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GOODWIN RICHARD

OPERATION MONGOOSE

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Margaret Girdosky

(Top Secret Control Officer)

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Mr. Hurwitch-CMA

Girdosky
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The National Archives has no objection to the release of this document.

SNT 6/23/98

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G - Mr. Johnson

February 26, 1962

CMA - Mr. Hurwitch

Cuba Project

There is attached the working level draft regarding the use of U.S. military forces in support of the Cuba project. When approved, the paper would, of course, assume the form of a joint memorandum to the President from the Secretaries of State and Defense. Neither Mr. Woodward nor Mr. Goodwin have seen this as yet.

I feel that the significant area of agreement lies in paragraph 3, page 2. The disagreement shown in paragraph 2, page 2 stems from my reluctance to agree to language which is speculative or alarmist. The disagreement shown in paragraph 8, page 8 stems from my belief that reprisals by the Cuban government (even before the revolt began) would not provide politically feasible circumstances for the use of military force. Further, paragraph 8 is inconsistent with the substance of paragraph 3 a. (page 2).

A somewhat more detailed breakdown of paragraph 6, Enemy Capabilities might be useful (we have tried to keep the paper brief).

DOD has been reluctant to provide detail regarding Force Involvement. Paragraph 7 reflects as much as the DOD representative (Col. Seamens) felt at liberty to provide. I understand that military intervention would take place in several areas of Cuba simultaneously, with the preponderance of force focussed in the vicinity of (but not on) Habana.]

The DOD representative intimated by telephone today that the JCS was unhappy about the draft - apparently feeling that he had conceded too much to State's position.

ARA:CMA:RAHurwitch:efb

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