

Date: 03/14/05

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

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RECORD NUMBER : 104-10332-10009
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PROJFILES-DECLASS STDS

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : ARRB-CIA ISSUE: YURI NOSENKO
DATE : 05/30/1978
PAGES : 76

SUBJECTS : NOSENKO YURI
JFK ASSASSINATION
UNIT INDEX
ARRB ISSUE

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INDEX: 4 PAGES DIF.

Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
65360 Date: 06-01-2023

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED 104-10332-10009

net copy

~~SECRET~~

Box 11

Fldr 11

OGC 78-3595
5-31-78

~~APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM~~

Executive Registry
78-8432/11

OLC 78-1012/8
30 May 1978

JUN 5 10 04 AM '78

SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence 2000
VIA : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : S. D. Breckinridge
Principal Coordinator, HSCA
Office of Legislative Counsel
SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Assassinations
Request for Access to the "Hart Report"

1. Action Requested: That you approve the recommendation at paragraph 14 for limited access of selected House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) staff members to a classified, sanitized version of the Hart Report.

2. Background: As you know, the HSCA Staff Director, Mr. Blakey, has requested you in a letter dated 9 May 1978 (Tab A), to provide access to a report prepared by John Hart in 1977 on the subject of the Agency's handling of the Nosenko case. This request is part of an inquiry into hypotheses arising from Epstein's book Legend, in which the view is presented that Nosenko was a dispatched agent with the mission of concealing KGB ties with Lee Harvey Oswald. Central to HSCA interest is the question of Nosenko's bona fides. Additional to that issue, interest has developed in the manner in which Nosenko was treated during the period that his bona fides were suspect. These two issues are treated separately below.

I

3. The Hart report is directed at the handling of the Nosenko case, addressing the actions and conduct of various officers in the Agency. These matters cannot be treated without also considering the question of Nosenko's bona fides, so there also is considerable review of the methodology employed and the analyses of those handling the matter. Mr. Blakey states in his letter that he has been informed that the report contains no information on the issues of bona fides, being concerned instead only with personnel and internal procedures. This understanding on his part is incorrect, and his letter suggests that he himself has reservations about it.

05948

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

4. The Agency has made available to the HSCA two studies conducted in 1967 and 1968 by SE Division, both of which questioned Nosenko's bona fides. A subsequent study by the Office of Security in 1968 has also been made available; it reached a conclusion contrary to the preceding studies and supports Nosenko's bona fides. Other Soviet defectors have been interviewed by the HSCA staff, as well as knowledgeable CIA officers and retirees. As a result, much of the information on the case has been revealed to the Committee.

5. The two SE Division studies, concluding that Nosenko was a KGB agent, were superceded by the Office of Security study, which prevailed. The HSCA investigators reportedly have problems with how the earlier two studies could be rejected so shortly after their completion. As a result, the HSCA seems focused on the issues as viewed at that time. The Hart report has the advantage of having been prepared after a ten year period, during which experience with the validity of Nosenko's information provides the basis for an objective re-examination. It is relevant to HSCA interests that the Hart Report constitutes a convincing statement of the bona fides of Nosenko. Access to this portion of the Hart Report would help broaden and complete the understanding of the HSCA of the matter.

6. Because of the above, the Agency has everything to gain and nothing to lose in providing the Hart Report for its review of the issue of Nosenko's bona fides.

II

7. In addition to the central issue of Nosenko's bona fides, Chairman Stokes has expressed interest in the treatment accorded Nosenko during the period that his bona fides were in question. Nosenko reportedly has provided the HSCA with some detail on this. We have made the point that how Nosenko was treated was a result of the issue, not a part of it. When we questioned the relevance of this line of inquiry to the HSCA charter, HSCA staff representatives assert that their charter extends to the conduct of the intelligence agencies in the Warren Commission inquiry which includes this. The rationale appears a bit contrived and stretched in terms of the real issues. How Nosenko was treated may indicate how concerned CIA was with the man's bona fides, but so far as relating further to the inquiry concerning President Kennedy's assassination, it seems marginal at best. The rationale is so far-fetched that we have been led to consider that its dramatic qualities are attractive for the projected TV spectacular this coming September. It also doubtless provides an opportunity for public criticism for those staff members who have been acknowledged by Mr. Blakey as hostile to the Agency.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

8. If the rationale of the HSCA for pursuing the question of Nosenko's treatment is contrived, and largely peripheral to the real purpose of the Committee, as we believe it to be, it should be faced in those terms. No one would disagree with there being relevant inquiries, but it is hardly proper to take an internal critique and turn it against the Agency on a point irrelevant to the central purpose of the inquiry. The HSCA staff position is tendentious, and reflects on its face a hostile attitude that the Committee may not otherwise want to be so obvious. The Committee has the right to determine what is relevant to its charter, but the Agency should also assert a similar right to defend itself from truly peripheral and hostile fishing expeditions.

9. Therefore, while we believe that the Hart Report should be made available to the HSCA staff, we do not believe that such action should be taken prior to attempting to limit the use made of information contained in the Report not related to the issue of Nosenko's bona fides.

III

10. There are aspects of the Hart Report that contain information on foreign liaison services that should not be exposed to the HSCA. There is, therefore, a question of some sanitization to be conducted prior to the Report's being made available.

11. A version of the Report has been prepared for the FBI in which the names of employees below the DCI have been removed, as well as certain modifications in more dramatic rhetorical phrases. That version is in other respects faithful to the original Report. It provides a working basis for further sanitization. Sanitization prior to review is not foreign to the HSCA, as the Directorate of Operations has had a continuing policy of selected sanitization. Extending this practice to the Hart Report would be consistent with the extant working relationship with HSCA. The Report will remain classified.

12. If the paper is made available, classified and sanitized, it should be on a highly restricted basis; the HSCA wants six named persons to have access to it, which is at least three times the number needed for bona fide research purposes.

13. Staff Position: This paper favors making a sanitized version of the paper, in classified form, available to a limited number of the HSCA staff representatives at the CIA Headquarters Building at Langley. Any such release should be preceded by appropriate discussions limiting use of the material by the Committee. The General Counsel is of the opinion (Tab B)

~~SECRET~~

That if the paper is withheld, and a court test results, the Agency must expect to fail in withholding the paper. The Office of the General Counsel, the Office of Security, SE Division and CI Staff favor making the paper available under the conditions set forth above.

14. Recommendation: That you approve granting access to a limited number of staff members of the HSCA to a classified, sanitized version of the Hart Report. Such access shall be conditioned on agreement to limit use of materials contained in the Report to those matters relating to the question of Nosenko's bona fides.

S. D. Breckinridge

Attachments

CONCURRENCE:

SIGNED

31 MAY 1978

General Counsel

Date

Chief, SE Division

Date

Chief, CI Staff

Date

[Signature]

Director of Security

1 JUN 1978

Date

APPROVAL:

/s/ Frank C. [Signature]

Director of Central Intelligence

Date

DISAPPROVAL:

Director of Central Intelligence

Date

SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations
Request for Access to the "Hart Report"

Distribution:

Orig - Adse
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - OGC
1 - C/SE Div
1 - C/CI Staff
1 - SA/DO/O
1 - D/OS
1 - OLC/Subj
1 - OLC/Chrono
OLC/SDB/ksn (30 May 78)

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL

2000

11 March 1993

clear

NOTE FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: Peter Earnest
Chief, Media Relations

SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST Request to Talk to an Agency
Specialist on the Kennedy Assassination

Jim
~~John~~
for circulation in HRC, f

The WASHINGTON POST is preparing a series of articles on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Kennedy assassination. ✓

With the help of CIC, we recently arranged for George Lardner and Walter Pincus of the WASHINGTON POST to interview former KGB officer Yuri Nosenko about his knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald during the time Oswald lived in the Soviet Union. To ensure that Nosenko's resettlement identity and location would remain protected, I made the arrangements for Nosenko to come to Washington for the interview. ✓


The POST reimbursed Nosenko for expenses and paid him a \$250 consulting fee. The interview was done on Wednesday, 3 March, at the POST offices downtown. I did not remain for it. Lardner and Pincus also hosted a lunch for Nosenko which was attended by Ben Bradlee. Lardner and Pincus were very pleased with their session with Nosenko and appreciative of our making it possible. I also spoke afterwards with Nosenko who said he was satisfied with how the interview was conducted and with the financial arrangements.

Shortly after the interview, Lardner faxed me a list of the questions that he and Pincus had prepared for themselves to use in checking out Nosenko's information. They asked if there was anyone at the Agency they could talk to about the individuals named. I told them that developing information in response to their questions would probably take a good deal of research and that I doubted the Agency would be able to take on such a task at this time for the POST. However, I said I would take it up with the appropriate offices.

Although I told the POST that I do not believe anyone would be willing to undertake research on their questions, I'm wondering if there is anyone around who might be knowledgeable of Nosenko's information who would be willing to talk with Lardner and Pincus on background based on his/her existing knowledge. I think Lardner and Pincus would be grateful for making such a person available even if

SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST Request

all their questions aren't answered. Considering that they are trying to do serious research on the Kennedy assassination, I think any effort on our part to help them would be seen as a gesture of good will.


Peter Earnest

Attachment:
As stated

_____ Agree to having a specialist talk to them on background about the Nosenko information if an appropriate person is available.

_____ No, do not want anyone from the DO talking about the Nosenko information.

SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST Request to Talk to an Agency specialist in the Kennedy Assassination

DCI/PAI/Earnest:ncbx37758 (11 March 1993)

Distribution:

Original	Addressee
1	ADDO
1	SA/DDO
1	DO Registry
1	D/PAI
1	D/DO/CIC
1	C/DO/NROC
1	C/DO/CE
1	C/CSI
1	C/History Staff

Names of Russians we should try to track down about Lee Harvey Oswald, Yuri Nosenko and the JFK assassination:

1. General Oleg M. Gribanov, head of the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB in the early 1960s where Nosenko says he worked, primarily against American tourists, as deputy chief of the Seventh Department. Nosenko described himself as sort of favored by Gribanov and he said Gribanov instructed him, after the JFK assassination, to retrieve the Oswald file from the Minsk KGB right away.

2. Anatoliy Koralenko, deputy chief of the Second Chief Directorate or one of its departments, at time of JFK assassination. Nosenko said when the file arrived from Minski, he and Koralenko were going over the all-important first volume--and finding KGB had nothing to do with Oswald--when a KGB officer from the First Department came in and picked it up on Gribanov's orders, to review it and write a summary of it.

3. The officer who picked it up was Col. Matveev, deputy chief(I think) of First(or American) Department, Second Chief Directorate. Unhave first name.

4. Chief of this First Department was Col. Sergei M. Fedoseyev or Fedoseev and presumably he would have had a hand in or supervised preparation of the "spravka" or summary.

5. Gribanov and more than 40 other KGB officers were kicked out because of Nosenko's defection, according to Nosenko. That right? *What happened?*

6. Maj. Georgi Rastrusin. Was in 1959 a senior case officer in KGB responsible for Intourist matters. Nosenko says that it was Rastrusin who told him about Oswald and how he wanted to stay in Soviet Union. Nosenko said Rastrusin said Oswald "doesn't present interest" to KGB and Nosenko checked out with his superiors. Word came back not to bother with Oswald. Nosenko was told to tell Rastrusin to tell Intourist to deal with him.

7. Rastrusin returned next day and said we got a problem. Oswald tried to kill self, etc. KGB washed hands of him, decided to let Intourist deal with him. Intourist then part of Ministry of Foreign Trade. Nosenko said he believes question of what to do with Oswald was run to top of that ministry and beyond, to Khrushchev or one of his deputies. In any case, decision was made to let Oswald stay in Minsk. But not, Nosenko says, by KGB.

8. In the fall of 1963, a KGB colleague, M. I. Turalin, Service No. 2(counterintelligence in foreign countries), First Chief Directorate, told Nosenko orally that Mexico City station had just sent a cable about a request by Oswald for a visa to re-enter Soviet Union. What should be done?

Nosenko said he said, 'wait a second. How come he's back in America?' At that point, Nosenko said he hadn't know Oswald had gone back.

9. Nosenko said he said let's go to chief of department who he identified as a Col. Chelnekov or Chelnenko(but later seemed to say his timing might be off and somebody else may have been chief of Nosenko's department at the time). In any case, Nosenko quoted chief as saying, in effect, 'I remember this crazy nut. No. No. No. Tell them we don't have any interest.'

Cable back to Mexico City advising KGB there get rid of Oswald by telling him to go back to his own country and apply for a visa at Soviet Embassy in Washington, etc., etc.

10. Col. Gruzdev, was chief of the KGB department in Minsk that was responsible for foreigners there.

11. Oleg Nechiporenko, one of three KGB officers stationed in Mexico City who reportedly interrogated or dealt with Oswald on his visit to Embassy there. Now living in Moscow area.

Other two Mexico City officers, both still alive in Russia: Valeriy Kostikov and Pavel Yatzkov.

3 March 1994

Memo to: C/HRG

Subject: Mangold Litigation

Today I alerted OGC (Theresa Wilcox/~~Kathy Kelly~~) that the JFK collections contains a significant number of documents on Nosenko (5-6000 pages) which may impact on the Mangold litigation. As I understand it, the Mangold Litigation is over the Angelton files and is several years old. According to JFK reviewers at the FBI, documents on Nosenko's defection and treatment are part of case. I talked with Theresa Wilcox who is the para-legal handling the litigation, however, she was not familiar with the documents involved. She will consult with ~~Kelly~~, the lawyer on the case, and get back to me.

I consider the ball in OGC's court. I propose that we continue to review the Nosenko files. If there are Mangold or other consideration to address, we can do so after the HRG review is complete.

Barry

9 March 94

Re: NOSENKO

Having reviewed Box 45 - we note several Reports, not completely identified as to author.

- (1) "Conclusions & Comments in the Case of Yuriy I. Nosenko" ^(att) ~~(att)~~ (File Salie Report) - 264 pgs.
(This is in Box 45, Folder 8)
(It has been released in JFK) - JFK 62-F9
(It concludes NOSENKO is GOOD)
- (2) "Case of Yuriy I. Nosenko" (835 page study)
dated February 1967

(No indication that it has been released)
(Believe it was prepared in SB (perhaps by Bagley - or perhaps with CIA/STAFF)
(It concludes NOSENKO is BAD)
- (3) "The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector" - TS # 197124
(447 pages) dated FEBRUARY 1968

(This is found in ORIS Box 62 JFK - FLD 9)
(It was released except for ANNEX A which is found in Box 45 F. 23.

(It concludes ~~that~~ NOSENKO WAS NOT Bona fide)
(Don't know author)

Jm)

23 March 1994

Memorandum For: C/HRG

Subject: Nosenko and the Mangold Litigation

I received a call from ~~Kathy Kelly~~, OGC, this morning concerning the Nosenko files in the JFK files. I described the files again (about 4000+ pages that include transcripts of all his interrogations and numerous studies on his bona fides and treatment by the Agency including the Solie and Hart reports and an 835 page comprehensive study). Since Nosenko is an important figure in the JFK assassination story and the files are part of the sequestered collection, HRG is reviewing the files under the JFK Assassination Records Collections Act. However, we were aware that some of the documents were part of the Mangold litigation and wanted to make sure that they were properly coordinated.

~~Kathy Kelly~~ said that the Mangold litigation should not be a factor in HRG's review. If the files were subject to the JFK Records Act, they should be processed under that Act. When the review is complete, a list of the documents released should be provide so that OGC can treat them the same in the Mangold case.

I also talked with Kathy Stricker (yesterday) to get some background on the handling of Nosenko files and what were the "secrets" given what we know is publicly available. She said for years the agency "glomared" Nosenko except for the Oswald information: however, once Golitsyn became public that ended. Today, the battle over his bona fides and how he was treated are public knowledge. The Agency up until a couple years ago had not released some of the studies (she mention Solie) but she was not sure that this was still the case or if it was possible to continue to deny them. DO has protected the information provided by Nosenko on other Soviet sources and leads for possible recruitment. This type of information should continue to be protected.

Kathy Stricker's comments are consistent with HRG's handling of the Nosenko files. We are considering all of the files as related; his bona fides is a key element of the story and there was a large amount of information including parts of the studies on him in both the Oswald 201 and the JFK hard copy collection. We have deleted information provided on other sources and operations not related to the JFK story. We are also recommending release of the rest of the studies. Although they contain potentially embarrassing information for the Agency (as did the IG report on the Castro plots), there doesn't appear to be grounds for denying under the JFK Act.

5/94

Restrictions on Declassifying Material on Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

The following should be used as guidelines in declassifying material files pertaining to the career and "bona fides" of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. CIA Knowledge of Russian intelligence tradecraft. Specific information in the files about KGB targetting of American citizens could reveal to the Russian Intelligence service our knowledge of their tradecraft. Since the Russian services continue to target Americans, this information should continue to be protected.

2. To protect a CIA asset. Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO remains an asset of this agency, and is under contract. Moreover, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVRR) remains interested in NOSENKO's whereabouts and activities. Russian intelligence services since the Second World War have tried to track their defectors. There are indications that the Russian services remain interested in the NOSENKO case.

o At the time of his arrest, ~~Rick Ames had some NOSENKO files~~ [redacted] in his possession. The US Counterintelligence Community is unsure if this material was passed ~~to the Russian service.~~



--Following NOSENKO's brother and mother's visit to the United States, both were questioned by the Russian service about NOSENKO's activity and place and residence.

JFK Act 5 (g)(2)(D)

Legal position
C.I.

~~Mr. Robert Fringle~~
~~2909 Rock Manor Court~~
~~Herndon, Virginia 22071~~

Dear Bob,

It was very good to meet with you again in Washington on June 12. I am writing to confirm our recent conversation about the CIA's release of documents about me to the National Archives. As I explained to you at our meeting, I am very displeased that this was done without my knowledge and especially since my photograph was officially released by the Agency for the first time in thirty years.

As you know, it has come to my attention that the CIA released these many hundreds of pages to the public without consulting me or telling me that this was going to be done. I have already seen copies of two of these reports totalling more than 700 pages. One is the October 1968 report supporting me by Bruce Solie; the other was a February 1968 report by the CI Staff which attacked my credibility. (This latter report contains a copy of my photo from the late 1960s. I consider this a breach of my personal security.)

I also consider many of the details in both of these reports to be of a very personal nature. Other pages deal with with some very sensitive cases which I gave the Agency about other people. The information in these reports was given freely and accurately by me to the CIA officers in the 1960s under terms of strict confidentiality. Although it is very difficult for me to say this, I feel that my trust in the Agency has now been seriously damaged.

This release particularly troubles me because for the past thirty years I have remained very loyal to the Agency and considerate of its wishes. For instance, despite many requests, I have only spoken to a few jour~~n~~^{al}ists, and only when the Agency advised me to ^{do} so. I have never sought

Page 2

on my own to publish my story in an article or book. But now, the CIA has not returned this courtesy. Instead, it has released sensitive information to the public without speaking to me first. Under the circumstances, I would like to respectfully request the following:

1. That you show this letter to DDO Ted Price, Director James Woolsey, and the current heads of the CIA's Freedom of Information Office and Historical Review staff -- so that they are aware of what has happened.
2. I would like to receive, in writing, an explanation from those responsible of why this release was done.
3. I would like to receive a list of the major reports about me which have already been released. Aside from the two reports that I already have seen, I would like to receive copies of any other major studies that have been released. (For instance, if there are reports released by Peter Bagley, Newton Miler, James Angleton, the CI Staff and John Hart, then I would like to see them as well.)
4. I would like to be given the Agency's written assurance that further releases will not occur without consulting me first.

Bob, you should know that before I wrote this letter I have spoken about this matter with my good friend George Kalaris. He too was troubled by what I told him, and he advised me that I should ask the Agency for an explanation.

Bob, I apologize for troubling you with this matter, but I have no one else to turn to for assistance.

Please let me know if there is any response as soon as possible.

Respectfully yours,

~~Secret~~

Draft letter to Nosenko from the DDO

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL

Dear

2000

The Director has asked me to respond to your letter expressing concern that US Government declassification of material could compromise your privacy and security.

In regard to your question about the documents that have already been released, rest assured that I have directed officers responsible for FOIA requests to take special care in reviewing information concerning you in light of your special circumstances. We will make full use of all possible exceptions to FOIA-mandated declassification in order to protect your privacy.

As you know, in 1992 Congress passed the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, which required all US Government agencies to release any records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. As Deputy Director for Operations, I am of course committed to fully supporting the DCI in meeting this requirement, but I also appreciate your concern about the files on you that are related to the assassination. I have therefore directed a senior officer in the DO to meet with the officials in the Agency's ~~historical staff~~ who are involved in the declassification program. This officer has had extensive discussions with members of the ~~staff~~ and has worked closely with them to identify those portions of the files that include personal and operational information.

Investigative of the

Historical Review Group

As a result of this effort, we have ~~postponed release of any~~ information touching on your private life or on operational information pertaining to your debriefings. Under the JFK law, a Presidential Review Board will make the final decision on the disposition of the material. This Agency values the sacrifices you have made for our country, and we will present the Board with the strongest possible case for protecting information that could affect your privacy and security.

Follow special law to protect an

Sensitive

Best wishes,

[Handwritten signature]

UNCLASSIFIED

17 April 1997

~~Steve Amiano~~ SA/CIC, gave to Gary Brenneman to give to Barry Harrelson, Historical Review Group, X31825, 2 soft files entitled:

1. "WARREN COMMISSION/OSWALD"
2. "DOCUMENTS YURI Ivanovich NOSENKO/OSWALD"

found by ~~Al Bonner~~ in the vault.



Received

GARY M. BRENNEMAN

17-APRIL-97

UNCLASSIFIED

~~Administrative HRG Internal Use Only~~
CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2008

30 April 1997

Note To: ARRB Staff

Subject: CIC Soft files:

1. Warren Commission/Oswald
2. Documents Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO/Oswald

The attached files were located in CIC. They are soft (or working) files containing information on Nosenko, Warren Commission and Oswald. It is not clear if the files date from the Warren Commission period, or were created in 1975/76 (latest date of documents) in response to a request or investigation.

Most of the documents are in the sequestered collection (OGC folders). The other documents may be in the Nosenko material put aside for discussion with the ARRB or in the Microfilm part of the sequestered material (the Microfilm is not indexed document by document).

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Barney', with a long horizontal line extending to the right.

~~Administrative HRG Internal Use Only~~

30 April 1997

Note for the Record

Subject: CIC Oswald/Nosenko related soft files:

1. Warren Commission/Oswald
2. Documents Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO/Oswald

1. I advised ~~Sue Amiano~~, SA/CIC, that most of the documents in the two folders are duplicates of documents in the CIA JFK Collection sequestered by the HSCA. The other documents are related to Nosenko, but do not mention Oswald. These documents are probably duplicated in the Nosenko material set aside for discussion with the ARRB. I recommended that we make the folders available to the ARRB staff. She concurred.

2. Documents will be made available to Michelle Combs, ARRB staff, on her next visit.



Barry

516

TO: Eileen M. Wukitch
FROM: James W. Zirkle
DATE: 08/01/97 09:54:03
SUBJECT: Re: The Nosenko Papers

JFK Act 5 (g)(2)(D)

CL BY: [redacted]
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: HUM 4-82

Eileen: Let me introduce myself. I am CIC/Legal. C/CIC asked me to touch base with you concerning any possible ARRB release of privacy information concerning Nosenko. While we are aware that such a decision to release is within the Board's discretion, we do believe that the Agency, when giving this information over to them, should request that the Board protect such information to the maximum extent possible. If I can be of help in that regard just let me know. Jim

From the Desk of Dennis D. Lamb

NOTE FOR: Ron L. Seckinger
FROM: Dennis D. Lamb
DATE: 07/31/97 10:44:28
SUBJECT: The Nosenko Papers

CL BY: 0790429
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: HUM 4-82

At about 1020 hrs on Tuesday, 31 July, I received a call from Eileen Wukitch of the Agency's External Support Group/Historical Collection Staff regarding Michelle Combs's interest in reviewing the Nosenko papers for the upcoming meeting of the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) on 5 August. Wukitch said Combs, an ARRB staffer, is planning on taking 20 pages of the Nosenko material with her. Wukitch wants to know whether we would like copies of the material Combs is taking. I said yes. Wukitch said Combs appears understanding of our concerns in this case and to this end wanted the following questions answered so she could put a human touch on our concerns in explaining our position to the ARRB.

1. Is Nosenko married? (No one in CIC/AG knows.)
2. What part of the country is he living in? (This is known, but I can't see why she or the ARRB needs to know.)
3. Did the Soviets actually sentence Nosenko to death? Or was this just his claim. (No one in CIC/AG know, but it appears reasonable to assume that the Soviets did sentence him to death.)
4. Nosenko's current age? (No one in CIC/AG knows off hand. Henry's observation was that Combs can find this out from open literature.)

~~SECRET~~

According to ~~Wukitch~~, Combs also wants to take to the ARRB two letters pertaining to the affair: the letter Nosenko wrote in 1994 objecting to the release of his material without his being consulted or advised, and the letter Ted Price wrote to him in response assuring him that everything possible would be done to prevent further release of his papers. I don't see any problem with this since the papers would support our position--unless the ARRB starts thinking about releasing the letters also.

~~Wukitch~~ said she told Combs CIC would have ~~Bob Pringle~~, former Chief of AG/FIOB currently serving as Officer in Residence at the University of Kentucky, flown in to address the ARRB if this appears necessary. Combs will pass this on to the ARRB. ~~Wukitch~~ noted that Combs alluded to the possibility that that ARRB might want to talk with Nosenko himself.

CC:

CC:

~~John B. ENGBERT, Nancy T. BRUNONE, Edgar C. BAUML, Dennis D. Lamb, Curtis L. MACKIAN, Jacqueline Frankfort @ DCI, Ron L. Seckinger~~

~~SECRET~~

