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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

~~TOP SECRET BINAR~~

Capt Quirke
Mr Guldseth

0600 22 November - 0600 23 November 1963

30. CATEGORY 16 - SCF Element Probably Controls Unidentified Hungarian Radio Communications Group

Further analysis of communications procedure indicates that an element of the SCF, Hungary, probably controls the unidentified Hungarian radio communications group observed since approximately 0900, 21 Nov 63.

Comment: Although the exact significance of this activity cannot be determined at this time, it may represent a joint SCF/Hungarian communications exercise since practice messages are being passed (22 Nov, 2103Z, D/Toll).
(USM 89, 2/R2/MURUM/R2-63, 222035Z) (TSD) (LONGUS)

31. CATEGORY 11 - CSFB - FIA:

Between 0654Z and 1300Z, 22 Nov a FIA involving elements of at least a battalion echelon was noted on VHF voice radio communications facilities.

Mention was made of repelling enemy attacks and destroying enemy tanks. Also noted was mention of a gas attack and the substituting of anti-tank armor.
Comment: This activity was intercepted by four US sites, two adjacent to the Third Shock Army area, one in Berlin and another in Southern Germany. At present the size and scope of this activity or the units participating cannot be determined.
(USM 43, 2X/R3/RUM/R029-63, 230210Z) (TSD) (LONGUS)

32. SECTION III/8 - Cuban Military Alert: Addendum to #23, this file.

1. In a message originated by Banes at 230222Z and relayed by Havana, Punta Maisi was requested to deny access to the coastal observation post until Monday, 25 Nov due to the state of alert.

2. At 222320Z, a message passed between two unidentified units on VHF communications which normally link First Army HQ, Santiago with Guantanamo City stated: "Inform the chief that by orders of LM (unit commander) here, all of them, all of the points were put on alert."

The reason for the alert was not mentioned.

(1)(USM 834, 2/Q5/CM/R667-63, 230704Z) (TSD)

(2)(USM 835, 2/LR1/CM/R167-63, 230217Z) (TSD)

33. SECTION I - ChiCom Commentary on Soviet Letter:

Peiping's fifth commentary upon the July 14 CPSU open letter, released here argues in 18,000 well-chosen Chinese characters that Soviet leaders are as much as capitulationist, and as anti-Marxist-Leninist on the issue of war and peace as they are on other cardinal issues under dispute which were analyzed in previous installments.

Comments:

Regardless of all other major considerations, such current HFC session, Peiping's polemical machinery grinds inexorably on. The latest item, which caps a year-long torrent of words against Khrushchev and the CPSU, conveys the impression of increasing unreality and of haggling over theological points which only would interest other theologians...

Notwithstanding some characteristically adroit sarcasm addressed at Khrushchev, the article as a whole is defensive in tone and reveals the difficulty of defending Mao's pronouncements against the Soviet attack other than by re-interpreting and distorting their original sense or by merely repeating them as holy writ, as if their very invocation would quell further argument...
(MCCSUL Hong Kong 942, 191100Z) (OJO)

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~~TOP SECRET BINAR~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

Dr. Chapin

0600 22 Nov - 0600 23 Nov 1963

Sgt. Chamberlain

21. CONTINUED: Flights to North Pole 12 were undertaken earlier than those to North Pole 10 probably because the airstrip was ready sooner. On 17 October, personnel responsible for directing flights, arrived at North Pole 12 aboard LI-2 04205. On 19 October it was reported that the airstrip measured 2952 X 164 feet and was ready to receive a trial flight by an IL-14 in the daytime. On 20 October two IL-14's began resupply operations from Mys Shmidtta and Somnitelnaya. Supply flights to North Pole 10 by LI-2 04205 commenced on 20 October. On 25 October, IL-14s were scheduled to fly there from Mys Kozisty and Chaluskina. It appears, judging from the usage of cover numbers, that the drift stations each have two airstrips, and that to date, all are capable of taking IL-14 aircraft.

In September the Soviets reported that preparation of an airstrip at North Pole 10 capable of taking heavy aircraft was to be undertaken. The description "heavy aircraft" is normally taken to mean an AN-12 type, but it is evident, to date at least, that no such aircraft has visited the drift station. During the past 10 days, five UPA IL-14s have been ferrying supplies to the ice islands at a very high rate. The transports carried fuel, food, instruments and personnel to North Pole 10 from Mys Chelyuskin and to North Pole 12 from Mys Shmidtta. UPA support of the fall high latitude expedition exceeds that of any previous expedition. On 18 November the location of the drift stations were: North Pole 10, 8424N-1.25E and North Pole 12, 7835N-17W.
(AFSOP, 63-229-06, 222020Z Nov) (TSD)

22. SECTION III/8 - Cuban - New Commander for Siguanoa SAM Site:

10 September 1963: During a conversation between SAM Regimental Headquarters at Santiago de las Vegas and the Siguanoa SAM site it was reported that a new commander for the Siguanoa SAM site had arrived from the Soviet Union. Past intercepts of SAM communications have indicated the appointment of new commanders at several SAM sites. In the majority of these cases the new commanders were previously acting as Chief of Staff at another site. The 10 September 1963 activity, represents the initial reflection in comint of a new arrival in Cuba being directly appointed as the commander of a Soviet SAM battalion in Cuba.
(DIRNSA, 2/0/CHREK/R210-63, 221758Z Nov) (TSD)

23. SECTION III/8 - Cuban - Addendum on Eastern Naval District:

In a circular message passed at 222044Z, Hq, Eastern Naval District, Banes, instructed naval posts at Jucvitas, Puerto Padre, Punta Maisi and Kanati to have all personnel ready to repel aggression.
(USN 83h, 2/OS/EN/R665-63, 230433Z Nov) (TSD)

24. SECTION III/8 - Status of Cuban/Soviet Communications as of 22 Nov:

A new radar observation post has been completed and is in operation at Punta Mulas, Eastern Naval District. Intercept reveals that this new post entered communications with the Eastern Naval District net on 19 November. The commencement of operations was in honor of Captain Jomarron, who was possibly the officer in charge of construction at Punta Mulas prior to his death while serving as commanding officer of the Southern Sector of the Western Naval District.
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~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~TOP SECRET BINAR~~
0600 25 November 1963 - 0600 26 November 1963

LTJG Taylor
SFC Hamilton
YML Gwin

11. SECTION III/8 - Probable Reference.....continuation of:
and move at 1400Z. The Regimental Headquarters was then informed by a speaker
at the site that he (the speaker at the site) was going to proceed to the
Nuevitas SAM Site to check out the equipment. This person is believed to be
associated with the SAM Support Facility at Victoria de las Tunas and was
probably making technical checks of equipment at the Camaguey and Nuevitas
SAM Sites prior to the movement of these sites.

Since the Camaguey site was ordered to practice only three hours prior
to the scheduled time of movement of the site the move may be a mobility
exercise rather than abandonment of the site.
(DIRNSA 2/O/CURUK/R211-63, 251800Z Nov)(TSD)

12. CATEGORY 13 - East Germany: Situation Report No. 112 - Political/Economic:
SED Communications on 22 November revealed that press, radio and television
had been advised by the Party Agitation Commission in Berlin to "take note
of a report" which implicated Fascist circles in the assassination of President
Kennedy.

Further to para. 2 of 2/AGC/C2463 regarding the murder of one and possible
two East German Taxi-drivers by Soviet Citizens in Dresden, a Berlin Party
official stated on 22 November that further local discussions on the matter
were undesirable since "((B P. cent the Soviets could easily get wind of it))".

A new Church Law ((Amtszuchtgesetz)) approval at a recent meeting of the
Hecklenburger Landes Synod ((probably the Synod of the Hecklenburger State
Church)) which ended on 9th November, has caused considerable alarm among
party members, the main aim of which is apparently to "remove"
clergymen branded as "progressives" ((a probable reference to those who voted
in the recent election)), was approved despite the intervention of the Bishop,
who forbade it, and of the party which enlisted at least 15 Clergymen to pose
strong objections, while the party has branded the law as invalid, because it
is concerned with the whole of Germany whereas there are two separate German
states. Full reasons for refutation are to be worked out in detail later.
(OCHQ 2/AGC/C2460, 251604Z Nov)(TSD)

13. SECTION III/8 - Alert in Eastern Naval District Relaxed, 23 November:

As a result of the death of President Kennedy, the Eastern Naval District
of Cuba was placed on an alert on 2044Z on 22 November by Banes, Headquarters
for that District. At 2037Z on 23 November, the alert was relaxed a certain
degree by Banes; instructions were passed to Santiago de Cuba, a subordinate,
to give leave to 25 percent of their personnel. For the 23rd and 24th and that
further orders would be forthcoming on 25 November 1963.

COMMENT: The authorization to grant leave to personnel is an indication that
the alert is somewhat relaxed and the note that further instructions would be
issued on Monday, 25 November indicates that a nonurgent view has been adopted
for the situation by Cuban Naval authorities in the Eastern Naval District.
(DIRNSA 2/O.CUN/R196-63, 251815Z Nov)(TSD)

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~~TOP SECRET BINAR~~

0600 26 November 1963 - 0600 27 November 1963

SFC Hamilton
YN1 Gwin

30. SECTION III/2 - Unidentified Regiments.....continuation of:
has been noted since. The number "983" which precedes the "(117th Regiment)" is perhaps this Regiment's Army Unit Number. The referenced placenames suggest that these unidentified units may be located in the vicinity of Sinanju and Cho'ngju. The 53rd rear hospital, according to a collateral document dated 1 July 1963, is located at BV 6958.
(USM 81, 3/01/USM/R46-63, 261744Z Nov)(TSD)

31. SECTION III/6 - Regarding Soviet Activities on Iranian Border:

At 1000 hours on 28 October, several Russian Soldiers were engaged in construction in the vicinity of Kandgareh, near the Soviet Observation Post, and a truck was transporting building materials from the Qazkan (repeated as Qafkan) post to this region.

At 1000 hours that same day Russians were marking out furrows and constructing new furrows at the Qushvar post.

At 1500 hours on 23 October, a Russian Jeep came down alongside the border from the Qushvar Post and stopped for a few minutes at Qalich Kallu (repeated as Kalich-Kalu), where the Russians have underground rooms; and then it returned.

Eskandar Chupan said in the presence of Chanzad ((40)) Chupan in (40) that on 19 October 11 Russian Soldiers from the Qukai Post, accompanied by a guide, inspected the border.

(DIRNSA 3/0/IRI/T4098-63, 262009Z Nov)(TSD)

32. SECTION III/8 - Alert in Oriente Province Believed to be Terminated: (see Item #13, WOI's 25/26 November):

The alert in Oriente Province is believed to be terminated. The alert, apparently prompted by President Kennedy's death on 22 November, was possibly pre-scheduled to terminate on 25 November. There have been two orders which suggest that the alert was destined to be concluded on 25 November: They are:

1) Access to the coastal observation post at Punta Maisi (20-15N 74-09W) was restricted until 25 November because of the alert.

2) Subordinates of Banes, Headquarters Eastern Naval District, were to receive further orders on the 25th, presumably concerning their alert status; no such orders have been noted in communications.

There have been no further references in intercepted communications to the alert since 0222Z on 23 November.

It is possible that the restricted access to the observation post at Punta Maisi extends to other observation posts in Oriente Province such as reported on 23 November when First Army Coastal Observation Posts were placed in alert status, and that the restriction was to be lifted on 25 November by all those posts.

Further indications that the alert was terminated is the fact that the Cuban Navy was engaged in an island-wide communications exercise on 25 November. It is considered unlikely that such an exercise would be conducted under alert conditions.

There have been no further references to the alert status of the (D Percent Santiago de Cuba) units which was first observed on 23 November. All GRAF and Soviet Forces Cuba Communications appear to be normal during this period,

22 - 26 November 1963.

(DIRNSA 2/0/CW/R58-63, 262019Z Nov)(TSD)

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