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MINUTES
OF
BOARD
MEETING
OF
JUNE 4,
1964

206-10001-10013

Bd. Minutes
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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENDA FOR MEETING OF JUNE 4, 1964

Mr. Baker 9:30
Mr. Lamb 10:00

Gen. Doolittle
about 10:00

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
1.	9:00 - 9:30	Chairman's Time
2.	9:30 - 9:45	<u>National Reconnaissance Program - Status Report</u> Mr. Coyne
3.	9:45 - 10:00	<u>Audio Penetrations of U.S. Embassy, Moscow</u> Dr. Baker and Mr. Coyne
4.	10:00 - 10:15	Executive Session
5.	10:15 - 11:00 <i>10:30 - 12:00</i>	<u>USIB Actions Related to Audio Penetrations-- Moscow</u> Mr. Robert Bannerman Chairman, Security Committee, USIB Mr. G. Marvin Gentile Director of Security, Department of State
6.	11:00 - 11:45 <i>10:30 - 12:00</i>	<u>Assessment of Potential Damage to Cryptographic Systems Caused by Audio Penetrations--Moscow</u> Lt. General Gordon Blake Director, National Security Agency Dr. Louis Tordella Deputy Director, National Security Agency
7.	11:45 - 12:00 <i>12:00 - 12:15</i>	Executive Session
8.	12:00 - 1:00	Lunch - The White House Mess
9.	1:00 - 2:00 <i>2:15</i>	Current Intelligence Briefing on: a. Chi-Com Capabilities and Intentions as related to Southeast Asia, India and USSR b. The Situations in South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam c. The Cyprus Situation d. The Cuba Situation

Mr. Ray Cline R. Jack Smith
Deputy Director of Intelligence, CIA
with Mr. Clinton B. Conger

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AGENDA FOR JUNE 4, 1964 (Continued):

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
10.	2:00 - 2:45 <i>2:15</i>	Status Report on Military (peripheral and overflight) Reconnaissance Programs (other than satellite) <u>Colonel Ralph D. Steakley, USAF</u> Director, Joint Reconnaissance Center, Pentagon <i>S. A. M. S. Coyle</i>
11.	2:45 - 3:00	Executive Session
12.	8:00 - 3:30 <i>8:45</i>	On-the-Scene Review at Moscow Embassy of State Department's Counter-audiosurveillance Measures to Safeguard U. S. Classified Systems and Information <u>Dr. Jerome Wiesner</u> <i>with S. Keeney</i> M.I.T. (White House Consultant and former Science Advisor to the President)
13.	3:30 - 4:00	Status Report on the Implementation of Prior Board Recommendations <u>Mr. Ash</u>
14.	4:00 - 5:30 <i>6:30</i>	Discussions with the Director of Central Intelligence <u>Mr. John A. McCone</u> <i>with Mr. Kirkpatrick</i>
15.	5:30 - 6:30	Executive Session <i>Diamond Fitzgerald & Robert Myers</i>
16.	6:30 - 8:00	Dinner - Metropolitan Club
17.	8:00 - End of Day <i>8:45</i> <i>9:30</i>	a) Discussion of peripheral and overflight reconnaissance b) Discussion of audio problem c) Consideration of up-dated requirements for Annual Reports to the Board by State, Defense, CIA, and the DCI.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

This document consists of 19 pages
No. 1 of 2 Copies, Series a

June 17, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Meeting,
June 4, 1964.

This regularly scheduled meeting of the Board convened at 9:00 a.m., June 4, 1964, in the Board offices, 297 Executive Office Building. Previously scheduled as a 2-day meeting, it was compressed into one day in order to accommodate other commitments and to permit the holding of Board Panel sessions on the following day. Present were Chairman Clifford and Messrs. Pace, Murphy, Langer and Gray; and J. Patrick Coyne and A. R. Ash. General Doolittle was unable to attend because of transportation difficulties in Alaska. Messrs. Baker and Land were unavoidably late in arriving, and upon their arrival later in the morning received a fill-in from the Chairman concerning the matters which had been discussed up to that point.

Chairman Clifford pointed out that the business of this meeting was confined to major subjects of particular importance: (1) recent developments following the submission to the President of the Board's May 2 report and recommendations on the National Reconnaissance Program (2) the recent discovery of extensive microphone installations in the U. S. Embassy, Moscow -- a most serious penetration which had prompted the Chairman to request a Board Panel study immediately upon his learning of the discovery, and (3) the subject of acquiring intelligence on Communist China, a problem highlighted by remarks of the Secretary of Defense when he was recently visited by Chairman Clifford, Dr. Baker and Mr. Coyne -- at which time Secretary McNamara expressed deep concern over the absence of meaningful intelligence on Chinese capabilities, intentions and activities (Mr. McNamara said that the USIB is not adequate for his purposes in this regard; he has to make decisions without the benefit of adequate intelligence support; if he can't get help from the USIB and CIA he will attempt to get the required intelligence through other sources; and he would welcome any assistance the Board might provide as a means of resolving this intelligence collection problem.)

With reference to the Board's report on the National Reconnaissance Program, Mr. Clifford said that it had gone to the White House on May 2. Thereafter two appointments with the President had to be cancelled, thereby preventing discussion of the report with the President. Accordingly, Mr. Clifford suggested to Mr. McGeorge Bundy that the matter was urgent. The same day, Mr. Bundy took up the report with the President, with the resulting decision that Mr. Bundy would obtain the views and comments of the Secretary of Defense and of the DCI, Mr. McCone, concerning the Board's report and recommendations, in order that further consideration might be given by the President.

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At Mr. Clifford's request, Mr. Coyne summarized the comments which had been submitted on the NRP report by the two officials in response to Mr. Bundy's memorandum. The June 2, 1964, response from Deputy Secretary Vance expressed concurrence of the Department of Defense in the report and its readiness to carry out the recommendations when instructed to do so. However, in his May 28 memorandum to Mr. Bundy, the DCI reported that he found it difficult to distill his thoughts in time for a written expression of views for immediate consideration; that he would be able to discuss the matter orally with the Board at this meeting; that his written views could be submitted by June 15; and that meanwhile he intended to discuss with the Director, NRO, any management problems the latter might have in mind.

Chairman Clifford thought it gratifying that the Defense Department had accepted the Board's NRP report and recommendations in toto, and he referred to informally received indications that the Department of Defense is anxious to get on with the actions proposed in the Board's report. Noting that the preliminary reply from the DCI was noncommittal, Mr. Clifford thought it best that the Board not engage in a discussion of the NRP report with the DCI when he joined the Board meeting later in the day. Mr. Clifford observed that the Board had studied the subject in depth; it had reached conclusions and made recommendations to the President; Mr. Bundy had asked for comments to the President by Messrs. McNamara and McCone; and it was desirable to keep the matter in that channel, rather than reopening discussions with the DCI at this Board meeting.

(Dr. Baker arrived at the Board meeting at this point.)

At the Chairman's request, Mr. Coyne summarized for the Board the reported successes and failures of satellite reconnaissance photographic missions since January 1, 1964 (4 successful missions; 3 failures) and the NRO mission schedule for the remainder of the year. (He also referred to the NRO report that OXCART has been flown at Mach 3.2 at 81,700 feet.)

Chairman Clifford noted that the manner in which the NRO reports on its satellite missions leaves much to be desired. He felt that the Board should ask for more meaningful reports from NRO, reflecting the number of missions scheduled, the number that were launched, how many succeeded, and how many failed and why. Also Mr. Clifford thought that the Board should be fully informed on how the USIB determines that the NRO has a capability to meet specified intelligence requirements through the launching of "X" number of missions over a given future period, e.g., "two flights per month".

Dr. Baker added that no one has efficiently organized the process of analyzing the photographic take from satellite missions, for the purpose of identifying intelligence targets which warrant further "point search" on future missions.

Turning to the matter of the technical penetration of the U. S. Embassy, Moscow, Mr. Clifford recalled that he had asked the Board's Baker Panel and Mr. Coyne to go into the subject immediately upon Mr. Clifford's learning of the discovery of the first of the 41 microphones on April 23. He noted that Mr. Bundy had asked Dr. Jerome Wiesner to make an on-the-scene assessment of the penetration during Dr. Wiesner's visit to Moscow this past week on other

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business, and he would join the Board meeting later in the day to report on that assessment. Also, Mr. Clifford noted, the Board meeting would later be joined by Dr. Tordella of NSA, Mr. Bannerman of CIA who chairs the USIB Security Committee, and Mr. Gentile who serves as Director of Security in the State Department.

Mr. Coyne summarized for Board members the highlights of the discovery of the technical penetration of the Embassy in Moscow, with indications that the 41 microphones, the 3 coaxial cables, the wiring, and the fixed antenna in the wall, have all been in place since 1952 when the Soviet Union completed construction on the Embassy building in preparation for U. S. occupancy which took place in 1953.

(Dr. Land arrived at the Board meeting at this point.)

Mr. Coyne drew attention to the fact that the microphone installations included coverage of the Embassy code room. He referred in this connection to the NSA damage evaluation dealt with in Tab C of the June 1 "Preliminary Damage Assessment" which had just been received from the USIB Security Committee. Mr. Coyne thought it regrettable that the State Department security people in Moscow had cut the cables upon discovery of the microphone and related installations. Mr. Clifford agreed, recalling that when he first learned of the development from Mr. Coyne he urged that efforts be made to keep the discovered items in place for the time being. Mr. Coyne said that this was urged on the State Department but certain State Department officials thought the Board was getting into operations, and a cable went out to Ambassador Kohler instructing him to proceed and to lodge a protest with the Soviet government.

Mr. Coyne called Board members' attention to the summary of U. S. Ambassadors' assessments (appearing in the USIB's Security Committee report) which discounted the likelihood of damage to the U. S. from the technical penetration of the Embassy.

Mr. Coyne pointed to the 1962 report of the Soviet defector who informed CIA (which in turn informed the State Department) that the Embassy in Moscow was bugged at various strategic locations. Mr. Coyne said that he had recently asked State Department representatives what had been done on the basis of the defector's 1962 report, and it appeared that no action had been taken by State Department security technicians -- until recent digging operations were begun following receipt of a report from a second Soviet defector early in 1964 that microphones were in place in specific Embassy office locations. Mr. Coyne also related the substance of his inquiries made of the State Department Chief of Communications (Mr. Coffey) in the summer of 1963 when Khrushchev boasted to Governor Harriman that he could produce a copy of a message which Ambassador Kohler had sent to Washington regarding the U. S. position on Soviet pipe-line negotiations with West Germany (Mr. Coffey's finding was to the effect that no communications penetration could in fact be established).

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Chairman Clifford expressed the view that there appeared to have been raised in this discussion a fundamental question to which the Board might well give its attention -- i.e., the overall attitude of the U. S. Government toward counterintelligence, intelligence and the security of intelligence matters. In this instance the Board had raised an important point in urging that the penetration cables not be cut precipitously when discovered in the Embassy, but the Board's urging was ignored. Mr. Clifford thought it appropriate to determine just what forum does have cognizance in such important developments as this one, i. e., whether the USIB, or the Special 5412 Group, or other group, has cognizance in these matters. Mr. Coyne read from NSC 5618 the policy requirement that upon the discovery of listening devices, U. S. agencies are required to obtain high level determinations as to whether the devices should be left in place for purposes of exploitation against the foreign intelligence service involved.

Mr. Gray expressed concern about the possibility that the Moscow penetration enabled the Soviets to learn what the U. S. was doing and about to do with regard to Cuba in the Fall of 1962.

In answer to the Chairman's inquiry, Mr. Coyne reported that U. S. security technicians do not today have a device capable of detecting a shielded cable microphone imbedded 7 inches in the wall, as in the case of the 41 microphones found in the U. S. Embassy, Moscow.

At 10:30 a.m. the Board meeting was joined by Mr. Bannerman of CIA (Chairman of the USIB Security Committee); Dr. Tordella, Deputy Director of NSA; and Mr. Marvin Gentile, since March 1964, Director of the Office of Security, U. S. Department of State. Mr. Clifford indicated the Board's interest in being fully informed on the facts relating to the recent discovery of the penetration in Moscow; the effectiveness of detection methods used at the Embassy previously and those available at present; and the information which led to the recent discoveries. Mr. Bannerman said that he could speak to the assessment of damage, leaving to Mr. Gentile the discussion of the history and effectiveness of tests to detect the presence of listening devices.

Referring to the USIB Security Committee's June 1 "Preliminary Damage Assessment", Mr. Bannerman explained that Army, Navy and Air Force had conducted interviews of personnel formerly assigned to the Embassy (now scattered) but the inquiries were along the line of possible compromise of military attache type of information, exclusive of the compromise of communications. On the other hand, State Department interviews of personnel previously assigned at the Embassy were made on the assumption that the Soviets had access to conversations and to communications as well. (Army, Navy and Air Force are still in the process of reviewing their old traffic in an effort to see whether their communications were compromised.) Mr. Bannerman pointed to the State Department conclusion that no damage to U. S. foreign policy can be detected as a result of the bugging of our Embassy in Moscow. Mr. Bannerman pointed to the conclusion in the USIB assessment to the effect that the Soviets did get information on operations, and on military attache movements, and on the intelligence targets in which they were interested. He pointed out that the agencies report that important decisions were not discussed aloud, but in whispers or in the form of written notes.

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(Chairman Clifford thought it remarkable that such precautions would have been consistently maintained over such a long period of 11 years.)

In answer to Mr. Coyne's inquiry, Mr. Bannerman said that the Security Committee's preliminary assessment had been "noted" by the USIB and USIB had approved the recommendations, with the request that the Security Committee complete a final assessment.

Mr. Bannerman said that it is most difficult to attempt to assess the damage to U. S. interests resulting from the Moscow penetration. First is the task of identifying information to which the Soviets may have obtained access. The next task is to try and find instances in which Soviet reaction provides evidence that a compromise of information was effected. Moreover, since this was a Soviet intelligence operation, the information obtained by the intelligence operators would not be passed on to Soviet political desks or to Soviet bloc allies without attributing to some source other than the technical penetration. Dr. Langer thought that, nevertheless, all such information obtained by technical penetration of the U. S. Embassy would be reviewed and utilized where possible by the Soviet government. Mr. Bannerman acknowledged that this would be the case, but he emphasized the difficulty in observing and identifying Soviet reactions and actions as being based on compromised U. S. information or communications. Dr. Land expressed the view that it is dangerous to assume that our information was not compromised because we cannot observe specific Soviet reactions to such information. Dr. Baker wondered whether the assessment of the 3 U. S. Ambassadors that no damage was done is in essence a finding that intelligence is worthless, is not needed, or is not used when it is obtained.

Chairman Clifford asked whether it is possible to relate compromised U. S. information to Soviet actions with respect to Cuba. Mr. Bannerman referred to the USIB Security Committee assessment on that point. Mr. Gentile pointed out that by 1962 an acoustically shielded conference room and an electronically shielded code room had been installed in the Embassy, and in addition the practice has always been followed of writing out sensitive information. Mr. Gray thought that the State Department assessment referred to in the Conclusions of the USIB Security Committee report should be amended by adding to the effect that "or, if the information was compromised, it was used by the Soviets with such skill as to conceal whether in fact the information was compromised".

Mr. Pace wondered whether information obtained by the Soviets through this technical penetration of our Embassy might not have resulted in the Soviet identification of any defectors serving as intelligence agents for the U. S. Mr. Bannerman said that this is a possibility in the Penkovsky case, and CIA is awaiting the assessment reports of other agencies in order to study this possibility further.

Mr. Pace asked whether the USIB, in accepting other agencies' own assessments of whether their information had been compromised, was not in effect accepting self-serving statements rather than performing an abstract assessment. Mr. Bannerman said that each agency is considered to have the greatest competence in assessing the extent of any compromise of its own information.

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Mr. Gentile informed the Board that the Embassy in Moscow was first designed and built as an apartment house. Then in 1952 it was made available to the U. S. for lease and occupancy as an Embassy building and apartment living quarters. The U. S. accepted the building, and in 1952 the Soviets added three top floors for use as Embassy offices. During the construction period no U. S. technical inspections were possible because access to the construction work was limited to cursory inspections. For a period of 3 weeks in March 1953 no Americans were given access to the building, and the construction area on the top three floors was covered by plywood screens said to have been put up to hasten the drying of plaster. The U. S. occupied the Embassy on May 1, 1953, under the lease. Since that time there have been 27 inspections in an effort to locate listening devices. Plaster was chipped in spots, floors were taken up in some locations, and various searches made short of tearing rooms apart -- all without locating any devices. Meanwhile, over the years Embassy personnel have been briefed and cautioned on the assumption that the Embassy was penetrated by listening devices.

On June 20, 1962, Mr. Gentile continued, his predecessors in the State Department Office of Security received from CIA the Soviet defector's 1962 report that the Embassy was bugged. This was made known to the State Department resident security technician who went to Moscow 3 months later. There is nothing in the files to indicate if any instructions went out or any action taken on the basis of the 1962 defector report. There is no indication that the Ambassador was informed.

In February 1964 the State Department resident security technician in the Moscow Embassy returned to Washington and there was discussed the question of the possible total destruction of an Embassy room in an effort to find listening devices. In March 1964 the State Department Security people received the report given by the second Soviet defector, pinpointing locations of concealed microphones. Accordingly, the destruction of one room was authorized by the Department of State Security Office (Room 10008 on the top floor) and on April 23, 1964, the first of the 41 microphones was uncovered.

Mr. Coyne asked about the cutting of the cables. Mr. Gentile said that this occurred two days after the discovery of the first microphone on April 23. The decision was made in the Security Office of State, ^{and} by the chief technician in Moscow. Mr. Clifford asked whether it had occurred to responsible officials to consider the possibility of exploiting the microphones found. Mr. Gentile said that in the first place it was assumed that the Soviets had spotted the technical men who were sent in by State Department, and that the noise of the jackhammer and other digging operations had alerted the Soviets that the discoveries had been made. Moreover, the microphones discovered were not considered unique finds requiring any unique technical study. Moreover, as part of standing operations procedure, State notified the CIA and other interested agencies immediately on making the first find, although this notification was not made at the Secretary level. It was decided that exploitation was not feasible.

The decision to cut the cables, however, was made by State Department, Mr. Gentile said. In answer to Mr. Murphy's question he said that State Department desk officers and the Ambassadors were told, but their judgments were not sought as to the matter of cutting the cables.

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Mr. Bannerman stated that the prescribed procedure was followed on the question of possible exploitation. State Department people discussed this with counterintelligence officers in CIA (including Mr. Angelton) and it was decided that no exploitation was possible because the Soviets had undoubtedly learned of the discovery of the microphones uncovered by extensive and noisy digging operations.

Mr. Gentile said that much remains to be done, including (1) a complete technical assessment of the fidelity of the Soviet devices (2) completion of the examination of the North Wing of the Embassy, and (3) the initiation of a search of the South Wing.

Mr. Bannerman observed that a key factor is the tremendous disadvantage to the U. S. resulting from Soviet control of the construction of buildings to be occupied by U. S. personnel.

As for the level of Soviet capability evidenced by the quality and kind of microphones discovered, Dr. Tordella said that they are better than the ones we have for this particular kind of installation.

Dr. Tordella expressed the opinion that the Moscow installation resulted in a compromise of our encrypted communications, particularly if you accord to the Soviets the capability of the U. S., U. K., and Germans. From 1953-1959 State used the MCB code machine (identical to that used by U. S. military attaches, 1953-1954) which is vulnerable to audiosurveillance which can detect the plain text being printed by the machine. Also the MCB machine could be cryptographically reconstructed by the opposition. (In 1948 an Army code room Sergeant defected under circumstances indicating that he had photographed materials which would have given complete information on the machine.) So, from 1953-1959 we must assume the Soviets were capable of reconstructing the machine, and also of reading the plain text from which the encryptions were made. All incoming and outgoing encrypted traffic of the Embassy could have been read, as well as traffic of other Iron Curtain U. S. posts using this system. From 1959-1962 (before installation of the electronically shielded code room in the Embassy) all Confidential encyphered material was subject to audio attack. Secret traffic was vulnerable until 1961, as was Top Secret until 1960 when the use of 1-time pads was required. After December 1962 (when the electronically shielded room was installed), according to tests run by NSA, there was no compromise of Embassy traffic through audio or electromagnetic penetrations. The screen grill antenna found in the wall of the North Wing of the Embassy, with coaxial cables attached, probably served as a Soviet means of electronic intercept of emanations from the U. S. 1-time teleprinter in the Embassy (and although this effort was frustrated in October 1960 when such machines were not permitted to be used at U. S. posts behind the Iron Curtain, that rule was lifted with respect to our Embassy in the USSR when the acoustically shielded room was installed in Moscow.)

As for the microwave energy signal which has been beamed at the Embassy building at least since 1957, Dr. Tordella believes that the purpose of the signal is to harrass us.

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At 12:05 p.m. Messrs. Tordella, Bannerman and Gentile departed the Board meeting with the thanks of the Chairman for their assistance.

Following lunch, the Board resumed its meeting at 1:00 p.m. at which time Mr. R. J. Smith of CIA (Deputy to Mr. Ray Cline, Deputy LCI for Intelligence) presented a briefing of the situation in Laos, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Indonesia. (Chairman Clifford left the meeting in response to a telephone call from the President.)

Mr. Smith outlined some CIA views concerning intentions and capabilities of the Chinese Communists: (1) the Chicoms hope to see China become a center of Communist authority world-wide, setting policy even for the USSR (2) the Chicom leaders presently wish to avoid high risk actions (3) Communist China has not achieved a nuclear production capability (4) of the 15 SAM sites in China, only 4 are operational, and the others lack equipment, and (5) the Chicom Air Force is deteriorating and replacements are slow in coming. CIA believes that Communist China will encourage Hanoi to keep high level of pressure going in Laos and South Vietnam; will continue efforts to subvert Malaysia; will avoid hostilities with the U. S.; will avoid a formal breach with the USSR, preferring to erode Soviet influence around the world; and will continue to support militant elements of Communist Parties in Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia.

In answer to a question by Mr. Pace, Mr. Smith expressed the opinion that if the U. S. moved against Hanoi in the Air, the Chicoms would not react.

Mr. Smith also mentioned briefly the situations in Cuba and in India. Mr. Smith concluded his presentation and left the Board meeting at 2:05 p.m.

At 2:10 the Board meeting was joined by Colonel Steakley, Director of the Joint Reconnaissance Center of the JCS. Colonel Steakley described in some detail the various COMINT, ELINT, Telemetry, and photographic collection programs which are carried out through peripheral and overflight aircraft missions under the monitorship of the JRC (including surface ship and submarine collection of COMINT and ELINT along the China coast). Colonel Steakley referred to the ELINT collection (plus some COMINT and telemetry) through RA-3B peripheral flights in the Arctic; C-130 peripheral flights for COMINT collection in the Pacific, European and Cuban areas, including KC-135 missions near the Soviet border; photographic missions (BOW TIE) flown with RF-101 aircraft by Chinat pilots over coastal areas of Southeast China; covert photo collection on MATS (C-97 G) flights over Europe and Indonesia; C-135 telemetry collection missions near the launch areas and impact areas involved in Soviet space and missile activities; and collection of telemetry from satellites over Africa.

Colonel Steakley described the main functions of the JRC as pertaining to (1) monitoring of military reconnaissance programs (2) review and evaluation of missions proposed by the military (3) coordination of reconnaissance operations at the national level (4) U. S. and allied cooperation (5) monitoring of actual reconnaissance operations (6) coordination of policies and procedures, and (7) monitoring of special OPLANS.

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In response to a query from Dr. Baker, Colonel Steakley acknowledged that our reconnaissance activity gives the Soviets "training" in detection and in the development of countermeasures.

Mr. Coyne asked whether there is not considerable duplication of intelligence collection as a result of the multiplicity of reconnaissance missions being flown in the same target areas. Colonel Steakley said that some duplication results, but in any event a single ELINT mission will not always pick up all the desired intelligence, whereas follow-on missions will pick up emissions which might not have been encountered on the previous run.

A question was asked by Mr. Coyne about the JRC's working relationship with the NRO. Colonel Steakley said that this is satisfactory, even though not documented.

Dr. Baker asked whether the system is fast enough to accommodate urgent intelligence requirements which might be formulated by non-military agencies, calling for overflights of denied territory, for example. Colonel Steakley said that this capability is adequate and he cited the example of the recent Alaskan earthquake, photographs of which were delivered to Washington within 15 hours after the request was made for them. In answer to a query by Dr. Baker along this same line, Colonel Steakley said that the System is capable of exercising straight-line channel of command to meet intelligence requirement which, e.g., the Secretary of Defense might suddenly need to have fulfilled -- such as a carrier-based U-2 mission over a particular intelligence target all of a sudden. Colonel Steakley expressed confidence that the JRC mechanism and resources are such that suddenly-arising intelligence reconnaissance needs can be met quickly.

Colonel Steakley's visit with the Board was completed and he departed the meeting at 3:30 p.m.

In executive session (with Dr. Baker in the chair during Mr. Clifford's absence) Board members considered and approved proposed letters from the Chairman requesting that State, Defense, CIA and the DCI up-date and revise the scope and coverage of their respective annual reports to the Board concerning the conduct of their intelligence-related responsibilities. These letters were approved and subsequently dispatched by the Chairman.

At 3:55 p.m. Chairman Clifford returned from the President's office and rejoined the Board meeting.

The Board meeting was joined at this point by the DCI, Mr. McCone; and Messrs. Kirkpatrick, Fitzgerald, and Meyers of CIA. Chairman Clifford said that the Board would appreciate hearing from the DCI concerning items of interest to Board members as set out in the list previously provided to the DCI, as well as any other matters which the DCI might wish to cover.

At the DCI's suggestion, Mr. Fitzgerald took up the subject of Cuba which he had discussed previously at the meeting of the Board in April. He reported the recent defection to the U. S. of a Cuban military officer who

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has been attached to Castro's security service since Castro came to power, and who is in the process of being interviewed concerning the structure of Castro's intelligence organization (the defector being primarily knowledgeable of Cuban external intelligence activities in other Latin American countries).

Mr. Fitzgerald said that there is still the problem of getting agent photography out of Cuba for examination in the U. S. At present the photographs are delivered by agents inside Cuba to a friendly foreign diplomatic mission which forwards them to the CIA in the U. S.

Efforts are still being made to locate the Soviet SIGINT installations in Cuba. A talkative Soviet truck driver who formerly had access to one of the Soviet installations has been transferred back to the Soviet Union, so that source is no longer available.

New miniaturized radios have now been supplied to 8 agents of the CIA in Cuba. There has been some difficulty encountered in the operation of an electronic "dead drop" which involves the use of a static receiver in a friendly Embassy in Havana, which picks up messages from an agent coming within a quarter of a mile of the Embassy.

Referring to newspaper reports of exile raids and attempted raids on Cuba, Mr. Fitzgerald said that there have been successful raids on sugar centrals. The reported executions of 7 "CIA agents" did include 3 who were once serving as agents but who had been doubled some time ago. The British capture of a "raiding party" in the Bahamas actually involved the seizure of Manuel Ray, b/a female secretary, and two or three others. In any event, these incidents did cause the Castro government to set up the biggest military alert in Cuba to date -- which indicates the uneasiness prevalent there.

(Mr. Fitzgerald left the meeting at this point.)

Mr. McCone observed that 2 Soviet ships have left Cuba for Russia in the last few weeks, and 4 others are enroute to Cuba, so a further withdrawal of Soviet personnel is expected. CIA does not know whether the SAM's have been turned over to Cuban control yet. Castro has said he will shoot down our U-2's. Khrushchev told Drew Pearson in Cairo that U. S. U-2 flights over Cuba are unacceptable and that the U. S. should rely on its satellite reconnaissance coverage instead. The word sent by the U. S. to Khrushchev and Castro is that we will continue U-2 surveillance of Cuba. We are in a difficult weather season now but are getting satisfactory results from the 2 or 3 U-2 flights flown each week, Mr. McCone said.

Chairman Clifford asked about Cuban capabilities for bringing down our U-2's. Mr. McCone said that they have that capability. He recalled that a year ago CIA equipped its U-2's with ECM's, but there is a difference of view within the military as to whether this will be effective; and, moreover, the JCS do not want the ECM's to be used over Cuba because this might compromise the SIOP's. (Mr. McCone said that the Secretary of Defense is not much worried about the latter.) Mr. McCone expressed the belief that U. S. reaction would be violent if a U-2 is shot down, and plans are in readiness for such an eventuality. However, if a U-2 is lost it may not be possible to ascertain for certain what happened to it. (We lost a U-2 six months ago and found

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Mr. Myers referred to the difficulties of effecting agent penetration of North Vietnam and Laos. South Vietnamese locals are being trained for infiltration into North Vietnam at the present time. (Mr. Myers concluded his briefing of the Board at this point.)

Mr. McCone answered a question from Mr. Murphy by saying that he feels that the intelligence situation in Saigon is unsatisfactory. When Diem was overthrown, the new regime rolled up the former agents of Nu who were operating under CIA supervision in a penetration of the Viet Cong. One of the problems is that U. S. military elements in South Vietnam are less interested in broader national intelligence objectives and are more interested in such data as order-of-battle information; however, USMACV is planning to drop 6-man teams into North Vietnam.

With regard to USIB consideration of increased intelligence coverage of China, Mr. McCone referred to the scheduling of satellite missions and to the beginning effort in the field of clandestine agent coverage. However, Mr. McCone observed, China is a difficult intelligence target. There appear to be few chances for exploitation of dissensions among the Chicoms, even though the economy is a shambles, and even though the military are not being supplied with the equipment they have been expecting. At the same time, the Chicoms seem to be forging ahead in an effort to achieve missile and nuclear capability.

In answer to a question by Mr. Pace, the DCI said that COMINT has proved to be of great value in covering Chicom troop deployment, i.e., traffic analysis of Chicom communications has produced such information. Mr. McCone agreed with Mr. Murphy's comment that the absence of an intelligence capability out of Taiwan is a disappointment, particularly in view of the fact that large numbers of the Chicom military force were once under the command of Chiang. Mr. McCone said that during the last 6 months the Chinats have lost a dozen 6-man intelligence teams sent into China.

Turning to the recent discovery of audio penetration of the U. S. Embassy in Moscow, Mr. McCone noted that the Board had heard from Mr. Bannerman on this subject earlier in the day. The DCI said that he was astounded as anyone else at this development, because he had received the impression that technical sweeps were made of the Embassy. CIA feels that there was an audio penetration of our communications. He said that the problem of fixing responsibility is still being studied, and that as yet no one has gotten to the bottom of the matter. Dr. Land wondered whether there should not be an over-riding responsibility and authority to deal with such problems, rather than leaving them to the individual agencies to solve. Mr. McCone said that he is still studying that question but is not yet ready to make recommendations. He said that there is a need for centralizing research and development efforts in the audio field (For instance, Mr. McCone pointed out that CIA had developed a print which could have prevented the audio penetration in Moscow, but CIA could not get it approved for use because the color did not appeal to some users). He said that State, Defense and CIA have differing views on how to proceed in the audio field, and there are several NSC directives which Mr. McCone wishes to sort out before he makes any recommendations. CIA has found that security instructions were ignored by officials and other personnel of some agencies, e.g., sensitive information was dictated and was subject to audio intercept. In the DCI's opinion, great damage was done to the U. S. by the Soviet Technical penetration of the Embassy in Moscow.

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Mr. Gray pointed out that assessments appearing in the June 1 preliminary report of the USIB Security Committee differed from the DCI's estimate that serious damage was done. Mr. McCone said that General Carter and Mr. Bannerman of CIA think that the damage was very severe; but the DCI added that he had not studied the USIB report inasmuch as he was out of the country attending the Honolulu conference.

Chairman Clifford remarked that the Moscow incident indicates a disregard for security on the part of the U. S., for example, the 1962 report of the Soviet defector was not acted upon. Mr. Clifford thought the question is what can we as Americans do to bring attention to and correct this fouled-up situation. Mr. McCone replied that in CIA there is an extremely competent group which is devoted to personnel and other security matters. The Dunlap case study showed that CIA's personnel security program is particularly good. Now there is a need for the State Department or some agency to be designated as responsible for not only technical security sweeps but physical security matters as well. There must be an insistence on conformance with security safeguards. (Here Mr. McCone recalled that in Bangkok the U. S. Ambassador mentioned that he had sent his furniture out to be upholstered by local people; and when the DCI asked about the possibility of listening devices being planted in the furniture, the Ambassador said that this had not occurred to him. Mr. McCone observed that in various parts of the world, CIA would be happy for an opportunity to take advantage of a situation of that kind, for intelligence purposes.)

Chairman Clifford pointed to the loose security attitude that prevailed in the Moscow situation, e.g., the cables were cut right away. The DCI thought that the proper procedure was followed with regard to State and CIA consultation to determine exploitation possibilities when the first microphone was found -- leading to a decision that the Soviets had by then been alerted to the discovery, making exploitation infeasible. However, Mr. McCone thought that the cutting of the coaxial cable was improper. Mr. McCone agreed with Mr. Clifford's statement that there is a need to place responsibility on some appropriate agency to ensure that security precautions are followed.

Mr. Pace said that there is also a need to ensure effective management of research and development in the audio field. Mr. McCone replied that there are jurisdictional problems; the Department of State has responsibility under NSC directives; and Mr. McCone wants the USIB to consider the matter, and meanwhile he would defer making any recommendations for now.

Chairman Clifford asked if Mr. McCone would comment on the status of the DCI's efforts to coordinate the total U. S. intelligence activity. Mr. McCone said that with regard to the Board's recent report on the National Reconnaissance Program, he would have some alternative proposals to make along the lines of a different approach to the problem, but he preferred to reserve this for a later time.

In another area of the coordination effort, Mr. McCone said that the intelligence community is faced with the question of the continued availability of certain overseas bases which are used for intelligence purposes -- such as intercept stations on Cyprus; bases in Pakistan; and AFTAC sites at locations around the world. In the USIB, an inventory of all overseas intelligence-

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related bases is being made with a view to analyzing alternative courses of action open to us if we lose specific bases, classified and otherwise.

In the audio field, Mr. McCone said that the USIB will have some recommendations to make.

As for information processing, the DCI referred to the SCIPS study which was recently made in the USIB. He considered this study to be a good approach, although it is difficult to apply a uniform program in all intelligence agencies, e.g., the State Department requires a coding system different from that which might be used as a central system in the intelligence community. So, Mr. McCone is urging that the SCIPS study be used by each agency as a model approach to the problem.

With reference to contacts with the President, Mr. McCone said that the CIA sends a daily check list to the President but he does not necessarily wish to read it every day. CIA also sends over special intelligence items and a weekly check list which General Clifton hands to the President for reading. Mr. McCone said that he sees the President frequently including occasions when others are present, e.g., at conferences on South Vietnam. Some items the DCI takes to the President directly, when they are of such critical or sensitive nature that Mr. McCone does not want to handle them through routine channels. The DCI said that he personally would prefer opportunities for intelligence briefings of the President with the Secretaries of State and Defense present, in order that these officials could express any differing views to the President (for example, it is the Secretary of Defense's view that U-2 overflights of Cuba are not required, whereas Mr. McCone says he feels that there is a need for them).

With regard to the situation in South Vietnam, Mr. McCone said that this had been discussed at the Honolulu meeting from which he had just returned. Ambassador Lodge and General Westmoreland reported a deterioration of the situation. For one thing General Khanh has not gained control of the people as he claimed he would. Mr. McCone said that he differed from others at the Honolulu meeting who are of the opinion that the situation in South Vietnam has "bottomed out". To the contrary, Mr. McCone believes that the situation may well deteriorate further and planning should be made on that basis. He recalled Ambassador Lodge's comment that South Vietnam is not a country but a place where a lot of discordant people live.

As for Laos, Mr. McCone noted that the Pathet Lao had stopped its advance after over-running the western part of the Plain de Jarres. Mr. McCone believes that the Pathet Lao forces can take over the country if it wants to, without the aid of the North Vietnamese.

In Mr. McCone's opinion, a token air strike on North Vietnam would probably not produce a military reaction from either Communist China or North Vietnam. If a strike were made by South Vietnamese pilots accompanied by U. S. "instructors" (project FARM GATE) more damage would be done and more reaction would result. An A-bomb attack would probably produce a strong Chicom reaction. In any event, the U. S. will have to guarantee to Khanh that we will bail him out as necessary.

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Also, U. S. forces would have to be extensively deployed to meet any reaction, and the American people would have to be prepared for the situation. Mr. McCone feels that U. S. public opinion could best be prepared by the adoption of a Congressional resolution, which would also serve as a meaningful signal to the Chinese.

In answer to Dr. Langer's question, Mr. McCone thought it unlikely that Khahn would be unseated by a military coup in South Vietnam, although there are disgruntled factions for him to contend with.

In answer to Mr. Murphy's query, the DCI saw no immediate prospect for a South Vietnamese penetration of North Vietnam along the lines of the successful penetrations which have been made of South Vietnam from the North. He said that CIA had plans for such penetration, but they were taken over by U. S. military forces the first of this year, and the military are now organizing such activity.

Mr. McCone made reference to the recently published book "Bay of Pigs" as being most damaging to the CIA. A most serious claim in the book is the statement the invasion brigade was told by CIA to be prepared to go ahead with the invasion even if President Kennedy should call it off. Mr. McCone said that he had caused a thorough inquiry to be made of this allegation, including interviews of the Cubans who were supposed to have made the allegation. Mr. McCone said that the inquiry produced no evidence whatsoever that any Deputy DCI or other CIA official ever issued any such order, nor any CIA representative outside of Washington, and the official records do reflect the issuance of any such instruction. At most, the DCI's inquiry turned up only an instance or two where in the heat of the operation statements were made to the effect that the operation was ready and nothing could make it fail.

Mr. McCone also referred to the book, "Invisible Government", which is about to be published and has been reviewed in Look Magazine. The book makes a complete disclosure regarding the Radio Free Europe program and other CIA proprietaries; it identifies CIA-personnel whose names have never appeared in public print before; and specific reference is made to the Special NSC 5412/2 Group by name and function. The authors came to see Mr. McCone last August and he had a luncheon meeting with them. The authors said that they were just starting preparation of the book. Mr. McCone asked them to come see him again, and to submit the manuscript for checking as to accuracy and security, but they did not do so. CIA later obtained a manuscript copy from Random House covertly. Mr. McCone tried to get the publishers to kill the book but was told that it had already been paid for. Some 2000 copies have already been printed, and the book is most damaging to the CIA, Mr. McCone said.

Following dinner at the Metropolitan Club, the Board meeting resumed. Dr. Jerome Wiesner (and Spurgeon Keeny) who had just returned from a science meeting in Moscow, gave the Board a preliminary report on Dr. Wiesner's review of the recently-discovered microphone penetration of the U. S. Embassy, Moscow. Dr. Wiesner said that a surprising job had been done by the Soviets. Most of the microphones found were still operable after 11 years. They were imbedded in the walls 8 inches deep, with wooden tubes extending out to the wall surface.

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The wires from the microphones ran out inside the exterior building walls to avoid detection. During construction before the U. S. occupied the building as an Embassy, our people gave instructions to the Soviets as to where to run telephone and electrical wiring to serve Embassy offices -- in effect almost giving the Soviets an advance blueprint of the layout of Embassy offices. As a result of the Soviet technical installation they had access to the sounds of machines and conversations in the Embassy up to the time that shielded rooms were installed. They had microphones in the Embassy rooms where U. S. intercept operations were going on. The State Department's resident security technician on the scene (Mr. Musser) is still surveying the situation, including the significance of the coaxial cables and grid antenna which have been uncovered in the walls of the Embassy. There is as yet no real evidence that the Soviets were able to pick up brush sparks from the U. S. cryptographic machines, but they were certainly able to pick up acoustic signals. (There was an operable microphone right next to the printer location prior to installation of the shielded room.) The microwave signal which is known to have been beamed at the Embassy since 1957 may be a diversionary activity, or it could be illuminating passive devices. (The trouble is that Mr. Musser does not have the resources to determine the use to which the signal is being put.) An effort should be made to intercept the signal outside the Embassy building in a line with the direction of the beam which is coming from a Soviet-guarded apartment building nearby. (For a long time now no active countermeasures have been tried against the signal, and the attitude seems to have been not to disturb it.)

Dr. Wiesner said that even if our Embassy security people had dug a trench around the rooms where microphones were installed this would probably not have uncovered the devices.

Dr. Wiesner feels that Mr. Musser is an able man but doesn't have the resources to help him do the job. There is a need for trained people to use adequate detection devices, and experts to oversee the job. There should be installed such equipment as a standard video alarm in Embassy rooms, and it should be possible to develop and use transistorized devices to detect radiation. (Mr. Musser stated his belief that there could be a duplicate of the Soviet system as yet undiscovered.) Dr. Wiesner thinks that the teletype machines are well protected in the electro-shielded rooms. But Mr. Musser needs help which he seems reluctant to ask for because "hit-and-run" visits by various experts would hinder the efforts he is now trying to make.

Chairman Clifford asked what measures Dr. Wiesner would take if he were charged with responsibility for security of the Moscow Embassy. Dr. Wiesner said that he would (1) complain to the Soviets about the microwave signal (2) do a more thorough tearing down of a room to see if other systems are present, and (3) scan the walls and floors with an appropriate radiation device, e.g., radioactive cobalt taken in on the Ambassador's plane -- although you could not be sure even then that an eavesdropping system was not installed. He added that there is a view that the acoustically shielded rooms should also be given electromagnetic shielding.

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Mr. Clifford asked whether a defense could be devised, assuming that we are unable to ^{determine} ~~ascertain~~ that concealed microphones remain in place. Dr. Wiesner said that aside from the measures already mentioned, one could literally destroy 1 or 2 rooms, i.e., take them apart thoroughly and rebuild them. It might also be well to panel, or paint, the office walls, starting with the offices of the Ambassador, the Deputy Chief of Mission, and the military attaches -- but you could not be certain that this defense would be totally effective.

Dr. Wiesner said that he and Mr. Keeny had visited the 2 intercept rooms in the Embassy, and the operating personnel talked freely about what they were doing, with no apparent fear that they were being overheard by the Soviets.

Mr. Gray asked why the Soviets would damage the Embassy switchboard and leave it out of commission as reported in a dispatch just received from Ambassador Kohler. Dr. Wiesner said one could speculate that this was done to salvage something left behind in the switchboard or telephone system. He added that the switchboard is on the ground floor area of the Embassy which is guarded by Soviet guards; and Messrs. Wiesner and Keeny and their wives found it easy to walk through the ground floor area unchallenged. (Dr. Wiesner and Mr. Keeny were not told of the burglary entry and damage to the switchboard even though they were in conversation with the Ambassador and other Embassy officials after the incident occurred. They heard about it from their wives who had learned of the incident in conversations with Embassy personnel.)

Dr. Wiesner also questioned the security of the Embassy practice of sending so many information copies of coded messages to other U. S. posts. He said that he found no evidence of particular concern on the part of Embassy personnel with regard to the bugging development. Mr. Musser, on the other hand, was working around the clock. Dr. Wiesner said that he had lunch with Ambassador Thompson who said he felt that any Soviet intercept of his conversations in the Embassy, and of his messages, would only have served to confirm to the Soviets the sympathetic attitude with which he looked upon the problems faced by the Soviets.

*Notes have
been taken
from this
report*

Chairman Clifford, on behalf of the Board, asked Dr. Wiesner to give the Board a brief memorandum suggesting steps which the U. S. Government should consider taking in the direction of getting complete security of the Embassy in Moscow. Dr. Wiesner said he would do so, but pointed out that his suggestions would probably be those already proposed and considered by others, but not acted on for various reasons including lack of funds. He said that Mr. Musser's principal need is for more experts on the scene.

Dr. Wiesner and Mr. Keeny completed their visit with the Board and departed at 9:00 p.m.

In executive session, Chairman Clifford emphasized the gravity of the Moscow penetration development, and stated his intention to have a special Board Panel study made, as soon as the USIB completes its appraisal and report on the subject.

With regard to the Board's May 2 report to the President on the National Reconnaissance Program, Mr. Clifford said that when the DCI's comments are received at the White House, and if the White House asks for Board recommendations,

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