

- (f) Attendance or teaching at organization schools or classes, especially leadership classes
- (g) Preparation or distribution of party propaganda
- (h) Recruiting and fund-raising activities
- (i) Possession of Marxist or revolutionary literature or urging others to read literature of revolutionary character

While none of the above may be of sufficient value alone, a combination may constitute convincing proof. Revolutionary purposes of subversive organization are frequently cloaked in veiled language or in language significant only to persons familiar with Marxist or revolutionary terminology. Such statements should be fully reported. Develop and report all revolutionary statements and circumstances under which made.

(3) Position and importance

- (a) Information showing importance of individual to subversive organization or movement should be fully developed and reported. Member or affiliate may be dangerous or important because of his position, influence, or activities inside or outside organization, or both.
- (b) Concealment of membership and underground activity. Member or affiliate may be highly dangerous although he takes no part in overt activities of organization. Subject may have assignment in underground and is not to contact or associate openly with others in subversive movement. By virtue of this assignment in secret operations, such individuals must be considered most dangerous. Be continually alert that individual may be serving in underground capacity. All logical investigative techniques should be used to develop fully individual's activities in underground; identities of other individuals engaged in underground operations; and method of operation, extent, and purposes of underground.

Coverage must be sufficient to insure underground activities of subversive movement are known. Identities of individuals who are directing underground operations; location of hiding places of fugitives and underground leaders; and locations of secret printing presses, mimeograph machines, and large stationery supplies must be known at all times.

[3.] Missing security subjects

- [a.] Location of all dangerous subversives must be known at all times. Each subject remaining out of control at time of national emergency represents threat to national security.
- [b.] Deleted
- [c.] When information is received that ADEX subject has changed his residence and/or employment, case must be opened and assigned for active investigation to locate subject.
- [d.] If subject has gone into hiding, or is working clandestinely in underground capacity, he can be classified as missing subject and should be included in unavailable section of [ADEX.] When FD-122 is submitted to Bureau, send cover letter advising of investigative steps taken to locate [subject.]
- [e.] Investigations to locate missing [ADEX] subjects must be given preferential and continuous attention [and should] be handled as thoroughly as fugitive investigation.
- [(1)] Advise Bureau each 45 days by letter of steps taken to locate missing [ADEX] subject. Do not submit reports which merely set forth negative results of investigation.
- [(2)] If subject may have gone to Mexico or Canada, request Bureau to alert appropriate Government agencies to this possibility and to seek verifying information through liaison channels. If subject is reported to have gone to any other foreign country, request Washington Field Office (WFO) to check records of Passport Office of State Department for verification.

[(3)] When all logical leads have been exhausted in case of important [security subject,] consider requesting Bureau authority to circularize all field offices with subject's photograph and background information.

[4.] Individuals traveling abroad (Also see section 105G, volume IV, of this manual.)

Set forth below are steps to be taken when information is received that subject in one of following [circumstances] intends to travel abroad or has already departed this country for foreign travel: subject of current security investigation, subject in [categories] I and II of [ADEX,] past security subjects who may be in underground capacity, or subject concerning whom there is current information indicating need for foreign coverage.

[a.] Immediately advise Bureau by LHM available details concerning travel, including places and dates of departure and intended return, destination and itinerary, purpose of trip, name under which passport was issued, number of passport, and issuing office, if known. Include full description of subject and all aliases (in case of Chinese and Korean subjects, include Chinese telegraphic code or Korean telegraphic code numbers). Also include concise resume of available subversive data regarding subject. Do not delay advising Bureau of actual or intended travel while developing details of travel as time is of essence.

[b.] Set out lead for WFO to check records of Passport Office, Department of State; but do not limit efforts to develop pertinent information to such check.

[c.] Information concerning subject's proposed travel abroad, including information concerning subversive activities, is furnished Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and legal attaches. If travel is in area covered by legal attache, forward sufficient copies of LHM to enable dissemination of three copies to each legal attache involved. For each of these legal attaches, forward one photograph of subject, if available. If stops are to be placed with security services abroad, cover letter should so indicate. Set forth requests for investigation abroad on separate numbered page, captioned "Leads," at end of LHM. Request should not refer to legal attache or request investigation by particular agency abroad.

[d.] Subsequent report in individual case should contain details regarding subject's travel.

[e.] Set forth below are steps to be taken when information is received that one of following is forming tour group for foreign travel: organization of investigative interest to Bureau or subject in one of [circumstances] described in first paragraph under item [4] above.

[(1)] Advise appropriate offices, under caption of tour group or organization, identities of individuals participating in tour, and furnish Bureau LHMs for State Department, CIA, and appropriate legal attaches. Include all readily available information pertaining to tour, such as itinerary, pertinent dates, names and addresses of participants, and thumbnail sketch of organization or individual sponsoring tour.

[(2)] Offices should immediately identify participants and submit LHMs on those in one of categories described in first paragraph under item 4 above. Refer to LHM previously prepared under caption of tour group or organization. Submit letter to Bureau under caption of tour group or organization listing individuals within territory participating in tour on whom there is no subversive information.

- [[f.] Advise Bureau promptly by LHM of subject's return from travel abroad. If such individual has traveled behind Iron Curtain, also furnish Bureau recommendations as to interview and state whether additional investigation is contemplated.
- [[5.] File reviews
 - Check office indices and review files thoroughly for pertinent information showing background and subversive activity. Include information in initial report. After each check and review of files has been made, consolidate reference cards pertaining to subject in indices.
- [[6.] Security informants
 - Information developed through security informants is unsurpassed in value both for intelligence purposes and as admissible evidence.
- [[7.] Physical surveillances
 - Physical surveillances should be used when, in opinion of SAC, information of sufficient value might be obtained to justify their use in light of existing circumstances and available manpower.
 - a. When information is received that meetings of subversive organizations are to take place, physical surveillances should be considered to corroborate such information and identify participants.
 - b. Surveillances of individuals in leadership or underground capacities serve to identify others within movement.
 - c. Success of surveillances depends upon resourcefulness of Agents who must at all times exercise sound judgment and discretion. Be alert to observe activity of subject and countersurveillances which may be used to identify Agents and embarrass Bureau.
- [[8.] Photographic surveillances
 - Photographic evidence of meetings between individuals or which shows subjects entering or leaving meeting places of subversive organizations affords convincing and admissible evidence to establish subversive activities. Prior Bureau authority is needed for photographic surveillances of meetings and they must be properly correlated with other investigative techniques to obtain maximum evidence. Conceal equipment to avoid detection by subjects or other individuals in proximity of surveillance.
- [[9.] Public sources
 - Make use of all logical public sources of information. Obtain background and lineage data from birth records and local bureaus of vital statistics, credit agencies, state records, public utility records, and school records. Credit check of individual should be limited to obtaining identifying information only (name, address, former address, employment, former employment). Obtain and index as reference material publications of subversive organizations and records of state and Federal committees which have conducted hearings concerning subversive activities.
- [[10.] Records of private firms
 - Where pertinent information is available in records of private firms, such as past or present employers, insurance companies, and merchants, contact such firms provided it will not jeopardize investigation.
- [[11.] a. Channelizing of information to case files
 - Membership or activity in subversive organizations should be channelized to main case files of individuals involved. Mimeographed form FD-306 may be used provided it is limited to reporting attendance at meetings. When information from informants or surveillances is channelized to individual case files, it must be documented. Coordinate information received from informants and confidential sources with active investigation.

- b. Preparation of channelizing memoranda for other offices. When preparing lengthy channelizing memoranda reporting material of interest to other offices, limit the number of copies prepared for each other such office to two. Clearly indicate next to the name of the receiving office the number of the page containing information pertinent to that office and note on cover page that distribution of material for case files is being left to the discretion of the receiving office. If the channelizing memorandum includes names of individuals who merely attend a meeting or gathering, and played no important role, the reporting office is to attach to the channelizing memorandum a one-page memorandum listing the names of all individuals who were merely in attendance and had no important function. The preparation and distribution of additional copies of the one-page attachment are left to the discretion of the receiving office.

[[12.] Preservation of evidence

Bear in mind necessity of obtaining admissible evidence.

- a. Identify, preserve, and maintain continuity of evidence obtained for possible admission in Federal proceedings. Identify specifically as to source and date.
- b. Notes or statements from informants necessary to refresh their recollection if called to testify must be in sufficient detail to serve this purpose and contain no material which would make their use inadvisable or inadmissible.
- c. Informant's original notes or statements are not to be blocked, stamped, serialized, or mutilated in any way which would render them unsatisfactory for use in Federal proceedings.

d. Above also applies to Agent's notes taken during surveillances or concerning evidence otherwise obtained.

[[13.] Interviews with subjects of security investigations

a. Policy

No security investigation of an individual is to be closed unless subject is included in [ADEX] or consideration given to interview. Bureau will not authorize cancellation of [ADEX] card for inactivity until subject has been interviewed or Bureau advised why interview is inadvisable.

b. Purpose

- (1) When investigation is inconclusive, to determine subject's sympathies and whether he continues to adhere to revolutionary doctrines
- (2) To develop information concerning activities of subject and his associates in subversive movement
- (3) To develop informants

c. SAC authority

Without Bureau authority SAC may:

- (1) Authorize interviews with individuals who have not been subjects of security investigations and available information does not warrant opening case
- (2) Authorize interviews of subjects of security cases who have previously been interviewed with Bureau authority, provided no change has taken place in subject's status and interviews are conducted under same conditions as previously authorized
- (3) Authorize interviews of subjects of closed security cases
- (4) Authorize interviews of rank-and-file black extremists except as noted in section 122, volume IV, of this manual

d. Procedures for interviews under SAC authority

- (1) If there is closed file, reopen it. If none, open case in 134 [classification.]
- (2) Case Agent [should] prepare memorandum requesting SAC authority to conduct interview of subject to determine his attitude towards cooperation with FBI. [Review of office files should be included.]
- (3) During first contact Agent should identify himself, outline Bureau's responsibilities in security field, and request subject's assistance. If individual has been member of basic revolutionary organization and appears cooperative, he may be questioned about his own activities. However, this interview is for sole purpose of determining whether subject might be cooperative.
- (4) If cooperative, advise Bureau and conduct background investigation under section 107, volume IV, of this manual. If uncooperative, prepare brief memorandum for file and close case. Letter to Bureau not necessary.

e. Prior Bureau authority

Prior Bureau authority required for:

- (1) Subjects of active current investigation where no prior Bureau authority has been obtained
- (2) Closed cases on current [ADEX] subjects where no prior interview has been conducted
- (3) Subjects of investigations requested by Bureau, both open and closed, such as applicant and loyalty cases
- (4) Individuals when circumstances indicate delicate situation and greater than usual risk involved, such as labor leaders and individuals in educational, mass media, religious, or publishing fields. Bureau authority needed even though there were prior interviews.
- (5) Security subjects who have publicly disclosed previous contacts
- (6) [Deleted]

In above cases, no report need be submitted when requesting Bureau authority to interview subject.

f. Letter requesting Bureau authority for interview

(1) In absence of special circumstances, include following statement in first paragraph of letter.

(a) Bureau authority is requested to interview subject in accordance with existing instructions relating to interviews of security subjects. If subject is cooperative, no affirmative steps will be taken during initial interview to direct his activities and complete background investigation required by section 107C of Manual of Instructions will be conducted and Bureau will be requested to authorize recontact with subject as PSI.

(b) Form FD-336 contains above statement and may be used. Statement in no way precludes interviewing Agents from obtaining all subversive information subject is willing to furnish or other data which will assist in determining his potential as informant.

(c) If available, letter must contain following information:

I. Residence address, occupation, employment, race, date and place of birth, citizenship, and status of health

II. Marital status. If married, occupation, employment, and race of spouse.

III. Length of time subject was member of or affiliated with subversive organization and positions held. When investigation is based on circumstances other than membership or affiliation with subversive organizations, briefly set forth facts.

IV. If married, state if spouse is or has been member of or affiliated with subversive groups, positions held, and period of such membership or affiliation.

V. Membership or affiliation of any other close relatives in subversive groups

VI. Information regarding defection, expulsion, inactivity, and present sympathies of subject and, if married, of spouse

VII. What is expected to be gained by interview

(d) In each letter, pertinent information, if available, regarding seven items listed must be set out under appropriate number but headings need not be restated. If no pertinent data is available regarding any item, so indicate after number.

(2) Letters must be personally approved by SAC.

(3) One copy of letter should only be first page of letter. When unnecessary to issue specific instructions, Bureau will approve request by stamping this page and returning by routing slip.

(4) When authorized, interview must be conducted within 45 days. If not possible, advise Bureau and indicate subject will be contacted within 45 days. If interview has not been conducted at end of second period, request new authority. Include any new information bearing upon advisability of interview.

g. Preparation for and conduct of interview

(1) Preparation must be thorough and interview conducted so that Agents will not be compromised, Bureau will not be embarrassed, and informants will not be exposed. CPUSA has planned traps for Agents attempting interviews with members by installing recording machines in members' homes or endeavoring to have interview observed by concealed third party.

(2) Interviews should be conducted by two Agents. Agent experienced in security investigations who is knowledgeable regarding development of informants should conduct interrogation. Actual approach need not be made by both Agents; one Agent may observe from secure distance. (Two Agents should be physically present during interview or contact with known or suspected Nation of Islam members in all cases.) Background of subject and circumstances will determine how approach should be handled.

- (3) Interviews of active communists should be conducted at secure place other than subject's residence or place of employment. If reasonable effort has been made for such approach and it is not practical, set forth circumstances and request Bureau authority to make contact at home or place of business explaining any need to contact employer. Letter should contain statement that, if subject appears cooperative, arrangements will be made for another interview at secure place away from residence or employment, if necessary, to determine fully degree of cooperation.
 - (4) If subject cooperative upon initial contact, further contact may be had without Bureau authority. No limitation on number of recontacts, but use good judgment. If interview authorized by Bureau, advise Bureau of results of contact and plans for recontacts. Obtain specific authority to make recontact where circumstances indicate delicate situation and greater than usual risks involved, such as labor leaders and individuals employed in educational, mass media, religious, and publishing fields.
 - (5) Terminate interview with active subversive if third person arrives during interview. Furnish Bureau details and obtain Bureau authority prior to reinterview.
 - (6) Terminate interview immediately if subject is hostile or uncooperative.
 - (7) Inform subjects connected with labor unions that Bureau is not interested in employee-employer relations and is concerned only with infiltration of labor unions by subversive elements. Furnish no information and make no statements to embarrass Bureau. Questions should require admission or denial by subject of all pertinent items of subversive information unless to do so would expose investigative techniques or security informants. Cordial and friendly attitude alone is not evidence of cooperation insofar as potential dangerousness is concerned when subject fails to admit or verify subversive information obtained through previous investigation.
 - (8) If cooperative, inform subject we want to interview him in detail and arrange interviews over extended period if necessary to exploit subject's knowledge to utmost. Conduct necessary investigation or research to corroborate and develop information received.
 - (9) Where appropriate, reduce information obtained to signed statement and determine his willingness to testify to information furnished if needed in Federal proceedings.
- h. Reporting results of interview
- (1) When no information is developed during interview which would affect subject's[ADEX]status, promptly submit results by letter and include in next report[or LHM.] If individual is employed in or holds sensitive position in trade-union, educational, mass media, religious, or publishing fields, results of all interviews must be submitted promptly in report or LHM,[except where subject is developed as]security informant or source.
 - (2) Report subject's admissions of his subversive activities and associations and indicate whether he did or did not furnish information regarding subversive activities of others.
 - (3) Report[any]statements by subject denying subversive activities and follow with concise statement of such activity[as shown by prior investigation.]
 - (4) Letter transmitting results of interview must contain:
 - (a) Conclusion of interviewing Agents as to cooperativeness of subject and reasons for conclusion
 - (b) Statement as to whether information furnished coincides substantially with other available information

- (c) Statement as to subject's availability as potential witness and evaluation of subject's potential as informant or confidential source and whether further contacts contemplated
 - (d) [Recommendation that ADEX card be canceled when interview, considered with other available information, indicates subject is no longer dangerous to internal security.]
 - (e) Pertinent information regarding subject's appearance or characteristics which has not previously been reported
- i. Reinterviews of [ADEX] subjects
Consider reinterviews with [ADEX] subjects on systematic basis.
Consider such reinterviews when necessary to review case or when case comes up on tickler.
 - j. Maintenance of control file on former members of subversive organizations
 - (1) Offices having sufficient volume should maintain control file on former members of subversive organizations for reference purposes. This file will obviate necessity for extensive file reviews to identify persons who may be in position to furnish information of value in future.
 - (2) Copies of memoranda designated for individual case files should be routed to this file. Such memoranda should contain: background of person, type of information he may furnish, period covered by this data, whether or not person is available for interview by all Agents, and whether he is in position and willing to testify.
 - (3) This file should not include information concerning security informants.
 - (4) If special index is used in conjunction with this file, it should contain cards filed alphabetically indicating times and places persons were in subversive movement and brief description of information available from them. It may be broken down geographically and subdivided by years.

F. ADMINISTRATIVE INDEX

1. Purpose and general policy

- a. To have a readily available and up-to-date listing of individuals who are deemed dangerous to the internal security, especially in the event of a national emergency.
- b. The Administrative Index (referred to as ADEX) includes the names and identifying data concerning individuals who fall within four categories of dangerousness described below.
- c. Under no circumstances should individuals be included in ADEX, or otherwise be the subject of investigative attention, merely because of their opposition to Government policies or because of the exercise of their constitutional rights of protest and dissent. The ADEX is intended, and should be utilized, solely to list individuals who constitute a potential or actual threat to the internal security of the United States and/or whose activities and statements indicate that they would resort to violent, illegal, or subversive means.
- d. Matters relating to the ADEX are not to be included in reports or LHMs prepared for dissemination outside the Bureau. If field office believes that special circumstances justify discussion of ADEX with qualified representatives of other Federal agencies on strictly confidential basis, furnish full facts to Bureau and request prior approval for such action.
- e. Contents of ADEX must be accurate and correct at all times. Matters relating to its maintenance should be given preferred attention.

2. Categories

a. Category I

- (1) All national leaders of revolutionary organizations whose aims and purposes include the overthrow and destruction of the Government by force and violence or other unconstitutional means, and individuals affiliated therewith who have demonstrated propensity for violence against the person rather than property or have received special training in sabotage, espionage, guerrilla warfare, or have engaged in underground-type operations.
- (2) Revolutionaries, though unaffiliated with any specific organization, who have demonstrated by acts or statements a propensity for violence, including acts of terrorism, assassination, or any interference with or threat to the survival and effective operation of national, state, and local Governments and of the defense efforts.
- (3) National leaders of extremist organizations.
- (4) Any individual who qualifies for the ADEX should be included in Category I if he is employed in or has access to a key facility.

b. Category II

- (1) Secondary leadership of revolutionary and extremist organizations. Secondary leadership would comprise, for example, regional, state, and local leaders who are involved in policy making in fulfilling anti-U. S. objectives of their respective revolutionary organizations and whose activities do not justify their inclusion in Category I.
- (2) Active participants in furthering the aims and purposes of the revolutionary or extremist organization with which affiliated.
- (3) Other unaffiliated revolutionaries or extremists who have demonstrated by acts or statements a propensity for violence against property rather than persons.

c. Category III

- (1) Rank-and-file membership in, or participation in activities of, revolutionary organizations within the last five years as evidenced by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

- (2) Leadership or activist position in affiliated fronts of revolutionary organizations within the last three years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.
- (3) An individual who, although not a member of or participant in activities of revolutionary organizations or considered an activist in affiliated fronts, has exhibited a revolutionary ideology and is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by national emergency to commit acts of espionage or sabotage, including acts of terrorism, assassination, or any interference with or threat to the survival and effective operation of national, state, and local governments and of the defense efforts.
- d. Category IV
 - (1) Individuals whose activities do not meet criteria of Categories I, II or III but who are in a position to influence others to engage in acts inimical to the national defense and are likely to furnish financial aid or other assistance to revolutionary or extremist elements because of their sympathy, associations, or ideology.
- 3. Factors relating to dangerousness
 - a. Dangerousness of individual does not depend solely upon personal characteristics, such as aggressiveness or disposition to violence. It also depends upon contribution subject has made or is making in advancing principles and aims of subversive movement, or his subversive potential in event of national emergency. All information must be carefully weighed. Among factors having bearing are:
 - (1) Long membership in subversive organization
 - (2) Affiliation with or attendance at training schools, especially leadership schools
 - (3) Possession of or study of revolutionary literature
 - (4) Espousal of subversive doctrines as shown by acts and utterances
 - (5) Contributions to or collections of funds for organizations
 - (6) Recruitment of new members
 - (7) Support of communist bloc powers in acts and utterances
 - (8) Activity as courier or confidential mail drop for subversive movement
 - (9) Regular participation in activities of subversive organization, especially when this involves sacrifices, inconveniences, or disadvantages
 - (10) Individuals who have defected, revoked, or sought revocation of U. S. citizenship in favor of communist country, have returned to U. S., and have taken no positive steps to counteract such action
 - (11) Statements or activities on subject's part establishing reasonable grounds to believe his loyalty would lie with communist country in event of armed conflict between U. S. and that country
 - (12) Training and/or participation in espionage, sabotage, or intelligence activities
 - (13) History of emotional instability or irrational behavior, prior acts indicating propensity for violence, coupled with subversive background or hatred against organized government
- 4. Evaluating interviews
 - a. Positive statement to interviewing Agents clearly indicating adherence to doctrines, aims, or purposes of revolutionary organization or front organization shall be considered in evaluating an individual's dangerousness.
 - b. Other than above, interviews are not factors in making determination as to ADEX; e.g., lack of cooperation or partial cooperation are not factors.

5. Recommendation for and preparation of ADEX cards
 - a. When potential dangerousness of subject has been established, office of origin is to prepare recommendation to Bureau on FD-122, in triplicate. Forward original and copy to Bureau, and place copy in subject's file. FD-122 has three uses: (1) to recommend subject for ADEX, (2) to submit changes for existing cards, and (3) to recommend subject be deleted from ADEX. Submit abstract when recommending subject for ADEX, or removal from ADEX, but no abstract for changes.
 - b. When FD-122 is submitted to recommend subject for ADEX, attach additional page or pages setting out succinct summary of facts on which recommendation based. Facts must be in sufficient detail to support recommendation, including justification for designated category.
 - c. If, at conclusion of investigation, subject is not being recommended for ADEX, closing communication should show reasons.
 - d. Summary report must be submitted when subject is recommended for ADEX unless one was previously furnished to Bureau. In latter instance, up-to-date report or LHM should be submitted. If case is pending because of outstanding leads, set out additional lead to follow authorization of ADEX card by Bureau. If case would otherwise be closed, place in pending-inactive status with lead to follow approval by Bureau and then close administratively.
 - e. Do not delay recommendations for ADEX because of absence of background or descriptive data. Submit recommendation with current report and retain in pending status to obtain missing items.
 - f. Subjects missing or out of country may be recommended for ADEX. FD-122 should include data required for unavailable section.
 - g. If Bureau approves recommendation, ADEX cards will be prepared. Copy of FD-122 will be returned stamped "ADEX card approved and prepared, two copies attached. Place description and photograph on reverse side of Geographical card." These cards should be filed in field office ADEX as outlined below. Place returned copy of FD-122 in subject's main file.
 - h. When cards are received from Bureau, check data for accuracy. Cards will be complete except for description and photograph, which are maintained on separate card stapled to back of one ADEX card. File this card in geographical section (except unavailable section cards.) Second ADEX card is filed in alphabetical section.
6. Inclusion in Stop Index File
 - a. Submit FD-122 in triplicate to Bureau when designating Category I ADEX subjects who are extremists for inclusion in Stop Index File.
 - b. Succinct summary with FD-122 should contain recommendation for inclusion in Stop Index File and appropriate descriptive data.
 - c. After recommendation approved, the third FD-122 copy will be forwarded to the Voucher-Statistical Section which maintains the Stop Index File for Category I ADEX extremist subjects.
7. Content and appearance of ADEX card
 - a. Data to appear on face of card

When complete, face of ADEX card should contain following information. If any items are missing, keep case pending to obtain necessary information. Set forth under each item are possible categories in which subject may be classified and code letters for appropriate space on FD-122. These code letters will appear on cards received from Bureau.

(1) Name and aliases	
Full and correct name and aliases of subject	
(2) Race	
White (Caucasian)	W
Negro	N
Chinese	C
Others	O
(All others, including Orientals (except Chinese), American Indian, etc.)	

- (3) Sex
Male M
Female F
- (4) Citizenship
Native born NB
Naturalized NA
Alien AL
(If unknown, space should be left blank, but status should be ascertained and submitted by FD-122.)
- (5) Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency
American Socialist Clubs ASC
American Workers' Communist Party AWC
Black Nationalist BNT
Black Panther Party BPP
Communist Party, USA COM
Groups advocating independence for Puerto Rico PRN
Minutemen MIN
Nation of Islam NOI
New Left NL
Progressive Labor Party PLP
Proletarian Party of America PPA
Revolutionary Action Movement RAM
Revolutionary Union RU
Socialist Workers Party SWP
Spartacist League SPL
Student National Coordinating Committee SNC
Students for a Democratic Society SDS
Workers World Party WWP
Albanian ALB
Bulgarian BUL
Chinese CH
Cuban CUB
Czechoslovakian CZE
Hungarian HUN
Polish POL
Romanian ROM
Russian RUS
Yugoslavian YUG
- (6) Category designation
Category I C I
Category II C II
Category III C III
Category IV C IV
- (7) Special Tabbing
Pro-Cuban CUB
Espionage subjects ESP
Foreign government employees FGE
U. S. Government employees GCV
- (8) Unavailable section
Missing MI
Out of country OC
Imprisoned PR
- (9) Date and place of birth

- (10) Key facility geographical reference number (obtained from Department of Defense Key Facilities List)
 - (11) Residence address
 - (12) Employment address and any additional data deemed necessary to assist in locating subject.
 - (13) Field office and Bureau file numbers
- b. Data to appear on separate attached card
- (1) Place following data on separate card attached to reverse side of ADEX card being filed in geographical, or unavailable sections.
 - (a) Complete description
 - (b) Notation that security flash notice has been placed in Identification Division
 - (c) Photograph, with date taken. It is to be most current or best likeness of subject available.
 - (d) Dangerous characteristics of subject, including notation if subject possesses firearms
 - (e) Other data which will assist in locating subject, such as directions to residence or employment when these are unusual.
 - (2) Upon posting of security flash notice, field will be furnished FBI number and fingerprint classification which should be affixed to reverse side of ADEX card filed in geographical or unavailable sections.
 - (3) Use FD-186 to report information for separate card attached to card. Case Agent should fill in form and forward to clerical employee designated to post information. Thereafter, file FD-186 in case file. FD-186 may be used to note that subject has been physically observed.
8. Arrangement of ADEX
- a. At Bureau
- Entire index is maintained on IBM tabulating cards, which are printed by automatic data processing and transmitted to field. An alphabetical breakdown of true names and all aliases of subjects is also maintained at Bureau.
- b. In field office
- Index is maintained in three sections: geographical, unavailable, and alphabetical sections.
- (1) Geographical section
- After receipt of two cards from Bureau and after descriptive data has been added to one, file latter in geographical section (or unavailable section, if applicable). Geographical section is broken down by residence address in accord with needs of each office, e.g., by state, county, city, or if needed, into boroughs or suburbs. Cards are filed alphabetically under each geographical breakdown.
- Cards will show "unknown" residence for subjects (a) whose addresses are not known but prompt location within division is expected and (b) whose location in another division is being verified. File in breakdown designated "Verification Pending."
- (2) Alphabetical section
- File duplicate card alphabetically in this section; there is no other breakdown.
- (3) Unavailable section
- Cards of individuals who are missing, out of the country, or imprisoned are retained in unavailable section, broken down into three subsections, as follows:
- (a) Missing subjects
- Subjects are not to be included in unavailable section until action required in instructions for missing subjects is taken (see paragraph E. 3 of this section). If subject is missing, word "Missing" is typed on FD-122 after "Miscellaneous."

- (b) Subjects out of country
Place cards for subjects who have departed from U. S. or Puerto Rico for foreign country in this subsection unless they should be canceled in accordance with instructions below under permanent departure.

Investigation of subject not yet included in ADEX may be in progress at time subject departs for foreign country. If facts otherwise warrant, submit FD-122 recommending inclusion in unavailable section.

If subject is out of country, type words "Out of Country" on FD-122 after "Miscellaneous." If foreign address known, include on FD-122 in space provided. If subject is only known to be in certain foreign country or is only known to be traveling abroad, include this on FD-122. If subject's current employment abroad is known, include on FD-122.

Follow case of any ADEX subject who is out of country at least once each year for verification of address and to determine if subject has returned. Place appropriate stops with Immigration and Naturalization Service to be advised of return.

- (c) Imprisoned subjects
Place cards of imprisoned ADEX subjects in unavailable section. Type word "Imprisoned" on FD-122 after "Miscellaneous." Identify institution in which subject is incarcerated in space provided for residence. Arrange with confining institution to be informed of subject's release. Set tickler shortly prior to expected release to verify. After release, determine whether subject should be retained in ADEX.

When submitting recommendation for unavailable section, include words "Unavailable Section" in upper right portion of FD-122. Do not include former residence or former employment. ADEX cards for unavailable section will bear code letters in upper right portion designating proper subsection.

Upon receipt of two cards from Bureau, check for accuracy, place required descriptive data on one, and file latter in unavailable section. File other card in alphabetical section. When missing subject is located or subject who has been out of country has returned or imprisoned subject released, submit FD-122 showing current residence and place of employment. Type words "Remove from Unavailable Section" after "Miscellaneous." When subject in unavailable section is located in another division, submit FD-128 to Bureau and new office of origin. Type "Remove from Unavailable Section" in space to right of addresses. Bureau will send revised cards to new office of origin.

- c. Special interest subjects
Certain classes of individuals could be of special interest depending on the particular circumstances of a national emergency. These include the following:
- (1) Espionage subjects
In the event of a national emergency, special consideration should be given to these individuals to insure that investigation or any

other action taken to neutralize their activities is handled, if possible, in such manner as to not destroy the opportunity to penetrate an active espionage network. When submitting FD-122 regarding such individual, the words "Special Interest" should be typed in upper right portion and the abbreviation "ESP" should be shown in the space provided after "Miscellaneous."

(2) U. S. Government employees

The Department has requested regular advice as to the identities of all U. S. Government employees whose names are listed in ADEX. When submitting FD-122 regarding such individual, the words "Special Interest" should be typed in upper right portion and the abbreviation "GOV" should be shown in the space provided after "Miscellaneous."

(3) Foreign government employees

In the event of a national emergency, special consideration should be given to these individuals to insure that investigation or other action taken to neutralize their activities is handled so as to minimize the possibilities of diplomatic repercussions. When submitting FD-122 regarding such individual, the words "Special Interest" should be typed in upper right portion and the abbreviation "FGE" shown in the space provided after "Miscellaneous."

(4) Pro-Cuban individuals

In the event of a limited emergency involving the U. S. and Cuba, consideration should be given to affording special attention to the investigation of these individuals. This would include individuals who are included in the ADEX solely on the basis of pro-Cuban activities or sympathies as well as individuals who are included in ADEX primarily because of other activities or affiliations but who have shown a marked sympathy for the communist regime in Cuba or who otherwise would be of special interest in the event of a U. S.-Cuban conflict. When submitting FD-122 regarding such individual, the words "Special Interest" should be typed in upper right portion and the abbreviation "CUB" should be shown in the space provided after "Miscellaneous."

FD-122 forms submitted relative to individuals in above "Special Interest" classes should, in addition to listing the appropriate abbreviation after "Miscellaneous," also indicate any other applicable organizational or nationalistic affiliation. For instance, FD-122 concerning a leader of the Communist Party, USA, who is a U. S. Government employee, would carry the abbreviation "GOV" as a miscellaneous item (and would have "Special Interest" typed in upper right portion) and in addition would be checked as to Communist Party affiliation.

Cards on "Special Interest" subjects should be filed in regular sequence with other ADEX cards in both the geographical (or unavailable, if applicable) and alphabetical sections and receive same handling as other ADEX cards except for instructions set forth above. Automatic Data Processing equipment at the Bureau will furnish on demand lists of individuals in any one or all of above "Special Interest" classes.

ADEX cards for "Special Interest" subjects will bear appropriate code letters in upper right portion designating type of case. When subject no longer comes within one of classes of special interest, submit FD-122 with words "Remove from Special Interest" typed after "Miscellaneous." If card should be placed in unavailable section, add "Place in Unavailable Section." When new cards are received from Bureau, destroy old cards.

9. Periodic verification of addresses

- a. Data on ADEX cards should be up to date at all times.
- b. Whereabouts of all ADEX subjects should be known at all times. Check residence and business addresses of subjects in Category I at least once each three months. Residence and business address of Category II subjects should be checked at least once each 6 months and of Category III and IV subjects at least once each year. These instructions, however, do not apply to subjects who are imprisoned (see instructions relating to unavailable section of ADEX) or those who meet criteria as disaffected U. S. citizens (see Section 105 H). Residence and employment of latter must be verified each 90 days. Case of any subject who is out of country must be followed at least once every year to determine if he has returned.

Arrange to be advised on current basis of any indication subject is engaged in subversive activities, is exhibiting violent tendencies, or plans to change residence or employment. Checks to verify residence or business addresses may be made under pretext by telephone once each six months for Category I subjects and once every two years for all others.

- c. Use FD-154 when it will facilitate verifying addresses. When FD-154 is not used, notation should be made on last FD-154, FD-122, or FD-128 in subject's file showing addresses and date verified. Each time residence and employment verified, reevaluate case to assure subject is still within criteria. Make notation in file to this effect.
 - d. If residence and/or business address has changed, submit FD-122 to Bureau showing only changes to be made. Also submit FD-366 to Bureau for dissemination to Secret Service and give copy to Secret Service locally.
 - e. Handle verifications by reopening and assigning cases and closing administratively when accomplished. Where appropriate, handle verifications at time cases are reopened for periodic reports or LHM and include results in report or LHM. Otherwise, record verifications on FD-154 and place in case file.
10. Changes, additions, and deletions of data on ADEX cards
- a. Submit to Bureau by FD-122 any changes, additions, or deletions involving name, aliases, citizenship, organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies, category designation, date or place of birth, key facility geographical reference number, abbreviation of agency having security responsibility, residence or business address. Exception: Change office of origin by FD-128.
 - b. Temporary handwritten notations may be made on existing cards pending receipt of corrected cards from Bureau.
 - c. Set out only items being changed, added, or deleted. If being deleted, specify "Delete."
 - d. Upon receipt from Bureau of corrected card, take following action:
 - (1) Check accuracy of data on cards.
 - (2) Transfer separate card with descriptive data and photograph from back of old geographical section card to corrected card and file in geographical section, (or unavailable section, if applicable).
 - (3) File other card in alphabetical section.
 - (4) Destroy old cards.
11. Movement of subjects between offices
- a. Subjects of ADEX cards
 - (1) Assign immediately requests from other offices to verify addresses of subjects and transmit results within thirty days.
 - (2) New office furnish old office information concerning key facility employment of subject so that geographical reference number,

- agency having security responsibility, and interested agencies can be included on FD-128 submitted by old office of origin.
- (3) Office of origin, upon verification of address, immediately submit FD-128 transferring origin. Submit original and one copy to Bureau and two copies to office covering new address enclosing copies of all previous reports, other pertinent serials, photograph if available, and ADEX cards. Show full title and designation.
 - (4) Where flash notice has been placed with Identification Division, note on FD-128 and designate extra copy of FD-128 for Bureau for attention of Identification Division.
 - (5) Old office of origin submit current report or LHM. If LHM submitted, cover communication should include same documentation as is required in administrative pages of reports.

Do not delay submission of FD-128 solely for preparation of report or LHM, but note on FD-128 that appropriate communication is being prepared. Old office of origin should furnish Secret Service locally with subject's new residence and business addresses by FD-366. Copy of FD-366 should be provided to new office of origin for dissemination to Secret Service locally by latter office. Case will remain pending in both old and new offices until report or LHM is submitted by old office. New office of origin is responsible to follow matter until completed.

- (6) New office of origin should review pertinent material received with FD-128 and information in its files to determine if additional investigation warranted. If not, advise Bureau by letter that case is being closed.
 - (7) Upon receipt of FD-128, office covering new address is origin and should place office file number on ADEX cards and file them in its ADEX.
 - (8) Upon receipt of new cards from Bureau, new office is to transfer information from reverse side of old geographical card to new card, appropriately file new cards, and destroy old ones.
- b. Subjects not included in ADEX
- (1) Transfer office of origin by FD-128 upon verification by another office of subject's presence in that division. Enclose copies of all reports and other pertinent serials to new office of origin.
 - (2) New office of origin should initiate appropriate investigation or advise Bureau case closed if no action warranted.

12. Cancellation and removal of cards from ADEX

- a. Death of a subject
Destroy card and advise Bureau by LHM.
- b. Permanent departure
Upon learning of subject's departure from U. S. or Puerto Rico for foreign country, immediately ascertain conditions of departure. No card shall be canceled by reason of such departure unless subject is alien whose permanent departure has been verified. If U. S. citizen who has been out of country has renounced U. S. citizenship and taken citizenship of foreign country, card may be canceled when it has been determined he does not intend to return to U. S.
- c. Imprisonment of subject
Do not cancel card because subject imprisoned, regardless of length of time he will be incarcerated. Place card in unavailable section and handle as set forth under imprisoned subjects above.
- d. Entry of subject into armed forces
Upon learning of entry, submit to Bureau FD-122 to cancel ADEX and FD-366 to advise Secret Service of entry, disseminating copy of FD-366 locally to Secret Service. Also submit report or LHM setting forth pertinent information not previously reported and including facts

regarding subject's entry into armed forces. Disseminate copy of report or LHM locally to appropriate military intelligence agency and furnish copies to Bureau for dissemination at headquarters level. Place case in closed status.

Remove subject from ADEX. File geographical card for subject in case file marked "canceled" and destroy alphabetical card. Set administrative tickler and each six months make appropriate inquiry to determine if subject has been discharged. Make such checks locally, through pretext if necessary, and, if necessary, submit letter requesting check by field office covering records of appropriate service.

When subject returns to civilian status, determine whether his activities still warrant inclusion in ADEX. If so, submit complete FD-122 as if initial recommendation being made, and current report. If not, advise Bureau of reasons.

e. Security informants

Card may be destroyed upon receipt of Bureau authority to designate person security informant. In requesting Bureau authority to designate individual as security informant, call attention to ADEX card and recommend cancellation.

f. Subject no longer dangerous or potentially dangerous

Frequently information is received or investigation develops that subject no longer represents threat to internal security by reason of physical condition, defection, or expulsion from subversive movement. Such defection may be shown by lack of activity and obvious disinterest over extended period, or by open declaration. In such cases, interview of subject should be recommended unless there are specific reasons to the contrary.

In all cases recommendation for removal from the ADEX should be made by FD-122 with attached succinct summary of facts on which the recommendation is based. Submit abstract with FD-122.

13. Administrative procedures regarding category designations

a. Changes in category

When facts warrant changing category designation for a particular subject, submit FD-122 indicating change to be made and attach additional page setting forth brief summary of facts supporting this recommendation.

b. Colors of ADEX cards

ADEX cards will be the following colors:

Category I - beige

Category II - green

Category III - white

Category IV - yellow

In both geographical and alphabetical sections of ADEX there should be no separate sequence of cards by category level. Of course, if necessary to identify subjects of any one category, for administrative purposes or otherwise, this could be accomplished readily by reference to the particular color involved.

14. Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities

a. Responsibility

FBI is responsible by Presidential directive to advise interested Federal agencies of developments affecting plants having armed forces contracts, as well as other facilities, utilities, and critical points of transportation and communications systems which have been designated vital to national defense by Department of Defense. Under Delimitations Agreement FBI is responsible for investigating employees of private

contractors holding contracts with agencies of Department of Defense where there is credible subversive information concerning employee. Conduct thorough investigation and consider for ADEX any individual employed in or having access to key facility who is alleged to have been, at any time in past, member of any basic revolutionary organization or against whom there is sufficient subversive information to warrant such action.

- (1) Requests for investigation from another agency
When another agency requests investigation of individual employed in key facility, institute investigation immediately if basis of request warrants, and advise Bureau.
 - (2) Verification of key facility status
Check Key Facilities List (maintained in each office) to verify that subject's place of employment is included.
 - (3) Individuals denied access to restricted information
Intelligence agencies of armed forces frequently report individual has been denied clearance to work in defense plant or to handle classified information. Intelligence agency is responsible to furnish Bureau with any information involving disloyalty or subversion. Office receiving such notification must promptly ascertain basis for denial and obtain all pertinent data contained in file of agency responsible for such action. Forward data to Bureau and include in next report. Where no investigation has been conducted by Bureau, open security investigation if information warrants.
- b. Inclusion in ADEX
In recommending key facility employee for ADEX, FD-122 is to contain:
- (1) Key facility geographical reference number
 - (2) Abbreviation for Department of Army (A), which has security responsibility for all key facilities
 - (3) Abbreviations for other agencies known to have classified contracts with key facility. Interested agencies are identified on FD-122 to assure proper dissemination of reports but will not appear on ADEX cards.
 - (4) Recommendation for Category I designation
- c. Dissemination
Following guidelines relative to dissemination of information in these cases should not be considered as hard-and-fast rules. If special circumstances exist which would dictate that outside dissemination should not be made or should be deferred (for example, the possibility of compromising a highly sensitive investigation) withhold dissemination and promptly submit appropriate recommendations to Bureau for its consideration.

Upon receipt of allegation concerning key facility employee from source other than interested intelligence agency, immediately furnish by letter to interested agency (1) summary of allegation and information concerning individual; (2) statement that information is unsubstantiated and has not been verified through investigation; (3) advise as to whether security investigation is being conducted and, if so, that copies of reports will be furnished upon completion. With exception noted below, disseminate derogatory information of security nature concerning persons employed at facilities holding classified contracts both to interested intelligence agencies and to Chief, Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO), Defense Supply Agency, Columbus, Ohio 43215, attention Chief, Adjudication Division (advise interested intelligence agency of dissemination to DISCO). This includes persons who may not currently be key facility employees but are known to hold industrial security clearances. Exception involves facilities holding classified contracts

with Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). Dissemination to AEC is made only at Bureau.

Disseminate copies of reports for Marine Corps locally to Naval Investigative Service Office (NISO). Dissemination to Defense Atomic Support Agency, Research and Development Board and Maritime Administration is made only at Bureau.

d. Status of cases

After all investigation is conducted, place in pending-inactive status. Make case pending-active 45 days before report due and check with armed services representative at key facility or with other reliable sources to determine whether subject has access to classified or restricted material.

e. Reports

See Manual of Rules and Regulations, part II, section 4D, item 2a, (6), and section 4M, item 4, for instructions concerning synopsis and classification of reports in key facility cases. Synopsis must set forth subject's employment specifying that subject works at key facility and statement that subject has or has not access to classified or restricted material.

15. Correlation of other investigations with ADEX

Individuals investigated by Bureau under any classification against whom subversive information is developed must be considered for ADEX. This includes espionage, foreign intelligence, applicant-type, and security of Government employees (SGE) investigations. When individual previously investigated under SGE classification is ADEX subject and is still employed by Federal Government or is being considered for Federal employment, use dual character of "Security of Government Employees" and character of security case in reports to insure proper routing. Use standards prevailing for SGE reports. Disseminate as any other security report. If other agencies locally request reports of SGE investigation, advise them to direct request to their headquarters for referral to Bureau.

G. REPORTS ON INDIVIDUALS

1. General

Cases of all ADEX subjects must be reopened for preparation of reports or LHMs following schedule below. LHM is permissible when information to be reported is brief and consists of no more than five pages. LHM should include appropriate main and subheadings where applicable. In connection with Categories III and IV only, if there is no additional information to report since last submission, FD-400 should be used in lieu of LHM. Critically analyze each case in light of ADEX criteria each time it is reopened and brought up to date.

2. Schedule of submission of reports or LHMs

In all cases, initial submission should be summary report but subsequent information may be furnished by LHM, if appropriate.

- a. Category I - semiannually
- b. Category II - annually
- c. Category III - annually
- d. Category IV - biennially

3. Origin

Office covering territory in which subject's subversive activities occur

4. Classification

- a. 100 - for individuals affiliated with revolutionary or communist organizations or fronts
- b. 105 - for members of Puerto Rican nationalist groups (or others having foreign nationalistic tendencies)

5. Title

Carry only one subject in title of each report. Submit separate reports for each subject regardless of relationship; i.e., husband and wife, father and son, etc.

6. Character

- a. The designation "Security Matter" (SM where appropriate) is to be set out in all instances. Use organizational affiliation where organization with which subject is affiliated is under current or continuing investigation or where a Bureau-approved thumbnail sketch exists.
Examples: Security Matter - C (Communist)
Security Matter - SWP (Socialist Workers Party)
Security Matter - SMC (Student Mobilization Committee)
- b. Every effort is to be made to use a meaningful organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency designation; however, where this cannot be done, following designations should be used:
 - (1) Security Matter - Subversive (Where activity of subject consists primarily of efforts to disrupt or destroy Government operations through violent protest and is in line with espousal or support of philosophy which advocates overthrow of Government by any means possible, including force and violence, and/or a demonstrated propensity for violence to achieve the same objective or to deny others their rights under the Constitution.)
 - (2) Security Matter - New Left (Where activity of subject is primarily extremist, student and/or communal-existence oriented and relates to violent efforts to disrupt or destroy Government operations in line with espousal or support of a philosophy which advocates overthrow of the Government by any means possible, including force and violence, and/or a demonstrated propensity for violence to achieve the same objective or to deny others their rights under the Constitution.)

7. Status

Carry cases as pending until all active investigation has been conducted. Thereafter, status shall be as follows:

- a. Category I: Cases should remain in pending status and report or LHM submitted six months from date of last report or LHM.
- b. Category II: Cases should be reopened 45 days prior to six months from date of last verification to meet annual reporting and six-month verifications requirements.
- c. Category III: Cases should be reopened 45 days prior to one year from date of last annual verifications to meet annual reporting and verifications requirements.
- d. Category IV: Cases in which there have been reports, or LHMs in lieu of reports, or verifications within last year should be reopened 45 days prior to one year from that date to meet annual verifications requirements and 45 days prior to two years from that date to meet biennial reporting requirements.
- e. Subjects recommended for ADEX
 - (1) Pending inactive
If all active investigation completed at time FD-122 forwarded to Bureau, set forth lead to follow for ADEX approval.
 - (2) Closed
After ADEX approved, follow by administrative tickler for periodic report.
- f. Subject not being recommended for ADEX
Closed - prior to closing, comply with instructions pertaining to interviews.

8. Content

- a. Include following and handle under topical headings (both in reports and LHMs) where appropriate.
 - (1) Background
 - (a) Birth data
 - (b) Citizenship status

- (c) Education
- (d) Marital status
- (e) Military service record (domestic or foreign, including type of discharge, citations, etc.)
- (f) Identification record
- (g) Employment
- (h) Residence
- (i) Status of health (if known)
- (2) Connections with basic revolutionary groups, front groups, and/or other subversive organizations or movements
 - (a) Information concerning admission into group, including sponsors, etc.
 - (b) History of activity in, attendance at meetings of, and positions held in subversive movement
- (3) Revolutionary statements by subject
 - (a) Determine each statement and full details surrounding it.
 - (b) Determine all statements showing adherence to principles of Marxism-Leninism or other revolutionary doctrines.
- (4) Other activities indicating furtherance of program of subversive organizations
 - (a) Speeches and writings
 - (b) Organizational directives and/or educational outlines signed by or issued by subject, or issued while subject was officer of organization
 - (c) Pertinent contacts between subject and leaders of organizations
 - (d) Details concerning subject's attendance or connection with subversive training schools
- (5) False statements made by subject, including aliases
Evidence may be obtained from passports, tax returns, and voting, marital, employment, and selective service records.
- (6) Miscellaneous
Pertinent items not falling under above categories
- b. Reports on individuals should be confined to:
 - (1) Information as to membership and activity in basic revolutionary organizations, front organizations, and/or other subversive organizations or unorganized groups
 - (2) Position and importance of subject in subversive movement
 - (3) Pertinent background information
Include only information pertinent to determining whether or not subject is engaged in subversive activities. Set out date or period to which it pertains; e.g., John Doe advised on January 15, 1970, that subject attended CP meetings in January, 1965, in Syracuse, New York.
- c. Summarizing information
 - (1) When prior summary reports are not suitable for dissemination, include all pertinent information in current summary report with sources fully protected.
 - (2) Repetitious and cumulative items may be limited to representative number with each item set forth fully documented. Number of items will depend upon preponderance of other information showing dangerousness of subject.
 - (3) When selection of representative number of items is made, follow with summary statement that source advised during specified period of time subject also attended certain number of other meetings. (Set out file number and serial range in documenting such statements.)
 - (4) Where there is extensive activity in subversive organizations, it is permissible to use narrative statements without exact dates of

activity; however, show period of time involved and inclusive dates of informant reports. Summary statements must be statements of facts and not conclusions. Information from different sources must be reported separately.

- (5) Above instructions do not lessen responsibility for reporting all pertinent items.

9. Administrative data - cover pages

a. General

References to following administrative items should be in cover pages accompanying reports:

- (1) ADEX, file numbers and titles of other cases, category level, security flash notice (FD-165), FD-122, FD-128, and noninvestigative information
- (2) In all ADEX cases, FD-305, appropriately filled out, shall be the last page of cover pages to annual reports and the last page of cover communications to LHMs submitted in lieu of annual reports. (If non-symbol informant page is used, FD-305 would be next to last page.)

b. Documentation of reports

- (1) Complete documentation of all reports is required. This also applies to LHMs.
- (2) If information necessary for complete documentation is not in subject's file, review other office files, as needed. If not obtainable, so state in cover pages.
- (3) Do not conduct extensive investigation to locate sources of background information or to otherwise document background information.
- (4) Office preparing summary report may include information originally obtained by another office but may not have necessary documentation. If office preparing report has copies of documents obtained by another office and identity of source, date of activity, date received, and receiving Agent are known, it is not necessary to obtain file number of original. Pertinent documentation, other than file number, should be obtained from auxiliary office.
- (5) When report includes references to known subversives who have associated with subject, identify source of characterization in cover pages without further documentation.
- (6) When it is necessary to obtain thumbnail sketch, place in thumbnail sketch file so it will be readily available for future use.

10. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of

Channelizing memoranda may be destroyed following submission of reports. Copies of informant's statements designated for 100 classification files of informants may be destroyed when one year old. (See instructions for destruction of channelizing memoranda in MRR, part II, section 3D, item 8.)

H. DISSEMINATION OF DATA DEVELOPED IN SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

1. Policy

Proper use of information received is foremost among Bureau's responsibilities. Information obtained during investigations should be forwarded to other interested agencies in executive branch unless there are compelling reasons not to do so. Delimitations Agreement and Presidential directives provide for dissemination to other agencies which have present or potential interest information relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and related matters.

2. Bureau requirements

All conceivable situations cannot be anticipated, however, following instructions pertain to representative situations which occur frequently. Basic rule is that security information must be furnished promptly to interested agencies in executive branch. Term "interested agency" must be interpreted in light of reason and common sense. Bring any unusual situations to Bureau's attention promptly for consideration.

Considerations affecting national defense in Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico require broadest possible construction of requirements for dissemination to intelligence services in those areas. See MRR, part II, section 5, pertaining to Bureau's overall responsibilities and policies in dissemination.

a. Members of armed forces

Delimitations Agreement between FBI and armed forces intelligence agencies (see section 102B, volume IV, of this manual) requires each agency to exchange freely and directly with other subscribing agencies all information of mutual interest. Any information developed concerning members of military services must be referred immediately to appropriate military branch having primary responsibility, even though allegations have not been fully resolved or verified. Specifically point out in such instances that information has not been verified. If it is determined subject is member of armed services, discontinue investigation immediately, advise Bureau, and disseminate pertinent reports locally to appropriate intelligence agency. Dissemination regarding military personnel is not confined to subjects of security investigations but extends to any subversive data developed against member of armed services during FBI investigations. If member of armed forces has been in contact with security subject or any individual or group with security implications, immediately advise appropriate local intelligence service, even though security aspects of contact have not been resolved. Point out in such instances that information is unverified and transmit any additional developments immediately.

Determine during security investigations whether subjects have any close relatives in armed forces. Promptly call such associations to attention of appropriate military intelligence services, together with pertinent data, including reports, on subjects involved. Evaluation of these associations lies entirely within province of military intelligence services, but Bureau must disseminate this information immediately upon receipt. Advise Bureau by letter concerning any subversive contacts or information developed concerning military personnel, including statement as to local dissemination and enclosing LHM setting out subversive data.

b. Aliens and naturalized citizens

Furnish information which might have bearing on their deportation or denaturalization to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). If in doubt, disseminate.

c. Employees of or persons having regular access to key facilities or employees of plants having contracts with military services

See instructions in this section concerning individuals employed in or having access to key facilities.

d. Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities) which are not on key facilities list or otherwise in manufacture of materials vital to national defense

Disseminate locally to Army and other intelligence services if their interest is apparent.

e. Individuals on inactive duty who are members of or hold commissions in reserve branches or National Guard

Disseminate locally to appropriate military intelligence service.

f. Seamen and subjects employed in maritime industry, including longshoremen and waterfront employees

Disseminate locally to Coast Guard and, when circumstances dictate, to other interested intelligence agencies, including NISO.

g. Employees of Federal Government within purview of Executive Order 10450

No dissemination of reports in security of Government employees cases may be made in field. If, however, subject is employed in key facility,

furnish copies of reports bearing dual character, "Security of Government Employees; Security Matter - C," to appropriate intelligence agencies of armed services. Instructions regarding dissemination to Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, Defense Supply Agency, Columbus, Ohio, appear in this section of this manual under individuals employed in or having access to key facilities - dissemination. Instructions regarding all phases of FBI responsibilities under Executive Order 10450 are in section 19, volume II, of this manual.

- h. Individuals who own property or reside in immediate vicinity of installation or other premises under cognizance of branch of armed services Disseminate locally to intelligence service of military branch involved.
- i. Airmen issued certificates by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) FAA issues certificates to airmen, defined as persons in command or acting as pilot, mechanic, or member of crew in navigation of aircraft while under way; individuals directly in charge of inspection, maintenance, overhauling, or repair of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances; and any individual serving in capacity of aircraft dispatcher or air-traffic control tower operator. Furnish subversive data concerning such persons to Bureau by report or LHM. In cover communication, recommend it be furnished to FAA. Dissemination will be made only at Bureau. For additional instructions regarding dissemination to FAA, see MRR, part II, section 5.
- j. Dissemination to Secret Service
Under agreement between FBI and Secret Service concerning protective responsibilities dated 11-26-71 (set out in section 102, volume IV, of this manual), reports or LHMs are disseminated to Secret Service (both locally and at SOG) in all cases which meet standards set forth. As practical matter, this includes virtually all security cases on individuals where any substantial information exists as to subversive, extremist, or revolutionary activities or sympathies on the subject's part. Furnish Bureau extra copy of report or LHM in these cases.
 - (1) Secret Service must be advised of reason for referral; that is, statement of class or classes of agreement which applies to subject. Use FD-376, which serves as letter of transmittal for both local and SOG dissemination. Forward original and one copy to Bureau. Maintain copy in case file and upon transfer of origin, furnish copy to new office of origin. Be certain individual is properly categorized.
 - (2) If subject of prior investigation is being recommended for ADEX, do not disseminate prior reports without first reviewing them carefully to insure they meet current reporting standards and are suitable for dissemination. If one or more prior reports are found unsuitable for dissemination, prepare LHM containing the pertinent information involved for dissemination to Secret Service along with current report. Forward copies of such LHM to Bureau for SOG dissemination.
 - (3) After initial dissemination to Secret Service, as changes occur in residence and employment, advise Secret Service locally by FD-366 and furnish two copies to Bureau.
 - (4) For instructions pertaining to dissemination to Secret Service in matters involving threats against President, refer to section 134B, volume IV, of this manual.

- (5) Upon transfer of office of origin in these cases, old office of origin should furnish Secret Service locally with subject's new residence and business address by LHM or FD-366 with copies to Bureau and new office of origin for dissemination to Secret Service headquarters and Secret Service office covering new residence, respectively.
- k. Dissemination at Bureau
- There are situations in which dissemination is made only at Bureau. Do not disseminate information to any field branch of another Government agency where security measures are inadequate. In such instances bring data to immediate attention of Bureau for SOG dissemination. In addition, Atomic Energy Commission receives reports only through Bureau. Information relating to foreign travel plans of security subjects is disseminated to interested agencies, including State Department, only at SOG.]

- (c) When all logical leads have been exhausted in case of missing important functionary, consider requesting Bureau authority to circularize all field offices with subject's photograph and background information.
- d. Individuals traveling abroad (Also see section 105G, volume IV, of this manual.)
- Set forth below are steps to be taken when information is received that subject in one of following categories intends to travel abroad or has already departed this country for foreign travel: subject of current security investigation, subject in priorities I and II of security index, past security subjects who may be in underground capacity, or subject concerning whom there is current information indicating need for foreign coverage.
- (1) Immediately advise Bureau by LHM available details concerning travel, including places and dates of departure and intended return, destination and itinerary, purpose of trip, name under which passport was issued, number of passport, and issuing office, if known. Include full description of subject and all aliases (in case of Chinese and Korean subjects, include Chinese telegraphic code or Korean telegraphic code numbers). Also include concise resume of available subversive data regarding subject. Do not delay advising Bureau of actual or intended travel while developing details of travel as time is of essence.
 - (2) Set out lead for WFO to check records of Passport Office, Department of State; but do not limit efforts to develop pertinent information to such check.
 - (3) Information concerning subject's proposed travel abroad, including information concerning subversive activities, is furnished Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and legal attaches. If travel is in area covered by legal attache, forward sufficient copies of LHM to enable dissemination of three copies to each legal attache involved. For each of these legal attaches, forward one photograph of subject, if available. If stops are to be placed with security services abroad, cover letter should so indicate. Set forth requests for investigation abroad on separate numbered page, captioned "Leads," at end of LHM. Request should not refer to legal attache or request investigation by particular agency abroad.
 - (4) Subsequent report in individual case should contain details regarding subject's travel. In nonsecurity index cases where LHMs are submitted, communication transmitting data regarding travel should indicate whether investigation is being initiated and, if not, why.
 - (5) Set forth below are steps to be taken when information is received that one of following is forming tour group for foreign travel: organization of investigative interest to Bureau or subject in one of categories described in first paragraph under item d above.
 - (a) Advise appropriate offices, under caption of tour group or organization, identities of individuals participating in tour, and furnish Bureau LHMs for State Department, CIA, and appropriate legal attaches. Include all readily available information pertaining to tour, such as itinerary, pertinent dates, names and addresses of participants, and thumbnail sketch of organization or individual sponsoring tour.
 - (b) Offices should immediately identify participants and submit LHMs on those in one of categories described in first paragraph under item d above. Refer to LHM previously prepared under caption of tour group or organization. Submit letter to Bureau under caption of tour group or organization listing individuals within territory participating in tour on whom there is no subversive information.

(6) Advise Bureau promptly by LHM of subject's return from travel abroad. If such individual has traveled behind Iron Curtain, also furnish Bureau recommendations as to interview and state whether additional investigation is contemplated.

3. File reviews

Check office indices and review files thoroughly for pertinent information showing background and subversive activity. Include information in initial report. After each check and review of files has been made, consolidate reference cards pertaining to subject in indices.

4. Security informants

Information developed through security informants is unsurpassed in value both for intelligence purposes and as admissible evidence.

5. Physical surveillances

Physical surveillances should be used when, in opinion of SAC, information of sufficient value might be obtained to justify their use in light of existing circumstances and available manpower.

a. When information is received that meetings of subversive organizations are to take place, physical surveillances should be considered to corroborate such information and identify participants.

b. Surveillances of individuals in leadership or underground capacities serve to identify others within movement.

c. Success of surveillances depends upon resourcefulness of Agents who must at all times exercise sound judgment and discretion. Be alert to observe activity of subject and countersurveillances which may be used to identify Agents and embarrass Bureau.

6. Photographic surveillances

Photographic evidence of meetings between individuals or which shows subjects entering or leaving meeting places of subversive organizations affords convincing and admissible evidence to establish subversive activities. Prior Bureau authority is needed for photographic surveillances of meetings and they must be properly correlated with other investigative techniques to obtain maximum evidence. Conceal equipment to avoid detection by subjects or other individuals in proximity of surveillance.

7. Public sources

Make use of all logical public sources of information. Obtain background and lineage data from birth records and local bureaus of vital statistics, credit agencies, state records, public utility records, and school records. Credit check of individual should be limited to obtaining identifying information only (name, address, former address, employment, former employment). Obtain and index as reference material publications of subversive organizations and records of state and Federal committees which have conducted hearings concerning subversive activities.

8. Records of private firms

Where pertinent information is available in records of private firms, such as past or present employers, insurance companies, and merchants, contact such firms provided it will not jeopardize investigation.

9. [a.] Channelizing of information to case files

Membership or activity in subversive organizations should be channelized to main case files of individuals involved. Mimeographed form FD-306 may be used provided it is limited to reporting attendance at meetings. When information from informants or surveillances is channelized to individual case files, it must be documented. Coordinate information received from informants and confidential sources with active investigation.

- [b. Preparation of channelizing memoranda for other offices. When preparing lengthy channelizing memoranda reporting material of interest to other offices, limit the number of copies prepared for each other such office to two. Clearly indicate next to the name of the receiving office the number of the page containing information pertinent to that office and note on cover page that distribution of material for case files is being left to the discretion of the receiving office. If the channelizing memorandum includes names of individuals who merely attend a meeting or gathering, and played no important role, the reporting office is to attach to the channelizing memorandum a one-page memorandum listing the names of all individuals who were merely in attendance and had no important function. The preparation and distribution of additional copies of the one-page attachment are left to the discretion of the receiving office.]

10. Preservation of evidence

Bear in mind necessity of obtaining admissible evidence.

- a. Identify, preserve, and maintain continuity of evidence obtained for possible admission in Federal proceedings. Identify specifically as to source and date.
- b. Notes or statements from informants necessary to refresh their recollection if called to testify must be in sufficient detail to serve this purpose and contain no material which would make their use inadvisable or inadmissible.
- c. Informant's original notes or statements are not to be blocked, stamped, serialized, or mutilated in any way which would render them unsatisfactory for use in Federal proceedings.

- (4) Office preparing summary report may include information originally obtained by another office but may not have necessary documentation. If office preparing report has copies of documents obtained by another office and identity of source, date of activity, date received, and receiving Agent are known, it is not necessary to obtain file number of original. Pertinent documentation, other than file number, should be obtained from auxiliary office.
 - (5) When report includes references to known subversives who have associated with subject, identify source of characterization in cover pages without further documentation.
 - (6) When it is necessary to obtain thumbnail sketch, place in thumbnail sketch file so it will be readily available for future use.
10. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of
Channelizing memoranda [must] be destroyed following submission of reports [or following submission of letterhead memoranda (LHM), or when information is of no value to report or LHM.] Copies of informant's statements designated for 100 classification files of informants may be destroyed when one year old. (See instructions for destruction of channelizing memoranda in MRR, part II, section 3D, item 8.)

I. DISSEMINATION OF DATA DEVELOPED IN SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

1. Policy

Proper utilization of information received is foremost among Bureau's responsibilities. Information obtained during investigations should be forwarded to other interested agencies in executive branch unless there are compelling reasons not to do so. Delimitations Agreement and Presidential directives provide for dissemination to other agencies which have present or potential interest information relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and related matters.

2. Bureau requirements

Because all conceivable situations cannot be anticipated, data below pertains to representative situations which occur frequently. Basic rule is that security information must be furnished promptly to interested agencies in executive branch. Term "interested agency" must be interpreted in light of reason and common sense. Bring any unusual situations to Bureau's attention promptly for consideration.

Considerations affecting national defense in Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico necessitate broadest possible construction to requirements for dissemination to intelligence services in those areas. See Manual of Rules and Regulations, part II, section 5, pertaining to Bureau's overall responsibilities, policies, and exceptions in dissemination.

a. Members of armed forces

Delimitations Agreement between FBI and armed forces intelligence agencies (see section 102B, volume IV, of this manual) requires each agency to exchange freely and directly with other subscribing agencies all information of mutual interest. Any information developed concerning members of military services must be referred immediately to appropriate military branch having primary responsibility, even though allegations have not been fully resolved or verified. Specifically point out in such instances that information has not been verified. When it is determined security subject is member of armed services, discontinue investigation immediately, advise Bureau, and disseminate pertinent reports locally to appropriate intelligence agency. Dissemination regarding military personnel is not confined to subjects of security investigations but extends to any subversive data developed against member of armed services during FBI investigations. If member of armed forces has been in contact with security subject or any individual or group with security implications, immediately advise appropriate local intelligence service, even though security aspects of contact have not been resolved. Point out in such instances that information is unverified and transmit any additional developments immediately.

Determine during security investigations whether subjects have any close relatives in armed forces. Promptly call such associations to attention of appropriate military intelligence services, together with pertinent data, including reports, on subjects involved. Evaluation of these associations lies entirely within province of military intelligence services, but Bureau must disseminate this information immediately upon receipt. Advise Bureau by letter concerning any subversive contacts or information developed concerning military personnel, including statement as to local dissemination and enclosing LHM setting out subversive data.

- b. Aliens and naturalized citizens
Furnish information concerning aliens and naturalized citizens which might have bearing on their deportation or [denaturalization] to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). If in doubt, disseminate.
- c. Employees of or persons having regular access to key facilities or employees of plants having contracts with military services
See instructions in this section concerning individuals employed in or having access to key facilities.
- d. Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities) which are not on key facilities list or otherwise in item c, above, and facilities which are or may become engaged in manufacture of materials vital to national defense
Disseminate locally to Army and other intelligence services if their interest is apparent.
- e. Individuals on inactive duty who are members of or hold commissions in reserve branches or National Guard
Disseminate locally to appropriate military intelligence service.
- f. Seamen and subjects employed in maritime industry, including long-shoremen and water-front employees
Disseminate locally to Coast Guard and, when circumstances dictate, to other interested intelligence agencies, including NISO.
- g. Employees of Federal Government within purview of Executive Order 10450
No dissemination of reports in security of Government employees cases may be made in field. If, however, subject is employed in key facility, furnish copies of reports bearing dual character, "Security of Government Employees; Security Matter - C," to appropriate intelligence agencies of armed services. Instructions regarding dissemination to Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, Defense Supply Agency, Columbus, Ohio, appear in this section of this manual under individuals employed in or having access to key facilities - dissemination. Instructions regarding all phases of FBI responsibilities under Executive Order 10450 are in section 19, volume II, of this manual.
- h. Individuals who own property or reside in immediate vicinity of installation or other premises under cognizance of branch of armed services
Disseminate locally to intelligence service of military branch involved.
- i. Airmen issued certificates by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
FAA issues certificates to airmen, defined as persons in command or acting as [pilot,] mechanic, or member of crew in navigation of aircraft while under way; individuals directly in charge of inspection, maintenance, overhauling, or repair of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances; and any individual serving in capacity of aircraft dispatcher or air-traffic control tower operator. Furnish to Bureau subversive data concerning such persons by report or LHM. In cover communication, recommend such data be furnished to FAA. Dissemination will be made only at Bureau. For additional instructions regarding dissemination to FAA, see Manual of Rules and Regulations, part II, section 5.

- (c) When all logical leads have been exhausted in case of missing important functionary, consider requesting Bureau authority to circularize all field offices with subject's photograph and background information.
- d. Individuals traveling abroad (Also see section 105G, volume IV, of this manual.)
- Set forth below are steps to be taken when information is received that subject in one of following categories intends to travel abroad or has already departed this country for foreign travel: subject of current security investigation, subject in priorities I and II of security index, past security subjects who may be in underground capacity, or subject concerning whom there is current information indicating need for foreign coverage.
- (1) Immediately advise Bureau by LHM available details concerning travel, including places and dates of departure and intended return, destination and itinerary, purpose of trip, name under which passport was issued, number of passport, and issuing office, if known. Include full description of subject and all aliases (in case of Chinese and Korean subjects, include Chinese telegraphic code or Korean telegraphic code numbers). Also include concise resume of available subversive data regarding subject. Do not delay advising Bureau of actual or intended travel while developing details of travel as time is of essence.
 - (2) Set out lead for WFO to check records of Passport Office, Department of State; but do not limit efforts to develop pertinent information to such check.
 - (3) Information concerning subject's proposed travel abroad, including information concerning subversive activities, is furnished Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and legal attaches. If travel is in area covered by legal attache, forward sufficient copies of LHM to enable dissemination of three copies to each legal attache involved. For each of these legal attaches, forward one photograph of subject, if available. If stops are to be placed with security services abroad, cover letter should so indicate. Set forth requests for investigation abroad on separate numbered page, captioned "Leads," at end of LHM. Request should not refer to legal attache or request investigation by particular agency abroad.
 - (4) Subsequent report in individual case should contain details regarding subject's travel. In nonsecurity index cases where LHMs are submitted, communication transmitting data regarding travel should indicate whether investigation is being initiated and, if not, why.
 - (5) Set forth below are steps to be taken when information is received that one of following is forming tour group for foreign travel: organization of investigative interest to Bureau or subject in one of categories described in first paragraph under item d above.
 - (a) Advise appropriate offices, under caption of tour group or organization, identities of individuals participating in tour, and furnish Bureau LHMs for State Department, CIA, and appropriate legal attaches. Include all readily available information pertaining to tour, such as itinerary, pertinent dates, names and addresses of participants, and thumbnail sketch of organization or individual sponsoring tour.
 - (b) Offices should immediately identify participants and submit LHMs on those in one of categories described in first paragraph under item d above. Refer to LHM previously prepared under caption of tour group or organization. Submit letter to Bureau under caption of tour group or organization listing individuals within territory participating in tour on whom there is no subversive information.

- (6) Advise Bureau promptly by LHM of subject's return from travel abroad. If such individual has traveled behind Iron Curtain, also furnish Bureau recommendations as to interview and state whether additional investigation is contemplated.
3. File reviews
Check office indices and review files thoroughly for pertinent information showing background and subversive activity. Include information in initial report. After each check and review of files has been made, consolidate reference cards pertaining to subject in indices.
 4. Security informants
Information developed through security informants is unsurpassed in value both for intelligence purposes and as admissible evidence.
 5. Physical surveillances
Physical surveillances should be used when, in opinion of SAC, information of sufficient value might be obtained to justify their use in light of existing circumstances and available manpower.
 - a. When information is received that meetings of subversive organizations are to take place, physical surveillances should be considered to corroborate such information and identify participants.
 - b. Surveillances of individuals in leadership or underground capacities serve to identify others within movement.
 - c. Success of surveillances depends upon resourcefulness of Agents who must at all times exercise sound judgment and discretion. Be alert to observe activity of subject and countersurveillances which may be used to identify Agents and embarrass Bureau.
 6. Photographic surveillances
Photographic evidence of meetings between individuals or which shows subjects entering or leaving meeting places of subversive organizations affords convincing and admissible evidence to establish subversive activities. Prior Bureau authority is needed for photographic surveillances of meetings and they must be properly correlated with other investigative techniques to obtain maximum evidence. Conceal equipment to avoid detection by subjects or other individuals in proximity of surveillance.
 7. Public sources
Make use of all logical public sources of information. Obtain background and lineage data from birth records and local bureaus of vital statistics, credit agencies, state records, public utility records, and school records. [Credit check of individual should be limited to obtaining identifying information only (name, address, former address, employment, former employment).] Obtain and index as reference material publications of subversive organizations and records of state and Federal committees which have conducted hearings concerning subversive activities.
 8. Records of private firms
Where pertinent information is available in records of private firms, such as past or present employers, insurance companies, and merchants, contact such firms provided it will not jeopardize investigation.
 9. Channelizing of information to case files
Membership or activity in subversive organizations should be channeled to main case files of individuals involved. Mimeographed form FD-306 may be used provided it is limited to reporting attendance at meetings. When information from informants or surveillances is channeled to individual case files, it must be documented. Coordinate information received from informants and confidential sources with active investigation.
 10. Preservation of evidence
Bear in mind necessity of obtaining admissible evidence.
 - a. Identify, preserve, and maintain continuity of evidence obtained for possible admission in Federal proceedings. Identify specifically as to source and date.
 - b. Notes or statements from informants necessary to refresh their recollection if called to testify must be in sufficient detail to serve this purpose and contain no material which would make their use inadvisable or inadmissible.
 - c. Informant's original notes or statements are not to be blocked, stamped, serialized, or mutilated in any way which would render them unsatisfactory for use in Federal proceedings.

- d. Above also applies to Agent's notes taken during surveillances or concerning evidence otherwise obtained.
11. Interviews with subjects of security investigations
- a. Policy
- No security investigation of an individual is to be closed unless subject is included in security index or consideration given to interview. Bureau will not authorize cancellation of security index card for inactivity until subject has been interviewed or Bureau advised why interview is inadvisable.
- b. Purpose
- (1) When investigation is inconclusive, to determine subject's sympathies and whether he continues to adhere to revolutionary doctrines
 - (2) To develop information concerning activities of subject and his associates in subversive movement
 - (3) To develop informants
- c. SAC authority
- Without Bureau authority SAC may:
- (1) Authorize interviews with individuals who have not been subjects of security investigations and available information does not warrant opening case
 - (2) Authorize interviews of subjects of security cases who have previously been interviewed with Bureau authority, provided no change has taken place in subject's status and interviews are conducted under same conditions as previously authorized
 - (3) Authorize interviews of subjects of closed security cases including persons who were on security index but were removed
 - (4) Authorize interviews of rank-and-file black extremists except as noted in section 122, volume IV, of this manual
- d. Procedures for interviews under SAC authority
- (1) If there is closed file, reopen it. If none, open case in 134 category to resolve whether subject is identical with information in files and determine his current employment and residence.
 - (2) Case Agent will prepare memorandum requesting SAC authority to conduct interview of subject to determine his attitude towards cooperation with FBI.
 - (3) During first contact Agent should identify himself, outline Bureau's responsibilities in security field, and request subject's assistance. If individual has been member of basic revolutionary organization and appears cooperative, he may be questioned about his own activities. However, this interview is for sole purpose of determining whether subject might be cooperative.
 - (4) If cooperative, advise Bureau and conduct background investigation under section 107, volume IV, of this manual. If uncooperative, prepare brief memorandum for file and close case. Letter to Bureau not necessary.
- e. Prior Bureau authority
- Prior Bureau authority required for:
- (1) Subjects of active current investigation where no prior Bureau authority has been obtained
 - (2) Closed cases on current security index subjects where no prior interview has been conducted
 - (3) Subjects of investigations requested by Bureau, both open and closed, such as applicant and loyalty cases
 - (4) Individuals when circumstances indicate delicate situation and greater than usual risk involved, such as labor leaders and individuals in educational, mass media, religious, or publishing fields. Bureau authority needed even though there were prior interviews.
 - (5) Security subjects who have publicly disclosed previous contacts
 - (6) Subjects of section A reserve index cards

In above cases, no report need be submitted when requesting Bureau authority to interview subject.

f. Letter requesting Bureau authority for interview

(1) In absence of special circumstances, include following statement in first paragraph of letter.

(a.) Bureau authority is requested to interview subject in accordance with existing instructions relating to interviews of security subjects. If subject is cooperative, no affirmative steps will be taken during initial interview to direct his activities and complete background investigation required by section 107C of Manual of Instructions will be conducted and Bureau will be requested to authorize recontact with subject as PSI.

(b) Form FD-336 contains above statement and may be used. Statement in no way precludes interviewing Agents from obtaining all subversive information subject is willing to furnish or other data which will assist in determining his potential as informant.

(c) If available, letter must contain following information:

I. Residence address, occupation, employment, race, date and place of birth, citizenship, and status of health

II. Marital status. If married, occupation, employment, and race of spouse.

III. Length of time subject was member of or affiliated with subversive organization and positions held. When investigation is based on circumstances other than membership or affiliation with subversive organizations, briefly set forth facts.

IV. If married, state if spouse is or has been member of or affiliated with subversive groups, positions held, and period of such membership or affiliation.

V. Membership or affiliation of any other close relatives in subversive groups

VI. Information regarding defection, expulsion, inactivity, and present sympathies of subject and, if married, of spouse

VII. What is expected to be gained by interview

(d) In each letter, pertinent information, if available, regarding seven items listed must be set out under appropriate number but headings need not be restated. If no pertinent data is available regarding any item, so indicate after number.

(2) Letters must be personally approved by SAC.

(3) One copy of letter should only be first page of letter. When unnecessary to issue specific instructions, Bureau will approve request by stamping this page and returning by routing slip.

(4) When authorized, interview must be conducted within 45 days. If not possible, advise Bureau and indicate subject will be contacted within 45 days. If interview has not been conducted at end of second period, request new authority. Include any new information bearing upon advisability of interview.

g. Preparation for and conduct of interview

(1) Preparation must be thorough and interview conducted so that Agents will not be compromised, Bureau will not be embarrassed, and informants will not be exposed. CPUSA has planned traps for Agents attempting interviews with members by installing recording machines in members' homes or endeavoring to have interview observed by concealed third party.

(2) Interviews should be conducted by two Agents. Agent experienced in security investigations who is knowledgeable regarding development of informants should conduct interrogation. Actual approach need not be made by both Agents; one Agent may observe from secure distance. (Two Agents should be physically present during interview or contact with known or suspected Nation of Islam members in all cases.) Background of subject and circumstances will determine how approach should be handled.

- i. Finances
Special efforts must be made to locate and monitor bank accounts of organizations. Emphasis must be placed on determining if funds are being furnished organizations from foreign sources and if there is any rapport between the organizations and organizations in foreign countries.
- j. Support given to or received from CPUSA or other communist group
Develop evidence showing support, financial or otherwise, given by organization to CPUSA or other communist group or received by organization from CPUSA or other communist group.
- k. Implementation of CPUSA line or that of other communist group
Usually shown through comparison of programs and literature of organization with those of CPUSA or other communist group during any particular period.
- l. Accuracy of identifications
Use extreme care to assure statements relating to affiliations or membership in subversive organizations are accurate in all respects. Show exact basis, plus corroboration wherever possible, for identification of suspected organizations or individuals with information of a possible subversive nature. Never refer to a person as a "known communist" unless he is publicly known as such.
- m. Specific requirements for CPUSA investigations
Follow previously established reporting format. New York is responsible, in addition to reporting activities of New York District, for investigating and reporting separately on national committee meetings, national training schools, and other important national meetings.
- n. Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and other Marxist-Leninist or Trotskyite groups
All offices submit semiannual reports and carry as pending inactive, except New York whose report on SWP activities on national basis should be designated pending. New York also submit report on local SWP activities. Indicate in cover pages whether all persons identified in report as members of SWP or as members of other Marxist-Leninist or Trotskyite groups who reside within area covered by reporting office are listed in security index, or are informants or sources. List any exception by name and show status of investigation and state whether name has been furnished Bureau for indexing.

Data concerning above topics can usually be secured through following sources: confidential informants, incorporation records, bank records, literature and publications of organization, newspapers, public meetings and rallies, confidential investigative techniques, various public records, panel sources, confidential sources and other sources of information, interviews with past or present CPUSA members, review of field office files, pretext interviews, surveillances, Agents attending mass meetings, etc.

- 4. Dissemination of information to Secret Service regarding plots against President
On 2-3-65, an "Agreement Between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secret Service Concerning Presidential Protection" was signed and became effective. This agreement is set out in its entirety in section 102, volume IV, of this manual. Agreement provides that FBI, in its investigations of organizations whose activities are inimical to welfare of U. S., will be alert to and promptly notify Secret Service of any information indicating plot against person of the President. It is responsibility of Secret Service to initiate necessary action to neutralize such plot.
- a. Be alert during investigation of organization for information indicating plot against person of President. Upon receipt, immediately furnish complete details to nearest office of Secret Service and appropriate local law enforcement agencies and advise Bureau by teletype, or telephone if facts warrant, of information furnished and fact it has been so disseminated. Attempt immediately to verify information, but do not attempt evaluation of information.

- b. Promptly prepare LHM, including complete details disseminated and identities of Secret Service officer and local law enforcement officers to whom given and date and time of notification. Promptly disseminate LHM locally to Secret Service and any other appropriate Government agency and furnish sufficient copies to Bureau for dissemination at SOG. Disseminate copies of all LHMs and reports concerning organization locally to Secret Service on continuing basis and furnish extra copies of such communications to Bureau for dissemination at SOG.
 - c. Determine identities of members of organization involved in plot. Background information concerning such individuals should be fully developed and included in communications disseminated to Secret Service.
5. Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C (code name "CIRM"). Bufile 100-442529. Office of origin: New York
- a. Submit quarterly reports, to reach Bureau by February 1, May 1, August 1, and November 1 on full extent of communist influence in racial matters. Include information on communist infiltration of Negro organizations and subversive individuals active in racial movement. Include this information even if it duplicates information in other reports. Offices with no information to report advise Bureau by letter.
 - b. Use three-part outline in report: (1) Communist Strategy, (2) Communist Tactics, and (3) Communist Penetration and Influence in Racial Organizations. Under strategy, include plans and line of CPUSA and other communist groups, such as SWP and Progressive Labor Party. Under tactics, describe communist direction, influence, and participation in demonstrations, disturbances, and other events with racial overtones. List events in chronological order with appropriate sub-headings. In part three, report influence of subversives in racial organizations.
6. Title and character.
- [Communications covering organizations and groups should carry the name of the organization and characters as set out below.
- a. Internal Security - Communist
The use of this character will apply to:
 - (1) Communist basic revolutionary organizations (both pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese); for example, Communist Party, USA, and Progressive Labor Party.
 - (2) Communist front groups.
 - (3) Communist infiltrated groups.
 - b. Internal Security - Communist (Trotskyist)
The use of this character will apply to:
 - (1) Trotskyist basic revolutionary organizations such as the Socialist Workers Party, Workers World Party, Young Socialist Alliance and Youth Against War and Fascism.
 - (2) Trotskyist fronts such as the Student Mobilization Committee.
 - c. Internal Security - New Left
This will include all organizations affiliated with the New Left Movement except those which would be characterized as Communist or Trotskyist front and infiltrated groups.]

Where appropriate, include identity of particular district or field division; e.g.,

Communist Party, USA
 District
 Division
 Internal Security - C

7. Classification - 100

- (5) Examples of organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency
- | | |
|-------------------------------|-----|
| American Socialist Clubs | ASC |
| American Workers' | |
| Communist Party | AWC |
| Black Nationalist | BNT |
| Black Panther Party | BPP |
| Communist Party, USA | COM |
| Minutemen | MIN |
| Nation of Islam | NOI |
| Nationalist groups | |
| advocating independence | |
| for Puerto Rico | PRN |
| [New Left | NL] |
| Progressive Labor Party | PLP |
| Proletarian Party of America | PPA |
| Revolutionary Action Movement | RAM |
| Revolutionary Union | RU |
| Socialist Workers Party | SWP |
| Spartacist League | SPL |
| Student National Coordinating | |
| Committee | SNC |
| Students for a Democratic | |
| Society | SDS |
| Workers World Party | WWP |
| Bulgarian | BUL |
| Cuban | CUB |
| Czechoslovakian | CZE |
| Hungarian | HUN |
| Romanian | ROM |
| Russian | RUS |
| Yugoslavian | YUG |
- (6) Priority designation
- | | |
|--------------|-------|
| Priority I | P I |
| Priority II | P II |
| Priority III | P III |
- (7) Top functionary designation (where applicable)
- | | |
|-----------------|----|
| Top functionary | TF |
|-----------------|----|
- (8) Special section cards
- | | |
|------------------------------|-----|
| Atomic energy program | |
| employees | AEP |
| Cuban special section | CUB |
| Espionage subjects | ESP |
| Foreign government employees | FGE |
| Pro-Tito subjects | YUG |
| United Nations employees | UNE |
| U. S. Government employees | GOV |
- (9) Unavailable section cards
- | | |
|----------------|----|
| Missing | MI |
| Out of country | OC |
| Imprisoned | PR |
- (10) Date and place of birth
- (11) Key facility geographical reference number (obtained from Department of Defense Key Facilities List) and abbreviation denoting agency having security responsibility
- (12) Residence address
- (13) Employment address and any additional data deemed necessary to assist in locating subject in emergency. Labor union affiliation, if any.
- (14) Field office file number
- b. Data to appear on separate attached card
- (1) Place following data on separate card attached to reverse side of security index card being filed in geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Cards contain printed captions for recording descriptive data which can be augmented if necessary.

SECTION 87. SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

- (a) Complete description
 - (b) Notation that security index flash notice has been posted in Identification Division
 - (c) Photograph, with date taken. It is to be most current or best likeness of subject.
 - (d) Dangerous characteristics of subject, including notation if subject possesses firearms
 - (e) Other data which will assist in apprehension, such as directions to residence or employment when these are unusual, number of minor children and aged dependents
- (2) If descriptive data have not been obtained, case must be kept pending. Upon posting of security index flash notice, field will be furnished FBI number and fingerprint classification which should be affixed to reverse side of security index cards filed in geographical, special, and unavailable sections.
 - (3) Use FD-186 to report information for separate card attached to back of security index card. Case Agent should fill in form and forward to clerical employee designated to post information. Thereafter, file FD-186 in case file. FD-186 may be used to record information that subject has been physically observed and to note descriptive data.
6. Arrangement of security index
- a. At Bureau

Entire index is maintained on IBM tabulating cards. Security index cards are printed by automatic data processing and transmitted to field. An alphabetical breakdown of true names and all aliases of subjects is also maintained at Bureau for administrative purposes.
 - b. In field office

Active security index in each field office is maintained in four sections: geographical, alphabetical, unavailable, and special sections. [Complete set of each field office's Security Index is also maintained in Headquarters city in a state of readiness to be evacuated on a moment's notice in the same manner as geographical section with unavailable and special section cards filed in back.]

 - (1) Geographical section

After receipt of three security index cards from Bureau and after necessary data have been added to two cards, file one in geographical section of index (except special section and unavailable section cards) and one in duplicate set maintained away from headquarters city. Geographical section is broken down by residence address in accordance with needs of each office. Where logical, it should be broken down by state, county, city, and, if needed, into boroughs or suburbs and precincts. Cards are filed alphabetically under each geographical breakdown. Cards in this section will be withdrawn and used by Agents should apprehension of subjects become necessary.

Cards will show "unknown" residence for (a) subjects whose addresses are not known but prompt location within division is expected and (b) subjects whose location in another division is in process of verification. File these cards in breakdown designated "Verification Pending." With Bureau authority, offices covering large industrial areas may set up second geographical section and file cards by subjects' employment. Depending on time of day apprehensions are initiated, geographical-employment or geographical-residence section may be used.
 - (2) Alphabetical section

File duplicate card alphabetically in this section; there is no other breakdown. Alphabetical card is control card. If card is withdrawn from geographical section for apprehension, make notation on alphabetical card.

- b. Definition
Top functionary is individual who is on high-policy level in CPUSA, other subversive organizations, or unorganized groups, to whom it is necessary to give continuous investigative attention because of his importance. Term "top functionary" does not require that individuals actually hold official positions in organizations but is given broad construction to include others of equal importance because of their influence in movement itself, or their position and activities outside movement in labor, front, or similar organizations. Consider black nationalist extremists whose importance justifies continuous investigative attention.
 - c. Manner of designation
Prior Bureau authority necessary to designate subject as top functionary. Top functionaries are to be in priority I and reports are submitted annually.
 - d. Regulations governing handling of top functionaries
 - (1) Designation and deletion of top functionary status
Handle by letter to Bureau containing brief statement of reason for designation or deletion.
 - (2) Photographs
Obtain photographs for each top functionary. Send two copies (one for Secret Service) to Bureau, either by cover letter or as enclosure to report. Maintain copy in subject's file. If album of top functionary photographs maintained, keep duplicate in subject's file.
 - (3) Handwriting specimens
Obtain suitable handwriting specimens of each top functionary. When possible, obtain specimens from public records, law enforcement agencies, and similar sources. Send specimens to Bureau under separate cover letter by registered mail for attention of FBI Laboratory. When they may be of value as evidence, so state in transmittal letter and request their return after copies have been made. Specimens should be sufficient to permit future comparisons by Laboratory.
 - (4) Security index cards
Request preparation by FD-122 at earliest possible moment.
 - (5) Change of office of origin
FD-128 changing office of origin on top functionary automatically deletes him as top functionary in old office and adds him as top functionary in new office.
 - (6) [Deleted]
 - e. Maintenance of list
Each office must maintain current list of top functionaries.
14. Correlation of other investigations with security index and reserve index
Individuals investigated by Bureau under any classification against whom subversive information is developed must be considered for security index and/or reserve index. This includes espionage, foreign intelligence, applicant-type, and security of Government employees (SGE) investigations. When individual previously investigated under SGE classification is security index subject and is still employed by Federal Government or is being considered for Federal employment, use dual character of "Security of Government Employees" and character of security case in reports to insure routing to proper field and Bureau desks for supervision. Use standards prevailing for SGE reports. Disseminate these reports as any other security report. Advise representatives of other agencies requesting reports of SGE investigation to direct request to their headquarters for referral to Bureau.

H. REPORTS ON INDIVIDUALS

1. General

Cases of all security index subjects must be reopened for preparation of reports following schedule below. Critically analyze each case in light of security index criteria each time it is reopened and brought up to date.

2. Schedule of submission of reports

- a. Priority I - annually
- b. Priority II - annually
- c. Priority III - initial report must be summary. Subsequent information may be furnished by LHM. Each office is responsible to insure all pertinent developments are furnished Bureau.

3. Origin

Office covering territory in which subject's subversive activities occur

4. Classification

- a. 100 - for individuals affiliated with basic revolutionary and front organizations of Marxist ideology
- b. 105 - for member of Puerto Rican nationalist groups or others having foreign nationalistic tendencies
- c. 157 - Nation of Islam and other black nationalist subjects

5. Title

Only one subject shall be carried in title of each report. Separate reports must be submitted for each subject regardless of relationship; i.e., husband and wife, father and son, etc.

6. Character

- [a. The designation "Security Matter" (SM where appropriate) is to be set out in all instances. Use organizational affiliation where the organization of the subject is a current or continuing investigation or where a Bureau-approved thumbnail sketch exists. Examples:

Security Matter - C (Communist)

Security Matter - SWP

(Socialist Workers
Party)

Security Matter - SMC

(Student Mobilization
Committee)

- b. Every effort is to be made to use a meaningful organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency designation; however, where this cannot be done, the following designations are to be adhered to in submitting to the Bureau:

- (1) Security Matter - Subversive (Where activity of subject is primarily protest in nature and is related to demonstrations and other efforts to disrupt or destroy Government operations in line with espousal or support of a philosophy which advocates overthrow of the Government by any means possible, including force and violence, and/or a demonstrated propensity for violence to achieve the same objective or to deny others their rights under the Constitution.)

- (2) Security Matter - New Left (Where activity of subject is primarily violence, extremist, student and/or communal-existence oriented and relates to demonstrations and other efforts to disrupt or destroy Government operations in line with espousal or support of a philosophy which advocates overthrow of the Government by any means possible, including force and violence, and/or a demonstrated propensity for violence to achieve the same objective or to deny others their rights under the Constitution.)]

7. Status

Carry cases as pending until all active investigation has been conducted. Thereafter, status shall be as follows:

a. Top functionaries

Pending inactive. Submit reports annually. Place case in pending-active status 45 days prior to date report due.

b. Key facility cases

Pending inactive. See instructions under individuals employed in or having access to key facilities.

c. Other security index subjects

(1) Closed

- (a) Follow by administrative tickler to insure submission of periodic reports according to priority designation. If, following investigation, no subversive data is developed and information consists only of verification of residence and employment and negative contacts with sources, submit FD-400 in lieu of report setting forth identities of informants and sources contacted and any pertinent administrative data. Also submit FD-305 properly executed. Open case 45 days prior to date report due.

[C. INVESTIGATION OF COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF LABOR UNIONS

1. Purpose of investigation
 - a. To obtain complete picture of control communists have over vital industry in U. S.
 - b. To develop data concerning extent of communist control over important trade unions
 - c. To develop evidence necessary to establish under provisions of Communist Control Act of 1954 that a labor union is communist infiltrated at time Attorney General files petition
 - d. To determine identity of each important communist in labor movement
2. Policy
 - a. Prior Bureau authority required to conduct active investigation. Bureau will advise field of unions being considered under Communist Control Act of 1954. Give continuous, thorough, and expeditious attention because of limited period (three years) pertinent evidence is admissible under statutory limits in act.
 - b. Ascertain availability and willingness to testify of all possible witnesses for benefit of Department in considering cases for presentation to Subversive Activities Control Board. Current informants and confidential sources should be described as currently furnishing information to FBI and not as unavailable. Department must be furnished brief statement on background and any known factors affecting credibility of all other witnesses, including discontinued informants. Investigative techniques not available for use in court may be described as unavailable.
 - c. Investigation is limited to activities of individuals acting in furtherance or apparent furtherance of communist program. Goal is complete picture of extent of communist infiltration and domination.
 - d. Labor union as such is not subject of investigation. Title of all communications must clearly show communist infiltration is subject of investigation. FBI is not interested in employer-employee relationships or legitimate union activities.
 - e. Prior Bureau authority required to conduct interview with any officer or official of labor union during investigation of communist infiltration unless officer or official is established reliable source or confidential informant.
 - f. Prepare brief history of union, including origin, constitution, bylaws, and organizational structure. Office of origin is responsible for coverage of officers and personnel of national or international office. Auxiliary offices responsible for coverage of international representatives, organizers, and regional, district, council, and local officers active within their territories.
3. Title

Title of all communications should clearly show that communist infiltration of union involved is subject of investigation, not the union itself; e.g.,

"Communist Infiltration of
United Electrical Workers of
America"
4. Classification - 100
5. Character - Internal Security - C

D. INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS - POLICY AND OBJECTIVES

1. Definitions

Following organizations are [examples of] "basic revolutionary organizations."

- a. Communist Party, USA
- b. Socialist Workers Party
- c. Progressive Labor Party
- d. Proletarian Party of America
- e. Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico
- f. [Revolutionary Union]

Black nationalist extremists and members of Puerto Rican nationalist groups and Puerto Rican subversive proindependence groups, although technically not members of basic revolutionary organizations, should be investigated under same rules. (See section 122, volume IV, of this manual.)

2. FBI responsibility

To conduct thorough investigations into background and activities of all persons in U. S. and Puerto Rico who are dangerous or potentially dangerous to internal security. Each SAC is responsible for investigation of persons in his area who, because of membership or affiliation with basic revolutionary organizations or other Marxist revolutionary organizations including splinter groups, may be potentially dangerous.

3. Purposes of investigation

a. Determination of dangerousness

To determine identity, whereabouts, and activities of all individuals in U. S. and Puerto Rico who, because of their membership in, activity in, or association with one or more revolutionary groups or related groups, are dangerous or potentially dangerous to internal security; collection of sufficient information concerning their subversive activities to justify apprehension in national emergency.

b. Determination of violations of Federal statutes

To determine identity, whereabouts, and activities of all individuals who have been or may be violating laws of U. S.

(1) Direct investigation to obtain admissible evidence to establish violation.

(2) Be alert for violation of Federal statutes relating to espionage, sabotage, and sedition.

4. Individuals to be investigated

Exercise sound judgment and discretion in evaluating importance and dangerousness of individuals or affiliates. Investigate activities of any individual falling within one or more of following categories who does not come within restrictions on investigations listed under 87D, item 5, below:

a. Membership in basic revolutionary organizations subsequent to 1-1-49

b. Espousing line of revolutionary movements

Espousal encompasses wide variety and range of activities. Actual membership in basic revolutionary organization is not prerequisite. Espousal may be expressed by membership or active participation in subversive front groups. Open investigation in every instance in which subject is actively engaged in affairs of subversive front organization in leadership capacity or by active participation in furtherance of aims and purposes of front organizations. Do not open on mere membership in front organization unless there is past membership at any time in basic revolutionary organization or other subversive derogatory information.

c. Special training

(1) Training in subversive movement abroad

(2) Leadership training in basic revolutionary organization

d. Military service

(1) Service in Abraham Lincoln Brigade; membership in basic revolutionary organization not prerequisite

(2) Service in military forces of any country, including U. S. armed forces, whenever individual has ever been member of basic revolutionary organization

d. Cases referred by military

Military intelligence agencies often refer cases for security investigations under Delimitations Agreement in which security-type fraud violations are involved. If subversive information does not warrant full security investigation but does indicate possible fraud violation, advise interested agency that FBI's investigation will be directed toward proving possible violation of law and that any background investigation contemplated by it pursuant to its administrative responsibilities will not interfere with FBI investigation. Advise agency pertinent information developed will be furnished and request agency to do likewise. Immediately initiate security matter - fraud against the Government investigation. If subversive information warrants full security investigation and also indicates fraud violation, advise interested agency that Bureau is initiating full security investigation in conjunction with investigation of possible violation of law and results will be furnished. Conduct expedite investigation to determine subject's dangerousness and whether a fraud violation is involved.

7. Submission of subversive derogatory information on individuals

- a. Offices covering national or local headquarters of various subversive groups should promptly furnish Bureau names and identifying data regarding persons affiliated with such groups, to include basic revolutionary organizations, fascist-type organizations, black extremist organizations, and front groups of these. Furnish Bureau such information by letter and, where appropriate, indicate that list of names is being furnished for Bureau indexing purposes.
- b. Information from all sources should be reviewed to insure Bureau has been furnished lists of all individuals affiliated with organizations enumerated in item a. Include information concerning a number of individuals in one letter if possible. Set out sufficient identifying data to facilitate check of Bureau files.
- c. Offices obtaining information regarding subversive affiliation of individuals residing outside their territories should promptly advise offices covering such persons' addresses.
- d. Names of subscribers to Communist Party nominating petitions and names appearing on subscription lists of subversive organizations should be indexed in field office covering address shown for subscriber but should not be forwarded to Bureau for indexing.
- e. Important subversive information concerning any individual and any new subversive information concerning an individual of importance should be furnished Bureau expeditiously.
- f. Subversive and/or derogatory information coming to attention of field office through name check or otherwise on employee of executive branch of Government, which information is within purview of EO 10450, should be forwarded promptly to Bureau for dissemination to Civil Service Commission. Such information relating to other employees of Government or employees of United Nations and other public international organizations should be furnished Bureau immediately.

E. INVESTIGATION OF INDIVIDUALS - INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

1. General

All pertinent information concerning subject's background and subversive activity must be fully developed and reported to assure accurate evaluation of his dangerousness. Use discretion to prevent subjects from becoming unnecessarily aware of investigation.

Members of law enforcement agencies are not to accompany Agents in security investigations without prior Bureau authority.

2. Scope of investigations

Following should be obtained:

a. Background

- (1) True name and aliases
- (2) Residence address
- (3) Occupation or business and employment address
- (4) Citizenship status, including date and place of birth and pertinent data concerning naturalization of aliens
- (5) Family background
If possible, ascertain from sources contacted and report date and place of birth of subject's parents and spouse and parents of spouse. Do not conduct investigation solely for this information.
- (6) Military record
Determine if subject has served in U. S. armed forces; time, place, and circumstances of such service; type of discharge received; and any membership in veterans' organizations. If subject served in armed forces of any foreign government, determine pertinent facts.
- (7) Close relatives
Determine whether subject has any close relatives in U. S. armed forces or in other positions of trust and confidence, whether public or private, relating to national defense.
- (8) Identification record
 - (a) Be alert for identification record showing arrests and/or civil data. Check local police records.
 - (b) When subject is approved for security index, submit FD-165 to check records of Identification Division and to post flash notice if fingerprints on file. FD-165 will be returned if positive identification cannot be made with fingerprints on file. Office of origin is responsible for resolving identification when record has been furnished by Identification Division as possibly identical. If positive identification cannot be made, it is not necessary to communicate further with Identification Division.
 - (c) When office of origin is changed for security index or reserve index A subject after flash notice has been placed, form FD-128 (changing origin) should so indicate. Send extra copy of FD-128 to Identification Division so its records will show new office of origin.
 - (d) [On those individuals who are Security Index subjects on whom no fingerprints are on file with the Identification Division, a Security Flash Notice (FD-165) should be submitted periodically on a staggered basis and at different intervals. Priority I, Security Index, subject requests should be submitted every six months commencing with the submission of an annual report and every six months thereafter. In the case of Priority II and Priority III, Security Index, subjects, requests should be submitted on an annual basis in conjunction with the submission of the annual report or annual verification of residence and employment. This periodic requirement is satisfied upon notification by the Identification Division of a fingerprint record on the subject and the placing of a stop against such record or upon the removal of a subject from the Security Index.]

- [
- [(e)] Cancel security flash notice when subject dies or is no longer of security interest.
 - (9) Physical description
 - (a) Obtain and report detailed physical description.
 - (b) Each subject should be personally observed whenever complete security investigation is conducted. Such direct observation is mandatory for all security index subjects; however, do not delay submission of form FD-122 (recommending subject for security index) when it has not been possible to observe subject. Keep case open until personal observation accomplished. When subject is outside U. S. or Puerto Rico, this requirement may be followed administratively until subject is personally observed upon his return to this country.

- (5) [Examples of]organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency
- | | |
|-------------------------------|-----|
| American Socialist Clubs | ASC |
| American Workers' | |
| Communist Party | AWC |
| Anarchist | ANA |
| Black Nationalist | BNT |
| Black Panther Party | BPP |
| Communist Party, USA | COM |
| Minutemen | MIN |
| Nation of Islam | NOI |
| Nationalist groups | |
| advocating independence | |
| for Puerto Rico | PRN |
| Progressive Labor Party | PLP |
| Proletarian Party of America | PPA |
| Revolutionary Action Movement | RAM |
| [Revolutionary Union | RU] |
| Socialist Workers Party | SWP |
| Spartacist League | SPL |
| Student National Coordinating | |
| Committee | SNC |
| Students for a Democratic | |
| Society | SDS |
| Workers World Party | WWP |
| Bulgarian | BUL |
| Cuban | CUB |
| Czechoslovakian | CZE |
| Hungarian | HUN |
| Romanian | ROM |
| Russian | RUS |
| Yugoslavian | YUG |
- (6) Priority designation
- | | |
|--------------|-------|
| Priority I | P I |
| Priority II | P II |
| Priority III | P III |
- (7) Top functionary designation (where applicable)
- | | |
|-----------------|----|
| Top functionary | TF |
|-----------------|----|
- (8) Special section cards
- | | |
|------------------------------|-----|
| Atomic energy program | |
| employees | AEP |
| Cuban special section | CUB |
| Espionage subjects | ESP |
| Foreign government employees | FGE |
| Pro-Tito subjects | YUG |
| United Nations employees | UNE |
| U. S. Government employees | GOV |
- (9) Unavailable section cards
- | | |
|----------------|----|
| Missing | MI |
| Out of country | OC |
| Imprisoned | PR |
- (10) Date and place of birth
- (11) Key facility geographical reference number (obtained from Department of Defense Key Facilities List) and abbreviation denoting agency having security responsibility
- (12) Residence address
- (13) Employment address and any additional data deemed necessary to assist in locating subject in emergency. Labor union affiliation, if any.
- (14) Field office file number
- b. Data to appear on separate attached card
- (1) Place following data on separate card attached to reverse side of security index card being filed in geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Cards contain printed captions for recording descriptive data which can be augmented if necessary.

- (a) Complete description
 - (b) Notation that security index flash notice has been posted in Identification Division
 - (c) Photograph, with dato taken. It is to be most current or best likeness of subject.
 - (d) Dangerous characteristics of subject, including notation if subject possesses firearms
 - (e) Other data which will assist in apprehension, such as directions to residence or employment when these are unusual, number of minor children and aged dependents
- (2) If descriptive data have not been obtained, case must be kept pending. Upon posting of security index flash notice, field will be furnished FBI number and fingerprint classification which should be affixed to reverse side of security index cards filed in geographical, special, and unavailable sections.
 - (3) Use FD-186 to report information for separate card attached to back of security index card. Case Agent should fill in form and forward to clerical employee designated to post information. Thereafter, file FD-186 in case file. FD-186 may be used to record information that subject has been physically observed and to note descriptive data.
6. Arrangement of security index
- a. At Bureau

Entire index is maintained on IBM tabulating cards. Security index cards are printed by automatic data processing and transmitted to field. An alphabetical breakdown of true names and all aliases of subjects is also maintained at Bureau for administrative purposes.
 - b. In field office

Active security index in each field office is maintained in four sections: geographical, alphabetical, unavailable, and special sections. Complete set of each field office's security index is also maintained away from headquarters city in same manner as geographical section with unavailable and special section cards filed in back.

 - (1) Geographical section

After receipt of three security index cards from Bureau and after necessary data have been added to two cards, file one in geographical section of index (except special section and unavailable section cards) and one in duplicate set maintained away from headquarters city. Geographical section is broken down by residence address in accordance with needs of each office. Where logical, it should be broken down by state, county, city, and, if needed, into boroughs or suburbs and precincts. Cards are filed alphabetically under each geographical breakdown. Cards in this section will be withdrawn and used by Agents should apprehension of subjects become necessary.

Cards will show "unknown" residence for (a) subjects whose addresses are not known but prompt location within division is expected and (b) subjects whose location in another division is in process of verification. File these cards in breakdown designated "Verification Pending." With Bureau authority, offices covering large industrial areas may set up second geographical section and file cards by subjects' employment. Depending on time of day apprehensions are initiated, geographical-employment or geographical-residence section may be used.
 - (2) Alphabetical section

File duplicate card alphabetically in this section; there is no other breakdown. Alphabetical card is control card. If card is withdrawn from geographical section for apprehension, make notation on alphabetical card.

- (4) In all instances there must be clear showing, by overt acts or statements or other evidence, that there has been continuing sympathy for aims and objectives of Cuban Government since 10-1-60. Citizenship status must be clearly established.

c. Pro-Cuban activity

All individuals in security index under basic criteria (item 3a, above) should be tabbed "Pro-Cuban" if by their activities and sympathies they warrant special consideration in event of limited emergency involving Cuba and U. S. This tabbing includes Cubans and non-Cubans who have engaged in activities in support of Cuban Government or pro-Castro groups. For this tabbing, submit FD-122 to Bureau with notation "Pro-Cuban" typed opposite words "Miscellaneous (specify)." Attach page containing concise summary of facts supporting recommendation. Security index cards sent to field on such subjects contain letter "C" on left side of card at beginning of second line. These cards are not kept in "Cuban" special section but are tabbed with metal tabs.

d. Evaluating interviews for security index status

- (1) Positive statement to interviewing Agents clearly indicating adherence to doctrines, aims, or purposes of revolutionary organization or front organization shall be considered overt act.
- (2) Other than above, interviews are not factors in making determination as to security index; e.g., lack of cooperation or partial cooperation are not factors.

e. Effect of resort to fifth amendment

Department has advised resort to fifth amendment by witness appearing before governmental body should be considered overt act within security index criteria (1) when subject was asked directly concerning present membership in subversive organization and (2) when question calls for response as to past membership in organization in those cases in which available information would seem to bring subject within criteria except for overt act within required period.

f. Activity in Nation of Islam and other black nationalist extremist groups

Department has advised Nation of Islam constitutes potentially dangerous instrumentality in event of national emergency; statements and activities of individuals in Nation of Islam indicating anarchist and revolutionary beliefs should be considered in making judgment as to whether or not member should be in security index. Give particular attention to developing and reporting such statements, including violent and revolutionary statements made by other members in subject's presence. Statements should be reported in detail. Apply these instructions to other black nationalist extremist groups.

4. Recommendations for and preparation of security index cards

- a. SAC must personally recommend inclusion in and removal of any name from security index except in offices having more than 1,000 security index subjects, where recommendations can be made by SAC, ASAC, or Bureau-approved security supervisor.
- b. Where potential dangerousness of subject has been established, office of origin is to [prepare] recommendation to Bureau on form FD-122; in triplicate. Forward original and copy to Bureau, and place copy in subject's file. Nothing should appear on FD-122 which is not in subject's file. FD-122 has [three] uses: (1) to recommend subject for security index, (2) to submit changes for existing cards, [and (3) to recommend subject be deleted from Security Index.] Submit abstract when recommending subject for security index but no abstract for changes [on the security index card.]
- c. When FD-122 is submitted to recommend subject for security index, attach additional page or pages setting out succinct summary of facts on which recommendation based. Facts must be in sufficient detail to support recommendation, including justification for designated priority level for apprehension. Statements of conclusion are not enough and original sources must be characterized as to reliability. Summary must show pertinent data of subject's activities.

- d. If, at conclusion of investigation, subject is not being recommended for security index, set out brief summary statement in appropriate closing communication showing reasons.
 - e. Current summary report must be submitted to Bureau when subject is being recommended for security index. If case is pending because of outstanding leads, set out additional lead to follow authorization of security index card by Bureau and, if approved, to disseminate copy of report to Secret Service. If case would otherwise be closed, place in pending-inactive status with lead to follow authorization by Bureau and, if approved, disseminate copy of report to Secret Service and then close case administratively.
 - f. Recommendations for security index should not be delayed because of absence of background or descriptive data. Submit recommendation with current report and retain in pending status to obtain missing items.
 - g. Subjects missing or out of country may be recommended for security index. FD-122 should include data required for unavailable section.
 - h. When FD-122 is submitted recommending subject of Chinese extraction, include words "Other - Chinese" under race. When recommending person not of Chinese extraction but who has definite sympathies for Communist China, include under "Miscellaneous" following statement: "sympathetic to Communist China."
 - i. If Bureau approves recommendation, security index cards will be prepared. Copy of FD-122 will be returned stamped "Security Index card approved and prepared, three copies attached. Place description and photograph on reverse side of Geographical card. Cards should be filed in your Security Index." These cards should be filed in security index as outlined below. Place returned copy of FD-122 in subject's main file. (Offices with geographical breakdown by residence and employment will receive extra card.)
 - j. When cards are received from Bureau, check data for accuracy. Cards will be complete except for description and photograph. Descriptions and photographs are maintained on separate cards which are stapled to back of two security index cards. File one of these cards in geographical section (except special section and unavailable section cards). [With the exception of Honolulu and Washington Field Offices,] file other in duplicate security index maintained [in headquarters city in a state of readiness to be evacuated on a moment's notice.] Third security index card is filed in alphabetical section.
5. Content and appearance of security index card
- a. Data to appear on face of card

When complete, face of security index card should contain following information. If any items are missing, case should be continued pending to obtain necessary information. Set forth under each item are possible categories in which subject may be classified and code letters which should be placed in appropriate space on FD-122. Code letters should appear on security index cards received from Bureau.

 - (1) Name and aliases

Full and correct name and aliases of subject
 - (2) Race

White and Caucasian	W
Negro	N
Chinese	C
Others	O

(All others, including Orientals (except Chinese), American Indians, etc.)
 - (3) Sex

Male	M
Female	F
 - (4) Citizenship

Native born	NB
Naturalized	NA
Alien	AL

(If unknown, space should be left blank, but status should be ascertained and submitted by FD-122.)

- (7) New office of origin is to review pertinent material received with FD-128 and information in its files to determine if additional investigation is warranted. If not, advise Bureau by letter case is being closed.
- (8) Upon receipt of FD-128, office covering new address is origin and should place office file number on security index cards and file them in its security index.
- (9) Upon receipt of new cards from Bureau with copy of FD-128, new office is to transfer information from reverse side of old geographical cards to two new cards, appropriately file new cards, and destroy old cards.
- b. Top functionaries
Above-described mechanics of transferring cases also apply to top functionaries. Additional procedures in this category are:
 - (1) Notification to Bureau of deletion of subject as top functionary in old office of origin is handled by designation in space provided on FD-128 that subject was top functionary.
 - (2) Upon receipt of FD-128, new office of origin shall automatically designate subject top functionary and keep case pending. After investigation is completed and summary report has been submitted by old office, case may be placed in pending-inactive status. Within three months, new office is to conduct investigation, submit report, and advise Bureau concerning continued designation as top functionary.
- c. Subjects tabbed for priority
Security index card shall continue to be tabbed for priority apprehension in new office of origin until that office determines that priority designation is not warranted under provisions set forth below.
- d. Subjects not included in security index
 - (1) Transfer office of origin by FD-128 only upon verification by another office of subject's presence in that division. Enclose copies of all investigative reports and other pertinent serials to new office of origin.
 - (2) New office of origin is to investigate or advise Bureau case closed if no action warranted.
10. Cancellation and removal of cards from active security index
SAC must personally recommend removal of any name from security index except in offices having more than 1,000 security index subjects where recommendations may be made by SAC, ASAC, or Bureau-approved security supervisor.
 - a. Death of subject
Destroy card and advise Bureau by LHM.
 - b. Permanent departure
Upon learning of subject's departure from U. S. or Puerto Rico for foreign country, immediately ascertain conditions of departure for foreign country. No security index card shall be cancelled by reason of such departure unless subject is alien who has permanently departed and whose departure has been verified. If U. S. citizen who has been out of country has renounced his citizenship and taken citizenship of foreign country, security index card may be cancelled only after it has been determined he does not intend to return to U. S.
 - c. Imprisonment of subject
Do not cancel security index cards because subject imprisoned, regardless of length of time he will be incarcerated. Place cards in unavailable section and handle as set forth under imprisoned subjects above.
 - d. Induction of subject into armed forces
Place security index cards in inactive section and follow procedure set forth above under inactive section.
 - e. Security informants
Security index card may be destroyed upon receipt of Bureau authority to designate person security informant. In requesting Bureau authority to designate individual as security informant, call attention to security index card and recommend cancellation.

SECTION 87. SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

- f. Subject no longer dangerous or potentially dangerous
Frequently information is received or investigation develops that subject is no longer threat to internal security by reason of physical condition, defection, or expulsion from subversive movement. Such defection may be shown by lack of activity and obvious disinterest over extended period or declaration of opposition to principles of subversive movement.

When there is sufficient information regarding subject's present sympathies to conclude he should no longer be considered dangerous, request authority for interview or advise Bureau why subject should not be interviewed. Bureau will not cancel security index card without consideration being given to interview. If, upon interview, subject proves cooperative, advise Bureau by letter and recommend cancellation.

[In all cases the recommendation for removal from the security index should be made by FD-122 with attached succinct summary of facts on which the recommendation is based. Submit abstract with FD-122 used to recommend removal from security index.]

- g. Subjects removed from security index solely upon basis of application of security index criteria, with no affirmative indication of defection

With passage of time, limits specified in security index criteria will operate to remove subjects even though there is no affirmative indication of defection. When recommending such removal, consider if facts warrant inclusion of subject in section A of reserve index. Following procedures are for subjects not being recommended for inclusion in section A of reserve index:

- (1) When subjects are removed from security index solely on basis of application of criteria, retain security index cards bearing descriptive matter on reverse sides; i.e., cards previously filed in geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Destroy cards previously filed in alphabetical section. Those offices maintaining two sets of geographical cards should retain only one card.
- (2) Mark "cancelled" across face of each card retained and file in reserve index, section B.
- (3) Above instructions do not apply to individuals removed from security index based upon activity in Nation of Islam. Their cards should be destroyed.

11. Priority apprehension program

a. Purpose

Some security index subjects, because of their training, violent tendencies, or prominence in subversive activity, would be more inclined or more capable of committing acts against U. S. in time of national emergency than others. Such subjects must be immobilized in least possible time. Individuals in security index tabbed priority I, and possibly priority II, would be arrested first in event of limited but grave emergency, probably without arrest of other subjects. In all-out emergency, consideration for apprehension will be given to all subjects. Decision as to priority of apprehension should be based on subject's subversive activities and revolutionary tendencies.

b. Priority tabbing

- (1) Each security index subject should be considered for priority I tabbing who falls within following categories:
 - (a) All top functionaries
 - (b) All individuals considered to be hard-core national and state leaders of basic revolutionary organizations and leaders of other subversive organizations and unorganized groups and individuals who have indicated propensity for violence and/or have received special training in sabotage, espionage, and/or guerrilla warfare, or have engaged in underground operations
 - (c) Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities

- (b) Priority III cases must be opened for verification of residence and employment on annual basis. Review case file for any necessary action including re-evaluation of subject's status, or possible redesignation as priority I or II.

When pertinent information is submitted to Bureau for dissemination, FD-305 and FD-376 should accompany cover communication.

d. Subjects recommended for security index

(1) Pending inactive

If all active investigation completed at time FD-122 forwarded to Bureau, set forth lead to follow for security index approval and dissemination of report to Secret Service.

(2) Closed

After security index approved and dissemination to Secret Service, follow by administrative tickler for periodic report.

e. Subject not being recommended for index

Closed - prior to closing, comply with instructions pertaining to interviews.

8. Content

a. Include following and handle under topical headings where appropriate.

(1) Background

- (a) Birth data
- (b) Citizenship status
- (c) Education
- (d) Marital status
- (e) Military service record (domestic or foreign, including type of discharge, citations, etc.)
- (f) Identification record
- (g) Employment
- (h) Residence
- (i) Status of health (if known)

(2) Connections with Communist Party, other basic revolutionary groups, front groups, black nationalist extremist groups, and/or other subversive organizations or unorganized groups

- (a) Information concerning admission into revolutionary group, including sponsors, etc.
- (b) History of activity in, attendance at meetings of, and positions held in subversive movement

(3) Revolutionary statements by subject

- (a) Determine each statement and full details surrounding it.
- (b) Determine all statements showing adherence to principles of Marxism-Leninism or other revolutionary doctrines.

(4) Other activities indicating furtherance of program of subversive organizations

- (a) Speeches and writings
- (b) Organizational directives and/or educational outlines signed by or issued by subject, or issued while subject was officer of organization
- (c) Pertinent contacts between subject and leaders of organizations
- (d) Details concerning subject's attendance or connection with subversive training schools

(5) False statements made by subjects, including aliases

Evidence may be obtained from passports, tax returns, and voting, marital, employment, and selective service records.

(6) Miscellaneous

Pertinent items not falling under above categories

b. Reports on individuals should be confined to:

- (1) Proof of membership and activity in basic revolutionary organizations, front organizations, and/or other organizations or unorganized groups

SECTION 87. SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

- (2) Position and importance of subject in subversive movement
 - (3) Pertinent background information
- Include only information pertinent to determining whether or not subject is engaged in subversive activities. Set out date or period to which it pertains; e.g., John Doe advised on January 15, 1970, that subject attended CP meetings in January, 1965, in Syracuse, New York.

c. Summarizing information

- (1) When prior summary reports are not suitable for dissemination, include all pertinent information in current summary report with sources fully protected.
- (2) Repetitious and cumulative items may be limited to representative number with each item set forth fully documented. Number of items will depend upon preponderance of other information showing dangerousness of subject. Base selection on need to report sufficient data to justify continued detention of subject if apprehended.
- (3) When selection of representative number of items is made, follow with summary statement that source advised during specified period of time subject also attended certain number of other meetings. (Set out file number and serial range in documenting such statements.)
- (4) Where there is extensive activity in subversive organizations, it is permissible to use narrative statements without exact dates of activity; however, show period of time involved and inclusive dates of informant reports. Do not use this type reporting in Smith Act of 1940 or ISA-50 cases. Summary statements must be statements of facts and not conclusions. Information from different sources must be reported separately.
- (5) Above instructions do not lessen responsibility for reporting all pertinent items.

9. Administrative data - cover pages

a. General

References to following administrative items should be in cover pages accompanying reports:

- (1) Reserve index, security index, file numbers and titles of other cases, priority apprehension program, top functionary status, security index flash notices (FD-165), FD-122, FD-128, and non-investigative information
- (2) [In all security index cases, FD-305, appropriately filled out, shall be the last page of cover pages to annual reports and the last page of cover communications to LHMs submitted in lieu of annual reports.]

b. Documentation of reports

- (1) Complete documentation of all reports is required. This also applies to LHMs submitted in priority III cases.
- (2) If information necessary for complete documentation is not in subject's file, review other office files, as needed. If not obtainable, so state in cover pages.
- (3) Do not conduct extensive investigation to locate sources who previously furnished background information for purposes of documentation or to obtain documentary evidence of background information. For example, if previous investigation revealed subject, according to reliable records, such as birth, school, or Immigration and Naturalization records, was born at certain place on certain date, report it without further verification.

- (c) When all logical leads have been exhausted in case of missing important functionary, consider requesting Bureau authority to circularize all field offices with subject's photograph and background information.

d. Individuals traveling abroad (Also see section 105G, volume IV, of this manual.)

Set forth below are steps to be taken when information is received that subject in one of following categories intends to travel abroad or has already departed this country for foreign travel: subject of current security investigation, subject in priorities I and II of security index, past security subjects who may be in underground capacity, or subject concerning whom there is current information indicating need for foreign coverage.

- (1) Immediately advise Bureau by LHM available details concerning travel, including places and dates of departure and intended return, destination and itinerary, purpose of trip, name under which passport was issued, number of passport, and issuing office, if known. Include full description of subject and all aliases (in case of Chinese and Korean subjects, include Chinese telegraphic code or Korean telegraphic code numbers). Also include concise resume of available subversive data regarding subject. Do not delay advising Bureau of actual or intended travel while developing details of travel as time is of essence.
- (2) Set out lead for WFO to check records of Passport Office, Department of State; but do not limit efforts to develop pertinent information to such check.
- (3) Information concerning subject's proposed travel abroad, including information concerning subversive activities, is furnished Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and legal attaches. If travel is in area covered by legal attache, forward sufficient copies of LHM to enable dissemination of three copies to each legal attache involved. For each of these legal attaches, forward one photograph of subject, if available. If stops are to be placed with security services abroad, cover letter should so indicate. Set forth requests for investigation abroad on separate numbered page, captioned "Leads," at end of LHM. Request should not refer to legal attache or request investigation by particular agency abroad.
- (4) Subsequent report in individual case should contain details regarding subject's travel. In nonsecurity index cases where LHMs are submitted, communication transmitting data regarding travel should indicate whether investigation is being initiated and, if not, why.
- (5) Set forth below are steps to be taken when information is received that one of following is forming tour group for foreign travel: organization of investigative interest to Bureau or subject in one of categories described in first paragraph under item d above.
 - (a) Advise appropriate offices, under caption of tour group or organization, identities of individuals participating in tour, and furnish Bureau LHMs for State Department, CIA, and appropriate legal attaches. Include all readily available information pertaining to tour, such as itinerary, pertinent dates, names and addresses of participants, and thumbnail sketch of organization or individual sponsoring tour.
 - (b) Offices should immediately identify participants and submit LHMs on those in one of categories described in first paragraph under item d above. Refer to LHM previously prepared under caption of tour group or organization. Submit letter to Bureau under caption of tour group or organization listing individuals within territory participating in tour on whom there is no subversive information.

- (6) Advise Bureau promptly by LHM of subject's return from travel abroad. If such individual has traveled behind Iron Curtain, also furnish Bureau recommendations as to interview and state whether additional investigation is contemplated.
3. File reviews
Check office indices and review files thoroughly for pertinent information showing background and subversive activity. Include information in initial report. After each check and review of files has been made, consolidate reference cards pertaining to subject in indices.
 4. Security informants
Information developed through security informants is unsurpassed in value both for intelligence purposes and as admissible evidence.
 5. Physical surveillances
Physical surveillances should be used when, in opinion of SAC, information of sufficient value might be obtained to justify their use in light of existing circumstances and available manpower.
 - a. When information is received that meetings of subversive organizations are to take place, physical surveillances should be considered to corroborate such information and identify participants.
 - b. Surveillances of individuals in leadership or underground capacities serve to identify others within movement.
 - c. Success of surveillances depends upon resourcefulness of Agents who must at all times exercise sound judgment and discretion. Be alert to observe activity of subject and countersurveillances which may be used to identify Agents and embarrass Bureau.
 6. Photographic surveillances
Photographic evidence of meetings between individuals or which shows subjects entering or leaving meeting places of subversive organizations affords convincing and admissible evidence to establish subversive activities. Prior Bureau authority is needed for photographic surveillances of meetings and they must be properly correlated with other investigative techniques to obtain maximum evidence. Conceal equipment to avoid detection by subjects or other individuals in proximity of surveillance.
 7. Public sources
Make use of all logical public sources of information. Obtain background and lineage data from birth records and local bureaus of vital statistics, credit agencies, state records, public utility records, and school records. Obtain and index as reference material publications of subversive organizations and records of state and Federal committees which have conducted hearings concerning subversive activities.
 8. Records of private firms
Where pertinent information is available in records of private firms, such as past or present employers, insurance companies, and merchants, contact such firms provided it will not jeopardize investigation.
 9. Channelizing of information to case files
Membership or activity in subversive organizations should be channelized to main case files of individuals involved. Mimeographed form FD-306 may be used provided it is limited to reporting attendance at meetings. When information from informants or surveillances is channelized to individual case files, it must be documented. Coordinate information received from informants and confidential sources with active investigation.
 10. Preservation of evidence
Bear in mind necessity of obtaining admissible evidence.
 - a. Identify, preserve, and maintain continuity of evidence obtained for possible admission in Federal proceedings. Identify specifically as to source and date.
 - b. Notes or statements from informants necessary to refresh their recollection if called to testify must be in sufficient detail to serve this purpose and contain no material which would make their use inadvisable or inadmissible.
 - c. Informant's original notes or statements are not to be blocked, stamped, serialized, or mutilated in any way which would render them unsatisfactory for use in Federal proceedings.
 - d. Above also applies to Agent's notes taken during surveillances or concerning evidence otherwise obtained.

- (4) In all instances there must be clear showing, by overt acts or statements or other evidence, that there has been continuing sympathy for aims and objectives of Cuban Government since 10-1-60. Citizenship status must be clearly established.
- c. Pro-Cuban activity
All individuals in security index under basic criteria (item 3a, above) should be tabbed "Pro-Cuban" if by their activities and sympathies they warrant special consideration in event of limited emergency involving Cuba and U. S. This tabbing includes Cubans and non-Cubans who have engaged in activities in support of Cuban Government or pro-Castro groups. For this tabbing, submit FD-122 to Bureau with notation "Pro-Cuban" typed opposite words "Miscellaneous (specify)." Attach page containing concise summary of facts supporting recommendation. Security index cards sent to field on such subjects contain letter "C" on left side of card at beginning of second line. These cards are not kept in "Cuban" special section but are tabbed with metal tabs.
- d. Evaluating interviews for security index status
(1) Positive statement to interviewing Agents clearly indicating adherence to doctrines, aims, or purposes of revolutionary organization or front organization shall be considered overt act.
(2) Other than above, interviews are not factors in making determination as to security index; e.g., lack of cooperation or partial cooperation are not factors.
- e. Effect of resort to fifth amendment
Department has advised resort to fifth amendment by witness appearing before governmental body should be considered overt act within security index criteria (1) when subject was asked directly concerning present membership in subversive organization and (2) when question calls for response as to past membership in organization in those cases in which available information would seem to bring subject within criteria except for overt act within required period.
- f. Activity in Nation of Islam and other black nationalist extremist groups
Department has advised Nation of Islam constitutes potentially dangerous instrumentality in event of national emergency; statements and activities of individuals in Nation of Islam indicating anarchist and revolutionary beliefs should be considered in making judgment as to whether or not member should be in security index. Give particular attention to developing and reporting such statements, including violent and revolutionary statements made by other members in subject's presence. Statements should be reported in detail. Apply these instructions to other black nationalist extremist groups.
4. Recommendations for and preparation of security index cards
a. SAC must personally recommend inclusion in and removal of any name from security index except in offices having more than 1,000 security index subjects, where recommendations can be made by SAC, ASAC, or Bureau-approved security supervisor.
b. Where potential dangerousness of subject has been established, office of origin is to submit recommendation to Bureau on form FD-122, in triplicate. Forward original and copy to Bureau, and place copy in subject's file. Nothing should appear on FD-122 which is not in subject's file. FD-122 has two uses: (1) to recommend subject for security index and (2) to submit changes for existing cards. Submit abstract when recommending subject for security index but no abstract for additions, deletions, or changes.
c. When FD-122 is submitted to recommend subject for security index, attach additional page or pages setting out succinct summary of facts on which recommendation based. Facts must be in sufficient detail to support recommendation, including justification for designated priority level for apprehension. Statements of conclusion are not enough and original sources must be characterized as to reliability. Summary must show pertinent data of subject's activities.

- d. If, at conclusion of investigation, subject is not being recommended for security index, set out brief summary statement in appropriate closing communication showing reasons.
 - e. Current summary report must be submitted to Bureau when subject is being recommended for security index. If case is pending because of outstanding leads, set out additional lead to follow authorization of security index card by Bureau and, if approved, to disseminate copy of report to Secret Service. If case would otherwise be closed, place in pending-inactive status with lead to follow authorization by Bureau and, if approved, disseminate copy of report to Secret Service and then close case administratively.
 - f. Recommendations for security index should not be delayed because of absence of background or descriptive data. Submit recommendation with current report and retain in pending status to obtain missing items.
 - g. Subjects missing or out of country may be recommended for security index. FD-122 should include data required for unavailable section.
 - h. When FD-122 is submitted recommending subject of Chinese extraction, include words "Other - Chinese" under race. When recommending person not of Chinese extraction but who has definite sympathies for Communist China, include under "Miscellaneous" following statement: "sympathetic to Communist China."
 - i. If Bureau approves recommendation, security index cards will be prepared. Copy of FD-122 will be returned stamped "Security Index card approved and prepared, three copies attached. Place description and photograph on reverse side of Geographical card. Cards should be filed in your Security Index." These cards should be filed in security index as outlined below. Place returned copy of FD-122 in subject's main file. (Offices with geographical breakdown by residence and employment will receive extra card.)
 - j. When cards are received from Bureau, check data for accuracy. Cards will be complete except for description and photograph. Descriptions and photographs are maintained on separate cards which are stapled to back of two security index cards. File one of these cards in geographical section (except special section and unavailable section cards). [With the exception of Honolulu and Washington Field Offices,] file other in duplicate security index maintained [in headquarters city in a state of readiness to be evacuated on a moment's notice.] Third security index card is filed in alphabetical section.
5. Content and appearance of security index card
- a. Data to appear on face of card

When complete, face of security index card should contain following information. If any items are missing, case should be continued pending to obtain necessary information. Set forth under each item are possible categories in which subject may be classified and code letters which should be placed in appropriate space on FD-122. Code letters should appear on security index cards received from Bureau.

 - (1) Name and aliases

Full and correct name and aliases of subject
 - (2) Race

White and Caucasian	W
Negro	N
Chinese	C
Others	O

(All others, including Orientals (except Chinese), American Indians, etc.)
 - (3) Sex

Male	M
Female	F
 - (4) Citizenship

Native born	NB
Naturalized	NA
Alien	AL

(If unknown, space should be left blank, but status should be ascertained and submitted by FD-122.)

- (4) Office preparing summary report may include information originally obtained by another office but may not have necessary documentation. If office preparing report has copies of documents obtained by another office and identity of source, date of activity, date received, and receiving Agent are known, it is not necessary to obtain file number of original. Pertinent documentation, other than file number, should be obtained from auxiliary office.
 - (5) When report includes references to known subversives who have associated with subject, identify source of characterization in cover pages without further documentation.
 - (6) When it is necessary to obtain thumbnail sketch, place in thumbnail sketch file so it will be readily available for future use.
10. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of
Channelizing memoranda may be destroyed following submission of reports. Copies of informant's statements designated for 100 classification files of informants may be destroyed when one year old. (See instructions for destruction of channelizing memoranda in Manual of Rules and Regulations, part II, section 3D, item 8.)

I. DISSEMINATION OF DATA DEVELOPED IN SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

1. Policy

Proper utilization of information received is foremost among Bureau's responsibilities. Information obtained during investigations should be forwarded to other interested agencies in executive branch unless there are compelling reasons not to do so. Delimitations Agreement and Presidential directives provide for dissemination to other agencies which have present or potential interest information relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and related matters.

2. Bureau requirements

Because all conceivable situations cannot be anticipated, data below pertains to representative situations which occur frequently. Basic rule is that security information must be furnished promptly to interested agencies in executive branch. Term "interested agency" must be interpreted in light of reason and common sense. Bring any unusual situations to Bureau's attention promptly for consideration.

Considerations affecting national defense in Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico necessitate broadest possible construction to requirements for dissemination to intelligence services in those areas. See Manual of Rules and Regulations, part II, section 5, pertaining to Bureau's overall responsibilities, policies, and exceptions in dissemination.

a. Members of armed forces

Delimitations Agreement between FBI and armed forces intelligence agencies (see section 102B, volume IV, of this manual) requires each agency to exchange freely and directly with other subscribing agencies all information of mutual interest. Any information developed concerning members of military services must be referred immediately to appropriate military branch having primary responsibility, even though allegations have not been fully resolved or verified. Specifically point out in such instances that information has not been verified. When it is determined security subject is member of armed services, discontinue investigation immediately, advise Bureau, and disseminate pertinent reports locally to appropriate intelligence agency. Dissemination regarding military personnel is not confined to subjects of security investigations but extends to any subversive data developed against member of armed services during FBI investigations. If member of armed forces has been in contact with security subject or any individual or group with security implications, immediately advise appropriate local intelligence service, even though security aspects of contact have not been resolved. Point out in such instances that information is unverified and transmit any additional developments immediately.

Determine during security investigations whether subjects have any close relatives in armed forces. Promptly call such associations to attention of appropriate military intelligence services, together with pertinent data, including reports, on subjects involved. Evaluation of these associations lies entirely within province of military intelligence services, but Bureau must disseminate this information immediately upon receipt. Advise Bureau by letter concerning any subversive contacts or information developed concerning military personnel, including statement as to local dissemination and enclosing LHM setting out subversive data.

- b. Aliens and naturalized citizens
Furnish information concerning aliens and naturalized citizens which might have bearing on their deportation or [denaturalization] to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). If in doubt, disseminate.
- c. Employees of or persons having regular access to key facilities or employees of plants having contracts with military services
See instructions in this section concerning individuals employed in or having access to key facilities.
- d. Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities) which are not on key facilities list or otherwise in item c, above, and facilities which are or may become engaged in manufacture of materials vital to national defense
Disseminate locally to Army and other intelligence services if their interest is apparent.
- e. Individuals on inactive duty who are members of or hold commissions in reserve branches or National Guard
Disseminate locally to appropriate military intelligence service.
- f. Seamen and subjects employed in maritime industry, including long-shoremen and water-front employees
Disseminate locally to Coast Guard and, when circumstances dictate, to other interested intelligence agencies, including NISO.
- g. Employees of Federal Government within purview of Executive Order 10450
No dissemination of reports in security of Government employees cases may be made in field. If, however, subject is employed in key facility, furnish copies of reports bearing dual character, "Security of Government Employees; Security Matter - C," to appropriate intelligence agencies of armed services. Instructions regarding dissemination to Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, Defense Supply Agency, Columbus, Ohio, appear in this section of this manual under individuals employed in or having access to key facilities - dissemination. Instructions regarding all phases of FBI responsibilities under Executive Order 10450 are in section 19, volume II, of this manual.
- h. Individuals who own property or reside in immediate vicinity of installation or other premises under cognizance of branch of armed services
Disseminate locally to intelligence service of military branch involved.
- i. Airmen issued certificates by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
FAA issues certificates to airmen, defined as persons in command or acting as [pilot,] mechanic, or member of crew in navigation of aircraft while under way; individuals directly in charge of inspection, maintenance, overhauling, or repair of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances; and any individual serving in capacity of aircraft dispatcher or air-traffic control tower operator. Furnish to Bureau subversive data concerning such persons by report or LHM. In cover communication, recommend such data be furnished to FAA. Dissemination will be made only at Bureau. For additional instructions regarding dissemination to FAA, see Manual of Rules and Regulations, part II, section 5.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
[A. Statutes.....	7
1. Public Law 733 as implemented by EO 10450.....	7
2. Smith Act of 1940 (Title 18, USC, § 2385). Advocating overthrow of Government.....	7
3. Internal Security Act of 1950 (Title 50, USC, §§ 781-816)....	7
a. Communist-action organizations.....	8
(1) Definition (§ 782).....	8
(2) Factors to be considered by Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB) in determining whether organization is communist-action organization (§ 792)....	8
b. Communist front organizations.....	8
(1) Definition (§ 782).....	8
(2) Factors to be considered by SACB in determining whether organization is communist front organization (§ 792).....	8
c. How proceedings are instituted (§ 792).....	8
d. Findings of Board and publication of same (§ 792).....	8
e. Employment of members; contributions of funds, services, or advice by Government personnel (§ 784).....	8
f. Use of mail and instrumentalities of interstate or foreign commerce (§ 789).....	9
g. Emergency detention provisions (§§ 811-826).....	9
h. Contributing to establishment of totalitarian dictatorship (§ 783).....	9
4. Communist Control Act of 1954.....	9
a. Definition of communist-infiltrated organization.....	9
b. Proceedings when Attorney General has reason to believe organization is communist infiltrated.....	10
c. Factors to be considered by SACB in determining whether organization is communist infiltrated (§ 792a).....	10
5. Other statutes.....	11
a. Fraud against Government (Title 18, USC, § 1001).....	11
b. Private correspondence with foreign governments (Title 18, USC, § 953).....	11
c. Rebellion or insurrection (Title 18, USC, § 2383).....	11
d. Sedition (Title 18, USC, §§ 2387, 2388, and 2391).....	11
e. Seditious conspiracy (Title 18, USC, § 2384).....	11
f. Recruiting for service against U. S. (Title 18, USC, § 2389).....	11
g. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended by Expatriation Act of 1954.....	11
[B. Investigation of Communist Party, USA; Socialist Workers Party; Other Marxist Revolutionary-Type Organizations; Front Groups; New Left and Miscellaneous Organizations.....	12
1. Purposes of investigation.....	12
2. Policy.....	12
a. General.....	12
b. Established subversive groups.....	12
c. Newly formed known or suspected subversive organizations, including those affiliated with new left movement.....	12
d. Political organizations.....	13
e. Organizations connected with institutions of learning....	13
f. Legitimate noncommunist organizations which are communist infiltrated.....	13

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
3. Investigative procedures re subversive organizations, new left groups, suspected subversive organizations, and communist fronts.....	14
a. Origin and scope.....	14
b. Whether incorporated.....	14
c. Aims and purposes.....	14
d. Location of headquarters.....	14
e. Officers.....	14
f. Membership.....	14
g. Official organ, if any, and other literature.....	14
h. General activities.....	14
i. Finances.....	15
j. Support given to or received from CPUSA or other communist group.....	15
k. Implementation of CPUSA line or that of other communist group.....	15
l. Accuracy of identifications.....	15
m. Specific requirements for CPUSA investigations.....	15
n. Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and other Marxist-Leninist or Trotskyite groups.....	15
4. Dissemination of information to Secret Service regarding plots against President.....	15
5. Communist influence in racial matters, Internal Security - C.....	16
6. Title and character.....	16
7. Classification.....	16
C. Investigation of Communist Infiltration of Labor Unions.....	17
1. Purpose of investigation.....	17
2. Policy.....	17
3. Title.....	17
4. Classification.....	17
5. Character.....	17
D. Investigations of Individuals - Policy and Objectives.....	18
1. Definitions.....	18
2. FBI responsibility.....	18
3. Purposes of investigation.....	18
4. Individuals to be investigated.....	18
5. Restrictions upon investigations of individuals.....	19
a. Investigations of and interviews with individuals connected with institutions of learning.....	19
b. Subjects not connected with institution of learning.....	20
c. U. S. Government employees, individuals having foreign diplomatic or official status, employees of foreign official establishment, employees of United Nations or international organizations, and members of armed forces.....	20
6. Fraud against Government (FAG) violations.....	20
a. Policy.....	20
b. Investigation.....	20
c. Legal questions.....	20
d. Cases referred by military.....	21
7. Submission of subversive derogatory information on individuals.....	21

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
[E. Investigation of Individuals - Investigative Procedures and Techniques.....	22
[1. General.....	22
[2. Scope of investigations.....	22
[a. Background.....	22
[b. Subversive activity.....	23
[c. Missing security subjects.....	24
[d. Individuals traveling abroad.....	25
[3. File reviews.....	26
[4. Security informants.....	26
[5. Physical surveillances.....	26
[6. Photographic surveillances.....	26
[7. Public sources.....	26
[8. Records of private firms.....	26
[9. Channelizing of information to case files.....	26
[10. Preservation of evidence.....	26
[11. Interviews with subjects of security investigations.....	27
[a. Policy.....	27
[b. Purpose.....	27
[c. SAC authority.....	27
[d. Procedures for interviews under SAC authority.....	27
[e. Prior Bureau authority.....	27
[f. Letter requesting Bureau authority for interview.....	28
[g. Preparation for and conduct of interview.....	28
[h. Reporting results of interview.....	29
[i. Reinterviews of security index subjects.....	30
[j. Maintenance of control file on former members of sub- versive organizations.....	30
[F. Reserve Index.....	31
[1. Purpose.....	31
[2. Composition.....	31
[3. Arrangement.....	31
[a. Section A.....	31
[b. Section B.....	32
[4. Content.....	32
[5. Removal and deletion of cards.....	32
[G. Security Index.....	33
[1. Purpose and general policy.....	33
[2. Determination of dangerousness of individual.....	33
[3. Criteria for placing and retaining name in security index.....	34
[a. Basic criteria.....	34
[b. Activity in support of Cuban regime.....	34
[c. Pro-Cuban activity.....	35
[d. Evaluating interviews for security index status.....	35
[e. Effect of resort to fifth amendment.....	35
[f. Activity in Nation of Islam and other black nationalist extremist groups.....	35
[4. Recommendations for and preparation of security index cards.....	35
[5. Content and appearance of security index card.....	36
[6. Arrangement of security index.....	38
[a. At Bureau.....	38
[b. In field office.....	38
[(1) Geographical section.....	38
[(2) Alphabetical section.....	38
[(3) Special section.....	39
[(4) Unavailable section.....	40
[(5) Inactive section.....	41

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
7. Periodic verification of addresses.....	41
8. Changes, additions, and deletions of data on security index cards.....	42
9. Movement of subjects between offices.....	42
10. Cancellation and removal of cards from active security index.	43
11. Priority apprehension program.....	44
a. Purpose.....	44
b. Priority tabbing.....	44
c. Recommendations for priority tabbing.....	45
d. Administrative procedures.....	45
e. Tabbing of cards.....	45
12. Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities...	45
a. Responsibility.....	45
b. Inclusion in security index.....	46
c. Dissemination.....	46
d. Status of cases.....	46
e. Reports.....	46
13. Top functionary program.....	46
a. General.....	46
b. Definition.....	47
c. Manner of designation.....	47
d. Regulations governing handling of top functionaries.....	47
e. Maintenance of list.....	47
14. Correlation of other investigations with security index and reserve index.....	47
[H. Reports on Individuals.....	48
1. General.....	48
2. Schedule of submission of reports.....	48
3. Origin.....	48
4. Classification.....	48
5. Title.....	48
6. Character.....	48
7. Status.....	48
8. Content.....	49
a. Include following and handle under topical headings where appropriate.....	49
(1) Background.....	49
(2) Connections with Communist Party, other basic revolutionary groups, front groups, black nation- alist extremist groups, and/or other subversive organizations or unorganized groups.....	49
(3) Revolutionary statements by subject.....	49
(4) Other activities indicating furtherance of program of subversive organizations.....	49
(5) False statements made by subjects, including aliases	49
(6) Miscellaneous.....	49
b. Reports on individuals should be confined to.....	49
c. Summarizing information.....	50
9. Administrative data - cover pages.....	50
a. General.....	50
b. Documentation of reports.....	50
10. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of.....	51

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
[I. Dissemination of Data Developed in Security Investigations.....	51
[1. Policy.....	51
[2. Bureau requirements.....	51
[a. Members of armed forces.....	52
[b. Aliens and naturalized citizens.....	52
[c. Employees of or persons having regular access to key [facilities or employees of plants having contracts with [military services.....	52
[d. Employees of public utilities.....	52
[e. Individuals on inactive duty who are members of or hold [commissions in reserve branches or National Guard.....	52
[f. Seamen and subjects employed in maritime industry, [including longshoremen and water-front employees.....	52
[g. Employees of Federal Government within purview of [Executive Order 10450.....	52
[h. Individuals who own property or reside in immediate [vicinity of defense installation.....	52
[i. Airmen issued certificates by Federal Aviation Ad- [ministration.....	52
[j. Dissemination to Secret Service.....	53
[k. Dissemination at Bureau.....	53

[A. STATUTES

There are four principal statutes to consider in security investigations: Public Law 733 as implemented by Executive Order (EO) 10450, Smith Act of 1940, Internal Security Act of 1950 (ISA-50), and Communist Control Act of 1954. On occasion, other statutes may be applicable, such as seditious conspiracy, treason, fraud against Government, and Registration Act.

1. Public Law 733 as implemented by EO 10450

President, by Executive Order 10450, dated 4-27-53, established government-wide employee security program, based on authority and approach set forth by Congress in Public Law 733, enacted on 8-26-50.

Section 8(a) of EO 10450 provides that investigations conducted pursuant to this order shall be designed to develop information as to whether employment or retention in employment in Federal service of person being investigated is clearly consistent with interests of national security. Such information relates, among other things, to following:

"Membership in, or affiliation or sympathetic association with, any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons which is totalitarian, Fascist, communist, or subversive, or which has adopted, or shows, a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or which seeks to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means."

Attorney General's part of employee security program consists of making full field investigations through FBI; maintaining list of totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive organizations; and giving agencies advice in establishing and maintaining their security programs.

2. Smith Act of 1940 (Title 18, USC, § 2385). Advocating overthrow of Government

Smith Act prohibits knowingly advocating or teaching overthrow of Government by force or violence; publishing or circulating written or printed material with intent to cause such overthrow; attempting to organize group of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage such overthrow; and conspiring to commit these offenses. Penalty for conviction carries fine of not more than \$20,000 and/or imprisonment for not more than 20 years and shall be ineligible for employment by U. S. or any department or agency thereof for five years next following his conviction. Decisions by Supreme Court on 6-7-57 and 6-5-61 established new evidentiary standards, such as proof of incitement to action, which must be met by Government in future prosecutions under this act.

3. Internal Security Act of 1950 (Title 50, USC, §§ 781-816)

Internal Security Act of 1950 (ISA-50) became effective 9-23-50. It generally provides for registration of communist-action and communist front organizations; amends obstruction of justice statute; implements espionage and sabotage statutes and various immigration and naturalization regulations; prohibits contributing to establishment of totalitarian dictatorship; and provides for detention of individuals in case of national emergency. Act was amended 1-2-68 to delete requirement that communist organizations and their members register with Attorney General, a procedure ruled unconstitutional by Supreme Court because it violated constitutional rights against self-incrimination. This manual section is limited to ISA-50 provisions pertaining to communist-action organizations, communist front organizations, contributing to establishment of totalitarian dictatorship, and detention of individuals in case of emergency.

a. Communist-action organizations

(1) Definition (§ 782)

Term "communist-action organization" means any organization in U. S. (other than diplomatic representative or mission of foreign government accredited by Department of State) which is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by foreign government or foreign organization controlling world communist movement (referred to in section 781) and which operates primarily to advance objectives of world communist movement.

(2) Factors to be considered by Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB) in determining whether organization is communist-action organization (§ 792)

SACB considers relationship of organization under review to foreign organization or foreign government described in above definition in regard to policies, activities, accountability, training received, financial support, concealment of foreign direction, and allegiance of its principal leaders to such foreign government or foreign organization.

b. Communist front organizations

(1) Definition (§ 782)

Term "communist front organization" means any organization in U. S. (other than communist-action organization) which (a) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by communist-action organization or (b) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by one or more members of communist-action organization, and (c) is primarily operated for purpose of giving aid and support to communist-action organization, communist foreign government, or world communist movement.

(2) Factors to be considered by SACB in determining whether organization is communist front organization (§ 792)

SACB considers extent to which organization is managed and financed by any communist-action organization, communist foreign government, or world communist movement. SACB also considers extent to which organization's policies are similar to and extent it promotes objectives of any communist-action organization, communist foreign government, or world communist movement.

c. How proceedings are instituted (§ 792)

When Attorney General has reason to believe any organization is communist-action or communist front organization, he files petition with SACB (and serves upon organization copy thereof) for determination that such is true by hearing before SACB.

d. Findings of Board and publication of same (§ 792)

If, after hearing, SACB finds (1) that organization is communist-action or communist front organization, it makes report in writing of its findings and causes to be served on such organization an order determining organization to be communist-action or communist front organization.

Findings of SACB are published in Federal Register and this publication is notice to all persons that such orders have become final; records of SACB concerning such hearings shall be available to public.

e. Employment of members; contributions of funds, services, or advice by Government personnel (§ 784)

When there is in effect final order of SACB determining any organization to be communist-action or communist front organization, it shall be unlawful

- (1) For any member of such organization with knowledge or notice of such final order: (a) to conceal or fail to disclose that he is a member of such organization in seeking, accepting, or holding any nonelective office or employment under U. S.; (b) to hold any nonelective office or employment under U. S.; (c) to conceal or fail to disclose that he is member of such organization in seeking, accepting, or holding employment in any defense facility; or (d) to hold office or employment with any labor organization, as defined in section 2 (5) of National Labor Relations Act, as amended, or to represent any employer in any matter or proceeding arising or pending under that act.
- (2) For any officer or employee of U. S. or of any defense facility, with knowledge or notice of such final order of SACB: (a) to contribute funds or services to such organization; or (b) to advise, counsel, or urge any person, with knowledge or notice that such person is member of such organization, to perform or omit to perform, any act if such act or omission would constitute violation of any provision of paragraph (1) above.
- f. Use of mail and instrumentalities of interstate or foreign commerce (§ 789)
Act requires any person acting for or on behalf of any organization for which there is in effect final order of SACB determining it to be communist-action or communist front organization to label properly all publications transmitted through mail or by any means or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce.
- g. Emergency detention provisions (§§ 811-826)
Detention provisions include establishment of program for arrests of certain individuals, hearings after arrests, and right to judicial review in event of "internal security emergency." Criminal provisions make it unlawful in connection with detention provisions to resist arrest, knowingly disregard or evade apprehension, escape from confinement, or conspire with others to escape from confinement or detention. Violations also cover aiding or assisting in commission of violations mentioned above and willful interference with activities of any members or agent of review board set up under detention provisions.
- h. Contributing to establishment of totalitarian dictatorship (§ 783)
ISA-50 provides that it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to combine, conspire, or agree with any other person to perform any act which would substantially contribute to establishment within U. S. of a totalitarian dictatorship, direction and control of which is to be vested in, or exercised by, or under domination or control of any foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign individual. Maximum penalty is \$10,000 or 10 years, or both, and thereafter be ineligible to hold any office or place of honor, profit, or trust created by Constitution or laws of U. S. Statute of limitations is 10 years, except statute will not run on officer or employee of U. S. until after his employment has ceased.
4. Communist Control Act of 1954
Act is divided into three measures: (a) termination of rights, privileges, and immunities formerly enjoyed by CPUSA and subsidiary organizations; (b) determination of membership in CPUSA and other subversive organizations; and (c) amendment of ISA-50, bringing within its purview communist-infiltrated organizations. This manual section is limited to provisions pertaining to communist-infiltrated organizations (Title 50, USC, § 782).
- a. Definition of communist-infiltrated organization
Term "communist-infiltrated organization" means any organization in U. S. (other than communist-action or communist front organization) which (1) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by individual or individuals who are, or who within three years have been, actively engaged in giving aid or support to communist-action organization, communist foreign government, or world communist movement, and (2) is serving, or within last three years has served, as means for (a) giving aid or support to any such organization, government, or

movement, or (b) impairment of military strength of U. S. or its industrial capacity to furnish logistical support required by its armed forces. Provided, however, that any labor organization which is affiliate in good standing of national federation or other labor organizations whose policies and activities have been directed to opposing communist organizations, communist foreign government, or world communist movement shall be presumed prima facie not to be communist-infiltrated organization.

- b. Proceedings when Attorney General has reason to believe organization is communist infiltrated

He may file petition with SACB and serve copy on communist-infiltrated organization. He may join more than one organization as respondents to his petition. Hearings will then be conducted by SACB on evidence presented by Attorney General. SACB is empowered to make finding that organization is or is not communist-infiltrated, and within six months after an unfavorable determination organization may petition for a new determination.

SACB is also authorized to notify National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) of its findings and to publish findings in Federal Register. NLRB has power to deny organizations found to be communist infiltrated representation before it, and upon petition of twenty per cent of membership of communist-infiltrated labor union to NLRB, that body may nullify rights of union to represent its members and call for election to determine new bargaining representative.

- c. Factors to be considered by SACB in determining whether organization is communist infiltrated (§ 792a)

SACB shall consider following:

- (1) To what extent, if any, effective management of affairs of organization is conducted by one or more individuals who are, or within three years have been, (a) members, agents, or representatives of any communist organization, any communist foreign government, or the world communist movement with knowledge of nature and purpose thereof; or (b) engaged in giving aid or support to any such organization, government, or movement with knowledge of nature and purpose
- (2) To what extent, if any, policies of such organization are, or within three years have been, formulated and carried out pursuant to direction or advice of any member, agent, or representative of any such organization, government, or movement
- (3) To what extent, if any, personnel and resources of such organization are, or within three years have been, used to further or promote objectives of any such communist organization, government, or movement
- (4) To what extent, if any, such organization within three years has received from, or furnished to or for use of, any such communist organization, government, or movement any funds or other material assistance
- (5) To what extent, if any, such organization is, or within three years has been, affiliated in any way with any such communist organization, government, or movement
- (6) To what extent, if any, affiliation of such organization, or any individual or individuals who are members thereof, or who manage its affairs, with any such communist organization, government, or movement is concealed from or is not disclosed to the membership
- (7) To what extent, if any, such organization or any of its managers or members are, or within three years have been, knowingly engaged (a) in any conduct punishable under § 783 or § 794 or under chapter 37, 105, or 115 of Title 18; or (b) with intent to impair military strength of U. S. or its industrial capacity to furnish logistical or other support required by its armed forces, in any activity resulting in or contributing to any such impairment

5. Other statutes

Following statutes should also be considered in security investigations.

- a. Fraud against Government (Title 18, USC, § 1001)
This section includes possible fraud against Government violations through concealments or falsifications relating to subversive information. Violation must be presented to Department instead of local USAs for prosecutive opinion. They ordinarily involve execution of U. S. Government forms. Common violators are employees of private concerns having Government contracts who execute Government forms required for clearance for access to classified information. (See section 47, volume II, of this manual.)
- b. Private correspondence with foreign governments (Title 18, USC, § 953)
Prohibits U. S. citizen from corresponding, without U. S. authority, with foreign government to influence conduct of that government in relation to any disputes or controversies with U. S. or to defeat measures of U. S.
- c. Rebellion or insurrection (Title 18, USC, § 2383)
Whoever incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against authority of U. S. or its laws shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and shall be incapable of holding any office under U. S.
- d. Sedition (Title 18, USC, §§ 2387, 2388, and 2391)
These sections penalize attempts to undermine loyalty, discipline, or morale of U. S. armed forces. (See section 88, volume III, of this manual.)
- e. Seditious conspiracy (Title 18, USC, § 2384)
If two or more persons in any state or territory, or in any place subject to jurisdiction of U. S., conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force Government of U. S., or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay execution of any law of U. S., or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of U. S. contrary to authority thereof, they shall each be fined not more than \$20,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
- f. Recruiting for service against U. S. (Title 18, USC, § 2389)
Whoever recruits soldiers or sailors within U. S., or in any place subject to its jurisdiction, to engage in armed hostility against the same; or whoever opens within U. S., or any place subject to its jurisdiction, a recruiting station for enlistment of soldiers and sailors to serve in any manner in armed hostilities against U. S. shall be fined not more than \$1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
- g. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended by Expatriation Act of 1954
The 1952 act provides that national of U. S., whether by birth or naturalization, shall automatically lose his nationality if he is convicted of: (1) committing any act of treason against U. S., or (2) attempting to overthrow by force U. S. Government, or (3) bearing arms against U. S. Offenses committed subsequent to 12-24-52 where conviction is obtained make defendant subject to expatriation. Expatriation Act of 1954 provides for expatriation when subject is convicted for one of following offenses subsequent to 9-3-54: (1) violating or conspiring to violate Title 18, USC, § 2383 (inciting rebellion or insurrection against U. S.); or (2) willfully performing any act in violation of Title 18, USC, § 2385 (Smith Act of 1940); or (3) violating Title 18, USC, § 2384, by engaging in conspiracy to overthrow, put down, or destroy by force U. S. Government; or (4) levying war against U. S.

B. INVESTIGATION OF COMMUNIST PARTY, USA; SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY; OTHER MARXIST REVOLUTIONARY-TYPE ORGANIZATIONS; FRONT GROUPS; NEW LEFT AND MISCELLANEOUS ORGANIZATIONS

1. Purposes of investigation

- a. To obtain legally admissible evidence for prosecution under existing Federal statutes
- b. To obtain sufficient pertinent data to determine organization's character and permit implementation of EO 10450
- c. To obtain intelligence data in order to have day-to-day appraisal of strength, dangerousness, and activities of organization; and to keep Department and other interested Government agencies advised

Specific objectives should include:

- a. Development of confidential informants at all levels of organization
- b. Coverage of all important ramifications of organization's activities
- c. Development of admissible evidence against organization's officials for violation of Federal laws

2. Policy

a. General

- (1) By Presidential directive 9-6-39, and subsequent restatements, FBI is charged with responsibility for coordinating all information regarding U. S. internal security.
- (2) FBI employees should not discuss communist or related investigations with any unauthorized individuals. This subject is not to be discussed in speeches of Bureau employees without specific authorization. However, mimeographed material, including speeches, testimony, and magazine articles prepared by Director, may be furnished without discussion to individuals interested.
- (3) Investigations must be conducted in most discreet and thorough manner. Members of law enforcement agencies are not to accompany Agents during security investigations without Bureau authority.
- (4) Established sources and informants who are students or employees at institution of learning, but who are not reporting on any campus activities or any matter pertaining to educational institution, may be contacted without Bureau authority. These contacts must be made away from campus.
- (5) No photographic surveillances are to be conducted in security cases without specific Bureau authority and then only when essential to protect Bureau's interest in internal security cases by supplementing informant coverage. In request for Bureau authority for photographic surveillance, outline manner in which it will be conducted and supervised.

b. Established subversive groups

- (1) Keep Bureau currently advised by appropriate communication, and later incorporate in reports, all pertinent activities, including any changes in principal officers, structure of organization, and forthcoming events.
- (2) If no specific leads outstanding, case may be placed in pending-inactive status after submission of initial report.
- (3) Submit reports semiannually unless advised otherwise in individual cases.

c. Newly formed known or suspected subversive organizations, including those affiliated with new left movement

- (1) When information is received concerning formation of group, immediately open case and advise Bureau.
- (2) Conduct sufficient inquiry through established sources to determine character of group.
 - (a) If further investigation warranted, submit report and thereafter submit reports semiannually unless advised otherwise in individual cases.
 - (b) If further investigation not warranted, furnish Bureau results of preliminary inquiry and reasons for this determination by letter. Incorporate any pertinent information in form suitable for dissemination.

- d. Political organizations
 - (1) Obtain Bureau approval to institute investigation.
 - (2) Furnish all pertinent information re communist infiltration, influence, or control of organization to Bureau by letter.
- e. Organizations connected with institutions of learning
 - (1) Conduct no investigation without prior Bureau approval.
 - (2) In request for Bureau approval, submit all available data and reason investigation is necessary.
 - (3) If Bureau authority granted, it is permissible to contact all established reliable sources, including those in administrative capacity with institution of learning.
 - (4) Complete justification must be submitted and Bureau authority obtained before conducting interview with student, graduate student, or professor connected with institution of learning.
- f. Legitimate noncommunist organizations which are communist infiltrated
 - (1) Conduct no investigation without prior Bureau approval.
 - (2) Investigations should be handled most discreetly by experienced Agents.
 - (3) Advise Bureau promptly under caption "Cominfil (name of organization)" when one of following exists and include recommendation for instituting investigation:
 - (a) Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) or other communist organization has specifically instructed its members to infiltrate organization.
 - (b) CPUSA members or members of other communist groups have infiltrated organization in sufficient strength to influence or control organization.
 - (4) When advising Bureau, include following:
 - (a) Name and address of organization
 - (b) Extent of communist infiltration
 - (c) Identities of CPUSA members or members of other communist groups and positions held in organization
 - (d) List of informants who hold positions, are members, or report on organization
 - (e) Recommendation as to additional investigation

Above instructions apply to local chapters or affiliates, as well as national organization. Break down information required under items (c) and (d) above by local chapters where they exist.

- (5) No informant or source should be instructed by FBI to join or attend meetings. If CPUSA or other communist organization asks informant to do so, he should comply.
- (6) No member of organization not already established source should be contacted regarding organization. This does not preclude pretext interviews where advisable.
- (7) Include in first paragraph of details of report basis for investigation and statement it is directed solely toward establishing extent of infiltration or that organization is specific target for infiltration, and that Bureau is not investigating legitimate activities of organization.
- (8) Develop fully and include following in report:
 - (a) Address of organization
 - (b) Brief characterization of organization, including total membership
 - (c) Principal officers of organization
 - (d) Pertinent information showing communist objective is to infiltrate organization and influence its policy. Results of infiltration efforts, including communist affiliations of officers and members.
- (9) Caption of all correspondence should contain "Communist Infiltration" preceding name of organization.
- (10) If organization becomes completely dominated and controlled by CPUSA or other communist group, submit recommendation to Bureau to drop "Communist Infiltration" from title and investigate as communist front.

3. Investigative procedures re subversive organizations, new left groups, suspected subversive organizations, and communist fronts
Develop fully and report on following topics, where applicable:
- a. Origin and scope
Date of formation. Circumstances under which founded. Identify individual or individuals responsible for organizing group. Identify all chapters and give their locations.
 - b. Whether incorporated
Determine if organization has filed incorporation papers with appropriate state officials.
 - c. Aims and purposes
Determine whether organization advocates violence, resistance, and unlawful activity.
 - d. Location of headquarters
 - e. Officers
List principal officers, including board of directors, and give appropriate characterization of each showing subversive affiliation.
 - f. Membership
 - (1) General
Ascertain estimated membership. Whenever possible, secure membership lists, mailing lists, or other records showing affiliation with organization. Secure accurate description of all lists to eliminate confusion as to exact identity or significance of any list.
 - (2) CPUSA
Details of semiannual reports are not to contain membership statistics. Following instructions are for cover pages.
 - (a) Cover pages must contain latest statistics on total CPUSA members in district. Set forth on separate page or pages. Offices covering district headquarters should submit following figures: for entire district, for individual states, or portion of state covered by district. Auxiliary offices which have been authorized to submit this data by letter should include membership figures in such letters and submit them to Bureau and office of origin on April 1 and October 1. Office of origin responsible to obtain complete figures from auxiliary offices.
 - (b) Each office must show for its territory following: number of Negroes in CPUSA, name and title of each Negro who has national level position or who has district level position above that of club chairman. When possible, membership totals should be broken down as to nationality, sex, employment, veteran status, and membership in unions.
 - (c) Include evaluation of reliability of figures furnished by each source and of final figures. Use of only one source is not acceptable unless facts demonstrate such information is most reliable available. Also include totals of positively identified CPUSA members and tentatively identified members within six-month period preceding report.
 - (d) Explain in detail any increase or decrease in membership. Include results of membership recruiting drives. Endeavor to ascertain results of national registration drives.
 - (e) Include whether all persons identified as CPUSA members in report who reside within area covered by reporting office are listed in security index, or are informants or sources. List any exception by name and show status of investigation and whether name has been furnished to Bureau for indexing.
 - g. Official organ, if any, and other literature
 - (1) May be obtained through confidential mailbox, panel sources, and confidential informants
 - (2) Appropriately identify all such literature.
 - (3) Promptly furnish to Bureau at least one copy of each pertinent piece of literature.
 - h. General activities

- i. Finances
Special efforts must be made to locate and monitor bank accounts of organizations. Emphasis must be placed on determining if funds are being furnished organizations from foreign sources and if there is any rapport between the organizations and organizations in foreign countries.
- j. Support given to or received from CPUSA or other communist group
Develop evidence showing support, financial or otherwise, given by organization to CPUSA or other communist group or received by organization from CPUSA or other communist group.
- k. Implementation of CPUSA line or that of other communist group
Usually shown through comparison of programs and literature of organization with those of CPUSA or other communist group during any particular period.
- l. Accuracy of identifications
Use extreme care to assure statements relating to affiliations or membership in subversive organizations are accurate in all respects. Show exact basis, plus corroboration wherever possible, for identification of suspected organizations or individuals with information of a possible subversive nature. Never refer to a person as a "known communist" unless he is publicly known as such.
- m. Specific requirements for CPUSA investigations
Follow previously established reporting format. New York is responsible, in addition to reporting activities of New York District, for investigating and reporting separately on national committee meetings, national training schools, and other important national meetings.
- n. Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and other Marxist-Leninist or Trotskyite groups
All offices submit semiannual reports and carry as pending inactive, except New York whose report on SWP activities on national basis should be designated pending. New York also submit report on local SWP activities. Indicate in cover pages whether all persons identified in report as members of SWP or as members of other Marxist-Leninist or Trotskyite groups who reside within area covered by reporting office are listed in security index, or are informants or sources. List any exception by name and show status of investigation and state whether name has been furnished Bureau for indexing.

Data concerning above topics can usually be secured through following sources: confidential informants, incorporation records, bank records, literature and publications of organization, newspapers, public meetings and rallies, confidential investigative techniques, various public records, panel sources, confidential sources and other sources of information, interviews with past or present CPUSA members, review of field office files, pretext interviews, surveillances, Agents attending mass meetings, etc.

4. Dissemination of information to Secret Service regarding plots against President
On 2-3-65, an "Agreement Between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secret Service Concerning Presidential Protection" was signed and became effective. This agreement is set out in its entirety in section 102, volume IV, of this manual. Agreement provides that FBI, in its investigations of organizations whose activities are inimical to welfare of U. S., will be alert to and promptly notify Secret Service of any information indicating plot against person of the President. It is responsibility of Secret Service to initiate necessary action to neutralize such plot.
 - a. Be alert during investigation of organization for information indicating plot against person of President. Upon receipt, immediately furnish complete details to nearest office of Secret Service and appropriate local law enforcement agencies and advise Bureau by teletype, or telephone if facts warrant, of information furnished and fact it has been so disseminated. Attempt immediately to verify information, but do not attempt evaluation of information.

- b. Promptly prepare LHM, including complete details disseminated and identities of Secret Service officer and local law enforcement officers to whom given and date and time of notification. Promptly disseminate LHM locally to Secret Service and any other appropriate Government agency and furnish sufficient copies to Bureau for dissemination at SOG. Disseminate copies of all LHMs and reports concerning organization locally to Secret Service on continuing basis and furnish extra copies of such communications to Bureau for dissemination at SOG.
 - c. Determine identities of members of organization involved in plot. Background information concerning such individuals should be fully developed and included in communications disseminated to Secret Service.
5. Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C (code name "CIRM"). Bufile 100-442529. Office of origin: New York
- a. Submit quarterly reports, to reach Bureau by February 1, May 1, August 1, and November 1 on full extent of communist influence in racial matters. Include information on communist infiltration of Negro organizations and subversive individuals active in racial movement. Include this information even if it duplicates information in other reports. Offices with no information to report advise Bureau by letter.
 - b. Use three-part outline in report: (1) Communist Strategy, (2) Communist Tactics, and (3) Communist Penetration and Influence in Racial Organizations. Under strategy, include plans and line of CPUSA and other communist groups, such as SWP and Progressive Labor Party. Under tactics, describe communist direction, influence, and participation in demonstrations, disturbances, and other events with racial overtones. List events in chronological order with appropriate sub-headings. In part three, report influence of subversives in racial organizations.
6. Title and character. Communications covering organizations should carry name of organization and character "Internal Security" followed by principal organizational affiliation; e.g.,

Communist Party, USA
Internal Security - C

Socialist Workers Party
Internal Security - SWP

Where appropriate, include identity of particular district or field division; e.g.,

Communist Party, USA
District
Division
Internal Security - C

7. Classification - 100

[C. INVESTIGATION OF COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF LABOR UNIONS

1. Purpose of investigation
 - a. To obtain complete picture of control communists have over vital industry in U. S.
 - b. To develop data concerning extent of communist control over important trade unions
 - c. To develop evidence necessary to establish under provisions of Communist Control Act of 1954 that a labor union is communist infiltrated at time Attorney General files petition
 - d. To determine identity of each important communist in labor movement
2. Policy
 - a. Prior Bureau authority required to conduct active investigation. Bureau will advise field of unions being considered under Communist Control Act of 1954. Give continuous, thorough, and expeditious attention because of limited period (three years) pertinent evidence is admissible under statutory limits in act.
 - b. Ascertain availability and willingness to testify of all possible witnesses for benefit of Department in considering cases for presentation to Subversive Activities Control Board. Current informants and confidential sources should be described as currently furnishing information to FBI and not as unavailable. Department must be furnished brief statement on background and any known factors affecting credibility of all other witnesses, including discontinued informants. Investigative techniques not available for use in court may be described as unavailable.
 - c. Investigation is limited to activities of individuals acting in furtherance or apparent furtherance of communist program. Goal is complete picture of extent of communist infiltration and domination.
 - d. Labor union as such is not subject of investigation. Title of all communications must clearly show communist infiltration is subject of investigation. FBI is not interested in employer-employee relationships or legitimate union activities.
 - e. Prior Bureau authority required to conduct interview with any officer or official of labor union during investigation of communist infiltration unless officer or official is established reliable source or confidential informant.
 - f. Prepare brief history of union, including origin, constitution, bylaws, and organizational structure. Office of origin is responsible for coverage of officers and personnel of national or international office. Auxiliary offices responsible for coverage of international representatives, organizers, and regional, district, council, and local officers active within their territories.
3. Title

Title of all communications should clearly show that communist infiltration of union involved is subject of investigation, not the union itself; e.g.,

"Communist Infiltration of
United Electrical Workers of
America"
4. Classification - 100
5. Character - Internal Security - C

[D. INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS - POLICY AND OBJECTIVES

[1. Definitions

[Following organizations are "basic revolutionary organizations."

- [a. Communist Party, USA
-
- [b. Socialist Workers Party
-
- [c. Progressive Labor Party
-
- [d. Proletarian Party of America
-
- [e. Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico
-
- [f. Johnson-Forest Group

[Black nationalist extremists and members of Puerto Rican nationalist
[groups and Puerto Rican subversive proindependence groups, although
[technically not members of basic revolutionary organizations, should
[be investigated under same rules. (See section 122, volume IV, of
[this manual.)

[2. FBI responsibility

[To conduct thorough investigations into background and activities of
[all persons in U. S. and Puerto Rico who are dangerous or potentially
[dangerous to internal security. Each SAC is responsible for investi-
[gation of persons in his area who, because of membership or affiliation
[with basic revolutionary organizations or other Marxist revolutionary
[organizations including splinter groups, may be potentially dangerous.

[3. Purposes of investigation

[a. Determination of dangerousness

[To determine identity, whereabouts, and activities of all individuals
[in U. S. and Puerto Rico who, because of their membership in, activity
[in, or association with one or more revolutionary groups or related
[groups, are dangerous or potentially dangerous to internal security;
[collection of sufficient information concerning their subversive ac-
[tivities to justify apprehension in national emergency.

[b. Determination of violations of Federal statutes

[To determine identity, whereabouts, and activities of all individuals
[who have been or may be violating laws of U. S.[(1) Direct investigation to obtain admissible evidence to establish
[violation.[(2) Be alert for violation of Federal statutes relating to espionage,
[sabotage, and sedition.

[4. Individuals to be investigated

[Exercise sound judgment and discretion in evaluating importance and
[dangerousness of individuals or affiliates. Investigate activities
[of any individual falling within one or more of following categories
[who does not come within restrictions on investigations listed under
[87D, item 5, below:

[a. Membership in basic revolutionary organizations subsequent to 1-1-49

[b. Espousing line of revolutionary movements

[Espousal encompasses wide variety and range of activities. Actual
[membership in basic revolutionary organization is not prerequisite.
[Espousal may be expressed by membership or active participation in
[subversive front groups. Open investigation in every instance in
[which subject is actively engaged in affairs of subversive front
[organization in leadership capacity or by active participation
[in furtherance of aims and purposes of front organizations. Do
[not open on mere membership in front organization unless there is
[past membership at any time in basic revolutionary organization or
[other subversive derogatory information.

[c. Special training

[(1) Training in subversive movement abroad

[(2) Leadership training in basic revolutionary organization

[d. Military service

[(1) Service in Abraham Lincoln Brigade; membership in basic
[revolutionary organization not prerequisite[(2) Service in military forces of any country, including U. S.
[armed forces, whenever individual has ever been member of
[basic revolutionary organization

- e. Employment in key facilities
Individual employed in or having access to key facility who is alleged to have been at any time member of any basic revolutionary organization
- f. Other individuals with revolutionary beliefs
Individuals who, because of anarchist or revolutionary beliefs, are likely to seize upon national emergency to endanger public safety and welfare. Membership or affiliation in basic revolutionary or front groups not prerequisite.

Falling within above category are leaders of Nation of Islam (NOI). Conduct security investigation of all individuals reported to be functionaries or leaders of NOI or active participants carrying out aims of organization. Investigation should not be initiated based on mere membership. During investigation be alert for violation of Selective Service Act.

Above standards are not all-inclusive. Resolve doubts in interest of security and conduct investigation. Cases should be investigated so as to permit determination for possible inclusion in security index.

Complaints from anonymous sources alleging subversive activities should be considered as basis for investigation.

Security cases must be evaluated continually to determine if we are fulfilling responsibilities in internal security field and those cases not warranting further investigation should be closed promptly.

- 5. Restrictions upon investigations of individuals
Do not institute investigations because of membership in organizations which do not advocate use of force to bring about changes in existing Government; e.g., Socialist Party, Independent Workers of the World, and Independence Party of Puerto Rico.

- a. Investigations of and interviews with individuals connected with institutions of learning

- (1) Prior Bureau authority required to institute investigation of faculty members.

Bureau authority not needed for student or nonacademic employee provided no unusual circumstances exist which would require advice from Bureau prior to investigation and there is sound basis for investigation. In requests for Bureau authority, identify subject, his position, and basis for investigation.

- (2) Contacts during investigation

- (a) After Bureau authority granted, it is permissible to contact:

- I. Established sources functioning in an administrative capacity, such as registrar, director of admissions, dean of men, dean of women, and security officers and their subordinates. Contacts may be made on campus. Other established sources and informants must be contacted away from campus.
- II. All individuals not connected with institutions of learning who, consistent with discretion, would be contacted in security case, such as neighbors and past employers.

- (b) No contacts are to be made with students, graduate students, and professors (other than sources outlined above) at educational institutions without prior Bureau authority. When requesting authority, give full justification, individual's name, position, and statement concerning his discretion and reliability.

- (c) Superiors of faculty members should not be contacted.

- (3) Receiving voluntary information

These instructions must not deter immediate interview of any person connected with institution of learning who desires to furnish information to FBI or be contacted by an Agent.

- b. Subjects not connected with institution of learning
When subject of investigation is not connected with an institution of learning and interview of student, faculty member, or other employee of institution of learning is desired, prior Bureau authority must be obtained except for established sources. When requesting authority, furnish name, position, and a positive statement concerning person's discretion and reliability.
- c. U. S. Government employees, individuals having foreign diplomatic or official status, employees of foreign official establishment, employees of United Nations or international organizations, and members of armed forces

If subject of investigation is or becomes employee of U. S. Government, foreign official establishment, United Nations, or other international organization, has foreign diplomatic or official status, or is member of U. S. armed forces, advise Bureau and request authority for further investigation.

6. Fraud against Government (FAG) violations

a. Policy

- (1) Upon receipt of information indicating violation of this type, initiate investigation under "Security Matter - Fraud Against the Government" character and immediately advise Bureau.
- (2) Investigate and report criminal fraud violation (such as concealment of arrests) arising during security-type fraud investigation on same subject in conjunction with investigation of security-type fraud. Bureau will present both violations to Department. If security-type fraud investigation is discontinued, handle criminal fraud separately following instructions in section 47, volume II, of this manual.
- (3) If admissible evidence developed does not warrant submission of prosecutive summary report, submit results in investigative report.

b. Investigation

- (1) To establish jurisdiction, it is necessary to prove that form was presented to Government agency for action or determination, and this should be first investigative objective. If form was not presented to Government agency, conduct no further investigation and so advise Bureau.
- (2) It must be established that subject actually signed form by testimony of witnesses to signature, handwriting examination, or other conclusive evidence. Original of form must be located. Thoroughly interview any sources who furnished pertinent information concerning subject during any previous investigation and other potential witnesses to determine basis for each item of pertinent information furnished and identities of other potential witnesses.
- (3) Where affiliation with subversive organizations is involved, interview individuals who were members of same units as subject for evidence of his membership, such as attendance at closed meetings, payment of dues, holding of office, etc. If possible, develop evidence to supplant pertinent information furnished by current informants. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview subject.
- (4) Interview subject and potential witnesses furnishing pertinent information under oath and obtain sworn signed statements if possible. Exception may be made when interviewing established sources, such as current informants, if oath and/or signed statements not considered desirable under circumstances. Be guided by instructions below concerning interviews with subjects of security investigations when interviewing potential witnesses with subversive backgrounds.

c. Legal questions

If question of law arises as to existence of violation, advise Bureau and hold investigation in abeyance for Department's opinion. Department has no fixed policy as to prosecution in these cases and desires to consider each case. Submit basic facts concerning execution and filing of document and subversive activity denied in report for presentation to Department, even though basis for concealment or fraudulent statement does not appear to be material.

d. Cases referred by military

Military intelligence agencies often refer cases for security investigations under Delimitations Agreement in which security-type fraud violations are involved. If subversive information does not warrant full security investigation but does indicate possible fraud violation, advise interested agency that FBI's investigation will be directed toward proving possible violation of law and that any background investigation contemplated by it pursuant to its administrative responsibilities will not interfere with FBI investigation. Advise agency pertinent information developed will be furnished and request agency to do likewise. Immediately initiate security matter - fraud against the Government investigation. If subversive information warrants full security investigation and also indicates fraud violation, advise interested agency that Bureau is initiating full security investigation in conjunction with investigation of possible violation of law and results will be furnished. Conduct expedite investigation to determine subject's dangerousness and whether a fraud violation is involved.

7. Submission of subversive derogatory information on individuals

- a. Offices covering national or local headquarters of various subversive groups should promptly furnish Bureau names and identifying data regarding persons affiliated with such groups, to include basic revolutionary organizations, fascist-type organizations, black extremist organizations, and front groups of these. Furnish Bureau such information by letter and, where appropriate, indicate that list of names is being furnished for Bureau indexing purposes.
- b. Information from all sources should be reviewed to insure Bureau has been furnished lists of all individuals affiliated with organizations enumerated in item a. Include information concerning a number of individuals in one letter if possible. Set out sufficient identifying data to facilitate check of Bureau files.
- c. Offices obtaining information regarding subversive affiliation of individuals residing outside their territories should promptly advise offices covering such persons' addresses.
- d. Names of subscribers to Communist Party nominating petitions and names appearing on subscription lists of subversive organizations should be indexed in field office covering address shown for subscriber but should not be forwarded to Bureau for indexing.
- e. Important subversive information concerning any individual and any new subversive information concerning an individual of importance should be furnished Bureau expeditiously.
- f. Subversive and/or derogatory information coming to attention of field office through name check or otherwise on employee of executive branch of Government, which information is within purview of EO 10450, should be forwarded promptly to Bureau for dissemination to Civil Service Commission. Such information relating to other employees of Government or employees of United Nations and other public international organizations should be furnished Bureau immediately.

[E. INVESTIGATION OF INDIVIDUALS - INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

1. General

All pertinent information concerning subject's background and subversive activity must be fully developed and reported to assure accurate evaluation of his dangerousness. Use discretion to prevent subjects from becoming unnecessarily aware of investigation.

Members of law enforcement agencies are not to accompany Agents in security investigations without prior Bureau authority.

2. Scope of investigations

Following should be obtained:

a. Background

- (1) True name and aliases
- (2) Residence address
- (3) Occupation or business and employment address
- (4) Citizenship status, including date and place of birth and pertinent data concerning naturalization of aliens
- (5) Family background
If possible, ascertain from sources contacted and report date and place of birth of subject's parents and spouse and parents of spouse. Do not conduct investigation solely for this information.
- (6) Military record
Determine if subject has served in U. S. armed forces; time, place, and circumstances of such service; type of discharge received; and any membership in veterans' organizations. If subject served in armed forces of any foreign government, determine pertinent facts.
- (7) Close relatives
Determine whether subject has any close relatives in U. S. armed forces or in other positions of trust and confidence, whether public or private, relating to national defense.
- (8) Identification record
 - (a) Be alert for identification record showing arrests and/or civil data. Check local police records.
 - (b) When subject is approved for security index, submit FD-165 to check records of Identification Division and to post flash notice if fingerprints on file. FD-165 will be returned if positive identification cannot be made with fingerprints on file. Office of origin is responsible for resolving identification when record has been furnished by Identification Division as possibly identical. If positive identification cannot be made, it is not necessary to communicate further with Identification Division.
 - (c) When office of origin is changed for security index or reserve index A subject after flash notice has been placed, form FD-128 (changing origin) should so indicate. Send extra copy of FD-128 to Identification Division so its records will show new office of origin.
 - (d) Cancel security flash notice when subject dies or is no longer of security interest.
- (9) Physical description
 - (a) Obtain and report detailed physical description.
 - (b) Each subject should be personally observed whenever complete security investigation is conducted. Such direct observation is mandatory for all security index subjects; however, do not delay submission of form FD-122 (recommending subject for security index) when it has not been possible to observe subject. Keep case open until personal observation accomplished. When subject is outside U. S. or Puerto Rico, this requirement may be followed administratively until subject is personally observed upon his return to this country.

- (10) Photographs
Make reasonable efforts during investigation to obtain photograph of subject. Maintain cases on security index subjects in pending status until suitable photograph is obtained unless circumstances dictate otherwise, in which case advise Bureau. Once photograph has been obtained, be alert for more recent photographs. Forward copy of photographs of security index subjects to Bureau for dissemination to Secret Service.
 - (11) Handwriting specimens
If readily available, obtain handwriting specimens for possible future use and maintain in subject's file. Case is not to be kept pending merely to obtain such specimens.
 - (12) Labor union membership
If subject is member of basic revolutionary group, ascertain his trade-union affiliation and what, if any, position he holds in labor organization.
- b. Subversive activity
- (1) Membership or affiliation
Obtain admissible evidence that subject is member of, or affiliated with, one of basic revolutionary and/or front organizations. Some more common types of evidence are:
 - (a) Oral or written statements or admissions of subject made publicly or privately
 - (b) Statements of informants and others in position to know and can testify to facts
 - (c) Official letterheads, documents, and membership and dues records identifying subjects with such organizations
 - (d) Selective service records in which subject admits membership
 - (e) Attendance at closed meetings and conventions of such organizations
 - (f) Letters to publications, public officials, or others signed by subject and admitting membership in or adherence to principles of such organization
 - (g) Recruitment or attempt to recruit members for such organization
 - (h) Solicitations or contributions of funds for such organization
 - (i) Seeking public office as candidate for such organization
- Communist Control Act of 1954 sets out list of 14 criteria to be considered in determining membership, including acceptance of organization discipline.
- (2) Knowledge of aims and purposes
Obtain admissible evidence that subject knows aims and purposes of subversive organization to overthrow Government by force and violence. Mere proof of membership or affiliation is not sufficient to prove knowledge. Proof that subject has knowledge includes:
 - (a) Direct admissible evidence, such as oral or written statements made by subject, or by responsible officials of subversive organization in subject's presence
 - (b) Length of time in subversive organization
 - (c) Official positions held in organization, especially in educational, propaganda, or policy-making capacities
 - (d) Charter membership in organization, participation in original establishment of organization
 - (e) Extensive and long-continued participation in various organizational activities
 - (f) Attendance or teaching at organization schools or classes, especially leadership classes
 - (g) Preparation or distribution of party propaganda
 - (h) Recruiting and fund-raising activities
 - (i) Possession of Marxist or revolutionary literature or urging others to read literature of revolutionary character

While none of the above may be of sufficient value alone, a combination may constitute convincing proof. Revolutionary purposes of subversive organization are frequently cloaked in veiled language or in language significant only to persons familiar with Marxist or revolutionary terminology. Such statements should be fully reported. Develop and report all revolutionary statements and circumstances under which made.

(3) Position and importance

- (a) Information showing importance of individual to subversive organization or movement should be fully developed and reported. Member or affiliate may be dangerous or important because of his position, influence, or activities inside or outside organization, or both.
- (b) Concealment of membership and underground activity. Member or affiliate may be highly dangerous although he takes no part in overt activities of organization. Subject may have assignment in underground and is not to contact or associate openly with others in subversive movement. By virtue of this assignment in secret operations, such individuals must be considered most dangerous. Be continually alert that individual may be serving in underground capacity. All logical investigative techniques should be used to develop fully individual's activities in underground; identities of other individuals engaged in underground operations; and method of operation, extent, and purposes of underground.

Coverage must be sufficient to insure underground activities of subversive movement are known. Identities of individuals who are directing underground operations; location of hiding places of fugitives and underground leaders; and locations of secret printing presses, mimeograph machines, and large stationery supplies must be known at all times.

c. Missing security subjects

- (1) Location of all dangerous subversives must be known at all times. Each subject remaining out of control at time of national emergency represents threat to national security.
- (2) When subject of pending investigation fits standards for security index and his location is not known, recommend for unavailable section of security index.
- (3) When information is received that security index subject has changed his residence and/or employment, case must be opened and assigned for active investigation to locate subject.
- (4) If subject has deliberately absented himself to avoid detection by us, has gone into hiding, or is working clandestinely in underground capacity, he can be classified as missing subject and should be included in unavailable section of security index. When FD-122 is submitted to Bureau placing missing subject in unavailable section, also send cover letter advising of investigative steps already taken to locate him.
- (5) Investigations to locate missing security index subjects must be given preferential and continuous attention. Investigation must be handled as thoroughly and promptly as fugitive investigation.
 - (a) Advise Bureau each 45 days by letter of steps taken to locate missing security index subject. Do not submit reports which merely set forth negative results of investigation to locate subject.
 - (b) If subject may have gone to Mexico or Canada, request Bureau to alert appropriate Government agencies to this possibility and to seek verifying information through liaison channels. If subject is reported to have gone to any other foreign country, request Washington Field Office (WFO) to check records of Passport Office of State Department for verification.

- (c) When all logical leads have been exhausted in case of missing important functionary, consider requesting Bureau authority to circularize all field offices with subject's photograph and background information.
- d. Individuals traveling abroad (Also see section 105G, volume IV, of this manual.)
- Set forth below are steps to be taken when information is received that subject in one of following categories intends to travel abroad or has already departed this country for foreign travel: subject of current security investigation, subject in agitator index or priorities I and II of security index, past security subjects who may be in underground capacity, or subject concerning whom there is current information indicating need for foreign coverage.
- (1) Immediately advise Bureau by LHM available details concerning travel, including places and dates of departure and intended return, destination and itinerary, purpose of trip, name under which passport was issued, number of passport, and issuing office, if known. Include full description of subject and all aliases (in case of Chinese and Korean subjects, include Chinese telegraphic code or Korean telegraphic code numbers). Also include concise resume of available subversive data regarding subject. Do not delay advising Bureau of actual or intended travel while developing details of travel as time is of essence.
 - (2) Set out lead for WFO to check records of Passport Office, Department of State; but do not limit efforts to develop pertinent information to such check.
 - (3) Information concerning subject's proposed travel abroad, including information concerning subversive activities, is furnished Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and legal attaches. If travel is in area covered by legal attache, forward sufficient copies of LHM to enable dissemination of three copies to each legal attache involved. For each of these legal attaches, forward one photograph of subject, if available. If stops are to be placed with security services abroad, cover letter should so indicate. Set forth requests for investigation abroad on separate numbered page, captioned "Leads," at end of LHM. Request should not refer to legal attache or request investigation by particular agency abroad.
 - (4) Subsequent report in individual case should contain details regarding subject's travel. In nonsecurity index cases where LHMs are submitted, communication transmitting data regarding travel should indicate whether investigation is being initiated and, if not, why.
 - (5) Set forth below are steps to be taken when information is received that one of following is forming tour group for foreign travel: organization of investigative interest to Bureau or subject in one of categories described in first paragraph under item d above.
 - (a) Advise appropriate offices, under caption of tour group or organization, identities of individuals participating in tour, and furnish Bureau LHMs for State Department, CIA, and appropriate legal attaches. Include all readily available information pertaining to tour, such as itinerary, pertinent dates, names and addresses of participants, and thumbnail sketch of organization or individual sponsoring tour.
 - (b) Offices should immediately identify participants and submit LHMs on those in one of categories described in first paragraph under item d above. Refer to LHM previously prepared under caption of tour group or organization. Submit letter to Bureau under caption of tour group or organization listing individuals within territory participating in tour on whom there is no subversive information.

- (6) Advise Bureau promptly by LHM of subject's return from travel abroad. If such individual has traveled behind Iron Curtain, also furnish Bureau recommendations as to interview and state whether additional investigation is contemplated.
3. File reviews
Check office indices and review files thoroughly for pertinent information showing background and subversive activity. Include information in initial report. After each check and review of files has been made, consolidate reference cards pertaining to subject in indices.
 4. Security informants
Information developed through security informants is unsurpassed in value both for intelligence purposes and as admissible evidence.
 5. Physical surveillances
Physical surveillances should be used when, in opinion of SAC, information of sufficient value might be obtained to justify their use in light of existing circumstances and available manpower.
 - a. When information is received that meetings of subversive organizations are to take place, physical surveillances should be considered to corroborate such information and identify participants.
 - b. Surveillances of individuals in leadership or underground capacities serve to identify others within movement.
 - c. Success of surveillances depends upon resourcefulness of Agents who must at all times exercise sound judgment and discretion. Be alert to observe activity of subject and countersurveillances which may be used to identify Agents and embarrass Bureau.
 6. Photographic surveillances
Photographic evidence of meetings between individuals or which shows subjects entering or leaving meeting places of subversive organizations affords convincing and admissible evidence to establish subversive activities. Prior Bureau authority is needed for photographic surveillances of meetings and they must be properly correlated with other investigative techniques to obtain maximum evidence. Conceal equipment to avoid detection by subjects or other individuals in proximity of surveillance.
 7. Public sources
Make use of all logical public sources of information. Obtain background and lineage data from birth records and local bureaus of vital statistics, credit agencies, state records, public utility records, and school records. Obtain and index as reference material publications of subversive organizations and records of state and Federal committees which have conducted hearings concerning subversive activities.
 8. Records of private firms
Where pertinent information is available in records of private firms, such as past or present employers, insurance companies, and merchants, contact such firms provided it will not jeopardize investigation.
 9. Channelizing of information to case files
Membership or activity in subversive organizations should be channelized to main case files of individuals involved. Mimeographed form FD-306 may be used provided it is limited to reporting attendance at meetings. When information from informants or surveillances is channelized to individual case files, it must be documented. Coordinate information received from informants and confidential sources with active investigation.
 10. Preservation of evidence
Bear in mind necessity of obtaining admissible evidence.
 - a. Identify, preserve, and maintain continuity of evidence obtained for possible admission in Federal proceedings. Identify specifically as to source and date.
 - b. Notes or statements from informants necessary to refresh their recollection if called to testify must be in sufficient detail to serve this purpose and contain no material which would make their use inadvisable or inadmissible.
 - c. Informant's original notes or statements are not to be blocked, stamped, serialized, or mutilated in any way which would render them unsatisfactory for use in Federal proceedings.
 - d. Above also applies to Agent's notes taken during surveillances or concerning evidence otherwise obtained.

11. Interviews with subjects of security investigations

a. Policy

No security investigation of an individual is to be closed unless subject is included in security index or consideration given to interview. Bureau will not authorize cancellation of security index card for inactivity until subject has been interviewed or Bureau advised why interview is inadvisable.

b. Purpose

- (1) When investigation is inconclusive, to determine subject's sympathies and whether he continues to adhere to revolutionary doctrines
- (2) To develop information concerning activities of subject and his associates in subversive movement
- (3) To develop informants

c. SAC authority

Without Bureau authority SAC may:

- (1) Authorize interviews with individuals who have not been subjects of security investigations and available information does not warrant opening case
- (2) Authorize interviews of subjects of security cases who have previously been interviewed with Bureau authority, provided no change has taken place in subject's status and interviews are conducted under same conditions as previously authorized
- (3) Authorize interviews of subjects of closed security cases including persons who were on security index but were removed
- (4) Authorize interviews of rank-and-file black extremists except as noted in section 122, volume IV, of this manual

d. Procedures for interviews under SAC authority

- (1) If there is closed file, reopen it. If none, open case in 134 category to resolve whether subject is identical with information in files and determine his current employment and residence.
- (2) Case Agent will prepare memorandum requesting SAC authority to conduct interview of subject to determine his attitude towards cooperation with FBI.
- (3) During first contact Agent should identify himself, outline Bureau's responsibilities in security field, and request subject's assistance. If individual has been member of basic revolutionary organization and appears cooperative, he may be questioned about his own activities. However, this interview is for sole purpose of determining whether subject might be cooperative.
- (4) If cooperative, advise Bureau and conduct background investigation under section 107, volume IV, of this manual. If uncooperative, prepare brief memorandum for file and close case. Letter to Bureau not necessary.

e. Prior Bureau authority

Prior Bureau authority required for:

- (1) Subjects of active current investigation where no prior Bureau authority has been obtained
- (2) Closed cases on current security index subjects where no prior interview has been conducted
- (3) Subjects of investigations requested by Bureau, both open and closed, such as applicant and loyalty cases
- (4) Individuals when circumstances indicate delicate situation and greater than usual risk involved, such as labor leaders and individuals in educational, mass media, religious, or publishing fields. Bureau authority needed even though there were prior interviews.
- (5) Security subjects who have publicly disclosed previous contacts
- (6) Subjects of section A reserve index cards

In above cases, no report need be submitted when requesting Bureau authority to interview subject.

f. Letter requesting Bureau authority for interview

- (1) In absence of special circumstances, include following statement in first paragraph of letter.
 - (a) Bureau authority is requested to interview subject in accordance with existing instructions relating to interviews of security subjects. If subject is cooperative, no affirmative steps will be taken during initial interview to direct his activities and complete background investigation required by section 107C of Manual of Instructions will be conducted and Bureau will be requested to authorize recontact with subject as PSI.
 - (b) Form FD-336 contains above statement and may be used. Statement in no way precludes interviewing Agents from obtaining all subversive information subject is willing to furnish or other data which will assist in determining his potential as informant.
 - (c) If available, letter must contain following information:
 - I. Residence address, occupation, employment, race, date and place of birth, citizenship, and status of health
 - II. Marital status. If married, occupation, employment, and race of spouse.
 - III. Length of time subject was member of or affiliated with subversive organization and positions held. When investigation is based on circumstances other than membership or affiliation with subversive organizations, briefly set forth facts.
 - IV. If married, state if spouse is or has been member of or affiliated with subversive groups, positions held, and period of such membership or affiliation.
 - V. Membership or affiliation of any other close relatives in subversive groups
 - VI. Information regarding defection, expulsion, inactivity, and present sympathies of subject and, if married, of spouse
 - VII. What is expected to be gained by interview
 - (d) In each letter, pertinent information, if available, regarding seven items listed must be set out under appropriate number but headings need not be restated. If no pertinent data is available regarding any item, so indicate after number.
- (2) Letters must be personally approved by SAC.
- (3) One copy of letter should only be first page of letter. When unnecessary to issue specific instructions, Bureau will approve request by stamping this page and returning by routing slip.
- (4) When authorized, interview must be conducted within 45 days. If not possible, advise Bureau and indicate subject will be contacted within 45 days. If interview has not been conducted at end of second period, request new authority. Include any new information bearing upon advisability of interview.

g. Preparation for and conduct of interview

- (1) Preparation must be thorough and interview conducted so that Agents will not be compromised, Bureau will not be embarrassed, and informants will not be exposed. CPUSA has planned traps for Agents attempting interviews with members by installing recording machines in members' homes or endeavoring to have interview observed by concealed third party.
- (2) Interviews should be conducted by two Agents. Agent experienced in security investigations who is knowledgeable regarding development of informants should conduct interrogation. Actual approach need not be made by both Agents; one Agent may observe from secure distance. (Two Agents should be physically present during interview or contact with known or suspected Nation of Islam members in all cases.) Background of subject and circumstances will determine how approach should be handled.

- (3) Interviews of active communists should be conducted at secure place other than subject's residence or place of employment. If reasonable effort has been made for such approach and it is not practical, set forth circumstances and request Bureau authority to make contact at home or place of business explaining any need to contact employer. Letter should contain statement that, if subject appears cooperative, arrangements will be made for another interview at secure place away from residence or employment, if necessary, to determine fully degree of cooperation.
 - (4) If subject cooperative upon initial contact, further contact may be had without Bureau authority. No limitation on number of recontacts, but use good judgment. If interview authorized by Bureau, advise Bureau of results of contact and plans for recontacts. Obtain specific authority to make recontact where circumstances indicate delicate situation and greater than usual risks involved, such as labor leaders and individuals employed in educational, mass media, religious, and publishing fields.
 - (5) Terminate interview with active subversive if third person arrives during interview. Furnish Bureau details and obtain Bureau authority prior to reinterview.
 - (6) Terminate interview immediately if subject is hostile or uncooperative.
 - (7) Inform subjects connected with labor unions that Bureau is not interested in employee-employer relations and is concerned only with infiltration of labor unions by subversive elements. Furnish no information and make no statements to embarrass Bureau. Questions should require admission or denial by subject of all pertinent items of subversive information unless to do so would expose investigative techniques or security informants. Cordial and friendly attitude alone is not evidence of cooperation insofar as potential dangerousness is concerned when subject fails to admit or verify subversive information obtained through previous investigation.
 - (8) If cooperative, inform subject we want to interview him in detail and arrange interviews over extended period if necessary to exploit subject's knowledge to utmost. Conduct necessary investigation or research to corroborate and develop information received.
 - (9) Where appropriate, reduce information obtained to signed statement and determine his willingness to testify to information furnished if needed in Federal proceedings.
- h. Reporting results of interview
- (1) When no information is developed during interview which would affect subject's security index status, promptly submit results by letter and include in next report. If individual is employed in or holds sensitive position in trade-union, educational, mass media, religious, or publishing fields, results of all interviews must be submitted promptly in report or LHM, depending on priority designation, until he begins to cooperate as security informant or source.
 - (2) Report subject's admissions of his subversive activities and associations and indicate whether he did or did not furnish information regarding subversive activities of others.
 - (3) Report statements by subject denying subversive activities developed through prior investigation and follow with concise statement of such past subversive activity.
 - (4) Letter transmitting results of interview must contain:
 - (a) Definite statement or conclusion of interviewing Agents as to cooperativeness of subject and reasons for conclusion
 - (b) Statement as to whether information furnished coincides substantially with other available information

- (c) Statement as to subject's availability as potential witness and evaluation of subject's potential as informant or confidential source and whether further contacts contemplated
 - (d) Recommendation that security index card be canceled when statements furnished by subject regarding his subversive activities and associates, considered with other information and factors, indicate subject is no longer dangerous to internal security during emergency
 - (e) Pertinent information regarding subject's appearance or characteristics which has not previously been developed or reported
- i. Reinterviews of security index subjects
Consider reinterviews with security index subjects on systematic basis. Consider such reinterviews when necessary to review case or when case comes up on tickler.
 - j. Maintenance of control file on former members of subversive organizations
 - (1) Offices having sufficient volume should maintain control file on former members of subversive organizations for reference purposes. This file will obviate necessity for extensive file reviews to identify persons who may be in position to furnish information of value in future.
 - (2) Copies of memoranda designated for individual case files should be routed to this file. Such memoranda should contain: background of person, type of information he may furnish, period covered by this data, whether or not person is available for interview by all Agents, and whether he is in position and willing to testify.
 - (3) This file should not include information concerning security informants.
 - (4) If special index is used in conjunction with this file, it should contain cards filed alphabetically indicating times and places persons were in subversive movement and brief description of information available from them. It may be broken down geographically and subdivided by years.

[F. RESERVE INDEX

[1. Purpose

[Reserve index includes persons who should be considered from stand-
[point of security with view toward investigation, interrogation, or
[security index. It serves as administrative aid and working index
[containing names of persons having sympathy for or affiliation with
[basic revolutionary organizations.

[2. Composition

[Reserve index contains names of individuals about whom investigation did
[not develop sufficient information to justify security index, but
[there is no reliable evidence of defection and there is evidence of:

- [a. Membership in basic revolutionary organization subsequent to 1-1-49,
[together with some indication of continuing sympathy or association
[with such organization or subversive front organization
- [b. Activity, association, or sympathy for subversive cause during past
[five years, even though investigation has failed to substantiate
[allegations of membership in revolutionary organization
- [c. Associations, writings, financial support, or conduct in support of
[subversive organizations or international communist movement within
[past five years and individual is in position to influence others
[during national emergency
- [d. Leadership or substantial activities in major subversive front groups
[over three years ago, together with some evidence of continuing
[activity, association, or sympathy for subversive cause within
[past three years
- [e. Membership in subversive front organization within past three years

[3. Arrangement

[Each office is to maintain this index alphabetically on 5- by 8-inch
[cards in two sections, A and B.

[a. Section A

[Section A represents special group of individuals who should receive
[priority consideration for investigation and/or other action following
[apprehension of security index subjects.

- [(1) Section A includes individuals whose subversive activities do
[not bring them within security index criteria but who, in time of
[national emergency, are in position to influence others against
[national interest or are likely to furnish material financial
[aid to subversive elements because of their subversive associations
[and ideology. Include individuals who meet standards for reserve
[index and are

- [(a) Professors, teachers, and educators
- [(b) Labor union organizers and leaders
- [(c) Writers, lecturers, newsmen, entertainers, and others
[in mass media field
- [(d) Lawyers, doctors, and scientists
- [(e) Other potentially influential persons on local or national
[level

- [(2) Inclusion or deletion of names must be approved by SAC
[Reserve index A is maintained only in field offices. When name
[is deleted from security index, consider including in reserve
[index A. Upon approval by SAC, make two cards and file one in
[office and one away from headquarters city at same location as
[extra set of security index cards.

- [(3) Review field office file of reserve index A subject whenever
[information is channeled to it to determine if additional in-
[vestigation is warranted and if current information is suf-
[ficient for retention in reserve index.

- [(4) Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing in reserve
[index A cards

- [(a) Forward changes in data to clerk in field office handling
[these cards.

- (b) Handle change in office of origin by submission of form FD-128. Forward section A cards to new office of origin. Where necessary, forward pertinent information to new office of origin by succinct LHM and appropriate cover communication. Yellow file copy of LHM must show location of all original information contained therein.

b. Section B

- (1) This section, which contains names of all others in reserve index, is maintained only in field office. Review file of reserve index B subject whenever information is channeled to it to determine if additional investigation is warranted.
- (2) Handle changes in office of origin in same manner as reserve index A.

4. Content

a. Each card in section A and section B should contain, as minimum:

- (1) Name and aliases
- (2) Race
- (3) Sex
- (4) Citizenship and birth data
- (5) Residence and employment
- (6) Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency
- (7) Office file number
- (8) Letters "SS" if dissemination has been made to Secret Service

b. Membership and position or association in subversive groups and source and date of information may be added.

5. Removal and deletion of cards

Destroy cards on individuals who become security informants, sources, or security index subjects.

[G. SECURITY INDEX

[1. Purpose and general policy

- [a. Security index cards are maintained by Bureau as operational guide for apprehension of persons deemed dangerous or potentially dangerous to internal security in event of national emergency.
- [b. Action will be taken against security index subjects only upon authorization of warrants of arrest by Attorney General.
- [c. Names are included in security index only when investigation has established sufficient facts and evidence to justify inclusion.
- [d. Contents of security index must be accurate and correct at all times. Give matters pertaining to its preparation and maintenance preferred attention.
- [e. Matters pertaining to security index are not to be included in reports or LHM prepared for dissemination. Operation and content of security index must not be discussed outside Bureau. However, matters pertaining to security index may be discussed with qualified representatives of other Federal intelligence agencies on strictly confidential basis when subject is of prime interest to one of these services.

[2. Determination of dangerousness of individual

- [a. Dangerousness of individual does not depend entirely upon personal characteristics, such as aggressiveness or disposition to violence. It also depends upon contribution he has made or is making in advancing principles and aims of subversive movement, or his subversive potential in event of national emergency. Loyalty to subversive organization and its principles is primary factor to consider in evaluating potential dangerousness. However, all evidence must be carefully weighed. Among factors having bearing are:
 - [(1) Long membership in subversive organization
 - [(2) Affiliation with or attendance at training schools, especially leadership schools
 - [(3) Frequent or regular attendance at organizational meetings and functions
 - [(4) Possession of or study of revolutionary literature
 - [(5) Espousal of subversive doctrines exemplified in his acts and utterances
 - [(6) Contributions to or collections of funds for organization
 - [(7) Recruitment of new members
 - [(8) Active service in military forces which are supported by subversive movement
 - [(9) Constant support of Soviet Union in acts and utterances
 - [(10) Activity as courier or confidential mail drop for subversive movement
 - [(11) Constant participation in activities of subversive organization or advancement of organization's aims or interests, especially when this involves financial sacrifices or personal inconveniences or disadvantage
 - [(12) Individuals who have defected, revoked, or sought revocation of U. S. citizenship in favor of communist country, have returned to U. S., and have taken no positive steps to counteract such action
 - [(13) Statements or activities on subject's part establishing reasonable grounds to believe his loyalty would lie with communist country in event of armed conflict between U. S. and that country
 - [(14) Training and/or participation in espionage, sabotage, or intelligence activities
 - [(15) History of emotional instability or irrational behavior, prior acts indicating propensity for violence, when coupled with subversive background or hatred against organized government
- [b. Above factors, which are not all-inclusive, should be taken into consideration in determining whether subject falls within security index criteria. Person shall not be deemed dangerous merely because one or more of these factors apply to him.

3. Criteria for placing and retaining name in security index

a. Basic criteria

No name shall be added to or retained in security index unless one or more of following have been established through investigation:

- (1) Subject has had membership in, or participation in activities of, basic revolutionary organization within last five years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.
- (2) Subject has had membership in, or participation in the affairs of, one or more front organizations which adhere to the policies and doctrines of a basic revolutionary organization, in a leadership capacity or by active substantial participation in furtherance of those aims and purposes of the front organization which coincide with those of a basic revolutionary organization, within the last three years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.
- (3) Investigation has developed information that an individual, though not a member of or a participant in activities of a basic revolutionary or front organization, has anarchist or revolutionary beliefs and is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to commit acts of espionage or sabotage, including acts of terrorism, assassination, or any interference with or threat to the survival and effective operation of national, state, and local governments and of the defense effort.
- (4) Although investigation has failed to establish the facts required by (1), (2), or (3) above, either as to the substance of those criteria or because there have been no overt acts or statements within time limits prescribed, facts have been developed which clearly and unmistakably depict subject as a dangerous individual who could be expected to commit acts of the kind described in (3) above.

b. Activity in support of Cuban regime

Recommend for security index individuals who would be dangerous or potentially dangerous to internal security of U. S. in event of emergency involving Cuba and U. S. There should be substantial showing of following:

- (1) Individual has served in pro-Castro organization as leader or officer or engaged in preparation or distribution of pro-Cuban or anti-U. S. propaganda; active collection of funds for any agency or representative of Cuban Government or pro-Castro group; acts of violence against anti-Castro individuals or groups or against U. S.; or active collection of intelligence data regarding national defense of U. S. which would serve purposes of Cuban Government, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that such data is to be or has been conveyed to any agency or representative of Cuban Government.
- (2) Based on overt acts or statements or other evidence, there are reasonable grounds to believe loyalty of individual would lie with Cuban Government in event of armed conflict between Cuba and U. S.
- (3) Alien of Cuban nationality or holding Cuban citizenship who (a) is likely to foster, encourage, or promote policies, programs, or objectives of Cuban Government, or collaborate with Cuban Government or (b) is likely to engage in or attempt to engage in acts of espionage, sabotage, or other activities detrimental to U. S. defense. Take into consideration (a) participation in organizations supporting Castro regime, (b) participation in picket lines formed in support of Cuban Government, or (c) contacts with Cuban agents operating in U. S. on behalf of Cuban Government.

- (4) In all instances there must be clear showing, by overt acts or statements or other evidence, that there has been continuing sympathy for aims and objectives of Cuban Government since 10-1-60. Citizenship status must be clearly established.
- c. Pro-Cuban activity
All individuals in security index under basic criteria (item 3a, above) should be tabbed "Pro-Cuban" if by their activities and sympathies they warrant special consideration in event of limited emergency involving Cuba and U. S. This tabbing includes Cubans and non-Cubans who have engaged in activities in support of Cuban Government or pro-Castro groups. For this tabbing, submit FD-122 to Bureau with notation "Pro-Cuban" typed opposite words "Miscellaneous (specify)." Attach page containing concise summary of facts supporting recommendation. Security index cards sent to field on such subjects contain letter "C" on left side of card at beginning of second line. These cards are not kept in "Cuban" special section but are tabbed with metal tabs.
- d. Evaluating interviews for security index status
(1) Positive statement to interviewing Agents clearly indicating adherence to doctrines, aims, or purposes of revolutionary organization or front organization shall be considered overt act.
(2) Other than above, interviews are not factors in making determination as to security index; e.g., lack of cooperation or partial cooperation are not factors.
- e. Effect of resort to fifth amendment
Department has advised resort to fifth amendment by witness appearing before governmental body should be considered overt act within security index criteria (1) when subject was asked directly concerning present membership in subversive organization and (2) when question calls for response as to past membership in organization in those cases in which available information would seem to bring subject within criteria except for overt act within required period.
- f. Activity in Nation of Islam and other black nationalist extremist groups
Department has advised Nation of Islam constitutes potentially dangerous instrumentality in event of national emergency; statements and activities of individuals in Nation of Islam indicating anarchist and revolutionary beliefs should be considered in making judgment as to whether or not member should be in security index. Give particular attention to developing and reporting such statements, including violent and revolutionary statements made by other members in subject's presence. Statements should be reported in detail. Apply these instructions to other black nationalist extremist groups.
4. Recommendations for and preparation of security index cards
a. SAC must personally recommend inclusion in and removal of any name from security index except in offices having more than 1,000 security index subjects, where recommendations can be made by SAC, ASAC, or Bureau-approved security supervisor.
b. Where potential dangerousness of subject has been established, office of origin is to submit recommendation to Bureau on form FD-122, in triplicate. Forward original and copy to Bureau, and place copy in subject's file. Nothing should appear on FD-122 which is not in subject's file. FD-122 has two uses: (1) to recommend subject for security index and (2) to submit changes for existing cards. Submit abstract when recommending subject for security index but no abstract for additions, deletions, or changes.
c. When FD-122 is submitted to recommend subject for security index, attach additional page or pages setting out succinct summary of facts on which recommendation based. Facts must be in sufficient detail to support recommendation, including justification for designated priority level for apprehension. Statements of conclusion are not enough and original sources must be characterized as to reliability. Summary must show pertinent data of subject's activities.

- d. If, at conclusion of investigation, subject is not being recommended for security index, set out brief summary statement in appropriate closing communication showing reasons.
 - e. Current summary report must be submitted to Bureau when subject is being recommended for security index. If case is pending because of outstanding leads, set out additional lead to follow authorization of security index card by Bureau and, if approved, to disseminate copy of report to Secret Service. If case would otherwise be closed, place in pending-inactive status with lead to follow authorization by Bureau and, if approved, disseminate copy of report to Secret Service and then close case administratively.
 - f. Recommendations for security index should not be delayed because of absence of background or descriptive data. Submit recommendation with current report and retain in pending status to obtain missing items.
 - g. Subjects missing or out of country may be recommended for security index. FD-122 should include data required for unavailable section.
 - h. When FD-122 is submitted recommending subject of Chinese extraction, include words "Other - Chinese" under race. When recommending person not of Chinese extraction but who has definite sympathies for Communist China, include under "Miscellaneous" following statement: "sympathetic to Communist China."
 - i. If Bureau approves recommendation, security index cards will be prepared. Copy of FD-122 will be returned stamped "Security Index card approved and prepared, three copies attached. Place description and photograph on reverse side of Geographical card. Cards should be filed in your Security Index." These cards should be filed in security index as outlined below. Place returned copy of FD-122 in subject's main file. (Offices with geographical breakdown by residence and employment will receive extra card.)
 - j. When cards are received from Bureau, check data for accuracy. Cards will be complete except for description and photograph. Descriptions and photographs are maintained on separate cards which are stapled to back of two security index cards. File one of these cards in geographical section (except special section and unavailable section cards). File other in duplicate security index maintained away from headquarters city. Third security index card is filed in alphabetical section.
5. Content and appearance of security index card
- a. Data to appear on face of card

When complete, face of security index card should contain following information. If any items are missing, case should be continued pending to obtain necessary information. Set forth under each item are possible categories in which subject may be classified and code letters which should be placed in appropriate space on form FD-122. Code letters should appear on security index cards received from Bureau.

 - (1) Name and aliases

Full and correct name and aliases of subject
 - (2) Race

White and Caucasian	W
Negro	N
Chinese	C
Others	O

(All others, including Orientals (except Chinese), American Indians, etc.)
 - (3) Sex

Male	M
Female	F
 - (4) Citizenship

Native born	NB
Naturalized	NA
Alien	AL

(If unknown, space should be left blank, but status should be ascertained and submitted by FD-122.)

- (5) Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency
 - American Socialist Clubs ASC
 - American Workers' Communist Party AWC
 - Anarchist ANA
 - Black Nationalist BNT
 - Black Panther Party BPP
 - Communist Party, USA COM
 - Johnson-Forest Group JFG
 - Minutemen MIN
 - Nation of Islam NOI
 - Nationalist groups
 - advocating independence for Puerto Rico PRN
 - Progressive Labor Party PLP
 - Proletarian Party of America PPA
 - Revolutionary Action Movement RAM
 - Socialist Workers Party SWP
 - Spartacist League SPL
 - Student National Coordinating Committee SNC
 - Students for a Democratic Society SDS
 - Workers World Party WWP
 - Bulgarian BUL
 - Cuban CUB
 - Czechoslovakian CZE
 - Hungarian HUN
 - Romanian ROM
 - Russian RUS
 - Yugoslavian YUG
 - (6) Priority designation
 - Priority I P I
 - Priority II P II
 - Priority III P III
 - (7) Top functionary designation (where applicable)
 - Top functionary TF
 - (8) Special section cards
 - Atomic energy program employees AEP
 - Cuban special section CUB
 - Espionage subjects ESP
 - Foreign government employees FGE
 - Pro-Tito subjects YUG
 - United Nations employees UNE
 - U. S. Government employees GOV
 - (9) Unavailable section cards
 - Missing MI
 - Out of country OC
 - Imprisoned PR
 - (10) Date and place of birth
 - (11) Key facility geographical reference number (obtained from Department of Defense Key Facilities List) and abbreviation denoting agency having security responsibility
 - (12) Residence address
 - (13) Employment address and any additional data deemed necessary to assist in locating subject in emergency. Labor union affiliation, if any.
 - (14) Field office file number
- b. Data to appear on separate attached card
- (1) Place following data on separate card attached to reverse side of security index card being filed in geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Cards contain printed captions for recording descriptive data which can be augmented if necessary.

- (a) Complete description
 - (b) Notation that security index flash notice has been posted in Identification Division
 - (c) Photograph, with date taken. It is to be most current or best likeness of subject.
 - (d) Dangerous characteristics of subject, including notation if subject possesses firearms
 - (e) Other data which will assist in apprehension, such as directions to residence or employment when these are unusual, number of minor children and aged dependents
- (2) If descriptive data have not been obtained, case must be kept pending. Upon posting of security index flash notice, field will be furnished FBI number and fingerprint classification which should be affixed to reverse side of security index cards filed in geographical, special, and unavailable sections.
- (3) Use FD-186 to report information for separate card attached to back of security index card. Case Agent should fill in form and forward to clerical employee designated to post information. Thereafter, file FD-186 in case file. FD-186 may be used to record information that subject has been physically observed and to note descriptive data.

6. Arrangement of security index

a. At Bureau

Entire index is maintained on IBM tabulating cards. Security index cards are printed by automatic data processing and transmitted to field. An alphabetical breakdown of true names and all aliases of subjects is also maintained at Bureau for administrative purposes.

b. In field office

Active security index in each field office is maintained in four sections: geographical, alphabetical, unavailable, and special sections. Complete set of each field office's security index is also maintained away from headquarters city in same manner as geographical section with unavailable and special section cards filed in back.

(1) Geographical section

After receipt of three security index cards from Bureau and after necessary data have been added to two cards, file one in geographical section of index (except special section and unavailable section cards) and one in duplicate set maintained away from headquarters city. Geographical section is broken down by residence address in accordance with needs of each office. Where logical, it should be broken down by state, county, city, and, if needed, into boroughs or suburbs and precincts. Cards are filed alphabetically under each geographical breakdown. Cards in this section will be withdrawn and used by Agents should apprehension of subjects become necessary.

Cards will show "unknown" residence for (a) subjects whose addresses are not known but prompt location within division is expected and (b) subjects whose location in another division is in process of verification. File these cards in breakdown designated "Verification Pending." With Bureau authority, offices covering large industrial areas may set up second geographical section and file cards by subjects' employment. Depending on time of day apprehensions are initiated, geographical-employment or geographical-residence section may be used.

(2) Alphabetical section

File duplicate card alphabetically in this section; there is no other breakdown. Alphabetical card is control card. If card is withdrawn from geographical section for apprehension, make notation on alphabetical card.

(3) Special section

Retain cards on individuals in following categories in special section for reasons stated. Maintain special section in subsections as follows:

- (a) Espionage subjects
When apprehension of subject will destroy chances of penetration and control of operating espionage parallel or destroy chances of penetration and control of "sleeper" parallel
- (b) U. S. Government employees
So their identities can be readily determined and consideration given to each before apprehension is ordered
- (c) Atomic energy program employees
Because their apprehension must be cleared with Atomic Energy Commission representatives to avoid interference with atomic energy work
- (d) Foreign government employees
So consideration may be given to each on basis of relations then existing between U. S. Government and country involved
- (e) United Nations Secretariat and other international organization employees
Because State Department must be notified after such apprehensions take place. This category includes U. S. citizens and immigrants or stateless persons not holding diplomatic visas and not having protection of International Organization Immunities Act.
- (f) Pro-Tito individuals
Because such individuals, although pro-Marxist-Leninist, adhere to Tito form of communism and it is not possible to predict whether Tito would become aligned with Russia in event of open hostilities or would align himself on side of U. S. This does not include members of communist groups who from time to time make statements in support of Tito, but only individuals, particularly those of Yugoslav birth or descent, whose support of Tito is clear and unequivocal regardless of Yugoslavia's foreign policies.
- (g) Cuban
So that, in event of emergency involving Cuba and U. S., special handling may be afforded those subjects on index solely on basis of pro-Castro affiliations, activities, or sympathies. (Security index cards denoting such contain code "CUB" on line 1.)

FD-122 recommending individuals in one of above categories should include words "Special Section" typed in upper right portion. Type proper category in space after "Miscellaneous (Specify)."

Cards for special section bear appropriate code letters in upper right portion designating proper subsection. When cards of subjects in these categories are received from Bureau, check for accuracy, place required additional data on two, and file alphabetically in appropriate subsection of special section. File third card in alphabetical section. Never file special section cards in geographical section.

When subject no longer comes within one of categories of special section, submit FD-122 with words "Remove from Special Section" typed in space provided after "Miscellaneous (Specify)." If card should be placed in unavailable section, add "Place in Unavailable Section" in this space. When new cards are received from Bureau, destroy old cards. Special section card shall indicate priority level for apprehension, although it is not contemplated that subjects in this section will be apprehended under mass apprehension program. Cases will be given individual attention and subjects will not be apprehended in absence of specific Bureau instructions.

(4) Unavailable section

Security index cards of individuals who are missing, out of the country, or are imprisoned are retained in unavailable section, broken down into three subsections headed by tabs, as follows:

(a) Missing subjects

Subjects are not to be included in unavailable section as missing immediately upon determination they are no longer at previously known places of residence or employment. Action required in instructions for missing subjects must be taken prior to placing subject in unavailable section. If subject is missing, word "Missing" is typed in space provided on FD-122 after "Miscellaneous (Specify)."

(b) Subjects out of country

Place cards for subject who have departed from U. S. or Puerto Rico for foreign country in this subsection unless cards should be cancelled in accordance with instructions below under permanent departure.

Investigation of subject not yet in security index may be in progress at time subject departed for foreign country. If facts otherwise warrant security index action, submit FD-122 recommending inclusion in unavailable section.

If subject is out of country, type words "Out of Country," in space provided on FD-122 after "Miscellaneous (Specify)." If foreign address known, place it on FD-122 in space provided. If subject is only known to be in certain foreign country or is only known to be traveling abroad, include this on FD-122. If subject's current employment abroad is known, include on FD-122.

Follow case of any security index subject who is out of country at least once each year for verification of address and to determine if subject has returned. Place appropriate stops with Immigration and Naturalization Service to be advised of subject's return.

(c) Imprisoned subjects

Place cards of imprisoned security index subjects in unavailable section. Type word "Imprisoned" in space provided on FD-122 after "Miscellaneous (Specify)." Show identity of institution in which subject is incarcerated in space provided for residence. Arrange with confining institution to be informed of subject's release. Set up-tickler for date shortly prior to expected release to verify release. After release, determine whether subject should be retained in security index.

When submitting recommendation for unavailable section, include words "Unavailable Section" in upper right portion of FD-122. Do not include former residence or former employment on cards of subjects who are missing, out of country, or imprisoned. Cards for unavailable section shall bear code letters in upper right portion designating proper subsection. Upon receipt of three cards from Bureau, check for accuracy, place required additional data on two, and file alphabetically in appropriate subsection. File third card in alphabetical section. When a missing subject is located or subject who has been out of country has returned or imprisoned subject released, submit FD-122 showing current residence and place of employment. Type words "Remove from Unavailable Section" in space provided after "Miscellaneous (Specify)." If card is to be placed in special section, "Place in Special Section - Espionage (or Foreign Government Employee, etc.)" should be added. When new cards are received from Bureau, check for accuracy and place description and photograph, if available, on two of three cards. File these cards in geographical or special section (where applicable) and file other card in alphabetical section. Destroy old cards.

When subject in unavailable section is located in another division, submit FD-129 to Bureau and new office of origin. Type "Remove from Unavailable Section" in space to right of addresses. Bureau will send new security index cards to new office of origin.

(d) Exception - re special section

Special section subjects who are unavailable are maintained in special section rather than unavailable section. When special section subject is out of country, imprisoned, or missing, submit FD-122 with appropriate unavailable category designated. New cards will be prepared. Upon receipt of amended cards from Bureau, file two in special section and one in alphabetical section.

(5) Inactive section

Each office shall maintain inactive section in its security index to contain cards of subjects who were in active security index when inducted into armed forces.

Upon learning of induction, submit letter to Bureau advising branch of service and date and place of induction. If there is pertinent information which has not been set forth in report, prepare report and forward by letter advising of subject's induction. Bureau will furnish appropriate intelligence agencies with pertinent information and request notification of subject's discharge from service.

Place geographical cards for such subjects in inactive section and destroy alphabetical cards.

Set up administrative tickler for each subject in inactive section. Each six months make appropriate inquiry to determine if subject has been discharged. Make such checks locally, through pretext inquiries if necessary. If information is not obtainable locally, submit letter requesting check of office covering records of appropriate service.

When subject in inactive section has returned to civilian status, determine whether his activities warrant inclusion in active security index. If so, submit FD-122 completely filled out as if initial recommendation is being made, and submit current report. If not, furnish Bureau reasons for not reactivating security index card. In either case, cancel inactive card.

7. Periodic verification of addresses

- a. Data on security index cards shall be up to date at all times.
- b. Whereabouts of all security index subjects should be known at all times. Check residence and business addresses of subjects in priority I at least once each three months. Residence and business address of all other security index subjects must be checked at least once each year, except those imprisoned and those in security index because of disaffection for U. S. (see section 105G). Residence and employment of latter must be verified every 90 days. Case of any subject who is out of country must be followed at least once every year to determine if he has returned.

Arrange to be advised on current basis of any indication subject is engaged in subversive activities, is exhibiting violent tendencies, or plans to change residence or employment. Checks to verify residence or business addresses may be made under pretext by telephone once each six months for priority I subjects and once every two years for all others.

- c. Physical characteristics and description of each security index subject shall be determined or verified by personal observation and noted in case file. If not observed previously, do so during next verification of addresses.

- d. Use FD-154 when it will facilitate verifying addresses. When FD-154 is not used, notation should be made on last FD-154, FD-122, or FD-128 in subject's file showing addresses and date verified. Each time residence and employment verified, reevaluate case to assure subject is still within criteria. Make notation in file to this effect.
 - e. If residence or business address or both have changed, submit FD-122 to Bureau showing only changes to be made. Also submit to Bureau FD-366 for dissemination to Secret Service. Advise Secret Service locally by FD-366.
 - f. Handle verifying addresses of security index subjects by reopening and assigning cases for verification and closing administratively when accomplished. In priority I and II cases, conduct verification of residence and employment when preparing reports and include therein. In priority III cases, record verification of residence and employment on FD-154 and place in case file.
8. Changes, additions, and deletions of data on security index cards
- a. Submit to Bureau by FD-122 any changes, additions, or deletions involving name, aliases, citizenship, organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies, priority designation, date or place of birth, key facility geographical reference number, abbreviation of agency having security responsibility, residence or business address. Exception: Change office of origin by FD-128.
 - b. Temporary handwritten notations may be made on existing cards pending receipt of corrected cards from Bureau.
 - c. Set out only items being changed, added, or deleted. If being deleted, specify "Delete."
 - d. Upon receipt from Bureau of corrected card with copy of FD-122, take following action:
 - (1) Check accuracy of data on cards.
 - (2) Transfer separate cards with descriptive data and photograph from back of old geographical section cards to corrected cards, and file in geographical section. Exception: For special or unavailable section subjects, see instructions for these sections.
 - (3) File third card in alphabetical section.
 - (4) Destroy old cards.
9. Movement of subjects between offices
- a. Subjects of security index cards
 - (1) Assign immediately requests from other offices to verify addresses of subjects and transmit results within two weeks.
 - (2) New office furnish old office information concerning key facility employment of subject so that geographical reference number, agency having security responsibility, and interested agencies can be included on FD-128 submitted by old office of origin.
 - (3) Office of origin, upon verification of address, immediately submit FD-128 transferring office of origin.
 - (4) Submit original and one copy of FD-128 to Bureau. Submit two copies to office covering new address, enclosing copies of all previous reports, other pertinent serials, photograph if available, and security index cards. Show full title and priority designation.
 - (5) Where flash notice has been placed with Identification Division, note on FD-128 and designate extra copy of FD-128 for Bureau for attention of Identification Division.
 - (6) Old office of origin will submit current report in priority I and II cases and succinct LHM in priority III cases. In latter instance, yellow file copy of LHM in old office of origin must include notations indicating exact location of all original information set forth in LHM.

Do not delay submission of FD-128 solely for preparation of report or LHM, but note on FD-128 that appropriate communication is being prepared. Old office of origin is responsible for furnishing Secret Service locally with subject's new residence and business address. Case will remain pending in both old and new offices until report or LHM is submitted by old office. New office of origin is responsible to follow matter until completed.

- (7) New office of origin is to review pertinent material received with FD-128 and information in its files to determine if additional investigation is warranted. If not, advise Bureau by letter case is being closed.
- (8) Upon receipt of FD-128, office covering new address is origin and should place office file number on security index cards and file them in its security index.
- (9) Upon receipt of new cards from Bureau with copy of FD-128, new office is to transfer information from reverse side of old geographical cards to two new cards, appropriately file new cards, and destroy old cards.
- b. Top functionaries
Above-described mechanics of transferring cases also apply to top functionaries. Additional procedures in this category are:
 - (1) Notification to Bureau of deletion of subject as top functionary in old office of origin is handled by designation in space provided on FD-128 that subject was top functionary.
 - (2) Upon receipt of FD-128, new office of origin shall automatically designate subject top functionary and keep case pending. After investigation is completed and summary report has been submitted by old office, case may be placed in pending-inactive status. Within three months, new office is to conduct investigation, submit report, and advise Bureau concerning continued designation as top functionary.
- c. Subjects tabbed for priority
Security index card shall continue to be tabbed for priority apprehension in new office of origin until that office determines that priority designation is not warranted under provisions set forth below.
- d. Subjects not included in security index
 - (1) Transfer office of origin by FD-128 only upon verification by another office of subject's presence in that division. Enclose copies of all investigative reports and other pertinent serials to new office of origin.
 - (2) New office of origin is to investigate or advise Bureau case closed if no action warranted.
10. Cancellation and removal of cards from active security index
SAC must personally recommend removal of any name from security index except in offices having more than 1,000 security index subjects where recommendations may be made by SAC, ASAC, or Bureau-approved security supervisor.
 - a. Death of subject
Destroy card and advise Bureau by LHM.
 - b. Permanent departure
Upon learning of subject's departure from U. S. or Puerto Rico for foreign country, immediately ascertain conditions of departure for foreign country. No security index card shall be cancelled by reason of such departure unless subject is alien who has permanently departed and whose departure has been verified. If U. S. citizen who has been out of country has renounced his citizenship and taken citizenship of foreign country, security index card may be cancelled only after it has been determined he does not intend to return to U. S.
 - c. Imprisonment of subject
Do not cancel security index cards because subject imprisoned, regardless of length of time he will be incarcerated. Place cards in unavailable section and handle as set forth under imprisoned subjects above.
 - d. Induction of subject into armed forces
Place security index cards in inactive section and follow procedure set forth above under inactive section.
 - e. Security informants
Security index card may be destroyed upon receipt of Bureau authority to designate person security informant. In requesting Bureau authority to designate individual as security informant, call attention to security index card and recommend cancellation.

- f. Subject no longer dangerous or potentially dangerous
Frequently information is received or investigation develops that subject is no longer threat to internal security by reason of physical condition, defection, or expulsion from subversive movement. Such defection may be shown by lack of activity and obvious disinterest over extended period or declaration of opposition to principles of subversive movement.

When there is sufficient information regarding subject's present sympathies to conclude he should no longer be considered dangerous, request authority for interview or advise Bureau why subject should not be interviewed. Bureau will not cancel security index card without consideration being given to interview. If, upon interview, subject proves cooperative, advise Bureau by letter and recommend cancellation.

- g. Subjects removed from security index solely upon basis of application of security index criteria, with no affirmative indication of defection

With passage of time, limits specified in security index criteria will operate to remove subjects even though there is no affirmative indication of defection. When recommending such removal, consider if facts warrant inclusion of subject in section A of reserve index. Following procedures are for subjects not being recommended for inclusion in section A of reserve index:

- (1) When subjects are removed from security index solely on basis of application of criteria, retain security index cards bearing descriptive matter on reverse sides; i.e., cards previously filed in geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Destroy cards previously filed in alphabetical section. Those offices maintaining two sets of geographical cards should retain only one card.
- (2) Mark "cancelled" across face of each card retained and file in reserve index, section B.
- (3) Above instructions do not apply to individuals removed from security index based upon activity in Nation of Islam. Their cards should be destroyed.

11. Priority apprehension program

a. Purpose

Some security index subjects, because of their training, violent tendencies, or prominence in subversive activity, would be more inclined or more capable of committing acts against U. S. in time of national emergency than others. Such subjects must be immobilized in least possible time. Individuals in security index tabbed priority I, and possibly priority II, would be arrested first in event of limited but grave emergency, probably without arrest of other subjects. In all-out emergency, consideration for apprehension will be given to all subjects. Decision as to priority of apprehension should be based on subject's subversive activities and revolutionary tendencies.

b. Priority tabbing

- (1) Each security index subject should be considered for priority I tabbing who falls within following categories:
 - (a) All top functionaries
 - (b) All individuals considered to be hard-core national and state leaders of basic revolutionary organizations and leaders of other subversive organizations and unorganized groups and individuals who have indicated propensity for violence and/or have received special training in sabotage, espionage, and/or guerrilla warfare, or have engaged in underground operations
 - (c) Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities

- (2) Security index subjects considered for priority II
All individuals who are considered to be of second level leadership of basic revolutionary organizations and other subversive organizations and individuals who present significant threat but are in less influential positions than those in priority I
 - (3) All other security index subjects will be tabbed priority III.
 - c. Recommendations for priority tabbing
 - (1) Approval of SAC
Designation of each subject as to priority or any change in priority must be personally approved by SAC, or in office having more than 1,000 security index subjects by SAC, ASAC, or Bureau-approved security supervisor.
 - (2) When FD-122 is submitted recommending either tabbing for priority or change in such tabbing, attach additional page setting forth brief summary of facts supporting recommendation.
 - d. Administrative procedures
Take following action to assure security index cards will be readily available for emergency action:
 - (1) Geographical section
Divide geographical section into three parts.
 - (a) Cards for subjects tabbed priority I
 - (b) Cards for subjects tabbed priority II
 - (c) Cards for subjects tabbed priority III
 - (d) In offices having two geographical sections, i.e., geographical-employment and geographical-residence, each section must have parts I, II, and III.
 - (e) Priority cards will be following colors:
Priority I - beige, priority II - green, priority III - white
 - (2) Alphabetical section
Alphabetical section is broken down into two groupings. First group includes priority I and II cards. Second group contains priority III cards
 - e. Tabbing of cards
Tab alphabetical cards on subjects designated "Pro-Cuban" with metal tab.
12. Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities
- a. Responsibility
FBI is responsible by Presidential directive to advise interested Federal agencies of developments affecting plants having armed forces contracts, as well as other facilities, utilities, and critical points of transportation and communications systems which have been designated vital to national defense by Department of Defense. FBI is responsible under Delimitations Agreement for investigating employees of private contractors who have contracts with agencies of Department of Defense where there is credible subversive information concerning employee. Conduct thorough investigation and consider for security index any individual employed in or having access to key facility who is alleged to have been, at any time in past, member of any basic revolutionary organization or against whom there is sufficient other subversive information to warrant such action.
 - (1) Requests for investigation from another agency
When another agency requests investigation of individual employed in key facility, institute investigation immediately if basis of request so warrants, and advise Bureau.
 - (2) Verification of key facility status
Check Department of Defense Key Facilities List (maintained in each office) for verification that subject's place of employment is included.
 - (3) Individuals denied access to restricted information
Intelligence agencies of armed forces frequently report individual has been denied clearance to work in defense plant or to handle classified or restricted information. Intelligence agency is responsible for furnishing Bureau with any information involving

disloyalty or subversiveness. Office receiving such notification must ascertain promptly basis for denial and obtain all pertinent data contained in file of agency responsible for such action. Forward data to Bureau and include in next report submitted. Where no investigation has been conducted by Bureau, open security investigation if information warrants.

b. Inclusion in security index

In recommending key facility employee for security index, FD-122 is to contain:

- (1) Key facility geographical reference number
- (2) Abbreviation for Department of Army (A), which has been designated agency having security responsibility for all key facilities
- (3) Abbreviations for other agencies known to have classified contracts with key facility. Interested agencies are identified on FD-122 to assure proper dissemination of reports but will not appear on security index cards.
- (4) Recommendation for priority I designation

c. Dissemination

Upon receipt of allegation concerning key facility employee from source other than interested intelligence agency, immediately furnish by letter to interested agency (1) summary of allegation and information concerning individual; (2) a statement that information is unsubstantiated and has not been verified through investigation; (3) advice as to whether security investigation is being conducted and, if so, that copies of reports will be furnished upon completion. With exception noted below, disseminate information of derogatory security nature concerning persons employed at facilities holding classified contracts both to interested intelligence agencies and to Chief, Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO), Defense Supply Agency, Columbus, Ohio 43215, attention Chief, Adjudication Division (advise interested intelligence agency of dissemination to DISCO). This includes persons who may not currently be key facility employees but are known to hold industrial security clearances. Exception involves facilities holding classified contracts with Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). Dissemination to AEC is made only at Bureau.

These instructions do not apply to allegations of espionage or those of confidential character not ordinarily disseminated. Such information of direct interest to other intelligence agencies should be submitted to Bureau expeditiously with request that Bureau consider dissemination.

Disseminate copies of reports for Marine Corps locally to Naval Investigative Service Office (NISCO). Dissemination to Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA), Research and Development Board (RDB), and Maritime Administration (MA) is made only at Bureau.

d. Status of cases

After all investigation is conducted, place in pending-inactive status. Make case pending-active 45 days before report due and check with armed services representative at key facility or with other reliable sources to determine whether subject has access to classified or restricted material.

e. Reports

See Manual of Rules and Regulations, part II, section 4D, item 2a, (6), and section 4M, item 4, for instructions concerning synopsis and classification of reports in key facility cases. Synopsis must set forth employment and statement that subject has or has not access to classified or restricted material.

13. Top functionary program

a. General

Purpose is to select for special attention individuals of key importance to subversive movement.

b. Definition

Top functionary is individual who is on high-policy level in CPUSA, other subversive organizations, or unorganized groups, to whom it is necessary to give continuous investigative attention because of his importance. Term "top functionary" does not require that individuals actually hold official positions in organizations but is given broad construction to include others of equal importance because of their influence in movement itself, or their position and activities outside movement in labor, front, or similar organizations. Consider black nationalist extremists whose importance justifies continuous investigative attention.

c. Manner of designation

Prior Bureau authority necessary to designate subject as top functionary. Top functionaries are to be in priority I and reports are submitted annually.

d. Regulations governing handling of top functionaries

(1) Designation and deletion of top functionary status

Handle by letter to Bureau containing brief statement of reason for designation or deletion.

(2) Photographs

Obtain photographs for each top functionary. Send two copies (one for Secret Service) to Bureau, either by cover letter or as enclosure to report. Maintain copy in subject's file. If album of top functionary photographs maintained, keep duplicate in subject's file.

(3) Handwriting specimens

Obtain suitable handwriting specimens of each top functionary. When possible, obtain specimens from public records, law enforcement agencies, and similar sources. Send specimens to Bureau under separate cover letter by registered mail for attention of FBI Laboratory. When they may be of value as evidence, so state in transmittal letter and request their return after copies have been made. Specimens should be sufficient to permit future comparisons by Laboratory.

(4) Security index cards

Request preparation by FD-122 at earliest possible moment.

(5) Change of office of origin

FD-128 changing office of origin on top functionary automatically deletes him as top functionary in old office and adds him as top functionary in new office.

(6) Reports

Character - Internal Security - (followed by appropriate letter designating organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency)

e. Maintenance of list

Each office must maintain current list of top functionaries.

14. Correlation of other investigations with security index and reserve index
- Individuals investigated by Bureau under any classification against whom subversive information is developed must be considered for security index and/or reserve index. This includes espionage, foreign intelligence, applicant-type, and security of Government employees (SGE) investigations. When individual previously investigated under SGE classification is security index subject and is still employed by Federal Government or is being considered for Federal employment, use dual character of "Security of Government Employees" and character of security case in reports to insure routing to proper field and Bureau desks for supervision. Use standards prevailing for SGE reports. Disseminate these reports as any other security report. Advise representatives of other agencies requesting reports of SGE investigation to direct request to their headquarters for referral to Bureau.

[H. REPORTS ON INDIVIDUALS

[1. General

[Cases of all security index subjects must be reopened for preparation of
[reports following schedule below. Critically analyze each case in light
[of security index criteria each time it is reopened and brought up to date.

[2. Schedule of submission of reports

[a. Priority I - annually

[b. Priority II - annually

[c. Priority III - initial report must be summary. Subsequent informa-
[tion may be furnished by LHM. Each office is responsible to insure
[all pertinent developments are furnished Bureau.

[3. Origin

[Office covering territory in which subject's subversive activities occur

[4. Classification

[a. 100 - for individuals affiliated with basic revolutionary and front
[organizations of Marxist ideology

[b. 105 - for member of Puerto Rican nationalist groups or others having
[foreign nationalistic tendencies

[c. 157 - Nation of Islam and other black nationalist subjects

[5. Title

[Only one subject shall be carried in title of each report. Separate
[reports must be submitted for each subject regardless of relationship;
[i.e., husband and wife, father and son, etc.

[6. Character

[a. Top functionaries

[Internal Security (or Racial Matters, if subject is black nationalist) -
[followed by letters designating organizational affiliation or nation-
[alistic tendencies. Examples:

[Internal Security - C

[Internal Security - SWP

[Racial Matters - NOI

[b. Others

[Security Matter - followed by letters designating organizational
[affiliation or nationalistic tendencies. Examples:

[Security Matter - C

[Security Matter - SWP

[Security Matter - X (native fascist)

[Security Matter - M (miscellaneous)

[When subject is deleted as top functionary, change character from in-
[ternal security to security matter in next communication. Communica-
[tions regarding subjects employed in key facilities should have "Key
[Facility" in character. Communications regarding CPUSA National
[Committee members should have "National Committee" in character.
[Black nationalist investigations and racial matters should have
[character as set out in section 122, volume IV, of this manual.

[7. Status

[Carry cases as pending until all active investigation has been conducted.
[Thereafter, status shall be as follows:

[a. Top functionaries

[Pending inactive. Submit reports annually. Place case in pending-
[active status 45 days prior to date report due.

[b. Key facility cases

[Pending inactive. See instructions under individuals employed in or
[having access to key facilities.

[c. Other security index subjects

[(1) Closed

[(a) Follow by administrative tickler to insure submission of
[periodic reports according to priority designation. If,
[following investigation, no subversive data is developed
[and information consists only of verification of residence
[and employment and negative contacts with sources, sub-
[mit FD-400 in lieu of report setting forth identities of
[informants and sources contacted and any pertinent admin-
[istrative data. Also submit FD-305 properly executed.
[Open case 45 days prior to date report due.

- (b) Priority III cases must be opened for verification of residence and employment on annual basis. Review case file for any necessary action including re-evaluation of subject's status, or possible redesignation as priority I or II.

When pertinent information is submitted to Bureau for dissemination, FD-305 and FD-376 should accompany cover communication.

- d. Subjects recommended for security index
- (1) Pending inactive
If all active investigation completed at time FD-122 forwarded to Bureau, set forth lead to follow for security index approval and dissemination of report to Secret Service.
 - (2) Closed
After security index approved and dissemination to Secret Service, follow by administrative tickler for periodic report.
- e. Subject not being recommended for index
Closed - prior to closing, comply with instructions pertaining to interviews.

8. Content

- a. Include following and handle under topical headings where appropriate.
- (1) Background
 - (a) Birth data
 - (b) Citizenship status
 - (c) Education
 - (d) Marital status
 - (e) Military service record (domestic or foreign, including type of discharge, citations, etc.)
 - (f) Identification record
 - (g) Employment
 - (h) Residence
 - (i) Status of health (if known)
 - (2) Connections with Communist Party, other basic revolutionary groups, front groups, black nationalist extremist groups, and/or other subversive organizations or unorganized groups
 - (a) Information concerning admission into revolutionary group, including sponsors, etc.
 - (b) History of activity in, attendance at meetings of, and positions held in subversive movement
 - (3) Revolutionary statements by subject
 - (a) Determine each statement and full details surrounding it.
 - (b) Determine all statements showing adherence to principles of Marxism-Leninism or other revolutionary doctrines.
 - (4) Other activities indicating furtherance of program of subversive organizations
 - (a) Speeches and writings
 - (b) Organizational directives and/or educational outlines signed by or issued by subject, or issued while subject was officer of organization
 - (c) Pertinent contacts between subject and leaders of organizations
 - (d) Details concerning subject's attendance or connection with subversive training schools
 - (5) False statements made by subjects, including aliases
Evidence may be obtained from passports, tax returns, and voting, marital, employment, and selective service records.
 - (6) Miscellaneous
Pertinent items not falling under above categories
- b. Reports on individuals should be confined to:
- (1) Proof of membership and activity in basic revolutionary organizations, front organizations, and/or other organizations or unorganized groups

- (2) Position and importance of subject in subversive movement
- (3) Pertinent background information
Include only information pertinent to determining whether or not subject is engaged in subversive activities. Set out date or period to which it pertains; e.g., John Doe advised on January 15, 1970, that subject attended CP meetings in January, 1965, in Syracuse, New York.

c. Summarizing information

- (1) When prior summary reports are not suitable for dissemination, include all pertinent information in current summary report with sources fully protected.
- (2) Repetitious and cumulative items may be limited to representative number with each item set forth fully documented. Number of items will depend upon preponderance of other information showing dangerousness of subject. Base selection on need to report sufficient data to justify continued detention of subject if apprehended.
- (3) When selection of representative number of items is made, follow with summary statement that source advised during specified period of time subject also attended certain number of other meetings. (Set out file number and serial range in documenting such statements.)
- (4) Where there is extensive activity in subversive organizations, it is permissible to use narrative statements without exact dates of activity; however, show period of time involved and inclusive dates of informant reports. Do not use this type reporting in Smith Act of 1940 or ISA-50 cases. Summary statements must be statements of facts and not conclusions. Information from different sources must be reported separately.
- (5) Above instructions do not lessen responsibility for reporting all pertinent items.

9. Administrative data - cover pages

a. General

References to following administrative items should be in cover pages accompanying reports:

- (1) Reserve index, security index, file numbers and titles of other cases, priority apprehension program, top functionary status, security index flash notices (FD-165), FD-122, FD-128, and non-investigative information
- (2) When report contains data affecting subject's existing security index card, FD-305, appropriately checked, should be last page of cover pages. This form provides checklist for various items regarding security index.
- (3) Attach FD-305 to cover communication submitting LHM in priority III cases.

b. Documentation of reports

- (1) Complete documentation of all reports is required. This also applies to LHMs submitted in priority III cases.
- (2) If information necessary for complete documentation is not in subject's file, review other office files, as needed. If not obtainable, so state in cover pages.
- (3) Do not conduct extensive investigation to locate sources who previously furnished background information for purposes of documentation or to obtain documentary evidence of background information. For example, if previous investigation revealed subject, according to reliable records, such as birth, school, or Immigration and Naturalization records, was born at certain place on certain date, report it without further verification.

- (4) Office preparing summary report may include information originally obtained by another office but may not have necessary documentation. If office preparing report has copies of documents obtained by another office and identity of source, date of activity, date received, and receiving Agent are known, it is not necessary to obtain file number of original. Pertinent documentation, other than file number, should be obtained from auxiliary office.
 - (5) When report includes references to known subversives who have associated with subject, identify source of characterization in cover pages without further documentation.
 - (6) When it is necessary to obtain thumbnail sketch, place in thumbnail sketch file so it will be readily available for future use.
10. Channelizing memoranda -- destruction of
Channelizing memoranda may be destroyed following submission of reports. Copies of informant's statements designated for 100 classification files of informants may be destroyed when one year old. (See instructions for destruction of channelizing memoranda in Manual of Rules and Regulations, part II, section 3D, item 8.)

I. DISSEMINATION OF DATA DEVELOPED IN SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

1. Policy

Proper utilization of information received is foremost among Bureau's responsibilities. Information obtained during investigations should be forwarded to other interested agencies in executive branch unless there are compelling reasons not to do so. Delimitations Agreement and Presidential directives provide for dissemination to other agencies which have present or potential interest information relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and related matters.

2. Bureau requirements

Because all conceivable situations cannot be anticipated, data below pertains to representative situations which occur frequently. Basic rule is that security information must be furnished promptly to interested agencies in executive branch. Term "interested agency" must be interpreted in light of reason and common sense. Bring any unusual situations to Bureau's attention promptly for consideration.

Considerations affecting national defense in Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico necessitate broadest possible construction to requirements for dissemination to intelligence services in those areas. See Manual of Rules and Regulations, part II, section 5, pertaining to Bureau's overall responsibilities, policies, and exceptions in dissemination.

a. Members of armed forces

Delimitations Agreement between FBI and armed forces intelligence agencies (see section 102B, volume IV, of this manual) requires each agency to exchange freely and directly with other subscribing agencies all information of mutual interest. Any information developed concerning members of military services must be referred immediately to appropriate military branch having primary responsibility, even though allegations have not been fully resolved or verified. Specifically point out in such instances that information has not been verified. When it is determined security subject is member of armed services, discontinue investigation immediately, advise Bureau, and disseminate pertinent reports locally to appropriate intelligence agency. Dissemination regarding military personnel is not confined to subjects of security investigations but extends to any subversive data developed against member of armed services during FBI investigations. If member of armed forces has been in contact with security subject or any individual or group with security implications, immediately advise appropriate local intelligence service, even though security aspects of contact have not been resolved. Point out in such instances that information is unverified and transmit any additional developments immediately.

- Determine during security investigations whether subjects have any close relatives in armed forces. Promptly call such associations to attention of appropriate military intelligence services, together with pertinent data, including reports, on subjects involved. Evaluation of these associations lies entirely within province of military intelligence services, but Bureau must disseminate this information immediately upon receipt. Advise Bureau by letter concerning any subversive contacts or information developed concerning military personnel, including statement as to local dissemination and enclosing LHM setting out subversive data.
- b. Aliens and naturalized citizens
Furnish information concerning aliens and naturalized citizens which might have bearing on their deportation or denaturalization to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). If in doubt, disseminate.
 - c. Employees of or persons having regular access to key facilities or employees of plants having contracts with military services
See instructions in this section concerning individuals employed in or having access to key facilities.
 - d. Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities) which are not on key facilities list or otherwise in item c, above, and facilities which are or may become engaged in manufacture of materials vital to national defense
Disseminate locally to Army and other intelligence services if their interest is apparent.
 - e. Individuals on inactive duty who are members of or hold commissions in reserve branches or National Guard
Disseminate locally to appropriate military intelligence service.
 - f. Seamen and subjects employed in maritime industry, including long-shoremen and water-front employees
Disseminate locally to Coast Guard and, when circumstances dictate, to other interested intelligence agencies, including NISO.
 - g. Employees of Federal Government within purview of Executive Order 10450
No dissemination of reports in security of Government employees cases may be made in field. If, however, subject is employed in key facility, furnish copies of reports bearing dual character, "Security of Government Employees; Security Matter - C," to appropriate intelligence agencies of armed services. Instructions regarding dissemination to Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, Defense Supply Agency, Columbus, Ohio, appear in this section of this manual under individuals employed in or having access to key facilities - dissemination. Instructions regarding all phases of FBI responsibilities under Executive Order 10450 are in section 19, volume II, of this manual.
 - h. Individuals who own property or reside in immediate vicinity of installation or other premises under cognizance of branch of armed services
Disseminate locally to intelligence service of military branch involved.
 - i. Airmen issued certificates by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
FAA issues certificates to airmen, defined as persons in command or acting as pilot, mechanic, or member of crew in navigation of aircraft while under way; individuals directly in charge of inspection, maintenance, overhauling, or repair of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances; and any individual serving in capacity of aircraft dispatcher or air-traffic control tower operator. Furnish to Bureau subversive data concerning such persons by report or LHM. In cover communication, recommend such data be furnished to FAA. Dissemination will be made only at Bureau. For additional instructions regarding dissemination to FAA, see Manual of Rules and Regulations, part II, section 5.

j. Dissemination to Secret Service

Under agreement between FBI and Secret Service concerning Presidential protection dated 2-3-65 (set out in entirety in section 102, volume IV, of this manual), reports are disseminated to Secret Service in all security index cases. Furnish Bureau extra copy of reports in these cases.

- (1) Secret Service must be advised of reason or reasons for referral; that is, statement of class or classes in appendix B of agreement which applies to subject. Use FD-376, which serves as letter of transmittal for both local and SOG dissemination. Forward original and one copy to Bureau. Maintain copy in case file and upon transfer of origin, furnish copy to new office of origin. Be certain individual is properly categorized. When subject is being recommended for security index, withhold dissemination pending Bureau approval only if subject is in category 3 of agreement. Make prompt dissemination of information developed on subjects other than those in category 3.
- (2) If subject of prior investigation is being recommended for security index, do not disseminate prior reports. Prepare LHM containing pertinent information previously developed and disseminate to Secret Service with current report. Forward copies of LHM to Bureau for SOG dissemination.
- (3) FD-376 should accompany LHM submitted in priority III cases.
- (4) After initial dissemination to Secret Service in security index cases, as changes occur in residence and employment, advise Secret Service locally and furnish two copies of LHM, containing reference to previous communication disseminated to Secret Service, to Bureau for SOG dissemination. FD-366 may be used for this purpose.
- (5) When reporting changes in residence and/or employment of Chinese and Cuban aliens on security index, disseminate to Secret Service, advise INS locally, and furnish four copies of LHM to Bureau for SOG dissemination. Copy furnished INS locally and two copies furnished Bureau should reference last communication to INS.
- (6) For instructions pertaining to dissemination to Secret Service in matters involving threats against President, refer to section 134B, volume IV, of this manual.
- (7) Upon transfer of office of origin in these cases, old office of origin is to furnish Secret Service locally with subject's new residence and business address and advise Bureau this has been done by submission of two copies of LHM disseminated locally. New office of origin need take no action regarding dissemination to Secret Service until further changes occur in subject's status or preparation of next periodic report.

k. Dissemination at Bureau

There are situations in which dissemination is made only at Bureau. Do not disseminate information to any field branch of another Government agency where security measures are inadequate. In these instances bring data to immediate attention of Bureau for SOG dissemination. In addition, Atomic Energy Commission receives reports only through Bureau. Information relating to foreign travel plans of security subjects is disseminated to interested agencies, including State Department, only at SOG.]

locate subjects are not to be submitted. The Bureau will closely follow investigative action to locate missing security index subjects.

- II. If you receive indications that the subject went to Mexico or Canada, request the Bureau to alert other appropriate Government agencies to this possibility and to determine any available verifying information through liaison channels.
- III. If the subject is reported to have gone to any other foreign country, the Washington Field Office should be requested to check the records of the Passport Office of the State Department for verification.
- IV. When all logical leads have been exhausted in the case of a missing important functionary, consideration should be given to circularizing all field offices with the subject's photograph and background information for the purpose of alerting the entire field to the identity of the subject. Bureau authority must be obtained before circularization is made. In seeking Bureau authority, advise the Bureau as to the position held by the subject and what efforts have already been made to locate him.

If this procedure is to be effective, its application must necessarily be restrictive in the number of subjects to which it is applied. Therefore, requests to circularize must be made only after every possible lead has been exhausted and then only in the cases of the most important missing functionaries.

- (4) Individuals traveling abroad (Also consider section 105G, volume IV, of this manual.)

When information is received indicating that [(1) a subject of a current security investigation; (2) a subject whose name is included in agitator index or priorities I or II of security index, or (3) where information available indicates a subject of a past security investigation may be a "sleeper" or in an underground capacity, or where current information otherwise would indicate a need to effect foreign coverage,]

intends to travel abroad or has already departed this country for foreign travel, take following action:

- (a) Immediately advise the Bureau by letterhead memorandum setting forth complete available details concerning the foreign travel, including places and dates of departure and intended return, destination and itinerary, purpose of trip, the exact name under which the passport was issued, the number of the passport, and the office issuing the passport, if known. Include in the letterhead memorandum a full description of the subject, including all aliases, and in the case of Chinese and Korean subjects Chinese telegraphic code and Korean telegraphic code numbers, as well as a concise resume of available subversive data regarding the subject. Do not delay in advising the Bureau of the actual or intended travel while developing the details of the travel as time is of the essence in this matter.
- (b) Set out a lead for the Washington Field Office for a check of the records of the Passport Office, Department of State; however, do not limit efforts to develop above information to a check of such records.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

	<u>Page</u>
D. SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS.....	19
1. Definitions.....	19
2. Responsibility of the Bureau.....	19
3. Purpose of investigation.....	19
a. Determination of dangerousness.....	19
b. Determination of violations of Federal statutes.....	19
4. Individuals to be investigated.....	22
a. Membership in basic revolutionary organizations subsequent to 1-1-49.....	22
b. Espousing line of revolutionary movements.....	22
c. Special training in a subversive movement.....	23
d. Military service.....	23
e. Employment in key facilities.....	23
f. Other individuals with revolutionary beliefs.....	23
5. Restrictions upon investigations of individuals.....	24
a. Investigations of and interviews with individuals connected with institutions of learning.....	24
(1) Subjects connected with institutions of learning.....	24
(a) Prior Bureau authority to institute investigation.....	24
I. Faculty members.....	24
II. Students and nonacademic employees.....	24
III. Requests for Bureau authority.....	24
(b) Contacts during investigation.....	25
I. Persons permissible to contact.....	25
(A) Established sources.....	25
(B) Individuals not connected with institution of learning.....	25
II. Students and professors.....	25
III. Superiors of faculty members.....	25
(c) Receiving voluntary information.....	25
(2) Subjects not connected with an institution of learning.....	25
(3) Contacts of foreign establishments.....	25
b. U. S. Government employees, individuals having foreign diplomatic or official status, employees of foreign official establishments, employees of the United Nations or international organizations, and members of the armed forces.....	25
6. Investigative procedures concerning individuals.....	26
a. General.....	26
b. Scope of investigations.....	26
(1) Background.....	26
(a) True name and aliases.....	26
(b) Residence address.....	26
(c) Occupation or business.....	26
(d) Business or employment address.....	26
(e) Citizenship status.....	26
I. Alien.....	26
II. Naturalized citizen.....	26
III. Native-born citizen.....	26
(f) Nationality background.....	26
(g) Military record.....	27
(h) Close relatives in armed forces.....	27
(i) Identification record - (Security flash notice FD-165).....	27
(j) Physical description.....	28
(k) Photograph.....	28
(l) Handwriting specimens.....	29
(m) Labor union membership.....	29

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

	Page
(2) Subversive activity.....	29
(a) Membership or affiliation.....	29
(b) Knowledge of aims and purposes.....	29
(c) Position and importance.....	30
(3) Missing subjects.....	31
(4) Individuals traveling abroad.....	33
(5) Investigative techniques.....	34
(a) File reviews.....	34
(b) Security informants.....	34
(c) Physical surveillances.....	35
(d) Photographic surveillances.....	35
(e) Public sources.....	36
(f) Records of private firms.....	36
(g) Deleted	
(h) Deleted	
(i) Channelizing information to case files.....	36
(6) Preservation of evidence.....	37
(7) Interviews with subjects of security investigations....	38
(a) Purpose.....	38
(b) Subjects not included in the security index.....	38
(c) Security index subjects.....	38
(d) Without Bureau authority the SAC may.....	38
(e) Prior Bureau authority.....	39
(f) Preparations for and conduct of interviews.....	40
(g) Maintenance of file on defected subjects.....	42
7. Administrative procedures.....	42a
a. Reserve index.....	42a
(1) Purpose.....	42a
(2) Individuals to be included.....	42a
(3) Arrangement.....	42b
(4) Content.....	43
(5) Removal and deletion of cards.....	43
b. Security index.....	43
(1) Purpose.....	43
(2) Determination of dangerousness of an individual.....	44
(3) Criteria for placing and retaining names in the security index.....	45
(4) Recommendations for and preparation of security index cards.....	46a
(5) Content and appearance of security index card.....	48
(a) Data to appear on face of card.....	48
(b) Data to appear on separate attached card.....	50
(6) Arrangement of the security index.....	50
(a) At Bureau.....	50
(b) In the field office.....	51
I. Geographical section.....	51
II. Alphabetical section.....	51
III. Special section.....	52
(A) Espionage subjects.....	52
(B) U. S. Government employees.....	52
(C) Atomic energy program employees.....	52
(D) Foreign government employees.....	52
(E) United Nations Secretariat and other international organization employees.....	52
(F) Pro-Tito individuals.....	52
(G) Cuban.....	53
IV. Unavailable section.....	53
(A) Missing subjects.....	54
(B) Subjects out of the country.....	54
(C) Imprisoned subjects.....	54
(D) Exception - re special section.....	56

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

	<u>Page</u>
V. Inactive section.....	56
(7) Periodic verification of addresses.....	57
(8) Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing on security index cards.....	58
(9) Movement of subjects between offices and transfers of security index cards.....	58a
(a) Subjects of security index cards.....	58a
(b) Top functionaries.....	59
(c) Subjects tabbed for priority.....	60
(d) Subjects not included in security index.....	60
(10) Cancellation and removal of cards from active security index.....	60
(a) Death of subject.....	60
(b) Permanent departure from Bureau's jurisdiction....	60
(c) Imprisonment of subject.....	60
(d) Induction of subject into armed forces.....	60
(e) Security informants.....	60
(f) Subject no longer dangerous or potentially dangerous.....	61
(g) Subjects removed from security index solely upon basis of application of security index criteria, with no affirmative indication of defection.....	61
(h) Subjects of Chinese extraction.....	62
(11) Priority apprehension program.....	62
(a) Purpose.....	62
(b) Subjects to be tabbed priority.....	62
(c) Recommendations for and removal of priority designation.....	63
(d) Administrative procedures for handling priority program.....	63
(e) General.....	64
c. Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities..	64
(1) Responsibility.....	64
(2) Inclusion in security index.....	65
(3) Dissemination.....	65
(4) Status of cases.....	66
d. Top functionary program.....	66
(1) General.....	66
(2) Definition of top functionary.....	66
(3) Manner of designation of top functionary.....	66
(4) Regulations governing the handling of top functionaries	67
(5) Maintenance of list.....	67

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

	<u>Page</u>
e. Correlation of other investigations with the security index and reserve index.....	70
(1) Espionage and foreign intelligence investigations.....	70
(2) Security of Government employees investigations.....	70
(3) Atomic Energy Act, U. S. Information Agency applicant, departmental applicant, Bureau applicant, and other Bureau investigations.....	70
f. Submission of and general rules concerning security reports.....	71
(1) General.....	71
(2) Schedule of submission of reports.....	72
(3) Origin.....	72
(4) Classification.....	72
(5) Title.....	72
(6) Character.....	73
(a) Top functionaries.....	73
(b) Others.....	73
(7) Status.....	73
(a) Top functionaries.....	73
(b) Key facility cases.....	73
(c) Other security index subjects.....	73
(d) Cases of subjects recommended for security index..	74
(e) Subjects not in security index who are not to be included therein.....	74
(8) Content.....	74
(9) Administrative data.....	77
(a) General.....	77
(b) Documentation of reports.....	78
g. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of.....	79
8. Dissemination of data developed in security investigations.....	79
a. Data developed concerning subjects of security investigations and other persons coming within investigative jurisdiction of the Bureau.....	80
(1) Aliens and naturalized citizens.....	80
(2) Employees of or persons having regular access to key facilities or employees of plants having contracts with the military services.....	80
(3) Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities) which are not on the key facilities list or otherwise falling into the category defined in (2) above, and facilities which are or may become engaged in the manufacture of materials vital to the national defense.....	80
(4) Individuals on inactive duty but who are members of or hold commissions in the reserve branches or National Guard.....	80

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

	<u>Page</u>
(5) Seamen and subjects employed in the maritime industry, including longshoremen and other water-front employees.	80
(6) Employees of the Federal Government within the purview of Executive Order 10450.....	80
(7) Individuals who own property or reside in immediate vicinity of an installation or other premises under cognizance of a branch of armed services.....	81
(8) Airmen issued certificates by Federal Aviation Administration.....	81
(9) Security index - dissemination of information to Secret Service.....	81
(10) Dissemination at Bureau.....	81a
b. Data developed concerning individuals who are not within the Bureau's investigative jurisdiction.....	82
(1) Members of the armed forces.....	82
Index.....	82a

- (D) When the office of origin for a security index or reserve index A subject against whose identification record a notice has been placed is changed, form FD-128 submitted to change office of origin should show that a security flash notice has been posted with Identification Division. An extra copy of form FD-128 should be specifically sent to Identification Division in order that its records will show new office of origin to which future records will be submitted.
- (E) Cancel a security flash notice when (1) it is learned that subject of such is deceased or (2) such subject is determined to be no longer of security interest. Do not cancel security flash notice when a subject is removed from security index solely by application of security index criteria.

(j) Physical description

- I. Obtain and report a detailed physical description.
- II. During the course of the initial investigation in any security-type case, including espionage and nationalistic tendency cases, the physical characteristics and description of the subject shall be determined or verified by personal observation. It is not necessary to observe personally the subject of any case where preliminary investigation determines the basis for opening the case is unfounded.
- III. The subject should be personally observed, if possible, early in the investigation after it is determined that a complete investigation is warranted to develop the extent of a subject's subversive activities and to consider whether the subject's name should be added to the security index. This action should be taken in the course of developing background information to determine the true identity and existence of the subject and to assist in establishing that the subject of the investigation is the person against whom the subversive allegations have been made. Each subject should be personally observed whenever a complete security investigation is conducted even though a security index card is not being recommended at the completion of the investigation.
- IV. Do not delay the submission of form FD-122 recommending the addition of a subject's name to the security index even though it has not been possible to observe personally the subject if it has been determined through investigation that the subject is dangerous or potentially dangerous.
- V. If a security index card is not being recommended after all logical investigation has been conducted and it has not been possible to observe personally the subject during the investigation, the case may be closed even though this has not been done. If a security index card has been recommended and prepared and it has not been possible to personally observe the subject, the case shall remain open until such time as the subject is personally observed, except when it has been determined that the subject is residing outside the U. S. or Puerto Rico, in which event the case may be closed if there is no other pending investigation and the matter should be followed administratively to be certain that the subject is personally observed upon his return to this country.

(k) Photograph

- I. Reasonable efforts should be made during the investigation of a security subject to obtain a photograph of the subject through usual sources.
- II. Cases on security index subjects are to be maintained in a pending status until such time as a suitable photograph is obtained unless circumstances dictate otherwise, in which case the Bureau should be advised. Once a photograph has been obtained, continue to be alert for the existence of more recent photographs which may become available.
- III. [Forward a copy of photographs of security index subjects to the Bureau for dissemination to U. S. Secret Service headquarters.]

(B) During first contact, interviewing Agent will introduce himself as a Special Agent of FBI by use of credentials or badge and will open conversation by using an appropriate pretext or by reciting Bureau's responsibilities in security field and asking subject whether he can be of assistance to Government. If individual has been a member of a basic revolutionary organization and indicates he might cooperate, he may be questioned during initial contact about his own activities in order to further ascertain extent to which he will cooperate. This original interview is for sole purpose of allowing Agent to determine whether individual being interviewed might be cooperative.

(e) Prior Bureau authority

- I. Subjects of active current investigations where no interview with prior Bureau authority has previously been conducted
 - II. Closed cases where subject is on security index and no prior interview has been conducted
 - III. Subjects of investigations requested by Bureau, both open and closed, such as applicant-type cases, loyalty cases, etc.
 - IV. Any persons where circumstances indicate a delicate situation exists and a greater than usual risk is involved, such as individuals employed in newspaper field, educational field, radio and television industry, religious field, publishing houses, labor leaders, and the like. Bureau authority must be requested with respect to situations of this kind even though prior interviews have been had with these interviewees.
 - V. Security subjects who have publicly disclosed previous contacts
 - VI. Subjects of section A reserve index cards
- In any of the above cases, no report need be submitted when requesting Bureau authority to interview a subject of a security investigation. This does not relieve you of responsibility of submitting reports in security cases when due.
- VII. Request for Bureau authority for interview should be set forth in first paragraph of letter[(after reference)] and unless you are recommending a special manner or procedure for conducting interview, paragraph should contain following statements:

"Bureau authority is requested to interview subject in accordance with existing instructions relating to interviews of security subjects. If this subject is cooperative, no affirmative steps will be taken during the initial interview to direct his activities and complete background investigation required by section 107C of the Manual of Instructions will be conducted and Bureau will be requested to authorize recontact with subject as a PSI."

Form FD-336 contains above statement and may be used in requesting Bureau authority for interview.

Above statement in no way precludes interviewing Agents during initial contacts and recontacts from obtaining all subversive information subject is willing to furnish or other data which will assist in determining his potentialities as an informant.

- VIII. Letters requesting Bureau authority for the interview must contain the following information, if available:
- (A) Residence address, occupation, employment and race of subject, date and place of birth, citizenship, and status of health
 - (B) Marital status. If married, the occupation, employment, and race of the spouse.
 - (C) Length of time subject a member of or affiliated with subversive organizations and positions he held in such organizations. In cases in which investigation is based on some allegation or circumstances of a security nature other than membership in or affiliation with subversive organizations, facts upon which investigation is predicated should be briefly set forth.
 - (D) If married, information indicating the spouse is or has been a member of or affiliated with subversive groups, the position held in such groups, and the length of time of such membership or affiliation.
 - (E) Membership or affiliation of any other close relatives in subversive groups
 - (F) Information regarding defection, expulsion, inactivity, and present sympathies of the subject and, if married, of the spouse
 - (G) What is expected to be gained by the interview
- IX. In each letter, pertinent information, if available, regarding the seven items listed above must be set out under the appropriate number but the above headings need not be restated. If no pertinent data is available regarding any of the items, you should make the appropriate comments after the respective number.
- X. All letters requesting Bureau authority to interview the subject of a security investigation must be personally approved by the SAC.
- XI. One of the required copies of the letter to the Bureau should consist only of the first page of the letter. When unnecessary for Bureau to issue specific instructions or comments in connection with authorizing an interview, the Bureau will approve the request by placing an appropriate rubber-stamp impression on the single-page copy of the incoming letter and return it by routing slip.
- XII. Upon receipt of Bureau authority, the interview must be conducted within [45] days. If this is impossible, advise Bureau of the reasons why the interview was not effected and state that the subject will be contacted within the next [45] days. At the end of the second [45-day] period if the interview has not been conducted, request additional authority. Include in the letters any new information bearing upon the advisability of conducting the interview.
- (f) Preparations for and conduct of interviews
- I. Interviews must be conducted by two Special Agents. An Agent experienced in security investigations who has knowledge of Bureau regulations regarding development of informants must conduct the actual interrogation. Approach need not be made by both Agents at the same time and one Agent may observe from a secure distance. Background of subject and individual circumstances will determine exactly how approach should be handled in each case. Two Agents should be physically present during any interview or contact with known or suspected Nation of Islam members in all types of Bureau cases.
 - II. Preparations for interview must be thorough and conducted so that interviewing Agents will not be compromised, the Bureau will not be embarrassed, and confidential informants will not be exposed.

- XI. Inform subjects connected with labor unions that Bureau is not interested in employee-employer relations and is concerned only with obtaining information on infiltration of labor unions by subversive elements.
- XII. Furnish no information and make no statements to a person being interviewed which might later be used to embarrass Bureau. Agents should not allow themselves to be interviewed by interviewee or to be placed in a position of answering questions instead of asking them.
- XIII. Terminate immediately an interview if subject proves to be hostile or uncooperative on initial contact.
- XIV. Exploit a subject's knowledge to utmost if he is found to be willing to furnish information of value.
- XV. Questions asked of a subject being interviewed should be so worded as to require an admission or denial of all pertinent items of subversive information developed during prior investigation unless to do so would expose investigative techniques or security informants.
- XVI. A cordial and friendly attitude alone on part of a subject should not be construed as evidence of cooperation insofar as potential dangerousness is concerned when he fails to admit or furnish substantially same subversive information verified through previous investigation.
- XVII. Inform subject that we are interested in interviewing him in great detail and arrange to conduct interviews over as extended a period of time as necessary to develop matter fully. Conduct necessary investigation or research to verify or add to what is being developed on interview. Request information from other offices or Bureau to assist in interview if needed.
- XVIII. Reduce information obtained to a signed statement if subject willing that this be done.
- XIX. Determine willingness to testify to information furnished in possible future Federal proceedings.
- XX. Consider possibility of developing these individuals as informants. If possibility is apparent, pursue matter with view to establishing subject as a reliable source in subversive movement with which he has been connected.
- XXI. When no information is developed during course of an interview which would affect a subject's status, submit results thereof in letter form immediately following interview and also in next report submitted in case. At least one report will be submitted in each case in which a subject is interviewed with Bureau authority. In case of an individual employed in or holding a sensitive position enumerated in 87D 6b (7) (e) IV above, results of all interviews must be submitted promptly in report[or letterhead memorandum]form; [depending on priority designation,] until such time as he begins to cooperate as a security informant or a source.
- XXII. Report information regarding subject's admissions of his own subversive activities and associations and set forth a statement to effect that he did or did not furnish information regarding subversive activities of others.
- XXIII. Report statements of denial regarding subject's subversive activities developed through prior investigation and follow by a brief summary statement of past subversive activity which is being denied by subject.

XXIV. Letter transmitting results of an interview must contain:

- (A) A definite statement or conclusion of interviewing Agents as to cooperativeness of subject
- (B) Whether information furnished by him coincides substantially with information developed against him
- (C) Reasons for the conclusions
- (D) Statement as to subject's availability as a potential witness and evaluation of subject's potential as an informant or confidential source
- (E) Further contacts contemplated
- (F) Recommendation that security index card be canceled when it is determined from statements furnished by a security index subject regarding his subversive activities and associates, considered with other known information and factors, that subject is no longer to be considered dangerous to internal security in time of an emergency

XXV. Above instructions shall not preclude immediate interview of subject of a security-type investigation who contacts a Bureau representative and expresses a desire to furnish information concerning subversive activities. They do not apply to an interview of a person once he is an established informant or confidential source.

XXVI. Reinterviews with security index subjects should be considered on a systematic basis. This may be done by considering a recontact when it is necessary [to review case or submit appropriate periodic communication to Bureau.]

(g) Maintenance of file on defected subjects

- I. A dead file should be maintained for reference purposes in those offices having sufficient volume of security work to justify such action.
- II. Copies of memoranda designated for individual case files should be routed to this file. Such memoranda to contain:
 - (A) The background of the defectee
 - (B) Type of information he may furnish
 - (C) Period covered by this data

- (D) Whether or not defector available for interview by all Agents
- (E) Whether he is in position to testify and willing to do so

III. Do not include information concerning security informants for security reasons.

IV. Proper maintenance of this file will be useful in identifying persons who may be in a position to furnish information of value in the future and will obviate necessity of extensive file reviews in this connection.

V. A special index may be used for this file if desirable. If used, it should contain cards filed alphabetically indicating names, times, and places defectors were in a subversive movement and a brief description of information available from them. Break index down geographically and subdivide by years if desirable.

7. Administrative procedures

[a. Reserve index

(1) Purpose

The reserve index is designed to represent those persons who, in the light of ever-changing conditions, should be continually borne in mind from the standpoint of the security of the country with a view toward possible investigation, interrogation, or action under the security index program. This index may serve as an administrative aid and working index containing a central repository of the names of individuals having sympathy for or affiliation with the Communist Party or other basic revolutionary organizations.

(2) Individuals to be included

This index is to contain names of individuals when, following investigation, the information does not justify the inclusion of the subject's name in the security index when there is evidence of:

- (a) Membership in a basic revolutionary organization subsequent to January 1, 1949, together with some indication of sympathy or association with such an organization or a subversive front organization subsequent to the reported membership and no reliable evidence of defection
- (b) Investigation has failed to substantiate allegations of membership in a revolutionary organization within the past five years, coupled with some evidence or information indicating activity, association, or sympathy for the subversive cause within the same period, and no reliable evidence of defection.
- (c) The individual, within the past five years, by his associations, writings, financial support, or conduct in relation to and support of subversive organizations or the international communist movement is in a position to influence others at the time of a national emergency and no reliable evidence of defection.
- (d) Leadership or substantial activities in a major subversive front group over three years ago, together with some evidence of continuing activity, association, or sympathy for the subversive cause within three years and no reliable evidence of defection
- (e) Membership in a subversive front organization within the past three years and no reliable evidence of defection

(3) Arrangement

This index is to be maintained[by each field office]in two sections, section A and section B. Each section will be maintained alphabetically on 5- by 8-inch cards.

(a) Section A

Section A of reserve index is designed to represent a special group of individuals who should receive priority consideration with respect to investigation and/or other action following apprehension of security index subjects.

I. Section A should include those individuals whose subversive activities do not bring them within security index criteria but who, in a time of national emergency, are in a position to influence others against national interest or are likely to furnish material financial aid to subversive elements due to their subversive associations and ideology. Include in this section those individuals meeting standards for inclusion in reserve index and who fall within following categories:

- (A) Professors, teachers, and educators
- (B) Labor union organizers or leaders
- (C) Writers, lecturers, newsmen, entertainers, and others in mass media field
- (D) Lawyers, doctors, and scientists
- (E) Other potentially influential persons on a local or national level
- (F) Individuals who could potentially furnish material financial aid

II. Inclusion[or deletion]of names in reserve index (section A)[must be approved by SAC.

(A) Reserve index (section A) will be maintained strictly by each field office. When a subject's name has been deleted from security index, consideration should be given to including his name in reserve index (section A). Upon approval by SAC for inclusion of an individual's name in section A of reserve index, two cards will be made, one card to be filed in your office and one card to be filed away from headquarters city at same location as extra set of security index cards is now stored.]

(B) [Deleted]

III. Field office file of a reserve index A subject should be reviewed whenever informant information or other information is channeled to file. A determination should be made as to whether additional investigation is warranted and whether current information is sufficient for inclusion in reserve index.

IV. Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing in section A of reserve index cards

- (A) Changes in data appearing on section A reserve index cards should be forwarded to clerk in each field division handling these cards.]
- (B) [Deleted]
- (C) Changes in office of origin are to be handled by submission of form [FD-128.] Forward section A cards to new office of origin. [Where necessary, pertinent information should be forwarded to new office of origin through preparation of a succinct letterhead memorandum which will be forwarded by appropriate cover communication.]
- (D) In preparing a succinct letterhead memorandum for purpose of transmitting pertinent information to new office of origin, yellow file copy for office preparing this memorandum must contain notations as to exact location of all original information contained therein. Statements should be included in cover communication transmitting succinct letterhead memorandum indicating that original source information has been noted on office file copy.]

(b) Section B

- I. This section is to contain names of all other individuals included in reserve index. This section is to be maintained only in field office. File of a reserve index B subject should be reviewed whenever informant information or other information is channeled to file. A determination should be made at that time as to whether additional investigation is warranted.
- II. Changes in office of origin are to be handled by submission of form [FD-128 as set forth concerning section A of reserve index.] Forward section B cards to new office of origin.

(4) Content

- (a) Each card in section A and section B should contain, as a minimum, the following:
 - I. Name and aliases
 - II. Race
 - III. Sex
 - IV. Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency
 - V. Citizenship
 - VI. Residence
 - VII. Employment
 - VIII. Birth data
 - IX. Office file number
 - X. Letters "SS" if dissemination has been made to Secret Service in accordance with instructions in section 134B, item 2, volume IV, of this manual
- (b) In addition, membership and position or association in a subversive group or groups, together with source and date of information, may be added.

(5) Removal and deletion of cards

- (a) Destroy cards on individuals who subsequently become security informants or sources or who subsequently become subjects of security index cards.
- (b) [Deleted]

b. Security index

(1) Purpose

- (a) Security index cards are prepared and maintained by Bureau to serve as operational guide for apprehension of persons deemed dangerous or potentially dangerous to internal security of country in event of a national emergency.
- (b) It shall contain names of all persons who have been determined through investigation to be dangerous or potentially dangerous because of their membership in or affiliation with or espousal of doctrines of basic revolutionary organizations and/or front organizations or who are black nationalist extremists and who will be apprehended upon receipt of instructions from Attorney General.
- (c) It shall include subjects of espionage investigations and any other type of Bureau investigation provided their activities bring them within scope of security index criteria.
- (d) Action shall be taken against individuals included in security index only upon authorization of warrants of arrest by Attorney General.

- (e) Names shall be included in security index only when investigation has established and reports show sufficient facts and evidence to justify inclusion of each subject in security index.
 - (f) Contents of security index must be accurate and correct at all times. Matters pertaining to its preparation and maintenance must be given preferred, expeditious, continuous, and detailed attention.
 - (g) Matters pertaining to security index are strictly confidential and are not to be mentioned or alluded to in investigative reports.
 - (h) General operation and content of security index must not be discussed by field personnel of Bureau without prior Bureau authority.
 - (i) Matters pertaining to security index may be discussed with duly qualified representatives of other Federal intelligence agencies only on a strictly confidential basis and only in instances in which an individual subject of prime interest to one of these services is involved.
- (2) Determination of dangerousness of an individual
- (a) The dangerousness of a member or affiliate of a subversive organization does not necessarily depend entirely upon his personal characteristics, such as aggressiveness or a disposition to violence. Although these factors must be taken into consideration in evaluating an individual's potential dangerousness, other factors are essential in making this determination. An individual's dangerousness also depends upon contribution he has made or is making in advancement of principles and aims of subversive movement with which he is connected or his subversive potentialities in event of a national emergency. Bear in mind that a subject active in a subversive organization is not merely an isolated individual but is a part of an organization of which the purposes are opposed to best interests of U. S. An individual's loyalty to a subversive organization and the principles thereof is a primary factor to take into consideration in evaluating his potential dangerousness; however, regardless of evidence of subversive affiliation, all evidence developed during course of a security investigation must be carefully weighed for purpose of determining whether subject's activities depict him as a potentially dangerous individual in time of a national emergency. Factors having a bearing upon an individual's potential dangerousness are numerous and will vary in each case in degree. Among such factors are:
 - I. Long continued membership in a subversive organization
 - II. Affiliation with or attendance at training schools, especially leadership schools
 - III. Frequent or regular attendance at organizational meetings and functions
 - IV. Subscriptions to publications of a subversive organization
 - V. Possession of or continued study of revolutionary literature
 - VI. Preparation or distribution of subversive propaganda and/or literature
 - VII. Holding positions in subversive organization or in other organizations of a front character which indicate confidence of such organizations in his loyalty
 - VIII. Espousal of a subversive doctrine exemplified in his acts and utterances

- (b) Where potential dangerousness of a subject has been established and inclusion of that subject in security index is warranted, office of origin shall submit a recommendation for inclusion in security index by submitting form FD-122 to Bureau. Form must be prepared in triplicate. Forward original and one copy to Bureau and place one copy in subject's investigative case file.

Nothing should appear on FD-122 or subsequently on security index card which is not in subject's case file. Form FD-122 has two uses: (1) to recommend a subject for inclusion in security index and (2) to submit changes to data which appears on face of security index cards already existent.

Proper selection should be made in opening paragraph option. FD-122 is submitted with abstract when used to recommend subject for inclusion in security index and without abstract when used to indicate additions, deletions, or changes in data appearing on existing cards.

- (c) When form FD-122 is submitted to Bureau recommending inclusion of a name in security index, attach additional page or pages setting out a succinct summary of facts on which recommendation has been based. Facts must be in detail to clearly show soundness of recommendation. Complete justification for designated priority level for apprehension must be included. Statements of conclusion are not enough and original sources must be characterized as to reliability. Summary must contain pertinent dates of subject's activities.
- (d) When, at conclusion of investigation, subject's name is not being recommended for security index, set out a brief summary statement in appropriate communication closing case showing reasons for decision.
- (e) Security index cards shall be recommended by and maintained by office of origin only.
- (f) A current[summary]report must be in possession of Bureau when subject is recommended for security index.
- (g) To assure that subject recommended for security index will receive proper attention, case shall be kept in pending or pending-inactive status until security index card has been received from Bureau and filed in office security index. If case continues in pending status because of outstanding investigation, reports shall carry a lead to follow authorization of security index card by Bureau and if approved to disseminate a copy of report to Secret Service in addition to other leads. If outstanding investigation has been completed and case would otherwise be closed upon submission of report and form FD-122, case shall be placed in pending-inactive status with lead to follow authorization of security index card by Bureau and if approved to disseminate copy of report to Secret Service. In latter instance, upon receipt of security index card and following local dissemination to Secret Service, case may be closed administratively.
- (h) Recommendation for security index card should not be delayed because of absence of information concerning race, sex, citizenship, date and place of birth, or description where security index card is warranted. In such instances, recommendation for card should be submitted with a current report and case retained in pending status with active investigation continuing to determine missing items of information.

- (i) Subjects missing or out of country may be recommended for the security index provided instructions set forth in 87D 6b (3) and (4) are followed. Forms FD-122 submitted on subjects should include data required in 87D 7b (6) (b) IV below.
- (j) When form FD-122 is submitted recommending a security index card be prepared on a subject who is of Chinese extraction, the words "Other - Chinese" must be included in the space on the form calling for a statement as to the subject's race. When form FD-122 is submitted recommending that a security index card be prepared on a person who is not of Chinese extraction but who has shown definite sympathies with Communist China, the form should include under "Miscellaneous" a statement to the effect "sympathetic to Communist China."
- (k) Upon receipt of form FD-122 at Bureau, the case of the subject will be reviewed and if recommendation of field is concurred in, security index cards will be prepared. Duplicate copy of form will be returned to office of origin stamped "Security Index card approved and prepared, three copies attached. Place description and photograph on reverse side of Geographical card. Cards should be filed in your Security Index." The three cards shall be filed in security index as outlined below. The returned copy of FD-122 shall be placed in subject's main investigative case file. Offices with a geographical breakdown by residence and employment will receive an extra card.
- (1) When security index cards are received from Bureau, data thereon must be checked for accuracy. Cards will be complete except for description and photograph. Descriptions and photographs are maintained on separate cards of similar size to security index cards which are stapled to back of two of the cards. One card will then be filed in the geographical section of office security index (except special section cards and unavailable section cards - see 87D 7b (6) (b) III and IV below), and one card shall be filed in the duplicate security index maintained away from headquarters city. The other card is filed in alphabetical section of security index. No information shall be permanently added, deleted, or changed on face of security index card without complying with instructions set forth below under 87D 7b (8).
- (5) Content and appearance of security index card
 - (a) Data to appear on face of card

When complete, face of security index card should contain the following information. If any of items enumerated in I through XIV are missing at time the security index card is made, the case should be continued as pending and investigation conducted to obtain the necessary information. Set forth under each item below are possible categories in which subject may be classified, together with code letters which should be placed in appropriate space on form FD-122 when sending form to Bureau recommending security index card be prepared. Code letters should subsequently appear on security index cards received from Bureau.

 - I. Name and aliases

The full and correct name and aliases of the subject must be contained on the security index card. When the true name of a subject or any aliases are changed, added, deleted, or are found to be incorrect, form FD-122 must be submitted showing the correct data to be placed on the security index card.
 - II. Race

White and Caucasian	W
Negro	N
Chinese	C
Others	O

(All others including Orientals (except Chinese), American Indians, etc.)

- III. Sex
Male M
Female F
- IV. Citizenship
Native born NB
Naturalized NA
Alien AL
(If citizenship status is unknown when security index card is recommended, space should be left blank but status should be ascertained and submitted by FD-122.)
- V. Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency
American Socialist Clubs ASC
American Workers' Communist Party AWC
Anarchist ANA
Black Nationalist BNT
[Black Panther Party BPP]
Communist Party, USA COM
Johnson-Forest Group JFG
Minutemen MIN
Nation of Islam NOI
Nationalist groups advocating independence for Puerto Rico PRN
Progressive Labor Party PLP
Proletarian Party of America PPA
Revolutionary Action Movement RAM
Socialist Workers Party SWP
Spartacist League SPL
Student National Coordinating Committee SNC
Students for a Democratic Society SDS
Workers World Party WWP
Bulgarian BUL
Cuban CUB
Czechoslovakian CZE
Hungarian HUN
Romanian ROM
Russian RUS
Yugoslavian YUG
- VI. Priority designation
Priority I P I
Priority II P II
Priority III P III
- VII. Top functionary designation (where applicable)
Top functionary TF
- VIII. Special section cards
Atomic energy program employees AEP
Cuban special section CUB
Espionage subjects ESP
Foreign government employees FGE
Pro-Tito subjects YUG
United Nations employees UNE
U. S. Government employees GOV
- IX. Unavailable section cards
Missing MI
Out of country OC
Imprisoned PR
- X. Date and place of birth
- XI. Key facility geographical reference number obtained from Department of Defense Key Facilities List and abbreviation denoting agency having security responsibility for key facility (where applicable)
- XII. Residence address

XIII. Employment address and any additional data deemed necessary to assist in locating a subject in an emergency. Labor union affiliation, if any.

XIV. Field office file number

(b) Data to appear on separate attached card

- I. The following data must be placed on a separate card to be attached to reverse side of the security index card being filed in the geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Data will not be attached to the security index card filed in the alphabetical section. These cards contain printed captions to assist in recording the descriptive information. Captions are not all-inclusive and should be augmented by other data required.
 - (A) Complete description
 - (B) Notation that security index flash notice has been submitted for posting in Identification Division
 - (C) Photograph, with date taken placed below. This photograph is to be the most current or best likeness of subject.
 - (D) Dangerous characteristics of subject, including notation if subject possesses firearms
 - (E) Other data which will assist in effecting apprehension of subject, such as directions to residence or employment, where subject not situated in usual locations, listing of number of minor children and aged dependents

II. If descriptive data have not been obtained, case must be kept pending and investigation conducted to develop this information. Upon posting of security index flash notices in security index cases, the field will be furnished the FBI number and fingerprint classification which should be affixed to reverse side of the security index cards filed in geographical, special, and unavailable sections.

III. Form FD-186 is used for purpose of compiling information to be posted on the separate card attached to back of the security index card filed in the geographical section of index. Form may be filled in by the Agent handling the case in legible handwriting and forwarded to clerical employee designated to post this information on the attachment to the geographical, special, or unavailable sections. After the security index card has been prepared at Bureau and sent to field and information appearing on FD-186 has been posted on the card to be attached, it shall be filed in the investigative case file.

FD-186 may also be used to record information that a security index subject has been physically observed. Descriptive data developed during observation of the subject should be noted on FD-186 for posting.

(6) Arrangement of the security index

(a) At Bureau

The entire security index is maintained at the Bureau through the utilization of IBM tabulating cards. The 5- by 8-inch security index cards are printed by automatic data processing and transmitted to the field. Through the use of this device, the security index can be broken down into the various categories of information appearing on the security index cards when such breakdowns become necessary for administrative purposes at the Bureau. This procedure makes it possible to maintain the content of the security index in the field and at the Bureau in an identical condition at all times.

An alphabetical breakdown of the true names and all aliases of security index subjects is also maintained at the Bureau for administrative purposes.

should be completely filled out just as if a first recommendation is being made, and submitted with a current report. If not, the Bureau should be advised of the reasons for not reactivating his security index card. In either case, cancel the inactive card.

(7) Periodic verification of addresses

- (a) The data recorded on security index cards shall be in an up-to-date status at all times.
- (b) The whereabouts of all security index subjects should be known at all times. The residence and business addresses of security index subjects in priority I must be checked at least once each three months. The residence and business addresses of all other security index subjects must be checked at least once each [year], except those imprisoned and those who were included in the security index because of disaffection for the U. S. (defection to a Sino-Soviet-bloc country, including Cuba since 10-1-60) (see section 105G, item 3, volume IV, of this manual). The residence and employment of those who were included in the security index because of disaffection for the U. S. must be verified every [ninety] days. The case of any security index subject who is out of the country must be followed at least [once each year] to determine if he has returned to this country.

Perfect arrangements to be advised on a current basis of any indication that the subject is engaged in subversive activities, is exhibiting violent tendencies, or plans to change his residence or employment. Periodic checks to verify residence or business addresses may be made under appropriate pretext by telephone once each six months for those individuals in priority I and once [every two years] for all other subjects. Pretext means may be utilized during other periodic checks conducted either personally or through appropriate sources.

- (c) The physical characteristics and description of each security index subject shall be determined or verified by personal observation and the individual case file of each security index subject shall show that this has been done. If a security index subject has not been personally observed previously, this should be done during the next verification of the subject's residence and/or business addresses.
- (d) Use form FD-154 in verifying addresses of security index subjects when its use will facilitate the checking of the addresses. When FD-154 is not used in verifying addresses, a notation must be made on the last FD-154, FD-122, or FD-128 in the subject's case file showing the subject's current residence and business addresses and the date such addresses were verified. This must be done to assure that the file will contain all information concerning the status of the case and that the file will come to the attention of the Agent or field supervisor to determine if additional action is warranted at the time of the verification of addresses. Each time that a security index subject's residence and employment are verified, the case must be reevaluated to assure that the subject is qualified for inclusion in the security index under the criteria for such inclusion. A notation to the effect that the case has been reviewed for this purpose shall be made in the file.
- (e) If it is determined that the residence or business address or both have been changed from those appearing on the security index card, FD-122 should be submitted to the Bureau with the current residence or business address shown thereon. In such instances, FD-122 should show only the changes to be made on the security index card. FD-122 should be accompanied by form FD-366 for dissemination to Secret Service. Secret Service should be advised locally by dissemination of FD-366.

- (f) Project of verifying addresses of security index subjects shall be handled by reopening and assigning cases for verification and closing cases administratively upon accomplishment of verifications. [In priority I and priority II security index cases, verification of residence and employment should be conducted at time of submission of investigative reports and should be included therein. I. In priority III security index cases, verification of residence and employment should be recorded on FD-154 and placed in case file. Such information may be included in letterhead memorandum when prepared.]

(8) Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing on security index cards

- (a) Submit to Bureau by FD-122 any changes, additions, or deletions involving name, aliases, citizenship, organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies, priority designation, date or place of birth, key facility geographical reference number, abbreviation of agency having security responsibility (see 87D 7c (2) below), residence or business address. Exception: Change office of origin by form FD-128.
- (b) Insertion or removal of cards from special section or unavailable section should be handled pursuant to 87D 7b (6) (b) III or IV.
- (c) Temporary handwritten notations may be made on existing security index cards pending receipt of corrected cards from Bureau.
- (d) Indicate use of FD-122 for changes by checking proper opening paragraph and submit without abstract.
- (e) Set out only items being changed, added, or deleted. If being deleted, specify "Delete."
- (f) Upon receipt from Bureau of corrected security index cards with duplicate copy of FD-122 (stamped "Corrected Security Index cards attached. Substitute for cards in file and destroy old cards. Place photograph and description on reserve side of geographical cards."), action to be taken includes:
- I. Check accuracy of data on cards.
- II. Transfer separate cards with descriptive data and photograph from back of old geographical section cards to back of corrected cards, staple them, and file in geographical section. Exception: For special or unavailable section subjects, see 87D 7b (6) (b) III or IV above.
- III. File third card in alphabetical section of security index.
- IV. Destroy old cards.

(9) Movement of subjects between offices and transfers of security index cards

(a) Subjects of security index cards

- I. Requests to verify addresses of security index subjects from other offices must be assigned immediately and results of investigation to verify new address must be transmitted to office of origin within two weeks.
- II. Office of origin, upon receipt of verification of address, should submit FD-128 immediately transferring office of origin. Forms regarding unavailable section subjects should be prepared in accordance with 87D 7b (6) (b) IV above.
- III. Submit original and one copy of FD-128 to Bureau. Submit two copies thereof to office covering subject's new address, enclosing copies of all previous reports, other pertinent serials, photograph if available, and security index cards. FD-128 should show full title and priority level designation.
- IV. Information concerning key facility employment of subject in new office should be furnished by that office to old office of origin so that geographical reference number, agency having security responsibility, and interested agencies can be included on FD-128 submitted by old office of origin.
- V. Where security index flash notice has been placed with Identification Division, notation to that effect must appear on FD-128 and extra copy of FD-128 must be specifically designated for Bureau marked for attention of Identification Division so that those records will show new office controlling existing security index flash notice.
- VI. Old office of origin will submit current report[in priority I and priority II security index cases and a succinct letterhead memorandum in priority III security index cases.]

Submission of FD-128 should not be delayed solely for preparation of report[or letterhead memorandum]when office of origin is to be changed, but notation should be made on FD-128 that old office of origin is preparing [appropriate communication.]

[Old office of origin is responsible for furnishing Secret Service locally with subject's new residence and business address.]

Case will remain pending in both old and new offices of origin until report[or letterhead memorandum]is submitted by old office of origin. New office of origin is responsible to follow matter until[completed.]

[In Priority III security index cases, a succinct letterhead memorandum should be prepared setting forth all pertinent information for Bureau and new office of origin. If applicable, information contained therein may be summarized. Yellow file copy retained by old office of origin must contain notations indicating exact location of all original information which has been set forth or summarized in letterhead memorandum. Cover communication transmitting such letterhead memoranda must contain a statement indicating that such notations have been made.]

- VII. New office of origin is to review pertinent material received with FD-128, as well as pertinent information in files of new office, to determine whether additional investigation is warranted. If no additional investigation is warranted, advise Bureau by letter that case is being placed in a closed status.
 - VIII. Upon receipt of FD-128, office covering new address of subject will be office of origin with no other communication necessary in this regard. New office of origin will place its file number on security index cards received and place them in security index of that office.
 - IX. Upon receipt of new security index cards from Bureau with copy of FD-128, new office of origin is to transfer information from reverse side of old geographical cards to two of the new cards, appropriately file new cards, and destroy old cards.
- (b) Top functionaries
- Mechanics of transferring cases for all security index subjects as described above shall apply to top functionaries. Additional procedures in this category are:
- I. Notification to Bureau of deletion of subject as top functionary in old office of origin will be handled merely by designation in space provided on FD-128 that subject was top functionary.
 - II. Upon receipt of form FD-128, new office of origin shall automatically designate subject top functionary and continue case in an assigned pending status until investigation is completed. After investigation is completed and a summary report has been submitted by old office of origin, case may be placed in a pending-inactive status. Within three months, new office of origin is to conduct active investigation, submit investigative report on subject, and advise Bureau concerning continued designation of subject in this category.

- (c) Subjects tabbed for priority
Security index card shall continue to be tabbed for priority apprehension in new office of origin until such time as it is determined by receipt of information by that office that priority designation is not warranted under provisions of 87D 7b (11) below.
- (d) Subjects not included in security index
 - I. Transfer office of origin by FD-128 only upon verification by another office of subject's presence in that division. FD-128 should show full title.
 - II. Enclose copies of all investigative reports and other pertinent serials with copies of FD-128 to new office of origin.
 - III. New office of origin is to investigate or advise Bureau that case closed if no action warranted
- (10) Cancellation and removal of cards from active security index
SAC shall personally recommend removal of any name from security index under conditions set out in 87D 7b (4).
 - (a) Death of subject
Destroy security index card without Bureau authority, but advise Bureau by letterhead memorandum.
 - (b) Permanent departure from Bureau's jurisdiction
Upon learning of departure of a security index subject from U. S. or Puerto Rico for a foreign country, immediately ascertain conditions surrounding his departure.

No security index card shall be canceled by reason of a subject's departure for a foreign country unless that subject is an alien who has permanently departed either voluntarily or as a result of deportation proceedings. In such instances security index cards will be canceled only after subject's departure has been verified as being permanent. If a U. S. citizen who is included in security index and who has been out of country is found to have renounced his citizenship and taken citizenship of a foreign country, his security index card may be canceled only after it has been determined that he does not intend to return to U. S.

Recommendations to cancel security index cards of such subjects shall be made by letter directed to Bureau. Cards shall be canceled only after receipt of advice from Bureau that Bureau's security index cards have been canceled.

 - (c) Imprisonment of subject
Security index cards shall not be canceled by reason of a subject's having been imprisoned regardless of length of time he will be incarcerated. Cards of such subjects shall be placed in unavailable section of security index and cases handled thereafter in accordance with instructions set forth in 87D 7b (6) (b) IV above.
 - (d) Induction of subject into armed forces
Security index cards of subjects who have been inducted into armed forces of U. S. are to be placed in inactive section of field security index. Follow procedure set forth above under 87D 7b (6) (b) (V).
 - (e) Security informants
Security index card of any subject who is developed as a security informant should be canceled. In requesting Bureau's permission to designate such a subject as a security informant, direct Bureau's

attention to existence of a security index card for that individual. In all such instances a specific recommendation must be made concerning cancellation of card. Card may be destroyed upon receipt of Bureau authority to designate subject as a security informant.

- (f) Subject no longer dangerous or potentially dangerous. Instructions set out below should be read in conjunction with 87D 6b (7) (c) herein relating to interviews with security index subjects.

Frequently, after a subject is included in security index, information is received or investigation develops information indicating that he is no longer a threat to internal security by reason of physical condition, defection or expulsion from subversive movement, membership in or affiliation with which was reason for placing him in security index. Such defection may be shown by lack of activity and obvious disinterest over an extended period of time or upon declaration of opposition to principles of subversive movement. Latter may manifest itself in declarations by a subject in presence of confidential informants or other sources, statements to press, or actual contact with Bureau representatives and admission of previous subversive activity.

When sufficient information is at hand regarding subject's present sympathies to reach conclusion that he should no longer be scheduled for apprehension as a dangerous subversive, request authority to interview subject or advise Bureau of reasons why subject should not be interviewed. Bureau will not cancel security index card without consideration being given to interview of subject. See 87D 6b (7) (c) and (d).

If, upon interview, subject proves cooperative to extent that his security index card should be canceled, advise Bureau by letter of results, together with a recommendation for cancellation which must be approved by Bureau.

(g) Subjects removed from security index solely upon basis of application of security index criteria, with no affirmative indication of defection

As security index cases are reviewed upon reopening in field, there will be instances in which removal will be required by application of security index criteria set out in 87D 7b (3). With passage of time, limits specified in criteria will operate to remove certain subjects even though there is no affirmative indication of defection.

[When] recommending removal of a subject's name from security index, [consider] if facts in case warrant inclusion of subject's name in section A of reserve index.

Follow procedures [set out hereafter for] those individuals not being recommended for inclusion in section A of reserve index:

- I. When subjects are removed from security index solely on basis of application of security index criteria as cases are reopened and reviewed in field, retain security index cards pertaining to such subjects bearing descriptive matter on reverse sides; i.e., cards previously filed in geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Destroy cards previously filed in alphabetical section. Those offices maintaining two sets of geographical cards under provisions of 87D 7b (6) (b) I should retain but one card in each instance, destroying second geographical card as well as card previously filed in alphabetical section.

II. Mark canceled across face of each card being retained and file in the reserve index, section B.

III. Above instructions do not apply to individuals removed from security index based upon activity in Nation of Islam. Security index cards in such cases should be destroyed.

(h) Subjects of Chinese extraction

In any communication recommending cancellation of a security index card on a subject of Chinese extraction, such communication must contain the words "Other - Chinese." This regulation relates specifically to those subjects placed on security index following a recommendation submitted in accordance with instructions contained in section 87D 7b (4) (j) above.

(11) Priority apprehension program

(a) Purpose

Many individuals included in security index because of their training, violent tendencies, or prominence in subversive activity are extremely dangerous and would be more inclined to commit or capable of committing overt acts against U. S. in time of national emergency than would others in security index. Degree of dangerousness of such individuals is so pronounced that in interest of security they must be immobilized in least possible time prior to others in security index.

Individuals in security index tabbed priority I and [possibly] priority II would be arrested first in event of a limited but grave emergency, probably without arrest of other security index subjects.

In an all-out emergency, [secondary consideration for apprehension will be given to] all subjects whose names are [included in priority III of security index.]

Each individual case should stand on its own merits and decision to consider subjects for priority of apprehension should be based on subject's subversive activities and revolutionary tendencies.

(b) Subjects to be tabbed priority

I. Each security index subject should be considered for priority I tabbing who falls within one or more of following categories:

(A) All top functionaries

(B) All individuals considered to be hard core national and state basic revolutionary organization leaders and those leaders of other subversive organizations and unorganized groups and individuals who have indicated a propensity for violence and/or have received special training in sabotage, espionage, and/or guerrilla warfare. Examples of activities of individuals who should be included in this priority are as follows:

- i. Activity as organizers or leaders in the organization
- ii. Special training at Lenin School or Far Eastern Institute in Moscow
- iii. Experience as picket captains, strong-arm men, or active participation in violent strikes, riots, or demonstrations
- iv. Violent statements or strong revolutionary tendencies as shown by their activities

- v. Persons active in Communist Party or other organization underground apparatus
- vi. Any other security index subject whose activities, past or present, regardless of membership in a revolutionary organization, clearly and unmistakably depict individual as a potential saboteur, espionage agent, or disruptionist in event of an emergency

(C) Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities

II. Security index subjects considered for priority II

- (A) All individuals who are considered to be of second level leadership of basic revolutionary organizations and other subversive organizations and individuals who present a significant threat but are in less influential positions than those in priority I

III. All other individuals on security index will be tabbed priority III.

(c) Recommendations for and removal of priority designation

I. Approval of SAC

Designation of each subject as to priority or removal of any subject therefrom must be personally approved by SAC, or in offices having more than 1,000 security index subjects by SAC, ASAC, or Bureau-approved security supervisor.

- II. When form FD-122 is submitted recommending either tabbing for priority or deletion of such tabbing, attach an additional page setting out a brief summary of facts upon which recommendation is based.

(d) Administrative procedures for handling priority program
Take following action to assure that security index cards for subjects tabbed for priority of apprehension will be readily available for emergency action in your office:

I. Geographical section

Divide geographical section of security index into three distinct parts.

- (A) Part I of geographical section shall include only security index cards for subjects who are tabbed priority I.
- (B) Part II of geographical section shall contain security index cards for all subjects that are tabbed priority II.
- (C) Part III of geographical section should contain security index cards for all subjects who are tabbed priority III.
- (D) In offices having two separate and distinct geographical sections, i.e., geographical-employment and geographical-residence, as provided under 87D 7b (6) herein, each such geographical section must be broken into parts I, II, and III.
- (E) Priority cards will be the following colors:
priority I - beige, priority II - green,
priority III - white.

II. Alphabetical section

- (A) [Alphabetical section will be broken down into two groupings. First group will include priority I and priority II security index cards filed in strict alphabetical order. Second group will contain all priority III security index cards filed in strict alphabetical order.]
- (B) Priority tabbings approved at Bureau will be shown on security index cards forwarded to field by code letters "P I," "P II," or "P III" in first line on cards.

(e) General

I. Tabbing of cards

The alphabetical security index cards on those individuals designated as "Pro-Cuban" should be tabbed with a metal tab.

II. Removal from priority I and priority II

Careful analysis must be made of each case in which deletion from priority I and priority II is proposed. For instance, when a subject is being removed from priority I or priority II tabbing, file review may well disclose that subject qualifies for priority tabbing for reasons covered in 87D 7b (11) (b).

c. Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities

(1) Responsibility

FBI is responsible by Presidential directive for keeping other Federal agencies advised of developments within their jurisdiction affecting plants having armed forces contracts, as well as other facilities, utilities, and critical points of transportation and communications systems which have been designated as vital to the national defense and welfare by the Department of Defense.

FBI is responsible under Delimitations Agreement for investigating employees of private contractors who have contracts with agencies of Department of Defense where credible subversive information concerning employee is obtained. Thorough investigation must be conducted and consideration for inclusion in security index given concerning any individual employed in or having access to a key facility who is alleged to have been, at any time in the past, a member of any basic revolutionary organization or against whom sufficient other subversive information is in our possession which warrants such action.

(a) Requests for investigation from another agency

When another agency requests investigation of individual employed in key facility, institute investigation immediately if basis of request so warrants. Advise Bureau of request, basis thereof, and that investigation is being conducted.

(b) Verification of key facility status of place of employment

Department of Defense Key Facilities List (maintained in each office) must be checked for verification of information that a security investigation subject's place of employment may be included in such list.

(c) Individuals denied access to restricted information

Intelligence agencies of armed forces frequently advise that an individual has been denied clearance to work in a defense plant or to handle classified or restricted information. In some instances clearance is denied based on information furnished by Bureau. At other times, information in Bureau files is very meager or possibly negative and basis for such denial of clearance is not known. The intelligence agency is responsible for furnishing Bureau with any information involving disloyalty or subversiveness.

Office receiving notification that an individual has been denied clearance must ascertain promptly basis for such denial and obtain all pertinent data contained in file of

agency responsible for such action. Forward such data to Bureau and include in next report submitted concerning individual in question. Where no investigation has been conducted by Bureau and there is no case on individual being denied clearance, give consideration to opening a security investigation if information received from intelligence agency warrants such action.

- (2) Inclusion in security index
In recommending key facility employee for inclusion in security index, FD-122 is to contain:
- (a) Key facility geographical reference number
 - (b) Abbreviation for agency having security responsibility.
The Department of the Army has been designated agency having security responsibility for all key facilities.
 - (c) Abbreviations for other agencies known to have classified contracts with key facility. Interested agencies should be identified on FD-122 to assure proper dissemination of reports but will not appear on security index cards returned from Bureau.
 - (d) [Recommendation that individual be designated as priority I security index subject]

If subject of existing security index card is found to have become employed in a key facility, FD-122 must be submitted to Bureau with above-required key facility data set forth thereon. Case is then to be handled in accordance with instructions set forth below concerning key facility cases.

- (3) Dissemination
Upon receipt of original complaint or allegation concerning key facility employee from source other than interested intelligence agency, a summary of complaint and information concerning individual should be furnished immediately by letter to interested intelligence agency. Intelligence agency should then be advised whether a security investigation is being conducted of individual and, if investigation is being conducted, that copies of reports will be furnished upon completion of investigation. Letter to intelligence agency should clearly point out that information is unsubstantiated and has not been verified through investigation by FBI.

In addition to disseminating to interested intelligence agencies information of a derogatory security nature developed concerning persons employed at facilities holding classified contracts, with exception of classified contracts with Atomic Energy Commission, such information should be furnished to Chief, Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO), Defense Supply Agency, Columbus, Ohio, 43215, attention Chief, Adjudication Division. In each instance, advise interested intelligence agency that dissemination has been made to DISCO. This dissemination is to include derogatory security information developed concerning persons who may not be currently employed at such a facility but who are known to be holders of an industrial security clearance.

These instructions do not apply to allegations of espionage or those of such a confidential character as would not ordinarily be disseminated. Such information appearing to be of immediate interest to other intelligence agencies should be submitted to Bureau by most expeditious means, depending upon circumstances, with a request that Bureau consider advisability of disseminating it.

Disseminate copies of each report to local representative of agency having security responsibility, as well as to local representative of other intelligence agencies known to have

classified contracts with the key facility. Copies of reports for the Marine Corps should be disseminated locally to NISO.

Dissemination to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) (formerly Armed Forces Special Weapons Project), the Research and Development Board (RDB), and the Maritime Administration (MA) will be made at the Bureau, and not in the field.

(4) Status of cases

After all active investigation conducted, place in a [pending-inactive] status. Forty-five days before report due, make case pending active and check with armed services representative at the key facility or with other reliable sources to determine whether subject has access to classified or restricted material.

[(Also see Manual of Rules and Regulations, part II, section 4D, item 2a, (6), and section 4M, item 4, for instructions concerning synopses and classification of reports in key facility cases.)]

d. Top functionary program

(1) General

Purpose of top functionary program is to select for special attention those individuals in a subversive movement who are of outstanding importance to the effectiveness of the movement.

Top functionary program is described below as pertaining to the Communist Party, USA. However, it also applies to important individuals active in or on behalf of other basic revolutionary groups, subversive organizations, or unorganized groups who have indicated a propensity for violence.

(2) Definition of top functionary

A top functionary is an individual, either a member or a nonmember of the Communist Party, to whom, because of his importance, it is necessary to give continuous investigative attention in order to keep abreast of communism on a national basis in the U. S. Necessarily, such an individual would be on a high policy level in the movement. This also applies to an individual, either a member or a nonmember of other subversive organizations or unorganized groups, who would be on a high policy level in the movement.

The term "top functionary" is not to be construed as requiring that individuals in this category must actually hold official positions in the organizations but shall be given a broad enough construction to include others who are of equal importance because of their influence in the movement itself, or their position and activities outside the party in labor, front, or similar organizations or movements. Black nationalist extremists whose importance justifies continuous investigative attention should be considered for designation as top functionaries.

(3) Manner of designation of top functionary

Prior Bureau authority necessary to designate a subject as a top functionary. Submit such recommendation to Bureau by letter containing reasons for the recommendation. Bureau desires to be very selective in this matter and to concentrate on individuals who, on a national basis, are the guiding hands in the communist movement and other subversive movements. Top functionaries are to be included in priority I and reports are to be submitted in accordance with 87D 7f (2).

When the subject of such an investigation is presently in the security index, a letter must be directed to the Bureau at the time the report is submitted advising that the subject is in the security index.

Information of interest to FBI and/or AEC obtained subsequent to completion of Atomic Energy Act - applicant investigations concerning AEC employees or persons having access to restricted data should be handled according to instructions in section 20, volume II, of this manual.

f. [Submission of and general rules concerning security reports]

(1) General

[Submission of summary reports should not be delayed for the purpose of conducting current investigation in previously closed cases, but appropriate leads should be set out.]

Cases of all security index subjects must be reopened or placed in a pending status for purpose of preparing investigative reports in accordance with schedule outlined in 87D 7f (2) and (7).

Office indices and any material channelized to case file since most recent report should be reviewed and case brought up to date by appropriate investigation to determine subject's current activities.

Each time that a case is reopened and brought up to date, it should be critically analyzed in light of security index criteria set out in 87D 7b (3) herein. This procedure must be followed on a continuing basis for each security index subject.

(2) Schedule of submission of reports

Reports shall be submitted on individuals designated for priority as follows:

- (a) Priority I - annually
(top functionaries - annually)
- (b) Priority II - annually
- (c) Priority III - [initial report recommending individual for priority III of the security index must be a summary-type investigative report. Once individual is approved for priority III, subsequent information may be furnished by letterhead memorandum with no investigative report being required.]

Each field office will be responsible, however, to insure that all pertinent developments regarding priority III subjects are furnished to Bureau.]

(3) Origin

Office of origin will be that office covering territory in which subject's subversive activities occur. In most instances this will also be office in which territory subject resides and is employed. In those cases in which subject's subversive activities take place in territory of an office other than office covering place of residence and/or employment, office of origin shall be that office which can best cover subversive activities of subject.

(4) Classification

- (a) 100 - for individuals affiliated with basic revolutionary and front organizations of Marxian ideology
- (b) 105 - for members of Puerto Rican nationalist groups or others having nationalistic tendencies of a non-Marxist character
- (c) 157 - Nation of Islam and other black nationalist matters

(5) Title

Only one subject shall be carried in title of each report. Separate reports must be submitted for each subject regardless of their relationship; i.e., husband and wife, father and son, etc.

(6) Character

(a) Top functionaries

Internal Security (or Racial Matters if subject is a black nationalist) - followed by letters designating organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies. Examples:

Internal Security - C
Internal Security - SWP
Racial Matters - NOI

(b) Others

Security Matter - followed by letters designating organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies. Examples:

Security Matter - C
Security Matter - SWP
Security Matter - X (native fascist)
Security Matter - M (miscellaneous)

When a subject is deleted as a top functionary, character shall be changed from internal security to security matter in first[communication]following deletion and all subsequent [communications.] When a security matter subject is designated a top functionary, first report after designation and all subsequent reports shall bear internal security character. Communications regarding subjects who are employed in key facilities should bear words "Key Facility" in character. Communications regarding subjects who are members of Communist Party, USA, National Committee should bear words "National Committee" in character. Black nationalist investigations and racial matters should be given character set out in section 122, volume IV, of this manual.

(7) Status

All cases shall be carried in a pending status until all active investigation required by preceding instructions has been conducted. Thereafter, status shall be as follows:

(a) Top functionaries

I. Pending inactive

(A) Reports are to be submitted annually. Forty-five days prior to date a report is due, each such case shall be placed in a pending-active status for preparation of report so that report can be submitted at designated time.

(b) Key facility cases

Key facility cases are to be maintained in pending-inactive status. (See 87D 7c (4).)

(c) Other security index subjects

I. Closed

(A) Cases of all other security index subjects must be followed by administrative ticklers set up so as to insure submission of a periodic investigative report according to priority designation[for priority I and priority II.] If, following investigation, no subversive data is developed and only available information consists of verification of residence and employment and negative contacts with security informants and sources, submit in lieu of a report a letter (form FD-400) to Bureau setting forth identities of informants and sources contacted, any additional administrative data deemed necessary, and form FD-305 properly executed. Cases shall be opened and assigned 45 days prior to date periodic report is due.

- (B) Each priority III security index case must be opened for verification of residence and employment on an annual basis. In connection with this verification, case file must be thoroughly reviewed for any necessary action including a reevaluation of subject's status. This will include removal from priority III or possible redesignation as a priority I or priority II security index subject.

Where necessary, pertinent information may be submitted to Bureau or other field offices through preparation of a letterhead memorandum. When pertinent information is submitted to Bureau for dissemination to interested agencies of executive branch of U. S. Government, forms FD-305 and FD-376 should accompany cover communication transmitting letterhead memorandum. (Refer to 87D 7a (3) (a) IV (D) for instructions regarding change of office of origin.)

- (d) Cases of subjects recommended for security index
- I. Pending inactive
 - (A) If all active investigation completed at time FD-122 forwarded to Bureau
 - (B) Set forth lead to follow Bureau for security index card and if approved for dissemination of report to Secret Service.
 - II. Closed
 - (A) Upon receipt of security index card from Bureau and dissemination to Secret Service
 - (B) Thereafter follow by administrative tickler for investigative report as in (c) above.
- (e) Subjects not in security index who are not to be included therein
- I. Closed
 - (A) Prior to closing, instructions under 87D 6b (7) pertaining to interview must be complied with.

(8) Content

- (a) In order to insure completeness of investigation, following items should be considered as pertinent to an investigation and subsequent reporting of such should be handled under topical headings where appropriate.
- I. Background
 - (A) Birth date
 - (B) Citizenship status
 - (C) Education
 - (D) Marital status
 - (E) Military service record (domestic or foreign, including type of discharge, citations, etc.)
 - (F) Identification record
 - (G) Employment
 - (H) Residence
 - (I) Status of health (if known)
 - II. Connections with Communist Party, other basic revolutionary groups, front groups, black nationalist extremist groups, and/or other subversive organizations or unorganized groups
 - (A) Information concerning admission to revolutionary group including sponsors, etc.
 - (B) History of activity in, attendance at meetings of, and positions held in subversive movement with which subject is identified

- (j) In connection with periodic reports in security index cases, there are instances in which evidence of extensive activity in subversive organizations will be developed. In these cases it is permissible to report such information in narrative-type statements without indicating exact dates of activity; however, period of time involved must be shown, as well as inclusive dates of informant reports.

This type reporting is not to be utilized in Smith Act of 1940 cases or Internal Security Act of 1950 cases. Narrative statements must be statements of facts and not conclusions and information from each source must be reported in separate narrative statements.

- (k) Above instructions in no way remove responsibility for reporting all items of pertinence to Bureau, bearing in mind fact that Bureau files must be complete insofar as matters of substance are concerned, nor is responsibility removed for reporting in detail of information tending to establish a subject's knowledge of basic aims and purposes of subversive organizations with which affiliated or information tending to establish that a subject holds revolutionary and/or anarchist beliefs.

In documentation of narrative statements, set forth location of original documents in field office files by file number and serial scope.

(9) Administrative data

(a) General

All references to following items, all administrative in nature, should be contained in cover pages accompanying reports:

- I. Reserve index, security index, file numbers and titles of other cases, priority apprehension program, top functional status, security index flash notices (FD-165), forms FD-122 and FD-128, and Bureau instructions for handling cases or any information contained in Bureau or field correspondence which is not investigative in nature.

- II. Whenever reports relating to security index subjects contain data affecting material included on subject's existing security index card, cover pages accompanying report shall include as last page form FD-305, appropriately checked, which form contains items pertaining to following:
- (A) That subject's name is included in security index or agitator index
 - (B) That data appearing on security index card or agitator index card is current
 - (C) That FD-122 or FD-397 has been submitted to Bureau where security index card or agitator index card changes are necessary
 - (D) That a suitable photograph is or is not available and date photograph was taken
 - (E) That subject is employed in a key facility and agency charged with security responsibility is specified and that agencies interested in that facility are specified
 - (F) Reason for classifying report
 - (G) Dates subject was previously interviewed and reason for not reinterviewing subject
 - (H) That subject no longer meets security index or agitator index criteria and a letter has been directed to Bureau recommending cancellation
 - (I) That subject's case has been reevaluated and reasons are set forth as to why subject's activities continue to fall within security index or agitator index criteria
 - (J) That subject's security index card is designated priority I, priority II, or [priority III] and reasons why subject's activities warrant such designation
- III. Form [FD-305 appropriately completed is also to be attached to cover communication submitting letterhead memorandum in priority III security index cases.]
- (b) Documentation of reports
- I. [Complete documentation of all reports is required. This also applies to succinct letterhead memoranda submitted in priority III security index cases and other similar letterhead memoranda where necessary. In this regard, see 87D 7a (3) (a) IV D.]
 - II. If information necessary for complete documentation is not available in subject's case file, necessary review of other office files should be made. If not obtainable, this fact must be indicated in cover page(s) accompanying report to Bureau.
 - III. Extensive investigation should not be conducted to further identify and locate outside individuals who have in past furnished background information or to obtain documentary evidence of background information. For example, if previous investigation revealed that subject, according to reliable records, such as birth records, school records, or records of Immigration and Naturalization Service, was born at a certain place on a certain date, such information will be sufficient for inclusion in report. Further verification will not be necessary.
 - IV. During preparation of summary reports, it is often found that information being included in a report was originally obtained by another office and all of necessary information for complete documentation will not be in possession of office preparing report. In such an instance, if office preparing report is in possession of photostats of documents obtained by other offices and identity

In case of individual subject of prior investigation who is currently being recommended for security index, do not disseminate prior reports. However, prepare a letterhead memorandum including pertinent information previously developed which should be disseminated to Secret Service, together with current report. Copies of this letterhead memorandum should be forwarded to Bureau for dissemination at headquarters level.

[FD-376 should also accompany succinct letterhead memoranda submitted in priority III security index cases.]

After initial dissemination to Secret Service in security index cases, as changes occur in status of individuals involved with respect to residence and employment, advise Secret Service locally and furnish two copies of letterhead memorandum to Bureau for dissemination at SOG. Form FD-366 may be used for this purpose. Letterhead memorandum should contain a reference to previous communication disseminated to Secret Service.

When reporting changes in residence and/or employment concerning Chinese and Cuban aliens on security index, in addition to dissemination to Secret Service, also advise Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) locally, and furnish four copies of letterhead memorandum to Bureau for dissemination at SOG. Bear in mind in filling out reference that some letterhead memoranda have been expressly prepared for dissemination to Secret Service only and have not been furnished to Department or INS; therefore, copy furnished INS locally and two of copies furnished Bureau should reference last communication to INS.

For instructions pertaining to dissemination to Secret Service in other than security index cases, refer to section 134B, volume IV, of this manual.

Upon transfer of office of origin in one of these cases, old office of origin is to furnish Secret Service locally with subject's new residence and business address and advise Bureau that such has been done by submission of two copies of letterhead memorandum disseminated locally. New office of origin need take no action regarding dissemination to Secret Service until such time as further changes occur with respect to subject's status or until preparation of next periodic report in case.

(10) Dissemination at Bureau

There are some situations in which dissemination is made at Bureau instead of in field. In majority of instances, information received by FBI should properly be furnished immediately to some other agency within executive branch of Government so that responsibilities of other agency might be fulfilled properly. Care must be taken, however, not to disseminate information to any field branch of another Government agency where such a procedure is deemed inadvisable because of inadequacy of security measures in that branch. In these instances data should be brought to immediate attention of Bureau for dissemination at SOG. An example of latter is, of course, Atomic Energy Commission, which receives reports only through Bureau, as noted in section 87D 7c (3) of this manual. Information relating to foreign travel plans of security subjects is disseminated to interested agencies, including State Department, only at SOG, as set out in 87D 6b (4). Dissemination is also made at SOG to State Department, unless it appears undesirable, in those cases in which subjects have been indicted for violations grounded on subversive activities.

Dissemination in these cases is made to preclude these subjects from utilizing the fact they obtained a passport to refute allegations of subversive connections. The State Department, therefore, will be in possession of data concerning a defendant should he attempt to utilize this tactic in such an action.

b. Data developed concerning individuals who are not within the Bureau's investigative jurisdiction

(1) Members of the armed forces

The Delimitations Agreement between the FBI and the armed forces intelligence agencies states that the responsibility assumed by one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation to exchange freely and directly with other subscribing organizations all information of mutual interest.

Thus, in discharging our basic responsibilities in the internal security field, it is imperative that information concerning members of the military services be referred immediately to the appropriate branch having primary responsibility for its personnel. This procedure is mandatory, even though the security aspects of the data have not been fully resolved or verified. It should be specifically pointed out in such instances that the information has not been verified.

Section 87D 5b of this manual instructs that if it is determined a security subject is a member of the armed services the investigation must at that point be discontinued immediately and reported to the Bureau. The basis for such instruction lies in the fact that the subject is no longer within our investigative jurisdiction. In addition, dissemination of pertinent reports must be made locally in the field to the appropriate intelligence agency.

Our responsibility with regard to military personnel is not confined to those who have been the subjects of security investigations. It extends to any subversive derogatory data developed against a member of the armed services during any of our investigations of either individuals or organizations. For instance, if it is determined that a member of the armed forces has been in contact with a security subject or with any individual or group raising security implications, the appropriate intelligence service should be immediately advised locally. This should be done even though the security aspects of the contact have not been resolved, so that the military services may be in a position to discharge their responsibilities. It must be pointed out to them specifically in such instances that the data are unverified, and pertinent developments must be transmitted to them thereafter immediately upon receipt.

Section 87D 6b (1) (h) provides that during the course of security investigations it must be determined whether the subjects have any close relatives in the armed forces. Our responsibilities require that such associations be called to the attention of the appropriate military intelligence services, together with pertinent data, including reports, on the security subjects involved. The evaluation of these associations lies entirely within the province of the intelligence services, but for the reasons stated previously herein it is incumbent upon the Bureau to disseminate this information immediately upon receipt.

Any subversive contacts or information developed concerning military personnel must be set out in a letter to the Bureau, together with a statement as to the local dissemination made in the field. Such letter should be accompanied by a letterhead memorandum setting out with particularity the subversive data in a form entirely suitable for dissemination.

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

- Abstract slips, 47,58
- Addresses, verification of (See verification of addresses.)
- Administrative
 - data, 77
 - tickler, 55,56,73
- Admissible evidence, 29,37
- Agitator index, 33,78
- Agreement between FBI and Secret Service, 81
- Airman with certificates from FAA, dissemination of information concerning, 81
- Aliens
 - Chinese, 48,62,81a
 - Cuban, 45a,45b,81a
 - dissemination of information concerning, 80,81a
 - investigation of, 26
- Alphabetical section of security index, 51,63
- Appearance and content of
 - reserve index cards, 43
 - security index cards, 48
- Applicant investigations, inclusion of subjects in security index or reserve index, 70
- Armed forces
 - dissemination to, 82
 - members of, 25
 - record in, 27
 - relatives in, 27
 - subjects entering, 56,60
 - subjects in, 25
- Arrangement of
 - reserve index, 42b
 - security index, 50
 - alphabetical section, 51,63
 - at Bureau, 50
 - geographical section, 51,63
 - in field office, 51
 - inactive section, 56
 - special section, 52 (See also special section of security index.)
 - unavailable section, 53 (See also unavailable section of security index.)
- Atomic Energy Act subjects, inclusion in security or reserve index, 70,71
- Black nationalist cases
 - character of case, 73
 - classification, 72
 - definitions, 19
 - reports
 - anarchist beliefs, 46a
 - content, 74
 - security index, 43,49
 - top functionary, 66
- Bureau
 - applicants, inclusion in security or reserve index, 70
 - authority to investigate individuals, 24
 - responsibility, 19,64
- Cancellation of
 - security flash notice, 27a
 - security index cards, 60,62
 - after induction into armed forces, 60
 - mechanics, 60
 - on departure from U. S., 60
 - only after interview, 38
 - recommending, 42,61
 - security informant, 60
 - upon death, 60
- Canvassing informants, 73
- Changes on
 - reserve index cards, section A, 42c
 - security index cards, 58,78
- Channelizing, 24,34,36,72,79
- Character of reports, 73
 - top functionaries, 67,73
- Characterizations, 79
- Chinese
 - aliens, changes in residence or employment, dissemination to Secret Service and INS, 81a
 - extraction, 48,62
 - sympathies, 48
- Classification of cases, 72
- Color of security index cards, 63
- Concealment of membership, 31
- Confidential informants (See security informants.)

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

Contacting
 faculty members, 25
 informants, 34,73
 registrars, 25
 students, 25
 superiors of faculty members, 25
Contacts
 during investigation, 25
 of foreign establishments, 25
Content
 and appearance
 of reserve index cards, 43
 of security index cards, 48
 of reports, 74
Corroboration, 37
Cover pages, 77,78
Criteria for inclusion in security
 index, 44a,45
Cuban
 activity in support of Cuban regime, 45a
 aliens, 45a,45b,81a
 contacts with, factor in determining
 dangerousness of
 individual, 44a
 pro-Cuban activity, 45b
 special section, 49,53
 tabbing cards, 45b,64
Dissemination
 concerning individuals who are
 not within Bureau
 investigative
 jurisdiction, 82
 of letterhead memoranda, 33a,42c,
 58a,74,81,81a
 of reports
 at SOG, 81a
 in field, 79
 on subjects employed in key
 facilities, 65,80
 to Defense Industrial Security
 Clearance Office,
 Defense Supply Agency,
 65,81
 to Immigration and Naturalization
 Service, 80,81a
 to Secret Service, 81,81a
 addresses
 business, change in, 58a
 residence, change in, 58a
 closing case, 47,74
 letterhead memoranda, 57,81,81a
 reports, 47,74,81,81a
 stamping reserve index cards, 43
Documentation of
 letterhead memorandum, 42c,58a,78
 reports, 78
 completion of, 78
Dangerousness
 definition of, 44
 determination of, 44
 Nation of Islam membership,
 46
Death of security index subject,
 60
Defected subjects, 42
Defectors to Sino-Soviet-bloc
 countries, 57
Defense
 Industrial Security Clearance
 Office, 65,81
 Supply Agency, 65,81
Definitions, 19
 of dangerousness, 44
 of top functionaries, 66
Delimitations Agreement, 64,82
Departmental applicants, inclusion
 in security index or
 reserve index, 70
Determination of
 dangerousness, 44
 membership and position in labor
 organizations, 29
Disaffection of U. S. citizens
 abroad, 57
Employees of
 international organizations, 25
 U. S. Government, 25,70
 dissemination of data re, 80
Employment, verification of (See
 verification of.)
Espionage subjects, inclusion
 in security
 index or reserve
 index, 70
Evidence, 37
 desirability of
 admissibility, 29,37
 corroboration, 37
 of knowledge of aims and
 purposes, 29
 of membership or affiliation, 29
 preservation of, 37
Executive Order 10450, 80,81

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

Faculty members

- contact with, 25
- investigation of, 24

Fifth amendment, 46

- File on defected subjects, 42

- File reviews, 34

Flash notices (security)

- cancellation of, 27a
- notation concerning, on
FD-128, 58a

- placing, 27

Foreign

- diplomats, 25

- establishments, 25

- intelligence subjects, inclusion
in security index or
reserve index, 70

- tours, 33a, 57

- travel, 33, 54, 57

Forms

- FD-122, 28, 34, 48, 49, 53 to 58, 67, 74, 78
- abstracts for, 47

- changes in data on security
index card by,
58, 78

- concerning persons of Chinese
extraction or
Chinese sympathy, 48

- cover letter thereto, 32

- Cuban subjects, 45b

- key facility employee, 65

- placing name in or removing from
special section of security
index, 53

- unavailable section of
security index, 32, 54

- priority tabbing or removal of
such tabbing, 63

- recommending for inclusion in
security index, 45b, 47

- recommending missing subjects for
unavailable section of
security index, 32, 54

- reference to, 77

- succinct summary with, 47

- Cuban subjects, 45b

- FD-128, 42c, 55, 57 to 60, 67

- reference to, 77

- when security flash notice
is on file, 27a

- when subject moves, 58, 58a, 59

- FD-154, 57, 58

- FD-165, 27, 77

- FD-186, 50

- FD-305, 73, 74, 78

- FD-306, 36

- FD-336, 39

- FD-366, 57, 81a

- FD-376, 74, 81, 81a

- FD-397, 78

- FD-400, 73

- Fraud against the Government,
20, 21, 22

Geographical

- reference number of key facility
shown on security
index card, 49

- section of security index, 51, 63

- Government employees, 25, 70, 80

Handwriting, 29

- of top functionaries, 67

- Hostile subjects, interviews
of, 41

- Husband and wife, security
investigations,
72

Identification record, 27

- Immigration and Naturalization
Service,
dissemination to,
80, 81a

- Imprisoned subjects in security
index, 54, 57, 60

- Inactive section of security
index, 56

- Indices, check of, 34, 72

Individuals

- to be investigated, 22

- traveling abroad, 33

- against whom stops are
placed, 34

- disaffection for U. S., 57

- verification of addresses, 57
- who are included in security
index, 34

- who travel behind iron
curtain, 34

- with tours when no subversive
information on
individual, 33a

- with tours when there is
subversive in-
formation on
individual, 33a

- with foreign diplomatic status,
26

- Industrial security clearances,
dissemination re,
65, 81

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

Informants (See security informants.)

Interviews

Bureau approval by rubber stamp, 40
Bureau authority, 39, 40a
conditions for, 40
conducting at place of employment, 40a
content and form of letter to Bureau requesting authority for, 39
contents of letter containing results of, 42
determine willingness to testify during, 41
discontinuing, 40a, 41
evaluation of, 45b
forty-five-day extensions of Bureau authority, 40
of hostile subjects, 41
of individuals connected with institutions of learning, 24, 25
of individuals who have traveled behind iron curtain, 34
of section A, reserve index subjects, 39
of security index subjects, 38
of subjects connected with labor unions, 41
of subjects who express desire for, 42
on SAC authority, 38
preparations for, 40
purpose of, 38
recontact without Bureau authority, 40a
reinterviews, 42
report
needed after, 41
not necessary
afterward, 40a
when requesting Bureau permission, 39
results not affecting security index status, 41
signed statements in connection with, 41
to be conducted within 45 days, 40
with Bureau authority, 39

Investigations
aliens, 26, 80 (See also aliens.)
faculty members, 24
members of labor unions, 29, 39, 41
naturalized citizens, 26, 80
purpose, 19
restrictions on, 24
scope of, 26
students, 24

Investigative

procedures, 26
techniques, 34
file reviews, 34
photographic surveillances, 35, 37
physical surveillances, 35, 37, 38
private firms, records, 36
public source information, 36
security informants, 34

Key facilities, 64

character, 73
Delimitations Agreement, 64
employees
considered for priority I, 63
included in security index, 65
list, 49, 64
responsibility, 64
agency having security, 49, 58, 58a, 65
status of reports of subjects employed in, 66, 73
when to investigate individuals employed in, 64

Knowledge of aims and purposes, 29

Labor union membership, 29

Labor unions, 29, 39, 41

Law enforcement officers not to accompany SAs on security investigations, 26

Letterhead memorandum, 33, 33a, 41, 42c, 57, 58, 58a, 60, 72, 74, 78, 81, 81a, 82

Letters in lieu of reports, security index cases, 73

List

key facilities, 49, 64

top functionaries, 67

Longshoremen, dissemination of information concerning, 80

Lumping information in reports, 76

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

- Maritime employees, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Members of
armed forces, 25
dissemination of information concerning, 82
labor unions, 29, 39, 41
law enforcement agencies, not to accompany SAs on security investigations, 26
- Membership or affiliation, 29
concealment of, 31
- Missing subjects, 31, 48, 54
letters re attempts to locate every 45 days, 32
unavailable section of security index, 32, 54
- Movement of subjects, 58a
not in security index, 60
security index subjects, 58a
tabbed for priority, 60
top functionaries, 59, 67
- Narrative-type statements in reports, 77
- Nation of Islam
abbreviation for organizational affiliation, 49
character, 73
classification, 72
members to be investigated, 23
potential dangerousness, 46
removal of cards from security index, 62
- National
Committee, CPUSA, character, 73
Defense Education Act of 1958, 22
Guard members, dissemination of information concerning, 80
Science Foundation Act of 1950, 22
- Naturalized citizens
dissemination of information concerning, 80
investigations of, 26
- Negative information, security index cases, submit by letter, 73
- New office of origin, 58a, 59, 60, 67, 81a
- Observation of subject, 28, 50, 57
Office of origin, 27a, 42c, 58, 58a, 59, 67, 72, 81, 81a
- Out of the country, unavailable section of security index, 54
- Overt acts, 45
- Personal observation of subject, 28, 50, 57
- Photographic surveillances, 35, 37
Photographs, 28, 78
of top functionaries, 28, 67
status of security index cases while obtaining, 28
to Secret Service, 28, 67
- Physical
condition, 61, 74
description, 28
surveillances, 35, 37
maintenance of SA's notes, 38
- Position
and importance, 30
in labor organizations, 29
Potential dangerousness, 44
of Nation of Islam members, 46
Preservation of evidence, 37
Pretext, 32, 37, 39, 56, 57

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

Priority apprehension program,
 62,77
 administrative procedures, 63
 priority designations, 41,49,53,58,
 60,62,63,74
 I, 49,57,58,58a,62,63,64,65,66,
 67,72,73,74,78
 II, 49,58,58a,62,63,64,72,73,74,78
 III, 49,58,58a,62,63,72,74,78,81a
 changes in, 58,63
 color of cards, 63
 justification for, 47
 recommendation for, 63
 removal of, 63,64
 reports, schedule of, 72
 who to be tabbed, 62,63
 purpose, 62
Private records, 36
Public
 Law 87-835, 22
 source information, 36
 utility employees, dissemination
 of information
 concerning,
 80
Purpose of
 interviews, 38
 investigation, 19
 priority apprehension program,
 62
 reserve index, 42a
 security index, 43

Receipt of information of
 subversive
 activities,
 25
Recommendation for inclusion in
 security index,
 46a,47,63,72
Cuban activity, 45a,45b
key facility employee, 65
status, 74
when subject has Chinese
 sympathy,
 48
when subject is of Chinese
 extraction,
 48
when subject is out of country,
 34,48
when there is missing back-
 ground
 information,
 47

Reevaluation of security index
 status, 46,57,72,
 74,78
Registrars, contacting, 25
Reinterviews, 42
Relatives in armed forces, 27
Removal from
 reserve index, 42b,43
 security index, 42b,46a,60,
 61,63
 priority I, 64
 priority II, 64
Reports
 administrative data in, 77
 character of, 73
 top functionaries, 67,73
 content of, 74
 cumulative items, 76
 dissemination of, 79 (See also
 dissemination.)
 documentation of, 78
 lumping information in, 76
 narrative-type statements, 77
 negative information, security
 index cases,
 submit by
 letter, 73
 schedule of, 72,73
 status of, 73
 summarizing information in, 76,77
 summary, 21,47,59,71,76
 title of, 72
 topical headings in, 74
 when necessary after interview, 41
 when not necessary after inter-
 view,
 40a
Reserve index, 42a
 arrangement, 42b
 cards
 changes on, 42c
 content and appearance, 43
 number prepared, 42b
 stamping, 43
 content, 43
 flash notice, 27
 inclusion of names in, 42b
 names deleted from security
 index, 42b,61,62
 purpose, 42a
 reference to on cover page, 77
 removal from, 42b,43
 section A
 changes, 42c
 individuals to be included,
 42b,61
 interviews of subjects of, 39
 section B, 42c
 security index cards placed in,
 62
 standards for, 42a

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.Reserve index (continued)
subjects

- applicant investigations, 70
- espionage and foreign intelligence investigations, 70
- security of Government employees investigations, 70
- travel abroad, 33
- Reserves, dissemination of information concerning members of, 80
- Responsibility of Bureau, 19,64
- Restrictions on investigations, 24

- Schedule of reports, 72,73
- Scope of investigation, 26
- Seamen, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Secret Service, dissemination to, 81,81a

- addresses
 - business, change in, 58a
 - residence, change in, 58a
- closing case, 47,74
- letterhead memoranda, 57,81,81a
- photographs to, 28,67
- reports to, 47,74,81,81a
- reserve index cards, stamping, 43

Security

- flash notice
 - cancellation of, 27a
 - notation concerning on FD-128, 58a
- placing, 27

index, 43

- arrangement of, 50 (See also arrangement of security index.)

cards

- cancellation of, 38,42,60,61,62
- changes on, 58,78
- color of, 63
- content and appearance of, 48
- of top functionaries, 67
- tabbing, 45b,53,60,62,63,64,67
- transfers to reserve index, 42b, 61,62

Security (continued)
index (continued)

- criteria for, 44a,45
- Cuban subjects, 45a,45b,53, 64,81a
- dangerousness, 44
- dissemination to
 - Immigration and Naturalization Service, 81a
 - Secret Service, 81,81a
 - letterhead memoranda, 57,81, 81a
 - photographs, 28,67
 - reports, 47,74,81,81a
- purpose, 43
- recommendation for, 34,45a,45b, 46a,47,48,63,65,72,74
- reevaluation of status, 46,57,72, 74,78
- reference to on cover page, 77
- removal from, 42b,46a,60,61,63
- priority I or II, 64
- subjects of
 - applicant investigations, 70
 - espionage and foreign intelligence investigations, 70
 - movement of (See movement of subjects.)
 - security of Government employees investigations, 70
 - travel abroad, 33
- summary reports, 21,47,59,71,76
- verification of addresses and employment, 32,54,57, 58,58a,73,74,81a

informants, 34

- cancellation of security index cards pertaining to, 60
- contacting, 34,73
- of Government employees cases, inclusion of subjects in security index or reserve index, 70

Signed statements, 41

- Sino-Soviet bloc, 44a,57

- Sleepers, 31,33,52

- Special section of security index, 52

- cards, 49,52,53,56

- Cuban, 49,53

- exception to unavailable section, 56

- Standards for reserve index, 42a

- section A, 42b

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

Status of cases, 73
on security index subjects
employed in key
facilities, 66,73
on subjects in security index, 73,74
on subjects recommended for
security index, 74
on top functionaries, 59,73
while obtaining photographs, 28
while securing handwriting, 29
while verifying residence and
employment, 58,73,74

Students
contacts with, 25
investigations of, 24
Summarizing information in reports,
76,77
Summary reports, 21,47,59,71,76
Superiors of faculty members,
25

Surveillances
photographic, 35,37
physical, 35,37,38

Tabbing SI cards, 45b,53,60,62,63,
64,67

Thumbnail sketches, 79

Title of reports, 72

Top functionaries, 66,67
change of office of origin, 67
character, 67,73
definition of, 66
deletion of, 67
designation of, 66,67
handling of, 67
handwriting of, 67
list, 67
movement of, 59,67
photographs of, 28,67
priority I, 62,66,67,72
program, 66
regulations governing, 67
reports on, 59,66,67,72,77
status of, 73
tabbing for priority, 62,63,66,67

Topical headings in reports, 74

Tours, 33a,57

Travel
abroad, 33,54,57
behind iron curtain, 34

Unavailable section of security
index, 53
imprisoned subjects, 54
missing subjects, 32,54
subjects traveling abroad,
34,54

Underground membership or
activity, 31
United Nations employees, 25,52
U. S. Government employees, 25,70,80
U. S. Information Agency, inclusion
of subjects in security
index or reserve
index, 70

Verification of
addresses, security index, 32,54,
57,58,58a,73,74,81a
employment, security index,
32,54,57,58,58a,73,74,81a
key facility status of place of
employment, 64
Voice of America (See U. S. Information
Agency.)

Wife and husband, security
investigations,
72

Yugoslav intelligence agents,
contacts with,
factor in deter-
mining dangerousness
of individual,
44a

out the full extent of the communist influence in racial matters. They should separate words and intentions from actions; mere participation from direct influence; and the bona fide communist from the mere "do-gooder." They should not include information concerning legitimate efforts in the racial movement where there is no communist taint.

- b. Information should be reported according to the following outline. All main headings denoted by Roman numerals must be accounted for. If there is no information to report under a particular main heading, the heading should appear, followed by a statement "No information developed."

I. COMMUNIST STRATEGY

(A) COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

- (1) Plans, strategy, party line, and the like made at national meetings, including expressions by national and other functionaries
- (2) Plans, etc., made at district and lower level meetings, including expressions by local leaders and rank-and-file members
- (3) Plans, etc., as revealed in party publications and other propaganda media, such as written directives, press releases, and the like

Information under item 3 should be reported by the office covering the origin of the publications, such as the New York Office for ["The Daily World," "Political Affairs," and directives from party headquarters; San Francisco Office for "People's World"; etc. Party expressions, oral or written, when directly related to a specific event covered under II, should be included under II.

(B) OTHER COMMUNIST GROUPS (Such as Socialist Workers Party, Progressive Labor Party, Workers World Party, and the like)

Under (B), report information under separate numbered subheadings for each organization. Report here information generally along the same lines as for (A) above.

II. COMMUNIST TACTICS

In this part report information on communist direction and influence of and participation in racial demonstrations, disturbances, drives, boycotts, and any other similar activities with racial overtones. This part will illustrate how communist activities attempt to exploit racial situations and expand communist influence, thus furthering communist objectives. List activities in chronological order with lettered subheadings, such as:

- (A) DEMONSTRATION, CLEVELAND, OHIO, [1-10-68]
- (B) STORE BOYCOTT, YOUNGSTOWN, OHIO, [3-6-68]

Under each subheading include such information as nature of event; sponsoring and participating groups; total participants; number and identities of subversives involved; specifics as to whether subversives directed, controlled, instigated, or merely participated; whether violence resulted and, if so, whether subversives involved; arrests of subversives and court disposition; and any other information believed pertinent to the overall picture of communist influence. Efforts by supporting groups to avoid communist involvement should also be reported. If a particular event had no communist involvement, it should, of course, not be included in the report.

4. Annual Communist Party, USA, organizational and membership survey. Each office is instructed to initiate by February 1 of each year a detailed and analytical survey of the organization and membership of the Communist Party in its territory, results to be forwarded to the Bureau by April 1. Set forth in detail the complete organizational structure of each Communist Party district or state organization including district and county committees, together with the identities of officers from the club through the district level. Identify each Communist Party club and section in the district, together with the identities of individual club members and most recent date each member was so identified. Where identification of an individual is tentative, this fact should be indicated by placing the word "tentative" after the individual's name. Note the informant coverage in each club, as well as on district and county committees, by setting forth the symbol numbers of the informants. In those instances in which no informant coverage exists in a particular club or on a district or county committee, this fact should be noted. In addition, summarize the overall findings by setting forth the estimated Communist Party membership in the field office territory, together with the number of members who have been positively and tentatively identified as such within the immediately preceding 12-month period. Charts and maps should be used in setting forth the geographic distribution of the Communist Party whenever feasible. Offices which are auxiliary offices in investigation of a Communist Party district should furnish the required information to the office of origin for inclusion in its survey by March 15 of each year.

Following the organizational breakdown, each office should critically appraise its knowledge of the Communist Party organization within its division and set forth its comments and recommendations concerning investigative activity to be undertaken to eliminate any weaknesses detected. In those instances in which the disclosed weakness is that of lack of adequate informant coverage, advise in detail of the number of Bureau-approved potential security informants being developed in the particular area, as well as concrete plans to obtain additional informant coverage in the future.

Each survey should contain a statement that all persons identified as members of the Communist Party are listed in the security index, or are informants or sources. Any exceptions should be named and a statement made as to whether the name has previously been furnished to the Bureau for indexing. The status of the investigation of each person listed should be shown.

5. Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - C (code name "CIRM"). Bufile 100-442529. Office of origin: New York.
 - a. Quarterly reports (to reach the Bureau by February 1, May 1, August 1, and November 1) should be submitted by each field office for the purpose of reporting, in a centralized manner, all available information bearing upon the communist influence in racial matters. Included should be information developed under the title of a variety of matters, such as CPUSA, Negro question, communist influence in racial matters; communist infiltration of various organizations, such as the Congress of Racial Equality, Student[National]Coordinating Committee, and the like; investigations of subversive individuals active in the racial movement; investigations of communist fronts and other miscellaneous organizations; and racial disturbances and other racial matters investigated under the racial matter character. Information should be included in these quarterly reports, notwithstanding the fact that it will duplicate reporting in the other substantive matters referred to above. These reports shall be designed to precisely spell

- III. Sex
Male M
Female F
- IV. Citizenship
Native born NB
Naturalized NA
Alien AL
(If citizenship status is unknown when security index card is recommended, space should be left blank but status should be ascertained and submitted by FD-122.)
- V. Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency
American Socialist Clubs ASC
American Workers' Communist Party AWC
Anarchist ANA
Black Nationalist BNT
Communist Party, USA COM
Johnson-Forest Group JFG
Minutemen MIN
Nation of Islam NOI
Nationalist groups advocating independence for Puerto Rico PRN
Progressive Labor Party PLP
Proletarian Party of America PPA
Revolutionary Action Movement RAM
Socialist Workers Party SWP
Spartacist League SPL
Student[National]Coordinating Committee SNC
Students for a Democratic Society SDS
Workers World Party WWP
Bulgarian BUL
Cuban CUB
Czechoslovakian CZE
Hungarian HUN
Romanian ROM
Russian RUS
Yugoslavian YUG
- VI. Priority designation
Priority I P I
Priority II P II
Priority III P III
- VII. Top functionary designation (where applicable)
Top functionary TF
- VIII. Special section cards
Atomic energy program employees AEP
Cuban special section CUB
Espionage subjects ESP
Foreign government employees FGE
Pro-Tito subjects YUG
United Nations employees UN
U. S. Government employees GOV
- IX. Unavailable section cards
Missing MI
Out of OC
Imprisoned PR
- X. Date and place of birth
- XI. Key facility geographical reference number obtained from the Department of Defense Key Facilities List and abbreviation denoting the agency having security responsibility for the key facility (where applicable)
- XII. Residence address

XIII. Employment address and any additional data deemed necessary to assist in locating a subject in an emergency. Labor union affiliation, if any.

XIV. Field office file number

(b) Data to appear on separate attached card

- I. The following data must be placed on a separate card to be attached to reverse side of the security index card being filed in the geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Data will not be attached to the security index card filed in the alphabetical section. These cards contain printed captions to assist in recording the descriptive information. Captions are not all-inclusive and should be augmented by other data required.
 - (A) Complete description
 - (B) Notation that security index flash notice has been submitted for posting in Identification Division
 - (C) Photograph, with date taken placed below. The photograph is to be the most current or best likeness of subject.
 - (D) Dangerous characteristics of subject, including notation if subject possesses firearms
 - (E) Other data which will assist in effecting apprehension of subject, such as directions to residence or employment, where subject not situated in field locations, listing of number of minor children and aged dependents

II. If descriptive data have not been obtained, case must be kept pending and investigation conducted to develop this information. Upon posting of security index flash notices in security index cases, the field will be furnished the FBI number and fingerprint classification which should be affixed to reverse side of the security index cards filed in geographical, special, and unavailable sections.

III. Form FD-186 is used for purpose of compiling information to be posted on the separate card attached to back of the security index card filed in the geographical section of index. Form may be filled in by the Agent handling the case in legible handwriting and forwarded to clerical employee designated to post this information on the attachment to the geographical, special, or unavailable sections. After the security index card has been prepared at Bureau and sent to field and information appearing on FD-186 has been posted on the card to be attached, it shall be filed in the investigative case file.

FD-186 may also be used to record information that a security index subject has been physically observed. Descriptive data developed during observation of the subject should be noted on FD-186 for posting.

(6) Arrangement of the security index

(a) At Bureau

The entire security index is maintained at the Bureau through the utilization of IBM tabulating cards. The 5- by 8-inch security index cards are printed by automatic data processing and transmitted to the field. Through the use of this device, the security index can be broken down into the various categories of information appearing on the security index cards when such breakdowns become necessary for administrative purposes at the Bureau. This procedure makes it possible to maintain the content of the security index in the field and at the Bureau in an identical condition at all times.

An alphabetical breakdown of the true names and all aliases of security index subjects is also maintained at the Bureau for administrative purposes.

The Communist Party, USA, is divided into district and state organizations, then into county, city, section, and club organizations. The number and nature of these subdivisions are dependent on the number of members in the various localities. Every party member must belong to a party club.

The Communist Party strategy and policy is based primarily on the loyal support and defense of the Soviet Union. The party line changes from time to time depending upon the current program of the international communist movement.

b. Socialist Workers Party

The Socialist Workers Party was founded at a convention held in Chicago, Illinois, from 12-31-37 to 1-3-38. The following statements are taken from the "Declaration of Principles and Constitution of the Socialist Workers Party" which was adopted at this convention:

"The purpose of the party is set forth in its declaration of principles: Its purpose shall be to educate and organize the working class for the abolition of capitalism and the establishment of a workers government to achieve Socialism." (From article 11 under the caption "Purpose.")

"We call upon all revolutionary militants to join with us to build the SWP into the mass revolutionary party which will lead the working class of the United States to power; and which, together with the revolutionists of all countries united in the Fourth International, will achieve the victory of the international revolution and of world Socialism."

"The main specific task of the SWP is the mobilization of the American masses for struggle against American Capitalism, and for its overthrow...." (Part III of above pamphlet.)

Shortly after the Fourth International was founded in Switzerland on 9-3-38, the Socialist Workers Party in the U. S. announced that it was the "American Section" of the "world party of the Socialist revolution" (Fourth International). At a special convention on 12-21-40, the Socialist Workers Party passed a resolution ending its organizational connection with the Fourth International (because of the passage of the Voorhis Act).

This organization follows the Marxist-Leninist-Trotskyist line. Statements made by functionaries indicate that in the event of war between the U. S. and the Soviet Union, the Socialist Workers Party would defend the latter.

c. Deleted

- with any additional information contained in the Bureau's files.
6. The names of subscribers to Communist Party nominating petitions and the names appearing on subscription lists of [the Communist Party, USA, publications] and publications and organs of the organizations set forth in 1 a, b, c, and d must be indexed in the field office covering the address shown for the subscriber and should not be forwarded to the Bureau for indexing. Mailing lists as such which cannot be identified as membership lists of subversive organizations also should be indexed in the field and not forwarded to the Bureau. Field offices obtaining such lists must promptly furnish them to the office covering the address shown for the subscriber.
 7. Important subversive derogatory information concerning any individual and any new subversive derogatory information concerning any individual of importance must be brought to the attention of the Bureau by expeditious means.
 8. Subversive and nonsubversive derogatory information coming to the attention of the field office through a name check or otherwise on an employee of the executive branch of the Government, which information is within the purview of Executive Order 10450, should be forwarded promptly to the Bureau for dissemination to the Civil Service Commission. In addition, subversive derogatory and other information relating to other employees of the Government and to employees of the United Nations and of other public international organizations received by the field office should be brought immediately to the attention of the Bureau.
 9. These instructions do not affect and are in addition to existing instructions for the submission of information in report form.

C. INVESTIGATION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY, AND OTHER MARXIST REVOLUTIONARY-TYPE ORGANIZATIONS

1. Policy

a. Communist Party, USA

By Presidential directive on 9-6-39, and subsequent restatements (see section 102, volume IV, of this manual), this Bureau is charged with the responsibility of coordinating all information with regard to the internal security of the U. S. Since 1939, a large portion of the Bureau's security investigations has been directed toward a coverage of the activities of communists and other groups whose aims seek the overthrow of the U. S. Government. The Communist Party, USA, is the best organized and most dangerous from a security standpoint. The party is not an isolated or purely domestic organization but is part of an international communist movement led and dominated by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the ultimate aim of which is to establish a world-wide communist state. The Communist Party, USA, bases its theory on the principles of Marxism-Leninism. (Considerable evidence shows that these principles look toward the violent overthrow of the U. S. Government or its downfall in the event of a war with the Soviet Union.) It would be a grave error to suppose that, because the party is actually and potentially small, it is not dangerous. The contemplated role of the party is such that it can be played best by an organization which is cohesive, easily mobilized, highly maneuverable, fanatically zealous, well disciplined, and immediately responsive in an emergency to the demands of its leaders. The highest authority in the Communist Party, USA, is the national convention which meets approximately once every two years. Between these conventions, the national committee is the highest authority of the party.

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

Forms (continued)

FD-122 (continued)
 placing name in or removing from
 special section of security
 index, 53
 unavailable section of
 security index, 32,54
 priority tabbing or removal of
 such tabbing, 63,64
 recommending for inclusion in
 security index, 45b,47
 recommending missing subjects for
 unavailable section of
 security index, 32,54
 reference to, 77
 succinct summary with, 47
 Cuban subjects, 45b
 when subject employed in key
 facility, 65
 FD-122a, 42b,42c,61,77
 FD-128, 55,57 to 60,67
 reference to, 77
 when security flash notice
 is on file, 27a
 when subject moves, 58,59
 FD-128a, 27a,42c,77
 FD-154, 57
 FD-165, 27,77
 FD-186, 50
 FD-305, 74,78
 FD-305a, 78
 FD-306, 36
 FD-336, 39
 FD-366, 57,81a
 FD-376, 81
 FD-397, 8
 FD-400, 74
 Fraud against the Government,
 20,21,22

Geographical

reference number of key facility
 shown on security
 index card, 49
 section of security index, 51,63
 Government employees, 25,70,80

Handwriting, 29

of top functionaries, 67

Hostile subjects, interviews
 of, 41

Husband and wife, security
 investigations,
 72

Identification record, 27
 Immigration and Naturalization
 Service,
 dissemination to,
 80,81a
 Imprisoned subjects in security
 index, 54,57,60
 Inactive section of security
 index, 56
 Indices, check of, 34,72
 Individuals
 to be investigated, 22
 traveling abroad, 33
 against whom stops are
 placed, 34
 disaffection for U. S., 57
 verification of addresses, 57
 who are included in security
 index, 34
 who travel behind iron
 curtain, 34
 with tours when no subversive
 information on
 individual, 33a
 with tours when there is
 subversive in-
 formation on
 individual, 33a
 with foreign diplomatic status,
 26
 Industrial security clearances,
 dissemination re,
 65,81
 Informants (See security
 informants.)
 Interviews
 Bureau approval by rubber
 stamp, 40
 Bureau authority, 39,40a
 conditions for, 40
 conducting at place of
 employment, 40a
 content and form of letter to
 Bureau requesting
 authority for, 39
 contents of letter containing
 results of, 42
 determine willingness to testify
 during, 41
 evaluation of, 45b
 forty-five-day extensions of
 Bureau authority, 40
 no report needed afterward, 40a
 of hostile subjects, 41
 of individuals connected with
 institutions of
 learning, 24,25
 of individuals who have traveled
 behind iron
 curtain, 34
 of section A, reserve index
 subjects, 39
 of security index subjects,
 38

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

Interviews (continued)

- of subject connected with
 - labor unions, 41
- of subjects who express desire for,
 - on SAC authority, 30
- preparations for, 40
- purpose of, 38
- recontact without Bureau authority, 40a
- results not affecting security index status, 41
- statements in connection with, 41
- to be conducted within 45 days, 40
- when current report necessary in order to request Bureau permission, 39
- when current report not necessary in order to request Bureau permission, 39
- when to discontinue, 40a, 41
- when report needed after, 41
- with Bureau authority, 39

Investigations

- aliens, 26, 80 (See also aliens.)
- faculty members, 24
- members of labor unions, 29, 39, 41
- naturalized citizens, 26, 80
- purpose, 19
- restrictions on, 24
- students, 24

Investigative

- procedures, 26
- techniques, 34
 - file reviews, 34
 - photographic surveillances, 35, 37
 - physical surveillances, 35, 37, 38
 - private firms, records, 36
 - public source information, 36
 - security informants, 34

Key facilities, 64

- character, 73
- Delimitations Agreement, 64
- employees
 - considered for priority I, 63
 - included in security index, 65
- list, 49, 64
- responsibility, 64
 - agency having security, 49, 58, 59, 65
- status of reports of subjects employed in, 66, 73
- when to investigate individuals employed in, 64
- Knowledge of aims and purposes, 29

Labor union membership, 29

- Labor unions, 29, 39, 41
- Law enforcement officers not to accompany SAs on security investigations, 26
- Letter in lieu of report security index cases, 74

List

- key facilities, 49, 64
- top functionaries, 67
- Longshoremen, dissemination of information concerning, 80
- Lumping information in reports, 76

- Maritime employees, dissemination of information concerning, 80

Members of

- armed forces, 25
- dissemination of information concerning, 82
- labor unions, 29, 39, 41
- law enforcement agencies, not to accompany SAs on security investigations, 26

Membership or affiliation, 29

- concealment of, 31

Missing subjects, 31, 48, 54

- letters re attempts to locate every 45 days, 32
- unavailable section of security index, 32, 54

Movement of subjects,

- 58
- not in security index, 60
- security index subjects, 58
- tabbed for priority, 60
- top functionaries, 59, 67

Narrative-type statements in reports, 77

Nation of Islam

- abbreviation for organizational affiliation, 49
- character, 73
- classification, 72
- potential dangerousness, 46
- removal of cards from security index, 62
- what members to be investigated, 23

Communist Party members, review of field office files, pretext interviews, surveillances, Special Agents attending mass meetings, etc.

4. Internal Security Act of 1950

To insure successful proceedings against a communist front organization under this act, a preponderance of admissible evidence must be secured to show extent to which

- a. Persons active in management, direction, or supervision of an organization are active in management, direction, or supervision, or as representatives, of
- b. Its support, financial or otherwise, is derived from
- c. Its funds, resources, or personnel are used to further or promote objectives of
- d. Positions taken or advanced by it from time to time do not deviate from those of

Any communist-action organization, communist foreign government, or the world communist movement.

[5. [Deleted]

6. Classification - 100

7. Character - Internal Security - letters for organizational activity or nationalistic tendency; e.g., (C), (SWP), (Miscellaneous), etc.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

	<u>Page</u>
V. Inactive section.....	56
(7) Periodic verification of addresses.....	57
(8) Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing on security index cards.....	58
(9) Movement of subjects between offices and transfers of security index cards.....	58
(a) Subjects of security index cards.....	58
(b) Top functionaries.....	59
(c) Subjects tabbed for priority.....	60
(d) Subjects not included in security index.....	60
(10) Cancellation and removal of cards from active security index.....	60
(a) Death of subject.....	60
(b) Permanent departure from the Bureau's jurisdiction.....	60
(c) Imprisonment of subject.....	60
(d) Induction of subject into the armed forces.....	60
(e) Security informants.....	60
(f) Subject no longer dangerous or potentially dangerous.....	61
(g) Subjects removed from security index solely upon basis of application of security index criteria, with no affirmative indication of defection.....	61
(h) Subjects of Chinese extraction.....	62
(11) Priority apprehension program.....	62
(a) Purpose.....	62
(b) Subjects to be tabbed priority.....	62
(c) Recommendations for and removal of priority designation.....	63
(d) Administrative procedures for handling priority program.....	63
(e) General.....	64
c. Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities..	64
(1) Responsibility.....	64
(2) Inclusion in security index.....	65
(3) Dissemination.....	65
(4) Status of cases.....	66
d. Top functionary program.....	66
(1) General.....	66
(2) Definition of top functionary.....	66
(3) Manner of designation of top functionary.....	66
(4) Regulations governing the handling of top functionaries	67
(5) Maintenance of list.....	67

TABLE OF CONTENTS
87D
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

	<u>Page</u>
e. Correlation of other investigation with the security index and reserve index.....	70
(1) Espionage and foreign intelligence investigations.....	70
(2) Security of Government employees investigations.....	70
(3) Atomic Energy Act, U. S. Information Agency applicant, departmental applicant, Bureau applicant, and other Bureau investigations.....	70
f. Submission of and general rules concerning security reports.....	71
(1) General.....	71
(2) Schedule of submission of reports.....	72
(3) Origin.....	72
(4) Classification.....	72
(5) Title.....	72
(6) Character.....	73
(a) Top functionaries.....	73
(b) Others.....	73
(7) Status.....	73
(a) Top functionaries.....	73
(b) Key facility cases.....	73
(c) Other security index subjects.....	74
(d) Cases of subjects recommended for security index..	74
(e) Subjects not in security index who are not to be included therein.....	74
(8) Content.....	74
(9) Administrative data.....	77
(a) General.....	77
(b) Documentation of reports.....	78
g. Channelizing memoranda - destruction of.....	79
8. Dissemination of data developed in security investigations.....	79
a. Data developed concerning subjects of security investigation and other persons coming within investigative jurisdiction of the Bureau.....	80
(1) Aliens and naturalized citizens.....	80
(2) Employees of or persons having regular access to key facilities or employees of plants having contracts with the military services.....	80
(3) Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities) which are not on the key facilities list or otherwise falling into the category defined in (2) above, and facilities which are or may become engaged in the manufacture of materials vital to the national defense.....	80
(4) Individuals on inactive duty but who are members of or hold commissions in the reserve branches or National Guard.....	80

- III. Sex
Male M
Female F
- IV. Citizenship
Native born NB
Naturalized NA
Alien AL
(If citizenship status is unknown when security index card is recommended, space should be left blank but status should be ascertained and submitted by FD-122.)
- V. Organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency
American Socialist Clubs ASC
American Workers' Communist Party AWC
Anarchist ANA
Black Nationalist BNT
Communist Party, USA COM
Johnson-Forest Group JFG
[Minutemen MIN]
Nation of Islam NOI
Nationalist groups
 advocating independence for Puerto Rico PRN
Progressive Labor Party PLP
Proletarian Party of America PPA
Revolutionary Action Movement RAM
Socialist Workers' Party SWP
Spartacist League SPL
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee SNC
Students for a Democratic Society SDS
Workers World Party WWP
Bulgarian BUL
Cuban CUB
Czechoslovakian CZE
Hungarian HUN
Romanian ROM
Russian RUS
Yugoslavian YUG
- VI. Priority designation
Priority I P I
Priority II P II
Priority III P III
- VII. Top functionary designation (where applicable)
Top functionary TF
- VIII. Special section cards
Atomic energy program employees AEP
Cuban special section CUB
Espionage subjects ESP
Foreign government employees FGE
Pro-Tito subjects YUG
United Nations employees UNE
U. S. Government employees GOV
- IX. Unavailable section cards
Missing MI
Out of country OC
Imprisoned PR
- X. Date and place of birth
- XI. Key facility geographical reference number obtained from the Department of Defense Key Facilities List and abbreviation denoting the agency having security responsibility for the key facility (where applicable)
- XII. Residence address

XIII. Employment address and any additional data deemed necessary to assist in locating a subject in an emergency. Labor union affiliation, if any.

XIV. Field office file number

(b) Data to appear on separate attached card

I. The following data must be placed on a separate card to be attached to reverse side of the security index card being filed in the geographical, special, or unavailable sections. Data will not be attached to the security index card filed in the alphabetical section. These cards contain printed captions to assist in recording the descriptive information. Captions are not all-inclusive and should be augmented by other data required.

(A) Complete description

(B) Notation that security index flash notice has been submitted for posting in Identification Division

(C) Photograph, with date taken placed below. This photograph is to be the most current or best likeness of subject.

(D) Dangerous characteristics of subject, including notation if subject possesses firearms

(E) Other data which will assist in effecting apprehension of subject, such as directions to residence or employment, where subject not situated in usual locations, listing of number of minor children and aged dependents

II. If descriptive data have not been obtained, case must be kept pending and investigation conducted to develop this information. Upon posting of security index flash notices in security index cases, the field will be furnished the FBI number and fingerprint classification which should be affixed to reverse side of the security index cards filed in geographical, special, and unavailable sections.

III. Form FD-186 is used for purpose of compiling information to be posted on the separate card attached to back of the security index card filed in the geographical section of index. Form may be filled in by the Agent handling the case in legible handwriting and forwarded to clerical employee designated to post this information on the attachment to the geographical, special, or unavailable sections. After the security index card has been prepared at Bureau and sent to field and information appearing on FD-186 has been posted on the card to be attached it shall be filed in the investigative case file.

FD-186 may also be used to record information that a security index subject has been physically observed. Descriptive data developed during observation of the subject should be noted on FD-186 for posting.

(6) Arrangement of the security index

(a) At Bureau

The entire security index is maintained at the Bureau through the utilization of IBM tabulating cards. The 5- by 8-inch security index cards are printed by automatic data processing and transmitted to the field. Through the use of this device, the security index can be broken down into the various categories of information appearing on the security index cards when such breakdowns become necessary for administrative purposes at the Bureau. This procedure makes it possible to maintain the content of the security index in the field and at the Bureau in an identical condition at all times.

An alphabetical breakdown of the true names and all aliases of security index subjects is also maintained at the Bureau for administrative purposes.

- v. Persons active in the Communist Party or other organization underground apparatus
 - vi. Any other security index subject whose activities, past or present, regardless of membership in a revolutionary organization, clearly and unmistakably depict the individual as a potential saboteur, espionage agent, or disruptionist in the event of an emergency
- (C) Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities
- II. Security index subjects considered for priority II.
- (A) All individuals who are considered to be of second level leadership of basic revolutionary organizations and other subversive organizations and individuals who present a significant threat but are in less influential positions than those in priority I
- III. All other individuals on the security index will be tabbed priority III.
- (c) Recommendations for and removal of priority designation
- I. Approval of SAC
- Designation of each subject as to priority or removal of any subject therefrom must be personally approved by SAC, or in offices having more than 1,000 security index subjects by SAC, ASAC, or Bureau-approved security supervisor.
- II. When form FD-302 is submitted recommending either tabbing for priority or deletion of such tabbing, attach an additional page setting out a brief summary of facts upon which the recommendation is based.
- (d) Administrative procedures for handling priority program
- Take following action to assure that security index cards for subjects tabbed for priority of apprehension will be readily available for emergency action in your office:
- I. Geographical section
- Divide geographical section of security index into three distinct parts.
- (A) Part I of geographical section shall include only security index cards for subjects who are tabbed priority I.
- (B) Part II of geographical section shall contain security index cards for all subjects that are tabbed priority II.
- (C) Part III of geographical section should contain security index cards for all subjects who are tabbed priority III.
- (D) In offices having two separate and distinct geographical sections, i.e., geographical-employment and geographical-residence, as provided under 87D 7b (6) herein, each such geographical section must be broken into parts I, II, and III.
- (E) Priority cards will be the following colors:
priority I - beige, priority II - green,
priority III - white
- III. Alphabetical section
- (A) One security index card for each subject is to be filed in alphabetical section in strict alphabetical order with no other breakdown whatsoever.
- (B) Priority tabbings approved at Bureau will be shown on security index cards forwarded to field by code letters "P I," "P II," or "P III" in first line on the cards.

(e) General

I. Tabbing of cards

The alphabetical security index cards on those individuals designated as "Pro-Cuban" should be tabbed with a metal tab.

II. Removal from priority I and priority II

Careful analysis must be made of each case in which deletion from priority I and priority II is proposed. For instance, when a subject is being removed from priority I or priority II tabbing, file review may well disclose that subject qualifies for priority tabbing for reasons covered in 87D 7b (11) (b).

c. Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities

(1) Responsibility

FBI is responsible by Presidential directive for keeping other Federal agencies advised of developments within their jurisdiction affecting plants having armed forces contracts, as well as other facilities, utilities, and critical points of transportation and communications systems which have been designated as vital to the national defense and welfare by the Department of Defense.

FBI is responsible under Delimitations Agreement for investigating employees of private contractors who have contracts with agencies of Department of Defense where credible subversive information concerning employee is obtained. Thorough investigation must be conducted and consideration for inclusion in security index given concerning any individual employed in or having access to a key facility who is alleged to have been, at any time in the past, a member of any basic revolutionary organization or against whom sufficient other subversive information is in our possession which warrants such action.

(a) Requests for investigation from another agency

When another agency requests investigation of individual employed in key facility, institute investigation immediately if basis of request so warrants. Advise Bureau of request, basis thereof, and that investigation is being conducted.

(b) Verification of key facility status of place of employment

Department of Defense Key Facilities List (maintained in each office) must be checked for verification of information that a security investigation subject's place of employment may be included in such list.

(c) Individuals denied access to restricted information

Intelligence agencies of armed forces frequently advise that an individual has been denied clearance to work in a defense plant or to handle classified or restricted information. In some instances clearance is denied based on information furnished by Bureau. At other times, information in Bureau files is very meager or possibly negative and basis for such denial of clearance is not known. The intelligence agency is responsible for furnishing Bureau with any information involving disloyalty or subversiveness.

Office receiving notification that an individual has been denied clearance must ascertain promptly basis for such denial and obtain all pertinent data contained in file of

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

- Abstract slips, 47,58
- Addresses, verification of (See verification of addresses.)
- Administrative
 - data, 77
 - tickler, 55,56,74
- Admissible evidence, 29,37
- Agitator index, 33,78
- Agreement between FBI and Secret Service, 81
- Airman with certificates from FAA, dissemination of information concerning, 81
- Aliens
 - Chinese, 48,62,81a
 - Cuban, 45a,45b,81a
 - dissemination of information concerning, 80,81a
 - investigation of, 26
- Alphabetical section of security index, 51,63
- Appearance and content of security index cards, 48
- Applicant investigations, inclusion of subjects in security index or reserve index, 70
- Armed forces
 - dissemination to, 82
 - members of, 25
 - record in, 27
 - relatives in, 27
 - subjects entering, 56,60
 - subjects in, 25
- Arrangement of security index, 50
 - alphabetical section, 51,63
 - at Bureau, 50
 - geographical section, 51,63
 - in field office, 51
 - inactive section, 56
 - special section, 52 (See also special section of security index.)
 - unavailable section, 53 (See also unavailable section of security index.)
- Atomic Energy Act subjects, inclusion in security or reserve index, 70,71
- Black nationalist cases
 - character of case, 73
 - classification, 72
 - definitions, 19
 - reports
 - anarchist beliefs, 46a
 - content, 74
 - security index, 43,49
 - top functionary, 66
- Bureau
 - applicants, inclusion in security or reserve index, 70
 - authority to investigate individuals, 24
 - responsibility, 19,64
- Cancellation of
 - security flash notice, 27a
 - security index cards
 - after induction into armed forces, 60
 - mechanics, 60
 - on departure from U. S., 60
 - only after interview, 38
 - recommending, 42,61
 - upon death, 60
- Canvassing informants, 74
- Changes on security index cards, 58,78
- Channelizing, 24,34,36,72,79
- Character of reports, 73
 - top functionaries, 67,73
- Characterizations, 79
- Chinese
 - aliens, changes in residence or employment, dissemination to Secret Service and INS, 81a
 - extraction, 48,62
 - sympathies, 48
- Classification of cases, 72
- Color of security index cards, 63
- Concealment of membership, 31
- Confidential informants (See security informants.)
- Contacting
 - faculty members, 25
 - informants, 34,74
 - registrars, 25
 - students, 25
 - superiors of faculty members, 25
- Contacts
 - during investigation, 25
 - of foreign establishments, 25
- Content
 - and appearance
 - of reserve index cards, 43
 - of security index cards, 48
 - of reports, 74
- Corroboration, 37
- Cover pages, 77,78
- Criteria for inclusion in security index, 44a,45
- Cuban
 - activity in support of Cuban regime, 45a
 - aliens, 45a,45b,81a
 - contacts with, factor in determining dangerousness of individual, 44a
 - pro-Cuban activity, 45b
 - special section, 49,53
 - tabbing cards, 45b,64
- Dangerousness
 - definition of, 44
 - determination of, 44
 - Nation of Islam membership, 46
- Death of security index subject, 60

INDEX FOR SECTION 87D
References are to page.

- Defected subjects, 42
- Defectors to Sino-Soviet-bloc countries, 57
- Defense
 - Industrial Security Clearance Office, 65,81
 - Supply Agency, 65,81
- Definitions, 19
 - of dangerousness, 44
 - of top functionaries, 66
- Delimitations Agreement, 64,82
- Departmental applicants, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
- Determination of
 - dangerousness, 44
 - membership and position in labor organizations, 29
- Disaffection of U. S. citizens abroad, 57
- Dissemination
 - concerning individuals who are not within Bureau investigative jurisdiction, 82
 - of reports
 - at SOG, 81a
 - in field, 79
 - on subjects employed in key facilities, 65,80
 - to Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, Defense Supply Agency, 65,81
 - to Immigration and Naturalization Service, 80,81a
 - to Secret Service, 81,81a
 - closing case, 47,74
 - letterhead memoranda, 57,81,81a
 - stamping reserve index cards, 43
- Documentation of reports, 78
 - completion of, 78
- Employees of
 - international organization, 25
 - U. S. Government, 25,70
 - dissemination of data re, 80
- Employment, verification of (See verification of.)
- Espionage subjects, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
- Evidence, 37
 - desirability of
 - admissibility, 29,37
 - corroboration, 37
 - of knowledge of aims and purposes, 29
 - of membership or affiliation, 29
 - preservation of, 37
- Executive Order 10450, 80,81
- Faculty members
 - contacts with, 25
 - investigation of, 24
- Fifth amendment, 46
- File on defected subjects, 42
- File reviews, 34
- Flash notices (security)
 - cancellation of, 27a
 - notation concerning, on FD-128, 59
 - placing, 27
- Foreign
 - diplomats, 25
 - establishments, 25
 - intelligence subjects, inclusion in security index or reserve index, 70
 - tours, 33a,57
 - travel, 33,54,57
- Forms
 - FD-122, 28,34,48,49,53 to 58,67,74,78
 - abstracts for, 47
 - changes in data on security index card by, 58,78
 - concerning persons of Chinese extraction or Chinese sympathy, 48
 - cover letter thereto, 32
 - Cuban subjects, 45b

"(4) the extent to which the positions taken or advanced by it from time to time on matters of policy do not deviate from those of any Communist-action organization, Communist foreign government, or the world Communist movement referred to in section 781 of this title."

e. [Deleted]

f. [Deleted]

3. [How proceedings are instituted (Title 50, USC, § 792 (§ 13 of act))

Whenever the Attorney General has reason to believe that any organization is a communist-action organization or a communist front organization, or that any individual is a member of an organization determined by a final order of the Board to be such, he shall file a petition with the Board and serve upon the organization or individual, as the case may be, a copy thereof, for a determination that such is true via a hearing before the Board.

4. Findings of the Board and publication of same (Title 50, USC, § 792 (§ 13 of act))

If, after a hearing on the matter, the Board finds - (1) that an organization is a communist-action organization or a communist front organization, it shall make a report in writing to state its findings and cause to be served on such organization an order determining the organization to be a communist-action organization or a communist front organization, or (2) that an individual is a member of a communist-action organization, it shall make a report in writing in which it shall state its findings and cause to be served on such individual an order determining such individual to be a member of a communist-action organization.

a. Findings of the Board shall be published in the Federal Register that such orders have become final and this publication shall be notice to all persons that such orders have become final. Records of the Board concerning such hearings shall be available to the public.

5. Employment of members; contribution of funds, services, or advice by Government personnel (Title 50, USC, § 784 (§ 5 of act))

"(a) When there is in effect a final order of the Board determining any organization to be a Communist-action organization or a Communist-front organization, it shall be unlawful -

"(1) For any member of such organization, with knowledge or notice of such final order of the Board -

"(A) in seeking, accepting, or holding any nonelective office or employment under the United States, to conceal or fail to disclose the fact that he is a member of such organization; or

"(B) to hold any nonelective office or employment under the United States; or

"(C) in seeking, accepting, or holding employment in any defense facility, to conceal or fail to disclose the fact that he is a member of such organization; or

"(D) if such organization is a Communist-action organization, to engage in any employment in any defense facility; or

"(E) to hold office or employment with any labor organization, as that term is defined in section 2 (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (29 U. S. C. 152), or to represent any employer in any matter or proceeding arising or pending under that Act.

"(2) For any officer or employee of the United States or of any defense facility, with knowledge or notice of such final order of the Board -

"(A) to contribute funds or services to such organization; or

"(B) to advise, counsel or urge any person, with knowledge or notice that such person is a member of such organization, to perform, or to omit to perform, any act if such act or omission would constitute a violation of any provision of paragraph (1) of this subsection."

6. Use of mail and instrumentalities of interstate or foreign commerce (Title 50, USC, § 789 (§ 10 of act))
The act requires any person acting for or on behalf of any organization for which there is in effect a final order of the Board determining it to be a communist-action organization or communist front to label properly all publications transmitted through the mail or by any means or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce.
7. Penalties (Title 50, USC, § 794 (§ 15 of act))
Any organization which violates any provision of section 10 of this act shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished for each such violation by a fine of not more than \$10,000. Any individual who violates any provision of section 5 or 10 of this act shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished for each such violation by a fine of not more than \$10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than five years, or by both.
8. Reporting of evidence developed on individual members
All admissible evidence showing a violation of the Internal Security Act of 1950, as amended (Title 50, USC, § 784), as it pertains to union officers, employees, and representatives of management (see item 5, part (a) (1) (E) above, and volume III, section 67C, of this manual), should be furnished the Bureau in a report on the individual and the report should carry the single character, Internal Security Act of 1950 - Labor (classification 122). Any admissible evidence showing a violation of this act on the part of any other individual should be furnished the Bureau in report on the individual and the report should carry the dual character, Internal Security - C or Security Matter - C, and Internal Security Act of 1950 (classification 100). See section 87D of this manual for complete instructions relative to investigation of individuals.
9. Instructions
The Bureau's responsibilities in connection with the internal security of this country necessitate that we promptly and thoroughly investigate all organizations subject to communist infiltration, influence, or control as set forth in section 87E of this manual. In view of the Internal Security Act of 1950, the necessity of developing legally admissible evidence as to the communist character of any organization must be emphasized during our investigation. Keeping in mind the factors to be considered by the Subversive Activities Control Board in determining whether an organization is a communist front, every effort must be made to develop legally admissible evidence relating to these factors. An investigation of any organization which might fall within the provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 should carry the dual character, Internal Security - C, Internal Security Act of 1950.
10. Emergency detention provisions (Title 50, USC, §§ 811-826)
Sections 100 to 111 inclusive cover the detention provisions of the act in the event of a state of "Internal Security Emergency" and set up a program for the arrests of certain individuals, provisions for hearings after arrest, and the right to judicial review. Criminal provisions are set out in sections 112 to 114 inclusive, making it unlawful in connection with the detention provisions of the act to resist arrest, knowingly disregard or evade apprehension, escape from confinement, or conspire with others to escape from confinement or detention. Violations are also set out covering the aiding and assisting in the commission of the violations mentioned above and in the willful interference with the activities of any member of a review board set up under the detention provisions or any of its agents.
 - a. Bureau instructions
These provisions do not affect instructions regarding individuals considered dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security as outlined in section 87D of this manual.

- (3) By force or violence, or
By assassination of any officer of such government
It will be necessary to show:
- (a) The identity and official capacity of such officer
 - (b) The identity of persons conspiring to assassinate, or actually assassinating such officer
 - (c) Full details surrounding the assassination or attempted assassination
 - (d) Reasons for the assassination, and ends to be gained by such assassinations, or
- b. Printed, published, edited, issued, or circulated
- (1) The person with the intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of the Government of the U.S., or the government of any state, territory, district, or possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision thereof
 - (2) Printed, published, edited, issued, circulated, sold, distributed, or publicly displayed written or printed matter
 - (3) Advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the Government

of the U. S. by force or the government of any state, territory, district, or possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision thereof, or

c. Organized society, group, or assembly

- (1) The person organized, or helped organize, a society, group, or assembly of persons
- (2) Which taught, advocated, or encouraged the overthrowing or destruction of the Government of the U. S., or the government of any state, territory, district, or possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision thereof.
- (3) By force or violence, or
- (4) The person became a member of, or affiliated with, such society, group, or assembly of persons
- (5) Knowing the purpose thereof

B. SUBMISSION TO THE BUREAU OF SUBVERSIVE DEROGATORY INFORMATION ON INDIVIDUALS

1. To insure the proper discharge of the Bureau's responsibility to furnish information at the seat of Government at the request of other agencies and to have it available at the seat of Government when such requests are received from other agencies, the Bureau must be promptly furnished, for indexing purposes, by offices covering the national and local headquarters of the various subversive organizations, the names of, and identifying data concerning, persons affiliated with and becoming affiliated with the following types of organizations:

a. Basic revolutionary organizations or groups

Communist Party, USA

Socialist Workers Party

Proletarian Party of America

Other Marxist revolutionary organizations including splinter groups, if any, of the preceding three organizations

Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico

b. Nationalist and fascist-type groups

c. Front organizations of 1, a and b above, including those

- (1) Cited by the Attorney General
- (2) Cited or declared by the House Committee on Un-American Activities [(now House Committee on Internal Security)] or by any of the various legislative committees
- (3) Described as such or as an organization dominated or controlled by one of the basic revolutionary organizations or groups by security informants or other sources of known reliability

d. Black nationalist extremist groups

Such lists should include the organization's membership list and any other record showing affiliation.

2. Field offices obtaining information concerning such affiliation of individuals residing outside their territory must expeditiously furnish such information to the office covering the address of the person.
3. The information should be submitted to the Bureau in duplicate by letter captioned with the title of the organizational case file, for example, "Communist Party, USA, _____ District, _____ Division; Internal Security - C" or "Socialist Workers Party, _____ Division; Internal Security - SWP" and should clearly indicate that the list is being furnished to the Bureau for indexing purposes only.
4. Information received from all sources, including that received from confidential sources, highly confidential sources, reports of security informants and sources, and public and other sources, should be reviewed to insure that the Bureau has been furnished in the past and will be furnished in the future lists of all individuals (together with identifying data) affiliated with all organizations set forth in 1 a, b, c, and d.
5. In forwarding such information to the Bureau, the offices should incorporate, insofar as possible, information concerning a number of individuals in one letter. The letter should contain sufficient identifying data concerning each individual to enable the Bureau to identify that individual

- (5) In evaluating this type of case, carefully consider the nature and activities of the front organization in behalf of the Communist Party or other revolutionary organizations throughout the country or in a certain area.
- c. Special training in a subversive movement
 - (1) Training in the Lenin School or in a subversive movement abroad
 - (2) Leadership training in one of the basic revolutionary organizations mentioned above
- d. Military service
 - (1) Service in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. Membership in one of the basic revolutionary organizations is not a prerequisite to initiating investigations in this category.
 - (2) Service in the military forces of any country, including the U. S. armed forces or the Office of Strategic Services whenever there is an allegation that an individual has been a member of one of the basic revolutionary organizations at any time
- e. Employment in key facilities
Investigate the activities of any individual employed in or having access to a key facility who is alleged to have been at any time in the past a member of any basic revolutionary organization or against whom sufficient other subversive information is known.
- f. Other individuals with revolutionary beliefs
Individuals who, because of anarchist or revolutionary beliefs, are likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to endanger the public safety and welfare. Membership or affiliation in basic revolutionary or front groups is not a prerequisite to initiating investigations of this type. Use sound judgment and discretion in this evaluation.

Falling within the above category are members of the Nation of Islam. When it is known or becomes known that this organization is active in the field office territory, a security-type investigation of all individuals who are reported to be (1) functionaries or leaders of the Nation of Islam, or (2) active participants carrying out fanatical and disloyal aims of the organization should be initiated. Investigations should not be initiated based on mere membership alone.

During the course of security investigations of individuals affiliated with the Nation of Islam, be alert for any information indicating a possible violation of the Selective Service Act.

The above standards for institutions of investigations of individuals are not to be interpreted as all-inclusive. Where there is doubt an individual may be a current threat to the internal security of the nation, the question should be resolved in the interest of security and investigation conducted.

The categories specified as a through f above are to be distinguished from

the criteria to govern the addition of subjects to and retention of subjects in the security index, set out in 87D 7b (3). Investigation should be undertaken when cases fall within the preceding categories, even though under existing criteria the subjects would not be placed in the security index on the information available. The cases should thereafter be investigated actively to determine the scope of subversive activities in which the subjects have been engaged and to fully develop all aspects of the cases in order that a determination can be made with respect to security index status.

Complaints alleging subversive activities of individuals which are received from anonymous sources should not be disregarded provided the allegations are sufficiently specific and of sufficient weight to warrant investigation. Such allegations should receive same consideration as if the identity of the source was known. Do not open cases for investigation based on non-specific or vague allegations which do not fall within the standards for opening investigations.

Do not institute investigations because of membership in organizations which do not advocate the use of force to bring about changes in the existing Government, e.g., the Socialist Party, the Socialist Labor Party, the Independent Workers of the World and the Independence Party of Puerto Rico (Partido Independentista Puertorriqueño), etc.

Security-type cases already existent must be continually and carefully evaluated to determine that we are fulfilling our responsibilities in the internal security field. Subversive information received regarding any individual should be channelized to the individual's main file. If no main file exists, one should be opened. Cases not warranting further investigative action should be promptly closed and should not be permitted to continue endlessly without a definite objective.

5. Restrictions upon investigations of individuals

a. Investigations of and interviews with individuals connected with institutions of learning

(1) Subjects connected with institutions of learning

The following restrictions apply to employees and students of colleges, universities, and elementary and secondary schools supported by private or public funds. Students and employees of schools, such as the Jefferson School of Social Science, the California Labor School, and others founded by or supported by revolutionary groups, do not come within the meaning of these instructions.

(a) Prior Bureau authority to institute investigation

I. Faculty members

Bureau authority is necessary prior to initiating a security investigation of a faculty member.

II. Students and nonacademic employees

Bureau authority is not needed prior to initiating a security investigation of a student or nonacademic employee provided no unusual circumstances exist which would require advice from the Bureau prior to initiating the investigation. Each SAC must see that there is a sound basis for initiating security investigations of such individuals.

III. Requests for Bureau authority

When requesting Bureau authority to conduct a security investigation of an individual connected with an institution of learning, the letter should set forth the identity of the subject, his position, and the basis for the investigation.

locate subjects are not to be submitted. The Bureau will closely follow investigative action to locate missing security index subjects.

- II. If you receive indications that the subject went to Mexico or Canada, request the Bureau to alert other appropriate Government agencies to this possibility and to determine any available verifying information through liaison channels.
- III. If the subject is reported to have gone to any other foreign country, the Washington Field Office should be requested to check the records of the Passport Office of the State Department for verification.
- IV. When all logical leads have been exhausted in the case of a missing important functionary, consideration should be given to circularizing all field offices with the subject's photograph and background information for the purpose of alerting the entire field to the identity of the subject. Bureau authority must be obtained before circularization is made. In seeking Bureau authority, advise the Bureau as to the position held by the subject and what efforts have already been made to locate him.

If this procedure is to be effective, its application must necessarily be restrictive in the number of subjects to which it is applied. Therefore, request to circularize must be made only after every possible lead has been exhausted and then only in the cases of the most important missing functionaries.

- (4) Individuals traveling abroad (Also consider section 105G, volume IV, of this manual.)

When information is received indicating that

- a subject of a current [security] investigation or where there is information showing subversive activity by a security subject during the past five years,
- a subject whose name is included in security index, agitator index, or section A of reserve index,
- a subject of a past security investigation who is likely to remain in a foreign country over six months, or
- where information available indicates a subject of a past security investigation, although inactive for over five years, may be a "sleeper" or in an underground capacity, or where current information would indicate a need to effect foreign coverage]

intends to travel abroad or has already departed this country for foreign travel, take the following action:

- (a) Immediately advise the Bureau by letterhead memorandum setting forth complete available details concerning the foreign travel, including places and dates of departure and intended return, destination and itinerary, purpose of trip, the exact name under which the passport was issued, the number of the passport, and the office issuing the passport, if known. Include in the letterhead memorandum a full description of the subject, including all aliases, and in the case of Chinese and Korean subjects Chinese telegraphic code and Korean telegraphic code numbers, as well as a concise resume of available subversive data regarding the subject. Do not delay in advising the Bureau of the actual or intended travel while developing the details of the travel as time is of the essence in this matter.
- (b) Set out a lead for the Washington Field Office for a check of the records of the Passport Office, Department of State; however, do not limit efforts to develop above information to a check of such records.

- XI. Inform subjects connected with labor unions that the Bureau is not interested in employee-employer relations and is concerned only with obtaining information on infiltration of labor unions by subversive elements.
- XII. Furnish no information and make no statements to a person being interviewed which might later be used to embarrass the Bureau. Agents should not allow themselves to be interviewed by the interviewee or to be placed in a position of answering questions instead of asking them.
- XIII. Terminate immediately an interview if the subject proves to be hostile or uncooperative on initial contact.
- XIV. Exploit a subject's knowledge to the utmost if he is found to be willing to furnish information of value.
- XV. Questions asked of a subject being interviewed should be so worded as to require an admission or denial of all pertinent items of subversive information developed during prior investigation unless to do so would expose investigative techniques or security informants.
- XVI. A cordial and friendly attitude alone on the part of a subject should not be construed as evidence of cooperation insofar as potential dangerousness is concerned when he fails to admit or furnish substantially the same subversive information verified through previous investigation.
- XVII. Inform the subject that we are interested in interviewing him in great detail and arrange to conduct the interviews over as extended a period of time as necessary to develop the matter fully. Conduct necessary investigation or research to verify or add to what is being developed on interview. Request information from other offices or the Bureau to assist in the interview if necessary.
- XVIII. Reduce information obtained to a signed statement if subject willing that this be done.
- XIX. Determine willingness to testify to information furnished in possible future Federal proceedings.
- XX. Consider possibility of developing these individuals as informants. If possibility is apparent, pursue matter with view to establishing subject as a reliable source in the subversive movement with which he has been connected.
- XXI. When no information is developed during the course of an interview which would affect a subject's status, submit the results thereof in letter form immediately following the interview and also in the next report submitted in the case. At least one report will be submitted in each case in which a subject is interviewed with Bureau authority. In the case of an individual employed in or holding a sensitive position enumerated in 87D 6b (7) (e) IV above, the results of all interviews must be submitted promptly in report form until such time as he begins to cooperate as a security informant or a source.
- XXII. Report information regarding the subject's admissions of his own subversive activities and associations and set forth a statement to the effect that he did or did not furnish information regarding subversive activities of others.
- XXIII. Report statements of denial regarding subject's subversive activities developed through prior investigation and follow by a brief summary statement of the past subversive activity which is being denied by the subject.

- XXIV. Letter transmitting results of an interview must contain:
- (A) A definite statement or conclusion of interviewing Agents as to cooperativeness of subject
 - (B) Whether information furnished by him coincides substantially with information developed against him
 - (C) Reasons for the conclusions
 - (D) Statement as to subject's availability as a potential witness and evaluation of subject's potential as an informant or confidential source
 - (E) Further contacts contemplated
 - (F) Recommendation that the security index card be canceled when it is determined from statements furnished by a security index subject regarding his subversive activities and associates, considered with other known information and factors, that the subject is no longer to be considered dangerous to the internal security in time of an emergency
- XXV. The above instructions shall not preclude immediate interview of subject of a security-type investigation who contacts a Bureau representative and expresses a desire to furnish information concerning subversive activities. They do not apply to an interview of a person once he is an established informant or confidential source.
- XXVI. Reinterviews with security index subjects should be considered on a systematic basis. This may be done by considering a recontact immediately prior to the time when it is necessary to submit a periodic report. In all cases in which subjects have been interviewed in the past with Bureau authority and no reinterview is conducted prior to the submission of the periodic report, the cover page(s) accompanying report should show why a reinterview was not conducted. Results of reinterviews should be submitted in report form.
- (g) Maintenance of file on defected subjects
- I. A dead file should be maintained for reference purposes in those offices having sufficient volume of security work to justify such action.
 - II. Copies of memoranda designated for individual case files should be routed to this file. Such memoranda to contain:
 - (A) The background of the defector
 - (B) Type of information he may furnish
 - (C) Period covered by this data

unequivocal regardless of Yugoslavia's foreign policies.

(G) Cuban

In order that, in the event of an emergency involving Cuba and the U. S., special handling may be afforded those subjects whose organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies are shown as "Cuban." Security index cards denoting such will contain the code "CUB" on line 1.

Standards for inclusion of subjects in the special section of the security index are the same as those for any other potentially dangerous subject.

When submitting a recommendation for preparation of a security index card on an individual falling in one of the above categories, form FD-122 must include the words "Special Section" typed in the upper right portion thereof. The proper category should be typed on FD-122 in the space provided behind the words "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)."

Security index cards to be placed in the special section shall bear the appropriate code letters in the upper right portion designating the subsection in which the cards should be placed. Upon receipt from the Bureau of the three security index cards of subjects in these categories, the required additional data shall be placed on two which shall be filed alphabetically in the appropriate subsection of the special section. The third card shall be filed in the alphabetical section of the security index. Under no circumstances should special section security index cards be filed in the geographical section of the index.

When a security index subject whose card is maintained in the special section no longer comes within one of the categories of the special section, FD-122 must be submitted with the words "Remove from Special Section" typed in the space provided behind the words "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)." If the card should be placed in the unavailable section, the statement "Place in Unavailable Section" should be added in this space. When the new cards are received from the Bureau, they should be checked for accuracy and the description and photograph, if available, should be placed on separate cards of similar size and attached to the back of two of the cards. These two cards should then be filed in the geographical or unavailable section (where applicable) and the other card filed in the alphabetical section of the security index. The old cards should be destroyed.

The special section card shall [indicate the priority level for apprehension.]

It is not contemplated that subjects of security index cards maintained in the special section will be apprehended under a mass apprehension program. The cases of such subjects shall be given individual attention upon the inception of the apprehension program and the subjects will not be apprehended in the absence of specific Bureau instructions in each case.

IV. Unavailable section

Security index cards of individuals who are missing, out of the country, or are imprisoned shall be retained in the unavailable section. This section shall be broken down into three subsections headed by tabs marked "Missing,"

"Out of the Country," and "Imprisoned." The unavailable section shall be maintained in accordance with the following instructions:

(A) Missing subjects

Security index subjects are not to be included in the unavailable section as missing immediately upon determination that they are no longer located at their previously known places of residence or employment. The action required in 87D 6b (3) above must be taken prior to submitting FD-122 placing a subject in the unavailable section as a missing subject. The Bureau must be periodically advised of the investigative steps taken to locate missing security index subjects in accordance with 87D 6b (3).

If the subject is missing, the word "Missing" shall be typed in the space provided on FD-122 behind the words "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)."

(B) Subjects out of the country

The security index cards of subjects who are found to have departed from the U. S. or Puerto Rico for a foreign country shall be placed in this subsection of the unavailable section of the security index unless their cards should be cancelled in accordance with instructions set forth below under 87D 7b. (10) (b).

If the subject is out of the country, the words "Out of the Country" shall be typed in the space provided on FD-122 behind the words "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)." If the foreign address is known, place it on FD-122 in the space provided for the residence address. If the subject is only known to be in a certain foreign country and his residence there is not known or is only known to be traveling abroad, include this information on FD-122. If the subject's current employment abroad is known, include it on FD-122.

The case of any security index subject who is out of the country must be followed at least [once each year] for verification of the subject's address, the same as any other security index case, to determine if the subject has returned to this country.

Appropriate stops should be placed with the Immigration and Naturalization Service to be advised of information which may become available to it indicating the subject's return to this country.

(C) Imprisoned subjects

The cards of security index subjects who are found to be imprisoned shall be placed in the unavailable section of the security index.

If the subject is in prison, the word "Imprisoned" shall be typed on the space provided on FD-122 behind the words "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)." The identity of the institution in which the subject is incarcerated shall be typed in the space provided for the residence address. The space for the business address shall be left blank.

should be completely filled out just as if a first recommendation is being made, and submitted with a current report. If not, the Bureau should be advised of the reasons for not reactivating his security index card. In either case, cancel the inactive card.

(7) Periodic verification of addresses

- (a) The data recorded on security index cards shall be in an up-to-date status at all times.
- (b) The whereabouts of all security index subjects should be known at all times. The residence and business addresses of security index subjects in priority I must be checked at least once each three months. The residence and business addresses of all other security index subjects must be checked at least once each [year], except those imprisoned and those who were included in the security index because of disaffection for the U. S. (defection to a Sino-Soviet-bloc country, including Cuba since 10-1-60) (see section 105G, item 3, volume IV, of this manual). The residence and employment of those who were included in the security index because of disaffection for the U. S. must be verified every [ninety] days. The case of any security index subject who is out of the country must be followed at least [once each year] to determine if he has returned to this country.

Perfect arrangements to be advised on a current basis of any indication that the subject is engaged in subversive activities, is exhibiting violent tendencies, or plans to change his residence or employment. Periodic checks to verify residence or business addresses may be made under appropriate pretext by telephone once each six months for those individuals in priority I and once [every two years] for all other subjects. Pretext means may be utilized during other periodic checks conducted either personally or through appropriate sources.

- (c) The physical characteristics and description of each security index subject shall be determined or verified by personal observation and the individual case file of each security index subject shall show that this has been done. If a security index subject has not been personally observed previously, this should be done during the next verification of the subject's residence and/or business addresses.
- (d) Use form FD-154 in verifying addresses of security index subjects when its use will facilitate the checking of the addresses. When FD-154 is not used in verifying addresses, a notation must be made on the last FD-154, FD-122, or FD-128 in the subject's case file showing the subject's current residence and business addresses and the date such addresses were verified. This must be done to assure that the file will contain all information concerning the status of the case and that the file will come to the attention of the Agent or field supervisor to determine if additional action is warranted at the time of the verification of addresses. Each time that a security index subject's residence or employment are verified, the case must be reevaluated to assure that the subject is qualified for inclusion in the security index under the criteria for such inclusion. A notation to the effect that the case has been reviewed for this purpose shall be made in the file.
- (e) If it is determined that the residence or business address or both have been changed from those appearing on the security index card, FD-122 should be submitted to the Bureau with the current residence or business address shown thereon. In such instances, FD-122 should show only the changes to be made on the security index card. FD-122 should be accompanied by form FD-366 for dissemination to Secret Service. Secret Service should be advised locally by dissemination of FD-366.

- (f) The project of verifying addresses of security index subjects shall be handled by reopening and assigning the cases for verification and closing the cases administratively upon accomplishment of verifications. Verification should also be made at the time of submission of all [periodic] investigative reports and should be reported therein.
- (8) Changes, additions, and deletions of data appearing on security index cards
 - (a) Submit to Bureau by FD-122 any changes, additions, or deletions involving name, aliases, citizenship, organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies, [priority designation,] date or place of birth, key facility geographical reference number, abbreviation of agency having security responsibility (see 87D 7c (2) below), residence or business address. Exception: Change office of origin by form FD-128.
 - (b) Insertion or removal of cards from special section or unavailable section should be handled pursuant to 87D 7b (6) (b) III or IV.
 - (c) Temporary handwritten notations may be made on existing security index cards pending receipt of corrected cards from Bureau.
 - (d) Indicate use of FD-122 for changes by checking proper opening paragraph and submit without abstract.
 - (e) Set out only items being changed, added, or deleted. If being deleted, specify "Delete."
 - (f) Upon receipt from Bureau of corrected security index cards with duplicate copy of FD-122 (stamped "Corrected Security Index cards attached. Substitute for cards in file and destroy old cards. Place photograph and description on reverse side of geographical cards."), action to be taken includes:
 - I. Check accuracy of data on card.
 - II. Transfer separate cards with descriptive data and photograph from back of old geographical section cards to back of corrected cards, staple them, and file in geographical section. Exception: For special or unavailable section subjects, see 87D 7b (6) (b) III or IV above.
 - III. File third card in alphabetical section of security index.
 - IV. Destroy old cards.
- (9) Movement of subjects between offices and transfers of security index cards
 - (a) Subjects of security index cards
 - I. Requests to verify addresses of security index subjects from other offices must be assigned immediately and results of investigation to verify the new address must be transmitted to the office of origin within two weeks.
 - II. Office of origin, upon receipt of verification of address, should submit FD-128 immediately transferring office of origin. Forms regarding unavailable section subjects should be prepared in accordance with 87D 7b (6) (b) IV above.
 - III. Submit original and one copy of FD-128 to Bureau. Submit two copies thereof to office covering subject's new address, enclosing copies of all previous reports, other pertinent serials, photograph if available, and security index cards. FD-128 should show full title and priority level designation.]
 - IV. Information concerning key facility employment of subject in new office should be furnished by that office to old office of origin so that geographical reference

When the subject of such an investigation is presently in the security index, a letter must be directed to the Bureau at the time the report is submitted advising that the subject is in the security index.

Information of interest to FBI and/or AEC obtained subsequent to completion of Atomic Energy Act - applicant investigations concerning AEC employees or persons having access to restricted data should be handled according to instructions in section 20, volume II, of this manual.

f. [Submission of and general rules concerning security reports]

(1) General

[Submission of summary reports should not be delayed for the purpose of conducting current investigation in previously closed cases, but appropriate leads should be set out.]

Cases of all security index subjects must be reopened or placed in a pending status for the purpose of preparing investigative reports in accordance with the schedule outlined in 87D 7f (2) and (7).

Office indices and any material channelized to the case file since the most recent report should be reviewed and the case brought up to date by appropriate investigation to determine subject's current activities.

Each time that a case is reopened and brought up to date, it should be critically analyzed in the light of the security index criteria set out in 87D 7b (3) herein. This procedure must be followed on a continuing basis for each security index subject.

- (2) Schedule of submission of reports
Reports shall be submitted on individuals designated for priority as follows: priority I - [annually] (top functionaries - [annually]); priority II - annually; priority III - every 2 years.
- (3) Origin
The office of origin will be that office covering the territory wherein the subject's subversive activities occur. In most instances this will also be the office in which territory the subject resides and is employed. In those cases in which the subject's subversive activities take place in the territory of an office other than the office covering the place of residence and/or employment, the office of origin shall be that office which can best cover the subversive activities of the subject.
- (4) Classification
 - (a) 100 - for individuals affiliated with the basic revolutionary and front organizations of Marxian ideology
 - (b) 105 - for members of Puerto Rican nationalist groups or others having nationalistic tendencies of a non-Marxist character
 - (c) 157 - Nation of Islam and other black nationalist matters
- (5) Title
Only one subject shall be carried in the title of each report. Separate reports must be submitted for each subject regardless of their relationship; i.e., husband and wife, father and son, etc.

(6) Character

(a) Top functionaries

Internal Security (or Racial Matters if subject is a black nationalist) - followed by the letters designating the organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies.

Examples:

Internal Security - C
Internal Security - SWP
Racial Matters - NOI

(b) Others

Security Matter - followed by the letters designating the organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies.

Examples:

Security Matter - C
Security Matter - SWP
Security Matter - X (native fascist)
Security Matter - M (miscellaneous)

When a subject is deleted as a top functionary, the character shall be changed from internal security to security matter in the first report following the deletion and all subsequent reports. When a security matter subject is designated a top functionary, the first report after the designation and all subsequent reports shall bear the internal security character. Communications regarding subjects who are employed in key facilities should bear the words "Key Facility" in the character. Communications regarding subjects who are members of the Communist Party, USA, National Committee should bear the words "National Committee" in the character. Black nationalist investigations and racial matters should be given the character set out in section 122, volume IV, of this manual.

(7) Status

All cases shall be carried in a pending status until all active investigation required by the preceding instructions has been conducted. Thereafter, the status shall be as follows:

(a) Top functionaries

I. Pending inactive

(A) Reports are to be submitted [annually.] Forty-five days prior to the date a report is due, each such case shall be placed in a pending-active status for the preparation of the report so that the report can be submitted at the designated time.

(b) Key facility cases

Key facility cases are to be maintained in pending-inactive status. (See 87D 7c (4).)

(c) Other security index subjects

I. Closed

- (A) Cases of all other security index subjects must be followed by administrative ticklers set up so as to insure submission of a periodic investigative report according to priority designation. If, following investigation, no subversive data is developed and the only available information consists of verification of residence and employment and negative contacts with security informants and sources, submit in lieu of a report a letter (form FD-400) to the Bureau setting forth identities of informants and sources contacted, any additional administrative data deemed necessary, and form FD-305 properly executed. The cases shall be opened and assigned 45 days prior to the date the periodic report is due.

(d) Cases of subjects recommended for security index

I. Pending inactive

- (A) If all active investigation completed at the time FD-122 forwarded to Bureau
- (B) Set forth lead to follow Bureau for security index card and if approved for dissemination of report to Secret Service.

II. Closed

- (A) Upon receipt of security index card from Bureau and dissemination to Secret Service
- (B) Thereafter follow by administrative tickler for investigative report as in (c) above.

(e) Subjects not in security index who are not to be included therein

I. Closed

- (A) Prior to closing, instructions under 87D 6b (7) pertaining to interview must be complied with.

(8) Content

- (a) In order to insure completeness of investigation, the following items should be considered as pertinent to an investigation and subsequent reporting of such should be handled under topical headings where appropriate. :

I. Background

- (A) Birth date
- (B) Citizenship status
- (C) Education
- (D) Marital status
- (E) Military service record (domestic or foreign, including type of discharge, citations, etc.)
- (F) Identification record
- (G) Employment
- (H) Residence
- (I) Status of health (if known)

II. Connections with Communist Party, other basic revolutionary groups, front groups, black nationalist extremist groups, and/or other subversive organizations or unorganized groups

- (A) Information concerning admission to revolutionary group including sponsors, etc.
- (B) History of activity in, attendance at meetings of, and positions held in subversive movement with which subject is identified

The above is not all-inclusive. Facts developed in each case will produce information which will be indicative of the necessity for conducting further investigation along lines which will necessitate the use of various investigative techniques to develop the case fully. The successful investigation of an individual will depend upon the resourcefulness of the investigating Agents in developing techniques which will further establish the subversive activity of a subject.

Discretion must be used in those instances in which contact with persons known to the subject is believed desirable. Where such contact is contemplated, the Agent should assure himself of the character, loyalty, and reliability of the person to be contacted concerning the subject by reviewing the office indices and in some instances conducting preliminary inquiry, possibly under pretext, with others to ascertain the character, reliability, and loyalty of the person of whom inquiry concerning the subject is intended.

In conducting security investigations the necessity of obtaining admissible evidence must be continually borne in mind. However, sources furnishing information of a confidential nature are valuable and should be continued and enlarged for the purpose of obtaining information which can be corroborated by other sources which can be disclosed, thus rendering the information admissible as evidence.

The danger of relying upon evidence from only one confidential informant or other source is obvious and every effort should be made to obtain evidence from various types of sources and through various investigative techniques.

Information obtained from one source should be corroborated by contacts with confidential informants, public and private sources, through physical and photographic surveillances, review of office files, and other sources. Adequate coordination of information received from confidential sources with active investigation should be maintained at all times. For example, when it is ascertained through one of these sources that an important meeting is to occur, the nature of the meeting should be confirmed if possible by independent sources which can furnish evidence of an admissible character. The meeting should be covered by arrangement for attendance by confidential informants to obtain admissible evidence of the proceedings. The meetings should be placed under physical surveillance, licenses of automobiles parked near the meeting place noted, and attendants identified. If possible and advisable, photographic surveillances should be established. Other types of information received from confidential sources should receive similar attention in order that verification may be made and admissible evidence developed.

(6) Preservation of evidence

- (a) Identify, preserve, and maintain continuity of evidence obtained with a view to its possible admission in Federal proceedings. Identify specifically as to source and date.

- (b) Satisfactory notes or statements of informants necessary from which to refresh their recollection in the event they are called upon to testify at some future date. Such notes and statements must be in sufficient detail to serve this purpose and must contain no material which would make their use advisable or inadmissible.
 - (c) Informant's original notes or statements not to be blocked, stamped, serialized, or mutilated in any way which would render them unsatisfactory for use in Federal proceedings
 - (d) The above applies to Agent's notes taken during surveillances or evidence otherwise obtained by Agents.
- (7) Interviews with subjects of security investigations
- (a) Purpose
 - I. To determine a subject's sympathies when investigation is inconclusive or to determine whether he continues to adhere to revolutionary doctrines
 - II. To develop information concerning subject's activities and those of others known to him to have been associated with a subversive movement
 - III. To develop security informants
 - (b) Subjects not included in the security index

No security investigation of an individual shall be closed unless the subject is included in the security index or consideration given to interviewing him.
 - (c) Security index subjects
 - I. Bureau will not authorize cancellation of a security index card on an individual by reason of inactivity in a subversive movement until he has been interviewed or Bureau advised why an interview is inadvisable or impossible.
 - II. Active subversives should be considered as potential informants. Consider interviews with selected individuals currently active in subversive organizations for development of additional active informants. Proper selection of individuals for interview is most important. They must possess necessary attributes for security informant work.
 - (d) Without Bureau authority the SAC may:
 - I. Authorize interviews with individuals who have not been subjects of security investigations and the available subversive information against them is not sufficient to warrant opening cases at this time
 - II. Grant authority to interview subjects of security cases where the persons have previously been interviewed with prior Bureau authority, provided no change has taken place in the subjects' status and the interviews are conducted under the same conditions as previously authorized
 - III. Authorize interviews of all persons who were the subjects of security investigations where the cases are now closed (This will include persons who were previously on the security index but whose names have been removed and the cases now closed.)
 - IV. Authorize interviews of rank-and-file black extremists except as noted in section 122, volume IV, of this manual
 - [V.] In authorizing these interviews no communication to the Bureau will be necessary and if there is a closed file, it should be reopened. If there is no closed file, a new case file of 134 category should be opened. The case should be assigned to an Agent to determine the residence of the subject, to make certain that the subject is identical with the information in the files, and to determine his current employment.
 - (A) The Agent to whom the case is assigned will prepare a memorandum for the SAC setting forth the information and requesting authority to conduct an interview with the subject solely for the purpose of determining his attitude toward cooperating with the FBI.