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Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA  
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10241

RECORD SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-146

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Document Information

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA  
FROM :  
TO :

TITLE : JFK ASSASSINATION FOLLOW-UP

DATE : 00/00/1976  
PAGES : 275

SUBJECTS :

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITES  
BRADEN, JIM  
CIA  
ROSSELLI, JOHN  
KENNEDY, JOHN, ASSASSINATION  
OSWALD, LEE  
DURAN, SYLVIA

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT  
CLASSIFICATION : Declassified  
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C  
CURRENT STATUS : Redact  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/31/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : CCBOX 441

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED  
CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/21/99  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : CCBOX 441

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

JFK ASSASSINATION FOLLOW-UP

Box 441

JFK  
Assassination  
Study

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is conducting a limited inquiry into certain leads which the Church Committee did not have time to finish checking out. The Committee is also ~~seeking to determine~~ <sup>continuing to explore the question of</sup> whether or Mr. Roseali's murder <sup>appearances</sup> was related in any way to his ~~testimony~~ <sup>church</sup> before the Committee.

Oct 12 mtg

Case Char.

- MOB —
- CIA —
- FBI —
- Cuban Exiles & Soldiers of Fortune
- Hughes

Case Plots

#1	#2	AMERSA	mob
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Ruby Connection >

Oswald Connection >

Allegations - catalogue

US/SPK Library

1. Inventory - Review > Tom/Ed.
2. Digesting
3. Timing & Nature of Public Statement
4. House Areas of Interest

Someone to work  
full system

Not leads  
instant interviews

SECRET

SECRET - CASE 24 July 74

Response  
to Memo  
re: Mervyn  
C. B. [unclear]  
CIA [unclear]  
in [unclear]  
[unclear] [unclear]  
[unclear] 1974

file  
which not directly involved & admittedly unaware  
of all facts & ramifications re exposure to  
Mervyn case of opinion. I termination at this  
stage, even if only temporary expedient, will have adverse  
effect on his loyalty in CIA. He might resent  
termination by CIA for something he not responsible  
for.

March 76 OS Memo to TB on Mervyn Hughes

June - 1974

Security Office Special Staff Project asked OS to check  
records on James R. Phelan & Wallace Turner, both  
of interest in connection w/ a sensitive SPS activity.  
OS records show Phelan to be a witness in Clay Shaw  
trial. Phelan wrote several articles re Mervyn's defamation  
suit w/ Hughes. Mervyn thought to be source. Duckett recalled

receiving call from RAM in Dec 1970 complaining  
that CIA embarked on a new Hughes project & had not gone  
thru him. (Mervyn - Hughes fight reason for termina-  
w/ RAMA)

Gen Off/Sec. Doc's in Mervyn OS File

1 Feb 71 memo from Eric I to DDP - discussed efforts to  
work out a satis. plan to terminate Mervyn from RAMA  
cover in a manner that avoids the need for a meeting w/  
RAMA officers

Non OIS Docs in RAM file **SECRET**

(2)

2. June 66 Houston to DDCI re Long Subcommittee  
and RAM: John Leon testified before  
Long Subcom. on Onassis  
Case + Subcom. staff undoubtedly  
know Mabeu used radio device.

Lyle Miller Memo For Record 14 March 1974  
par B Notes contact w/ L. Houston re Mabeu/Giannina  
Houston said the only Agency officials "aware"  
of details were Edwards, Osborn, Angleton, Roca  
and himself.

Lyle Miller MFR 10 Oct 73

re meeting w/ Scott Armat. re his interview  
of 3 10/3/73 + interest in  
RAM assoc. w/ CIA.

"New Years Eve Party" - Wilkinson report  
critical of CIA.

5 page PELTIER memo 11/18/68 re "Observations  
on Cover Company Personnel + Activities  
(RAMA).

4 page 7 Apr 71 MFR of O'Connell + [?]  
(CCS/LPCLOBE) meeting w/ Ed Mullen (Intertel) re  
RAMA/INM/CIA. (J. Duran) [J. Duran Crisis] \$10,000  
withdrawn

Rodmark cont. 7  
- Muller/Interlex

SECRET

(3)

14 MAY 62 TOP SECRET Edwards MFR - re Bartoli.

Memo prepared for RFK following oral briefing.

"Roselli and Mahen spent consid.  
time in Miami talking with the  
Courier. Giancanni also present.  
Giancanni put them in touch w/ a

"Courier" who went back from to Havana.  
Courier said op. possible

Eddy.  
put in  
quarter

Jan 71 - All CIA contact w/ RAM cut off  
because Hughes battle + unfav. publ.  
However - Osb. note that Helms had  
directed formation of Mahen relations  
early as 1966. "floss" ignored

O'Connell MFR 1/5/71 - re: RAM

On 17 Nov. 70 - Mahen called O'Connell

to say that Roselli's lawyer advised  
that unless someone interceded on his  
behalf re deportation - Ros. was going  
to make complete expose of his activities  
w/ CIA.

7 Jan 71 - Mahen advised DTC - that his  
past affiliat. w/ CIA had no bearing on  
Hughes power struggle situation.



Review STAFF FILE - EL Property

2/15/72 OSB memo to Colby re Russell.

→ DCI ignored Rosselli exposure threat, taking  
 calcul. risk as to exposure. [Sanitizes  
 CIA officer's name for unknown reason.]

X5 June 75 - Subm. to Schwartz  
 from Knoche - Elder for  
 Type writer - fragmentary resume - Cuba

B.71 Angeloni: used for dirty work - surveil. by Mahen

Mahen file "Gaps".

Vol. 1 Nov 63 - Dec. 73 - CCS 12419  
3 June 71

Eric I to Sam Halpern.

"The attached 2 memoranda

contain the latest development

in the Robert R. Mahen Associates

(RAMA) "thriller". The second

memorandum is self explanatory

except you should know that -

Robert ~~MA~~ <sup>Mullen</sup> Assoc. is a longtime

cooperator in the cover field, and Howard

Hurst is now one of its Vice Presidents."

(No Attach.)

13 Apr 71 MFR by 5 (CCS / CP6008E)

re 1 meeting -

1 wondering

how his name came

up in Hughes Tool

investig. of RAMA.

Heinonen meeting w/ Mullen

of interest to det. Hurst

Some Interest re Review of R 4881 documents (requested by Rike)  
→ need unsanitized copy of May 74 memo re Record Search  
by Logistics & access to all 2<sup>nd</sup> items forwarded  
to you 16.

→ why did Naughton tell Kyle Miller (per Miller's Mar 74 memo)  
that only himself, Edw, Oso, Angleton & Rosca aware of  
details of Maher, Giannacoma matter.



JFK ASSASS.

MEMORANDUM

October 1, 1976

TO : Bill Miller, Mike Madigan, Howard Liebengood,  
Mike Epstein and Ed Greissing

FROM : Rick Inderfurth

SUBJECT: Meeting with Senator Hart

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I've set up a meeting with Senator Hart for Wednesday, October 6, to discuss where we go with the JFK inquiry. The meeting will take place here at 10:30 in the morning. Please let me know if for any reason you cannot attend. The meeting should go for about an hour to an hour and a half.

# Memorandum

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Bishop	
Mr. Casper	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. Felt	
Mr. Gale	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Sullivan	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

TO : Mr. Mohr

FROM : C. D. DeLoach *President's*  
*COM 10-1011*

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF THE PRESIDENT

DATE: December 12, 1963

I had a long talk this morning with Congressman Gerald R. (Gerry) Ford (R. - Michigan) in his office. He asked that I come up to see him. Upon arriving he told me he wanted to talk in the strictest of confidence. This was agreed to.

*6-6* Ford told me he was somewhat disturbed about the manner in which Chief Justice Warren was carrying on his Chairmanship of the Presidential Commission. He explained that the first mistake that Warren made was his attempt to establish a "one man commission" by appointing a Chief Counsel, Warren Olney, that was his own protege. Ford stated that after the mention of Olney's name by the Chief Justice, at their first meeting, Allen Dulles, former Director of CIA, protested quite violently. Because of Dulles' protest, the other members told Warren that they would like to know more about Olney prior to giving their consent.

On the occasion of their second meeting, Ford and Hale Boggs joined *w* Dulles. Hale Boggs told Warren flatly that Olney would not be acceptable and that he (Boggs) would not work on the Commission with Olney. Warren put up a stiff argument but a compromise was made when the name of Lee Rankin was mentioned. Warren stated he knew Rankin and could work with him.

Ford told me that he was currently having problems inasmuch as the majority of the members of the Commission desired to go along with the recommendation made in Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach's letter to the Commission dated 12-9-63. In this letter, Katzenbach recommended that the Commission make an immediate press release pointing out that the FBI report clearly showed there was no international conspiracy or collusion and that Oswald was a loner. Ford stated he was a minority one that did not want to give out any press release until the Commission had had a thorough opportunity to review and discuss the FBI report. (I noted that the report was on his desk at the time of our meeting.)

*This is my view point too.*

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. Evans
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Jones

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings of your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized persons without the express approval of the Committee.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

CD: saj  
 1963  
 JAN 3 1964  
 DEC 30 1963

REC 55

62-109970-2

22 DEC 27 1963

DeLoach to Mohr 12-12-63  
Re: Assassination of the President

I told Ford in strict confidence that the Director concurred with his viewpoint. I mentioned that our investigation thus far had conclusively shown that Oswald operated by himself and that Ruby additionally was a loner. However, FBI investigation was still pending on a large number of rumors, speculation and gossip and it, therefore, would be quite unfair for the Commission to take a stand prior to all the evidence being turned in. Ford stated this was his point entirely and that although he was a minority of one he intended to stick to his point.

Ford told me that John McCone, Director of CIA, had, approximately one week ago, gone up to his office and told him that CIA had uncovered some "startling information" in the Oswald case. McCone proceeded to tell Ford that a source of CIA's in Mexico had seen money exchange hands between Oswald and an unknown Cuban Negro. Ford stated this excited him greatly inasmuch as it definitely tended to show there was an international connection involved in the assassination of the President.

*This shows how glib McCone is. N*

I told Ford that apparently McCone had failed to follow up on this matter. I mentioned that CIA's source had recanted his story and had indicated that it was a fragment of his imagination. However, to prove the unstable tendencies of this source, the source had later claimed that he was actually telling the truth. I pointed out that we were still checking some angles of this, however, the CIA source was obviously either insane or somewhat of a psychopathic liar. Ford stated he could certainly see this.

*When will we discuss this? N*

Ford indicated he would keep me thoroughly advised as to the activities of the Commission. He stated this would have to be on a confidential basis, however, he thought it should be done. He also asked if he could call me from time to time and straighten out questions in his mind concerning our investigation. I told him by all means he should do this. He reiterated that our relationship would, of course, remain confidential.

We have had excellent relations with Congressman Ford for many years. He has been given an autographed copy of the Director's book "A Study of Communism" and has been in touch with my office on numerous occasions in the past.

ACTION:

Contact will be maintained with Congressman Ford.

\* SEE MEMO  
12-13-63  
JLH: HET

RL

*Well handled*

FLU  
FBI

## Kennedy and the Cuban Connection



Conspiracy theories are fashionable, sometimes even fruitful, as in the case of Watergate. So it is not surprising that recent revelations of the Senate Intelligence Committee have resurrected an old question: what connection, if any, did the Castro government have with the assassination of John F. Kennedy?

Current speculation is that the Cuban dictator, having learned of CIA plots against his life, decided to strike back, returning violence for violence, with consequences that are now history. Indeed, the recent report of the Schweiker-Hart task force, while finding no hard evidence to support this theory, did uncover some interesting new leads. More than that, it established that a CIA-FBI "cover-up" had deprived the Warren commission of vital information that prevented it from seriously exploring the possibility of Castro's involvement and that consequently there is no longer any reason to have faith in its picture of the Kennedy assassination."

And so we may well have a reopening of the investigation. At last.

Given all this, it seems appropriate to examine the record of the period. A small but interesting body of published testimony and reminiscences describes and amply documents a little-known campaign of accommodation launched by Washington and Havana in the weeks preceding that fateful day in November 1963. Actually, the origins of this tentative and ultimately ill-fated rapprochement may be traced to the previous spring, when Castro, increasingly dependent on his Soviet sponsors, found himself obliged to embrace the banner of "peaceful coexistence" in order to obtain economic and military agreements needed to assure the continued development of his revolution. In practical terms, this meant the normalization of relations with the United States.

### A MESSAGE FOR CASTRO

It was not until September 1963, however, that this campaign began to show results. At that time, William Attwood, an adviser to the U.S. delegation to the United Nations, told his superiors he had word that Castro wanted an accommodation. John Kennedy got the message and approved a "discreet contact" with the Cuban U.N. representative, Carlos Lechuga. Subsequently, communications were established and meetings held

to discuss the prospect of negotiations.

By early November, Kennedy had decided to push toward an opening with Cuba in hopes of taking Castro out of the Soviet fold and erasing the memory of the Bay of Pigs. The Americans sought a meeting to draw up an agenda for later discussions. On Nov. 18, this message was transmitted to Havana. Shortly thereafter, Lechuga was instructed to set forth such a plan for U.S. consideration.

Even as these developments were unfolding, a second dialogue was taking place through an unofficial envoy—the French journalist Jean Daniel. On Oct. 24, Kennedy had received Daniel in the White House. The President, it seems, had learned of the Frenchman's forthcoming visit to Cuba and had decided to seize the occasion to send Castro a message. The essence of this communication was a strong hint that the United States would be willing to normalize relations providing certain conditions were met. What were those conditions? One, clearly, was an end to Castroite subversion. The U.S. had a special responsibility to contain Communist expansionism. As long as Havana continued to export revolution, the economic "blockade" of the island would remain in effect.

### ACCOMMODATIONS

Beyond this, not much was definite. The American negotiating position had not yet been worked out. Even so, hints of possible Cuban participation in the Alliance for Progress and of the desire of the United States to see a decline in Soviet influence on the island suggested further avenues for discussion.

Bearing this message and an invitation to revisit the White House upon his return, Daniel set off for Cuba. There he found a remarkably receptive Fidel Castro. Indeed, during the course of a six-hour interview the *líder máximo* found occasion to praise the American President for his sincerity, realism and "good ideas": Kennedy might yet understand that there could be "coexistence between capitalists and socialists, even in the Americas." Castro was convinced that normal relations could be restored "on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty." His country needed peace in order to concentrate on the socio-economic tasks of the revolution. The issue of subversion would not be an obstacle. Cubans would naturally "feel solidarity"

with their revolutionary brethren in other lands. But ultimately, each nation would have to determine its own destiny, and "if they choose regimes other than ours, this is not our business."

This was two days prior to President Kennedy's death.

I mention these developments because they provide an important—and perhaps crucial—frame of reference for Congressional investigators and the public alike. They are not, of course, proof of innocence. But they are suggestive: would Castro have been so intent on coming to terms with a man he was conspiring to kill? One may seriously doubt it. In point of fact, the assassination would bring a quick end to Washington's interest in accommodation.

### POSSIBLE SCENARIOS

Still, this is not to rule out the possibility of a "Cuban connection." Governments often behave in inconsistent and self-defeating ways. Indeed, even as the Kennedy Administration was taking these first covert steps toward rapprochement, the CIA was engaged in an attempt on Castro's life. If, due to a lack of political control and a prevailing atmosphere of cold-war hostility, U.S. agents could be conducting such activities in direct conflict with Presidential policy, it is not difficult to imagine similar distortions on the Cuban side. Only a few weeks earlier, Castro had publicly denounced U.S.-sponsored assassinations and even threatened retaliation. Might not some overzealous security officials have taken this for tacit authority to set up a "program of elimination"?

But all this remains speculation. It is possible to envision any number of scenarios that *might* have led to the fatal events of Nov. 22. In lieu of hard evidence, however, it seems only fair to give Castro the same benefit of the doubt that Kennedy has been accorded—namely, that he be considered innocent until proved guilty. It is hoped that the investigations to come will proceed on the basis of that assumption.

*Schulz, a Ph.D. candidate in political science at Ohio State University, is writing a book on the Cuban revolution.*



Gaudin Fonzi  
305-861-7651

Fonzi Mtg. Notes  
9/20/76  
photos  
Re Sarah mem.

Ruby-Castles  
Ltr.  
FBI got quest.

July 62/63 in Havana to see Arzuff's dealer

news  
Ray: Cuba - Artime someone at time tipped on  
in circle Cuba

Cuba - ~~Alleman~~ / Trafficante -

USA - Conservatism  
Black bordered ad

DEA  
Sturgis / King B.  
w/ valued in  
case against  
Bernstein.

Larry Crawford - lived Casaruel

Myers links to  
How Hollywood  
makes movies  
Called picture  
publ' so got paper  
all of it

~~Monte-Lorenz~~ puts Hunt w/ Sturgis early. Shortly  
after she got here. I knew  
Hunt as Eduardo

Bernstein  
Warkall  
(Cain) / How Cuba

Paul Meskill - NY Daily News - 1975 - Series of  
Sturgis - Lorenz pieces

DEA  
Gibson  
Traffic

Sylvia Otis - sure it was Oswald in Dallas late Sept  
when Duran - KMET.  
When supposed to  
be in Mex.

Imposter

~~Norman Rothman - Ruby-Castles~~ (McQuilley  
Stromman)

Oswald  
Ferris - Havana - Ruby  
show Myers

Sturgis  
Clarey  
the money

Ruby  
Mob

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