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OK 5/27/97

OPERATIONAL PLAN
(REDUCED EFFORTS)

STATE DEPARTMENT SYSTEMATIC REVIEW
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EO 12958, 25X
FPC/HR by EW Date: 11-13-
11/2/97
Withdrawal No. 11252

I. SITUATION:

A. The purpose of this plan is to outline the action to be undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency against the Castro/Communist government of Cuba during FY-63 and for such longer period as may be directed.

B. The intelligence estimate for the period of this plan is contained in the National Intelligence Estimate 65-2-62 and subsequent revisions.

C. For the purpose of this plan the following assumptions are made:

1. National Policy with respect to Cuba is essentially as follows:

a. Isolate Castro/Communism from other Western Hemisphere nations.

b. Discredit the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba and in the Hemisphere.

c. Maintain ^{maximum} moderate economic and political pressure on the Castro/Communist regime to retard development of the Cuban economy and maintain a drain on Bloc resources. [Conduct limited, secure, viable covert resistance and action operations.]

d. Maintain maximum coverage of Cuban intelligence requirements.

Take steps to inspire a split in Cuban leadership or a split
e. Be prepared to capitalize on any significant uprising, split in Cuban leadership, or split in Cuban-Bloc relationships.

II. MISSION:

Covertly support the above-cited U. S. national policy objectives with respect to Cuba.

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III. TASKS

A. Intelligence

1. Provide the maximum intelligence coverage of Cuba with particular emphasis on the following:

- a. Capabilities and intentions of the Castro government.
- b. Activities of Cuban G-2.
- c. Soviet activities in Cuba.

d. State of resistance including the tone and temper of the population.

e. Militia morale.

f. Locus of power and/or stress and strain among the "power centers" in the Cuban government.

B. Political

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action to develop active C&S and Latin-American country support for the containment or overthrow of Castro.

2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.

3. Provide covert support to the CRC and to such other Cuban political groups as appropriate.

4. Develop contacts in the "power centers" of the Cuban government as a possible means of splitting the regime.

C. Economic

1. Participate in inter-agency economic action planning and execution.

2. By limited deception and other operations, cause the diversion of Cuban resources from productive purposes.

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1. Conduct limited and selected sabotage of major Cuban industries and public utilities with priority attention being given to transportation, communications, power plants and utilities. No sabotage would be undertaken against food supplies, medical facilities, or directly against the population of Cuba as such.

D. Psychological:

1. Develop, maintain, and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro/Communism.

2. Discredit the Castro regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere.

E. Resistance:

1. Strengthen and maintain an atmosphere of resistance in the general population.

2. Recruit, train, and supply small resistance cells in the major cities and in other selected areas of Cuba.

3. Cache arms, ammunition, and other supplies in limited amounts, in areas accessible to the resistance cells and in potential resistance areas.

4. Be prepared to covertly provide limited personnel and logistic support to any significant internal resistance group or uprising.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION:

To undertake the above-listed tasks, CIA would be required to develop the following program:

A. Intelligence (FI):

The past build-up of intelligence assets must be intensified and expanded. No additional policy approvals are needed. The following types of actions will be maximized:

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1. Spotting/recruiting/training of legally established Cubans in Cuba or in Cuban government posts abroad. Establishment and maintenance of reliable, secure communications will become more critical as police state controls increase.

2. Spotting/recruiting/training of third country nationals resident in Cuba.

3. Spotting/recruiting/training of legal travelers who have potential access to significant information.

4. Expansion of communications intelligence particularly in the G-2, police, and militia nets. (This is primarily an NSA problem.)

B. Psychological Warfare (CA):

The program must primarily concentrate on and reach the Cuban population; however, under this plan the expense of establishing and operating a medium wave broadcasting facility by CIA is not considered justified.

The following psychological warfare activities are considered essential:

1. A propaganda balloon launching capability and appropriate policy authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching operations.

2. Continuation and expansion of the "Voice of Cuba" submarine broadcasting operations in collaboration with the Navy.

3. Continue and expand the present propaganda operations infiltrating material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travelers, or couriers.

4. Continue propaganda activities utilizing political, professional, cultural, student, and other groups which have a potential for getting their message to their counterparts inside of Cuba.

C. Paramilitary:

The program will be basically for the development of controlled intelligence sources and small resistance cells for use in the event of any significant uprising. Experience plus continuity

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tightening security controls has demonstrated the difficulty of infiltrating and maintaining individuals or "black teams" in the target country for longer than a brief period. Nor has any method been devised by which infiltrators can become "legalized." Therefore, the PFI program must increasingly emphasize infiltrations, spotting, recruiting, and training legal residents, caching and exfiltration of the original infiltrators. To accomplish the required tasks, the following program and support are considered essential:

1. Urban Cells - Singleton or two-man teams equipped with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the major Cuban cities to recruit and train small "legal" compartmented intelligence and/or resistance cells. Upon the completion of training, the infiltrated team will be withdrawn if its continued presence jeopardizes the "legal" residents. Primarily, these cells will be intelligence producers. A second mission would be to establish small caches of arms and supplies for use in the event of a major uprising. It is estimated that within a year six to eight urban cells could be established. For planning purposes, at least 25% of these will be lost due to enemy counteraction or to other causes. Spotting, recruiting, and training of the infiltrators can be accomplished within Agency facilities and existing policy approvals.

2. Rural Cells - Three- to five-man teams equipped with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the rural areas to recruit, train, and arm small "legal" compartmented cells. The infiltrated trainers will be withdrawn if they pose a threat to the security of the resident rural cell. These resident rural cells would have limited intelligence functions until called into action in the event of an uprising. It is estimated that six to eight could be in place within a year. Forces lost due to attrition are estimated at 25%. Selection and training of the infiltration teams can be accomplished by Agency facilities.

3. Infiltration/Exfiltration -

The increased Cuban defensive capabilities require freedom to utilize infiltration/exfiltration facilities as follows:

- a. CIA commercial/private maritime capability.
- b. Submarines.

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c. Limited number of aerial overflights by CIA planes with U. S. or other contract crews.

Additional policy approval is required.

V. SUPPORT REQUIRED FROM OTHER AGENCIES:

A. From Department of Defense

1. Naval Support:

a. Submarine infiltration/exfiltration missions. Estimate maximum two per month first three months increasing to four per month by January 1963.

b. Submarine radio broadcasts - "Voice of Free Cuba"

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Limited numbers of qualified personnel may be required to provide specialized instruction in CIA training programs, specialized support in connection with the CIA maritime program, and to provide communications support.

VI. POLICY APPROVALS REQUIRED:

The following policy approvals are required to implement the foregoing program:

A. Authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching.

B. Authority to use U. S. Navy submarines for infiltration/exfiltration.

C. Authority to overfly Cuba for re-supply/infiltration/exfiltration missions using CIA aircraft with U. S. or other contract crews.

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D. Authority to conduct limited and selected sabotage against major Cuban industries and public utilities, i.e., refineries, power plants, transportation, and communications.

VII. ESTIMATED COST TO CIA:

A. The estimated total number of CIA personnel assigned full time would be 500.

B. Estimated Budget:

Fiscal Year 63 - \$25,000,000

Fiscal Year 64 - \$25,000,000

Experiences in implementing this operational plan during the next year may permit us to scale down the estimated budget and personnel commitment, but this is by no means certain.

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July 19, 1962

I - What we hoped to accomplish in Phase I

A - Increase U.S. intelligence with respect to Cuba and Cuban activities in the Hemisphere.

B - Undertake as many political, economic, psychological and other actions as feasible, designed to weaken the Castro regime and isolate it from the rest of the Hemisphere.

II - What was accomplished in Phase I:

A - With reference to A above, the following were accomplished:

1. An increased number of reports from friendly embassies in Habana and improved mechanism for distribution of these reports to agencies concerned.
2. Greater vigilance on the part of our embassies and improved reporting on Cuban activities throughout the world.
3. Regular de-briefing of U.S. and foreign newsmen as well as foreign diplomats who have visited or are posted in Cuba.
4. An improved program of acquisition of Cuban newspapers and other publications.
5. Provision of a list of U.S. citizens now in the U.S. who have lived in Cuba, as possible sources of intelligence information.
6. Publication and dissemination of several intelligence reports covering Cuba (as well as contributions to USIB reports).

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B - With respect to B above, the following were accomplished:

1. Political

- a. As a result of the major U.S. effort at the Punta del Este meeting, Cuba was excluded from the OAS, and two Special Committees were established to deal with Cuban-Communist subversion. (For the actions taken to implement the Punta del Este decisions, please see Annex #1).
- b. Fifteen American republics no longer maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba.
- c. Overwhelming defeat in the UN of Cuban sponsored resolutions charging U.S. with planning an invasion of Cuba.
- d. As a result of efforts by the Secretary and Mr. Rostow, NATO has become more aware of U.S. concern over Cuba. No significant actions that might materially affect the situation in Cuba are expected from NATO in the near future, however, since NATO continues generally to regard Cuba as a U.S. problem.
- e. A wide variety of conversations held both by Embassy officers throughout the Hemisphere and by Departmental officers in Washington with government officials, politicians, labor, student and other groups have constituted an important factor in their greater awareness of Castro-Communist subversive techniques as well as their increasingly low opinion of Castro and Castroism. These conversations have contributed to influencing the policies

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policies of the governments concerned and stimulating a large number of anti-Castro statements throughout the Hemisphere which were then exploited for their propaganda value (for a sampling of such statements, please see Annex # 2).

- f. The President's trip to Mexico which demonstrated dramatically for the Castro regime the close relationship between the peoples and governments of the two nations.
- g. Special reference to the plight of the Cuban people by Latin American clergy during religious services.
- h. Several acts such as a symbolic work stoppage by Latin American labor groups designed to call attention to the plight of the Cuban people.
- i. Instructions to all posts emphasizing the importance of developing youth assets in the cold war struggle and urging the inclusion of student and other leaders in the exchange of persons program.
- j. Instructions to block Cuban accreditation to the ECE.
- k. Instructions to deny Cuban participation in the ILO
- l. Instructions to block Cuban entry into the proposed Latin American Free Trade Area.

2. Economic

- a. U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba.
- b. General decline of trade between the free world and Cuba. (While a variety of factors have contributed to this situation, U.S. Embassy activities in this field

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have made a substantial contribution to the decline in trade. For a list of specific actions taken, please see Annex # 3).

- c. Tightening of transshipment controls, particularly in Canada and Mexico.
- d. Extension of technical data controls to include Cuba.
- e. Extension of U.S. Customs control procedures to U.S. ports in addition to Miami for the purpose of guarding against transshipment of U.S. goods to Cuba.
- f. Application to Cuban or Cuban-chartered vessels of port security measures in force for Soviet Bloc vessels.
- g. Denial of bunking facilities at U.S. ports to vessels under Sino-Soviet Bloc charter carrying cargo between Cuba and Bloc ports.

3. Psychological

(The Department chairs a working-level inter-agency psychological warfare committee which supports the Cuba project, although it is not an organic part of the operation. The Committee coordinates the propaganda activities of the agencies involved, determines themes for exploitation and assigns operational responsibility).

The principal themes that have been emphasized are:

- a. the failures and betrayed promises of the Castro regime;
- b. the suppression of human rights, economic deterioration and social injustice in Cuba;

c. Cuba's

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- c. Cuba's domination by Communism and alignment with the Sino-Soviet Bloc;
- d. Cuban subversive attempts elsewhere in the Hemisphere;
- e. Cuba's isolation from the rest of the Hemisphere;
- f. opposition to Cuba at international conferences;
- g. activities of democratic anti-Castro groups;
- h. the Castro regime is not permanent.

The Committee has had a role in bringing about the following accomplishments:

- a. Indictment of the Prensa Latina representative in New York.
- b. Exposure of author Waldo Frank's acceptance of money from the Cuban Government.
- c. Exploitation of the poor quality of Soviet Bloc medicines in Cuba.
- d. Widely distributed pamphlet on the subversion of the University of Habana.
- e. Effective anti-Castro activity at the UNESCO-ECIA conference on education in Santiago, Chile, March 1962.
- f. Exposure of the Cuban "troika" attempt to appear pro-Western, neutralist and pro-Communist at the same time.
- g. Strained relations between Cuba and the Philippines.
- h. Dissemination of reports on Cuban attempts to subvert a peaceful solution of the Dominican problem after Trujillo's assassination.
- i. Establish

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- i. Establishment of a program under which U.S. Embassies in Latin America forward clippings from all available publications, which indicate anti-Castro attitudes.
- j. Compilation of material for magazine length article on Cuba in all languages by Readers Digest.
- k. U.S. television programs on Cuba.

III - Operational Estimates

Political and Economic

Given the present attitude toward the Cuban problem of friendly nations in the Hemisphere and elsewhere, and barring the unforeseen, the potential for accomplishing significant and effective, new, overt political and economic measures against Cuba (unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally) appears limited. In the economic field, there may arise opportunities when we might covertly engage in economic warfare with good effect. The present unavailability of funds specifically designed for economic warfare purposes would prevent us from taking advantage of such opportunities.

Attachments:

1. Annex # 1
2. Annex # 2
3. Annex # 3

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Annex # 1

Status of the Implementation of the Punta del Este Resolutions

1. Resolution II - Measures to Combat the Subversive Action of International Communism

Pursuant to this resolution the Council of the OAS elected the members to comprise the Special Consultative Committee on Security on March 21, 1962. The Committee met during the month of April and submitted its Initial General Report to the Council on April 30. To date two governments (United States and Argentina) have submitted their comments and others are expected to do so in the near future. We are developing a program looking toward a second meeting of the SCCS in the early fall.

2. Resolutions VI and VII - Exclusion of Cuba from OAS Participation

On February 14, 1962 the Council excluded the Cuban Delegate from further participation in the Council sessions. This was accomplished through a ruling of the Chair which went unchallenged, except by the Cuban. He interrupted the proceedings to make a short speech and then departed. The Cuban Delegation soon thereafter returned to Cuba.

At about the same time the Secretary General of the OAS also suspended further program benefits to Cuba provided by the General Secretariat and terminated the sending of documents and publications.

The box score on exclusion in other organs and organizations of inter-American system is as follows:

February 15, 1962 - Inter-American Defense Board

The Council of Delegates took official recognition of Resolution VII by which the Foreign Ministers specifically excluded the present Government of Cuba from the Inter-American

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Annex # 1 (con't)

Defense Board with immediate effect.

February 21, 1962 - Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences.

At a meeting of the Governing Board of the Institute the Chairman ruled that the present Government of Cuba was excluded from further participation in the Board. The ruling went unchallenged.

March 21, 1962 - Committee for Cultural Action

The Council of the OAS, acting on a report of its General Committee concerning additional measures by the COAS to implement Resolution VI, agreed that it was necessary to elect a new member to the Committee for Cultural Action replacing Cuba.

April 3, 1962 - Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission

At the fourth meeting of IANEC in Mexico City, the Chairman in the opening session noted the applicability of Resolution VI to IANEC. He was not challenged in his ruling. Cuba did not send a delegation.

April 27, 1962 - Pan American Health Organization

The Executive Committee decided not to take action on Resolution VI but to leave this to the conference to be held in August of this year. Cuba sent an observer. (The case of PAHO is complicated by the fact that the organization also serves as the Regional Office of WHO and that in this dual capacity Cuba had the right to participate by virtue of its WHO membership.

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Annex # 1 (con't)

On April 26, 1962 we distributed through the UN our reply to a Cuban note of April 19 charging that we were trying to expel Cuba from the PAHO.

June 9, 1962 - Pan American Institute of Geography and History

The Directing Council approved a resolution suspending the present Government of Cuba from further participation in the Institute. The vote was 8 to 0 with five absentions (Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile and Mexico). Two Cuban delegates came to the meeting but the Chairman succeeded in persuading them not to insist on presenting credentials. They departed the meeting before the opening session.

July 12, 1962 - Inter-American Commission of Women

At a meeting of the Executive Committee the members acknowledged the applicability of Resolution VI to the IACW. There was no dissenting opinion.

3. Resolution VIII - Suspension of Trade with Cuba.

Pursuant to this resolution the Council of the OAS has established a Special Committee (Argentina, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Panama, Peru, United States) to study "the feasibility and desirability of extending the suspension of trade with Cuba to other items (than arms), with special attention to items of strategic importance." We have prepared a program to be advanced in this Committee at a suitable opportunity.

We have consulted with the Chairman of the OAS on the desirability of extending the role of this Special Committee to include the vigilance function assigned to the Council by the MFM in paragraph 1 of Resolution II.

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Annex # 2

Examples of Anti-Castro Statements Made in the Hemisphere Since the Punte del Este Meeting

1. Costa Rica - Ex-President Figueres hailed the defeat of Castro Communism in Guatemala, Costa Rica, Venezuela and Peru. With regard to Castro he said "The day for the battle will come. Cuba awaits it."
2. Peru - Peruvian national radio broadcast that in addition to being a traitor, "Fidel Castro has turned out to be a malignant tumor spreading throughout the continent."
3. Uruguay - Montevideo newspaper charged that "the life of the accused in Cuba is at the mercy of the whims of the members of these so-called revolutionary tribunals imposed by Castro."
4. Argentina - Juan Antonio Solari, leader of the Argentine Social Democratic Party, in congratulating Betancourt publicly stated that Betancourt support by the people will win over the extreme left and Castro communist elements that have produced two bloody uprisings.
5. Brazil - Hundreds of labor leaders publicly affirmed their anti-Castro stand.
6. Colombia - The national radio called upon the peoples of America to defend against Russian imperialism and the continental expansion plans of Fidel Castro.
7. Costa Rica - The Costa Rican labor federation adopted a resolution condemning Fidel Castro.
8. Bolivia - The Bolivian University Confederation manifested its opposition to Cuban harassment of higher education.

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Annex # 2 (con't)

9. San Salvador - The general public manifested its opposition to Castro-communist led student demonstrators.
10. Paraguay - The Febrerista Party publicly expelled its strongly pro-Castro left wing.

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Annex # 3

Specific Economic Actions Taken by Foreign Governments at U.S. Request

1. Israel cancelled a \$2,000,000 transaction which involved shipping Israeli ties to a friendly African nation in exchange for Cuban sugar.
2. Israel agreed to reduce Cuban sugar imports.
3. Israel agreed to cancel a shipment of eggs to Cuba.
4. Jordan agreed to stop imports of Cuban sugar.
5. Iran gave assurances it did not intend to purchase Cuban sugar
6. Greece agreed to ban either direct or indirect imports of Cuban sugar.
7. Japan actively seeking new sources of sugar to replace Cuba. Probably will purchase 200,000 tons from India and 20,000 tons from South Africa.
8. Israel gave assurances that it does not intend selling surplus Britanmast Constellation to Cuba.

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