

Date : 08/28/98

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----
AGENCY INFORMATION

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RECORDS SERIES : FOIA SERIES
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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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EXEMPT PER E.O. 13526
SEC 3.3(b) *50x5*

DATE EXEMPTED: MAR 2016

JS RE-REVIEW DATE: 31 DEC 2017
OKAY TO RELEASE AS REDACTED

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

SPECIAL HANDLING

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

[A]

22. "Voice of Free Cuba" broadcasts from submarine. (CIA, with Defense support).

To have a "voice" for resistance inside Cuba.

The initial broadcasts indicated that this can be made into an effective medium, at small risk. In strengthening the effectiveness, full use should be made of talents in the Cuban refugee community. CIA will coordinate this activity closely with State and USIA.

23. Continue "Radio Americas" broadcasts from Swan Island as appropriate. (CIA).

To provide an irritant to the Castro/ Communist regime.

24. Make available to the International Narcotics Commission documented evidence of Cuban exportation/importation of narcotics. (State).

To create increased awareness in Latin America of Cuban subversive activities.

Documented evidence available or obtainable should be fully exploited for impact upon hemisphere and world opinion.

25. Arrange for caches of limited Soviet-Czech arms to be "discovered" in selected Latin American countries, ostensibly smuggled in from Cuba. (CIA).

To sow and increase distrust in Latin America of the Castro/ Communist regime.

This activity will be undertaken only on a spot basis, coordinated with U.S. objectives in the specific country.

SPECIAL HANDLING

SECRET
SPECIAL HANDLING

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

27. (continued)

- Matahambre Mine-Santa Lucia
- Texaco Refinery-Santiago
- Shell/Esso Refinery-Habana
- Regla Steam Electric Plant-Habana
- Matanzas Steam Electric Plant-Matanzas
- [Nicaro Nickel Plant]
- Moa Bay Nickel Plant
- Paper Mill - Cardenas
- Micro Wave Towers

Each operation entails risk, not only physical risk for the saboteurs, but also risk of attribution to the U.S. in case of capture. Care will be taken to give these actions the appearance of being done by internal resistance groups, and in isolating team members from press sources upon return. The U.S. handling of information, in case of contingency, will be established by CIA in coordination with USIA and State.

SECRET
SPECIAL HANDLING

TOP SECRET - NOFORN
SPECIAL HANDLING

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

34. (continued)

In addition to meeting the above cited intelligence objectives, operational intelligence, and recruitment leads as well as agent material result from the Opa-locka and Madrid operations. In addition to meeting basic intelligence requirements above, timely operational intelligence is vital to CIA current operations.

35. Spot, recruit, and train third country nationals resident in Cuba. (CIA, supported by State and Defense).

See 34 above.

36. Spot, recruit and train legal travellers who have potential access to significant information. (CIA, supported by State and Defense).

See 34 above.


37. Continue Caribbean Admissions Center, Opa-locka, Florida. (CIA, with Defense, USIA, and other support).

See 34 above.

The continuation of the refugee flow and the selective debriefing of refugees provide the most significant source of intelligence. Follow up debriefing of selected refugees after departure from Opa-locka will continue.

TOP SECRET - NOFORN
SPECIAL HANDLING

[E]



TOP SECRET
SPECIAL HANDLING

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

[A]
[E]

38. Continue [joint Spanish IS/CIA interrogation center, Madrid.] (CIA)

See 34 above.

Due to local conditions and problems, the [Madrid] Debriefing Center will continue to be more limited in size and selective in choice of refugees than Opa-locka. This is primarily an NSA problem but CIA will continue to assist as practicable.

[A]

39. Maintain [PAA] service between the U. S. and Cuba. (State, with CIA support).

To provide intelligence and agent personnel and documentation, as well as to continue the exodus of skilled manpower from Cuba.

[PAA] requires financial assistance to continue this activity.

40. Continue and expand, as practical, communications intelligence coverage of Cuban communications nets. (Defense and CIA).

See 34 above.

It is recognized that significant increase in coverage of the internal micro-wave system would become a major budget and personnel problem.

41. Continue monitoring overt Cuban broadcasts. (CIA).

To obtain intelligence and propaganda material.

This is done on a regular basis by FBIS.

42. Urge, assist, and/or support friendly third country intelligence services to expand their intelligence coverage of Cuban intelligence requirements. (CIA).

See 34 above.

This will be handled through existing liaison channels.

TOP SECRET
SPECIAL HANDLING

100-100000-100000
SPECIAL HANDLING

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

[A] 22. "Voice of Free Cuba" broadcast [redacted]
[redacted] (CIA, with Defense support).

To have a "voice" for resistance inside Cuba.

The initial broadcasts indicated that this can be made into an effective medium, at small risk. In strengthening the effectiveness, full use should be made of talents in the Cuban refugee community. CIA will coordinate this activity closely with State and USIA.

23. Continue "Radio Americas" broadcasts from Swan Island as appropriate. (CIA).

To provide an irritant to the Castro/ Communist regime.

24. Make available to the International Narcotics Commission documented evidence of Cuban exportation/importation of narcotics. (State).

To create increased awareness in Latin America of Cuban subversive activities.

Documented evidence available or obtainable should be fully exploited for impact upon hemisphere and world opinion.

25. Arrange for caches of limited Soviet-Czech arms to be "discovered" in selected Latin American countries, ostensibly smuggled in from Cuba. (CIA).

To sow and increase distrust in Latin America of the Castro/ Communist regime.

This activity will be undertaken only on a spot basis, coordinated with U.S. objectives in the specific country.

100-100000-100000
SPECIAL HANDLING

TOP SECRET - SI
SPECIAL HANDLING


ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

34. (continued)

[E]



In addition to meeting the above cited intelligence objectives, operational intelligence, and recruitment leads as well as agent material result from the Opa-locka and operations. In addition to meeting basic intelligence requirements above, timely operational intelligence is vital to CIA current operations.

35. Spot, recruit, and train third country nationals resident in Cuba. (CIA, supported by State and Defense).

See 34 above.

36. Spot, recruit and train legal travellers who have potential access to significant information. (CIA, supported by State and Defense).

See 34 above.

37. Continue Caribbean Admissions Center, Opa-locka, Florida. (CIA, with Defense, USIA, and other support).

See 34 above.

The continuation of the refugee flow and the selective debriefing of refugees provide the most significant source of intelligence. Follow up debriefing of selected refugees after departure from Opa-locka will continue.

TOP SECRET - SI
SPECIAL HANDLING

TOP SECRET
SPECIAL HANDLING

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

[A]
[E]
38. Continue [redacted] CIA interro-
gation center [redacted] (CIA)

See 34 above.

Due to local conditions and problems, the [redacted] Debriefing Center will continue to be more limited in size and selective in choice of refugees than Opa-locka. This is primarily an NSA problem but CIA will continue to assist as practicable.

[A]
39. Maintain [redacted] service between the U.S. and Cuba. (State, with CIA support).

To provide intelligence and agent personnel and documentation, as well as to continue the exodus of skilled manpower from Cuba.

[redacted] requires financial assistance to continue this activity.

40. Continue and expand, as practical, communications intelligence coverage of Cuban communications nets. (Defense and CIA).

See 34 above.

It is recognized that significant increase in coverage of the internal micro-wave system would become a major budget and personnel problem.

41. Continue monitoring overt Cuban broadcasts. (CIA).

To obtain intelligence and propa-
ganda material.

This is done on a regular basis by FBIS.

42. Urge, assist, and/or support friendly third country intelligence services to expand their intelligence coverage of Cuban intelligence requirements. (CIA).

See 34 above.

This will be handled through existing liaison channels.

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SPECIAL HANDLING