

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

500 THRU 535

537 THRU 541

543 THRU 546

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 [44 USC 2102
Note] Case#: NW 88326 Date: 03-18-2025

- 1 - Mr. Adams
- 2 - Mr. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
- 1 - Mr. J. Cochran

August 18, 1975

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-11-00 BY SP2 ALM/JTB

Reference is made to the August 5, 1975, request of the SSC for FBI materials.

Enclosed is a memorandum for your approval and forwarding to the Committee in response to Item V in referenced request, relating to access to screen material by August 18, 1975.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum prepared for the Committee.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

- 1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

JPT:1hb 1hb
(11)

REC 27 62-116395-546

EX 104

AUG 21 1975

"ENCLOSURE IN BULKY ROOM"

- Exec. Dir. _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Serv. _____
- AD Adm. _____
- AD Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Intell. _____
- Lab. _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Plan. & Insp. _____
- Rec. Mgmt. _____
- Tech. Serv. _____
- Training _____
- Off. Cong. & Public Affs. _____

25 AUG 1975

TELETYPE UNIT

GPO 954-546

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
- 1 - Mr. J. Cochran
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

62-116395

August 18, 1975

- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

#MDR 16
10-11-00
SP-2 ALM/STB

**U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)**

Reference is made to Item V of the August 5, 1975, request by the SSC for access to screen FBI materials.

Materials considered responsive to the SSC request have been assembled and are available for review by SSC Staff Members in Room 4171, JEH Building, regarding the following parts of Item V:

Part A. Materials pertaining to Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chermault and Spiro T. Agnew. Regarding Item V., A., 6., information pertaining to actions taken by the White House as a result of information contained in the summary letters described in Item V., A., 4., is not contained in FBI files. Regarding Item V., A., 7., the FBI has no record of any former or current Special Agent (SA) named William Jackson who could have performed the tasks enumerated in the SSC request. However, at the time that SA Phil Claridge was assigned to the Albuquerque Field Office, there was also assigned there a Special Agent named Gordon Jackson, now retired. The last known residence for SA Claridge, who retired June 29, 1973, is 619 16th Street N.W., Albuquerque, New Mexico. The last known residence for SA Jackson is 1537 Wellesley Drive N.E., Albuquerque, New Mexico.

Part B. Materials pertaining to Yeoman Charles E. Radford.

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell. _____
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Coun. _____
- Phone Rm. _____
- Sec'y _____

JPT:1hb *llb*
(10)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

[Handwritten initials and signatures]

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

ENCLOSURE

GPO 951-546

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Part E. Materials relating to the National Security Agency (NSA) "watch list." Regarding this request, it should be noted that no central file or individual case regarding the "watch list" has been maintained by the FBI. Accordingly, a diligent search of logical files and inquiries of personnel possibly knowledgeable of information pertinent to the SSC request have been conducted. Materials secured by this effort have been assembled in chronological order, in order to facilitate Staff review.

Part F. Materials pertaining to authorization for FBI contacts with, dissemination of FBI information to, receipt of information from, and requests by the FBI for action by the Special Services Staff of the Internal Revenue Service.

Part G. The "Handbook of Technical Equipment." Pursuant to agreement between Mr. John T. Elliff of the SSC and Mr. William O. Gregar of the FBI, the aforementioned handbook, which deals entirely with technical information, is available for review by Mr. Elliff to determine its relevance to SSC interests. Should Mr. Elliff determine that the handbook or specific portions thereof are relevant, and request delivery of same, prior review by FBI laboratory personnel, to determine the necessity for security classification of requested materials, will be required before delivery.

Part H. Materials pertaining to FBI activity with respect to the National Environmental Teach-in (also known as "Earth Day"), April 22, 1970.

Part I. Materials pertaining to the origin and implication of any decision to gather intelligence on "Women's Liberation" in the FBI Philadelphia Field Office from 1969 to the present.

Part J. Additional SAC letters and memoranda identified on a list attached to the referenced request.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Part K. Performance ratings (form FD-185) of several named current or former FBI employees. Regarding this request, pursuant to agreement between Mr. Elliff, supra, and Mr. Greger, supra, the personnel file of former SA George Berley, containing forms FD-185 regarding Mr. Berley, will be available in the possession of a representative of the FBI for discussion and responses to specific questions Mr. Elliff may desire to ask regarding the performance ratings contained therein.

Part L. The current office assignment or last known address of individuals listed in Part K. of the request.

As previously indicated, the aforementioned materials will be available in Room 4171, JEH Building.

Part C. of the referenced request concerned surreptitious entries carried out by the FBI from January 1, 1960, to the present. Part D. of the referenced request concerned materials pertaining to any jurisdictional agreements, agreements of coordination, or other agreements between the FBI and any other Federal, state or local agency with regard to the conduct of and dissemination of information from surreptitious entries. The Department of Justice has previously informed the SSC that it has the matter of surreptitious entries under study and the FBI has been instructed by the Department of Justice to withhold responses to inquiries concerning surreptitious entries until Departmental study of the matter has been completed.

1 - The Attorney General

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

LTR LHM Memo Report dated 8/18/75

U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Caption of Document: Activities. (Item V of 8/5/75
SC request.)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V. Kelly Date: 8/18/75

Received by: [Signature]

Title: _____

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-11-00 BY SP2 ALM/ATG

62-116395-546

ENCLOSURE

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

2. DATE PROVIDED

DOCUMENT BRIEFING INTERVIEW TESTIMONY OTHER

8/18/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

SSC
 HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

SSC letter 8/5/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)

U

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

**Operating Procedures
Intelligence collection**

#MDR16
10-11-00 SP2 MM 18/75

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Made available to appropriate personnel of the SSC Staff, for review at FBIHQ, materials pertaining to Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault and Spiro T. Agnew. Addresses furnished of two former Special Agents of the Albuquerque, New Mexico office, Material pertaining to Yeoman Charles E. Redford. Materials relating to the National Security Agency "watch list". Materials pertaining to authorization for FBI contacts with, dissemination of FBI information to, receipt of information from, and requests by the FBI for action by the Special Services Staff of the Internal Revenue Service. The "Handbook of Technical Equipment." Materials pertaining to FBI activity with respect to the National Environmental Teach-in, April 22, 1970. Materials pertaining to the origin and implication of any decision to gather intelligence on "Women's Liberation" in the FBI Philadelphia Field Office from 1969 to the present. Additional SAC letters and memoranda. Performance ratings (form FD-185) of several named current or former FBI employees.

62-116395 FMK: fmk (4)

TREAT AS YELLOW

11W000
54/6

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

- 1 - Mr. J. Adams
- 1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

The Attorney General

August 7, 1975

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

#MDR/6
10-11-00 SP-2 ALM/jag

Enclosed for your information is a memorandum with enclosure concerning an interview by a representative of the captioned Committee of former FBI Inspector Donald E. Moore. Single copies of the memorandum and its enclosure are also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 4

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 67- (Personnel File Former FBI Inspector Donald E. Moore)

LFS:1hb/hb
(10)

EX 104

REC 27

62-116395-543

9 AUG 21 1975

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.: **3 ENCLOSURE**
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell. _____
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

62-116395

August 7, 1975

**U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)**

**RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI
INSPECTOR DONALD E. MOORE
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER**

This memorandum and its enclosure contain information concerning an interview on July 28, 1975, of former FBI Inspector Donald E. Moore by Mr. Loch Johnson, SSC Staff Member. Mr. Moore entered on duty with the FBI on March 10, 1941, and served continuously in a variety of assignments until his retirement on June 29, 1973.

On advance notice from Mr. Johnson, Mr. Moore was advised that Mr. Johnson desired to interview him at Mr. Moore's convenience relative to his knowledge of the Huston Report. Mr. Moore was advised that he was being released from any applicable employment agreement for purposes of the SSC interview concerning the Huston Report. It was explained to him that he had the right to counsel; however, the FBI would be unable to provide private counsel. He was also advised that there were certain privileged areas concerning which he would not be required to answer questions. These areas concerned information which might divulge the identities of FBI sources; information relating to sensitive methods and techniques; information which might adversely affect ongoing FBI investigations; and information originating with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies. Mr. Moore was advised that if he desired an FBI representative to be available for consultation at the time and place of the interview, one would be supplied. Mr. Moore commented that

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- Gen. Inv. _____
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- Laboratory _____
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- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

1 - 67- (Personnel File Former FBI Inspector Donald E. Moore)

LFS:lhblhb

(9)

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

ENCLOSURE

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

JEB
PC
LFS
62-116395-20018-545

AL
10-11-00
#MDE 16
SP-2 ALM/STB

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI INSPECTOR BY SSC

this would not be necessary but indicated that if necessary he might contact a Bureau representative telephonically if a matter requiring consultation should come up during the interview. Mr. Moore subsequently contacted Mr. Johnson and made arrangements to be interviewed in Mr. Moore's office on July 28, 1975.

On July 31, 1975, Mr. Moore voluntarily furnished the attached memorandum which he prepared subsequent to his interview with Mr. Johnson.

Enclosure

NOTE:

Mr. Moore's memorandum concerning the interview was voluntarily furnished to SA L. F. Schwartz.

Interview of Donald E. Moore by
Mr. Loch Johnson, Senate Select Committee
July 28, 1975

Mr. Johnson stated at the outset that this was an informal interview and he did not place me under oath. He asked about my background which was provided him and included the fact that I served in the FBI from March 10, 1941, until my retirement at the end of June 1973.

The interview concerned the so-called Huston Committee and he asked if I knew Tom Charles Huston before the Committee was established. I said I recalled meeting Huston once, in Bill Sullivan's office, but I didn't recall when this was, but it was before the Committee was formed. In response to questions, Mr. Johnson was informed as follows:

I was aware of the meeting at the White House attended by Director Hoover, Mr. Helms, Admiral Gayler and Gen. Bennett. I was probably aware the meeting was to take place before the meeting date but I can't recall this. (He said the meeting was held June 5, 1970.) I was not at a meeting held in Mr. Hoover's office June 8 but I recall hearing about the meeting, probably from Bill Sullivan. I don't recall a meeting held in the Domestic Intelligence Division after this at which Sullivan, Bill Cregar, George Moore, Fred Cassidy and I were present. I did attend the initial meeting of the Working Group headed by Sullivan and was present because Sullivan asked me to be there. I remember Sullivan and Cregar were at the meeting and I thought one or more other FBI representatives were present. He mentioned George Moore and Fred Cassidy were at the meeting.

I recall Mr. Helms and Mr. Angleton from CIA were present but did not recall the names of others including the representatives from NSA, DIA and the military services. I recall Sullivan chaired the meeting and that Huston sat at the opposite end of the table. Either Helms or Sullivan announced that Helms probably couldn't stay for the entire meeting but I don't recall Helms leaving, although he did not sit directly at the conference table.

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/11/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-543

I can't recall the conversation at the meeting but think that Sullivan outlined the request of the President to study means of getting better intelligence information on new left activities and violent protest movements in the US, especially with regard to possible foreign support. I think Sullivan probably outlined areas of concern and asked representatives present to document where they felt intelligence was lacking, how it could be obtained, who should obtain it and what was needed to obtain it. I said I couldn't at this date recall specific observations or proposals and rather believed the purpose of the meeting was to outline the general problem and ask the representatives to document these and come in with specific recommendations at a subsequent meeting. I am certain Mr. Huston spoke about the purpose of the meeting but I can't recall his comments.

This was the only meeting of the Working Group I attended. I told Mr. Sullivan that if agreeable with him I would not attend subsequent meetings and I thought the FBI had several representatives present and that the thrust was on new left and related activities. As I recall he said "suit yourself." Johnson pressed me on this and I told him this was what I expressed to Sullivan but I also was somewhat uneasy after the first meeting as I did not believe Mr. Hoover was aware of collection efforts that were likely to be recommended. I could not state what FBI members attended subsequent meetings but I believe Charles Brennan and Bill Cregar, and of course, Bill Sullivan, attended as well as some other representatives.

I can't say who drafted the report but was sure it was under Sullivan's direction. During the period of the meetings Deke DeLoach had retired and Sullivan had been appointed Assistant to the Director and moved from the 9th & D Building to the Justice Building. I don't recall when Mr. Hoover's objections to certain of the recommendations were added. I can't say whether I saw the report prior to the objections being in it but may have; I do recall seeing the report after the objections were in it. I don't know whether Mr. Hoover told Sullivan to put the objections in it but presume Sullivan knew Mr. Hoover's views and put the objections in on this basis. I could not answer the question as to whether Mr. Tolson was the person responsible for having the objections made but felt he would have objected to the initial recommendations.

I did see the letter from the White House saying the report had been approved. I believe it was signed by Huston and stated the President had approved the recommendations. I was aware Mr. Hoover had either written or seen Attorney General Mitchell expressing his reluctance and was aware the White House letter was withdrawn. I didn't know why it was withdrawn other than this occurred after Mr. Hoover went to the Attorney General.

Mr. Johnson asked certain specific questions during or after the above discussion. He asked what covert mail coverage was involved since CIA in 1970 was engaged in covert mail interception. After checking with Mr. Leon F. Schwartz of the FBI, Mr. Johnson was advised that while I had been released from my pledge of confidentiality by the FBI in general with regard to the Huston Committee this matter was under review by the Department of Justice and I had not been released from my pledge on this aspect. A similar answer was given to the question about what was meant by the removal of restrictions on the use of surreptitious entry of embassies to obtain cryptographic materials.

Mr. Johnson asked if I thought the Huston Committee had been instigated by Bill Sullivan to more or less force Mr. Hoover to take a more aggressive stance in intelligence collection. I answered that I would not like to speculate on this and I could not make a definite statement yes or no.

He asked why the Working Group met at CIA as opposed to the FBI and whether this had special meaning. I answered that I did not think so, that the US Intelligence Board was headed by the Director of CIA, was concerned with intelligence collection and met at CIA and also meeting arrangements could probably be better arranged at CIA in view of parking, conference rooms, etc.

He said Admiral Gayler had stated that he and his predecessor, Gen. Carter, had tried to get Mr. Hoover to provide more support to NSA with regard to Communications Intelligence and asked if I was aware of any such efforts, and if they were in person or in writing. I said I was aware that Gen. Carter and Adm. Gayler had asked for support and I believe they might have seen Mr. Hoover personally and perhaps had written him.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

2. DATE PROVIDED

DOCUMENT

BRIEFING

INTERVIEW

TESTIMONY

OTHER

8/7/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

SSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memorandum reporting results of an interview by SSC Staff Members of former FBI Inspector Donald E. Moore

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)

U

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

Intelligence Collection

#MDR16

10/11/00 SP2 ALM/JTG

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Concerning the FBI and the so-called Huston Report

62-116395

FMK: fmk

(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

5-16-75

TREAT AS YELLOW

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee; etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 14 1975

REC 22

TELETYPE

NR 012 NY CODE

5:08PM URGENT 8-14-75 PLQ

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (105-146601)

~~TOP SECRET~~

ATTN: INTD, W. O. CREGAR

SENSTUDY 75; IS-R

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/STG
ON 11-28-00
W. O. Cregar

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Intell.	<i>W. O. Cregar</i>
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

THERE FOLLOWS A PRELIMINARY SUMMARY OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY SPECIAL AGENT (SA) JAMES P. KEHOE TO STAFF MEMBERS OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON AUGUST 12, 1975. COMPLETE DETAILS WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE BUREAU WHEN THEY ARE RECEIVED FROM SA KEHOE'S ATTORNEY.

THREE SUBJECTS WERE DISCUSSED BY SA KEHOE AND THEY WERE SAM SURVEY, SUN SURVEY, AND Z COVERAGE. WITH REGARD TO SAM SURVEY, IT WAS STATED THAT TO THE BEST OF HIS RECOLLECTION THIS BEGAN ABOUT 1959 AND WAS BELIEVED TERMINATED IN 1963. IT BEGAN AS A SURVEY TO OBSERVE THE OUTSIDE OF THE ENVELOPS DESTINED TO VARIOUS CITIES IN EUROPE, LOOKING FOR INDICATORS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO LOCATION OF SOVIET ILLEGAL AGENTS. AT A LATER POINT IN TIME COVERAGE WAS ALSO MAINTAINED ON CERTAIN ADDRESSES IN EUROPE KNOWN TO BE MAIL DROPS UTILIZED BY THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SIS). THE ACTUAL SCRUTINY OF THE MAIL WAS CONDUCTED AT

COPY RETAINED IN PERSONNEL RECORDS

James P. Kehoe

EX 104

REC 27

9 AUG 21 1975

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

84 AUG 26 1975

KENNEDY AIRPORT IN A ROOM AT THE POSTAL AIR MAIL FACILITY. CERTAIN CONSTANT CITIES WERE EXAMINED AND OTHER CITIES WERE SELECTED ON A VARIABLE BASIS. WHEN LETTERS WERE OBSERVED THAT WERE BELIEVED TO MEET THE CRITERIA THEY WERE BROUGHT BACK TO THE NEW YORK OFFICE (NYO) WHERE THEY WERE OPENED AND PHOTOGRAPHED BY THE AGENT CONDUCTING THE Z COVERAGE. THE VOLUME WAS VERY SMALL, PROBABLY CONSISTING OF ABOUT TEN LETTERS IN A SIX MONTH PERIOD. A DESCRIPTION OF THE MACHINE UTILIZED IN THE OPENING WAS PROVIDED AND IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT WHEN A LETTER, BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN SENT BY A SOVIET AGENT WAS OBSERVED, PHOTO COPIES WERE PROVIDED TO HEADQUARTERS IN WASHINGTON, AS WELL AS, AN INVESTIGATIVE FILE BEING OPENED IN NEW YORK CITY (NYC). THE SIZE OF THE SQUAD HANDLING THIS TOTAL OPERATION WAS ESTIMATED TO BE ABOUT TWENTY MEN. IT WAS INDICATED THAT THE POSTAL EMPLOYEES WHOSE NAMES WERE NOT RECALLED MERELY PROVIDED THE MAIL POUCHES AND WERE NOT PRESENT IN THE ROOM DURING THE SCREENING PROCESS. IT WAS ALSO STATED THAT ANY MAIL REMOVED AND BROUGHT TO THE NYO WAS RETURNED TO THE AIRPORT FOR DISPATCH ON THE NEXT OUTGOING FLIGHT, TO THE CITY OF DESTINATION.

WITH REGARD TO SUN SURVEY IT WAS STATED THAT THIS OPERATION WAS RUN BY THE SAME SQUAD BUT THAT IN THIS OPERATION THE ONLY MAIL SCREENED WAS MAIL ADDRESSED TO THE UNITED NATIONS (UN) AT A POST OFFICE BOX IN GRAND CENTRAL STATION. THE SCREENING TOOK PLACE IN A ROOM PROVIDED BY THE POST OFFICE AT GRAND CENTRAL STATION AND THE PURPOSE WAS TO OBTAIN MAIL WHICH MIGHT BE ADDRESSED TO SOVIET MEMBERS OF THE UN AT THIS BOX NUMBER. THESE LETTERS WERE ALSO RETURNED TO THE NYO AND OPENED AND PHOTOGRAPHED IN A SIMILAR MANNER. IN THIS INSTANCE, PHOTOGRAPHS WERE NOT FORWARDED TO HEADQUARTERS BUT WERE FORWARDED TO THE INDIVIDUAL CASE FILE OF THE SOVIET NATIONAL AND THE RESULTS OF THE MAIL INTERCEPT WOULD BE REPORTED TO THE BUREAU AT THE NEXT REPORTING SCHEDULE FOR THAT PARTICULAR CASE. IT WAS ESTIMATED THAT SUCH COVERAGE RESULTED IN THE OPENING OF ABOUT FIVE OR SIX LETTERS A DAY.

WITH REGARD TO Z COVERAGE IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT SA KEHOE HAD NO DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF THIS OPERATION BUT HAD BEEN PRESENT IN THE ROOM, IN THE NYO, WHEN MAIL WAS OPENED. NO ESTIMATE COULD BE GIVEN OF THE INCLUSIVE DATES OF COVERAGE OR THE VOLUME OF MAIL.

BUT IT WAS STATED THAT ALL MAIL TO THE SOVIET MISSION TO THE UN (SMUN) WAS OPENED AND PHOTOGRAPHED IN THE NYO AND THAT THIS MAIL WAS PROVIDED BY POSTAL OFFICIALS AND THAT AFTER PHOTOGRAPHING, THE INFORMATION WOULD BE PROVIDED TO THE INVESTIGATIVE CASE FILES.

THE NAMES OF SOME INDIVIDUALS EMPLOYED IN THESE THREE OPERATIONS WERE PROVIDED AND THE THOUGHT EXPRESSED THAT ALL THREE OPERATIONS MAY HAVE BEEN CONCLUDED AT THE SAME TIME AND THAT THE DECISION TO CONCLUDE THE OPERATIONS CAME FROM WASHINGTON.

IT WAS STATED THAT SA KEHOE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE AS TO WHICH OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON APPROVED THE ORIGINAL PROGRAMS OR TERMINATED THEM, BUT IT WAS FELT THAT THE ONLY PERSON WHO COULD GIVE APPROVAL TO COMMENCE AND TERMINATE WOULD HAVE HAD TO HAVE BEEN FORMER DIRECTOR HOOVER. OTHER QUESTIONS, SUCH AS DID THE AGENT KNOW SPECIFIC NAMES, WERE ANSWERED EITHER AFFIRMATIVELY OR NEGATIVELY, DEPENDING UPON THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE NAMES RECOGNIZED WERE POSTAL INSPECTORS, AND QUESTIONS SUCH AS WAS THERE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) AND THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) IN THESE OPERATIONS

PAGE FIVE NY L 05-L4406 TOP ~~SECRET~~

WERE ANSWERED NEGATIVELY. QUESTIONS AS TO KNOWLEDGE OF THE CIA'S MAIL SCREENING OPERATION WERE ANSWERED IN EFFECT THAT SA KEHOE GENERALLY HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THESE OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WHAT HE READ IN THE PAPERS.

A DIRECT QUESTION WAS ASKED IF SA KEHOE WAS AWARE THAT A PIECE OF CORRESPONDENCE HAD BEEN FOUND IN THE MEDIA BREAK-IN INDICATING THAT MAIL OPENINGS WENT ON AS LATE AS 1970. THE ANSWER WAS GIVEN THAT HE HAD READ THIS STATEMENT IN THE PAPERS, AND IT WAS THEN ASKED HOW HE WOULD EXPLAIN THIS. HE REPLIED THAT HE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THIS WHATSOEVER, BUT THAT IF THE BUREAU ISSUED A STATEMENT ADVISING THAT ALL MAIL OPENINGS CEASED IN 1966, THEN THERE WAS AN EXPLANATION, BUT SA KEHOE WAS UNAWARE OF IT.

A QUESTION AS TO WHAT SPECIFIC INDICATORS WERE LOOKED FOR IN SAM SURVEY WAS NOT ANSWERED ON THE GROUNDS THAT SUCH INFORMATION REPRESENTED A SENSITIVE TECHNIQUE THAT WAS STILL VIABLE.

AT NO POINT IN THE PROCEEDINGS DID SA KEHOE EXERCISE HIS RIGHT TO CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 6444, XGDS 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.~~

END.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 7/8/75

FROM : Legal Counsel *JAM*

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep. AD Adm.	_____
Dep. AD Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

#MDR/6
10/1/00 SP-2 AM/7/6

Mr. Callahan requested that a research be conducted to determine whether the FBI or the Department of Justice would be authorized to pay for private counsel for employees called to testify before the Senate Select Committee and who desired private counsel.

I advised Mr. Callahan that the position of the FBI and the Department is that we could not provide counsel directly to the individuals because of the potential conflict of interest between the rights of the individual and the duties of our officers. However, I told him that to my knowledge the question concerning whether the Government could pay for private counsel selected by the employee has not been researched. Mr. Callahan therefore requested that the research be conducted.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Administrative Division and Legal Counsel confer and prepare an appropriate response to Mr. Callahan's request.

- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Walsh
- 1 - Mr. Daly
- 1 - Mr. Donahue
- 1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:mfd
(6)

Memo by C. m. 9/26
Reviewed 7/23/75
P&A/mfd

JAM *62-116395-540*
REC-42 *6-108*

AUG 1 1975
PLM

JAM

11-9/8

84 AUG 25 1975



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 7/23/75

FROM : Legal Counsel *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: AUTHORITY OF FBI AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO RETAIN PRIVATE COUNSEL TO REPRESENT EMPLOYEES

- Assoc. Dir.
- Dep. AD Adm.
- Dep. AD Inv.
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm.
- Comp. Syst.
- Ext. Affairs
- Files & Com.
- Gen. Inv.
- Ident.
- Inspection
- Intell.
- Laboratory
- Legal Coun.
- Plan. & Eval.
- Spec. Inv.
- Training
- Telephone Rm.
- Director Sec'y

#MDR16
10/11/00
SP-2 ALM/186

Legal Counsel memorandum to you dated 7-8-75 captioned "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities," recommended that the Administrative Division and Legal Counsel Division confer and prepare an appropriate response to Mr. Callahan's request that research be conducted to determine whether the FBI or the Department of Justice would be authorized to pay for private counsel for employees who are called to testify before the Senate Select Committee and who desire private counsel. We have also undertaken to present the statutory considerations governing the provision of such representation in a legal proceeding as distinguished from a legislative hearing.

Title 5, United States Code, Section 3106, states:

"Except as otherwise authorized by law, the head of an Executive department or military department may not employ an attorney or counsel for the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or an employee thereof is a party, or is interested, or for the securing of evidence therefor, but shall refer the matter to the Department of Justice. . . ."

This statutory prohibition makes it clear that only the Attorney General has the authority to make a contract for special employment of an attorney. This Bureau, as an agency of the Department of Justice, obviously does not have authority to do that which is denied to Executive departments which are otherwise of coequal stature to the Department of Justice.

- 1 - Mr. Callahan
- 1 - Mr. Jenkins
- 1 - Mr. Donahue
- 1 - Mr. Adams
- 2 - Mr. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. Walsh

PGD:mbk

[Handwritten signature]



Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams
Re: Authority of FBI and Department of Justice
to Retain Private Counsel to Represent Employees

An examination of our budgetary language by representatives of the Administrative Division and this Division does not disclose any explicit or implicit authority which would qualify as "otherwise authorized by law, . . ." under the above statute. The statutory authority for provision of private counsel is contained in Title 28, United States Code, Section 515, which gives the Attorney General the authority to appoint and pay special attorneys. However, this authority is circumscribed by the statement that these attorneys "may, when specifically directed by the Attorney General, conduct any kind of legal proceeding, civil or criminal, including grand jury proceedings and proceedings before committing magistrates, which United States Attorneys are authorized by law to conduct. . . ." It is evident then that this authority pertains only to proceedings held within the judicial system, not to hearings held before a legislative body. Such a hearing is not a "legal proceeding" and is not one "which United States Attorneys are authorized by law to conduct. . . ."

In the event that employees need representation in a legal proceeding and the Department believes that a potential conflict of interest would prevent it from providing counsel, outside counsel could be appointed and paid under the statute up to the monetary limits fixed. Whether the Department would allow the individual employee to designate or select the outside counsel would be a matter of Departmental policy but we see no reason why such an individual selection would not ordinarily be approved.

We are aware that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has recently engaged the law firm of Arnold and Porter and that Mr. Mitchell Rogovin of that firm has been designated as the individual attorney to represent that agency. Inquiry with CIA has determined that the authority relied on for this action is Title 50, United States Code, Section 403j, which states:

- 2 -

↓ ↓
(CONTINUED - OVER)

Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams

Re: Authority of FBI and Department of Justice
to Retain Private Counsel to Represent Employees

"(a) Notwithstanding any other other provisions of law, sums made available to the Agency by appropriation or otherwise may be expended for purposes necessary to carry out its functions, including --

"(1) personal services, including personal services without regard to limitations on types of persons to be employed. . . ."

^{appears} We would emphasize, however, that the counsel hired, represents the CIA, not individual employees, and that private counsel has the same problems as does their "in-house" counsel. Therefore, no firm or individual hired by that agency can provide counsel to the individual employee in any situation which presents a potential conflict between the interests of the individual and the interests of the agency.

CONCLUSION:

We conclude that there is no authority for either the FBI or the Department to pay for private counsel selected by employees called to testify before the Senate Select Committee or any other legislative body. If an employee called to testify in such a forum desires private counsel, or where a potential conflict of interest makes representation by "in-house" counsel or the Department impossible, the employee must decide if the possible consequences warrant the personal expense of such counsel and, if so, responsibility for payment rests with him.

Furthermore, private counsel retained by an agency having authority to do so would be under the same disabilities as "in-house" or Departmental counsel in situations presenting a potential conflict of interest.

Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams
Re: Authority of FBI and Department of Justice
to Retain Private Counsel to Represent Employees

The only authority for payment by the Department of private counsel would be in a legal proceeding in the judicial system under Title 28, United States Code, Section 515.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

MBU

pen

JWT

aw

JM

JM

K

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall *Wannall*

FROM : W. O. Cregar *Cregar*

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

DATE: 7/24/75

- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. D. Ryan
- 1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Assoc. Dir. _____
 Dep. AD Adm. _____
 Dep. AD Inv. _____
 Asst. Dir.:
 Admin. _____
 Comp. Syst. _____
 Ext. Affairs _____
 Files & Com. _____
 Gen. Inv. _____
 Ident. _____
 Inspection _____
 Intell. _____
 Laboratory _____
 Legal Coun. _____
 Plan. & Eval. _____
 Spec. Inv. _____
 Training _____
 Telephone Rm. _____
 Director Sec'y _____

This memorandum records Bureau waiver from secrecy agreement for interview of Atlanta Field Office (FO) SA Edward A. Shea by Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Members at Atlanta, 7/22-23/75.

Supervisor S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project was in Atlanta 7/22/75 in connection with the interviews there of six SAs (five from Atlanta FO; one who traveled to Atlanta from Knoxville FO) by SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo. Interviews concerned the former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr. At approximately 5:00 p.m., 7/22/75, Epstein telephonically contacted Phillips and advised that one of the interviews developed information resulting in his desire to interview a seventh SA, Edward A. Shea of the Atlanta FO. In order to avoid another trip to Atlanta, Epstein asked if Phillips could obtain FBI clearance for the interview which would concern: (1) any possible COINTELPRO operations in Atlanta with respect to King or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC); (2) Shea's assignment to a "file review or file retrieval" project during past year concerning COINTELPRO; and (3) concerning COINTELPRO "generally." (It should be noted that earlier this year, Shea handled a project relating to classifying documents in Atlanta files regarding COINTELPRO. Shea advised Phillips of this and also said that he does not recall seeing any documents regarding COINTELPRO/SCLC - KING.) Epstein desired to interview Shea the morning of 7/23/75.

62-116395

EX 104

REC 17 62-116395-538

1 - 67- (Personnel File SA Edward A. Shea)

5 JUL 31 1975

SFP:1hb/1hb

~~CONTINUED~~ OVER

(8)
4 AUG 2 1975

S. Phillips
Wannall

MDC 16
10/11/00 SP-2 RUM/FTG






Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

On basis of foregoing request, Phillips telephonically contacted Assistant Director (AD) Mintz who granted clearance for (1) and (2) above and suggested withholding clearance on (3) pending further request from Epstein after interview on items (1) and (2). Mintz asked that Phillips touch base with AD Wannall for his concurrence. In the absence of Wannall who was out of the building, Deputy AD T. Leavitt concurred with Mintz. At about 5:30 p.m., 7/22/75, Epstein was telephonically advised by Phillips as indicated above--clearance for (1) and (2); not for (3) at this time. Arrangements were then made for interview of Shea morning of 7/23/75.

Subsequent interview of Shea (being reported separately) apparently satisfied Epstein and it does not appear there will be any further request as to item (3).

ACTION:

None. For information.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall *Wannall*

- 1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
- 1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 7/16/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar *WOC*

- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

mde 16
 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 10/16/00 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell. _____
- Laboratory _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

This memorandum records that no effort is being made to respond to a request of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) dated 6/27/75, pursuant to instructions of the Deputy Attorney General, until such time as the Department can obtain clarification from the SSC regarding the meaning of paragraph 2 in the SSC's letter of 6/27/75.

Memorandum Wannall to Adams, dated 6/30/75, reviewed a draft copy of the SSC's letter to the Department. This draft copy is dated 6/25/75. It is identical in content with the final version dated 6/27/75.

Memorandum Cregar to Wannall, dated 7/2/75, reported the results of a meeting in the office of the Deputy Attorney General on the morning of 7/2/75. In this memorandum it was pointed out that the Deputy Attorney General found considerable difficulty in understanding paragraph 2 of the SSC's draft of a letter dated 6/25/75. He noted that in view of the ambiguities found in the letter, as well as the lack of any specific agreement entered into with the SSC by the Department and/or the FBI, the Department should prepare a letter over the Attorney General's signature asking for clarification. In the meantime, the Deputy Attorney General advised that we should take no action responsive to the requests levied on the FBI in this letter. To date, we have received no information from the Department that a letter asking for clarification of the SSC has been sent.

Enclosure

62-116395

WOC:1hb (6)

EX 104

ENCLOSURE

REC-10 62-116395-537

5 JUL 31 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

The purpose of this memorandum is to note for the record that no effort is being made to develop responses to the SSC request of 6/27/75 until such time as the Department obtains the clarification described above. This position was noted during a conference that the Director and other Bureau officials had with the Attorney General on the morning of 7/15/75.

Enclosed herewith is a copy of the 6/27/75 request mentioned above.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

per *J. [unclear]*
WRW

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HIDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

June 27, 1975

RECEIVED

JUL 31 1975

O.L.A.

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Enclosed with this letter are notifications concerning certain matters currently under investigation by the Select Committee which relate to government entities under your jurisdiction.

These notifications are submitted pursuant to an agreement between the Committee, the various intelligence entities, and the White House. Pursuant to that agreement, the various entities in the Executive Branch have agreed not only to make available the pertinent witnesses, but also to submit in response all information and material which they possess that is relevant to the areas and cases which the Committee wishes to investigate. The response should include all relevant underlying documentation and other information, including documents which may not have come to the Committee's attention and which the Committee has not specifically requested, and all material relating to any prior Executive Branch inquiry into the matter. In addition, we would welcome a current analysis of the particular questions raised by the Committee and any other observations on the subject that you believe would be helpful.

We welcome the promise of cooperation and full disclosure that underlies that agreement. Success in fulfilling the full disclosure policy contained in the agreement is indispensable to the Committee's analysis and to the formulation of our ultimate findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE	R
	E
	G
	N
	D
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS	

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-537

10/10/00 SP-9 ACM/STG #MDR16

June 27, 1975

Within the Committee mandate, contained in S. Res. 21, there are four broad subjects relating to the intelligence community which we are required to investigate and study in order to determine the facts and ultimately to decide whether to make recommendations for legislative or other changes. They are:

1. The structure, performance, and utility of government operations with respect to intelligence activities.
2. Whether certain policies or practices are or are not illegal, unethical, or otherwise improper.
3. Whether there has or has not been excessive duplication or inadequate coordination between and among intelligence agencies and, more generally, the efficiency of intelligence activities.
4. Whether there has or has not been adequate internal and external control and oversight over the policies and practices of intelligence agencies.

In attempting to find the answers to these fundamental questions, the Committee is proceeding in two ways. First, we are examining intelligence functions broadly as instruments of government policy, giving attention to the authority for particular functions, the problems which intelligence activities are designed to solve, the procedures by which intelligence activities are and have been proposed, approved, executed, evaluated, and terminated, the range and scope of the activities utilized to achieve intelligence objectives, and the propriety and utility of the activities undertaken. Second, we will examine in depth certain subjects within the broad topics of investigation. (We would, of course, welcome your suggestion of other cases that would give added insight into intelligence matters under your jurisdiction.) These specific subjects for investigation are not intended to limit the scope contained in the more general questions.

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Page Three


June 27, 1975


The annexed notifications spell these matters out in greater detail. In addition, they ask certain specific questions, set forth certain previously requested documents not yet received, request additional documents,* and, in some cases, ask for the names and present addresses of persons who have held certain positions. Where appropriate, the subject's description indicates that, pursuant to the agreed Outline for Inquiry Procedures, the matter primarily concerns allegations of abuse or other controversial specific matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred. Finally, the notifications indicate the name(s) of the staff member(s) who, in addition to the Committee's senior staff, will be responsible for the particular matters.

The Committee, in the course of the next few months, will undertake other subjects for investigation as its work proceeds and will notify you as appropriate.

We look forward to your cooperation in these matters.

Sincerely yours,


Frank Church
Chairman


John Tower
Vice Chairman

encl ✓

* These specific requests are not, of course, intended to limit the agreement to come forward with all relevant information and material, including documents, whether or not they have been brought to the Committee's attention or have been specifically requested by the Committee.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
(Including DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE)

Table of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
I. Issues	1
II. Areas of General Inquiry	3
A. Legal Authority for FBI Intelligence and Counterintelligence Activities	3
B. Organization and Operation of the FBI Intelligence Division	3
1. FBI Internal Security Intelligence Operations	4
2. The FBI and the U. S. Intelligence Community	4
3. FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Operations	5
4. Inspection Division Investigations	5
5. FBI Intelligence Activities and State or Local Law Enforcement Agencies	6
III. Case Studies	7
General Questions	7
A. Electronic Surveillance	9
1. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance	9
2. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance and "Leaks"	11

	<u>Page</u>
3. Electronic Surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King	13
4. Electronic Surveillance and the Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, 1964	15
B. Surreptitious Entry	17
C. Mail Covers and Mail Openings	18
D. Other Specific Techniques	20
E. COINTELPRO and Disruptive Activities	21
F. Clandestine Informant Activities	24
G. "Notional" Organizations	27
H. Joint FBI-Police Operations	28
1. White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Mississippi	28
2. Black Panther Party, Chicago	30
I. The "Huston Plan"	32
J. Alleged Political Misuse of the FBI	34
IV. Department of Justice	36
A. The Attorney General	36
B. The Internal Security Section (formerly Division)	38

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
(INCLUDING DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE)

I. Issues

The Committee's inquiry into the intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is examining fundamental issues which bear directly on the adequacy of current legislation and administrative organization and procedure. The Committee seeks to determine whether FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities achieve legitimate objectives in conformity with the rule of law. Among the basic issues to be addressed are the following:

- A. What is the legal authority for FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities? Should the FBI's authority be clarified or revised or incorporated in a comprehensive statutory charter?
- B. What limitations are placed on FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities by the Constitution and laws of the United States? Should these limitations be clarified or revised?
- C. What have been the purposes and aims of FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities? Should these objectives be modified?
- D. How have the intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the FBI been organized and coordinated with other agencies of government? Should these procedures and practices be revised?
- E. What have been the procedures for and techniques of intelligence gathering and dissemination and counterintelligence operations used by the FBI? Under what conditions and through what procedures should these methods and techniques be used in the future?
- F. What have been and should be the mechanisms for internal and external policy-making, control, and supervision of FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities?

As a means of examining the above issues in the context of actual FBI intelligence operations, the Committee intends to study certain specific topics, some of which are general in nature, and others of which involve specific cases, programs or techniques. Part II, below, contains descriptions of the general areas into which the Committee intends to inquire. Part III contains descriptions of the specific cases mentioned above. The descriptions specifically indicate whether the investigation may concentrate on specific allegations of possible abuses or other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred. In addition to the topics described below, additional areas of inquiry may develop during the course of the Committee's work.

II. Areas of General Inquiry

A. Legal Authority for FBI Intelligence and Counter-intelligence Activities

The Committee is examining the legal basis for FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities. There may be serious question as to the adequacy of the present legislative framework for the FBI's functions in these fields. Current statutes authorize the FBI to perform investigative and law enforcement functions, but they do not specifically authorize intelligence or counterintelligence activities. Therefore, the Committee seeks to determine whether the FBI's authority should be clarified, revised, or incorporated in a comprehensive statutory charter.

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Mark Gitenstein

B. Organization and Operation of the FBI Intelligence Division

The Committee is investigating the structure and operating practices of the FBI Intelligence Division. Proposals have been made that the national security intelligence and counterintelligence functions of the FBI should be lodged in a separate agency or otherwise separated from the FBI's criminal investigative activities. Further recommendations have been advanced for improved coordination between the FBI and other intelligence agencies, for strengthened supervision of FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities by the Attorney General or an independent board, and for clearer standards and procedures for FBI activities in this area. Therefore, the Committee desires complete information on the operating practices and procedures of the FBI Intelligence Division and of the field office activities supervised by the Intelligence Division.

The Committee's inquiry focuses on the following specific areas:

1. FBI Internal Security Intelligence Operations

The Committee seeks to determine the nature and purpose of FBI intelligence operations directed at foreign intelligence activities and subversive or extremist activities within the United States. It has been alleged that the scope of FBI intelligence investigations is too broad and has extended to legitimate political activities. Consequently, the Committee must examine how the FBI's responsibilities have been defined.

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Mark Gitenstein

2. The FBI and the U. S. Intelligence Community

The Committee seeks to determine what have been the policies and procedures for coordination between the FBI and other agencies in the U. S. intelligence community. There have been occasions in the past where friction between the FBI and other agencies has produced serious dissatisfaction within the U. S. intelligence community. The purpose of this inquiry is to evaluate the adequacy of past and present coordinating mechanisms.

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Mark Gitenstein

3. FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Operations

The Committee seeks to determine the nature of FBI counterintelligence operations directed at foreign intelligence activities within the United States or at any other hostile foreign-related activities within the United States. Since FBI operations to "counter" these activities go beyond intelligence collection, the Committee must consider whether such practices require statutory authorization. The impact of counterintelligence operations on United States foreign relations will also be considered..

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Loch Johnson
Barbara Banoff

4. Inspection Division Investigations

The Committee is examining the relationship of the FBI Inspection Division to FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities. This includes both regular Inspection Division reviews of Intelligence Division and field office functions and specific investigations of allegations of improper conduct in connection with FBI intelligence activities.

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Mark Gitenstein

5. FBI Intelligence Activities and State or Local Law Enforcement Agencies

The Committee seeks to determine the nature of the relationships between FBI intelligence activities and state and local law enforcement agencies. This subject involves the delicate balance between the necessary centralization of certain law enforcement activities and the Constitutionally-mandated decentralization of general law enforcement responsibility. It is necessary for the Committee to evaluate the centralizing influence of the FBI, as well as the FBI's role as a check on local law enforcement abuses.

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Mark Gitenstein
Walter Ricks

III. Case Studies

General Questions

The descriptions which follow of the specific cases the Committee intends to study are intended to serve the dual purpose of notifying the FBI of the issues the Committee will explore in connection with each case and eliciting from the FBI all information and material in its possession relating to the questions the Committee wishes to explore in each case. In order to avoid unnecessary repetition of certain questions which will be basic to the Committee's investigations of each case, certain fundamental questions are set forth below. As to each case described, the Committee intends to explore these fundamental questions, and expects that the FBI will, as to each case, provide all information and material it has relating to these basic questions even though they are not repeated in the discussion of each particular area.

1. What is or has been the legal authority for the activity?
2. What have been the purposes of the activity?
3. What techniques have been employed in the activity?
4. What kinds of information have been gathered in the activity?
5. How have specific uses of the activity been initiated and approved?
6. How have the targets for the activity been selected?
7. What have been the criteria for target selection?
8. How has the intelligence which is collected been used?
9. To whom has the intelligence collected been disseminated?
10. What has been the basis for any dissemination with respect to each recipient?
11. How has the activity been coordinated with other intelligence agencies?

12. What have been the effects of this coordination?
13. To what extent has each of the foregoing been compatible with the legal authority for and the purposes of the activity?
14. By what means has the activity been monitored, controlled and administered?
15. What are the potential abuses to which the activity may lead?
16. To what abuses has the activity led?
17. What steps have been taken to investigate such abuses?
18. What steps have been taken to avoid such abuses?
19. What have been the costs and utility of the activity?

In some instances, the specific questions set forth below may appear to repeat some of the general questions. The purpose in such cases is simply to clarify the application of the general question to the specific case. Except where inapplicable by their terms, all general questions relate to each specific case.

A. Electronic Surveillance

The Committee is examining all forms of electronic interception of communications including wiretapping, electronic eavesdropping, consensual electronic surveillance interception of video and data communications, local monitoring devices, and all other forms of electronic or technical monitoring. The Committee's general questions apply to each of the techniques listed above, as well as to the matters set forth in the following specific cases.

1. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance

The Committee seeks to determine whether the Attorney General should have the authority to authorize electronic surveillance for certain purposes without a prior judicial warrant. This power has been exercised by succeeding Attorneys General since 1940, upon the explicit directive of the President. The Supreme Court has ruled that this power does not extend to purely domestic matters, but the remaining scope of the Attorney General's authority remains undefined by the Supreme Court.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

- a. What is the scope and basis of the claim of Executive authority to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance?
- b. What have been the procedures for consideration and approval of requests for warrantless electronic surveillance authorized by the Attorney General?
- c. What are the specific disadvantages of the judicial warrant requirement for those electronic surveillances which have been authorized by the Attorney General?

- d. Does the Fourth Amendment permit the issuance of judicial warrants for electronic surveillance on grounds other than ordinary probable cause where national security intelligence purposes are advanced to justify the surveillance?
- e. To what extent are the specific procedures of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968 inappropriate for electronic surveillance conducted for national security intelligence purposes?

Documents

The Committee requests the following additional documents bearing on the questions stated above:

- a. All written justifications for the specific authorizations by the Attorney General for warrantless electronic surveillance from January 1, 1960, until the present.
- b. All documents reflecting the denial by the Attorney General of specific requests for warrantless electronic surveillance from January 1, 1960, until the present.
- c. Committee staff access to information contained in the impounded documents, depositions, and other materials in all pending civil suits which involve warrantless electronic surveillance and in which the Committee has received the consent of the plaintiffs for such access.

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Mike Epstein

2. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance and "Leaks"

The Committee is examining several instances of the use of warrantless electronic surveillance and other investigative techniques in connection with "leaks" of classified information. These cases may involve specific allegations of abuse or other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred. These instances include:

- a. The investigation of alleged "leaks" by or to 17 Executive officials and newsmen between May 1969 and February 1971.
- b. The investigation of alleged "leaks" from a military staff member assigned to the National Security Council in 1971-72.
- c. The reported investigation of columnist Joseph Kraft in 1969.
- d. The reported investigation of the activities of Mrs. Anna Chennault and Vice Presidential candidate Spiro Agnew in 1968.
- e. Any other instances of warrantless electronic surveillance in connection with the investigation of "leaks" to the press.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

- a. Through what procedures and by whom were each of these electronic surveillances authorized and approved, continued, and terminated?
- b. As to each person to whom information was disseminated, please state:
 - (1) The nature of the information.
 - (2) The basis for the dissemination.

- (3) The date of each dissemination.
- (4) The use which was in fact made of the information by the recipient.
- c. What evaluations were made of the original grounds for the surveillance as it progressed?
- d. What were the results of the evaluations?
- e. Who made them?
- f. What are the reasons for use of electronic surveillance without judicial warrant to investigate "leaks" of classified information to the press?
- g. How does each of the above instances relate to these reasons?
- h. To what extent would requirement of a warrant interfere with the ability to detect such leaks?

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Mark Gitenstein

3. Surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King

This investigation examines the authorization for, conduct and termination of, and deliberations regarding the surveillance of Dr. King. This case may involve specific allegations of abuses and other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

- a. Through what procedures and by whom were wiretaps and electronic bugs of Dr. King initiated, approved, continued, and terminated?
- b. What were the locations, extent, and duration of the electronic surveillances of Dr. King?
- c. What were the grounds of national security, if any, for the introduction of the electronic surveillances of Dr. King?
- d. What was the relationship between the information collected and each of the purposes of the surveillance?
- e. What evaluations were made of the original grounds for the surveillance as it progressed?
- f. What were the results of those evaluations?
- g. Who made them?
- h. What periodic evaluations were made of the relationship between the information being collected and the original objectives of the surveillance?
- i. What were the results of the evaluations?
- j. Who made them?

- k. To whom were any results of the surveillance disseminated?
1. As to each person to whom information was disseminated, please state
- (1) The nature of the information.
 - (2) The basis for the dissemination.
 - (3) The date of each dissemination.
 - (4) The use which was in fact made of the information.

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force Leader
Mike Epstein

4. Surveillance at the Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, 1964

The Committee is examining the use of surveillance and other intelligence operations in Atlantic City, New Jersey, on or about the time of the Democratic National Convention in 1964. This case may involve specific allegations of abuses and other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

- a. Did the FBI conduct electronic surveillance and other intelligence operations at this time and place?
- b. Who were the targets?
- c. Through what procedures and by whom were the decisions made to engage in electronic surveillance and intelligence operations at this time and place?
- d. What were the nature, extent, and duration of the electronic surveillance and other intelligence operations at this time and place?
- e. What was the relationship between each target selected and the purpose of the surveillance?
- f. Was the FBI requested to conduct such surveillance by any person or organization outside the FBI?
- g. If so, by whom, when, and for what stated reason?
- h. To whom were the results of the surveillance disseminated?
- i. As to each person whom information was disseminated, please state

- (1) The nature of the information.
- (2) The basis for the dissemination.
- (3) The date of each dissemination.
- (4) The use which was in fact made of the information.

Responsible staff: Senior Staff
Task Force Leader
Mike Epstein

B. Surreptitious Entry

The purpose of this inquiry is to determine the extent to which the FBI has used surreptitious entry as an intelligence technique, either through its own operations or through operations by other agencies and individuals. This case may involve allegations of abuse and controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. What are the scope and basis of the claim of Executive authority to conduct warrantless surreptitious entry as asserted by the Department of Justice in United States v. Ehrlichman?
2. What surreptitious entries have been carried out by the FBI or by another government agency with the knowledge of the FBI from January 1, 1960, to the present? Please list by date, place, and target.
3. As to any instance in which the FBI has refused to comply with another agency's request for surreptitious entry, what was
 - a. The basis for the refusal?
 - b. The reason given for the request?
4. What procedures were employed to authorize any surreptitious entry identified under 2, and who authorized each such entry?
5. To the extent applicable by their terms, each of the above questions and the General Questions will be explored specifically with reference to any entry or proposed entry at an embassy in May 1972.

Responsible Staff: Senior Staff
Task Force Leader
Mike Epstein
Paul Wallach

C: Mail Covers and Mail Openings

The Committee is examining the conduct of mail covers and mail openings by or on behalf of the FBI and any instances of mail openings or intercepts which may have been conducted by or on behalf of the FBI. This inquiry may involve allegations of abuse or other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. The specific purposes of all mail covers conducted in connection with FBI intelligence and counter-intelligence activities. This includes all documents pertaining to FBI decisions to request Postal Service mail covers and lists of all subjects upon whom mail covers have been placed as a result of FBI requests since January 1, 1960.
2. The procedures and practices for the dissemination of information from mail covers requested by the FBI. This includes a list of all entities to whom mail cover information has been disseminated since January 1, 1960.
3. Whether or not FBI personnel may have conducted mail covers in violation of existing Postal Service regulations. For any mail covers which may have been conducted by FBI personnel or for the FBI by persons other than Postal Service employees, from January 1, 1960, to the present: identify the physical location where the mail cover was conducted, the names of all persons who participated in and authorized the mail cover, and a brief explanation of the purpose of the mail cover and why it was initiated.
4. Whether or not the FBI has opened mail or caused mail to be opened, either with or without the permission of the Postal Service. For all incidents of mail opening which may have been conducted by FBI employees or by other persons in cooperation with the FBI, from January 1, 1960, until the present: identify the physical location where the mail was opened or intercepted, the names of the individuals who participated in the opening or intercept, and the purpose of the opening or intercept.

Documents

The Committee requests the following additional documents bearing on the questions stated above:

1. All documents which discuss, refer to, or relate to the origins, authorizations, conduct, and termination of and procedures for the mail covers, intercepts, and openings identified in 3 and 4 above.

Responsible Staff: Senior Staff
Task Force Leader
Paul Wallach

D. Other Specific Techniques

A. As As to the following techniques, the Committee's inquiry will initially be confined to the General Questions. As the inquiry proceeds, areas of potential abuse and thus of specific inquiry beyond the General Questions may develop:

1. Incommunicado detention and interrogation.
2. Photographic and television surveillance.
3. Polygraphs.
4. The obtaining of bank, credit, school, and other personal records and information, including the obtaining of information under false pretext.

E. COINTELPRO and Disruptive Activities

The Committee is investigating the circumstances surrounding the origins of, authorization for, and implementation of the FBI program known as COINTELPRO and any similar programs. This inquiry may involve allegations of abuse and controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred. The scope of this investigation covers:

1. COINTELPRO -- Communist Party USA;
2. COINTELPRO -- Socialist Workers Party;
3. COINTELPRO -- White Hate Groups;
4. COINTELPRO -- Black Extremists;
5. COINTELPRO -- New Left;
6. COINTELPRO -- Special Operations (except as targeted against hostile foreign intelligence services);
7. COINTELPRO -- Puerto Rican Independence Groups;
8. COINTELPRO -- Operation Hoodwink
9. Any other activities of the FBI which have or have had the purpose and effect of disrupting domestic groups or discrediting U.S. citizens, whether or not carried out under a COINTELPRO program.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. Under what circumstances, through what procedures, and by whom were these programs initiated, authorized, and terminated?
2. Under what circumstances and through what procedures did the FBI discover and report to the Attorney General the existence of items 7 and 8 identified above and similar disruptive activities not included in the original review of COINTELPRO activities conducted by the Department of Justice in 1974?

3. What were the purposes of each program?
4. In each case, by what means was it intended the purpose would be accomplished?
5. What internal FBI procedures were adopted for the consideration and approval of specific disruptive activities and for determining the results of such activities?
6. As to each operation listed above, and any others of a fundamentally similar kind, identify by type the sources of the information used against individuals and groups for disruptive purposes.
7. As to each instance in which such information was obtained through electronic surveillance
 - (a) What or who was the target of the surveillance?
 - (b) Was the surveillance legal?
 - (c) Was the surveillance conducted pursuant to warrant?
 - (d) What were the dates of the surveillance?
 - (e) What were the precise means of surveillance?
 - (f) Who authorized the surveillance (both within and without the FBI)?
 - (g) What was the purpose of the surveillance?
8. As to each case listed above and all fundamentally similar cases, what was the legality and propriety of the disruptive activities? Should any of the activities referred to in the above sentence be forbidden by statute, considered for future use, or otherwise subject to statutory or administrative regulation?

9. In what activities has the FBI engaged since April 28, 1971, the purpose or effect of which has been to disrupt domestic groups or discredit U.S. citizens or which bear any other similarity to the purposes or effects of COINTELPRO activities?
10. What restrictions, directives, or other measures have been adopted by the FBI and the Justice Department to limit or regulate the use of such disruptive techniques?

The Committee will investigate all COINTELPRO and disruptive activities identified above. On the basis of a review of the summaries of COINTELPRO cases prepared for the so-called Petersen Committee, as well as other sources of information, the Committee will develop further requests for information and documents.

Responsible Staff: Senior Staff
Task Force Leader
Les Seidel
Mike Epstein
Walter Ricks

F. Clandestine Informant Activities

The Committee is examining all aspects of the FBI's use of informants, sources, and undercover personnel and the techniques employed by such persons. Although informants are the single most productive source of intelligence information, the difficulties of controlling their activities may increase the possibility of improper conduct. The use of informants to infiltrate organizations also may pose dangers to the right of associational privacy. Consequently, proposals have been made for the imposition of a judicial warrant requirement or other safeguards for the use of informants. The Committee seeks to evaluate such proposals as well as the contributions of informants to the accomplishment of legitimate objectives.

In addition, the Committee is examining informant activities with respect to several particular situations and cases. This investigation may involve specific allegations of abuse or controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred. The Committee's inquiry covers the general circumstances surrounding the following incidents or cases:

- a. Wounded Knee;
- b. Kent State;
- c. New York v. Stroble (Attica);
- d. United States v. Buckalew (Gainesville);
- e. United States v. Briggs (Camden);
- f. New York v. Dillon (Hobart College);
- g. United States v. Marshall (Seattle).

Additional cases may also be examined.

In addition to the above cases, the Committee is examining the role of FBI informants in providing information to the FBI concerning members of the following organizations:

- a. Ku Klux Klan;
- b. Students for a Democratic Society;
- c. Weathermen;
- d. Black Panther Party;
- e. Communist Party USA;
- f. W.E.B. DuBois Clubs.

Additional studies of informant activities with respect to members of other organizations may be formulated.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. With respect to both categories of cases listed above, what allegations, whether unfounded or not, of improper, illegal, unethical, or provocative conduct by FBI informants have been made in connection with these situations or groups?
2. What measures has the FBI taken to investigate such allegations of misconduct and to prevent such alleged misconduct from taking place in the future?
3. What instructions has the FBI given to its informants with respect to possible improper, illegal, unethical, or provocative conduct?
4. What has been the largest number of informants, sources, and undercover personnel in use at any one time during each year from 1960 until the present in connection with security, intelligence, and counterintelligence matters, cases, and programs?
5. What has been the annual total amount of funds (including reimbursement for expenses) paid to informants and sources for each year from 1960 until the present?

6. What limits, if any, have been placed on the type of information which informants have been intrusted to report back to the FBI?
7. What have been the annual percentage of potential informants who became paid informants in connection with security, intelligence, and counterintelligence matters, cases, and programs from 1960 until the present?

Documents

Please provide a summary of ten cases (for each of the following categories) where the FBI's use of informants, sources, or undercover personnel resulted in:

1. the conviction of an espionage agent of a foreign government.
2. the prevention of the theft of national security information.
3. the prevention of sabotage.
4. the prevention of an act of violence.
5. the prevention of the carrying out of a conspiracy to overthrow the government.
6. any other successful preventive actions in furtherance of the FBI's national security responsibilities.

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Mike Epstein
Jack Smith
Walter Ricks
Pat Shea

G. "Notional" Organizations

The Committee is examining the FBI's alleged creation of the support for "notional" organizations for intelligence or counterintelligence purposes. Although it may rely upon informants and other clandestine operatives, this alleged practice is sufficiently novel to require separate attention.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. What groups, organizations, movements, or other associations has the FBI caused directly or indirectly to be formed or created for intelligence or counterintelligence purposes? Please provide a complete list from January 1, 1960, to the present.
2. What groups, organizations, movements, or other associations has the FBI supported financially or materially? Please provide a complete list from January 1, 1960, to the present.
3. In which cases has the FBI supported or created such organizations in coordination or cooperation with other agencies?
4. How have the presence of such "notional" organizations affected the public's perception of the movements of which they form a part?
5. How have any FBI programs for the creation and support of such groups been coordinated with any similar programs undertaken by the CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies?

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Mike Epstein

H. Joint FBI-Police Operations

The purpose of this inquiry is to examine certain allegations that joint FBI-police operations resulted in misconduct or abuse. These cases are complex and involve a variety of techniques. Nevertheless, they may indicate some of the most serious problems which may arise in attempting to deal with potentially violent situations.

1. The White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Mississippi

The Committee is inquiring into the relationships between the FBI and other law enforcement agencies and private organizations in Mississippi in connection with the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. The purpose of the inquiry is to determine what effect, if any, FBI activities had on the actions of other law enforcement agencies and private individuals with respect to the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in Mississippi. This investigation may involve allegations of abuses or other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

- a. Was this organization a target of FBI COINTELPRO operations?
- b. If so, how and by whom was it selected as a target?
- c. What were the purposes of any disruptive operations directed at it?
- d. To what extent were the purposes achieved?
- e. What disruptive techniques, if any, were employed?

- f. Over what period of time did the disruptive activities occur?
- g. What evaluations were made of their effects?
- h. By whom were they made?
- i. What were the results of the evaluations?
- j. Were FBI informants used to infiltrate the organization?
- k. If so, what kinds of information did the informants gather?
- l. What activities did the informants engage in other than information gathering?
- m. Identify by date and names the persons involved in all contacts the FBI had with other law enforcement agencies and private groups and individuals with respect to alleged Klan bombings of Jewish synagogues and the homes of Jewish leaders in Meridian, Mississippi, during May - August 1968.

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Jack Smith
Les Seidel

2. The Black Panther Party, Chicago

The Committee is inquiring into the relationships between the FBI and other law enforcement agencies in the Chicago area in connection with the Chicago chapter of the Black Panther Party. The purpose of the inquiry is to determine what effect, if any, FBI activities had on the actions of other law enforcement and intelligence agencies with respect to the Black Panther Party in the Chicago area. This investigation may involve allegations of abuses or other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

- a. Was the Chicago chapter of the Black Panther Party a target of FBI COINTELPRO operations?
- b. If so, how and by whom was it selected as a target?
- c. What were the purposes of any disruptive operations directed at it?
- d. To what extent were the purposes achieved?
- e. What disruptive techniques, if any, were employed?
- f. Over what period of time did the disruptive activities occur?
- g. What evaluations were made of their effects?
- h. By whom were they made?
- i. If FBI informants were used to infiltrate the organization, what kinds of information did the informants gather?

- j. What techniques did the informants employ to gather the information?
- k. Were the techniques used by the informants all approved and monitored by the FBI? If not, which were not so approved?
- l. What activities did the informants engage in other than information gathering?
- m. What other methods and sources did the FBI use to gather intelligence on the organization?
- n. If electronic surveillance was used, how did the use of such surveillance relate to each of the general questions?
- o. To what extent was information on persons and groups not members of or affiliated with the Black Panther Party gathered, stored, or disseminated by the FBI as a result of its investigations of the organization?

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Walter Ricks
Chris Pyle

I. The "Huston Plan"

The Committee is examining the FBI's role in the disposition of the report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) in 1970. This report as submitted to the President included certain options which were specifically identified as "illegal". It purported to represent the joint recommendations of all members of the U. S. intelligence community, but FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover disagreed in a series of footnotes.

The serious consideration given to such allegedly illegal proposals gives this case the utmost significance for the Committee's understanding of the risks of uncontrolled intelligence activity. This case may involve specific allegations of abuse and controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. What contacts occurred between Tom Charles Huston and personnel of the FBI and the Department of Justice during 1969 and 1970? Identify by date and names of persons involved.
2. What was the purpose of each such contact?
3. With respect to any assistance provided to the Interdepartmental Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) by personnel of the FBI:
 - a. Who were the FBI participants?
 - b. What kind of assistance was provided?
 - c. What was the role of the FBI in preparing the various drafts of the special report of the Committee?

4. What were the specific arguments advanced for the inclusion of the allegedly illegal options in the special report submitted for the President's consideration? Were other allegedly illegal options considered and rejected?
5. Were any measures taken by the FBI to implement specific elements of the Huston Plan? This includes both the allegedly "illegal" aspects and other provisions such as the expanded recruitment of 18-21 year old informants.
6. What are the present views of the FBI and the Department of Justice as to the legality and propriety of the various options included in the special report?

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Barbara Banoff
Loch Johnson

J. Alleged Political Misuse of the FBI

The Committee is investigating allegations that the intelligence and investigative resources of the FBI have been misused by various Presidents, Attorneys General, Members of Congress, and FBI executives themselves. This subject may involve specific allegations of abuse and other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. Have persons outside the FBI sought the FBI's assistance for partisan political purposes or personal advantage? Please identify each instance by the name of the person seeking to so use the FBI, the date, and the nature of the assistance sought.
2. In each such case, what has been the response of the FBI?
3. Have persons inside or outside the FBI sought to employ the resources of the FBI for purposes outside the FBI's authority? Please identify each instance by the name of the person seeking to so use the FBI, the date, and the purpose for which the person sought to use the FBI.
4. In each such case, what has been the response of the FBI?
5. What measures has the FBI employed to
 - a. Respond to critics.
 - b. Affect the reputation or credibility of or otherwise discredit critics.
6. What were the nature, purpose, duration, and results of Project INLET involving preparation of an intelligence letter for the President and other Executive officials?

7. With respect to any so-called "secret files" maintained within the FBI, including the "official and confidential" and "personal and confidential" files maintained by the executive assistant to the FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover on his behalf until the time of his death, the Committee seeks to establish the contents of such files, the circumstances surrounding the transfer of a portion of such files within the Bureau at the time of Director Hoover's death, the transfer of a portion of such files to Mr. Hoover's residence, the destruction of any such files, the transfer of any such files from Mr. Hoover's residence, the use of information within such files, and their relationship to the official investigative files of the FBI. The Committee desires all information bearing on these matters, including the results of any inquiries conducted within the FBI and the Department of Justice.
8. What measures have been taken to ensure that the intelligence and investigative resources of the FBI are not misused for political purposes or personal advantage.
9. What additional measures should be taken?

Responsible Staff: Senior Staff
Task Force Leader
Mark Gitenstein

IV. Department of Justice

The Committee is examining activities of divisions of the Justice Department other than the FBI which perform internal security and intelligence functions. The purpose of these inquiries is to determine whether these functions have been carried out in conformity with the rule of law.

A. The Attorney General

The Committee is studying the functions of the Attorney General with respect to the supervision of and policy-making for internal security and intelligence activities. The Committee seeks to determine whether his duties are properly defined and his office properly organized to perform these functions effectively.

Questions

The Committee requests that the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. To what extent has the Attorney General been involved in the consideration or approval of the policies and activities of U. S. foreign and military intelligence agencies?
2. Has the Justice Department made any agreements with the CIA or any other U. S. intelligence agency with regard to the investigation or prosecution of agency personnel?
3. Under what circumstances and for what purposes has the Office of Legal Counsel provided legal advice to the Attorney General on matters pertaining to foreign and domestic intelligence activities?
4. To what extent has the Attorney General authorized cooperation, including the exchange of information and the conduct of joint operations, between the Drug Enforcement Administration or its predecessors and the CIA or other

intelligence agencies with respect to narcotics intelligence?

5. What standards and procedures has the Attorney General adopted for:
 - a. The collection, analysis, use, and dissemination of narcotics intelligence.
 - b. The collection, analysis, use, and dissemination of organized crime intelligence.
 - c. The use of intelligence information by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
 - d. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration grants for the support of state or local police intelligence activities and intelligence data systems.
6. To what extent have communications between the White House and the FBI or other agencies under the jurisdiction of the Attorney General bypassed the Attorney General? To what extent should such communications be channeled through the Attorney General?
7. What have been the policies and procedures of the Justice Department for evaluating the budget requests of the FBI for intelligence and counterintelligence activities?

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Mark Gitenstein
Barbara Banoff

B. The Internal Security Section (formerly Division)

The Committee is examining the activities of the Internal Security Section of the Justice Department and its predecessor, the Internal Security Division. These entities have supervised the Department's internal security law enforcement activities, coordinated certain interdepartmental internal security policies, and engaged in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence.

Questions

The Committee requests that the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. Under what circumstances, if any, has the Justice Department seriously considered prosecutions under the Smith Act and laws pertaining to seditious conspiracy, rebellion, or insurrection, or "subversive activities", since January 1, 1960?
2. To what extent has FBI intelligence activity provided valuable evidence for use in the prosecution of specific federal crimes?
3. What have been the practices and procedures for coordination of policy through the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security?
4. What have been the practices and procedures for the interdepartmental and interagency evaluation of domestic intelligence and domestic collection of foreign intelligence through the Intelligence Evaluation Committee and its predecessors?
5. With respect to the Interdivisional Intelligence Unit and the Analysis and Evaluation Section of the Internal Security Division,
 - a. What have been the practices and procedures of the Unit and Section for the gathering of intelligence?

- b. What type of information has been stored in readily retrievable form by the Unit and Section?
 - c. To whom and for what reasons has intelligence information been disseminated by the Unit and Section?
 - d. What were the reasons for the submission of IDIU computer printouts to the CIA, as reportedly occurred in 1969?
 - e. To what extent did the Unit and Section make specific requests to other agencies within and outside the Justice Department for intelligence information?
6. With respect to the use of grand juries by the Special Litigation Section of the Internal Security Division,
- a. Have any allegations of misuse of the grand jury process in cases handled by Special Litigation Section attorneys come to the attention of the Department? If so, briefly describe each such allegation and what, if any, action was taken by the Department in response to such allegation.
 - b. To what extent, if any, did the use of grand juries in cases handled by the Special Litigation Section attorneys differ from the use of grand juries in cases handled by other sections of the Justice Department?
 - c. To what extent, if any, was information obtained through the use of grand juries included in the intelligence files of the Interdivisional Intelligence Unit or the Analysis and Evaluation Section?

7. What have been the practices and procedures of the Internal Security Division and the Departmental Security Office for advising the Attorney General and other executive agencies with regard to the Federal Employee Security Program?

Responsible staff: Senior staff
Task Force leader
Barbara Banoff

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 15 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.	_____
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NR008 AT CODE
 4:15 PM URGENT AUGUST 15, 1975 WCG
 TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)
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 SP2 ALM JTB

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SENSTUDY 75

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ATLANTA, AUGUST 14, 1975.

FORMER SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, HOME ADDRESS 2861 GANT
 QUARTERS DRIVE, MARIETTA, GEORGIA, 30062, WAS CONTACTED BY
 ASAC THIS DATE AND ADVISED CONCERNING CAPTIONED MATTER
 IN ACCORDANCE WITH REBUTEL.

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AJN FBIHQ CLR TU

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84 AUG 20 1975



OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

FBI

August 14, 1975

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request for Documents

14/15
#m DE 16
10/10/60 SP-2 ALM/TG

Attached is a request from the Senate Select Committee dated August 13, 1975, for underlying materials logically related to Department of Justice file #82-46-5. Please arrange for compliance with this request as soon as possible.

Rec'd from SSC 8/14/75

treat as original 62-116395-534

REC-102

9 AUG 19 1975

113
ENCLOSURE

62-116395

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84 AUG 21 1975

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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

August 13, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

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10-16-00
SP-8 ALM 1/8/76


Dear Mike:

On July 17, 1975, the Committee received from the Department of Justice a summary of the material in departmental file No. 82-46-5. This was in addition to materials received by the Committee on June 25, 1975.

The Committee now wishes staff access to all underlying materials logically related to the above and maintained in the files of the Justice Department and the FBI. Please expedite this request since it is of immediate importance to the Committee.

Sincerely yours,

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force



62-116395-534
ENCLOSURE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 13 1975

TELETYPE

NR 024 NY CODE

7:35 P.M. NITEL 8-13-75 PLQ

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (105-14660)
CONFIDENTIAL
ATTN: INTD

SENSTUDY, 1975.

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

Wooch

(S) NEW YORK 6811-IA TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED SPECIAL AGENT JOSEPH J. PALGUTA ON AUGUST 13, 1975, AND FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

ON AUGUST 11, 1975, MR. PATRICK A. SHEY^A, A MEMBER OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS (SSCIO), TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED NEW YORK 6811-IA^(S) AND THEY MADE AN APPOINTMENT TO MEET IN NYC AT 2:00 PM ON AUGUST 13, 1975. SOURCE MET WITH SHEY AS ARRANGED ON AUGUST 13, 1975. SHEY TOLD SOURCE THAT SAM JAFFE (FORMER NEW YORK 2524-S) VISITED A FRIEND OF HIS, A MR. MILLER, WHO IS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE SSCI. WHILE IN MILLER'S OFFICE, JAFFE WAS RELATING TO MILLER THAT HE HAD A

REC-102

62-116325-533
AUG 19 1975

#MPR 16 10/25/00
SP2 ALM/JTG

S. H. S.

tel to AT
LFS:166 8/14/75

84 AUG 19 1975

PLEASANT RELATIONSHIP WITH FORMER SPECIAL AGENTS (SAS) JOHN G. WILLIS AND EDWARD F. GAMBER WITH REGARD TO SOVIET INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.] (S)

DURING THE TIME THAT JAFFE WAS RELATING ABOVE DATA TO MILLER, SENATOR CHURCH, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SSCIO, ENTERED MILLER'S OFFICE AND BECAME VERY MUCH INTERESTED IN JAFFE'S STATEMENTS. JAFFE RELATED TO MILLER THAT AS A REPORTER FOR THE COLUMBIA BROADCASTING COMPANY, HE COVERED THE STORY INVOLVING THE RELEASE OF FRANCIS G. POWERS BY THE SOVIETS (POWERS WAS THE FORMER U-2 PILOT WHO WAS SHOT DOWN IN THE USSR IN 1960). JAFFE RELATED TO MILLER THAT THEREAFTER HE WENT TO HONG KONG. JAFFE ALSO TOLD MILLER THAT WHEN HE RETURNED FROM HONG KONG [SOURCE BELIEVES THIS TO BE IN 1966-1968], HE LEARNED THAT HE WAS "FINGERED" BY A SOVIET DEFECTOR BY THE NAME OF PENKOVSKIY. THIS DEFECTOR ALLEGEDLY REPORTED THAT HE SAW JAFFE'S NAME ON A PIECE OF PAPER ON THE DESK OF A SOVIET INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.] (S) JAFFE TOLD MILLER THAT THE FBI, UPON LEARNING THAT INFORMATION FELT THAT JAFFE WAS A "DOUBLE AGENT" BECAUSE OF THE COOLNESS OF BUREAU PERSONNEL TOWARD HIM WHEN HE RETURNED TO THE UNITED STATES FROM HONG KONG. JAFFE

TOLD MILLER THAT EVER SINCE HIS RETURN FROM HONG KONG, HE CANNOT HOLD A JOB, AND BELIEVES THE FBI IS THE CAUSE OF HIS PREDICAMENT. JAFFE IS OF THE OPINION THAT THE FBI IS BEING VINDICTIVE TOWARD HIM IN PURSUING THIS MATTER AND DEPRIVING HIM OF MAKING A LIVELIHOOD.

MR. SHEY TOLD THE SOURCE THAT THE SSCIO IS LOOKING INTO THE ABOVE MATTER TO DETERMINE IF JAFFE'S STATEMENTS ARE TRUE, AND TO DETERMINE IF SOME CONTROLS COULD BE CREATED SO THAT THE FBI COULD NOT BE VINDICTIVE IN SIMILAR SITUATIONS.

SOURCE ADVISED THAT HE TOLD SHEY THAT HE KNEW NOTHING ABOUT THE FBI'S ATTITUDE TOWARD JAFFE AFTER 1964, SINCE HE RETIRED FROM THE BUREAU THAT YEAR. ^(S) SOURCE ADVISED THAT SHEY TOLD HIM THAT AS YET HE HAS NOT TALKED TO FORMER SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, BUT MAY INTERVIEW HIM IN THE FUTURE.

SOURCE ADVISED THAT SHEY TOLD HIM THAT JAFFE IS CURRENTLY EMPLOYED AS A FREE-LANCE REPORTER WORKING IN WASHINGTON, DC. SOURCE STATED THE HE INFORMED SHEY OF FORMER SA GAMBER'S CURRENT EMPLOYMENT.

PAGE FOUR

NY 105-14660

C O N F I D ~~E~~ N T I A L

SOURCE ADVISED THAT HE MET WITH SHEY ON AUGUST 13, 1975 FROM
2:00 PM UNTIL 3:30 PM.

THE ABOVE INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM THE SOURCE IN A
GUARDED MANNER, AND ONLY THE PERTINENT FACTS WERE OBTAINED.

THE NYO WILL PERSONALLY REINTERVIEW THE SOURCE REGARDING THE
ABOVE AND OBTAIN COMPLETE DETAILS CONCERNING THE MATTER.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 2609, XGDS 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.~~

END.

LRF FBIHQ CLR

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

JBG

TO : W. Raymond Wannall
Assistant Director, Intelligence Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: August 13, 1975

FROM : *DEM* Douglas R. Marvin
Counselor to the Attorney General

#MDR 16
10/10/00 SP-2 AM/716

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request for Information
on Warrantless Electronic Surveillances

Rec'd from SSC 8/13/75

In accord with our telephone conversation of August 12th, I am forwarding to you a letter from the Senate Select Committee requesting answers to questions relating to electronic surveillance conducted by the Federal government in the interests of national security. The Committee has been told that we would try to respond to their request by August 20th. That date is fast approaching and may not be a reasonable period of time in which to compile the information requested and respond to their questions. That date is a useful target, however, since any issues to be presented to the Attorney General with respect to complying to this request must be considered prior to August 19th, the date the Attorney General is scheduled to leave Washington.

B

Would your office please prepare responses to the following questions that involve areas with which, I believe, you are familiar: questions 2-10, 11(b)-(d), 12, 14, 15, 17, 21 and 24.

Thank you.

Treat as original 62-116395-532

REC-102

9 AUG 19 1975

ENCLOSURE

5-P

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

84 AUG 19 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

John

~~SECRET~~

R432

FRANK CH. PELL, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
 JOHN G. TOUHY, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
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 EDWARD H. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
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 W. M. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
 FREDERICK A. G. SCHWARTZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
 CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 11, 93RD CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

COPY 6 OF 8

July 7, 1975

MDR 16
10/10/00 SP 2 ALM/275

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Thank you for your letters of June 24 and June 25, 1975, relating to electronic surveillance conducted by the federal government in the interests of national security and foreign intelligence. The Select Committee also appreciates your providing the information of a sensitive nature in your separate letter of June 24, 1975.

Your letters, and the recent testimony of Kevin T. Maroney and Clarence M. Kelley before the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, have raised several additional questions which the Committee wishes to pursue. Further questions are raised by the July 1, 1975, White House news briefing by the Press Secretary relating to the effect of the recent Zweibon decision. Some of these questions relate to general policy considerations in the electronic surveillance area; others address our need for a more complete factual base from which we can draw our conclusions. A list of these questions is attached to this letter. These questions, of course, do not supersede prior requests for material relating to electronic surveillance, which are itemized in the document requests of May 14, June 16, and June 27. Rather, they should be considered as supplementary to the prior requests.

ENCLOSURE

62-711-395-534

~~SECRET~~

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Page two

July 7, 1975

I believe that the answers to these questions are essential to a complete understanding of the policies and procedures followed by the Justice Department in electronic surveillance cases. Full information on these matters is necessary for the Committee to fulfill its mandate "to recommend the enactment of any new legislation . . . necessary or desirable to strengthen or clarify the national security, intelligence, or surveillance activities of the United States and to protect the rights of United States citizens with regard to these activities." With the continued cooperation of the Justice Department, I am convinced that the Committee will be able to discharge this responsibility in the critical area of national security electronic surveillance.

Sincerely,

Frank Church
Chairman

~~SECRET~~

#mpe/6

11/10/00 SP2 ALM/216

Warrantless Electronic Surveillance for National Security Purposes v

- 60
1. With respect to the "Special Review Group" which you have established within the office of the Attorney General for the purpose of examining requests for non-consensual electronic surveillance without a judicial warrant, the following questions are asked:
 - a. What have been the names and titles of the persons serving on the Special Review Group?
 - b. If the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division is not a member of the Special Review Group, does he normally have the opportunity to review requests for warrantless electronic surveillance?
 - c. Have any individuals other than those serving on the Special Review Group or the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division had the opportunity to review requests for warrantless electronic surveillance? If so, whom?
 - d. Does the Special Review Group have the authority to deny requests for warrantless electronic surveillance?
 - e. Does the Special Review Group review requests for reauthorizations of warrantless electronic surveillance?
 - AGO 2. Do Justice Department standards and procedures for the authorization and reauthorization of warrantless electronic surveillance require the concurrence of the State Department in the request for such surveillance? If so, in what types of cases is such concurrence required?
 - FBI 3. What procedures, if any, have been followed to obtain the concurrence of the State Department in the request for warrantless electronic surveillance?

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4. What have been the identities of the agencies and the Presidential appointees who have initiated requests for warrantless electronic surveillance from 1966 to the present?
5. How many such requests have been initiated by each agency and each Presidential appointee?
6. How many of the requests initiated by each agency and Presidential appointee have been approved by the Attorney General?
7. How many requests have been made by each agency and each Presidential appointee for the continuation of previously approved surveillance?
8. How many of the requests for the continuation of previously approved surveillance made by each agency and each Presidential appointee have been approved by the Attorney General?
9. What procedures have been followed for the review of all such surveillance on a regular basis to ensure that the criteria for the surveillance are satisfied?
10. With respect to non-consensual electronic surveillance instituted outside the United States by agencies of the United States government, the following questions are asked:
 - a. What have been the standards and procedures, if any, established for the authorization and review of such surveillance?
 - b. What has been the total number of such surveillances by year and by month for each year from 1966 to the present?
 - c. What have been the identities of the agencies and the Presidential appointees who have initiated such requests from 1966 to the present?
 - d. How many such requests have been initiated by each agency and each Presidential appointee?
 - e. How many of the requests initiated by each agency and each Presidential appointee have been approved by the Attorney General?

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- f. How many requests have been made by each agency and each Presidential appointee for the continuation of such previously approved surveillance?
- g. How many of the requests for the continuation of such previously approved surveillance have been approved by the Attorney General?
- h. For each year from 1966 to the present, how many such surveillances have been instituted in (1) North America, other than the United States; (2) South America; (3) Western Europe; (4) Eastern Europe; (5) Africa; (6) the Middle East; (7) South-east Asia; (8) the rest of Asia?
- i. For each year from 1966 to the present, how many such surveillances have been directed at subjects who are United States citizens?

ii. With respect to the requirement that the Attorney General must be satisfied that the subject of the surveillance "plans unlawful activity directed against a foreign power or a foreign-based political group", the following questions are asked:

- a. To what extent does the recent decision in Zweibon v. Mitchell by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia limit or otherwise affect this standard?
- b. What has been the total number of subjects under surveillance and installations for telephone and microphone surveillance requested and approved under the standard "plans unlawful activity directed against a foreign power" and under the standard "plans unlawful activity directed against a foreign-based political group" for each year from 1966 to the present?
- c. How many of the subjects in each category and for each year identified in "b" above have been United States citizens?
- d. What have been the identities of all "foreign-based political groups" related to the surveillances identified in "b" above?

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- 4 -

With respect to the requirement that the Attorney General must be satisfied that the subject of the surveillance is "assisting a foreign power or foreign-based political group", the following questions are asked:

- a. What has been the total number of subjects under surveillance and installations for telephone and microphone surveillance requested and approved under the standard "assisting a foreign power" and under the standard "assisting a foreign-based political group" for each year from 1966 until the present?
 - b. How many of the subjects in each category and for each year identified in "a" above have been United States citizens?
 - c. What have been the identities of all "foreign-based political groups" related to the surveillances identified in "a" above?
13. With respect to the requirement that the Attorney General must be satisfied that the requested surveillance is "necessary for national security or foreign intelligence purposes important to national security", the following questions are asked:
- a. Is this standard intended to supplant the standard for national security electronic surveillance under former Attorney General Elliot Richardson (i.e., that the proposed surveillance must be necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or any other hostile action of a foreign power, that it be necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or that it be necessary to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities)?
 - b. Is this standard intended to modify the standard for national security electronic surveillance under former Attorney General Elliot Richardson?

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- c. If the answer to "a" or "b" above is yes, what is the reason(s) for such change?
 - d. If the answer to "a" or "b" above is yes, what is the precise legal authority supporting such change in the formulation of the standard?
 - e. If the answer to "a" or "b" above is yes, what is the reason(s) for the deletion of the word "essential" from the formulation of the standard under former Attorney General Elliot Richardson?
 - f. If the answer to "a" or "b" above is yes, please give examples of hypothetical situations where national security electronic surveillance would be permitted: (1) under the current standard but not under the former standard, and (2) under the former standard but not under the current standard.
14. What have been the standards and procedures, if any, that have been established for determining that "the minimum physical intrusion necessary to obtain the information will be used"?
15. With respect to warrantless electronic surveillance in cases of "leaks" of information deemed either "essential" or "important" to the security of the United States, the following questions are asked:
- a. Has there been a Justice Department policy specifically addressed to such cases?
 - b. Have there been Justice Department standards or procedures specifically addressed to such cases?
 - c. Have surveillances in such cases been approved by the Attorney General under the standard "assisting a foreign power or a foreign-based political group"?
 - d. If the answer to "c" above is no, under what standard have surveillances in such cases been approved?
 - e. What has been the total number of subjects under surveillance and installations for telephone and microphone surveillance requested and approved for such cases for each year from 1966 to the present?

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- f. What have been the identities of the agencies and the Presidential appointees who have initiated requests for warrantless electronic surveillance in such cases from 1966 to the present?
 - g. How many such requests have been initiated by each agency and each Presidential appointee?
 - h. How many of such requests initiated by each agency and each Presidential appointee have been approved by the Attorney General?
 - i. Of the total number of subjects under surveillance in such cases for each year from 1966 to the present, how many were (1) employees of news media organizations; (2) current employees of the federal government; (3) former employees of the federal government; (4) other?
16. With respect to the dissemination of information obtained from national security electronic surveillance, the following questions are asked:
- a. What have been the standards and procedures for the dissemination of such information?
 - b. What have been the identities of the agencies and Presidential appointees who have received information obtained from national security electronic surveillance for each year from 1966 to the present?
 - c. What have been the standards and procedures for the dissemination of such information to agencies and Presidential appointees who did not initiate the request for the surveillance?
17. Can additional monthly data on warrantless electronic surveillances prior to November 1972 be made available in view of the fact that the FBI was able to precisely state the number of warrantless electronic surveillances in operation on nineteen separate days, ranging from March 4, 1965, to March 31, 1972, in response to a request by the Select Committee? (By letter of June 9, 1975, the FBI's Office of the Director informed the Committee of the number of warrantless electronic

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surveillances in operation on, thirty days before, and thirty days after testimony by the Director before the House Appropriations Committee from 1965 to the present.)

18. In his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, Kevin T. Maroney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, stated in reference to a three-man Executive Branch commission used in Great Britain to review applications for national security electronic surveillance, "Whether such a commission would be feasible under our system . . . I think it might well be." Is it the official position of the Justice Department that a similar commission composed of Executive Branch officials would be an acceptable alternative to the present system for authorizing national security electronic surveillance?
19. In the testimony referred to above, Mr. Maroney also stated, "I think the Department has previously committed itself . . . to complete disclosure to an oversight committee." With respect to this statement, the following questions are asked:
 - a. When and in what context has the Justice Department committed itself to complete disclosure to an oversight committee?
 - b. What material or information, if any, that relates to the authorization for, identities of the subjects of, conduct of, and dissemination of information from particular electronic surveillances would the Justice Department be unwilling to disclose to an oversight committee?
20. What is the basis for Justice Department opposition to the concept of a specially-designated court, composed of one or three federal judges, which would review applications for warrants in cases of national security electronic surveillance?
21. In his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, Clarence M. Kelley stated that he would accept a requirement of judicial warrants for national security

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electronic surveillance if the standard for issuance of the warrant was "less than probable cause". When asked by Mr. Badillo what the appropriate standard should be, he answered, "I think reasonable grounds, that as a result of the pursuit of an investigation (it is), possible to believe that there has been, or will be, or there is a need for the gathering of intelligence." Does this statement reflect the official position of the FBI in regard to (1) a warrant requirement for national security electronic surveillance, and (2) the appropriate standard for the issuance of a warrant?

22. What have been the standards and procedures followed by the Justice Department for the authorization and conduct of national security electronic surveillance where one (but not all) of the parties to the conversation consents to the monitoring?
23. With respect to the July 1 White House news briefing by Ron Nessen relating to the effect of the Zweibon decision, the following questions are asked:
 - a. What is the nature of the directive from the President to the Attorney General, referred to by Mr. Nessen, relating to Justice Department policy and procedures for electronic surveillance of United States citizens?
 - b. How does this directive affect Justice Department policy and procedures for electronic surveillance of United States citizens?
 - c. Will the Justice Department support legislative proposals that would require a court order for any electronic surveillance, as was indicated by Mr. Nessen's statement?
 - d. If the answer to "c" above is yes, which of the pending bills in Congress, if any, would the Justice Department be willing to support?
 - e. If the answer to "c" above is yes, what would the Justice Department consider to be the appropriate judicial standard for the issuance of a warrant?
 - f. If the answer to "c" above is yes, what would the Justice Department consider to be the appropriate court or courts to issue such warrant?

