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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : PFIAB
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10012
RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : PFIAB
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD AGENDA
FOR MEETING OF MARCH 8-9, 1963 (THE BOARD MET WITH THE
PRESIDENT ON MARCH 9, 1963)
DATE : 03/08/63
PAGES : 28
SUBJECTS : AGENDA FOR MARCH 8 AND 9, 1963 MEETING
SUMMARY OF MARCH 8 AND 9, 1963 MEETING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : ~~08/14/98~~ 08/01/2024
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the
President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992

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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

MEETING OF MARCH 8 - 9, 1963 (The Board
met with the President on March 9, 1963)

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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA FOR MEETINGS OF MARCH 8 - 9, 1963

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
<u>March 8th</u>		
1.	10:00 - 10:30	The Chairman's Time
2.	10:30 - 11:00	Status Report on Implementation of Prior Board Recommendations <u>Mr. Russell Ash</u>
3.	11:00 - 12:00	Discussions with the Director of Central Intelligence <u>Mr. John McCone</u>
4.	12:00 - 12:30	Intelligence Briefing on the Current Situation in Cuba <u>Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, DDP Staff, CIA</u>
5.	12:30 - 1:30	Lunch
6.	1:30 - 2:30	Review of DCI's Comments on Board's Interim Report to the President dated December 28, 1962
7.	2:30 - End of Day	Preparation of Report to the President
<u>March 9th</u>		
8.	9:00 - 9:55	Resume Consideration of Item No. 7
9.	10:00 - 10:30 (Approx.)	Meeting with the President
10.	10:30 - END	Discussion of Future Board Business

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March 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: March 8 and 9, 1963 Meeting of the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

The Board meeting of March 8 convened at 10:00 a.m., with the following in attendance: Messrs. Killian, Baker, Clifford, Doolittle, Gray, Land, Langer, Ash and Coyne. (Mr. Pace was unable to attend the two-day meeting because of absence from the country; Mr. Murphy was unable to join the meeting until later in the day.)

As the first order of business, in executive session, the Chairman reported on a number of items including the following.

The Chairman advised that on the previous day Mr. Murphy had informed Mr. Coyne that he had received a telephone call at his offices in New York from the Director of Central Intelligence. Mr. McCone indicated to Mr. Murphy that the President had talked with him about the Board's final report on the Cuba situation dated February 4; that the President had shown Mr. McCone a copy of the report, indicating that no other distribution was being made of the report at this time. Mr. Murphy advised that Mr. McCone was quite emotional in discussing the Board's report, stating that if the Board is going to insist on submitting the report, the top five people in CIA, including Mr. McCone, would have to resign from the Agency. Mr. Murphy pointed out to Mr. McCone that the report had already been formally submitted to the President by the Board. Mr. McCone then expressed to Mr. Murphy his concern and disagreement with the references in the report to the failure of intelligence. Mr. Murphy advised Mr. McCone that in his judgment, and indeed he thought in the judgment of all of the Board members, there was in fact a failure of intelligence and it was the duty of the Board to so state in its report to the President. Mr. Murphy expressed the view that the report was really mild. Mr. McCone indicated that even in retrospect there were only about seven of the thirty-five indicators listed in the report of offensive missiles in Cuba which might be considered valid. Mr. Murphy reiterated that Mr. McCone was quite emotional in discussing the above matter, saying if the report stood it could lead to resignations from DIA as well as CIA. At this point he mentioned to Mr. McCone that he was in New York at a meeting with others and didn't like discussing this aspect on the telephone and suggested they discuss the matter further when they next met.

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Moving to another subject, the DCI said that he was concerned about the prospects of a future nuclear explosion in Communist China, and to a lesser degree he was concerned about the prospects of such a development in Israel. He thought that the prospects of these developments brings up a most serious problem from the standpoint of psychological effect upon other nations should these developments take place, although there does not seem to be anything we can do about them.

Insofar as U-2 overflights of Communist China by Chinese Nationalist pilots are concerned, these missions are being flown in "Category 3" weather (instead of Category 2 weather conditions involving a maximum of 25% cloud cover) because there is a need for frequent missions. The DCI said that although these missions have not produced evidence of a reactor in operation in Communist China, there are some indications, e.g., a test area in Tibet, and the President has been alerted to this possibility.

The DCI said that somewhat of a problem is presented in Israel. Although we are close to the Israeli government, it appears to be withholding information on the extent of its nuclear activities. As in the past France is assisting Israel and the French government is helping the Israeli government build a nuclear reactor at the present time. In a building next to the reactor there is an installation which could be a chemical separation facility, but the Israelis deny that this is the case. Moreover, the DCI pointed out, the Israelis refuse to submit to international safeguards prescribed by the international atomic energy agency. Mr. McCone stated that he believes that the development of a nuclear weapon capability by Israel would have most serious effects on countries of the Middle East and, therefore, Mr. McCone is ready to repeat recommendations which he previously made to President Eisenhower that unless Israel joins in the international safeguards we should take certain economic reprisals against Israel. Mr. McCone observed that our government permits tax deductions on Israeli bonds, and we have given Israel billions of dollars in aid. Despite this the Israelis could well be proceeding without full knowledge on our part on an atomic energy program which could trigger grave trouble in the Middle East.

Finally, Mr. McCone reported that CIA has concluded that our policy on intelligence collection within the United States is wrong and particularly as it applies to Soviet Bloc Embassies and to telephone intercept coverage as well as exploitation of official Soviet Bloc personnel in the United States. Mr. McCone stated that he was going to propose that the CIA intensify its activities on these matters or that the FBI be directed to intensify their activities in these areas. He noted that basically this is an FBI responsibility but that it is his own view that this responsibility could more properly be carried out by the CIA. Mr. Clifford inquired as to

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whether the DCI would not encounter difficulty in trying to get this function transferred from FBI to CIA, and Mr. McCone responded that he does not care who carries out the responsibility as long as it is appropriately done and he added that he believes the CIA is qualified to do it. Dr. Land observed that this activity does not belong with the FBI; that coverage of an espionage agent is one thing but that exploiting Soviet Bloc coverage for intelligence collection purposes is quite another.

Mr. McCone advised that there is another dimension to this problem which involves increasing the number of CIA intelligence representatives in Moscow. He noted that CIA has only three employees in the Moscow Embassy. He pointed out that in Washington, D. C. and New York City out of a total of 392 Soviet official representatives CIA has identified 176 as intelligence officers of the KGB and GRU, a proportion of 45%. He added that 23% of the Soviet official representatives in London are intelligence officers and in France the figure is 36%.

Before departing the meeting Mr. McCone displayed to the Board a photograph demonstrating the success of the latest infrared photography taken of terrain from an altitude of 3500 feet.

Dr. Killian asked the DCI if the Board could have a copy of the new draft NRO agreement, and in response to this the DCI made a copy of the draft available later on in the day. Before Mr. McCone left the meeting he suggested that if the Board had any questions regarding the terms of the draft NRO agreement it would be appropriate to raise them with the Secretary of Defense or Mr. Gilpatric or Mr. McCone himself, rather than raising such questions at working levels at the Defense Department or the CIA. The DCI said that he did not want to inhibit in any way the discussions that the Board might want to have at any level at any time, and he noted that Dr. Land was to confer with Secretary Gilpatric the following day. (Dr. Land assured the DCI that the scheduled meeting was to be confined strictly to a technical discussion.)

This concluded the DCI's meeting with the Board and he and Mr. Kirkpatrick departed the meeting at 12:30 p.m.

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At 12:30 p.m., Mr. Arthur Lundahl of the NPIC, and Mr. William Tidwell joined the Board meeting. (Before beginning their presentations, Mr. Lundahl answered a question from a Board member by stating that the NPIC moved into its new quarters at the Naval Gun Factory on January 1, 1963, and it occupies the entire facility except for the occupancy of a part of one floor by the U. S. Geological Survey.) Mr. Tidwell proceeded to give the Board a briefing on the internal situation in Cuba. In essence Mr. Tidwell said that Cuba is a good example of Latin American Communism in action. The Castro regime has established very good security, but the internal political situation is considerably messed up in a controversy between the Castroites and the old-line members of the Communist Party of Cuba.

The sugar crop in Cuba is off one-third this year. The country will have a hard time economically next year and the Soviets will have to provide further substantial aid. Although the rationing program is difficult to enforce in Cuba, the people have by no means reached a starvation level. Bloc shipping carries most of the imports into the island, and non-Bloc shipping is negligible.

Because of the efficiency of the Castro internal security program, any significant organized revolt efforts have been prevented. Fifty per cent of the refugees who were interrogated during January thought that as of last summer there was a good chance of a successful revolution against Castro. After the Soviets reached a peak of introducing personnel and armaments in July, only five per cent thought that a revolt could succeed. When the Russians subsequently withdrew strategic missiles from Cuba fifteen per cent of the refugees thought that a revolt might succeed.

Some 1500 students from other Latin American countries have been given guerilla warfare training in Cuba. Castro's radio propaganda is urging other Latin American countries to follow the Cuban example. In answer to a question by Dr. Killian, Mr. Tidwell said that the Cubans are jamming U. S. radio broadcasts beamed at Latin America, but Mr. Tidwell had no information to indicate that our Government was jamming the Cuban broadcast activity. Mr. Tidwell then summarized information on the Cuban and Soviet orders of battle, along the lines of information contained in Current Intelligence Bulletins.

Dr. Baker raised a rhetorical question as to whether the Soviets were not in fact establishing in Cuba a command-and-control post for use in the event of a military offensive against the Western Hemisphere, and Dr. Baker asked if it were not true that never before

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March 14, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

Subject: Board Meeting with the President, March 9, 1963

At 10:00 A.M., on March 9, 1963, the Board met with the President in the Cabinet Room of the White House for the purpose of presenting the Board's report and recommendations growing out of its completed review of the foreign intelligence aspects of the Soviet military build-up in Cuba. Those present were Messrs. Killian, Doolittle, Land, Langer, Gray, Clifford, Baker, Murphy, and Messrs. Coyne and Ash. Mr. McGeorge Bundy was also present.

Dr. Killian informed the President that the Board had recommendations to present based on the Cuba episode. He recalled to the President that the Board had submitted two previous reports, one - an interim report dated December 28, 1962, containing recommendations of such urgency that the Board forwarded them prior to completing its review of Cuba; and a more comprehensive report dated February 4, 1963, in which the Board set forth its complete findings based on a detailed investigation of the Cuba situation from the standpoint of foreign intelligence coverage. Dr. Killian said that the recommendations which the Board was now presenting should be considered in the light of the two previous reports, particularly the report dated February 4, 1963.

Dr. Killian then presented the Board's recommendations, reading from the written report which was forwarded to the President under date of March 8, 1963. In reading this report to the President, Dr. Killian directed attention to the fact that most of the recommendations which were being presented were an outgrowth of the Board's study of Cuba, but that two of the recommendations dealt with major problems affecting the over-all foreign intelligence effort.

Dr. Killian stated Recommendations 1 through 4 of the March 8, 1963 report.

Following Dr. Killian's statement of Recommendation 4 regarding low-level aerial surveillance flights over Cuba, the President observed that such flights had not been suspended but were being reserved for coverage of particularly critical intelligence targets should the situation warrant, as, for example, the February 9, 1963 low-level mission. Mr. Bundy

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commented that two or three important targets in Cuba have been identified since the February 9 low-level mission, but the approval of low-level coverage of these new targets is being held in abeyance pending the completion of efforts by Attorney Donovan to obtain the release of some twenty Americans held prisoner in Cuba, including three individuals whom the United States is particularly desirous of returning to this country. The President asked for elaboration on the Board's recommendation for the development of long focal length cameras to be used in U-2 aircraft. Dr. Land explained that some time ago an effort was made to develop such a camera but the earlier version was not a success, and the development efforts were suspended because there was not an immediate need for a camera having this particular capability, although at the present time such a camera would be most useful in covering such Cuban targets as caves and other installations suspected of being used for concealment of materials and equipment. Dr. Land thought that the cost of developing a long focal length camera would be relatively inexpensive in comparison to the cost of such projects as DISCOVERER.

Dr. Killian then presented Recommendations 5 through 7 of the March 8 report.

When Dr. Killian stated Recommendation 8 concerning proposals for and the monitoring of unique intelligence operations, Mr. Bundy made the comment that the Special Group fully agrees with this recommendation and has instituted procedures designed to assure that the Special Group is informed regarding operational delays encountered in the course of carrying out surveillance missions previously approved by the Special Group.

Dr. Killian then stated Recommendation 11 of the Board's report dated March 8.

In connection with Dr. Killian's statement of Recommendation 12 on the need for improving national intelligence estimates, Mr. Bundy reiterated the point which the Board had made to the effect that the present system for producing national intelligence estimates is being run by the originators of the system, and the present mechanism for producing such estimates is a "founders' body." Dr. Langer said it is true that the estimative group has a highly trained staff which has been in existence for many years, but the Board has not yet conducted a specific study of its operations. Dr. Killian summarized the tenor of this recommendation of the Board by saying that a monolithic point of view is not necessarily the best estimate.

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Turning next to two recommendations of a general nature, Dr. Killian stated Recommendations 13 and 14 of the March 8 report dealing with the subjects of scientific intelligence resources and the effective organization and management of the National Reconnaissance Office.

Following Dr. Killian's presentation, the President expressed his appreciation for the Board's efforts and said that he would follow through on the recommendations which had been made.

Referring to the thirty-five intelligence reports containing indicator-type data which were dealt with in the Board's February 4 report, the President observed that these indications were "pretty thin." The President observed that first there was the Berlin Wall incident and then the Cuba development, and in retrospect the President found it extraordinary that our Government had not obtained more advance information with respect to those situations.

The President said that we should have accomplished a penetration of the Castro regime at a relatively high level in the Cuban Government.

Dr. Land stated that he and Dr. Langer had been engaged in recent discussions of Dr. Land's concern about the manner in which our national intelligence estimates are produced. Dr. Land thought that, under the present system, it seemed that no meaning could be derived from particular facts or information unless the information could be fitted into patterns which the estimators already had in mind. The Board is therefore suggesting, Dr. Land said, that the CIA see if there is not a need for trained professionals who are not only open-minded, but whose careers are devoted to fitting intelligence information into all possible patterns. In the Cuba situation, Dr. Land pointed out, there was a fixed pattern in the minds of estimators to the effect that refugee reports concerning offensive missiles were in reality reports concerning surface-to-air missiles and installations. Dr. Land said that the Board was not proposing a policy under which the President would review raw intelligence reports, but the Board felt that the estimators should form the various alternative patterns which can be reliably derived from an analysis of intelligence, in order that policy makers may have the benefit of such alternatives. Dr. Langer said that on the other hand the estimators have to act on rationality and cannot assume that the enemy is acting on an irrational basis.

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The President said that looking back on the Cuba situation it is now apparent that the SAM sites were related to the deployment of offensive missiles. The President observed that there has not been made, to his knowledge, an analysis of the assumption under which the Soviets operated in Cuba, and it would be of some academic interest, at least, to know why the Soviets did not use their SA-2's against our over-flight operations. Dr. Land observed that if the Soviet camouflage teams in Cuba had been up to schedule along with the Soviet schedule for deployment of offensive missiles, we would not have found the missiles, and it was by the grace of God that we did find them.

Mr. Clifford, referring to earlier references to the need for clandestine agent penetration of Cuba, said that the Board had concluded that the absence of clandestine coverage is attributable to a lack of imagination on the part of our intelligence elements over a long period of years during which we enjoyed close relations with the Cuban Government. Therefore, Mr. Clifford said, the Board is concerned about the adequacy of such coverage at the present time in places like Brazil and Argentina. Mr. Murphy observed that originally the CIA set out to use U. S. diplomatic establishments as a cover for CIA intelligence operations only for an initial period, but these cover arrangements became permanent. Mr. Murphy noted that in discussion with the Board the Director of Central Intelligence has said that it is difficult to achieve deep cover for clandestine agent operations, and while Mr. Murphy agrees that this task is of course difficult, he has seen no evidence that concerted efforts have been made, for example, to penetrate the Castro regime. Mr. Clifford recalled that on the preceding day Mr. McCone had directed the Board's attention to the fact that whereas the CIA has three operatives in Moscow, the Soviet Union has 153 intelligence officers in the United States. Dr. Killian informed the President that the Board lays great stress on the need for a real effort to increase our clandestine agent operations.

Referring again to the reports and findings of the Board, the President said that one problem is reflected in the instance where the Secretary of State had recommended that a particular U-2 surveillance mission over Cuba be broken up into four over-flight missions. The President said he was not suggesting that this was not a prudent suggestion by the Secretary of State, but that this made him conscious of the fact that there is perhaps a lack of expertise on the part of policy makers with respect to certain intelligence operations. The President commented that one flight was flown over an area where the aircraft could well have been shot down.

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The President then referred to the fact that Dr. Killian was retiring as Chairman of the Board in May. The President expressed deep appreciation for the work which Dr. Killian has done and the valuable contribution which Dr. Killian has made to the country. The President recalled that the Board has conducted three post-mortems on intelligence situations, and that these efforts of the Board have been most useful, particularly in the case of Cuba. The President added that he wished to express his appreciation for the effective manner in which the Board has carried out its duties in the past. He stated that the Board's contribution has been most valuable. In addition to its being valuable to the President, the Board has also contributed in an important way through the awareness which it has created in the intelligence community of its continuing operations and continuing review of intelligence activities. The President said that he was very much indebted to all of the Board members and is hopeful that the Board will continue its present operations for he considered them to be invaluable.

Dr. Killian expressed his gratitude for the President's comments, and then said that, as a footnote to the Board's present report, the members wished to say to the President that he has a right to expect high quality performance on the part of the intelligence community, and the Board suggests that the President see fit to emphasize to the intelligence community the necessity for producing adequate information.

The President then referred to current criticisms and inquiries which have been received from various quarters concerning the role of the Government in the Bay of Pigs invasion, and the President wondered whether the Board felt that the Administration should be more responsive to such criticisms and inquiries. Mr. Murphy commented that we would be well advised to follow the practice of Prime Minister Macmillan who responds to such criticism and inquiries with a statement to the effect that we do not discuss our intelligence activities in public.

Dr. Killian assured the President that members of the Board feel that to the greatest extent possible the Administration should refrain from making intelligence disclosures with respect to the Bay of Pigs incident. Mr. Clifford thought that the situation had been summed up humorously and accurately in a recent statement by Congressman Mahon who questioned whether the real problem was a lack of intelligence information or, on the other hand, a lack of intelligence on the part of self-appointed critics. The President stated that he too was impressed with Congressman Mahon's statement and, in fact, after the statement appeared in the press, he called Congressman Mahon and commended him on its content.

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