Portuguese text of Guevara's book in Brazil, and a mimeographed abridgement of Bayo's 150 questions has been prepared by a terrorist-guerrilla organization in Colombia.

All of these textbooks stress that the guerrilla must be self-sustaining. They not only tell him how to make Molotov cocktails, explosives, and incendiary preparations from materials that he can obtain easily and sometimes even openly at home. They stress that his weapons, his equipment, and supplies should come from "the enemy"—that is, from the security forces in his homeland.
III. Training

We estimate that at least 1,000, and perhaps as many as 1,500 persons came to Cuba during 1962, from all the other Latin American countries with the possible exception of Uruguay, to receive ideological indoctrination or guerrilla warfare training or both. More have gone in 1963 despite the limited facilities for reaching Cuba at present.

The largest contingents have come from Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, and Bolivia. Some of the courses are as short as four weeks, designed to let it appear that the trainees had merely attended some conference or celebration and done a little sightseeing. Other courses last as long as a year, and may include intensive training in such things as sabotage, espionage, and psychological warfare.

We have devoted a great deal of effort to monitoring Latin American travel to Cuba at the main jump-off points such as Mexico and Curacao. (Curacao has not been used since October, but KLM may soon resume flights.) The Cubans go to great lengths to conceal the fact that some of these trainees have ever been to Cuba, and how long they stayed. However, we know a great deal about this travel from our penetrations of the Communist parties, from controlled agents we have been able to maneuver into the training courses in Cuba, and from cooperative travel control authorities in Latin American countries. The Cuban Embassy in Mexico City gives the trainee a visa on a separate piece of paper, so that his passport, when he goes home, will only show that he has been in Mexico. We have a record, however, of those who fly on to Cuba. In other cases, particularly in the case of travel through Montevideo before the quarantine, the Cubans furnished passports under other names for travel by way of Curacao.

We derive some of our figures from travel control points, and another set from the information we receive from penetration agents of established reliability in the Communist parties. Some of the
Latin American governments are also able to maintain fairly accurate lists of their nationals known to have been in Cuba. We get a certain amount of cross-checking from lists of names furnished us by several of our agents who have undergone training, and in confessions of captured guerrillas who had been in Cuba. Thus in the case of Peru, for instance, we come up with a list of 235 names of individuals known to have made extended stays in Cuba in 1961 and 1962. We have to make allowance for some who did not receive guerrilla training, and allowance in the opposite direction for those whose names have escaped our surveillance. But we are guided in these adjustments by the cross-checking information mentioned above.

Some of the trainees arrive, and many go home, by way of the Iron Curtain and Western Europe, using Soviet, Czech, or Cuban aircraft—and probably ships as well—for the trip between Cuba and the Bloc. This is another attempt to conceal their movements, and in some cases permits further indoctrination and training in Bloc countries.

Under the circumstances we consider that our estimate of 1,000 to 1,500 guerrilla warfare trainees in 1962 is reasonably accurate. We also believe that the scope and volume of this training is being stepped up, just as we know that it increased in 1962 over 1961.

The basic training covers cross-country movement of guerrillas, firing, care of weapons, and general guerrilla tactics. One trainee who took such a four-week course more than a year ago, under cover of going to Cuba for a convention. He returned to his Havana hotel every few days during the course to spread the word that he had been sightseeing. An trainee who took a longer course and then was sent home by way of Europe has given us a great deal of detail on the type of training. He reports that some of the trainees remain indefinitely. The Cubans sometimes refer to these men as their International Brigade. Sometimes they are formed into national units from a particular country, in effect forming a packaged cadre which can be returned to the homeland to lead a "Liberation Army."

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A trainee who recently returned to Peru after several months of training in Cuba, said that all his fellow trainees were asked to mark bridges and other similar demolition targets on detailed maps of Peru. They were also required to fill out lengthy questionnaires on sabotage targets, possibilities for subversion of police, methods for illegal entry and travel, suitable drop zones for air supply, possible points of attack against police and military posts, and similar information necessary for directing subversion and insurrection.

Numerous reports come to us indicating that in such countries as Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru, where there are indigenous guerrilla forces either in action or in being in the hills, there are Cubans among the bands acting as leaders, instructors or advisors for these forces. These reports are invariably second-hand, and we have not been able to confirm any of them. In some cases, it has turned out that a reference to "a Cuban" with the guerrillas referred to someone who has been trained in Cuba and was training others, rather than a Cuban national. However, we know positively that three Cuban nationals were involved in the strike violence at La Oroya, Peru, last December, which culminated in several million dollars worth of damage to the smelter of the American-owned Cerro de Pasco mining company. One of these Cubans has also been directing the armed invasions of big ranches in the Andean highlands by land-hungry Indians. Information of this nature contributed to the decision of the Peruvian junta to crack down on Communists in January. In Brazil, the complaint of guerrillas in training camps was that they had been recruited by a promise of Cuban instructors, but found there were none. This came to light when the report of a Cuban intelligence agent, relaying their complaints to Havana, turned up in the wreckage of the Varig airliner which crashed in Peru in November.

IV. Weapons

In general, the Cubans appear to be following the textbook for guerrillas in regard to provision of arms. We have strong evidence, from numerous
sources, that they are telling the guerrilla warfare students and their leaders to obtain their own weapons at home.

One who was in the original group of trainees said he was trained exclusively in the use and maintenance of the Garand M-1 rifle and M-3, Browning and Hotchkiss machineguns. His group was told that these were the weapons Brazilian guerrillas would be able to buy, steal, or capture from the security forces at home. Similarly, an Argentine trainee, , said their instructors told them Cuba would not be sending weapons because there was a plentiful source of supply for any determined guerrilla movement in its own homeland. Leaders of militant groups in Venezuela, Brazil, and Peru who have gone to Cuba seeking assistance have been told by the Cuban leaders that Cuba is willing to furnish funds, training, and technical assistance. Reference to weapons is pointedly omitted. This is reported to us by in these same groups.

We have recently again checked with all of our stations in Latin America to review what evidence we have of military shipments from Cuba. In Peru, radio transmitters were admittedly brought in from Cuba. (In Venezuela so much radio equipment was stolen last fall that this was unnecessary.) In 1962, Cuba furnished cash to buy weapons in Mexico to be smuggled into Guatemala. In Peru, the guerrilla trainees who were rounded up in the Huampani-Satipo incident last March had been issued kits containing a Czech rifle with a pistol grip, apparently of bloc origin. Otherwise, however, in case after case guerrilla hardware turned out to have been bought or stolen locally, or smuggled in from the adjoining country. We do not have a single case where we are certain of the Cuban origin of captured arms.

This is not to say that we are positive weapons have not been sent from Cuba. Latin America has a long tradition of smuggling, a long coastline, innumerable isolated landing fields and drop zones, and inadequate security forces to control all such channels. A Venezuelan Communist leader has been telling guerrilla leaders that Cuba will soon send
them mortars. It is always possible, of course, that he is fabricating to build up the morale of his units, but we must also conclude that if he is indeed making this up, he risks inevitable disillusionment.

In summary, we have evidence that in principle Cuba is not sending identifiable quantities of weapons to Latin American insurgents at present. But we have no reason to believe that they will not or cannot do so, when so doing serves their stated purpose of creating uprisings in Latin American Countries. Needless to say, this is a matter that we consider of most serious concern and we intensively trace every rumor that comes to us of the importation of arms from Cuba to Latin American countries.

V. Funding

Cuban financing of subversive operations in Latin America is easy to ascertain and hard to document. Our evidence shows that it is generally effected by couriers carrying cash. The following are a few examples of these operations.

A Venezuelan politician, Fabricio Ojeda, returned from Cuba in March of 1962, and was seen by several witnesses to have large quantities of US currency stuffed in a false-bottomed compartment of his suitcase. There is no law against bringing currency into Venezuela, so that authorities could not even determine how much he had brought in. Ojeda later was captured, tried, and sentenced for guerrilla activity.

A Nicaraguan exile, Julio Cesar Mayorga Portocarrera, was flying from Mexico to Honduras in September, 1961, when weather forced the plane to overfly Honduras and land in Nicaragua. He was found to be carrying $3,600 in cash, which he admitted he was bringing from Cuba for Nicaraguan rebels in Honduras.

Last March Ecuadorean troops raided a guerrilla training camp in the mountains west of Quito and arrested some 48 members of the Union of Revolutionary Ecuadorean Youth. The leaders of the group admitted
having received guerrilla training in Cuba, together with funds to support their activities. One item of $44,000 was publicized in the press.

A highly placed Guatemalan Communist who defected last November has given us a specific account of procedures by which Cuba sent cash to Mexico to buy weapons which were then smuggled into Guatemala. We also have considerable evidence of involved bank transfers by which Cuban money eventually reached Latin American front groups to pay for political and propaganda activity. In some countries where the Cubans still have diplomatic missions, we have obtained photostats showing that Cuban diplomats paid for printing of front-group propaganda.

In January 1963 one of the first Brazilians to receive guerrilla warfare training in 1961 was picked up with a suitcase full of ammunition he was carrying to some of those same guerrilla training camps exposed when the Varig plane crashed in Peru. The man admitted that a woman attorney in Rio had given him the money to buy a large hacienda as a new guerrilla camp. We know that this woman is a cut-out in the communications between the pro-Communist Peasant Leagues, which have run the camps, and the Cuban embassy.

The principle that guerrillas must be self-sustaining has obviously been applied to finances as well. Communist guerrillas have staged numerous bank robberies in Peru, Venezuela, and Argentina. The most spectacular hold-up was that of a bank in a Lima suburb last year which netted almost $100,000. From the participants, who have been caught, we know that the hold-up was carried out by a combination of guerrillas and ordinary criminals, who divided the loot fifty-fifty. Some of the share of the common criminals has been recovered, but the Communist half is believed to have reached the sizeable guerrilla forces of Hugo Blanco in the Cuzco Valley. In February 1963 a bank in an outlying Venezuelan town was robbed of $25,000 by men wearing FALN armbands.

VI. Cuban Propaganda Broadcasts

International broadcasts by Cuban radio stations maintain a relatively constant propaganda level at all
times, with regularly scheduled and special broadcasts to specific countries as well as general transmissions to all Latin America. The general theme of these broadcasts is that the "Cuban example" is awakening the "people" of Latin America to the opportunity for revolutionary action against the "corrupt" regimes in power and against "Yankee imperialism" which allegedly supports them. Within the last two months there has been an increase in the aggressiveness with which the broadcasts incite revolt.

The official Cuban international service called Radio Havana Cuba is the chief radio propaganda outlet. More commonly known as Radio Havana, this station broadcasts weekly a total of 187 hours and 50 minutes of propaganda in languages which include Spanish, English, French, Arabic, Portuguese, and Haitian Creole, to listeners in Europe, the Mediterranean area, and the Western Hemisphere.

Radio Havana's international service was inaugurated on May Day in 1961. It has grown rapidly since that time and is now Latin America's first international broadcaster in terms of program hours. Its time on the air is as follows, in hours per week:

- Haitian Creole to Haiti: 7 hr
- Arabic to the Mediterranean area: 5 hr 15 min
- English to Europe: 9 hr 20 min
- English to the Western Hemisphere: 17 hr 30 min
- French to Europe: 9 hr 20 min
- French to Canada: 3 hr 20 min
- French to Mediterranean: 3 hr 30 min
- Portuguese to Brazil: 7 hr
- Spanish to Europe: 16 hr 55 min
- Spanish to the Americas: 108 hr 30 min
In addition to the regularly scheduled international service, Radio Havana has been known to broadcast special programs in order to take advantage of unique political situations. When serious disorders broke out in the Dominican Republic in late 1961, for example, broadcasts emanating from a self-styled "clandestine" station which said it was located inside the Dominican Republic demanded the overthrow of the Dominican government. The station went off after about a week, but not before direction finder bearings and other technical clues indicated that it had been transmitting from Radio Havana's transmitting facilities in Cuba.

Radio Havana states that it makes its facilities available to political groups from other Latin American countries so they can beam programs to their homelands. These programs, which have the evident intent of encouraging subversion and inciting revolt, are presently beamed on regular weekly or twice a week schedule to Guatemala, Peru, and the Dominican Republic. Similar programs were beamed to Nicaragua and Honduras until last September when they were replaced by a single program with wider targets now programmed nightly. These special programs are exemplified by the programs transmitted to the Dominican Republic on 28 January. One was a "manifesto" by Dominican Communists (who are based in Cuba) on the recent election of the "demagogic imperialist agent" Juan Bosch as President of the Dominican Republic. Another was allegedly by a pro-Communist group of Dominicans in Cuba called the "National Liberation Movement." It appealed to Dominican university students to demonstrate against the Constituent Assembly meeting in Santo Domingo.

There are also two special programs beamed to the United States. "Radio Free Dixie" is a one hour a week transmission in English aimed at US Negroes. The other program, "The Friendly Voice of Cuba," is somewhat more subtle and aimed at a wider audience. Both programs can be heard well in Florida and also in many parts of southern United States.

The technical facilities of Radio Havana are at a transmitter site at Bauta, some 23 miles

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southwest of Havana. At present, no more than four shortwave transmitters are being used, but in the past as many as five have been observed on the air at the same time. These transmitters range in power from 10 to 100 kilowatts, enabling Radio Havana to be heard all over the world. Programs are being sent from studios to the transmitter site by means of microwave relays.

VII. Rival Forces in Latin American Subversion

Since the October crisis, Fidel Castro has obviously been trying to straddle the rift between Moscow and Peiping over global Communist strategy. It has been aptly put that Castro's heart is in Peiping but his stomach is in Moscow. This same split between all-out militancy and a more cautious policy—call it coexistence or "two steps forward, one step back"—is reflected on the extreme left in many Latin American countries. Thus Cuba at present not only seeks to serve two masters, but to choose among rival servants in its Latin American subversion.

Castro's views on what is good for socialism and revolution in Latin America are more in line with those of the Chinese Communists than the Soviets. Only the Cuban and Venezuelan Communist parties are totally committed to terror and revolution. In spite of differences over tactics and timing between various Communist groups, all intend eventually to deliver the Latin American countries into the Communists-socialist bloc. The so-called Soviet "conservative" view, as it is now espoused, is more intent on trying to achieve power by legal means if possible and by subversion rather than by force.

Direct Soviet interest in Latin America is clearly increasing. An excellent example of this was the setting up early in 1962 of a Latin American Institute in the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. The avowed purpose of this institute is to raise the study of the problems of Latin America, which in their own statements the Soviets claim they have neglected, to the highest possible level. Teaching of Spanish and Portuguese
languages is to be stressed in the institute and throughout the school system. A list of subjects on which this institute intends to publish shows that it is to be used to attack the Alliance for Progress; it has already attacked the Alliance program in Colombia—a showpiece of the Alliance. We have been reliably informed that posters have been placed in some Colombian universities referring to the problems of the "national liberation and workers' movements in Latin American countries" as topics which will be studied by the institute. Results of these studies will be published in the near future in a magazine called América Latina, intended especially for distribution in Latin America. A pamphlet, apparently to be distributed by the institute, and entitled Alianza para el Progreso, will in the words of its heralds, "unmask the economic expansion of the USA" in Latin America. The institute also expects to enter into close contact with leading Latin American scientists and academicians during 1963.

One of the most important Communist assets in Latin America is a large number of Bloc diplomatic and Cuban missions. These missions are used to further Communist subversive activities even in countries where there are no Bloc diplomatic missions. The USSR, and in some cases some Satellites as well, have diplomatic missions in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. The USSR maintains relations with Bolivia, but has no resident mission there. Cuba maintains embassies in Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Chile. The Chinese Communists have no diplomatic ties in Latin America except with Cuba. That fact alone would make Cuban missions important to the Chinese. Only seven Latin American countries—Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Peru—have no official ties whatever with any bloc country.

Uruguay offers a good example of how the Communists misuse diplomatic missions and the importance the Communists attach to them. We have found that Communist subversive activities in Uruguay are not now aimed at promoting revolutionary activity against the government. In this case even the Cubans appear to be much more interested in retaining the good will of the government so that they can continue to use the country as a base of operations.
against Argentina, Paraguay, etc. Communist diplomatic missions, however, are active in supporting local Communists and other pro-Castro groups to retain enough leverage within the country so as to prevent the anti-Castro groups from forcing a break in relations. The badly split Uruguayan government itself is anti-Communist, but is highly tolerant of the activities of these missions and of the Uruguayan party itself. The USSR, most of the Satellites, and Cuba all have diplomatic missions in Montevideo—some 70 or so bloc personnel. In addition, couriers and travellers can go back and forth between this city and the bloc countries and Cuba at any time.
ANNEX A - ARGENTINA

A participant has given us a detailed account of a six-month guerrilla warfare training course given to 50 Argentine extremists in Cuba from July to December 1962. Instruction included such subjects as weapons and explosives, ballistics, communications, construction of defenses, guerrilla strategy and tactics, map reading, and closed and open order drill. The trainees practiced with Mauser and Garand rifles, Thompson submachineguns, Brownings, bazookas, 81-millimeter mortars, and a 57-millimeter recoilless cannon. Part of the group reached Cuba by way of Chile. Some of the men were given two passports, one Cuban and one Ecuadorean, and returned to Argentina by way of Prague.

Buenos Aires police in July 1962 announced that they had raided a warehouse which had served as headquarters for terrorists working with both the Peronists and Communists. According to the police, the gang was engaged in smuggling Cuban propaganda into Argentina and distributing it; facilitating travel of Argentines to Cuba for guerrilla training; and had carried out about 30 robberies to obtain funds, weapons, and explosives.

A special Cuban office in Montevideo, Uruguay, provides false documentation for Argentines and Paraguayans traveling to Cuba for guerrilla training.
Morais, had a flat tire on 14 December. When a police patrol stopped to investigate, they found he was carrying a number of rifles in his car.

In the last week of January, another of the original batch of trainees in Cuba, Jeronimo Rodrigues Lima, was arrested by national security police at an airport. He was carrying a suitcase full of ammunition for some of the camps which apparently are still operating. Jeronimo Rodrigues at first refused to talk, but in less than 24 hours, disgusted, announced he would tell his whole story. So far, according to the press, he has revealed that a woman attorney in Rio de Janeiro had furnished money with which he had bought another farm to continue the Peasant League guerrilla operation. We know this woman works for the Cuban Embassy. Rodrigues says the farm is in his name, and that if he gets out of jail, he intends to forget the Peasant League, move his family to the farm, and work it.
ANNEX B - BRAZIL

Documents found in a wrecked airliner in Peru now have made public an obvious case of Cuban involvement in subversion directed against Brazil. These are the so-called VARIG documents recovered by Peruvian authorities when an airliner carrying a Cuban commercial delegation crashed near Lima en route from Rio de Janeiro on 27 November.

The documents, a letter and attachments from "Gerardo" to "Petronio," comprised a report from a Cuban diplomat in Rio de Janeiro, writing under a cover name, to his superior in Havana. The letter made it plain that Cuba had financed and supervised efforts by Francisco Juliao, Brazilian Peasant League leader, to set up guerrilla warfare training camps within the framework of his pro-Communist peasant organization. The report, which relays complaints of some of the guerrillas recruited for these camps, makes it clear that the Peasant League guerrilla operation was plagued by confusion and corruption, but leaves no doubt of Cuban involvement, and names many Brazilians involved.

Purely fortuitously, a Brazilian customs police official checking on possible clandestine landing fields in the interior, ran across evidence of the training camps and arranged to have some of them raided even before the Varig aircraft crashed. The raids turned up no evidence pointing directly to Cuba, but the camps happened to be precisely those described in the Gerardo-Petronio correspondence. The Varig document provided the evidence against Cuba, the two independent sources matched their details perfectly, and it has become impossible for the Communists and the Peasant League to obtain serious consideration for any claim that the documents might be forgeries. We in turn are sure of their authenticity.

The Peasant League operation, which was staffed by some of the first Brazilian Communists to take guerrilla training in Cuba in June of 1961, continues to provide evidence against Cuba. Although the Cubans apparently have done their best to avoid all contact with the guerrilla organization since the exposé, Brazilian police continue to turn up further ramifications of the operation. The second-in-command of the Peasant League and head of the guerrilla organization, Clodomir
On 28 October 1962, at the height of the missile crisis, a homemade bomb exploded during assembly in a downtown Santiago apartment house. The Chilean police who searched the apartment found four members of the extremist Social Progressive Group (SPG), 6 cases of Cuban propaganda, 30 sticks of dynamite, 38 fuses, and one small bomb already assembled.

One of those arrested, an SPG leader, who had his hand blown off, had earlier been photographed with three Cuban diplomats. At least two of these, Orlando Prendes Gutierrez and Raul Zayas Linares, have been reliably reported as Cuban intelligence officers. The Chilean police told the press that the group had planned bomb attacks on the US Embassy and residence, US firms, and local public utilities. This incident occurred two days after a clandestine Havana broadcast urging Latin American Communists to attack US property and installations wherever possible in Latin America.
ANNEX D - ECUADOR

have reported that the last Cuban chargé in Quito, Ecuador, had given more than $40,000 to the Union of Revolutionary Ecuadorean Youth (URJE) for guerrilla warfare training.

More than 45 young Ecuadoreans, including three girls, were rounded up by Ecuadorean paratroopers last spring at a guerrilla training camp at Santo Domingo de los Colorados, about 50 miles west of Quito. Many of the trainees had been to Cuba. The leaders of the group, Santiago Perez Romoleroux, Jorge Rivadeneyra Altamirano, and Efrain Alvarez Fiallos, had recently returned from extensive guerrilla warfare training in Cuba.

When the Ecuadorean Communist Party last January arranged for the expulsion of several URJE leaders involved with the guerrilla operation in order to restore full Communist control, newspapers reported that the expelled leaders had been accused by the Communists of wasting Cuban funds.

Guillermo Layedra, Communist leader from Rio Bamba, arrested on his return from Cuba in March 1962, was reported to have photographs showing him undergoing guerrilla training in Cuba. Communist Miguel Lechon, the only Indian on the party Central Committee and president of the Ecuadorean Federation of Indians, was arrested in 1962 for shooting a peasant. He showed a Soviet pistol which he said had been given him by Fidel Castro during a visit to Cuba, and has also shown a key which he boasts is the ignition key for a Cadillac Castro has promised to send him as soon as he recruits 300 Indians for the Communist Party.

Reliable sources in Ecuador report that at least 80 Ecuadoreans were in Cuba as of January for guerrilla training. We have 30 of these trainees listed by name.
ANNEX E - PERU

The ruling military junta in Peru started in February 1963 mass trials of more than 200 extremists, including 63 Communist leaders. In a 68-page indictment, the government charges that the extremists have attacked police stations and banks, raised guerrilla forces, incited peasant violence, and caused riots in San Marcos University. The evidence to be submitted in the Lima trial alone runs to almost 700 single-spaced pages. The security forces have given us no evidence of a Moscow-Havana master plan, but there is ample evidence of Cuban involvement.

The trials center on the activities of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a roof-organization for extremist militants founded by De La Puente Uceda in 1961. De La Puente had just returned from Cuba and said he brought instructions to "organize the revolution in Peru with economic and technical help from Fidel Castro." This phrase from the indictment conforms with reports our agents received at the time from close associates of De La Puente. He is one of the top extremists who escaped the roundup launched by the junta early in January. We believe he is in Cuba. We have a photograph, taken some time ago, which shows De La Puente and two of his top Peruvian associates with Fidel Castro in Havana.

Although the government did not move against the Communists and other extremist groups with any great vigor, proof of Cuban involvement in subversion goes back at least as far as March 1962. Peruvian police fooled a Cuban-trained agent in the mountains into directing them to a guerrilla camp accessible only by foot, near Satipo, and almost simultaneously raided a house in the Lima suburb of Huampani from which trainees were being sent to the camp. As a result, they found complete guerrilla kits including Czech-made rifles with a pistol grip, instructions for dispatching and equipping the guerrilla candidates, and two radio transmitters brought in from Cuba. The custodian admitted he had used the radios to contact a sister in Havana. Most of the men arrested in this incident were released, but have been picked up again in the January roundup and are to be included in the mass trials.
who took guerrilla training in Cuba last fall has provided a detailed account of his training, lists of other trainees he could identify, and in particular, a list of questions the Cubans apparently gave to all the Peruvians. Possibly it is a standard questionnaire for all guerrilla warfare trainees. The Peruvians were asked to pinpoint possible sabotage targets such as bridges on a large map. The Cuban instructors also wanted information on all kinds of targets for sabotage, chances to subvert the police, possibilities for illegal entry into and travel in Peru, the problems of setting up business firms to cover espionage and agent operations, and information on location of and access to police and military installations.

Three major guerrilla groups, according to good reports from our agents and from Peruvian police, appear to have reached agreement on a plan for coordinated action. This may be one factor that persuaded the junta to move against the extremists.

The main guerrilla strength at present is a force which local police in the Cuzco area estimate to be as large as 2,000 men. This is the guerrilla force led by Hugo Blanco, who is reported by Peruvian authorities to have received his guerrilla training in Argentina. If in fact he has 2,000 men, this figure includes landless peasants and Indians, largely untrained and unarmed; we have no reason to believe that more than a small proportion are trained and equipped guerrillas. The Indians, however, are almost as deadly with rock slings as guerrillas are with rifles. The junta has moved in some troops because the local police detachments have been unable to withstand Blanco's raids. Interrogations and agent reports have established that the guerrillas are buying weapons stolen from or sold by the Bolivian military and smuggled across the frontier into Peru. Some of the money is apparently the Communist share of the $100,000 Miraflores bank robbery.

As one example of the activities of the coordinated extremist forces, a lieutenant of the Guardia Republicana, assisted by half a dozen guerrillas dressed in Guardia uniforms, attacked the village Guardia post in Jauja, 110 miles east of Lima, and overwhelmed it. Arming another score of guerrillas with the captured weapons, the gang then robbed three local banks and retreated to the hills.

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ANNEX F - VENEZUELA

Venezuela is the top priority target for Cuban subversion. A campaign of terror is in full swing. Castro, Che Guevara, Blas Roca and other high-ranking Cuban officials have, as recently as January 1963, told various visiting Latin American Communists that Venezuela is the first goal of Castroism in Latin America. Venezuela is receiving priority attention from Castro, who has claimed that the Betancourt regime will be toppled by guerrilla warfare methods.

It would appear from the meager evidence available in Venezuela, that the Venezuelan Communists have been thoroughly briefed to hide or deny any Cuban involvement in the present guerrilla-terroristic campaign which is being waged in the country. The wave of terror which has existed for months in Venezuela has physically exhausted the handful of competent men in the Venezuelan police system, which has little or no time left over to track down evidence of Cuban involvement.

Support from Havana can be inferred, however, if only from the expert character of the sabotage carried out. In mid-February, for instance, it was discovered that the Communists have begun to use shaped charges to sabotage vulnerable oil pipe lines. Earlier attempts had involved more conventional explosives.

The paramilitary apparat of the Venezuelan Communist Party, which is directly charged with the mission for continuing terrorism in the urban areas, has been actively engaged in carrying out other major acts of sabotage, such as burning down warehouses with advanced combustibles and dynamiting major bridges, pipelines and pumping stations. All of these acts have been well planned and professionally executed. There is circumstantial evidence that the Communist sabotage of the Maracaibo oil fields last October and November was in reply to an appeal from Radio Havana to attack all American installations in Venezuela as a reprisal for the quarantine of Cuba.

Last November a Venezuelan military court tried 139 guerrillas captured in the course of the Puerto
Cabello revolt, and handed out heavy jail sentences. Some of the defendants had previously been in Cuba. One of them, Fabricio Ojeda, who had at one time been photographed in Cuban uniform during Cuban army maneuvers, was known to have brought back a large sum of US currency from Cuba, and had made several trips there. He was also the recipient of large quantities of Cuban Communist propaganda.

Venezuelan police early in January raided a house registered in the name of a Venezuelan Communist known to have made at least one trip to Cuba, and discovered a radio transmitter capable of reaching Cuba. Two Communists were subsequently arrested attempting to enter the house. The armed forces have also heard a voice radio, which appears to be located on the grounds of the Central University in Caracas, communicating with another station which they believe to be in Cuba.

Late last fall a raid on the home of a leader in Caracas of the pro-Communist Movement of the Revolutionary Left turned up a sheet of instructions for procedures in radio communication with Cuba. When the man himself was arrested, police found a radio transmitter being carried in the trunk of his car.

We have received reports from a reliable source that Rafael Martinez, head of the Communist paramilitary apparatus (PCV) in Venezuela, asked Castro last September for assistance. Castro reportedly had promised to give the PCV mortars and other weapons. However, Castro is reported to have given Martinez $50,000 instead, and offered to train some of Martinez' men in Cuba. Castro had explained that he was unable to offer arms at that time because the USSR would not permit him to do so. Last month (January 1963), it was further reported that the wife of Martinez, Argelia Laya de Martinez, received an additional sum of $6,000 to finance sabotage operations against North American business installations in Venezuela. Mrs. Martinez was visiting in Cuba at the time that she received these funds.
INVESTIGATION OF
THE PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM

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INTERIM REPORT BY
PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING
SUBCOMMITTEE

Of The
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

Under The Authority Of
S. Res. 75
(88th Cong., 1st Sess.)

On
THE CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP

SECRET

5812 (8)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

U. S. Senate,
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee,
Committee on Armed Services,
May, 1963.

Honorable Richard B. Russell,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
U. S. Senate

My Dear Mr. Chairman:

There is transmitted herewith an interim report by the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, appointed under Senate Resolution 75 of the 88th Congress, on the Cuban Military Buildup.

In its inquiry to this time the Subcommittee has received testimony in executive session from the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence sections. The interim report transmitted herewith is addressed primarily to a review of military developments and intelligence activities and operations in connection with Cuba from early 1962 to the present insofar as the facts have been developed and are now known to the Subcommittee.

The Subcommittee intends to pursue further its inquiry into the Cuban situation and it is anticipated that one or more subsequent reports on this subject will be issued in the future.

It is necessary that this interim report to the full Committee on Armed Services be classified "Secret." However, the Subcommittee is submitting the report for review for security purposes and will have the report printed and released to the public when it has been so reviewed and the necessary security matters have been deleted.

Respectfully,

JOHN STENNIS,
Chairman, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee.
# INTERIM REPORT ON CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP

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I. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

The dramatic events which occurred last October with respect to Cuba are now history. Following photographic confirmation of the fact that strategic and offensive weapons had, in fact, been introduced into Cuba and President Kennedy's confrontation with Premier Khrushchev, such strategic and offensive weapons were ostensibly withdrawn.

However, the public concern and debate about the Cuban situation has not subsided. There have been and are insistent reports that the Soviets still maintain strategic missiles in Cuba which are concealed in caves and other underground facilities and that Soviet troops are based in the island in numbers far in excess of those accepted by our intelligence community. Reports also abound with respect to the use of Cuba as a base for subversive, agitational and revolutionary activities directed at other Latin American countries.

The prevalence of these reports and allegations prompted the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee to launch an investigation into the entire subject matter in an effort to determine the facts. Although the investigation still continues, the Subcommittee deems it appropriate to issue an interim report at this time. This report will be limited to a review of military developments and intelligence activities and operations in connection with Cuba from early 1962 to the current time insofar as the facts are now known to us. A discussion of the use of Cuba as a base for subversive activities will be included in a subsequent report.

Broadly speaking, the term "intelligence community" includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the intelligence sections of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of State, the National Security Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is used in this report, however, in a somewhat more limited sense. Where the term appears in this report it primarily refers to and includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence sections of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Other agencies are, of course, impliedly included in our use of the term to the extent that they participated in or contributed to any of the activities or operations discussed.

Up to this time, the Subcommittee has received testimony in executive hearings from Mr. John A. McCona, Director of Central Intelligence; Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, Director of Defense Intelligence Agency; Major General Alva R. Fitch, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U. S. Army; Rear Admiral Vernon L. Lowrance, Director of Naval Intelligence; and Major General Robert A. Breitweiser, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U. S. Air Force.

The Subcommittee has also received and has on file a number of written reports from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We have also considered reports issued by the Special Consultative Committee on Security of the Council of the Organization of American States and the Cuban Revolutionary Council.

In addition, the Subcommittee staff has made an extensive investigation and has thus far interviewed more than 70 witnesses who do not hold official positions, including many Cuban refugees and exiles. Staff investigators spent approximately 45 man days in the Miami area alone.

Information has also been received from individual Senators and Members of the House of Representatives.
This interim report is based primarily on the testimony received from the intelligence chiefs who appeared before the Subcommittee. It does, however, include some information from other sources.

Since our inquiry is not yet completed, this report does not contain any overall or comprehensive conclusions and recommendations. Major findings, based on the testimony and evidence thus far received, relative to intelligence activities during the military buildup have been incorporated. Our general recommendation at this time is that an alert vigilance be maintained over all activities taking place in Cuba.

II. SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS

1. While hindsight shows that the performance of the Central Intelligence Agency and the military intelligence agencies can be criticized in some areas, in other areas they performed creditably. Offensive weapons systems were identified before becoming operational and their locations and performance characteristics spelled out in a limited period of time despite adverse weather and an almost completely closed society.

2. Although photographic reconnaissance has limitations, it was this capability which ultimately produced incontrovertible proof of the presence of strategic missiles and offensive weapons in Cuba. Credit is due to those involved in this mission.

3. While a reasonably competent job was done in acquiring and collecting intelligence information and data, in retrospect it appears that several substantial errors were made by the intelligence agencies in the evaluation of the information and data which was accumulated.
4. Faulty evaluation and the predisposition of the intelligence community to the philosophical conviction that it would be incompatible with Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba resulted in intelligence judgments and evaluations which later proved to be erroneous. Among these were:

(a) It was not until after a confirming picture was obtained on October 25th, 1962, that it was established by the intelligence community that organized Soviet ground combat units were present in Cuba. At this time our plans for a possible landing in Cuba were substantially complete and were necessarily based upon the information that our forces would face only indigenous Cuban defense forces.

(b) The number of Soviet troops in Cuba was substantially underestimated throughout the crisis. On October 22nd, our intelligence people estimated that there were 8,000 to 10,000 Soviets in Cuba. They now say that, at the height of the buildup, there were at least 22,000 Soviet personnel on the island.

(c) It was not until the photographic evidence was obtained on October 14th that the intelligence community concluded that strategic missiles had been introduced into Cuba. In reaching their pre-October 14th negative judgment the intelligence analysts were strongly influenced by their judgment as to Soviet policy and indications that strategic missiles were being installed were not given proper weight by the intelligence community. A contributing factor to this was the tendency on the part of the intelligence people to discredit and downgrade the reports of Cuban refugees and exiles.

5. The Subcommittee has uncovered no evidence to substantiate charges and speculation about a photography "gap" having existed from September 5th to
October 14th. The evidence before the Subcommittee leads to the conclusion that such charges are unfounded.

6. The news reports of an alleged conflict between the Central Intelligence Agency and Strategic Air Command with reference to the operation of U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance flights prior to October 14th were also closely inquired into and found to be without merit. No evidence was presented to support the charge that the operation of the U-2 flights were transferred from the Central Intelligence Agency to Strategic Air Command because of a deadlock or friction between the agencies.

7. To a man the intelligence chiefs stated that it is their opinion that all strategic missiles and bombers have been removed from Cuba. However, they readily admit that, in terms of absolutes, it is quite possible that offensive weapons remain on the island concealed in caves or otherwise. They also admitted that absolute assurance on this question can come only from penetrating and continuing on-site inspection by reliable observers and that, based on skepticism, if nothing more, there is reason for grave concern about the matter.

8. There are literally thousands of caves and underground caverns in the Island of Cuba and many of these are suitable for the storage and concealment of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons. Refugee and exile reports continue to insist that they are being so utilized. Military-connected activities have been noted with reference to a number of them but it is the view of the intelligence analysts that the military usage of the caves is for the storage of those weapons which we know are now in Cuba and not for the storage of offensive weapon systems. Admittedly, however, this view is based to a substantial degree on the negative proposition that there is no hard evidence
confirming the presence of strategic missiles in Cuba at this time.

9. Even though the intelligence community believes that all have been withdrawn, it is of the greatest urgency to determine whether or not strategic missiles are now concealed in Cuba. The criticality of this is illustrated by the fact that, assuming maximum readiness at pre-selected sites, with all equipment pre-located, the Soviet mobile medium range (1100 miles) missiles could be made operational in a matter of hours.

10. The intelligence community estimated that approximately 5000 Soviet personnel were withdrawn from Cuba following the October confrontation, leaving, according to intelligence sources, about 17,500 Soviets in Cuba. A net of 4000 to 5000 additional have been withdrawn since the first of the year, our intelligence people say. However, because of what is described by intelligence as "technical reasons," the 17,500 intelligence estimate of those remaining is unchanged at the writing of this report. At the least, this indicates to the Subcommittee that there is a low level of confidence in the original estimate. There is also some doubt in our minds as to the adequacy of the information as to the number of Soviets newly arriving. All of the intelligence people agree that there is no evidence that any of the combat ground troops associated with the four mobile armored groups have been withdrawn.

11. Some other sources --primarily refugee and exile groups-- estimate that as many as 40,000 Soviets are now in Cuba. Bearing in mind the lack of hard evidence on the question and the substantial underestimation of last Fall, we conclude that no one in official United States circles can tell, with any real degree of confidence, how many Russians are now in Cuba and we are of the opinion that the official 17,500 estimate is perhaps a minimum figure.

12. In any event, it is conceded that the combined Soviet and Cuban forces now in the island are quite powerful defensively and could offer severe opposition to any attack. They are admittedly capable of suppressing any
internal rebellion or revolt mounted without external support, and it is clear that an invasion from without, to have a fair chance of success, would require large forces, extensive sea-borne landing efforts, and adequate air cover.

13. Based upon their judgment that all strategic missiles and offensive weapons have been removed, the intelligence chiefs do not believe that the Communist forces in Cuba now present a direct aggressive military threat to the United States or Latin America. Strategic weapons may or may not be now in Cuba. We can reach no conclusion on this because of the lack of conclusive evidence.

14. The evidence is overwhelming that Castro is supporting, spurring, aiding and abetting Communist revolutionary and subversive movements throughout the Western Hemisphere and that such activities present a grave and ominous threat to the peace and security of the Americas.

III. SITUATION PRIOR TO MID-JULY, 1962

A. Cuban Forces

It was estimated by intelligence sources that at the beginning of 1962, the Cuban ground forces consisted of a standing army of 75,000, a ready reserve of 100,000, and a home guard of 100,000. Although the ground combat capability of the Cuban forces had increased since the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion, it was thought that, although the Cuban forces were of varying states of training, they had the capability for effective ground operations at the battalion combat team level. They were not thought to be organized for operations with units larger than reinforced battalions and it was believed that they were maintained primarily for the purpose of internal security operations and to repel any attempted invasion. The intelligence community thought that approximately 500
Soviet bloc advisory personnel were then in Cuba.

By the beginning of 1962, the Cuban Air Force had benefitted by the acquisition of MIG aircraft and the return of a number of people trained in bloc countries. It had some 40 MIG 15's, 17's and 19's as well as about 40 propeller-driven aircraft of training, transport and utility types.

The Cuban Navy was small and of an essentially coastal patrol type. Several of these craft in the sub-chaser and motor torpedo boat types had been received from the Soviets. The crews on a number of these craft were mixed Cuban and Soviet, indicating that the Cubans were still under training.

It was agreed by intelligence sources, however, that even prior to July, 1962, vast amounts of Soviet military equipment had been introduced into Cuba for the use of the Cuban forces. As a result, it was believed that even then the Cuban Army was one of the best equipped in all Latin America. The arms and equipment furnished the Cubans at this time consisted of a mixture of World War II equipment and more modern weapons. There is a question as to whether the amount of heavy and more complicated weapons introduced into Cuba at this time was not more than ample to supply the needs of the Cuban forces as then constituted.

B. Intelligence Activities and Operations

The intelligence activities with respect to Cuba prior to July, 1962, consisted of reconnaissance overflights by U-2 aircraft, peripheral reconnaissance flights over international waters and the collection of reports from refugees, exiles, and other human sources.

For sometime prior to 1962, U-2 aircraft operated by the Central Intelligence Agency flew one mission a month at high altitudes over the Island of Cuba itself for reconnaissance purposes. Commencing in early 1962, two flights
were flown each month, weather permitting, until September, 1962, when the number of flights was increased.

Also, even before 1962, regular electronic reconnaissance and photographic flights were flown by the military on a regular basis over international waters but not over the Island of Cuba itself.

In addition, during the same period, thousands of human source reports were collected and assessed. Included in these reports were many which contained allegations of missile-related activities and of the presence of Soviet ground combat units in Cuba. However, although the reports were checked to the greatest extent possible, the intelligence community obtained no confirmation of such activities.

In recognition of the increasing importance of the Cuban problem, the intelligence community in early 1962 intensified their intelligence activities and stated a greater urgency in their collection requirements with respect to Cuba. The routine one-a-month flight over Cuba was increased to two a month. The intelligence community was alert to the implications of the communization of Cuba. However, on the basis of the information collected and the assessment of this information, the intelligence conclusion at this time was that the activities were primarily defensively oriented. No Soviet combat units or strategic weapons were discovered.

The intelligence community, although agreeing that the activities in Cuba were then primarily directed towards defense, did conclude in early 1962 that it might probably be expected that the IL-28 (Beagle) light bomber would be supplied to Cuba by the Soviets in the future.
IV. SITUATION FROM MID-JULY TO OCTOBER 22, 1962

A. Buildup in Soviet Forces and Equipment

In late July and early August, our intelligence noted a significant change in the situation in Cuba. A sudden rise in military aid from the Soviet Union became clearly evident. Ship arrivals, both dry cargo and passenger, increased drastically. For example, for the first half of 1962, an average of 15 Soviet dry cargo ships per month arrived in Cuba. The number jumped to 37 in August. Only one Soviet passenger ship had arrived in Cuba during the first five months of 1962. Four arrived in July and six in August.

While our intelligence people were aware from this and other information that a major Soviet effort in Cuba was under way, its exact nature and impact was not clear to the intelligence community.

During the July-August period, refugee reports of alleged missile activity in Cuba increased significantly. These reports were checked out as scrupulously as possible, but even though many of them included consistent and similar descriptions of some form of missile activity, there was no confirmation of them.

At the same time, there were human source reports that some of the ships were unloaded at night under rigid security with all non-Soviet personnel being excluded from the dock areas. The practice of unloading at night in small easily guarded ports, remote from large population centers, was known to the intelligence community, although the alleged security conditions ashore could not be confirmed.

Human source reports also alleged that the nature and character of the arriving Soviet personnel had changed significantly. It was reported that some of the arriving personnel during this period were primarily young, trim,
physically fit, sun-tanned and disciplined, and that they formed in ranks of fours on the docks and moved out in truck convoys. Refugee, exile, and other human source reports suggested that, in contrast to the earlier arrivals, the new arrivals were Soviet combat troops. However, the intelligence community adhered to the view that they were military instructors, advisors, and trainers, plus a number of civilian technicians and advisors associated with improving the Cuban economy. The view was that they did not include significant numbers of Soviet military personnel and that they were not organized into combat units. As late as October 29, in an unclassified information brochure published by the Defense Department entitled "Cuba," the Soviet personnel in the island were estimated at 5,000.

B. Identification of Specific Weapons and Equipment

1. SA-2 Sites - About August 15, as a result of suspicions generated by human source reports, the Department of Defense focused special attention on suspected areas and requested that they be covered by the "next" high altitude flight. As a result, the next such flight, flown on August 29, established positive identification of SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites at two of the suspect locations and at six others in Western Cuba. Flights from August 29 through October 7 discovered additional SA-2 sites. The SA-2 system can engage targets at altitudes from about 3,000 to 80,000 feet and has a slant range of about 25 miles.

2. Cruise Missiles - A coastal defense cruise missile installation was identified shortly after the flight of August 29. Three additional cruise missile sites were discovered by October 7. These are anti-shipping missiles estimated to have a maximum range of about 40 miles. On August 29th KOMAR class patrol boats with 2 missile launchers each were identified in Cuba.
3. **MIG-21 Fighters** - Although the Soviets had supplied the Cuban Air Force with MIG-15, 17, and 19 aircraft prior to the Spring of 1962, the presence of the modern supersonic MIG-21 fighter was first confirmed by a picture obtained on September 5, 1962.

4. **IL-28 (Beagle) Bombers** - As early as the Spring of 1962, the intelligence community was of the view that the Soviets might send the IL-28 (Beagle) light bomber into Cuba. This apprehension was confirmed by a picture taken on September 28 which was later evaluated as showing crates containing IL-28’s aboard a Cuba-bound ship. This evaluation was not made until October 9 and was disseminated to the intelligence community on October 10.

5. **Medium Range and Intermediate Range Missiles** - As has already been indicated, during all of this period there was a great volume of unconfirmed reports and rumors from human sources about strategic missile-related activity in Cuba. None of these reports were confirmed prior to October 14, 1962. It is evident that many of these reports in fact referred to the SA-2 missile, which, although nowhere near the size of the strategic missiles later identified, still appears large to the untrained observer.

However, after mid-September some reports of missiles being introduced into Cuba were suggestive enough of strategic or offensive weapons to arouse the suspicions of intelligence analysts. This resulted in the conclusion—apparently reached near the end of September, 1962—that there was a suspect medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) site in Pinar del Rio Province. As a result, photographic coverage of the suspect area was proposed and on October 14 a Strategic Air Command U-2 reconnaissance aircraft overflew the area and emerged with hard photographic evidence of the San Cristobal medium-range ballistic missile complex.
Photographic reconnaissance was unable to detect precisely how many ballistic missiles were introduced into Cuba. Prior to the Soviet announcement that 42 missiles would be withdrawn, our photographs had revealed evidence of only 33. It could not be established, therefore, how many ballistic missiles were, in fact, introduced into Cuba or how many the Soviets planned to introduce.

Additional medium-range ballistic missile sites and intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) sites were located by high altitude reconnaissance missions flown after October 14. Six MRBM sites were located, all of which had achieved a full operational capacity on October 28 when the dismantling of the sites commenced. Three IRBM sites were located and it was anticipated that a fourth would be established. None of the IRBM sites became operational before being dismantled, it being the estimate that they would have become operational by December 15.

The medium-range missile is estimated to have a range of about 1100 miles and the intermediate range missile is credited with a range of 2200 miles.

C. Failure to Identify Soviet Organized Ground Combat Units

As has already been noted, notwithstanding some reports that many of the Soviets arriving in Cuba after mid-July were military units, and notwithstanding the evidence of a drastically increased buildup in modern and sophisticated ground weapons, the intelligence community did not identify the presence of Russian organized ground combat forces in Cuba until October 25 when new pictures obtained by low-level photography, coupled with a re-analysis of previous photography, led to the conclusion that there were, in fact, four organized, mobile, and powerful armored Soviet units in Cuba.
The aggregate strength of these units is now estimated by intelligence people to be about 5,000 men.

In addition, it is agreed that the number of Soviet personnel in Cuba was substantially underestimated by our intelligence. For example, on October 22, 1962, the date that the President addressed the nation, the intelligence community estimated the Soviet personnel in Cuba to be 8 to 10 thousand. The current intelligence evaluation is that at the height of the Soviet build-up, there were in Cuba an aggregate of at least 22,000 Soviet troops. This is, of course, a retroactive or reconstructed intelligence estimate. One factor in the underestimation of the number of Soviet personnel in Cuba in October was the assumption that the arriving passenger ships were normally loaded. It is obvious now that these ships were, in fact, troop loaded and that the actual aggregate troop-carrying capacity of the arriving passenger ships was in excess of 20,000. In addition, it is believed that additional Soviet military personnel arrived in cargo ships. There is some reason to doubt that even the 22,000 figure would account fully for all of the great quantities of weapons and equipment introduced into Cuba since June, 1962.

The failure to identify the presence of organized Russian combat units in Cuba and the underestimation of the number of Soviet personnel present there merits special comment. At that time, that is, on October 22, our plans for a possible landing of forces in Cuba, which were already substantially complete, were necessarily based upon the information that our invading forces would be opposed only by indigenous Cuban troops. The fact of the matter is that the native Cuban forces would have been reinforced by highly trained, powerful, and mobile Soviet armored units possessed of tremendous striking power. These facts were not transmitted to the responsible United States commanders until several days subsequent to October 25.
In other words, the true order of battle of the enemy had not been ascertained at the time of the completion of plans for possible landings of our forces in Cuba. This omission could have resulted in our paying a much higher price in casualties in the occupation of Cuba than had been anticipated.

Equally important, since on October 22nd the President did not know of the presence in Cuba of a substantial number of Soviet soldiers in heavily armed organized ground combat units, he could not include this factor in his actions vis-a-vis the Soviets and demand at that time their withdrawal from the Western Hemisphere along with the strategic missiles.

D. Alleged Photographic Gap

There has been considerable public discussion about an alleged gap in our photographic reconnaissance over Cuba during the period from September 5 to September 14. We have examined this question as thoroughly as possible and have found the allegations with respect to it to be unfounded. The record of the flights which were scheduled between August 29 and October 14 should be sufficient to clear up the situation and these will be summarized here.

The flight of August 29, which has already been discussed, resulted in the discovery of surface-to-air missile and cruise missile sites.

On September 5, a mission was flown which covered the central and eastern portion of the island. Good coverage was obtained of the central portion but weather conditions prevented any photographic returns with reference to the eastern end of the island.

A flight was planned for September 10th but this was not flown.

On September 17, a mission was flown but, because of weather conditions, it was not wholly successful.
Adverse weather precluded further flights until September 26th. Flights were flown on September 26, September 29, October 5 and October 7. These flights completed the coverage of those areas of Cuba which had been spotlighted as requiring early attention.

Weather prevented any additional flights until October 14. On October 12, the Strategic Air Command was given responsibility for operating the U-2 high altitude reconnaissance missions over Cuba, and on October 14, it flew the flight which gave the first hard evidence of the existence of strategic missiles in Cuba.

E. Transfer of U-2 Flights from CIA to SAC

There have been numerous news reports alleging the existence of a conflict between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Strategic Air Command (SAC) with reference to the operation of the U-2 high altitude flights. These reports have contained allegations that a deadlock existed between CIA and SAC and that this was resolved at the policy level by transferring the function of flying the U-2 missions from CIA to SAC. It has also been alleged that this is one of the reasons for the delay in locating the MRBM sites in Cuba.

These allegations have also been closely inquired into and have been found to be without merit. There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that any conflict between CIA and SAC existed or that there was any delay in photographic coverage of the island because of the fact that the U-2 program was being operated by CIA prior to October 14.

Likewise, there is no evidence whatsoever of any deadlock between the two agencies or any conflict or dispute with respect to the question of by whom the flights should be flown.
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The Subcommittee inquired thoroughly into the reason for the transfer of the U-2 operation from CIA to SAC. It is to be remembered that the SA-2 sites in the San Cristobal area had been located on August 29th. The U-2 flight which was flown on October 14th was programmed to over-fly this area. In view of the possibility that the flight might provoke hostile reactions from the SA-2's, it was concluded that it would be more appropriate for the operation to be conducted by the military rather than by civilians. This decision was entirely reasonable and proper.

It is a fact, of course, that the first U-2 flight flown by SAC was the one which resulted in obtaining a photograph of the MREM site. This, without explanation, originally gave the Subcommittee some concern. However, after inquiring closely into the situation we are convinced that there is no significance to it and that it was just a matter of timing and coincidence.

F. Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally

As has been indicated, the U-2 high altitude reconnaissance flights over Cuba continued at the rate of two a month, weather permitting, until September. The stepped-up schedule for September and early October has already been outlined. All of the U-2 flights prior to October 14th were flown by the CIA.

After the mission which verified the existence of MREM's in Cuba, there was a concentrated effort to determine the precise nature of the missile buildup and the exact location, number, configuration and state of readiness of the missile systems. Between October 14 and October 22, the Strategic Air Command flew a total of 17 high altitude sorties. Low altitude overflights were not initiated until October 23, the day following the President's message.

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During the same period, the peripheral reconnaissance flights over international waters continued, as did the intensified collection efforts using refugees, exiles, and other human sources.

In reviewing the intelligence activities with respect to Cuba, the Subcommittee found areas in which criticism is justly due. In other areas, however, our intelligence did quite well. The MREMs were discovered while they were in the process of being deployed. The IRBM sites were discovered in a very early stage of construction. The IL-28 bombers were discovered while they were still in their crates. The MIG-21's were discovered when only one had been removed from the shipping container. All these weapon systems were identified, and their locations and performance characteristics spelled out before they became operational in a very compressed and limited period of time despite adverse weather conditions and the fact that we were penetrating an almost completely closed society.

The SA-2 sites were discovered commencing August 29th, and were credited by the intelligence community with becoming operational on a site-by-site basis commencing in mid-September. It is certain that these air defense missiles had attained an operational capability by October 27th. On that date a U-2 plane piloted by Major Rudolph Anderson, USAF, was shot down by an SA-2 and Major Anderson was killed.

CIA and military intelligence, by use of their highly developed photographic capability, were able to give a unique performance in intelligence operations. They ultimately placed in the hands of the President, his advisors and United States diplomatic representatives incontrovertible proof of the presence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba in direct contravention of Soviet government assurances. This visual proof unquestionably played a major part in the united action of the Organization of American States and world acceptance of the correctness of our position.
Photographic reconnaissance, however, does have limitations. It is only a part of the total intelligence collection means, although a most important one. It did not reveal the presence of ballistic missiles in Cuba during the period of at least a month between their introduction into the Island and their deployment on sites. The absence of photographic confirmation of human source and other reports, therefore, does not of itself disprove the accuracy of the other sources.

The responsible agencies of the intelligence community appear to have done a creditable job in gathering and collecting quantities of data and information. The deficiency in the performance of the intelligence community appears to have been in the evaluation and assessment of the accumulated data. Moreover, there seems to have been a disinclination on the part of the intelligence community to accept and believe the ominous portent of the information which had been gathered.

In addition, the intelligence people apparently invariably adopted the most optimistic estimate possible with respect to the information available. This is in sharp contrast to the customary military practice of emphasizing the worst situation which might be established by the accumulation of evidence.

There also appeared to be a tendency on the part of the intelligence people to discredit and downgrade refugee and exile reports. This was based on the general lack of experience and training of the refugees and exiles as military observers, their frequent inclusion of items not reasonably credible among those things which were within their power of observation as to time, place and comprehension, and on the consideration of the obvious self-interest of the Cuban sources.
Finally, the intelligence community was of the opinion that the Soviets would not introduce strategic missiles into Cuba because they believed that such a development would be incompatible with Soviet policy as interpreted by them. The error inherent in this estimate was clearly demonstrated by subsequent events. The danger that such pre-conceptions will control the weighing of the facts as events unfold is evident.

The influence of these and other factors resulted in several intelligence judgments and estimates which, in the retrospect, proved to be erroneous. A few of these will be mentioned.

The fact that the intelligence community did not accept the fact that organized Soviet ground combat units were being introduced into Cuba until photographic confirmation of this fact was obtained on October 25, and the related fact that the number of Soviets in Cuba was substantially underestimated throughout the entire crisis have already been discussed.

It has also been noted that the intelligence community did not estimate that strategic missiles would be introduced into Cuba until photographic confirmation was obtained on October 14th. It appears that, on this point, the analysts were strongly influenced by their philosophical judgment that it would be contrary to Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba. In retrospect, it appears that the indicators to the contrary were not given proper weight. Among other things the discovery of the surface-to-air missile complex in the San Cristobal area on August 29th could logically have led to the assumption that they were being constructed to protect a strategic missile installation since it was clear that these SA-2's were not being emplaced for the purpose of protecting any existing or known military installation.
V. SITUATION FROM OCTOBER 22, 1962, TO TIME OF REMOVAL OF IL-28 BOMBERS

A. Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally

On the day following the President's statement, that is, on October 23, 1962, low altitude flights over Cuba were commenced and there was a concerted effort to obtain detailed information both about the entire island and selected targets.

During the period from October 22 to December 6 the Strategic Air Command flew a total of 82 high altitude sorties, and from October 23 through November 15, when the low level flights over the island were discontinued, the Air Force and Navy flew a total of 162 low altitude sorties.

B. Identification of Organized Soviet Ground Combat Units

As has already been mentioned, photographs obtained on October 25th provided the first confirmation of the presence of Soviet highly mobile armored task groups in Cuba. The information obtained as a result was first distributed to the operational military commands on October 30th. Up to that time, it was thought that the Soviet ground equipment arriving in Cuba was to be utilized by the Cuban forces.

C. Removal of Missiles and IL-28 Bombers

To a man the intelligence chiefs believe that, following the October crisis and quarantine, the Soviets removed from Cuba 42 medium range ballistic missiles and related equipment, intermediate range ballistic missile equipment, and 42 IL-28 jet light bombers.

A comprehensive and concentrated aerial reconnaissance and fleet observation program endeavored to cover every aspect of the exodus of this equipment. This program involved high and low altitude flights over Cuba, accompanied by intensive sea and aerial surveillance of the departing ships over Cuba and Caribbean waters and continued surveillance across the Atlantic.

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The effort was directed at covering the dismantling and abandonment of the missile sites, at covering the roads and highways leading from the sites to the ports, and at covering the port areas to observe the material as it arrived, was assembled on the docks and loaded aboard ships.

As stated, the intelligence community believes that all strategic missiles and bombers which were in Cuba at the time of the quarantine were removed by the USSR. However, they acknowledge the existence of continuing reports to the contrary and freely concede that, in terms of absolutes, it is possible that despite our surveillance program, we were misled and deceived.

VI. CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION IN CUBA

A. Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally

Since the withdrawal of the strategic missiles and the IL-28 bombers the intelligence community has turned its primary attention to surveillance of the situation as it now exists. High level U-2 photographic flights continue on a regular basis. Since the U-2 was shot down on October 27 there has been no further attempt to interfere with our aerial reconnaissance. The reason for this one incident amidst a pattern of acquiescence in the overflights remains a matter for speculation.

The collection efforts using the technical and the various human sources available, such as refugees, exiles, and returned prisoners of the ill-fated Bay of Pigs operations, and others is a continuing process. The close surveillance of merchant shipping arriving and departing Cuba, by naval air and surface ships continues, as does the peripheral surveillance by electronic reconnaissance and photographic aircraft. There is additional surveillance of the aircraft activity over and near Cuba, from bases and ships to the extent that radar range permits.
A particular focus of attention has been the prospect that Cuba might become a base for Soviet submarine operations. There have been repeated rumors and speculations that such is already the case. Much of this is related to the Soviet assistance to Cuba in improving and expanding certain commercial fishing facilities. The intelligence community, however, does not believe that in fact Cuba is now, or has been, a base for Soviet submarines.

Admittedly, however, no spectacular operation is necessary to provide temporary advance base type support to submarines, sufficient to greatly extend their time on station away from bloc nation ports, and to facilitate their operations generally. Reasonably sheltered anchorages or ports with sufficient depth, ready supplies of diesel fuel, fresh water, food supplies, and relaxation facilities ashore for the crews greatly extend the time away from home for any submarine. The presence of a few skilled technicians and a supply of the high usage repair parts would additionally extend operational periods considerably. The use of shore-based long range communication systems and information from surface and shore-based radio and radar nets would greatly facilitate Soviet submarine operations in the Caribbean as well as assist in attempts to evade detection.

B. Nature and Capabilities of Forces and Equipment Now in Cuba

1. Types and Numbers of Weapons - As previously mentioned, it was testified that the native Cuban forces are organized only at reinforced battalion level with the effective modern weapons for such units, including rifles, machine guns, light and heavy mortars and considerable field artillery. For an organization of that type they have a rather large amount of mechanized equipment, tanks, self-propelled artillery and armored personnel carriers.
They also have available a considerable amount of anti-tank guns and light antiaircraft guns suitable for use against low flying aircraft. How much of the large numbers of additional crew-operated weapons of the types mentioned above are now in Cuban hands is apparently not known or estimated.

The Soviet organization has a powerful modern array of weapons in plentiful numbers. There are 24 SA-2 sites of 6 launchers each, in a tight knit perimeter air defense of the entire Island of Cuba. These weapons are similar to our NIKE-HERCULES and are very good indeed. Their fire control system is also estimated as of a high order of effectiveness. They have brought in a large amount of ammunition for these units. The SA-2 system which is quite complex is manned by Soviet troops. It would take over a year of intensive training, including quite technical schooling, for the native Cuban troops to replace the Soviets in the SA-2 system. Probably associated with the SA-2 sites for low level air defense, as well as in local defense of other important sites, are some of the large additional numbers of light antiaircraft guns brought in by the Soviet Expeditionary Force. Whether any or all of these weapons are manned by Soviets is apparently not known.

There are four cruise missile sites, with missiles of a range of about 30 to 40 miles from their ground launchers. The missiles are placed as part of the coastal defense system of Cuba, which is the normal Soviet employment of these weapons. They are manned by Soviet naval crews. As an added feature of these missiles, there are at least one hundred fifty (150) of them in Cuba, far more than could be logically associated with the known missile launching sites. It may be speculated that the launchers for these missiles may have been in some of the bloc shipping turned back by the October Quarantine and thus failed to reach Cuba.
The Soviet naval contingent in Cuba also operates 12 KOMAR-type high-speed patrol craft as part of the Cuban coastal defenses. These boats are each equipped with a pair of cruise-type missiles. The missiles are estimated to have a range of 10 to 15 miles. These boats are under Soviet control, but Cubans are believed to have been observed aboard them. The KOMARS are apparently the only Soviet naval craft introduced into Cuba as part of their expedition.

The Soviet Army element of the Soviet expedition in Cuba is armed with almost all of the weapons found in large Soviet troop formations. Many of these weapons, of the type characteristic of elements of mechanized and motorized divisions, reinforced by artillery and other units, are known to be in surprisingly large numbers. As mentioned before, the amounts, if any, handed to the Cubans from the many hundreds of heavy weapons brought in by the ships of the Soviet expedition, are not fully known. These weapons include heavy tanks and medium tanks, to a total in Cuba, both in Soviet and Cuban hands, of almost 400. There are several score self-propelled assault guns; over 200 57mm anti-tank guns; over 500 light, medium and heavy mortars; over 600 field artillery pieces; around 400 antiaircraft guns, both 300 mm and 57 mm; almost 100 armored personnel carriers, a number of the truck-mounted multiple launchers for the 130 mm rocket, all brought in over and above the numbers already in Cuban hands. In addition, of course, quantities of various types of motor vehicles, radio equipment and engineer equipment were also brought in.

To the above must be added two very modern Soviet Army tactical missiles. The first is the SNAPPER, a wire guided anti-tank missile similar to our SS-10 and SS-11. The second is the FROG, a rocket with a range of about 25 miles,
which can be equipped with a nuclear warhead. It is similar to our HONEST JOHN.

According to our intelligence, the Soviet Air Force in Cuba has approximately 42 MIG-21's, one of their most modern high performance supersonic jet fighters. They are equipped with infra-red seeking, homing missiles similar to our SIDEWINDER. Associated with them is a net of radars and radios necessary for their control and the integration of the entire air defense system, SA-2 and fighter.

2. Strength and Capabilities of Forces

The estimate of the strength of the Cuban army remains at the same level as before the crisis, that is, 75,000 in the regular Army, 100,00 in the Militia and 100,000 in the form of a home guard.

The native Cuban Army capabilities are believed generally limited by their organization. They are probably able, as before the crisis, to suppress an insurrection, depending upon the degree of support the insurgents obtain from the people of Cuba, and the amount of effective outside help given. It also has a limited degree of static defense ability against modern highly organized and heavily supported forces such as those employed in United States amphibious and air-borne landing operations. The lack of an organization which would permit coordinated operations by units larger than reinforced battalions indicates a low probability that any such combat would be of long duration.

The Cuban Navy is estimated to number some 4000 to 5000 men and to consist of 6 KRONSTADT patrol craft and a relatively small number of other coastal patrol craft. Although its previously slight capabilities have been
somewhat enhanced by the provision of Soviet equipment and by training, it is not believed to be very effective and is generally limited to coastal patrol activities.

The Cuban Air Force consists of a Cuban manned jet fighter force of about 70 MiG-15's, 17's, and 19's, about 14 World War II propeller fighters, about 18 propeller-driven tactical bombers, a considerable quantity of anti-aircraft equipment, plus a limited number of trainers, transports, and helicopters. The modern MiG-21 jet fighters which are in Cuba are not believed to have been turned over to the Cubans.

The effectiveness of the Cuban Air Force is not readily apparent. The assortment of fighters for air defense have varying performance characteristics. The effectiveness of its bomber force would probably be limited to action against insurgents in or invaders of Cuba who were not possessed of any real air cover or air defense capability.

The Soviet Expeditionary Force is still currently credited by the intelligence community with a total strength of about 17,500. Of these, about 2000 are believed to be Soviet Navy, with about 1000 manning the cruise missile sites, and the remainder in the KOMAR missile-bearing patrol boats, supporting Cuban ships and headquarters, security and other miscellaneous assignments. About 7800 Soviets are believed in the Air Force and Air Defense system, which includes the personnel manning the SA-2 system. This leaves an estimated 7700 soldiers to man all the weapons and equipment of the Soviet Army contingent in Cuba.

At this point it must be said that there is no really hard evidence of the number of Soviets who are now in Cuba. While 17,500 is still the official estimate of our intelligence people, despite the reported withdrawal of some
4000 to 5000 since the first of the year, the level of confidence in its accuracy varies even within the intelligence community. Other sources present considerably higher estimates --some ranging up to 40,000 and more. Bearing in mind the substantial underestimation of last October, we can only conclude that no one--outside of Soviet and Cuban official circles--knows how many Russian troops are now there. The 17,500 estimate is perhaps a minimum figure.

In any event, it is believed that the Soviet expedition, combined with the Cuban forces, as an entity, is quite powerful in a defensive sense. The air defense system is believed to be of a high order of effectiveness. The coastal defense cruise missiles do not form a tight perimeter defense of the Cuban shoreline, evidently because the quarantine turned back the necessary launchers to complete an interlocking net similar to the SA-2 system. This gap in the island defense may be partially covered by the KOMAR missile craft. The Soviet Army units, trained in mobile aggressive armored warfare, if well coordinated with the static defense ability of the Cuban native forces, could offer severe opposition to any attack. This opposition would be sufficient to make it necessary to mount a large sea-borne landing effort along with any desired air-borne effort in order to be sure of success. The public evidence of the forces assembled during the October crisis indicate that the combination of Soviet and Cuban forces would require the bulk of the ready forces in the United States and the Atlantic Ocean.

Based upon their judgment that all strategic missiles and offensive weapon systems have been removed, the intelligence community does not believe that Cuba now presents any major direct military threat to the United States or Latin America in an offensive or aggressive sense. Strategic weapons may
or may not be now in Cuba. We can reach no conclusion on this because of lack of conclusive evidence.

It is clear, however, that as a source of weapons and small bands of provocateurs, saboteurs, agents of revolution and chaos it is a distinct and present threat to all of the Latin American nations with shores on the Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea. It might be relatively difficult to engage in the smuggling of tanks, self-propelled guns, and heavy truck-towed artillery. Light mortars, machine guns, rifles, and the ammunition for these weapons, grenades, explosives, radios and bribe money are an entirely different matter. Gun running is an ancient art in Central and South America, well-practiced and well-understood in many quarters. Modern facilities make Cuba, as a centrally located base for such Communist operations, a present and grave menace to the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere. The use of Cuba as a base for subversion will be discussed in more detail in a later report.

3. Reports of Concealed Strategic Weapons in Cuba

Reports from refugee, exile and other human sources insist that the strategic missiles and bombers were not removed from Cuba but are concealed in caves and otherwise. The intelligence community, although aware of these reports, have been unable to confirm them and adhere to the position that all strategic weapons are withdrawn.

It is fair to say, however, that this is a matter of great concern to the intelligence community. Based on skepticism, if nothing else, there is grave apprehension on this score. It is agreed that iron-clad assurance of the complete absence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba can come only as a result of thorough, penetrating on-site inspection by reliable observers. The
current intelligence estimate that they are not present is based largely on the negative evidence that there is no affirmative proof to the contrary. This of course, was precisely the status of the matter prior to last October 14.

There is no doubt that there are literally thousands of caves and caverns in Cuba and that it is feasible to use many of these for the storage and concealment of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons. It is also true that military activity has been observed in connection with these caves. Our intelligence people are of the opinion that some of the caves are in fact utilized for the storage of military items and equipment other than strategic missiles, such as ammunition, explosives, etc.

The importance of making every effort to ascertain the truth with respect to this matter cannot be over-emphasized. The criticality of it can best be illustrated by the fact that the testimony established that, upon the assumption that all missiles and associated equipment and the necessary personnel were readily available near pre-selected sites in a state of complete readiness, mobile medium range missiles could be made operational in a matter of hours. Thus, if these missiles and their associated equipment remain in Cuba, the danger is clear and obvious.

The possible installation of advance submarine bases in Cuba has already been discussed.

4. Withdrawal of Soviet Personnel

Even though the intelligence community believes that a net 4000 to 5000 Soviet military personnel have been withdrawn from Cuba since the first of the year, because of what intelligence describes as "technical reasons" the previous intelligence estimate of approximately 17,500 Soviets in Cuba remains unchanged. At the very least this suggests to the Subcommittee that
there is a low level of confidence in the original estimate. There is also some question in our minds as to the adequacy of the information as to the number of Soviets newly arriving. Admittedly, there could have been undetected arrivals at smaller ports, where it is known that cargo ships have repeated their prior practice of unloading at night under conditions of strict Soviet-imposed security. Since night photographic methods were not employed, we have little knowledge of what happened in these cases. In any event, as the matter stands at the writing of this report, the intelligence community does not believe it yet has sufficient concrete evidence to estimate any reduction in overall Soviet military capability on the Island. There is no evidence that any of the combat troops associated with the four armored groups have been withdrawn.

C. Summary of Threat Arising from Soviet Presence in Cuba

Our summary of the threat and potential threat which the Soviet presence in Cuba presents to the Americas is as follows:

1. Cuba is an advanced Soviet base for subversive, revolutionary and agitational activities in the Western Hemisphere and affords the opportunity to export agents, funds, arms, ammunition and propaganda throughout Latin America.

2. Assuming without deciding that all strategic weapons have been withdrawn, there is the ever-present possibility of the stealthy re-introduction of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons, using the Soviet forces still in Cuba as camouflage and security for the activity.

3. Cuba serves as an advance intelligence base for the USSR.

4. The potential exists to establish electronic warfare capabilities based on Cuba.
5. The vital Panama Canal could be the target for sneak raids originating from Cuba.

6. Potentially, Cuba is a base from which the Soviets could interdict our vital air and sea lanes. It can now be used for the air, sea, and electronic surveillance of our military activities in the Southeast United States and the Caribbean.

7. Cuba's airfields could serve as recovery air bases for planes launched against the United States from the Soviet Unión.

8. Advanced Soviet submarine bases could be established in Cuban ports with very little effort.

9. The continued presence of the Soviets in Cuba could require a further reorientation of the U.S. air defenses.

10. Cuba provides a base for the training of agents from other Latin American countries in subversive, revolutionary, agitational and sabotage techniques.

11. The very presence of the Soviets in Cuba affects adversely our nation's image and prestige. Our friends abroad will understandably doubt our ability to meet and defeat the forces of communism thousands of miles across the ocean if we prove unable to cope with the communist threat at our very doorstep.

A consideration of all these matters serves to emphasize the gravity of the threat to our national security which Cuba now represents.

D. Prospect of Internal Revolt or Invasion

The continued presence of the Soviet expedition in Cuba can now be seen to be a most effective shield against either internal revolt by native insurgents, or invasion by external forces from any source. The ringing of the
Island by the Soviet air defense and missile system, and the island-wide evidence of impressive, powerful, armored Russian troop units, all apparently immune from attack, has been and will be an increasing psychological damper to the fires of revolt. We can only expect, under present circumstances, that whatever capacity and will to resist communism may exist among the people in Cuba, will wither and shrink. The communization of the younger element creates simultaneously an increasingly militant communist nation.

The withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Cuba would remove a primary psychological prop of Castroism, and remove what is presently being used as a physical shield against any overt effort to keep alive the fires of freedom in Cuba. As mentioned before, the ability of Castro's native Cuban forces standing alone, to withstand any insurrection, depends upon the support the Cuban people give to the insurgents, and the effective outside help given to insurgent forces.
VII. CONCLUDING STATEMENT

Barring some development which is unforeseen at this time, the public debate will probably continue as to whether missiles and other strategic weapons are now based in Cuba and as to the number of Soviet troops being maintained there. These things are certainly of undeniable importance. The matter of basic and fundamental importance, however, and the source of the real threat, is that international communism now has a firm foothold in this hemisphere and that, if we permit it to do so, it is here to stay.

The Soviets are in Cuba primarily for the purpose of increasing and spreading communism's influence and power in Latin America and we can be sure that they will exploit their foothold to the greatest extent possible. The paramount danger at this time is that the nations of this hemisphere may be subverted one by one and be exploited, in turn, for subversive and revolutionary activities. By this process of erosion our neighbors to the South may fall nation by nation until the entire hemisphere is lost and the Communist goal of isolating the United States has been attained.

Communism, of course, operates on a world-wide scale and its methods and techniques are always adapted to the environment in which it operates. With this in mind, the value to the USSR of the occupation of Cuba is apparent. The techniques of communist subversion may vary from simple infiltration to violent intervention. Whatever its form, however, in Cuba as elsewhere it is conceived, developed and perfected by the leaders of world communism for the purpose of furthering their concept of world domination. Its aim and goal is to destroy existing political, economic and social orders and to replace them with new and dictatorial regimes which presuppose the complete physical and moral control of subjugated peoples.
This aim and goal has already been achieved in Cuba. It will be achieved elsewhere in Latin America unless positive steps are taken to prevent it. We must be prepared to take appropriate and positive action in our own national self-interest and in the interest of the collective security of the Western Hemisphere.

The Communist domination and occupation of Cuba, and the resulting menace to our security, requires and demands that the United States be ever alert and vigilant to all of its sinister implications. We must exercise the greatest surveillance and watchfulness possible, and use all available resources, for the purpose of ascertaining the true military situation in that unhappy island and to insure that we will not again be deceived and surprised. The entire Cuban problem, both military and political, should be accorded the highest possible priority by our governmental officials to the end that the evil threat which the Soviet occupation of Cuba represents will be eliminated at an early date.
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT A. HURWITCH, Department of State

SUBJECT: Missile Crisis Section of the President's Draft Report to Congress on US Participation in the UN During 1962

Pursuant to our telephone conversation, the attached draft has been reviewed and the Department of Defense has no objection to it, subject to the following changes:

1. **Page 3, Line 8:** Change number "25" to "24." *Reason: Accuracy, based on official Department of the Navy records.*

2. **Page 3, Line 10:** Change "12" to "16" and "25" to "24." *Reason: Accuracy.*

3. **Page 34, Lines 14 and 15:** Insert "10" before word "November," "and observed" before "42," and "ballistic" before "missiles." *Reason: Clarity and more accurate detail.*

4. **Page 37, Lines 13-15:** Insert "by December 6" before "its promise" and "42" before "IL-28." Eliminate the sentence "and, by December 6, the US was informed that all bombers (42 in number) had left," and substitute "their removal being confirmed by aerial reconnaissance and by along-side observation at sea on the decks of the Soviet ships carrying them back to the USSR." *Reason: Provide additional positive detail, particularly with reference to the IL-28 removal being based upon confirmed observation and not merely upon information provided by the USSR.*
Page 42, Line 9: Insert "more vigilant and" before "stronger." Reason: Strengthen prime point that increased awareness of Communist duplicity and potential threats resulted from crisis, particularly in the OAS.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Special Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
28 March 1963

U17,171/P-2

SUBJECT: Missile Crisis Section of the President's Draft Report to Congress on US Participation in the UN During 1962

TO: General Counsel
Department of Defense

Intelligence content of subject draft has been reviewed and the following comments are submitted:

1. Page 3, Line 8: Change number "25" to "24." Reason: Accuracy, based on official Department of the Navy records.


3. Page 34, Lines 14 and 15: Insert "10" before word "November," "and observed" before "42," and "ballistic" before "missiles." Reason: Clarity and more accurate detail.

4. Page 37, Lines 13 - 15: Insert "by December 6" before "its promise" and "42" before "IL-28." Eliminate the sentence "and, by December 6, the US was informed that all bombers (42 in number) had left," and substitute "their removal being confirmed by aerial reconnaissance and by along-side observation at sea on the decks of the Soviet ships carrying them back to the USSR." Reason: Provide additional positive detail, particularly with reference to the IL-28 removal being based upon confirmed observation and not merely upon information provided by the USSR.

5. Page 42, Line 9: Insert "more vigilant and" before "stronger." Reason: Strengthen prime point that increased awareness of Communist duplicity and potential threats resulted from crisis, particularly in the OAS.

JOSEPH F. CARROLL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director
28 March 1963

U17,171/P-2

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JOSEPH F. CARROLL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director
MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

March 27, 1963

Attached is a draft of the missile crisis section of the President's Report to Congress on United States Participation in the United Nations during 1962.

The Department of State has drafted this report and sent it to me for Department of Defense clearance. I should appreciate it if you would read the report and return it to me with any comments by 1200 hours on March 29, 1963.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

Attachment
As Stated

cc:
Mr. Yarmolinsky
Mr. McGiffert
General Carroll (DIA)
TO: CCA - Mr. Hurwitch

FROM: RPA - William G. Bowdler

DATE: March 27, 1963

SUBJECT: Defense Clearance of Missile Crisis Section of President's Report to Congress on US Participation in UN During 1962.

UNP, with RPA's cooperation, has prepared the attached draft chapter on the missile crisis for the President's annual report to Congress on US participation in the UN.

Mr. Monsma is handling clearance of the chapter within ARA. I have been asked to obtain Defense clearance. When I spoke to Mr. Knaur about this last week, he touched base with Mr. Yarmolinsky and came back with the reply that the most expeditious way to get DOD clearance is through CCA channels. Could you please arrange for this to be done as quickly as possible as the report is now overdue?
MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

March 27, 1963

Attached is a draft of the missile crisis section of the President's Report to Congress on United States Participation in the United Nations during 1962.

The Department of State has drafted this report and sent it to me for Department of Defense clearance. I should appreciate it if you would read the report and return it to me with any comments by 1200 hours on March 29, 1963.

Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

Attachment
As Stated

cc:
Mr. Yarmolinsky
Mr. McGiffert
General Carroll (DIA)
Soviet Buildup

On October 22, President Kennedy announced to the nation and to the world the "secret, swift and extraordinary buildup" by the Soviet Union of offensive missiles in Cuba and the initial steps that the United States was taking to cope with this threat. Information on the buildup had been given to the President the previous Tuesday morning (October 16) and, during the week that followed, surveillance was stepped up, confirming evidence evaluated, a course of action decided upon, friendly governments notified and consulted, the members and machinery of the Organization of American States (O.A.S.) brought into the picture, and American defenses in the Caribbean strengthened and put on the alert.

The President revealed that a serious threat against the peace and security of the Americas was being secretly mounted by the Soviet Union on the "imprisoned island" of Cuba. Sites for medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) capable of carrying a nuclear warhead 1,000 nautical miles had been rapidly and secretly installed and additional sites not yet completed were designed for intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) capable of travelling twice as far and thus posing a nuclear threat to most of the major cities of the Western Hemisphere. This urgent transformation of Cuba into a strategic base with nuclear striking capacity constituted an explicit threat to the peace and security of the Americas in defiance of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) of 1947, "the traditions of this nation and hemisphere," and the Charter of the United Nations. This Soviet action contradicted the repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen, both

/ publicly and
publicly and privately delivered, that the arms buildup in Cuba would retain its original defensive character. Neither the United States nor the world community, the President emphasized, could tolerate the deliberate deception and offensive threat represented by the clandestine deployment of strategic nuclear weapons.

To meet this threat the United States was taking immediately the following steps: 1) to halt the buildup, a strict quarantine of all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba was being initiated and, should offensive military preparations continue, "further action will be justified;" 2) the United States declared that it would regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union; 3) Guantanamo was being reinforced; 4) the Council of the Organization of American States was being convened to apply the Rio Treaty in support of hemispheric security; and 5) under the Charter of the United Nations, the United States was requesting an emergency meeting of the Security Council. Finally, the President called on Chairman Khrushchev "to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations."

**U.S. Objective**

This was a difficult and dangerous effort on which the United States had set out, the President concluded, "...the greatest danger of all would be to do nothing." On the military side, steps were taken to strengthen defenses in the Caribbean and to put United States forces in a posture to apply the quarantine. The Department of Defense had ordered all tours of duty of Navy and Marine personnel extended until further notice; the

/Guantanamo naval
Guantanamo naval base defenses were strengthened; air power was built up in the Southeastern portion of the United States; and military deployment put 5,000 marines and 40 naval vessels in the Caribbean, initially as part of a training exercise. Following the resolution adopted by the Organ of Consultation of the Council of the Organization of American States (described below) the President issued a proclamation establishing the quarantine of Cuba as of 10 A.M. on October 24. The Department of Defense ordered the interdiction of 25 Soviet merchant vessels known to be headed for Cuba. At 8 A.M. on October 25 the first interception of a Soviet ship, the oil tanker Bucharest, took place, and the ship was allowed to proceed. 12 of the 25 Soviet vessels heading for Cuba turned around and no encounter with a contraband-carrying vessel occurred during the Cuba affair.

From the beginning it was clear that in the political and diplomatic realm U.S. policy had two immediate tasks. The first and most proximate task of U.S. diplomacy was to show that the Soviets had in fact used guile and deception to emplace in Cuba offensive nuclear weapons, and that our evidence was conclusive. The second was to halt further shipments and bring about rapidly and effectively the removal of the offensive weapons, under U.N. supervision, before the quarantine could be lifted. The United States was prepared to negotiate on modalities and to consider various formulae but not to abandon this goal.

From the start, both the Organization of American States and the United Nations were involved. Resources and institutions of this hemisphere were used to underline its solidarity and determination, and to convince the Soviet Union that elimination of the offensive weapons was a purpose to which the hemisphere was solidly committed. From the start, too, it was clear that
the United Nations would have a crucial role. It was the forum in which the evidence of Soviet guilt could be most convincingly exposed to a world-wide audience, world opinion mobilized, and the world verdict pronounced. It was, also, a ready and efficient mechanism for diplomatic communications. The United Nations served as a site where U.S. and Soviet negotiators could easily meet. The Secretary-General himself supplied an important link between the parties particularly during the first days when tension was highest. Thirdly, although Cuba prevented their employment, the United Nations proved itself willing and able to devise acceptable mechanisms for inspection and verification of dismantling and removal of the offensive weapons and for safeguards against their reintroduction. The United Nations was also prepared to carry out the necessary operational responsibilities. Simultaneously with the President's speech, therefore, the United States took diplomatic steps to set in motion the political machinery of the O.A.S. and the U.N.

O.A.S. Action

In Washington the U.S. Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States (O.A.S.) sent a note to the Acting Chairman requesting the immediate convocation of the Council as a Provisional Organ of Consultation under Article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty). This article provides for immediate consultation on measures to be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of peace and security of the Continent when "the inviolability of the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American States should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America."

/ The O.A.S. 
The O.A.S. Council met on the morning of October 23. Secretary of State Dean Rusk sitting as the U.S. Representative described the nature of the threat to this hemisphere and the countermeasures which the United States considered it essential for the inter-American system to take. He stated that "the Soviet intervention in this hemisphere with major offensive weapons challenges as never before the determination of the American Governments to carry out hemispheric commitments solemnly assumed in inter-American treaties and resolutions for the defense of the peace and security of the nations of the hemisphere against extra-continental aggression or intervention." He proposed that under the Rio Treaty the Council, serving as Organ of Consultation, without delay "call for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons of offensive capability and ... recommend ... that the member states of the Organization of American States take the necessary measures to ensure that Cuba does not continue to receive additional offensive weapons ... and if necessary to prevent the offensive capacity already acquired by the Castro regime from being used to destroy the peace and security of the hemisphere."

The Secretary noted that the United States was simultaneously asking the U.N. Security Council to act in the matter. He observed: "The threat is to our hemisphere and we have primary responsibility and duty to act as we are now doing, as a hemisphere. But the threat originates from outside the hemisphere and it is appropriate that the extra-continental power which challenges our inter-American commitments ... be dealt with in the forum in which that power participates. It is therefore fitting in this case that the Security Council of the United Nations be requested to call upon this member..."
to refrain from his aggressive actions against us and seek to enforce upon him its decisions. Meanwhile, without awaiting the outcome of the United Nations approach, we must ensure that our hemisphere is effectively quarantined against any further addition to Soviet offensive nuclear military power in our midst."

Following a general discussion of the danger confronting the hemisphere the Council voted 19 to 0 (Bolivia abstained for lack of instructions) to constitute itself provisionally as the Organ of Consultation (C.O.A.S./O.C.). Then, at the suggestion of the U.S. Representative, the Organ of Consultation adjourned for several hours to permit a number of delegations to consult their governments and receive instructions on the draft resolution presented by the United States to deal with the threat confronting the hemisphere.

The Organ of Consultation reconvened that same afternoon. Debate centered on the draft resolution. As each representative spoke, it became evident that the American republics were solidly united in their determination to resist this most dangerous threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere. A few delegations were not in a position to vote affirmatively on certain provisions of the resolution, attributable for the most part to domestic constitutional considerations, but when the resolution as a whole was put to a vote, the support was unanimous. In one of the historic decisions of the inter-American system the Organ of Consultation: (1) called for "the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability," and (2) recommended that "the member states, in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, take all measures, individually and collectively including the use of armed force, ..."
which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent." The resolution also expressed "the hope that the Security Council will, in accordance with the Resolution introduced by the United States, dispatch United Nations observers to Cuba at the earliest moment."

Following the meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States/Organ of Consultation and pursuant to the recommendations contained in the second paragraph of the resolution adopted, President Kennedy issued the Presidential Proclamation interdicting the delivery of offensive weapons and associated material to Cuba, to commence at 10:00 A.M. Eastern Standard Time on October 24. The proclamation stated that the Secretary of Defense "shall take appropriate measures to prevent the delivery of prohibited material to Cuba, employing the land, sea and air forces of the United States in cooperation with any forces that may be made available by other American states." The Secretary of Defense was authorized to designate prohibited or restricted zones and prescribed routes and declared that "any vessel or craft which may be proceeding toward Cuba may be intercepted and may be directed to identify itself, its cargo, equipment and stores and its ports of call, to stop, to lie to, to submit to visit and search, or to proceed as directed." Any vessel that refused to comply with directions might be taken into custody. In carrying out the order force was not to be used except in case of failure or refusal to comply with directions or...
regulations after reasonable efforts had been made to communicate with the vessel or craft, or in self-defense.

In the days immediately following, twelve other American republics offered assistance in support of the quarantine operation: Argentina, Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, and Nicaragua. Several of these offers included naval units, posing the problem of coordination of forces. Consequently, on November 5, the C.O.A.S./O.C. recommended that the contributing member states take among themselves the technical measures necessary to establish an efficient and coordinated action. Pursuant to this recommendation, the governments of Argentina, the Dominican Republic and the United States on November 9 notified the C.O.A.S./O.C. of the establishment of an Inter-American Combined Quarantine Force into which they were integrating their respective naval units and placing officers of the participating navies on the staff of the Commander of the Combined Quarantine Force.

Security Council Consideration

Simultaneously with the call for a meeting of the O.A.S. Council, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson in New York requested the President of the Security Council — that month the Soviet Representative — to call an urgent meeting of the Council “to deal with the dangerous threat to the peace and security of the world caused by the secret establishment in Cuba by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of launching bases and the installation of long-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying thermonuclear warheads to most of North and South America.” “The United States,” he wrote, “now has incontrovertible evidence that the U.S.S.R. has been installing in Cuba a whole series of facilities for launching offensive nuclear missiles and other offensive weapons and installing the weapons themselves.”
The establishment of these bases, Ambassador Stevenson declared, "constitutes a grave threat to the peace and security of this hemisphere and of the whole world." It should be the purpose of Security Council action, he concluded, "to bring about the immediate dismantling and withdrawal of the Soviet missiles and other offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of United Nations observers, to make it possible to lift the quarantine which is being put into effect." He also expressed the willingness of the United States to confer with the Soviet Union "on measures to remove the existing threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere and the peace of the world."

Ambassador Stevenson transmitted a draft resolution which called for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other offensive weapons, and which authorized the sending to Cuba of a U.N. observer corps to assure and report on compliance with the resolution. The resolution called for an end to the U.S. quarantine of military shipments to Cuba when the above terms were complied with and recommended that the United States and the U.S.S.R. "confer promptly on measures to remove the existing threat."

The Security Council held four meetings on October 23, 24, and 25. By the time the first meeting opened on the afternoon of October 23, the Soviet Union and Cuba had introduced two parallel letters to the President of the Security Council making similar requests for an urgent meeting of the Council in an attempt to change the focus of the question. They contended that U.S. countermeasures and "aggressive action" against Cuba constituted the real threat to peace in the Caribbean. Under Rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, the Cuban Representative was invited to participate in the discussion of the matter before the Security Council.

/Ambassador
Ambassador Stevenson's opening speech put the issue in the perspective of Soviet post-war aggressive expansionism. He traced the "vast plan of piecemeal aggression" and "the basic drive to abolish the world of the Charter" which had characterized Soviet policy in the post-war years and which had not been altered by the present Soviet Government. Contrasting the history of Soviet expansionism and rejection of the principles of the Charter with the United States record of loyal support for the Organization and "the world of the Charter," Ambassador Stevenson regretted that some members "seemed to believe that the cold war is a private war between two great super powers." "It is not a private struggle," he insisted, "it is a world civil war -- a contest between the pluralistic world and the monolithic world -- a contest between the world of the Charter and the world of Communist conformity."

"The Castro regime," he pointed out, "has aided and abetted an invasion of this hemisphere" and "has given the Soviet Union a staging area in this hemisphere" by inviting "an extra-continental, anti-democratic and expansionist power into the bosom of the American family" and by making itself "an accomplice in the communist enterprise of world domination." The Soviet Union, he continued, had secretly transformed Cuba into a formidable missile and strategic airbase, armed with the deadliest, most far-reaching modern nuclear weapons, in an attempt to put all the Americas under a "nuclear gun" and to intensify the "Soviet diplomacy of blackmail." The day of forbearance is past, he concluded. "If the United States and the other nations of the Western Hemisphere should accept this new phase of aggression, we would be delinquent in our obligations to world peace." He could not believe that the Soviet leadership had deluded itself into supposing the United States lacked the nerve and will to use its power, and he voiced the hope that the Soviets would call an end "to this new..."
phase of aggression." He urged the Council to call for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet missiles and other offensive weapons from Cuba.

Ambassador Stevenson then informed the Security Council, in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter, that the Council of the O.A.S. had adopted a resolution by 19 affirmative votes (as noted above) calling for the dismantling and withdrawal of the offensive weapons, recommending that member states of the O.A.S. take all measures to ensure that the threat was removed from the continent, and expressing the hope that the Security Council will "dispatch U.N. observers to Cuba at the earliest moment."

Ambassador Stevenson thus made three points before the Security Council which defined the themes for the debate during the rest of the week:

1. The Soviet action in sending thousands of military technicians to its puppet in the Western Hemisphere, supplying jet bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons, installing missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads and preparing sites for additional missiles with a range of 2,200 miles, and doing these things through deceit and under the cloak of secrecy, were in defiance of the security commitments of the Organization of American States and in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, and contained a manifest threat to this hemisphere and to the whole world.

2. The action and policy of the United States in this matter were in consonance with the U.N. Charter and had the unanimous backing of the Organization of American States.

3. The Security Council should remove the threat by calling, as the resolution proposed, for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and all offensive weapons; authorizing and requesting the Secretary-General to dispatch to Cuba a U.N. observer corps to assure and
report in compliance with this resolution; calling for termination of the quarantine upon U.N. certification of such compliance; and urgently recommending that the United States and the Soviet Union confer promptly on measures to remove the existing threat to the security and the peace of the world and report therein to the Security Council.

Following Ambassador Stevenson's presentation, the Cuban and Soviet Representatives made their initial statements. The Cuban Representative, Mr. Garcia-Inchaustegui, denounced the naval "blockade" as an "act of war" and declared that the Cuban people had answered the "armed attack" with general mobilization. He asked the Council to call for the immediate withdrawal of all troops, ships and planes deployed on the approaches to Cuban shores, and for the cessation of all "interventionist" measures. The Cuban Representative also contended that the United States had no right to ask for dismantling and disarmament and that "logically, U.S. observers should be sent to the U.S. bases from which invaders and pirates emerge to punish and harass a small state." He insisted that Cuba "will not accept any kind of observers in matters which fall within our domestic jurisdiction."

The Soviet Representative, Ambassador Zorin, declared that the United States charges were "a clumsy attempt to cover up aggressive actions" in Cuba. He described the U.S. quarantine as a "new and extremely dangerous act of aggression" and as "undisguised piracy." During this first encounter, while avoiding direct reference to the presence of Soviet missiles or bombers in Cuba, Ambassador Zorin declared that accusations that the Soviet Union had "set up offensive armaments in Cuba" were false, and officially confirmed the statement already made by the Soviet Union in this connection, "that the Soviet Government has not directed and is not directing to Cuba any offensive armaments." He also recalled the statement of Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs

/Andrei Grozvyko
Andrei Gromyko in the General Assembly just a month previously (September 21, 1962) that "any sober-minded man knows that Cuba is not ... building up her forces to such a degree that she can pose a threat to the United States ... or else a threat to any state of the Western Hemisphere."

Ambassador Zorin submitted to the Security Council a statement published by the Soviet Government that day which addressed a "serious warning to the United States Government, to advise it that, in carrying out the measures announced by President Kennedy, it is taking on itself a heavy responsibility for the fate of the world;" declared that the Soviet Government will do "everything in its power to frustrate the aggressive designs of U.S. imperialistic circles;" and appealed to all governments and peoples to raise their voices in protest against the "aggressive acts" of the United States and strongly to condemn such acts. He introduced a draft resolution condemning the "actions of the Government of the United States designed to violate the Charter of the United Nations and to intensify the threat of war." The Soviet resolution insisted that the United States "repeal its decision on the control of ships of other states going towards the shores of Cuba," and called upon the United States, Cuba, and U.S.S.R. "to establish contacts and enter into negotiations for the purpose of normalizing the situation and thereby removing the threat of war."

At the request of the Representative of Ghana the meeting was adjourned to the following morning so that representatives might consult with other delegations outside the Council.

The Next Morning: October 24

The next morning, the Security Council heard the Representative of Venezuela, Mr. Sosa-Rodriguez, associate the Latin American nations with the action taken by the United States pursuant to the O.A.S. resolution. He noted...
that "it has been proved that the Soviet Union has set up in Cuba rocket bases that might deliver nuclear missiles to about 1,000 miles distance, and that, apparently, it is at present setting up others for rockets with a range of up to 2,200 miles." This had created an atmosphere of insecurity and concern in the countries of the American hemisphere which felt themselves directly threatened by such weapons. The weapons in Cuba, the Venezuelan Representative emphasized, were no longer defensive but offensive, and "they are of a magnitude that might be sufficient to wipe out any of the American republics and drag the world into the holocaust of nuclear war." He described the apprehension felt throughout the continent at Cuban subversive activities, including the introduction of agents, propaganda, and weapons to equip guerrilla forces in American republics. Ambassador Sosa-Rodriguez recalled the resolution adopted by the Organization of American States and declared that he was speaking for the entire continent in asking the Security Council to take measures to stop nuclear weapons from arriving in Cuba and to have the presently existing bases of nuclear rockets in Cuba dismantled.

Sir Patrick Dean, Representative of the United Kingdom, noted that by no stretch even of the Soviet imagination could a nuclear missile with a range of 2,200 miles in Cuba be called defensive, and recalled assurances on this point by Foreign Minister Gromyko and President Dorticos of Cuba at the General Assembly the previous month. "While the Soviet Government were acting their lie," he stated, "the orders were being given, plans laid and preparations being made for the supply of missiles to Cuba. Who can possibly believe in the honesty of the Soviet Government's intentions in these circumstances?"

The United Kingdom, he concluded, considered that the United States acted properly by coming to the Security Council at the first possible moment. Now the Security Council must take immediate and urgent steps to restore confidence
in the Western Hemisphere by having these offensive missiles dismantled and withdrawn. The United Kingdom fully supported the U.S. resolution before the Council.

The Representative of Rumania, Mr. Malitza, supported the Soviet position. The Irish Foreign Minister, Mr. Aiken, underlined world concern with the growth of Soviet intervention in Cuba. He appreciated Cuban concern with its national security, "but it is a far cry from that to a military buildup of the kind which the Cuban Government now appears to have embarked upon with the massive assistance of the Soviet Union." He could not understand "why the Soviet Union should have chosen this moment to establish new missile and bomber bases on the island of Cuba?" The Foreign Minister believed he perceived some common ground in the U.S. statement to the Security Council of October 22 which declared U.S. willingness "to confer with the Soviet Union on measures to remove the existing threat to security of the Western Hemisphere," and in the Soviet draft resolution which proposed that the United States, U.S.S.R. and Cuba establish contacts and enter into negotiations.

The Security Council reconvened that evening, some forty-eight hours after President Kennedy's historic speech. The naval quarantine had gone into effect at 10:00 A.M. that morning. Members knew that if a Soviet ship attempted to run the quarantine the result would be serious. They also knew that the President had indicated that the quarantine was an "immediate step" which would be followed by "further action" if the Soviet missiles were not removed.

At this meeting the Council heard statements by those members who had not yet spoken: France, China, Chile, United Arab Republic, and Ghana. In addition to expressions of support for the U.S. resolution by France and China, the highlights of the meeting were the statement of Chile, the United Arab...
Republic-Chine "restraint resolution," and the first formal intervention of the Secretary-General. Ambassador Seydoux, the Representative of France, noted that "the appearance of foreign nuclear missiles on Cuban soil...cannot be considered as other than a serious initiative aimed at creating a new war front in a region which up to now has been free from such threats." He stated that the U.S. had demonstrated clearly that it is seeking a peaceful solution in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and that the solution proposed by the U.S. was desirable in the interest of the countries concerned and "in order to banish once and for all the dangers with which world peace is threatened by the recent developments in Cuba." Ambassador Lin, for the Republic of China, noted that it was particularly disturbing to see Cuba transformed, as a result of Sino-Soviet intervention, into an armed base for communist penetration of the Americas. He declared that the measures initiated by the United States designed to call an immediate halt to the shipment of military material to Cuba were justified and supported the U.S. draft resolution as a reasonable and peaceful solution.

Speaking for Chile, Ambassador Schweitzer endorsed the security measures of the regional system and expressed support for the U.S. draft resolution. He welcomed the authorization that the U.S. draft resolution gave to the Secretary-General to dispatch an observer corps to Cuba. "Unfortunately," he said, "the Representative of Cuba yesterday rejected this idea. At such a decisive moment as this, we believe Cuba should trust the methods of the United Nations for putting out the flames of conflict and for ensuring peace. One such method could be to ensure the United Nations presence in a zone of conflict .... We make a fervent and heartfelt appeal to Cuba to accept such a procedure."
The United Arab Republic Representative, Mr. Mahmoud Rimy, declared that his country "cannot condone the unilateral decision of the United States of America to exercise the quarantine" which he characterized as contrary to international law and likely to increase world tension. He recalled that Dr. Dorticos had told the General Assembly that the weapons Cuba had acquired were "defensive in nature" and called for "normalization" of relations between Cuba and the United States. At the same time he reaffirmed U.A.R. policies against the spread of nuclear weapons. He urged all parties to refrain from tension-aggravating action and called for negotiations. The Ghana Representative, Mr. Quaison-Sackey, took a similar position, stating that he had no "incontrovertible proof...as to the offensive character of military developments in Cuba" and therefore could not condone the quarantine. He also called for negotiations to resolve the crisis on the basis of "mutual respect for sovereign rights." The U.A.R.-Ghana joint draft resolution requested the Secretary-General "to promptly confer with the parties directly concerned on immediate steps to be taken to remove the existing threat to world peace, and to normalize the situation in the Caribbean;" and called on the parties concerned to comply forthwith with the resolution, to provide every assistance to the Secretary-General, and "to refrain meanwhile from any action which may directly or indirectly further aggravate the situation." The formula proposed was thus limited to a general appeal for mediation by the Secretary-General, but provided neither for the suspension of the Soviet offensive buildup nor for U.N. involvement in inspection and verification.

U Thant's Proposal of October 24

At the close of the meeting, the Secretary-General revealed that he had
just addressed an urgent appeal to President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev which proposed "the voluntary suspension of all arms shipments to Cuba, and also the voluntary suspension of the quarantine measures involving the searching of ships bound for Cuba." That believed that such voluntary suspension for a period of two to three weeks would greatly ease the situation and give time to the parties to "meet and discuss." He offered to "make myself available to all parties for whatever services I may be able to perform."

In addition to this appeal to President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev, the Secretary-General took the occasion of the Security Council meeting to address an urgent appeal to the President and Premier of Cuba, declaring that "it would also contribute greatly to the same end if the construction and development of major military facilities and installations in Cuba would be suspended during the period of negotiations." He then appealed to "the parties concerned" to enter into negotiations immediately, "even this night," irrespective of other procedures, with the first subject to be discussed being the "modalities" to achieve his suggestions. Significant in U Thant's intervention were his offer to make himself available to U.S. and Soviet negotiators "for whatever services" he might perform and the concrete suggestion for "suspension" of Soviet arms shipments and of the construction and development of major military installations in exchange for the suspension of the quarantine.

The next day, President Kennedy's reply reminded the Secretary-General that the threat, "was created by the secret introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba, and the answer lies in the removal of such weapons." The President noted that the Secretary-General had "made certain suggestions and... invited preliminary talks to determine whether satisfactory arrangements can be assured" and indicated that "Ambassador Stevenson is ready to discuss promptly..."
those arrangements with you." Premier Khrushchev's reply welcomed U Thant's initiative and characterized the situation "as highly dangerous and calling for the immediate intervention by the United Nations."

When the Security Council reconvened Thursday afternoon for what proved to be the last formal meeting on the Cuban crisis, Ambassador Stevenson welcomed both the course adopted by the Soviet Union the previous day to avoid direct confrontations in the zone of quarantine and the report that Mr. Khrushchev had agreed to the proposals advanced by the Secretary-General. Nevertheless, the situation remained serious and Ambassador Stevenson set the theme in his opening remark by inviting the Council to address itself to "the realities of the situation posed by the buildup of nuclear striking power in Cuba."

Ambassador Stevenson cautioned the Council not to forget that "we are here today...for one single reason: because the Soviet Union secretly introduced this menacing offensive military buildup into the island of Cuba while assuring the world that nothing was further from its thoughts." Already the Communists had attempted to distort the record by arguing that it was not the Soviet Union which created this threat to peace by secretly installing these weapons in Cuba, "but that it was the United States which created this crisis by discovering and reporting these installations. This is the first time, I confess," the U.S. Representative continued, "that I have ever heard it said that the crime is not the burglary but the discovery of the burglary." He noted that some representatives in the Council say that they do not know whether the Soviet Union has in fact built in Cuba installations capable of firing nuclear missiles over ranges from 1,000 to 2,000 miles. If further doubt remained on this score the United States would
gladly exhibit photographic evidence to prove the truth of the charges.

One by one Ambassador Stevenson demolished the arguments that Ambassador Zorin had presented at the first Security Council meeting. As for the "thirty-five bases in foreign countries" which the Soviet Representative had mentioned, the fact was that there were such missiles with the forces of only three of our allies -- the United Kingdom, Italy, and Turkey -- and that these were established by the decision of Heads of Government in December 1957 "which was compelled to authorize such arrangements by virtue of a prior Soviet decision to introduce its own missiles capable of destroying the countries of Western Europe." Why was it necessary for the Western Hemisphere nations to act with such speed? The "speed and stealth" of the Soviet offensive buildup in Cuba demonstrated the premeditated attempt by the Soviet Union "to confront this hemisphere with a fait accompli." If the United States had not acted promptly and had delayed its counteraction, "the nuclearization of Cuba could have been quickly completed." He stressed that the United States had acted promptly to put into process "the political machinery which we pray will achieve a solution to this grave crisis." The one action in the last few days which had strengthened the peace was the determination to stop this further spread of weapons in this hemisphere. The United States was now in the Security Council, Ambassador Stevenson noted, because it wished the machinery of the United Nations "to take over to reduce these tensions and to interpose itself to eliminate this aggressive threat to peace and to ensure the removal from this hemisphere of offensive nuclear weapons and the corresponding lifting of the quarantine."

When Zorin again attempted to delude the Council about the facts of the Soviet offensive buildup, a dramatic encounter occurred between

/Stevenson and
Stevenson and Zorin, which exposed the truth beyond doubt.

STEVENSON: Well, let me say something to you, Mr. Ambassador: We do have the evidence. We have it, and it is clear and incontrovertible. And let me say something else: Those weapons must be taken out of Cuba.

Next, let me say to you that, if I understood you, you said -- with a trespass on credulity that excels your best -- that our position had changed since I spoke here the other day because of the pressures of world opinion and a majority of the United Nations. Well, let me say to you, sir: You are wrong again. We have had no pressure from anyone whatsoever. We came here today to indicate our willingness to discuss U Thant's proposals -- and that is the only change that has taken place.

But let me also say to you, sir, that there has been a change. You, the Soviet Union, have sent these weapons to Cuba. You, the Soviet Union, have upset the balance of power in the world. You, the Soviet Union, have created this new danger -- not the United States....

Finally, Mr. Zorin, I remind you that the other day you did not deny the existence of these weapons. Instead, we heard that they had suddenly become defensive weapons. But today -- again, if I heard you correctly -- you say that they do not exist, or that we have not proved they exist -- and you say this with another fine flood of rhetorical scorn. All right, sir, let me ask you one simple question: Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that the U.S.S.R. has placed and is placing medium and intermediate-range missiles and sites in Cuba? Yes or no? Do not wait for the interpretation. Yes or no?

ZORIN: I am not in an American courtroom, sir, and therefore I do not wish to answer a question that is put to me in the fashion in which a prosecutor puts questions. In due course, sir, you will have your reply.
STEVENSON: You are in the courtroom of world opinion right now, and you can answer "yes" or "no". You have denied that they exist -- and I want to know whether I have understood you correctly.

ZORIN: Will you please continue your statement, sir? You will have your answer in due course.

Inasmuch as Zorin delayed his response, Stevenson proceeded to present conclusive evidence of the existence of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. This consisted of a display of enlarged aerial photographs and maps pinpointing the details and location in Cuba of Soviet bomber aircraft and of Soviet missile bases, complete with launching sites and supporting equipment, "in short, all of the requirements to maintain, load, and fire these terrible weapons." When Zorin's reply again evaded the question of whether the Soviet Union had installed offensive missiles in Cuba, Stevenson challenged the Soviet Union to ask the Cubans to permit a UN team to visit the sites he had identified in order to authenticate the evidence.

The proposal made by the United Arab Republic, and supported by Ghana, to postpone further work of the Council and to adjourn the meeting was adopted without objection, in the light of the willingness of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to consult with the Secretary-General on his suggestions of the previous day. The Security Council thus adjourned but remained "seized" of the problem while the parties negotiated. The scene then shifted from the formal chamber of the Security Council to the informal chambers of the Secretary-General.

/Weekend Negotiations:
Weekend Negotiations: The Kennedy-Khrushchev Letters

That weekend (October 26-28) there was an exchange of letters between Moscow and Washington which transformed the nature of the Cuba crisis. On October 26, Khrushchev sent a letter to President Kennedy making certain proposals on the removal of offensive weapons from Cuba. On October 27, another letter from Khrushchev, which was broadcast before delivery, also expressed willingness to withdraw the weapons but proposed to link the question of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba to the unrelated issue of strategic weapons in Turkey. The USSR would "agree to remove from Cuba those means which you regard as offensive means; we agree to carry this out and make a pledge in the United Nations. Your representative will make a declaration to the effect that the United States of America, on its part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the Soviet State, will remove its similar means from Turkey...After that persons entrusted by the United Nations Security Council may check on the spot the fulfillment of the pledge made by either side." Of course, he added, "the authorization of the Governments of Cuba and of Turkey would be necessary for the entry into those countries of these agents." In addition, Khrushchev proposed that the United States and the USSR give pledges against invasion of Cuba and Turkey respectively and solemn promises to respect the sovereignty and the inviolability of the frontiers of these countries.

This tie-in of Turkey with Cuba was immediately rejected by the United States. A statement issued by the White House that day noted that several inconsistent and conflicting proposals had been made by the USSR in the past twenty-four hours, including the one just broadcast.

/\The proposal
The proposal involved the security of nations outside the Western Hemisphere and it was the Western Hemisphere nations alone that were the subject of the threat which produced the crisis. The position of the United States, the statement read, was that "as an urgent preliminary to consideration of any proposals work on the Cuban bases must stop; offensive weapons must be rendered inoperable; and further shipment of offensive weapons to Cuba must cease -- all under effective international verification." As to proposals concerning the security of nations outside this hemisphere, the statement concluded, the United States and its allies had long taken the lead in seeking properly inspected arms limitation, on both sides. These efforts could continue as soon as the present Soviet-created threat was ended.

President Kennedy's letter to Chairman Khrushchev of the same day (October 27) replied to Khrushchev's letter of October 26.

"As I read your letter," the President wrote, "the key elements of your proposals which seem generally acceptable as I understand them are as follows:

"1. You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate U. N. observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

"2. We, on our part, would agree -- upon establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments -- (a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect, and (b) to give assurance against an invasion of Cuba, and I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise."
Assuming work ceased on offensive missile bases in Cuba and all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use were rendered inoperable, under effective UN arrangements, the President was prepared to have representatives in New York work out an arrangement in cooperation with the Secretary-General for a permanent solution along the lines suggested in Chairman Khrushchev's letter of October 26.

On Sunday, October 28 -- Chairman Khrushchev broadcast the text of his reply. In addition to earlier instructions to discontinue further work on weapons construction sites, he said, the Soviet Government "has given a new order to dismantle the arms which you described as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union." The letter stated:

"I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message of October 27, 1962, that there would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba, and not only on the part of the United States, but also on the part of other nations of the Western Hemisphere, as you said in your same message. Then the motives which induced us to render assistance of such a kind to Cuba disappear.

"It is for this reason that we instructed our officers -- these means as I had already informed you earlier are in the hands of the Soviet officers -- to take appropriate measures to discontinue construction of the aforementioned facilities, to dismantle them, and to return them to the Soviet Union. As I had informed you in the letter of October 27, we are prepared to reach agreement to enable United Nations Representatives to verify the dismantling of these means.

"Thus in view of the assurances you have given and our instructions on dismantling, there is every condition for eliminating the present conflict."

Chairman
Chairman Khrushchev sent a copy of this message to U Thant "to enable you to familiarise yourself with our position, which we regard as exhaustive and which will help you to discharge your noble functions." At the same time, he informed the United States and the United Nations, that in connection with the negotiations U Thant was conducting with representatives of the USSR, the United States, and Cuba, the Soviet Government was sending First Deputy Foreign Minister V. V. Kusnetsov to New York to help U Thant in his "noble efforts aimed at eliminating the present dangerous situation."

President Kennedy replied at once to the broadcast message of October 28 even before the official text reached him, and welcomed it as "an important contribution to peace." The operative paragraph read:

"The distinguished efforts of Acting Secretary-General U Thant have greatly facilitated both our tasks. I consider my letter to you of October 27 and your reply of today as firm undertakings on the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out. I hope that the necessary measures can at once be taken through the United Nations as your message says, so that the United States in turn can remove the quarantine measures now in effect. I have already made arrangements to report all these matters to the Organization of American States, whose members share a deep interest in a genuine peace in the Caribbean area."

"I agree with you," the President concluded, "that we must devote urgent attention to the problem of disarmament...I think we should give priority to questions relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on earth and in outer space, and to the great effort for a

/nuclear test ban.
nuclear test ban. But we should also work hard to see if wider measures of disarmament can be agreed and put into operation at an early date. The United States Government will be prepared to discuss these questions urgently, and in a constructive spirit, at Geneva or elsewhere."

A. U.S. statement issued the same day welcomed the Khrushchev response and stated: "We shall be in touch with the Secretary-General of the United Nations with respect to reciprocal measures to assure the peace in the Caribbean area."

Weekend Negotiations in New York

Meanwhile steps continued in New York to reach agreement on practical means of avoiding conflict at sea and on arrangements to carry out the Secretary-General's suggestion for stopping work on the offensive bases and screening further shipments as conditions of suspending the quarantine.

The initial aim of the Secretary-General was to avoid an incident at sea. What concerned him most, he had written on October 25 to Chairman Khrushchev, was that a confrontation at sea between Soviet ships and United States vessels "would destroy any possibility of the discussions I have suggested as a prelude to negotiations on a peaceful settlement." He therefore asked that Soviet ships already on their way to Cuba be instructed to stay away from the interception area for a limited time in order "to permit discussions of the modalities of a possible agreement." The next day (October 26), the Secretary-General addressed a parallel letter to President Kennedy, informing him of his approach to Chairman Khrushchev and requesting that "instructions may be issued the United States' vessels in the Caribbean to do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation with
Soviet ships in the next few days in order to minimize the risk of an outward incident." He expressed the further hope that such cooperation could be the prelude to a quick agreement in principle on the basis of which the quarantine measures could be called off as soon as possible.

Premier Khrushchev accepted the proposal and "ordered the masters of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba...to stay out of the interception area, as you recommend." President Kennedy welcomed U Thant's efforts for a satisfactory solution and stated that if the Soviet Government accepts and abides by his request that Soviet ships already on their way to Cuba stay out of the interception area during the period of preliminary discussions, "you may be assured that this Government will accept and abide by your request that our vessels in the Caribbean do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet ships in the next few days in order to minimize the risk of any untoward incident!" At the same time the President underlined that this was a matter of great urgency in view of the fact that certain Soviet ships were still proceeding toward Cuba and the interception area.

Screening Shipments

As the White House statement on October 27 made clear, the urgent preliminary to the consideration of any proposals for a solution was that work on the Cuban bases stop, the offensive weapons be rendered inoperable, and further shipment of weapons to Cuba must cease—all under effective international verification. After that means must be found to get the missiles and other offensive weapons removed and their removal verified and to institute adequate safeguards against their reinstallation.
The immediate concern of the negotiators in New York, during the initial phase, was to work out a system for incoming shipments to ensure that no further offensive weapons were being introduced. The UN asked the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to serve as its agent in inspecting incoming vessels to make sure that no more Soviet weapons were coming in to Cuba. The operation would be expected to continue for about one month and would be entrusted to some thirty inspectors which the ICRC would undertake to recruit. Mr. Paul Ruesger, former president of the ICRC, arrived in New York early in November to discuss with the UN whether and under what circumstances the ICRC could undertake this task.

In releases issued in Geneva on November 5 and November 13, the ICRC pointed out that the organization could participate in the plan only with the formal agreement of "the three parties concerned." The statement issued by the ICRC on November 13 explained that "eventual action by the ICRC would be based on previous consent being given by the three states concerned" and the methods of control would have to be clarified in future discussions. Premier Castro refused to give his consent to the proposed scheme. Before final arrangements could be made it was, in any event, realized that the system envisaged would no longer be required and that the United States and other countries of the Western Hemisphere could rely on other means, including air surveillance, to guard against new shipments of offensive weapons.

Havana Talks

The main obstacle to progress on establishing the conditions for a settlement was the attitude of the Cuban government. On October 26 U Thant wrote Prime Minister
wrote Prime Minister Castro renewing his appeal that he (Castro) direct that "the construction and development of major military facilities and installations in Cuba, and especially installations designed to launch medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, be suspended during the period of negotiations which are now underway."

Dr. Castro's reply came the next day and proved to be a hedged acceptance. He rejected "the presumption of the United States to determine what action we are entitled to take within our country, what kind of arms we consider appropriate for our defense." Cuba was prepared to accept "the compromises that you request as efforts in favor of peace, provided that at the same time, while negotiations are in progress, the United States Government desists from threats and aggressive actions against Cuba, including naval blockade of the country." Read literally, Dr. Castro was saying that he would consider the suspension only at the price of ending the quarantine. At the same time, his letter contained another note:

"...Should you consider it useful to the cause of peace, our government would be glad to receive you in our country as Secretary-General of the United Nations, with a view to direct discussions on the present crisis."

U Thant replied the next day noting that Castro was prepared to accept the suggestion he had made provided the United States Government "desists from threats...against Cuba including the naval blockade" while negotiations were in progress. He accepted the invitation to visit Cuba early in the coming week — and to "bring a few aides with me to leave some of them behind to continue our common effort towards a peaceful solution of the problem."

To facilitate his task the United States had agreed to suspend its naval quarantine and aerial surveillance during the Secretary-General's visit to Havana.
Havana. At this point, the United Nations was working on the assumption that the visit to Cuba would be concerned with working out modalities of U.N. observation and inspection and "reciprocal measures to assure the peace in the Caribbean."

The issue was further clouded by Castro's "statement of conditions" issued in Havana on October 28. "The guarantees of which President Kennedy speaks against the invasion of Cuba will not exist without the elimination also of the naval blockade," he declared, "and adoption, among others, of the following measures:"

1. End of the economic blockade and "all measures of commercial and economic pressure" exercised by the United States against Cuba;

2. End of "all subversive activities" and the organization or support of invasions;

3. End of "pirate attacks" from bases in the United States and Puerto Rico;

4. End of "violations of air and naval space" by the United States;

5. United States withdrawal from the naval base at Guantanamo and its "return to Cuba."

This statement of conditions was clearly unacceptable and adumbrated its intransigent position that the Cuban authorities would take during the Havana talks. U Thant and a party of nineteen, including Brigadier General Rikhye and a small military staff, flew to Havana on October 30 and held talks with Cuban leaders that day and the next to arrange for U.N. supervision of removal of the offensive weapons and to discuss the other modalities for carrying out the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement of October 27-28. 

/Although general
Although general agreement was reached that the United Nations should participate in settlement of the Cuban crisis and the talks were characterized as "fruitful," the Cuban authorities balked at all proposals for U.N. inspection of weapons removal and safeguards against their reintroduction. Premier Castro reiterated the five demands he had made in his October 28 statement. These demands were obviously beyond the scope of the Secretary-General's purpose in negotiating with the Cubans, and no agreement was reached.

The Secretary-General and his party returned to New York the next day, where, it was understood, talks between the Secretary-General and Cuban representatives would continue. Premier Castro, however, did state that he would not interfere with the Soviet removal of the missiles. The missiles are "not ours," he said in a radio speech on November 1 in which he reported on his talks with U Thant, but he rejected any form of international inspection on the withdrawal of Soviet weapons. He specifically turned down a proposal that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) carry out the inspection task. He also rejected other forms of U.N. inspection. On Friday, November 2, Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan arrived in New York on his way to Havana and issued a statement supporting Premier Castro's demands and warmly endorsing the Cuban regime.

Surveillance and Dismantling Continued

When U Thant left Havana without a mutually satisfactory formula, President Kennedy ordered resumption of the quarantine on shipping to Cuba and authorized resumption of close aerial surveillance of the island to determine whether dismantling of Soviet missile bases was proceeding as reported by Soviet officials. On the evening of November 2, the

/President reported
President reported in a short television and radio broadcast that the "Soviet missile bases are being dismantled, the missiles are being crated and the fixed installations at the sites are being destroyed." The President said the information was based on aerial photographs and added that the United States intended to follow closely the completion of this work through various means, including aerial surveillance, until "an equally satisfactory international means of verification is effected." He also said that while the quarantine remained in effect, he was hopeful that adequate procedures could be developed for international inspection of Cuba-bound cargoes. The International Committee of the Red Cross could be "an appropriate agent" for carrying out this inspection.

New York Negotiations: Verification and IL-28s

Meanwhile, talks proceeded in New York between Ambassador Stevenson and Mr. John J. McCloy for the United States and Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, for the Soviet Union. Apart from working out the details of the scheme for ICRC inspection of incoming shipments (described above), the negotiators spent the next three weeks in considering two main issues. Until November 12 the central concern of the negotiators was to make sure that the offensive missile system had left Cuba and to work out a satisfactory system for verification that dismantling and removal had in fact taken place. Associated with this was the problem of longer-term safeguards against the reintroduction of offensive weapons. From November 12 to November 20 the focus of negotiation shifted to the problem of removal of the Soviet IL-28 bombers from Cuba.

On verification, it was clear that what the President had termed "an equally satisfactory international means of verification" required an adequate UN system of inspection to make sure that the offensive weapons
had in fact been removed, to guard against hiding, and to prevent reintroduction of such weapons. Various schemes were considered and the USSR made clear its willingness to have UN verification take place. Castro adamantly refused to accept any form of verification in Cuba by the UN or under its auspices for removal of the weapons. US negotiators continued to make it clear to the Soviet negotiators that US aerial surveillance would continue as long as there was no adequate UN system of inspection. When it became clear that Castro would not give his consent to UN inspection or verification of shipments from his ports, the negotiators turned to devising a system for US inspection at sea of outgoing ships carrying the dismantled missiles. The US naval vessels would come "alongside" departing Soviet vessels which would be loaded in such a way as to enable the US vessels to see and count the missiles and associated equipment. Rapid progress was made in dismantling and loading the missiles and by November the US had counted 42 departing missiles by this procedure. Failing UN verification and safeguards, the US continued its own system of surveillance under the existing OAS resolution to make sure that offensive weapons were not reintroduced.

On November 12, with the missiles removed, the US negotiators took up again the question of the removal of IL-28s and made it clear that the United States could not consider lifting the quarantine until the bombers were withdrawn. The Soviets claimed they had fulfilled their part of the bargain by dismantling and removing the missiles and were pressing for lifting of the quarantine and a U.S. non-invasion pledge.

The US position was that the bombers were defined as offensive weapons in the Presidential Proclamation of October 23 and that they...
were included as such in the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange of October 27-28. The United States made it clear that it could not consider lifting the quarantine until the Soviets agreed to remove the IL-28s within a short time.

**Partial Settlement: November 20**

On November 20, Dr. Castro informed U Thant that if the Soviets wished to remove the bombers he would not object. That day an agreement was reached between Kennedy and Khrushchev under which the IL-28s would be withdrawn. U Thant was notified the same day by Ambassador Stevenson and Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetzov. Soviet agreement to remove the bombers paved the way for the lifting of the quarantine. The partial settlement had taken just four weeks to accomplish.

At his press conference that evening, President Kennedy announced that he had that day been informed by Chairman Khrushchev that all of the IL-28 bombers in Cuba would be withdrawn in thirty days, and that these planes could be observed and counted as they departed. "Inasmuch as this goes a long way towards reducing the danger which faced this hemisphere four weeks ago," the President announced, "I have this afternoon instructed the Secretary of Defense to lift our naval quarantine." The President then recalled the agreement he had reached with Chairman Khrushchev October 27-28, including the stipulation that once the Soviet leader had complied with all his pledges, "we would remove our naval quarantine and give assurance against invasion of Cuba." Evidence to date indicated that all known offensive missile sites had been dismantled, he stated, and sea inspection by the navy had confirmed that the missiles had been withdrawn. But, he warned, "important parts" of the agreement "remain to be carried out. The Cuban Government has not yet permitted the United Nations to

\/*verify whether all
verify whether all offensive weapons have been removed, and no lasting safeguards have yet been established against the future introduction of offensive weapons back into Cuba." The United States, therefore, had no choice but to pursue its own means of checking on military activities in Cuba. The United States, he said, will continue its efforts to achieve "adequate international arrangements for the task of inspection and verification of Cuba." Later, in reply to a question, he defined adequate safeguards as "an inspection which would provide us with assurances that there are not in the island weapons capable of offensive action against United States or neighboring countries and that they will not be reintroduced."

Regarding guarantees against invasion, the President stated that these were contingent on adequate verification and safeguards for the future.

"As for our part, if all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, "We shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere."

The United States, he stressed, would not abandon the political, economic, and other efforts to halt subversion from Cuba nor its purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be fully free. "But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

**Inter-American Quarantine Force Terminates Operations**

Following the lifting of the quarantine, the three governments whose

/ naval units had
naval units had participated in the inter-American combined quarantine force -- i.e., Argentina, Dominican Republic, and the United States -- notified the C.O.A.S./O.C. on November 30 that the operations of the quarantine force had been terminated. During this period, it had not been necessary to take up the offers of airport and seaport facilities and other types of assistance made by other hemispheric determination and solidarity.

As the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in New York progressed, the United States kept the C.O.A.S./O.C. fully informed of developments. The C.O.A.S./O.C. in the meantime withheld taking any further action with regard to the crisis until these talks were completed.

Continued Negotiations

The Soviet Government carried out its promise to withdraw the Il-28 bombers, and, by December 6, the United States was informed that all bombers (42 in number) had left. No progress, however, was made during the rest of the month in achieving the "adequate international arrangements for the task of inspection and verification in Cuba" that the President had mentioned on November 20, and which were part of the original understanding. Deputy Premier Mikoyan's three-hour conversations with the President on November 29 and with the Secretary of State on November 30, did not advance the final solution. The question was turned over again to the delegations in New York.

By mid-December several important loose ends still remained. No
adequate, U.N.-supervised arrangements for verification of removal of offensive weapons and safeguards against their reintroduction had been achieved. The U.S. assurance against invasion or supporting an invasion of Cuba was dependent on adequate safeguards that offensive weapons were not present or reintroduced into Cuba and that Cuba refrained from aggressive acts against the Western Hemisphere.

**Soviet Troops**

The withdrawal of Soviet personnel from Cuba was also a matter of deep concern to the United States. As the President stated at his press conference of November 20, the U.S. had been informed that Soviet combat units and other Soviet units were associated with the protection of offensive weapons systems and would also be withdrawn in due course. The U.S. position was that removal of the offensive weapons systems made the presence of Soviet troops to defend such weapons no longer necessary. Efforts to secure their removal continued into 1963.

**Security Council Consideration Concluded**

The formula for terminating Security Council consideration of the Cuban crisis was finally agreed between the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union on January 7, 1963. It represented a standstill rather than a final settlement. The two governments agreed to send a joint letter to the Secretary-General which he, in turn, transmitted to the Security Council for information of its members. The text of the letter read:

"On behalf of the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, we desire to express to you our appreciation for your efforts in assisting our governments to avert the serious threat to the peace which recently arose in the Caribbean area."

"While it has not been possible for our governments to

/resolve all the
resolve all the problems that have arisen in connection with this affair, they believe that, in view of the degree of understanding reached between them on the settlement of the crisis and the extent of progress in the implementation of this understanding, it is not necessary for this item to occupy further the attention of the Security Council at this time.

"The Governments of the United States of America and of the Soviet Union express the hope that the actions taken to avert the threat of war in connection with this crisis will lead toward the adjustment of other differences between them and the general easing of tensions that could cause a further threat of war."

The same day (January 7, 1963), the Permanent Representative of Cuba, Carlos M. Lechuga, addressed a letter to the Secretary-General, which he requested be transmitted to United Nations members, expressing a dissenting view on the conclusion of the affair. Cuba, the letter declared, "does not consider as effective any agreement other than one which would include consideration of five points or measures, which as minimum guarantees to peace in the Caribbean, our Prime Minister Fidel Castro stresses in his declaration of 28 October, 1962..."

As the Security Council concluded its consideration of the Cuban item, the situation remained as follows:

1. The Soviet Union had withdrawn its offensive missiles, its bombers, and some of its military personnel. The United States and participating American Republics had lifted the quarantine.

2. The Cubans had refused to accept on site inspection and post-removal verification or to agree on a system of continuing safeguards against reintroduction of offensive weapons under United Nations auspices.

3. In the absence of adequate inspection and safeguards, the United States continued other methods of surveillance of military
activities in Cuba in the interests of hemispheric security.
4. The continued presence of Soviet military personnel in Cuba constituted an unacceptable intervention of foreign military power in the Western Hemisphere. Efforts continued with the USSR to obtain their removal as agreed.
5. The United States continued to be seriously concerned about Cuban subversive efforts directed against other American Republics.
6. The United States position with regard to assurance against invasion remained that stated by the President on November 20, as outlined above.
7. With the conclusion of the New York talks and the joint US-USSR letter terminating Security Council consideration of the matter, responsibility of further action remained with the OAS Organ of Consultation in its hemispheric context.

Conclusion: Complementary Roles of Bilateral, Regionals, and UN Diplomacy

The Cuban affair demonstrated the utility and possibilities for interaction of the various diplomatic and military instruments available to the United States in a crisis. Orchestration of bilateral diplomacy, regional arrangements, and the United Nations system marked the handling of the crisis throughout. In particular, the Cuba affair represented a unique demonstration of coordination between a regional system and the world organization, with diplomatic action being taken in the O.A.S. and the United Nations, depending on the task to be performed and the governments directly involved. The O.A.S. system successfully met the test of

/workability by
workability by demonstrating conclusively the solidarity and determination of the American Republics when their security is endangered. The rapid, decisive action taken by the American Republics under the Rio Treaty strengthened the hand of the United States in making its case before world opinion, in dealing in the Security Council with the crisis, and in negotiating with the Soviets.

The United Nations played a three-fold role: as a forum for exposing Soviet duplicity and for enlisting diplomatic support of the United States position; as an instrument for international consultation and as a site for negotiation; and, as an institution willing and able, on short notice, to provide inspection and verification services.

(1) The United States provided an unparalleled forum for presenting the facts of the Soviet offensive buildup directly to representatives of 109 nations and through communications media directly to world public opinion. Ambassador Stevenson’s speeches of October 23 and 25 in the Security Council, together with the photographs and explanations to delegations both inside and outside the chamber, presented incontrovertible evidence in a dramatic and effective manner and thus helped in convincing the world of the facts. In addition, the United Nations provided a forum in which the American Republics could impress on the world and on the Secretary-General their solidarity on this issue.

(2) The Secretary-General provided an effective point of contact, notably in the tense days at the outset of the crisis and valuable suggestions for avoiding direct confrontation. The Secretary-General’s intervention on the second day of Security Council debate, in which he called for suspension of arms shipments and of construction and development of military installations in exchange for suspension of
the quarantine led to the formula under which Soviet ships stayed away from the interception area and on that condition the United States agreed to do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation. Khrushchev gave unprecedented agreement to the idea of U.N. inspection and verification of arms removal on the spot. And, the United Nations proved that it was ready and capable of organizing a corps of observers and a system of inspection in rapid order.

Both the United Nations and the Organization of American States proved their utility and vigor -- and emerged stronger from the ordeal.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BROMLEY SMITH

SUBJECT: Cuba

As a follow-up to my memorandum to you on February 15, 1963, I am attaching excerpts containing references to Cuba in testimony given by the Department of Defense to congressional committees. They continue from the latest date of each committee excerpt you now have, and include excerpts from the Senate Armed Services Committee transcripts.

Not all testimony has been screened for Cuba references inasmuch as all transcripts are not available. Thus the House Armed Services Committee has been covered up to February 21, the DOD Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee to February 13, and the Senate Armed Services Committee to February 22. The DOD Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee has not yet begun its hearings.

As transcripts become available, I will send the requested items to you.

SIGNED

David E. McGiffert
Assistant to the Secretary
(Legislative Affairs)

11 Attachments
4 HASC Transcript excerpts
3 DoD SC, HAAppns Transcripts excerpts
4 SASC Transcript excerpts

cc:(S/Attachments included) -
Mr. McNaughton, GC
Mr. Yarmolinsky, Spec Asst.
Mr. McGiffert, ATSD(LA)

Mr. Lennartson, PA
Mr. Califano, OSA
STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
ROBERT S. McNAMARA TO THE PERMANENT
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
U. S. SENATE

13 March 1963

Mr. Chairman, I am grateful to this Committee for having granted my request of 9 March that I be afforded the opportunity to present my views on the development of the TFX concept and on the selection of General Dynamics Corporation as prime contractor for this versatile new addition to our Defense arsenal.

My decision in November 1962 to select General Dynamics over the Boeing Company, as the better of two qualified competitors, was based on the judgment that the General Dynamics design would result in an airplane less expensive to produce, maintain, and operate, and more dependable both in training missions and in actual combat.

The General Dynamics-Grumman team was successful because, in my judgment, and in the judgment of the Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force, their proposal gave the most valid promise of obtaining a single airplane that can meet Navy and Air Force requirements with:

- The least expensive, time-consuming research and development effort before production.
- The least reliance upon unknown process and materials.
- The earliest delivery to our fighting forces.
- The highest level of experience in building fighter-type aircraft.
- The greatest use of proven design techniques and methods.
- The most understanding of the requirements and difficulties in developing, testing, tooling, and producing a fighter-type aircraft.

When the General Dynamics and Boeing proposals were first identified in the early stages of the competition in December-January 1961--1962 as the two significantly better proposals among those submitted by six competing companies, neither proposal was found to be acceptable without substantial changes. Differing opinions were expressed as to whether a single contractor, Boeing, should be selected at the outset, or whether the competition between General Dynamics and Boeing should be continued in order to meet the military requirements.

Competition was continued over the period from January to the Fall of 1962. In November 1962, the Fourth Evaluation Report, prepared by the evaluation officers of the Navy and the Air Force, concluded:

"(1) Both contractors have the capability to successfully design and produce this weapon system.

"(2) Both designs are acceptable as initial development design configurations to the using Agencies involved -- TAC and the Navy.

"(3) Both designs will require further design refinement, and changes can be expected during the development period.
"(4) When fully developed, the operational tactical aircraft will markedly improve the capability of the Tactical Air Command in carrying out its assigned missions, especially in limited war.

"(5) Similarly, the Navy version, when fully developed, and when configured with the new long range air-to-air missile, will markedly improve existing fleet air defense capability."

The Report itself did not express a preference for either proposal, and indicated there was little to choose between the proposals. Both proposals were certified by General LeMay and Admiral Anderson to meet military requirements. My examination of the facts, in consultation with my advisers, convinced me that, as compared with the Boeing proposal, the General Dynamics proposal was substantially closer to a single design, requiring only relatively minor modifications to adapt it to the differing requirements of the Navy and the Air Force, and that it embodied a more realistic approach to the cost problem. Accordingly, I decided to select General Dynamics as the development contractor, since I concluded that it was best qualified to design the most effective airplane that could be produced at the least cost, in the least time, to meet our military requirements. It should be unnecessary to add that no other considerations entered into my judgment, but I wish to make that statement a part of the record.

When I took office in January 1961, President Kennedy instructed me to:
1. Develop the force structure necessary to our military requirements without regard to arbitrary budget ceilings.

2. Procure and operate this force at the lowest possible cost.

Following this guidance, we have made substantial increases in both our nuclear and non-nuclear forces. The additions to our nuclear forces have been designed both to strengthen our strategic retaliatory forces and to increase their flexibility by shifting the emphasis to those weapon systems which have the best chance of riding out any kind of nuclear surprise attack.

At the same time, we have substantially expanded our non-nuclear forces -- ground, sea, and air -- so that we can cope with the many and varied threats confronting us around the world. To insure that our non-nuclear forces are properly equipped and supplied, procurement of weapons, equipment, and ammunition has been vastly increased.

Concurrently with these increases in our fighting strength we have attacked the problem of costs on a wide variety of fronts. Because of the great technical complexity of modern-day weapons, their lengthy period of development, their tremendous combat power and their enormous cost, sound choices of a limited number of major weapon systems in relation to military tasks and missions have become the key decisions around which much else of the Defense program revolves.
In the past, the actual costs of major weapon systems have commonly increased from 300 to 500 percent over the costs estimated when the program started, and in some instances more. Some of the reasons for such overruns have been:

1. We have insisted that weapon systems meet performance standards that go far beyond essential military requirements.

2. We have accepted unrealistically optimistic cost estimates at the beginning of a program, only to find costs multiplied many times during the program.

3. We have not sufficiently defined at the outset what it is we are asking our contractors to develop. Here we have discovered that it is frequently helpful to work with more than one contractor in what we call a "program definition phase" before a development contract is awarded.

4. We have too often employed inadequate and unsatisfactory procedures to select major contractors, putting insufficient weight on seasoned experience in the design and production of similar weapons.

5. We have relied too much on cost-plus-contracts and other contracting procedures which do not provide incentives to reduce cost.
Within the Department of Defense, we have taken a number of steps to attack these problems. A formal five-year cost reduction program has been launched, which should produce savings of at least $3 billion per year by the end of fiscal year 1965. It has already produced savings that should amount to $1.4 billion per year. We are shifting from cost-plus-fixed-fee to fixed price and incentive contracts. We are studying ways to improve program definition and cost estimates, using the resources of such non-profit organizations as the Logistics Management Institute as well as in-house resources.

At my request the problem of how we select contractors has been under study for several months by a subcommittee of the recently established Defense Industry Advisory Council, which represents a cross-section of America's business and industrial leaders. Both the Council and we are convinced that our current source selection procedures can be improved.

One way to reduce costs (and to increase reliability) is to insist that weapon systems be developed that can be used by more than one Service, where this can be accomplished without degradation of essential military requirements. The advantages of one weapon system over two are obvious. They result in substantial savings not only in the development, test and production stages, but throughout the life of the system in terms of logistic support, maintenance, training programs, and operations.

The disadvantages of operating many different weapons systems can be observed in the Navy and in the Air Force today. The Navy currently has a
rate of aircraft out of operation for lack of parts which is altogether too high. The Air Force is maintaining a better operational rate but at a cost of excessive spare parts inventories. With the present rapid rate of technological change, the Air Force has acquired a $2.2 billion inventory of spare parts that are already obsolete and practically worthless.

When I became Secretary of Defense, I learned that the Air Force was developing plans for a tactical fighter that would ultimately replace the F-105. At the time, the Navy was designing a second tactical fighter to replace the F4H in its fleet air defense role. These two planes would have many common missions and require many similar operational capabilities. After consultation with my military and civilian advisors, and independent study, I became convinced that one tactical fighter could be developed that would meet both the Navy and Air Force requirements. Accordingly, I directed that the Air Force reorient its program, with Navy participation, to achieve the goal of a common tactical fighter.

The concept of a major multi-Service weapon system is new. I would be less than candid with you if I did not admit that the majority of experts in the Navy and Air Force said it couldn't be done. As late
as the 22nd of August 1961, after the Navy and the Air Force had been working together for almost 8 months, it was reported to me by both Services that development of a single TFX aircraft to fulfill stated requirements of both Services was not technically feasible.

While this attitude, based on years of going separate ways, was understandable, I did not consider it was a realistic approach, considering the versatility and capabilities that could be built into a modern aircraft because of advances in technology. I was also convinced that, if we could achieve a single tactical fighter, we would save at least one billion dollars, in development, production, maintenance and operating costs. In short, after study and review, I believed that the development of a single aircraft of genuine tactical utility to both Services in the projected time frame was technically feasible and economically desirable. I directed that we continue to work toward this objective. Because this decision was peculiarly my own, I kept myself fully advised of the development of the TFX as it progressed over the succeeding 14 months.
Since I consider it essential to a thorough understanding of the matter before you, I would like at this point to recount for you in some detail the sequence of events which led up to the decision. On 1 September 1961, I directed the Air Force to seek to develop a single aircraft for both the Air Force tactical mission and the Navy fleet air defense mission. From the outset, the emphasis was on development of a weapons system that provided minimum divergence between the Navy and Air Force versions. My specific guideline in this regard was: "Changes to the Air Force tactical version of the basic aircraft to achieve the Navy mission shall be held to a minimum." This is a recurring theme throughout the procurement actions which followed.

Requests for proposals from aircraft manufacturers were issued in October, 1961, and proposals were submitted by six firms two months thereafter.

A Source Selection Board was organized with members appointed by the Navy and the Air Force, and they were instructed to work jointly in evaluating the proposals, under the non-voting chairmanship of the Commander of the Air Force Aeronautical Systems Division.
To assist the Source Selection Board, an Evaluation Group was established, consisting of approximately 235 Navy and Air Force officers, advisors and consultants, divided into teams to make the detailed analyses and to evaluate each of the proposals in the areas of technical design, operational effectiveness, logistics, management strength, production efficiency, and suitability for use on aircraft carriers.

The findings of the Evaluation Group were submitted to the Source Selection Board. The Board's recommendations were reviewed by appropriate commands within the Navy and the Air Force, as well as by the Air Council, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Chief of Naval Operations, and finally, by the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force who made their recommendations to me.

Of the six proposals considered in December and January, those of Boeing Company and General Dynamics Corporation were determined by the Evaluation Group to be significantly better. But it was recognized that each of these designs would require substantial changes before it would be acceptable. Although the Boeing design was given the higher rating in operational capability, and General Dynamics was given the higher rating in the technical area, the Evaluation Group recommended that study contracts be awarded to both Boeing and General Dynamics, in order to modify their designs to meet the military requirements. For example, Boeing's proposal had offered the General
Electric engine which was found to be unacceptable. The senior Navy member of the Evaluation Group stated that none of the designs was acceptable without very substantial change.

A different view was expressed by the Source Selection Board which recommended that further work to achieve a satisfactory design be conducted exclusively with Boeing. It recognized that substantial changes had to be made to the Boeing design: a different engine was required, the means of stowing missiles was unsatisfactory, the radar equipment required revision, and feasibility of substituting capsules for ejection seats had to be explored. The Source Selection Board proposed that a letter contract be issued to Boeing for the limited purpose of refining a design specification which would be acceptable to the Navy and the Air Force. The Board's recommendation was concurred in by the Tactical Air Command, the Air Force Logistics Command and the Navy Bureau of Weapons. The Air Force Systems Command, however, which would have the over-all responsibility for development of the aircraft, recommended against the selection of Boeing, and proposed the award of study contracts to both Boeing and General Dynamics, as suggested by the Evaluation Group.
The Air Force Council, chaired by the Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Operations, in the absence of the Vice Chief of Staff, with the concurrence of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, also supported the Evaluation Group, and recommended that study contracts be issued to both companies for continued competition for another 60 to 90 days. The Council recognized that neither the Boeing nor the General Dynamics proposal, as submitted, would meet the established military requirements. The Council felt that by extending the competition for an additional period "time and dollars are thereby more apt to be saved than lost in the long run." It considered that competition should produce realistic cost estimates, further assurance of the validity of the eventual choice, and, in all probability, an earlier final design.

Agreeing with the Air Council's proposal, the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force recommended to me that study contracts be awarded to both Boeing and General Dynamics. They pointed out that:

a. The proposals of these two companies were markedly superior to the others and offered the best chance of being brought up to stated Service requirements.

b. The Services were unanimous in rejecting the General Electric engine (on which the Boeing design had been based) because of the low probability of its development in the time required, since not even a prototype existed at the time.
c. The extension would permit the fuller use of the two designs and provide the incentive for sharper competition from business and design standpoints.

I approved the recommendations of the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force, raising particular questions about the realism of the Boeing cost estimates.

The two companies submitted new proposals on April 2, 1962, and the second evaluation was conducted in April and May. The Evaluation Group concluded that both contractors had done an excellent job in correcting identified deficiencies, but neither design was acceptable to the Navy from the standpoint of suitability for use on aircraft carriers and ability to remain on station for adequate periods of time.

The difference of opinion between the Navy and the Air Force emerged more fully in the deliberations of the Source Selection Board, and overshadowed consideration of the relative merits of the two companies, since the Navy member of the Board took the position that neither the Boeing nor the General Dynamics design was acceptable to the Navy, and the endorsements transmitted to the Chief of Naval Operations, and by him to the Secretary of the Navy, recommended in effect abandonment of the effort to achieve a joint fighter. It is clear also that the Air Force members of the Source Selection Board preferred the Boeing submission. The qualified
confluence of the Navy member must be viewed in the light of the
over-all Navy recommendation. As a matter of fact, Admiral Anderson
stated in writing that he had "no indication that Navy requirements can
indeed be met." Therefore, he was of the opinion that "it was premature
to state a firm recommendation at that time that Boeing be unequivocally
selected."

The Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force advised me that, in
view of the joint nature of the program and the continued nonacceptance by
the Navy of either design (principally because of high gross weight and
wing loadings), the Source Selection Board had been directed to examine
courses of action which would correct deficiencies as specified by the
Navy. Minimum design changes were to be analyzed and the resulting
divergence between the Navy and the Air Force versions of the aircraft,
resulting from the elimination of those deficiencies, were to be determined.
Three weeks were suggested to accomplish the task. I concurred, emphasiz-
ing that acceptable Navy and Air Force versions were not to be created by
reducing the degree of commonality so far as to lose the savings inherent
in a joint program.

At the end of the three-week period, both companies submitted proposals
which contained very substantial changes from previous designs. The Navy
member of the Source Selection Board remained unconvinced that either of
the new proposals met the Navy's requirements. The Board also noted that
the degree of divergence between the Navy and the Air Force versions that would be necessary to meet Navy specifications had not been determined in the time available. Nevertheless, the Board recommended, and the Air Council, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Chief of Naval Operations proposed that a single contractor, Boeing, should be selected at that point to undertake a continuing "design definition" phase. The expressed need for the continuation of the definition process pointed up the fact that the purposes for which the third evaluation were held had not been satisfied.

Following the second and third evaluations of the TFX, it appeared to me not only that neither contractor was meeting Navy requirements, but also that my primary goal was not accepted or not fully understood by the contractors or the Source Selection Board. That goal was to develop, if at all possible, one plane to meet the needs of both the Navy and the Air Force.

Therefore, the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Air Force directed that work be continued to establish detailed designs, from which they could better assess the probability of developing the respective versions into an effective weapon system acceptable to both the Navy and the Air Force. They also directed that the obvious disparity between the contractors' cost proposals and the Air Force standards be reconciled. Lastly, they restated my intent to reduce cost by maximizing similarities.
in the Navy and Air Force versions, and by use of common equipments and structures.

To avoid any doubt as to the objective, I asked Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric to write to Boeing and General Dynamics explaining fully my position, and asking both of them to rework their proposals in accordance with our requirements. That letter of July 13, 1962, explicitly established three conditions that had to be met before any contract would be awarded. These were:

"1. Satisfaction of both Navy and Air Force that a significant improvement to their tactical air capabilities is represented by the winning design.

"2. Minimum divergence from a common design compatible with the separate missions of the Air Force and Navy to protect the inherent savings of a joint program.

"3. Demonstrably credible understanding of costs both for development and procurement of the complete TFX weapon system, which costs must be acceptable in view of the capability added to our military strength by the weapon system."

These three conditions are vital. They are the yardsticks I used in judging and weighing the two proposals -- Boeing and General Dynamics. They were constantly in my mind as I reviewed the Fourth Evaluation Report. Rather than ignoring its advice, I relied heavily on its comments and conclusions.
The two companies submitted their new proposals in September 1962. These proposals were reviewed by the Evaluation Group and the Source Selection Board, which made its report on November 2.

At the risk of repetition, I want to read to you again the general conclusions of the Evaluation Group which were restated verbatim by the Air Council, with the concurrence of Admiral Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations, and General LeMay, Chief of Staff of the Air Force:

"(1) Both contractors have the capability to successfully design and produce this weapon system.

"(2) Both designs are acceptable as initial development design configurations to the using Agencies involved -- TAC and the Navy.

"(3) Both designs will require further design refinement, and changes can be expected during the development period.

"(4) When fully developed, the operational tactical aircraft will markedly improve the capability of the Tactical Air Command in carrying out its assigned missions, especially in limited war.

"(5) Similarly, the Navy version, when fully developed, and when configured with the new long range air-to-air missile, will markedly improve existing fleet air defense capability."

The Fourth Evaluation Report did not choose as between the contractors. When I reviewed the report, I could see why. The question was a very close one.

In the technical area, the Report evaluated the General Dynamics design as having "a better structural design, a simpler fuel system, a slight edge in the flight control area and better proposed programs in the Personnel
Subsystem and Aerospace Ground Equipment areas. The General Dynamics design had an edge in supersonic dash capability and supersonic maneuverability at altitude. It has a low radar cross section and an integrated penetration aids system. For deceleration, it uses dive brakes in the air and brakes on the ground, providing a conventional but limited deceleration capability. The Boeing design has the edge in ferry capability, conventional weapon carriage, loiter capability, and in landing performance. It has the advantage in low-altitude maneuvering capability. For deceleration it uses a thrust reverser which offers an excellent deceleration capability, but will require additional development effort."

In the operational area, the Boeing proposal received the higher score, but the Report stressed that either design was considered acceptable from the users' viewpoint.

In the "Production, Management and Cost" area, General Dynamics was rated higher than Boeing. In "Scheduling," General Dynamics presented the better program. It was somewhat more detailed and better time phased.

In the "Logistics" area, which includes the functional elements of maintenance, supply, transportation and procurement, the Boeing proposal received a slightly higher rating over-all.

It was clear that both designs met the first condition prescribed in Mr. Gilpatrick's letter of July 13, i.e., satisfaction of both Navy and Air Force that the designs represented significant improvement to their tactical air capabilities. With this state of the record, the degree to which the two designs met the other two cardinal conditions became crucial. You will recall that those two conditions were: (1) minimum divergence from a
common design; and (2) demonstrably credible understanding of costs.

It should be emphasized that these two conditions would understandably loom less important in the eyes of the Source Selection Board than operational capability. These are conditions more properly the concern of those charged by law with the over-all direction of our defense effort. They are equally a part of my determination of what is in the national interest.

When I reviewed the Fourth Evaluation Report from the standpoint of minimum divergence from a common design, I was immediately struck by the difference in approach adopted by the two contractors. The Report found that General Dynamics proposed an airframe design that has a very high degree of identical structure for the Navy and Air Force versions.

On the other hand, the Report estimated that in the two Boeing versions less than half of the structural components of the wing, fuselage and tail were the same. In fact the Evaluation Group concluded that Boeing is, in effect, proposing two different airplanes from a structures point of view. The same differences in approach were apparent in the larger number of identical parts in the General Dynamics design -- a particularly crucial point, since there are strong incentives in the course of the development process to retain identity of parts, while, on the other hand, small divergences in the early stages tend to grow as development proceeds.

In short, Boeing simply did not meet the fundamental requirement of minimum divergence from a common design. No amount of peripheral technical argument should be permitted to obscure this central and crucial fact.
It has been suggested by several of your committee staff in their role as witnesses before the committee that much ado about nothing has been made about the so-called issue of commonality. It has been suggested to you that the only reason for common structures or common parts is so that money could be saved by use of common tooling. Such a conclusion overlooks the basic purpose of attempting to get one airplane instead of two. Two airplanes increase costs at every stage beginning with development itself.

As the Fourth Evaluation Report stated, the design approach adopted by Boeing would "require separate documentation, (drawings; loads, stress, flutter, and fatigue analyses; etc.); separate static, dynamic and fatigue test programs; and more extensive developmental flight testing for the USAF and Navy versions."

Separate production lines or unique production operations would be required earlier in the production process. Supply and logistics problems become complicated. It is evident that the less the divergence, the greater the savings in the logistics area.

These future savings are not susceptible of precise measurement, involving as they do such factors as training, supply processes, future usage rates, common technical manuals, and the like.

If I had approved what was essentially two different airplanes, the prospects of saving one billion dollars would have evaporated. The issue of minimum divergence is fundamental. The effort to attain the highest possible degree of commonality.
lies at the heart of the entire TFX endeavor. My instructions on this point were clear and consistent.

Another aspect of the Fourth Evaluation Report struck me as I reviewed the report and consulted with my technical advisors, including Dr. Charyk, who was then Under Secretary of the Air Force, and Dr. Brown, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. On the basis of my studies, discussions with my advisers, and my experience over the years in judging development and production programs, it became clear to me that the General Dynamics proposal was generally more straightforward in approach than that of Boeing, although the General Dynamics design was fully acceptable. There were aspects of the Boeing proposal which, on their face, complicated the development of the aircraft. Three problems in particular stood out in my mind.

The first problem was Boeing's proposed use of engine thrust reversers for in-flight deceleration, as well as for reducing ground roll after landing touch-down. To date, engine thrust reversers have never been used in flight on operational fighter aircraft, nor have they ever been employed on supersonic aircraft. The only operational experience has been on subsonic commercial jet transports and cargo-type aircraft in which the engines are mounted on outboard pylons underneath the wings. The Air Force does have one fighter aircraft in which a research and development type installation has been made. This is a single engine aircraft with the exhaust on the airplane centerline
and aft of the tail surfaces. The Boeing design uses two engines nestled in the fuselage with their nozzles exhausting hot gases directly alongside the horizontal and vertical control surfaces. The full effect of this hot gas efflux is unknown. Assurance that longitudinal and directional stability was not impaired could not be obtained without extensive flight tests, in addition to considerable developmental wind tunnel testing. Since flight testing cannot occur until late in the development phase, the Boeing design would impose an added degree of risk in terms of meeting an early operational date for the TFX.

In addition, the Boeing thrust reverser feature, as the Fourth Evaluation Report observed, adds considerably to the complexity and to the development task associated with the engine. The full impact of this problem could not be completely assessed because Boeing did not collaborate in detail with the engine contractor, Pratt and Whitney, on its proposed thrust reverser design and development.

Speed brakes, as proposed by General Dynamics, are historically proven and offer a more straightforward approach to meeting the stated military requirement. Since speed brakes will, in themselves, exceed the military requirement, the greater development risk of thrust reversers must be weighed against their possible advantages. I want to point out that in selecting the General Dynamics proposal we retain the option to apply
thrust reversers to the aircraft design, but we have the flexibility to undertake this development on an exploratory basis concurrent with the overall program, and terminable at will if costs should exceed anticipated benefits.

The second area in which Boeing's approach seemed likely to produce more complicated development problems was its proposed power plant installation with top-mounted inlets. The Fourth Evaluation Report commented that Boeing's location of the inlets on top of the fuselage, in combination with the Boeing subsonic diffuser design, results in significant distortion of the airflow at the engine face under most conditions, and prohibitive distortion during high angle of attack operation. The Report noted that the effect of this distortion on engine operation is virtually impossible to predict accurately, and it can only be determined by actual testing of the engine in flight under the distortion conditions delivered by the induction system.

In contrast, General Dynamics chose a conventional "straight through" installation and inlet design which the Evaluation Group considered to be a good selection for the TFX aircraft -- one which should give the best trade-off in terms of performance, complexity and operational problems. The top-mounted inlet does minimize the problem of foreign object damage during ground operations, but there is no reason to believe that the more conventional General Dynamics solution for this problem will not be effective, and it avoids all of the other uncertainties of the Boeing approach.
The third area in which the Boeing approach involved greater development risks was its extensive use of titanium in its wing carry-through structure. We have had some experience in the use of titanium in other Department of Defense weapon systems but mainly in heat-resistant applications and where high stress levels in thick plates are not involved. The Fourth Evaluation Report observed that data concerning the fatigue design properties of titanium, in the thickness Boeing proposed to use in the wing carry-through structure, is very limited, and that this raises the question of the advisability of using such thickness. The Report further commented that the effect of temperature on structural details, especially in the aluminum-to-titanium splice, can be expected to be quite pronounced in producing metal fatigue, and the Report concluded the Boeing fatigue test program showed lack of realism. In fact, Colonel Gayle, the TFX System Project Officer, sent a letter to the competing companies pointing out that, in the judgment of the Aeronautical Systems Division, it was not advisable to use titanium in fittings which are subject to heavy load, nor in heavy section areas because of a lack of data relating to such use. If Boeing's proposed use of titanium did not work out and heavier steel had to be used to replace the lighter metal, I realized that not only would the operational capabilities of the Boeing plane suffer, but additional costs would be incurred.

In contrast, the General Dynamics design solved the problem of wing loading by the ingenious but simple expedient of providing a bolt-on extra wing extension for the Navy version of the aircraft, instead of employing relatively unusual applications of an exotic metal.
These three examples point up for me a basic difference between the overall philosophies underlying the two proposals. I should emphasize that this difference in philosophy was not peculiar to the fourth phase of the competition. Boeing had from the very beginning consistently chosen more technically risky trade-offs in an effort to achieve operational features which exceeded the required performance characteristics. This approach was first exemplified in Boeing's choice of the undeveloped General Electric engine for its initial submission.

Mr. Chairman, I do not mean to say that the Boeing approach posed insuperable obstacles. On the contrary, I assumed that the problems associated with the use of titanium, the use of thrust reversers in supersonic flight, and the high inlet ducts in the propulsion system are all susceptible of solution. But my judgment, reinforced by the Fourth Evaluation Report, clearly indicated that these proposals would, in fact, complicate the development problems, and would require a significantly greater development effort to be expanded by Boeing in their solution.

But, significantly, Boeing proposed a development effort less than that proposed by General Dynamics, and this in spite of the greater complexity of the Boeing aircraft design, the greater divergence between the Navy and the Air Force versions of the Boeing aircraft, and the lesser experience which they possess in building high-density supersonic fighter aircraft. This anomaly caused me to examine other cost aspects of the Boeing proposal.
I discovered additional evidence of unrealistic cost estimates in the Boeing proposal. In the judgment of the Evaluation Group, Boeing was overly optimistic in its estimate of production tooling and was dangerously low in estimating the manufacturing hours for both the development and production phases. It appeared to me that Boeing simply did not appreciate the complexities of developing the TFX. This is understandable because Boeing's past experience in aircraft development and production has been with bombers and transport aircraft -- experience which is largely inapplicable to TFX estimating.

I therefore concluded that as to the third cardinal condition -- demonstrably credible understanding of costs -- Boeing's proposal was deficient.

The Evaluation Team cost estimators recognized this fact. They attempted to correct for it by raising Boeing's costs to a level which in their judgment was more accurate. They also made adjustments for the General Dynamics cost estimates, which were considered deficient, but not nearly so much so as Boeing's.

The Air Force estimators applied experience and other statistical factors to the two proposals in an effort to arrive at ultimate costs. The application of such factors is well suited to correction of an intentionally low proposal. Where, however, the low proposal is the result of a lack
of appreciation of the complexity of a problem, the adjusted figures are subject to substantial errors.

Expressed another way, the cost estimators of the Evaluation Group could only assume an equal understanding of the problem by both Boeing and General Dynamics, and then correct the two cost proposals more or less mechanically. But the predictable result of the lack of appreciation of the scope of a problem is delay and increased costs, the extent of which is essentially unpredictable, and therefore not susceptible to analysis by the application of statistical factors.

The question has been raised as to why costs are important when both contractors were proposing fixed-price incentive contracts. There are several reasons.

In a development contract for a complex new weapon system like the TFX, there inevitably will be engineering change orders. The cost of change orders is borne by the government. Consequently, when two proposals both meet military requirements as did Boeing's and General Dynamics', the proposal which seems likely to involve less change, with consequent delays and increased costs, is to be preferred.

Aside from the matter of cost over-runs induced by multiplicity of change orders, there are other reasons why credibility of costs must be carefully evaluated in a fixed-price incentive contract.
It is true that any costs over the contract ceiling are at the expense of the contractor and not the government. Nonetheless, if after several years of effort it appeared that a contractor's costs were going to be far in excess of the ceiling, say, by several hundred million dollars, the contractor would be in very serious financial difficulty. He would then be motivated to take every possible cost saving alternative. These alternatives could have a serious adverse impact on the continuity and quality of the development.

In short, while incentive contracts are generally important to force efficient management and obtain good estimating, where the dollar expenditure is exceedingly large, as in the case of the TFX, it is imperative that we make our own judgment of cost estimates. This is the only way we can insure that a contractor, through optimism or misunderstanding, has not imposed a ceiling on himself that could lead to serious degradation of the development. This result would hurt the Department of Defense as well as the contractor.

Further, the proposed contract covered only the research and development phase of the TFX program. A multi-billion dollar production
program is to follow. There is no future price commitment for this production program. In the event of very large over-runs on the research and development contracts, the price of the production program, which for all practical purposes would be committed to the development contractor, would probably be affected.

When we talk about the TFX program, we are talking National Defense. This aircraft is to be an important element in our military force; it must be operational in proper quantities in the time span scheduled. The more straightforward design of General Dynamics, an airframe contractor well versed in the design, development, and production of supersonic fighters, and assisted by Grumman, an outstanding designer, developer, and producer of Navy carrier-based aircraft, offered a more dependable answer to our needs.

I have detailed at some length the reasons underlying my judgment that the General Dynamics proposal offered the better possibility of obtaining a satisfactory aircraft on the desired time schedule and within the dollars programmed.

Having studied the TFX question over many months, I met with Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, Secretary Korth, and Secretary Zuckert early in
November 1962, I found that their own views, arrived at independently, coincided with mine. After several discussions we concluded:

First, that all the evidence showed that the TFX concept was a valid concept that would markedly improve existing military capabilities of the Navy and Air Force. We therefore decided to move ahead with the development of the TFX aircraft.

Second, our best judgment of the many factors involved let us to the tentative conclusion that General Dynamics should receive the award. Although I considered our judgment to be soundly supported on the broad bases I have outlined, I agreed that Mr. Zuckert was to review the facts again before we arrived at a final decision.

Having verified to our satisfaction our judgments, we decided to award the TFX development contract to General Dynamics.

There remains one more important aspect of this case which I believe should be thoroughly understood. Fundamentally, we are dealing with a question of judgment. Granted there are specific technical facts and calculations involved; in the final analysis, judgment is what is at issue.

In this case we are faced with a situation in which judgments are pyramided upon judgments. First, we have the judgments of the competing
contractors that an aircraft of particular design can be built at a given cost within a specific time-frame. Next, we have the judgments of the Evaluation Group regarding feasibility, and the degree to which the designs would or would not satisfy the stated requirements. Then the Source Selection Board, using factors weighted by judgment, made a recommendation which appeared to place greater emphasis on potential bonus factors in certain operational areas, rather than on dependability of development and predictability of costs. This recommendation, understandably, was seconded by the Navy and Air Staffs, since these officers are most vitally interested in obtaining the ultimate in performance in individual weapons systems. On occasion, this desire leads to the establishment of characteristics for weapons systems which cannot be met within the time or funds available, and it has frequently resulted in lowering operational effectiveness.

There is only one way I know to minimize the compounding of error that can occur through this pyramiding of judgment, and that way is to apply the judgment of the decision-maker not only to the final recommendation, but also to the underlying recommendations and facts. This I did to the best of my ability. In doing so, I found it necessary to balance the promises held out by competing contractors, against the hopes and aspirations of military officers, and the limiting realities of economics and technology.

That I attach great importance to the principle of free competition is, I believe, demonstrated by my insistence that competition continue
through the program definition phase of the TFX project. That I attach
great importance to the fulfillment of established military requirements
is, I believe, demonstrated by my refusal to terminate the program
definition phase until I was satisfied that the military requirements of
both the Navy and Air Force had been met. That I attach great importance
to the recognition of economic and technological limiting conditions is,
I believe, demonstrated by my selection of General Dynamics as the
contractor that most clearly recognized the effects of these limitations
on the task to be achieved.

I do not feel that this is a case which presents a civilian--military
conflict but rather one of placing emphasis where it must be placed.
In the final analysis, judgments differed. In reaching my decision, I
considered the recommendations of my various military and civilian
advisors as well as other available evidence, but I had the final
responsibility. The basic judgments on my part which determined my
decision were:

- Both the General Dynamics and the Boeing designs
  met stated military requirements and would provide
  significant improvements in combat capabilities of
  the Navy and the Air Force.

- The General Dynamics proposal resulted in
  minimum divergence from a common design
  compatible with the separate mission of the Navy
  and Air Force, thus insuring the substantial savings
and increased dependability inherent in a joint program.

- The General Dynamics proposal reflected a more realistic understanding of costs.

As Secretary of Defense my responsibilities were clear; the decision was mine.