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The United States Senate

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Report of Proceedings

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Hearing held before

INVENTORIED
ON 2/15/77
BY BC

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

76000811404

Thursday, June 19, 1975

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

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TESTIMONY OF
James Angleton

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EXECUTIVE SESSION

Thursday, June 19, 1975

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Government.

Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:20 p.m.,
in Room S.123, The Capitol, Senator John G. Tower, presiding.

Present: Senators Tower (presiding), Baker and Mathias.

Also present: William Miller, Staff Director; Frederick
A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Charles Kirbow and David
Aaron, Professional Staff Members.

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1 Senator Tower. Mr. Angleton, I understand that you came
2 on very short notice. And I appreciate your accommodating
3 the Committee.

4 You will have to be sworn.

5 Would you rise, please, and raise your right hand?

6 Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about
7 to give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth and
8 nothing but the truth, so help you God?

9 Mr. Angleton. I do.

10 Senator Tower. Counsel, you may proceed.

11 TESTIMONY OF JAMES ANGLETON

12 Mr. Schwarz. I would like to first get your name and
13 address on the record.

14 Mr. Angleton. James Angleton, Arlington, Virginia.

15 Mr. Schwarz. Just some procedural matters. You have a
16 right to counsel, you understand that?

17 Mr. Angleton. Yes, I understand it.

18 Mr. Schwarz. And if at any time you want to stop to ob-
19 tain counsel you have a right to do that. And if you wish
20 to claim any of your Constitutional rights you have a right
21 to do that, you understand those things also, do you?

22 Mr. Angleton. Yes, I understand them.

23 Mr. Schwarz. You were employed at the CIA for what
24 period of time?

25 Mr. Angleton. From the beginning until December, the

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1 end of December.

2 Mr. Schwarz. 1974?

3 Mr. Angleton. 1974.

4 Mr. Schwarz. And were you the Chief of Counterintelligence
5 at the CIA for that period?

6 Mr. Angleton. I was.

7 Mr. Schwarz. For that entire period of time?

8 Mr. Angleton. No, from 1954.

9 Mr. Schwarz. [Redacted] JFK Act 5 (g) (2) (D)

10 [Redacted] JFK Act 5 (g) (2) (D)

11 Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

12 Mr. Schwarz. Can you briefly state the connection, if any,
13 between your counter intelligence work and the [Redacted] JFK Act 5 (g) (2) (D)

14 or put even more generally, how did you happen to have both
15 those jobs?

16 Mr. Angleton. Well, if I could ask you some clarifica-
17 tion, are we addressing ourselves here in terms of
18 this meeting to the Szulc business, or are we trying to take
19 up everything?

20 Mr. Schwarz. No, we are not going to try to take up
21 everything. We may try to take up a few things beyond the
22 Szulc business. What we are trying to do --

23 Mr. Angleton. I can direct my answers to you better
24 if I know more where we are going.

25 Mr. Schwarz. We are going to the Szulc business, but it

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1 it would be helpful to have a few background first.

2 Senator Baker. If I may say so, so that Mr. Angleton
3 will not be taken by surprise, there are one or two things that
4 I would like to discuss. The nature of that material would be
5 similar to what you have already discussed with Rockefeller,
6 having to do with the Oswald situation and other things.

7 Mr. Angleton. Well, to begin with, I went into OSS in
8 1943, in 1943 from the infantry. And then I was assigned to an
9 embryonic counter intelligence unit under General
10 Donovan. My immediate chief was James R. Murphy, who had been
11 a protegee and obtained his law degree in General Donovan's
12 office. And he is a practicing attorney here in Washington.
13 And he was Chief of X-2, which was the counter intelligence.
14 And during that time a number of us were put together who
15 had never had any experience in the subject. And that included
16 people such as Jonnie Oaks, who was the head of the editorial
17 page of the New York Times, and Ben Wells, and a tremendous
18 cross-section of American life.

19 And there was a training intensive in this country, and
20 I was sent to London. And the purpose of that was to ab-
21 sorb the British experience, and more important, the breaking
22 of German codes.

23 The breaking of the German codes, which is relevant to
24 our activity, was really done in England. And by way of
25 digression, the Germans were using a receiver machine called

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1 Enigma, the blue prints of which were originally obtained by
2 a Frenchman. And I might add that the Frenchman never re-
3 ceived credit for it. And yet that perhaps was the most
4 single important breakthrough of the entire war. And he had
5 obtained it about eight to nine or ten years prior to the out-
6 break of war, when it was non-operative. And he had the
7 prescience to know that the systems could only be one thing,
8 that it would be operative in a time of war.

9 I give this digression simply to point out that the
10 fruits of that breakthrough would first go to the military
11 and the military operations. And the counter intelligence
12 use of it would be the bottom of the list of priorities, in
13 one sense.

14 But it would mean that a compromise of the material
15 in any fashion to the Germans would destroy the military
16 uses. And during the war or when the Germans went into the
17 war, they brought it up from 10 percent recovery to about
18 100 percent.

19 And I believe it was in the neighborhood of some 22,000
20 operational messages from the German high command. I know
21 the Battle of Tobruk was fought on six intercepts.

22 So our job was to make use of the counter intelligence
23 for the purpose of playing back German agents to their high
24 command. And this was an elaborate deception. And when the
25 war ended I would say that 99 percent of all reporting agents

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1 that the Germans had were under our control. And in fact
 2 when many of the German hierarchy tried to escape to the
 3 west under aliases, their only point of contact for most
 4 documentation and money was to our agent under control.
 5 And it was called the Safe Haven program.

6 So London was in a sense a staging area with full access
 7 to British, or the fruits of British activity, going back
 8 through their entire history. And it was the advance head-
 9 quarters for General Donovan, and Mr. Murphy.

10 I was then sent to Italy in 1943. And I took over the
 11 counter intelligence for Italy, the OSS, AFHQ, Allied Forces
 12 Headquarters.

13 Subsequently I became the Chief of OSS Italy. And
 14 I want to say that my work then became more broad in terms of
 15 espionage and all the other branches of OSS. And I re-estab-
 16 lished the counter intelligence services. And I brought the
 17 French back into existence, particularly the man who
 18 originally acquired the code, and who worked on it for many
 19 years. And by this time it was shifted to the Saudi bloc.

20 I left Italy in 1947 or 1948 and came back, and was
 21 discharged and went into the Agency immediately. And during
 22 the period I was in the Agency, of course, I had both agent
 23 operations, long distance operations, and counter intelligence,
 24 and some sabotage, black propaganda, infiltration.

25 And probably the first overnight operation that there was.

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1 which was known as Plan Hope, which is simply putting the
2 Italians in an airplane and having them fly over to the
3 Roumanian border and make very primitive photographs of the
4 whole region.

5 And I was sent back to the Air Force. And then I had
6 code operations, embassy penetrations, and so on.

7 So, in a sense the resuscitation of the Italian service,
8 Army and Navy, Air Force, and the Minister of the Interior,
9 was American rehabilitation. And I am not going to go into
10 the details of the political situation. There was the
11 civil war in Greece, and the revival of the international
12 Brigade and in fact the Soviets had built up, when they were
13 not fighting the war, in the post-war period, assassinations,
14 and instability.

15 And throughout this we had very close supervision from
16 Mr. Murphy, and General Donovan. And we had special interest
17 in the Vatican, and what was happening in Berlin behind the
18 Curtain.

19 And the then acting Secretary of State for the Vatican,
20 Montini, who is the present Pope. And so there was much
21 to do through our channels, and General Donovan, with Montini,
22 the Pope, who is now the Pope, one of the basic problems was
23 the cold war. We did not buy the cold war, it came to us
24 and we worked with the Germans, and as we broke down the
25 opposition, we began to find that we were not getting the

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1 Germans, we were getting the Soviets.

3 But the penetrations and the operations which we ran
4 during the military phase began to take on a character of
5 their own in the civilian phase in the very long term Soviet
6 objectives against the U.S. in particular, and against the
7 allies.

8 And then I got into all fields of labor, subversion,
9 illegal immigrants, and then revolution. I was in

10 And our penetrations at that period were fairly high level and
11 sophisticated, because of the reaction to Stalin.

12 And as the Soviet troops occupied new territories, it
13 was faced with these ambiguities, the defectors coming
14 over to us at very high levels.

15 And in the course of this, of course, was the Israeli
16 immigration. Technically we were still a part of AFHQ, which
17 was a combined and Allied Headquarters. And the British desires
18 were that our activities be directed in supporting their
19 responsibilities in the Middle East, and, therefore, to pre-
20 vent the immigration.

21 And I think the only policy cable that was ever re-
22 ceived during that period was one we sent to Mr. Murphy, and
23 through General Donovan to the President. That
24 was where we exercised our influences on the Italians to
25 prevent immigration. And they addressed themselves to this
issue, and they came back with an ambiguity, but it leaned

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