

Date : 05/04/99
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : DOS
RECORD NUMBER : 179-10003-10046
RECORDS SERIES : COORDINATOR OF CUBAN AFFAIRS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : LOT 66D501

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : OPERATIONAL PLAN
DATE : 00/00/62
PAGES : 9
SUBJECTS : ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

OPERATION MONGOOSE

COVERT OPERATIONS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/04/99
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Postponements taken by DOD, JSC, and DOS.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
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Jan 10/27/97

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OPERATIONAL PLAN

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Reviewed on 2-IV-97

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CIA cleared 6/9/97

I. SITUATION:

A. The purpose of this plan is to outline the action to be undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency as part of the U. S. Government's action against the Castro/ Communist government of Cuba during FY-63 and for such longer period as may be directed.

B. The intelligence estimate for the period of this plan is contained in the National Intelligence Estimate 85-2-62 and subsequent revisions.

C. For the purpose of this plan the following assumptions are made:

1. National policy with respect to Cuba is essentially as follows:

a. Isolate Castro/ Communism from other Western Hemisphere nations.

b. Discredit the Castro/ Communist regime in Cuba and in the Hemisphere.

c. Maintain maximum economic and political pressure on the Castro/ Communist regime to retard development of the Cuba economy and maintain a drain on Bloc resources.

d. Maintain maximum coverage of Cuban intelligence requirements.

e. Take steps to inspire splits in Cuban leadership or split in Cuban/ Bloc relationships, and be prepared to capitalize on any significant uprising.

II. MISSION:

Covertly support the above-cited U. S. national policy objectives with respect to Cuba.

STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW

Retain classification Change to _____
 Declassify with concurrence of CIA
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EO 12958, 25X

JPS/CWIR by glen Date 2-IV-97
WITHDRAWAL § 11-22(B)

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WMO 12-16-97
OSD CONCUR WITH JCS
REDACTIONS 26-VI-97 1998

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III. TASKS:

A. Intelligence:

1. Provide the maximum intelligence coverage of Cuba with particular emphasis on the following:
 - a. Capabilities and intentions of the Castro government.
 - b. Activities of Cuban G-2.
 - c. Soviet activities in Cuba.
 - d. State of resistance including the tone and temper of the population.
 - e. Military and militia order of battle and morale.
 - f. Locus of power and/or stress and strain among the "power centers" in the Cuban government.
 - g. Economic.

B. Political

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action to develop active OAS and Latin American country support for the containment or overthrow of Castro.
2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.
3. Provide covert support to the CRC and to such other Cuban political groups as appropriate.
4. Develop contacts in the "power centers" of the Cuban government as a possible means of splitting the regime.

C. Economic:

1. Participate in inter-agency economic action planning and execution.

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2. By deception and other operations, cause to the extent practicable diversion of Cuban resources from productive purposes.

3. Conduct selected sabotage principally of major Cuban industries and public utilities with priority attention being given to transportation, communications, power plants and utilities. No sabotage would be undertaken against food supplies, medical facilities, or directly against the population of Cuba as such.

D. Psychological:

1. Develop, maintain, and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro/Communism.

2. Discredit the Castro regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere.

E. Resistance:

1. Strengthen and maintain an atmosphere of resistance in the general population.

2. Recruit, train, and supply small resistance cells in the major cities and in other selected areas of Cuba.

3. Cache arms, ammunition, and other supplies in areas accessible to the resistance cells and in potential resistance areas.

4. Be prepared to covertly provide personnel and logistics support to any significant internal resistance group or uprising.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION

To undertake the above-listed tasks, CIA would be required to develop the following program:

A. Intelligence (FI):

The past build-up of intelligence assets must be intensified and expanded. No additional policy approvals are needed. The following types of actions will be maximized.

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1. Spotting/recruiting/training of legally established Cubans in Cuba or in Cuban government posts abroad. Establishment and maintenance of reliable, secure communications will become more critical as police state controls increase.
2. Spotting/recruiting/training of third country nationals resident in Cuba.
3. Spotting/recruiting/training of legal travelers who have potential access to significant information.
4. Expansion of communications intelligence coverage particularly in the G-2, police, and militia nets. (This is primarily an NSA problem.)

B. Psychological/Political Warfare (CA)

1. The program must primarily concentrate on and reach the Cuban population, the political and military power centers and selected individuals inside Cuba. Its purpose will be to maintain morale and increase the will to resist. Initially the following themes and general guidance will be emphasized:
 - a. Expose the betrayal of the original aims of the Revolution.
 - b. Expose the contradictions between past and current promises and performance of the Castro regime.
 - c. Expose the encroachment of Bloc Communists into the domestic affairs of Cuba and increasing foreign domination of Cuba by Soviet imperialism.
 - d. Stimulate disaffection in the leadership and ranks of the supporters of the Castro regime, principally among the militia, the government bureaucracy, organized labor, youth and students, farmers.
 - e. Inspire tensions between Cuban leaders and Bloc representatives.

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2. The following psychological/political warfare activities are considered compatible with and essential to the operational plan:

a. Stimulate and guide the propaganda and political action activities of the Cuban exile political, professional, student, cultural and other groups and individuals which have an existing or potential capability for communicating with and influencing the behavior of their counterparts inside Cuba. Also utilize these groups and individuals for propaganda activities in Latin America and other critical areas.

Note: The expense of establishing and operating a medium wave broadcasting facility by CIA is not considered justified. The Swan Island facility will be phased out. Time on existing commercial radio stations reaching Cuba will be utilized when appropriate.

b. Continue and expand operations involving the infiltration of propaganda material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travelers or controlled couriers.

c. Establish a propaganda balloon launching capability with appropriate policy authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching operations.

d. Continue and expand the "Voice of Free Cuba" submarine deception broadcasts in collaboration with the Navy.

C. Paramilitary:

The program will aim primarily for the development of controlled intelligence sources and small resistance cells for use in the event of any significant uprising. Experience plus continually tightening security controls has demonstrated the difficulty of infiltrating and maintaining individuals or "black teams" in the target country for an indefinite period. Nor has any method been devised by which infiltrees can become "legalized." Therefore, the PM program must increasingly emphasize infiltrations.

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spotting, recruiting, and training legal residents, caching and exfiltration of the original infiltrees. The program will be developed to the extent that proves feasible and possible in the light of existing circumstances, including Cuban security controls, morale and motivation of agent material, and the Cuban population's willingness to support infiltrees. To accomplish the required tasks, the following program and support are considered essential:

1. Urban Cells: Two-to five-man teams equipped with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the major Cuban cities to recruit and train small "legal" compartmented intelligence and/or resistance cells. Upon the completion of training, the infiltrated team will be withdrawn if it is seriously endangered or its continued presence jeopardizes the "legal" residents. Primarily, these cells will be intelligence producers. A second mission would be to establish small caches of arms and supplies for use in the event of a major uprising. Spotting, recruiting, and training of the infiltrees can be accomplished within Agency facilities and existing policy approvals.

2. Rural Cells: Three- to five-man teams equipped with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the rural areas to recruit, train, and arm small "legal" compartmented cells. The infiltrated trainers will be withdrawn if they are seriously endangered or if they pose a threat to the security of the resident rural cell. These resident rural cells would have limited intelligence functions until called into action in the event of an uprising. Spotting, recruiting, and training of the infiltrees can be accomplished within Agency facilities and existing policy approvals.

3. Commando/Sabotage Teams: A pool of 20 to 50 most carefully selected men highly trained in commando-sabotage tactics should be maintained. From this group, especially constituted sabotage teams will be selected for specific sabotage assignments per para III. c. 3 above. Except for occasional specialized training (such as possibly parachute), all spotting, recruiting and training can be done by Agency facilities.

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4. Infiltration/Exfiltration:

The increased Cuban defensive capabilities require freedom to utilize infiltration/exfiltration facilities as follows:

- a. CIA commercial/private maritime capability.
- b. Submarines.
- c. Limited number of aerial overflights by CIA planes with U. S. or other contract crews.

Additional policy approval is required for b. and c. above.

VI. SUPPORT REQUIRED FROM OTHER AGENCIES:

A. From Department of Defense:

1. Naval Support:

- a. Submarine infiltration/exfiltration mission. Estimate maximum two per month first three months increasing to four per month by January 1963.
- b. Submarine radio broadcasts - "Voice of Free Cuba".

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c. Use of Guantanamo Naval Base for limited covert operational purposes including agent infiltration/exfiltration, support for clandestine maritime operations, and for holding and interrogating Cuban agents and suspects who enter the base.

2. All Services:

- a. Limited numbers of qualified personnel may be required to provide specialized instruction in CIA training programs and specialized support in connection with the CIA maritime program.
- b. Occasional use of facilities and/or personnel to provide specialized training which cannot be duplicated at CIA facilities.

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VI. POLICY APPROVALS REQUIRED:

The following policy approvals are required to implement the foregoing program:

- A. Authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching.
- B. Authority to use U. S. Navy submarines for infiltration/exfiltration.
- C. Authority to overfly Cuba for re-supply/infiltration/exfiltration missions using CIA aircraft with U. S. or other contract crews.
- D. Authority to conduct selected sabotage principally against major Cuban industries and public utilities, i. e., refineries, power plants, transportation, and communications.
- E. Authority to utilize Guantanamo Naval Base for limited covert operational purposes including agent infiltration/exfiltration, support for clandestine maritime operations, and for holding and interrogating Cuban agents and suspects who enter the base. (The scope of the proposed operational use of Guantanamo would not provide the Cuban government with additional issues to enable them to increase their already existing or planned pressure on the U. S. retention of Guantanomo.)
- F. Authority to occasionally utilize DOD facilities to provide specialized training for the commando/sabotage teams when such training cannot be duplicated at Agency facilities.

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Exert all feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without prior commitment to employ U.S. military force, recognizing, however, that employment of such force may have to be considered.