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TO : CRIMMINS, JOHN
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AFFAIRS: TRANSMITTAL OF INFORMATION
DATE : 07/29/63
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AFFAIRS

CUBAN EXILES

ANIT-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

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State, JCS, OSD.

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED



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
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

July 29, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN CRIMMINS
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban
Affairs: Transmittal of Information

Enclosed herewith are two reports from Guantanamo Base
furnished by the Navy which I am forwarding for your information
and possible future consideration by the Committee.


Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Attachments (2)
As Stated

cc: Mr. Desmond FitzGerald, CIA
Mr. W. A. Geoghegan, Dept of Justice

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CUBAN COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY

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A. MY 291738Z MARCH 1963

1. REF A REPORTED GRANTING OF LEAVE TO ALONSO GONZALES, CUBAN NATIONAL BASE EMPLOYEE. GONZALES RETURNED FROM LEAVE ON 23 APRIL 1963. TODAY GONZALES REQUESTED AND WAS GRANTED AN AUDIENCE WITH COMMANDER NAVAL BASE WHEREIN HE RELATED THE FOLLOWINGS:

A. DURING HIS LEAVE WHILE IN MIAMI, HE CONFERRED ON CUBAN AFFAIRS WITH A GROUP OF ANTI-CASTRO PRIVATE PERSONS, NONE OF WHOM BELONG TO ESTABLISHED OR PUBLICIZED COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS.

B. AS A RESULT OF THEIR DISCUSSIONS, THIS GROUP, MANY OF WHOM ARE WEALTHY, FORMED A FUND-RAISING COMMITTEE TO RAISE ONE AND ONE-HALF MILLION DOLLARS TO PURCHASE WEAPONS FOR OPENING A NEW FRONT IN CUBA.

C. MANY OF THE WEAPONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN OBTAINED AND THE REMAINDER OF THE AMOUNT, WHICH IS INTENDED TO FULLY EQUIP 2,000 MEN, SHOULD BE AVAILABLE WITHIN ONE TO TWO MONTHS.

D. THE INTENDED FRONT WILL BE ON THE NORTHERN COAST OF CUBA APPROXIMATELY 60 MILES FROM THE GTMO NAVAL BASE.

E. ABOUT 2,000 COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES PRESENTLY LOCATED IN CUBA, A GROUP OF MILITIA WHO HAVE INDICATED THEIR DESIRE TO DEFECT, AND ABOUT 300 COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES NOT PRESENTLY IN CUBA WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE OPERATION.

F. PRIOR TO THE ACTION DATE GONZALES WILL REQUEST LEAVE WITH THE INTENTION OF PROCEEDING TO MIAMI TO WORK OUT FINAL DETAILS WITH THE GROUP THERE. HE WILL THEN RETURN TO THE BASE.

G. TEN TO TWELVE DAYS PRIOR TO THE OPERATION GONZALES WILL REQUEST THAT HE AND 9 OR 10 OTHER CUBAN BASE RESIDENTS BE PERMITTED TO DEPART THE BASE ARMED. THEY INTEND TO PROCEED TO THE STAGING AREA TO MAKE PREPARATIONS FOR THE ARRIVAL OF THE 300 MEN WITH THE SHIPMENT OF ARMS. IT IS NOT THEIR INTENTION TO USE THE ARMS THEY POSSESS WHEN DEPARTING THE BASE UNLESS IT BECOMES NECESSARY AS A RESULT OF ENCOUNTERING HOSTILE GOC TROOPS WHILE TRAVELLING THE 60 MILES ON FOOT.

2. GONZALES VOLUNTEERED THE FOREGOING INFORMATION AND REQUESTED NAVY COOPERATION IN EITHER SUPPLYING ARMS FOR THE 10 OR 11 BASE RESIDENTS OR IN PERMITTING THEM TO INTRODUCE SAID ARMS INTO THE BASE FOR REMOVAL AS PLANNED. HE FURTHER STATED THAT INCLUDED IN THE EQUIPMENT BEING OBTAINED IS RADIO GEAR ADEQUATE FOR CONTINUOUS COMMUNICATION WITH THE BASE WHILE THE OPERATION IS UNDERWAY.

3. GONZALES WAS INFORMED BY COMNAVBASE THAT HE AND ANY OTHERS THAT SO DESIRE WILL BE AIDED IN DEPARTING THE BASE, AS HAS BEEN THE POLICY IN THE PAST BUT, AS SET FORTH IN THE TREATY PROVISIONS, INTRODUCTION OF ARMS INTO CUBA FROM THE NAVAL BASE WILL NOT BE PERMITTED.

4. THE FOREGOING IS SUBMITTED FOR INFORMATION. OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE PLANNING ARE NOT KNOWN.

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SPECIAL HANDLING

(Classification and Control Markings)

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: Cuba
2. SUBJECT: Cuban Counterrevolutionary Activities
3. ISC NUMBER:
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 12 June 1963
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Cuba, 3 July 1963
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE R INFORMATION 2
7. SOURCE: Cuban national
8. REPORT NUMBER: 536607563
9. DATE OF REPORT: 12 July 1963
10. NO. OF PAGES: 1
11. REFERENCES: (a) My ~~151725Z~~ ^{151640Z} of June 1963
12. ORIGINATOR: Commander, U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
13. PREPARED BY: P.W. BENEDIKTSSON LT, USN
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: HARRY H. RUMBLE II CDR, USNR

15. SUMMARY:

1. Reference (a) outlined a plan by a group of Cuban private citizens in Miami to raise one and one-half million dollars to be used for opening a new front in Cuba. Attachment (1) is a copy of a letter from one of this Miami group to Alonzo Gonzalez, the Naval Base contact, outlining the plan further.

(Leave Blank)

1. Preparing Officers Comment: The addressee on the attached letter "Guillermo" is identified as Alonzo Gonzalez, DPOB: 4 November 1921, Guantanamo City, Oriente, Cuba. Gonzalez claims to be the leader of the group. Other names mentioned in the attached letter are not known. Gonzalez presented his proposal and the attached letter to ComNavBase GTMO and swore him to secrecy. He is not aware that a copy of the letter was made. Gonzalez has confided some of the details of the plan to one of the FIO Guantanamo representatives. When pushed as to names of other persons involved he became evasive. Instead of running the possibility of alienating him it was decided to let the matter lie for the present.

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

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17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING:
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18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

(1) Letter addressed to Guillermo & signed Antonio of 12 June 1963 from Miami, Fla.

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REPLACES DA FORM 1048, 1 AUG 60;
OPNAV FORM 3820 (Rev 10-61);
AF FORM 112, JUL 61, WHICH MAY BE
USED UNTIL 1 JAN 63.

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Miami, June 12, 1963.

Dear Guillermo:

Each of your informative letters has been received and discussed at length between Ignacio and myself. Your progress there seems phenomenal.

Our progress here has been slow and not at all spectacular. Yet, I feel that our progress has been meaningful and heartening. But let me first do a little straight-from-the-shoulder talking with you. This is not presented in anyway as an alibi for the apparent lack of action by us. For you have thrown the challenge of freedom and neither Ignacio nor I will rest until we have met this challenge.

However, the intenseness of your own devotion to Cuba and freedom forms a shield through which you can neither see nor understand the doubts, suspicions, rivalry, greed, ambition, and disinterest that characterizes most Cubans of wealth in exile. Yes, you know this exists in an abstract way but you haven't ---thanks to Almighty God---had to live it, to taste it, to feel it, or to be sickened by it.

It is in this morass of moral nothingness that Ignacio and I have had to begin our work. We have turned our back upon most of it to formulate the following simultaneous courses of action. We submit here a summary of our views, the steps taken to date, and current status of three situations for your comments of agreement or disagreement with these actions:

Aid from the United States

1) We both have been in complete agreement from the first that we must make overtures to the U.S. authorities for aid for this country. The elements of time and money alone are so demanding that the power of the United States must be sought. The need for future U.S. policy decisions in our favor is another tremendous requisite for ultimate success.

2) To achieve this has not been easy due to the U.S. recent positions against the hit-and-run action groups. Ignacio used a contact within the FBI to solicit an off-the-record expression of any government interest towards action within Cuba. He received a reply of positive interest coupled with a request for a "general" memo on the subject which would be forwarded to higher levels.

Ignacio and I have prepared a draft of such a memo which is enclosed for your (a) approval or disapproval of this approach to the U.S. and (b) corrections and/or additions to the memo. Depending upon your reply is our future action in this direction.

3) I should add that I approached the Miami office of the Office of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs with the same type inquiry and received an expression of interest in "new faces, new ideas, and new situations". Our project certainly meets those three points. However, we plan to stick to the FBI route which I believe will travel via the Office of the Coordinator. The fact that Ignacio is highly regarded by the FBI will give the plan an added weight which might well be helpful.

A Committee to raise Funds.

When you were here this idea of a committee was rather thoroughly discussed but Ignacio and I have had to wait and maneuver for the right set of conditions to appear because of the fantastic number of committees already in existence to aid the "cause" of Cuba.

I well recall your remark to me that the amount of funds needed could not await on the dollars and dimes from the exiles. We agreed then and agree now.

But two factors are cramping down on dollars from Americans---first, the U.S. crackdown on the raiders and second, the average American's demand for a tax deduction for any contribution. Therefore, I am working on the dodge used by Miami representatives of the Israeli underground back in their war with the Arabs to obtain funds for arms here.

A Florida non-profit corporation was established to purchase medicine, food, and "other essentials" for the Israeli people. Thousands of dollars were collected for arms under this system. The attorneys involved then are assisting us with our problems now.

In such a set-up a humanitarian type board of directors is essential, Ignacio and I, by virtue of our daily work, are obviously acceptable. We need, of course, Msgr. Boza Masvidal.

He was due here in mid-May but did not arrive until yesterday. I spent a long time with him., outlining our real purpose without disclosing any pertinent details. He was both enthusiastic for the project and fearful of his own participation in something which has a considerable element of duplicity.

Boza will be back in Caracas by Saturday and will immediately let me know of his decision. I believe the odds are 60-40 in our favor that he will accept. I feel he is a "must" to such a corporation to obtain such a non-profit charter in order that we may, in turn, give a tax-exemption for big U.S. contributions.

Jose "Pepin" Bosch

The third attack is this gentleman of more than modest means. Through a man of deep mutual confidence (Dr. Ernesto Freyre, attorney for Sears Roebuck, Texaco, Chase Manhattan, etc, etc.) Bosh has been interested in our project.

You should be advised that, prior to the crackdown on the raids, Bosch had been given a quiet okay to go ahead with a plan of his own to equip a sabotage "mother" ship for action against Castro. He expended thousands and thousands of dollars in outfitting a ship with the latest and finest equipment known. Then the crackdown came and the U.S. told him that it had to be dismantled.

Bosch has stipulated to Freyre that his man Polo Valdes Miranda (Usually known only as Polo Miranda), who was in complete charge of the ship described above, must be furnished complete information on this project of ours if he (Bosch) is to have a basis of determining whether he will put money into it.

I firmly recommend that we do this. These men are of unquestionable integrity, honor, and rare for Cubans ---can keep their mouth shut.

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The trio

The three principals jointly and individually attest that they have no personal selfish interest in this action now or in the past-Castro period. Their sole aim is a free, independent, and democratic Cuba.

The Plan

1. To initiate the action with preliminary acts of terrorism against personages of the Castro regime and acts of sabotage against specific military objectives.
2. With force numbering 2,000 men to open military action against specific communist military posts in terrain of Oriente where counterattack by air could not be top effective.
3. The absorption of militia units, already contacted, into the rebel force.
4. Establishment of a government-in-arms on Free Cuba territory and the appeal to other American democracies for immediate recognition and assistance.

Requisites

1. Money
2. Arms
3. Professionals and technicians (doctors, demolition experts, etc)
4. Liason with the United States.

Note; Transportation from a reasonable point in the Hemisphere is already under the control of the leader.

Conclusion

The original draft of this memorandum was sent to Cuba to the leader. It has been returned by him to the principals in this country and is presented herewith in its final form as agreed to by all three.

It is presented in the sincere belief that it conforms to the spirit of the declaration by American officials that the United States sincerely desires to expel Communism from Cuba to establish democracy in its place.

The principals agreed from the beginning that the prohibitions placed upon anti-Castro military operations from U.S. soil must be respected in the fulfillment of this plan.

In the spirit the principals ask that immediate discussions begin on this project in the hope that the beginning of the end of Communism in the Americas can become something far greater than conversation.

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Memorandum to Interested Parties on a Plan to Initiate Anti-Communist Action within Cuba

Background

There are three men involved in the overall planning of this military project. Two of the principals are in the United States, the third---the leader--- is in Cuba as of this writing.

The leader initiated this effort by coming from Cuba with the basic military plan to throw the challenge of raising funds for the necessary equipment before the two principals in the U.S..

Before accepting or rejecting this challenge, the latter engaged in exhaustive discussions with the leader in which the following points were agreed upon by all three men:

1. The plan is a military one. It is fundamentally non-political even by U.S. standards.
2. The plan is militarily sound.
3. The plan can be--and must be--tailored so as not to compromise the international position of the United States.
4. The United States should be approached to see if "all the cards" concerning the plan could be put on the table.
5. Should the U.S. interest in this plan go beyond the early introductory phase, the contact man assigned to the project must be an identifiable U.S. military officer.
6. The forces of most every anti-Castro action group will be acceptable to be integrated into this military action.

The Leader

The leader has been known to one of the principals in the U.S. for many years. The other U.S. principal has verified the facts about this man independently.

He has studied in the United States, speaks excellent, English, is a professional, has solid military qualifications, is personally well versed in the use of pistol, rifle, machine gun, and bazooka. He has lived and worked in the underground and operates in the eastern part of the island.

He is a young man--a man of action, idealism, and resolutely dedicated against communism. He is deeply attached to the United States which is no way compromising his keen independence as a Cuban patriot.

He will make himself available for consultations within the United States upon word from the two principals in this country.

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Ignacio agrees with me on this.

Your acceptance, rejection, or limitations are sought.

Now, to turn to a question from us to you. When you were here you spoke of 2,000 men. Your list of arms is for 2,000 men. But in ordering the identifying arm bands you ask for 3,000. And in a letter to Ignacio you make mention of 5,000.

I am certain there are logical explanations for these various figures. But I would point out to you that everyone here both U.S. and exile--are highly suspicious of claims of large numbers of men inside cuba. Can you please set us straight as to what each of these figures represent?

In closing let me point out that we can make no move further in these three sectors until we have your concurrence. I know this will receive your prompt attention.

Yours in the cause of liberty.

Antonio

P.S. Also enclosed is a copy of a recent statement of Ass't Secretary of State Edwin Martin. This is most comprehensive statement on U.S. Cuban policy yet issued. I have been advised to "read between the lines" to find the guidance for U.S. policy with regards to rendering assistance to actions against Castro.