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HOOVER, J. EDGAR
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EDWARDS, SHEFFIELD
DULLES, ALLEN
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CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS
CIA
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP
BAY OF PIGS
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1. As set forth in detail elsewhere, the Central Intelligence Agency was involved in assassination plots against Fidel Castro beginning as early as late 1959 or 1960. These plans arose at approximately the same time as preparations were underway for the Bay of Pigs. The plans involved a number of bizarre schemes and, in at least one instance, involved some contact with organized criminal elements. Among the means considered were poison, botulism pills, and the use of Cuban Exile Groups. There is evidence to indicate that Allen Dulles was aware of these early efforts to develop plans to assassinate Castro and authorized them. It is unclear whether other officials of the Eisenhower or Kennedy Administrations were aware of these early plans.

2. The Bay of Pigs operation occurred between April 17 and April 19, 1961. Following that unsuccessful operation, President Kennedy directed Maxwell Taylor, Robert Kennedy, Arleigh Burke, and Allen Dulles to "study our governmental practices and programs in the area of military and paramilitary, guerilla and anti-guerilla activity which fell short of outright war," paying special attention to the lessons which could be learned from the Bay of Pigs operation.

3. During the course of the Taylor group's review of the Bay of Pigs operation, the FBI notified Robert Kennedy, in a memorandum dated May 22, 1961, that it had been confirmed by Sheffield Edwards, CIA Director
of Security, of Agency contacts with Robert Maheu and Sam Giancana with respect to "anti-Castro activity," "clandestine efforts in Cuba" and "CIA's clandestine efforts against the Castro government."

Mr. Edwards advised the FBI that "since this is 'dirty business' he could not afford to have knowledge of the actions of Maheu and Giancana in pursuit of any mission for CIA." The FBI memorandum added that:

"Colonel Edwards advised that only Mr. Bissell (Deputy Director of Plans, CIA) and two others in CIA were aware of the Giancana-Maheu activity in behalf of CIA's program and that Allen Dulles was completely unaware of Edwards' contact with Maheu in this connection. He added that Mr. Bissell, during his recent briefings of General Taylor and the Attorney General in connection with their inquiries into CIA relating to the Cuban situation told the Attorney General that some of the CIA's associated planning included the use of Giancana and the underworld against Castro."

It should be noted that Mr. Edwards and Lawrence Houston, then General Counsel of the CIA, briefed Mr. Kennedy again almost a year later, on May 7, 1962, on the Agency's contacts with the Mafia, beginning in August and September 1960, concerning Castro. This briefing was apparently initiated by the CIA. The relationship with Sam Giancana was discussed in detail.

There is no indication that the Attorney General mentioned either the May, 1961 memorandum from the FBI or the briefing he and General Taylor had received the year earlier from Mr. Bissell. Mr. Edwards
has stated that Mr. Kennedy did not disapprove of any of the actions taken in the past. Mr. Houston has testified that:

"We went down to brief Mr. Kennedy on the full story (that the CIA) had set up a project with its aim the demise of Castro, that the project had fallen through, that these following people were involved, and we gave them the names, and this is what made him unhappy, because at the time he felt he was making a very strong drive to try to get after the Mafia. And so his comment was to us that if if we were going to get involved with the Mafia, in the future at any time, to make sure you see me first."

4. On June 13, 1961 General Taylor's group reported to the President.

The report included no mention of the prior CIA activities with respect to assassinating Castro. The group's recommendations included:

"In the course of its work, this Group has been exposed to the views on Cuba of many U.S. officials and of individuals, Cuban and U.S., who have been close to the Cuban problem. We have been struck with the general feeling that there can be no long-term living with Castro as a neighbor. His continued presence within the hemispheric community as a dangerously effective exponent
of Communism and Anti-Americanism constitutes a real menace capable of eventually overthrowing the elected governments in any one or more of weak Latin American republics. There are only two ways to view this threat; either to hope that time and internal discontent will eventually end it, or to take active measures to force its removal. Unless by "time" we are thinking in terms of years, there is little reason to place reliance on the first course of action as being effective in Castro's police state. The second has been made more difficult by the April failure and is now possible only through overt U.S. participation with as much Latin American support as can be raised. Neither alternative is attractive, but no decision is, in effect, a choice of the first.

"While inclining personally to a positive course of action against Castro without delay, we recognize the danger of dealing with the Cuban problem outside the context of the world Cold War situation. Action against Castro must be related to the probable course of events in such other places as Southeast Asia and Berlin which may put simultaneous claims on our resources.

"It is recommended that the Cuban situation be reappraised in the light of all presently known factors and new guidance be provided for political, military, economic and propaganda action against Castro."

5. The record of actions of the National Security Council meeting of April 29, 1961 "noted the President's request" that the "Defense study of the military training of Cubans" be coordinated with "further proposals from the Department of State with respect to the broader aspects of the Cuban problem." On May 4, a series of papers captioned "Cuba and Communism in the Hemisphere" were circulated to the NSC members (President Kennedy, Vice President Johnson, Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara) as well as the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Director of Central Intelligence. The papers made the following points:

- "There is no sure way of overthrowing Castro short of U.S. military intervention. There is a possibility, although a slight possibility, that lesser measures -- covert and overt -- might result in the overthrow of the Castro regime from within. As long as Castro thrives, his major threat -- the example and stimulus of a working communist revolution -- will persist."

- "The cost of eliminating Castro by military intervention would be substantial at the present time and under present circumstances. These costs might include significant loss of life and other casualties and would severely endanger the U.S. position of leadership in the Free World. It is our judgment that these costs outweigh the advantages of intervention."

"In view of these considerations, it is the recommendation of the Task Force that:

"1) We should not undertake military intervention now.

"2) We should make no statements or take no action that would foreclose the possibility of military intervention in the future.

"3) We should work to reduce the Castro threat through measures discussed in the balance of this paper -- thus seeking to avoid the need for more drastic and costly action at some time in the future.

"4) We should attempt to reduce the costs of intervention should it become necessary. There is not a great deal the United States by itself can do along these lines as a matter of deliberate policy. We can, however, plan for various contingencies so that intervention will be sufficient and more effective. We should
strive to develop a creditable doctrine based on self-defense against indirect aggression which would justify more drastic action, and we should seek to have that doctrine generally accepted by world opinion. At the same time, we should seek to continue our efforts to establish a multilateral base for action."

"We must immediately develop a longer-range program for these nations. This includes the organization of a Democratic alternative to Trujillo and Duvalier. Such a group can be formed basically out of exiles since there is little opportunity for opposition or potential opposition to exist within the framework of the Haitian and Dominican regimes, though possibilities appear to exist in the Dominican Republic. When the formation of Democratic alternatives is well under way, we should develop and begin to put into effect a plan for accelerating a transition from the regimes of Trujillo and Duvalier. In this way the timing and initiative on replacement will be ours, and we will gain the tremendous propaganda advantage which will accrue to us as a result of participation, however, indirect, in an effort to eliminate these dictatorships. The methods whereby this can be accomplished have not yet been explored.

"In this connection, we should step up our campaign against tyranny in the hemisphere and, wherever possible, couple Trujillo and Castro."

(It should be noted that Trujillo was assassinated 27 days after this report, on May 30, 1961.)

"A political vulnerability of the regime lies in the person of Castro himself. It is not clear whether the regime could continue to operate for long without him. There is no question that the bureaucracy operates relatively freely and probably makes many decisions without consulting Castro. However, it is equally certain that the Castro personality and his appeal to the Cuban people is an important element in maintaining popular support for the regime. If Castro were removed from the scene, the regime might collapse for lack of this central rallying point. On the other hand, the bureaucracy might now be so firmly entrenched that it could function independently ---
although admittedly without the support it now enjoys. Further, by using Castro as a martyr, it might be possible to generate at least a temporary support for his successor."

"The survival of the Castro regime would probably not in itself pose a direct threat to the immediate security of the U.S. The continued existence of the regime would, however, fundamentally alter the terms of Latin American relations with the U.S. U.S. restraint in allowing the regime to survive would be interpreted generally by Latin American ruling groups as evidence of weakness and a demonstration of U.S. unwillingness to use force against a Soviet-backed government. This would be true despite the frequently asserted opposition of Latin American leaders to U.S. intervention in the affairs of any Latin American country and their refusal to take joint action to quarantine Cuba."

"Aside from its direct effect upon U.S. prestige in the area, the survival of Castro would have a profound effect on Latin American political life. It would set the stage for political struggle in terms long promoted by Communist propaganda in the hemisphere, with the issue drawn between "popular" anti-U.S. forces and the ruling groups allied with the U.S. Governments willing to cooperate with the U.S. would be faced by political leaders promising an immediate remedy to social wrongs through seizure of property and overturn of the society. Evolutionary reform and improvement over a period of years, even at an accelerated pace, would be discounted as extremist leaders played on mass bitterness and distrust of the ruling groups. In these circumstances, political stability in Latin America would be seriously jeopardized."

"In the atmosphere produced by Castro's survival, U.S. efforts to promote social progress would encounter new difficulties as political leaders witheld their cooperation for programs involving domestic sacrifices and attendant political risks. In the circumstances the U.S. Government would have to be prepared to underwrite huge welfare and economic development programs and to involve itself directly in their success, always under some threat of withdrawal of cooperation by the Latin American governments. On the other hand, if Castro were eliminated, the
U.S. would be in a much stronger position to insist upon adoption of a program of moderate, evolutionary change by the ruling groups in Latin America."

"The overwhelming majority of anti-Castro exiles in this country hope for an early overthrow of the Castro regime. The exiles feel and believe that this is realizable; thus they are prepared, each on his own level, to contribute to and participate in actions necessary to achieve the objective for a free democratic Cuba which would mean their return to the Island. Most of these Cubans are convinced that U.S. leadership and active participation in this struggle are essential for success. Therefore, they can be expected to follow and support the U.S. in any venture promising an early elimination of Castro. Direct contacts with invasion survivors and other returnees, indicate that there is disappointment, hurt and uncertainty as to why the U.S. did not come to the aid of the freedom fighters; however, there is no question that these personnel are prepared and anxious to continue the fight in partnership with the U.S. Exile political leaders are also anxious to continue to press the crusade.""

6. The May 4 papers were considered at a meeting of the National Security Council on May 16, 1961. The record of the actions at that meeting, approved by the President, indicate the following actions with respect to "U.S. policy toward Cuba":

- "Agreed that U.S. policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall of Castro, and that since the measures agreed below are not likely to achieve this end, the matter should be reviewed at intervals with a view toward further action."

- "Noted the importance the President attaches to publica-
tion in the Free World press of the terroristic actions of the Castro regime, and to possible political actions to end the current terror."

- "Noted the President's direction that the Central Intelligence Agency, with other departments, should..."
make a detailed study of possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the elements which assert control in Cuba today."

7. On November 30, 1961, President Kennedy sent a memorandum to Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, John McConel, Robert Kennedy, Maxwell Taylor, Edward Lansdale and Richard Goodwin setting forth a "summary of the major decisions which have been made in regard to the Cuba Operation." The President's memorandum went on to state that "We will use our available assets to go ahead with the discussed project in order to help Cuba overthrow the communist regime." The addressees of this memorandum became known as the "Special Group Augmented." McGeorge Bundy was a regular participant in meetings of the Special Group Augmented. The United States Information Agency was also regularly represented at Special Group Augmented meetings. The Special Group Augmented met formally on at least 26 occasions between the end of 1961 and October 26, 1962.

8. The program administered by the Special Group Augmented was initially known as "The Cuba Project." It later was referred to as "Operation Mongoose." The objective of the Cuba Project was described in a January 19, 1962 memorandum by General Lansdale as "to help the Cubans overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace." It stated "the operation is to bring about the revolt of the Cuban people..."
requires a strongly motivated political action movement established within Cuba, to generate the revolt, to give it direction towards the objective, and to capitalize on the climactic moment." It said "The climactic moment of revolt will come from an angry reaction of the people to a government action (sparked by an incident), or from a fracturing of the leadership cadre within the regime, or both. (A major goal of the Project must be to bring this about)." The agencies were given a number of tasks to implement the project. The overall objectives of the Cuba project program were presented to the President and the Special Group by General Lansdale on January 18, 1962.

9. On January 20, 1962, General Lansdale sent a memorandum to the Special Group Augmented (then known as the "Caribbean Survey Group") stating that "At yesterday's meeting, the Attorney General underscored with emphasis that it is your responsibility to develop and apply the maximum effort of your Department (Agency) to win the goal of the Cuba project."

The memorandum added that

"As the Attorney General said, it is untenable to say that the United States is unable to achieve its vital national security and foreign policy goal re Cuba. Castro and his Communist henchmen have many difficult problems to meet in maintaining even a status quo, and we have all the men, money, material, and spiritual assets of this most powerful nation on earth. It is our job to put the American genius to work on this project, quickly and effectively. This demands a change from business-as-usual and a hard facing of
the fact that we are in a combat situation -- where we have been given full command."

General Lansdale thereafter received, on January 30, 1962, a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs' representative to the Special Group Augmented proposing an "Operation Bounty," the objective of which was:

"To provide inducement to Cuban citizens to overthrow the Cuban Communist Regime; to put pressure on Cuban Communists by creating distrust and disunity."

The major aspects of the proposal were as follows:

"1. Operation BOUNTY establishes a system of financial rewards, commensurate with position and stature, for killing or delivering alive known Communists.

"2. Rewards range from two cents to $1 million and are determined by the position the individual concerned holds in the Communist hierarchy of Cuba.

"3. A reward will be paid to an individual upon presentation of a leaflet, together with conclusive proof of death and the party/revolutionary membership card of the deceased or delivery to designated locations of known party/revolutionary members.

"4. Leaflets will be delivered to Cuba by air.

"5. Leaflets will be designed to indicate phases. For example, the first leaflets will contain only names of Communist leaders; the next leaflets will revise the names by job; i.e. cell leader, informer, party members, etc.; any of the above or subsequent leaflets will announce the amount of the reward, how and where it may be collected. One final leaflet may be deemed advisable and that one announcing a .02¢ reward for the delivery of Castro."
"6. A proposed price list is as follows:

a. Informer $20,000 - $5,000
b. Cell Leader 40,000 - 10,000
c. Block Leader 45,000 - 20,000
d. Department Head 57,500 - 26,000
e. Foreign Communist 97,000 - 47,000
f. Government Officials 100,000 - 55,000
g. Castro .02¢ "

The action plan concluded that:

"Once this operation is implemented, covert actions by U.S. agents could be initiated to kidnap known party members thereby instilling confidence in the operation among the Cuban populace and apprehension among the Cuban hierarchy."

10. On February 20, 1962, General Lansdale distributed to the President and the Special Group Augmented a "program review" on the Cuba Project. The "action plan" included a proposal -- to be implemented in September, 1962 -- for "attack on the cadre of the regime, including key leaders." The "considerations" listed with respect to this proposal were stated as follows:

"This should be a 'special target' operation. CIA defector operations are vital. Gangster elements might provide the best recruitment potential for actions against police - G2 officials. Bloc technicians should be added to the list of targets. CW agents should be fully considered."
11. On March 5, 1962, the Special Group Augmented met in Dean Rusk's office. General Lansdale sent a memorandum to Richard Goodwin the next day stating that:

"At the 5 March meeting chaired by Secretary Rusk, on our favorite subject, the Secretary spoke of 'other tracks' which might be opened for the U.S. to achieve its objective. He mentioned proof of 'their' plots in Latin America, as an example. Also, there was joking reference to a 'Bay of Pigs' in, perhaps, Guatemala, as a national clandestine action for which 'they' could be blamed."

The memorandum added that:

"Along these same lines, and in response to direction, I am asking the Defense representative (General Craig) to give me a brief but precise description of pretexts which the JCS believe desirable if a decision is ultimately made to use..."
direct military intervention. I would appreciate it if you could provide a companion statement, a brief but precise description of pretexts which the State Department believes desirable in connection with any such direct military intervention."

The minutes of the March 5, 1962 Special Group Augmented meeting state that "Mr. Johnson (U. Alexis Johnson) was asked to have a list prepared of various situations which would serve as a plausible pretext for intervention." The words "would" and "plausible pretext" are bracketed in pencil in the minutes, and the words "could" and "valid basis" are printed beneath them in pencil.

12. On March 13, 1962, the Defense Department provided a "status report" to the Special Group Augmented. It contained the following statement:

"Task 33 b - Plan for Incapacitation of Sugar Workers - completed 2 February. Task as assigned was to develop a plan for incapacitating large sections of the sugar workers by the covert use of BW or CW agents. Study revealed the idea was infeasible and it was cancelled."

The terms "BW" and "CW" stand for biological (or bacteriological) warfare and chemical warfare, respectively.

13. The minutes of the April 11, 1962 meeting of the Special Group Augmented state that:

"The Secretary of State said that, at this time, he can see no way in which an organized invasion of Cuba could be justified; on the other hand, this should not be taken as an excuse to cease activity against the Castro regime. He, supported by the Secretary of Defense, took the position 'play for the breaks,' and should take necessary steps so as to get into a position which would afford the U.S. a
maximum number of choices of action. In this connection, he and Mr. McNamara suggested that the current target date for bringing covert operations to a climax should be removed. Mr. Bundy cautioned that this could lead to an uncontrollable action internally, which might come to a head at a time which would be embarrassing or inconvenient for the U.S."

14. On April 12, 1962, General Lansdale forwarded to Maxwell Taylor an "advance copy" of the Joint Chiefs' paper on "Pretexts," stating "I am informed that the Chiefs approved this." The paper, captioned "Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)," set forth 9 "pretexts."

These included:

"We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington. The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans enroute to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of a Cuban agent and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government."

The minutes of the Special Group Augmented Meeting of April 12, 1962, state that "General Taylor called the Group's attention to the JCS paper "Justification of U.S. Military Intervention," which most of them had not yet received."

15. At the Special Group Augmented meeting of April 12, 1962, it was also decided that a review would be conducted in August, 1962 "of the progress made and of the long range objective" of Operation Mongoose. On April 13,
1962, Maxwell Taylor reported on Mongoose to "higher authority" (President Kennedy). It was decided that Operation Mongoose would have no target date. The memorandum of the meeting with "higher authority" states:

"Taylor was informed that we would have to live with the consequences of no date, doing the best we can to bolster motivation. Taylor commented that we can probably carry out the first phase as planned, with a review of the situation about August 1."

16. On July 10, 1962 General Lansdale distributed a "Guideline for a Post-Castro Political Program" prepared by the State Department to members of the Special Group Augmented. According to General Lansdale:

"It sketches in the general boundaries of a Cuba with which the U.S. could live in peace, and is only the first step in the political work of having a Cuban platform, created by Cubans, upon which Cubans can rally for the overthrow of the Castro-Communist regime with U.S. help."

17. On July 11, 1962 General Lansdale advised the Special Group Augmented that "the operational representatives are readying presentations to assist the Special Group assess and review the policy of Operation Mongoose, as of the end of July." The Lansdale memorandum indicated these papers would cover "Operational estimates of the potential for resistance in Cuba, intelligence collection, political, psychological, economic and military operations (it is expected that these operational estimates will note ways and means)."
18. On July 25, 1962 General Lansdale distributed a memorandum on "Review of Operation Mongoose" to the members of the Special Group Augmented. It was a compilation based on the "contribution of each major participant, on objectives, on the planning and operational activity to win these objectives, and on future possibilities to be governed by the policy framework." One of the original objectives of the Operation was stated to be "Undertaking all other political, economic, and covert actions, short of inspiring a revolt in Cuba or developing the need for U.S. armed intervention." It included also a section on "PROJECTION (PHASE II)," stating that "The working statements of the choices open to the U.S. are as follows:

"A. Cancel operational plans; treat Cuba as a Block nation; protect Hemisphere from it, or

"B. Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without overt employment of U.S. military, or

"C. Commit U.S. to help Cubans overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, with a step-by-step phasing to ensure success, including the use of U.S. military force if required at the end, or

"D. Use a provocation and overthrow the Castro-Communist regime by U.S. military force."

19. On August 8, 1962, U. Alexis Johnson distributed to the members of the Special Group Augmented a "paper on the effects of the existence of the Castro Government during the past year on Latin America, the United States and the USSR, a subject on the agenda for discussion at the
meeting on Cuba, August 10, 1962." On the same date, the Joint Chiefs
distributed a memorandum on "Consequences of (US) Military Intervention
(in Cuba) to include cost (personnel, units and equipment), effect on
world-wide ability to react, possibility of a requirement for sustained
occupation, the level of national mobilization required, and Cuban coun-
teraction."

20. On August 8, 1962 General Lansdale also distributed a memorandum
on "Stepped Up Course B" to the Special Group Augmented. The memo-
randum indicated that Course B, as described in the July 25 memorandum,
differed from "Phase I" in that Course B removed the prior restriction
that Mongoose actions be kept "short of those reasonably calculated to
inspire a revolt within the target area." The August 8 memorandum in-
cluded papers from the "operational representatives" of State, Defense,
CIA and USIA with respect to a possible "Stepped Up" Course B. The CIA
paper, prepared by William Harvey, set forth the following "Task":

  o "Assist and support State in any feasible action
to develop active OAS and individual Latin American
country support for the overthrow of Castro."

  o "Assist State in the development of post-Castro con-
cepts, leaders, and political groups."

  o "Develop contacts in the 'power center' of the Cuban
Government as a possible means of splitting the
regime."

  o "Induce the population to engage in militant mass
action such as demonstrations, slow-downs, work
stoppages, and sabotage."
The CIA paper also recommended a significantly expanded paramilitary program, including "Commando/Raider Teams," "Urban Resistance Cells," "Rural Resistance Cells," "Guerrilla" teams, and use of "Cuban Exile Forces."

21. The files of the Joint Chiefs contain an unsigned memorandum captioned "DOD Task #69 Ideas to beef-up course of action B." Stapled to this memorandum is an unsigned, undated memorandum setting forth as follows:

"We believe Castro can be overthrown only by the use of considerable external military support. The objective of Operation Mongoose is the overthrow of the Castro regime.

"If course of action B were pursued vigorously and the resistance elements in Cuba were stirred to action without U.S. military support, then the assets presently in Cuba would probably be destroyed by Castro's effective means of repression.

"If, however, course B is followed with the intention of providing U.S. military support, when required, simply not telling the Cubans, the following things could be done: (Cubans would do better tho, if they knew)."

The memorandum contains a disjointed list of ideas, including:

"Assassinate Castro and his handful of top men."
22. On August 10, 1962, the Special Group Augmented met in Dean Rusk's office. The following people attended:

- **State**: Mr. Rusk, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Martin, Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Hurwitch
- **White House**: General Taylor, Mr. Bundy
- **Defense/JCS**: Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, General Lennitzer, General Lansdale
- **CIA**: Mr. McConne, Mr. Harvey
- **USIA**: Mr. Murrow, Mr. Wilson

According to the minutes of the meeting, prepared by Thomas A. Parrott of Maxwell Taylor's staff:

"The discussion then turned to the objectives of the MONGOOSE program. Mr. McNamara questioned whether we cannot separate the building up of agent assets within Cuba from actions that would hurt the U.S. in the eyes of world opinion. This led to the suggestion by General Taylor that we should consider changing the over-all objective from one of overthrowing the Castro regime to one of causing its visible failure.

"In this context Mr. McCone then presented an alternate plan (called hereafter the "CIA variant") to the stepped-up Course B described by General Lansdale, which he said had been prepared as a result of the conclusion that stepped-up B would not in fact result in the overthrow of Castro. He emphasized that the stepped-up plan should not be undertaken unless the U.S. is
prepared to accept attributability for the necessary
actions, including the eventual use of U.S. military force.
Mr. McConie said that a stepped-up B will risk inviting
an uprising, which might result in a Hungary-type blood
bath if unsupported. Not only would the U.S. be blamed,
but there would also be a high noise level in the press and
eventually a situation would be created which would re-
quire intervention.

"On the other hand, the CIA variant now proposed would,
in Mr. McConie's view, avoid all of these dangers be-
cause it would not invite an uprising. Again he repeated
his view that the U.S. might, however, face a stronger
Cuba in the future."

"The principal members of the Special Group felt, after
some discussion, that the CIA variant should be developed
further for consideration at next Thursday's meeting of
the Special Group. Mr. McConie was asked to stress
economic sabotage, and to emphasize measures to foment
a Castro-oldline Communist split. It was emphasized that
any actions under this plan must be so designed as to
avoid major attribution to the U.S."

"Mr. Bundy suggested that a hard look be taken at the
possibility of support to selected Cuban exiles on a strictly
"disengaged" basis; in other words, should they be given
covert financial and material support, with the idea of see-
ing what they could generate on their own."

Mr. Harvey, on April 14, 1962, sent the following memorandum to Mr. Helm,
attaching a copy of an August 13, 1962 memorandum prepared by General
Lansdale:

"1. Action. None. This memorandum is for your informa-
tion.

"2. Reference is made to our conversation on 13 August, 1962,
concerning the memorandum of that date from General Lansdale.
Attached is a copy of this memorandum, excised from which are four words in the second line of the penultimate paragraph on page 1. These four words were "including liquidation of leaders."

"3. The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's office on 10 August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record. I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point.

"4. Upon receipt of the attached memorandum, I called Lansdale's office and, in his absence, pointed out to Frank Hand the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document. I advised Frank Hand that, as far as CIA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it. I strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he excise the phrase in question from all copies of this memorandum, including those disseminated to State, Defense, and USIA. Shortly thereafter, Lansdale called back and left the message that he agreed and that he had done so."

The August 13 Lansdale memorandum had a phrase excised from it. The blank space was the approximate size of the phrase, "including the liquidation of leaders."

The NSC records of the Special Group Augmented include a one page uncaptioned, unsigned memorandum dated August 10, 1962. It is typed on the same kind of paper -- and apparently on the same typewriter -- as the minutes of the Special Group Augmented of the same day. Stapled to
the memorandum is a handwritten note on White House letterhead. Although unsigned, the handwriting is apparently that of Mr. Parrott.

The memorandum states:

"The objective of the MONGOOSE program is to cause the visible failure of the target regime as quickly as possible as a preliminary to its ultimate elimination. In pursuing this objective the U.S. will make maximum use of indigenous and non-U.S. personnel and resources, particularly for covert operations.

"The current intelligence collection program will continue essentially as at present. Increased efforts will be directed at weakening the economy of the target country, to include a stepped-up program of economic sabotage. An intensive propaganda campaign will be maintained, designed to do maximum damage to the image of the target leader as a successful liberating revolutionary, while stressing the failures of his regime.

"While a revolt is not sought at this time, we must be prepared to exploit it if one should unexpectedly occur."

As noted above, the objective of "visible failure" of the "castro regime" had been proposed by Maxwell Taylor at the Special Group Augmented meeting as a change from the objective of "overthrowing" the regime.

The handwritten note stapled to the unsigned memorandum reads as follows:

"Attribution? How much will we use Cubans?

"Paramilitary and resistance activities in addition to intell?

"Use of U.S. personnel for overflights?"
23. On August 17, 1962 Maxwell Taylor sent a memorandum to President Kennedy on Operation Mongoose. The memorandum states:

"As we look ahead in the MONGOOSE program, we have considered several alternative courses of action. We have ruled out those which commit us to deliberate military intervention although we recognize that an unanticipated revolt might at any time force a decision for or against the support of such a revolt by U.S. forces. For the coming period, we favor a somewhat more aggressive program than the one carried out in Phase I, wherein we continue to press for intelligence, attempt to hurt the local regime as much as possible on the economic front and work further to discredit the regime locally and abroad.

"While we believe that this new course of action will create added difficulties for the regime and will increase the visibility of its failures, there is no reason to hope that it will cause the overthrow of the regime from within."

General Taylor attached "Guidelines for Operation MONGOOSE, Phase II August 1, 1962 until __________) Terminal date to be set later." They read in pertinent part as follows:

"While retaining as its eventual objective the overthrow of the target government, the objective of the MONGOOSE program during Phase II will be the further containment, undermining and discrediting of the target regime while isolating it from other Hemisphere nations."

"Efforts will be increased to inspire frictions and schisms both within the target regime and between its leaders and the Bloc."

"It is recognized that this program may cause the noise level to rise; however, the importance of maintaining nonattributability remains unchanged."
"While a revolt is not sought at this time, we must be prepared to exploit it should one unexpectedly occur. The JCS will maintain plans for U.S. military intervention."

On August 20, 1962, Maxwell Taylor advised the Special Group Augmented that the memorandum and guidelines had been "read and approved by higher authority today, 20 August 1962."

24. On August 23, 1962 McGeorge Bundy transmitted National Security Council Action Memorandum No. 181 to Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, Robert Kennedy, the Acting Director of CIA and Maxwell Taylor. It provided:

"The President has directed that the following actions and studies be undertaken in the light of evidence of new bloc activity in Cuba."

"The line of activity projected for Operation Plan B plus should be developed with all possible speed."

"A study should be made of the advantages and disadvantages of action to liberate Cuba by blockade or invasion or other action beyond Mongoose B plus, in the context of an aggravated Berlin crisis."

NSAM No. 181 also made several assignments to White House staff, State and Defense with respect to the impact and military alternatives with respect to the establishment in Cuba of "surface-to-air missiles or surface-to-surface missiles which could reach the U.S."

25. On August 29, 1962, William Harvey requested General Lansdale to secure Special Group Augmented approval for a sabotage operation.
involving the largest Cuban copper mine. The Special Group Augmented approved the proposal on August 30, 1962 and "agreed that higher authority should be made aware of this operation."

26. On August 31, 1962 McGeorge Bundy circulated to Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, Robert Kennedy, the Acting Director of CIA and Maxwell Taylor a memorandum on the probable military, political and psychological impact of Soviet missiles in Cuba. The memorandum notes that:

"Any missile deployment in Cuba will strengthen critics of the Administration's 'softness' on Cuba. This effect can be somewhat mitigated by words and actions being considered in other responses to NSAM 181, but it cannot be prevented while the missiles remain in place."

27. On August 31, 1962 General Lansdale provided the Special Group Augmented with "a proposed projection of actions to be undertaken in Phase II, Operation Mongoose."

28. At the Special Group Augmented meeting of September 6, 1962, the objective of a proposal to sabotage Cuban assets outside of Cuba was changed from "crippling" to "harassing" Cuban commerce. Also considered was a proposal with respect to "agricultural sabotage" within Cuba. The minutes of the meeting state that:

"General Carter emphasized the extreme sensitivity of any such operation and the disastrous results that would flow from something going wrong, particularly if there were obvious attribution to the U.S. He went
on to say, however, that it would be possible to accomplish this purpose by means more subtle than those indicated in the paper. He mentioned specifically the possibility of producing crop failures by the introduction of biological agents which would appear to be of natural origin. Mr. Bundy said that he had no worries about any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as the result of local Cuban disaffection or of a natural disaster, but that we must avoid external activities such as the release of chemicals, etc., unless they could be completely covered up."

29. Additional sabotage and related activities were approved by the Special Group Augmented during the balance of September, 1962.

30. On October 4, 1962, the Special Group Augmented convened again. The minutes of that meeting state that:

"The Attorney General opened the meeting by saying that higher authority is concerned about progress on the MONGOOSE program and feels that more priority should be given to mounting sabotage operations. The Attorney General said that he wondered if a new look is not required at this time in view of the meager results, especially in the sabotage field. He urged that 'massive activity' be mounted within the entire MONGOOSE framework. There was a good deal of discussion about this, and General Lansdale said that another attempt will be made against the major target which has been the object of three unsuccessful missions, and that approximately six new ones are in the planning stage."

The minutes do not disclose the identity or nature of the "major target" referred to by General Lansdale or otherwise shed light on the "three unsuccessful missions" or the "six new ones in the planning stage." It is possible that the reference involved the Cuban copper mine sabotage operation. The
minutes indicate that a "major point" emerging from the Special Group Augmented's discussion was that "All efforts should be made to develop new and imaginative approaches to the possibility of getting rid of the Castro regime."

31. On October 22, 1962, President Kennedy, in a nationally-televised address, informed the American people of the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. The "Cuban Missile Crisis" continued until October 28, when Khrushchev announced an order "to dismantle the weapons, which you (President Kennedy) describe as offensive, and to return them to the Soviet Union."

32. The last formal meeting of the Special Group Augmented was held on October 26, 1962 -- during the Cuban Missile Crisis. A memorandum was distributed at the meeting concerning "OPERATION MONGOOSE Main Points to Consider." It stated:

"What is the Policy Objective? We need a sharp focus on exactly what we hope to get from Mongoose now. This will determine how best to employ these unique resources -- either to support U.S. military operations or directly to commit against the Communist regime immediately.

"Is the end objective the removal of the Castro/Communist regime or to bring it to its knees? Should Mongoose help generate a popular revolt with the probable need for overt U.S. military help as the regime moves in to crush it? Or, is the aim that of maximum harassment, to make Cuba a maximum burden for the Bloc?"
"Undoubtedly, most people in the world now expect us to move towards removing the Castro/Communist regime. Certainly the Cubans in exile and inside Cuba, who are the main covert assets of CIA, now expect this policy goal as the price of risking their lives."

The memorandum also contained a reference to the following "Mongoose Action":

"Harassment of and resistance to Cuban regime.

"Status: 3 teams (2- to 5-man) en route by small craft today. 6 teams by submarine, starting tomorrow. One more team being readied to go in by small craft. 10 more teams being readied to go by submarine shortly. One team now in Oriente and one team in Pinar del Rio. All teams have W/T, arms, explosives."

Marginal notations in pencil on a carbon copy of this memorandum marked "Mr. Gilpatric" are as follows:

- 10 teams (3-7) to date
- 30 sent in
- 12 still active
- 3 teams rolled up
- 1 team in Pinar del Rio has lined up 200 Cubans
The minutes of the Special Group Augmented meeting state that:

"1. The meeting began with a discussion of the considerably increased activity in the dispatch, and preparation for dispatch, of agent teams. As a result of this discussion, it was agreed that all plans for dispatch should be suspended pending further examination; instructions were issued during the course of the meeting designed to recall the three teams already on the way.

"It was agreed that the first order of business with regard to these teams is to examine in detail the requirements toward which they could contribute. General Lansdale will arrange to get into contact with: (a) General Carroll, to examine what military requirements such agents could service; (b) similarly, the State Department for political intelligence requirements; (c) USIA for requirements peculiar to that Agency. After this examination, it will then be decided what the best use of these agent assets actually should be.

"2. Mr. McCone and Mr. Harvey said during the course of the discussion on agent teams, that the action taken had represented a unilateral decision by CIA and was not in response to specific military requirements. CIA had felt that this was within its sphere of responsibility, and particularly with respect to the first three teams had considered that it was a continuation of previously-approved operations. Mr. McCone commented that internal security in Cuba is now far more stringent than it was two weeks ago, thereby making agent operations much more difficult; he felt, therefore, that agent activity on this scale will only be justified if the responsible departments specifically require it for intelligence purposes.

"In this connection, General Taylor brought out that the Chiefs had approved the use of submarines for agent dispatch but had not been asked to review the operation in broader context. The Chiefs had concluded, however, that no revolt should be stimulated
unless and until the U.S. is ready to support it and that the military establishment does not wish to take over sabotage and similar operations at this time, although it should be prepared to do so if an invasion should be mounted. Mr. McConé agreed that it is possible that as the situation develops, CIA Cuban-operations might move under military control, but that such action is not indicated at this time."

The NSC version of last sentence of this reference has crossed out the words "agreed that it is possible that as the situation develops, CIA Cuban operations might move under military control." There is the following handwritten substitution: "stated that if an active military situation develops, CIA ops in the theater would move under military control."

The minutes continue as follows:

"3. Mr. Harvey made the point that the proposed agent dispatches would not use up all existing assets. He said that in the event of invasion, a sizeable number of Cubans could be trained quickly.

"4. The Attorney General and General Lansdale emphasized that the Cubans are entirely prepared to make the necessary sacrifices if they are in support of an approved plan. The Cubans do want, however, assurances that such activities are in fact approved at a high level.

"5. Mr. Bundy emphasized the importance of planning for the use of Cubans in political and civil activities during and after any military action. He felt that there should be established within the government some sort of "Office of Free Cuban Affairs," which probably should be placed within the Department of State. The activities of this office would be distinct from General Lansdale's operations but would be closely related to them. He pointed out that top priority should be given to selecting a man to head such an office. Mr. Bundy
also said that he thought a subcommittee of the NSC Executive Committee should be established to deal with MONGOOSE affairs.

"6. Mr. McNamara thought that MONGOOSE in the short-term should be considered in the context of (a) providing support for action designed to get rid of the missiles, and (b) support for a possible invasion.

"7. Specific discussion took place on points raised in the paper distributed at the meeting, as follows:

"a. CIA should continue to develop the balloon propaganda facilities, although it was recognized that by the target date of 1 December this capability might no longer be needed because of other methods of delivery.

"b. No major acts of sabotage should be undertaken at this time. This decision will be reviewed in about a week.

"c. General Lansdale should develop further plans to "help the Cubans to help themselves." Mr. Morales-Carrion should be brought into this planning.

"d. Political planning for the post-Castro period will be assigned to the "Office for Free Cuban Affairs."

"e. Establishment of USIA's new 50 KW transmitter in the Florida Keys should be expedited.

"8. It was reiterated that General Lansdale is the focal point for all MONGOOSE activities, that he is charged with their overall management and that he should be kept informed of all significant plans and activities in connection with the project."
33. Further actions with respect to the "agent teams" were taken on October 30 and 31, 1962. On October 30, John McConne sent a memorandum to Robert Kennedy, Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk and Lyman Lemnitzer advising as follows:

"This is to advise you that there are at the present time 20 intelligence collecting infiltration and guerrilla warfare teams who have been carefully trained and equipped with communication facilities available for such use as the JCS may indicate. These teams are all Cubans, there are no Americans or other foreign nationals included, they have been carefully selected by men familiar with the Cuban community and the tradecrafts involved and are ready to go. In addition there are a number of others who are partially trained that could be brought to a reasonable level of efficiency in a short time.

At a meeting on 26 October it was decided that General Lansdale would determine JCS requirements from General Carroll and State requirements for political information from Secretary Alexis Johnson and then determine what resources were available and what actions would be desirable to accomplish the needed results. CIA is awaiting word from General Lansdale. In the meantime, with General Lansdale's concurrence, CIA has taken steps to inform CINCLANT and several other Commands of the availability of the above assets."

On the same day, General Lansdale wrote a memorandum for the record, stating that:

"John McConne asked me to call him on the gray telephone this morning. I did so. He stated that he didn't know exactly how I was supposed to get word on this, so he was informing me to help out: at the Executive Council meeting this morning, the President had decided to hold back Operation Mongoose for the time being. Also, during the negotiations re Soviet missile bases in Cuba, there were
to be no Mongoose sabotage or similar militant operations. McConie said that he had informed General Carter of this, but was letting me know, as Chief of Operations, to let the operations team know; he mentioned that Alpha 66 and the approved sabotage of Cuban shipping were to be held, specifically.

"I commented that I had just received a copy of a memorandum from him to the Attorney General, the Sec/Def., etc., dated today, saying that CIA was still awaiting word from me on sending in 20 teams by submarine for intelligence collection, after I'd determined JCS and State requirements. I said that I had been told by McGeorge Bundy on Sunday, 28 October, to hold up action on this for 24 hours and had promptly notified CIA, and that yesterday, upon receipt of a memorandum from Bruce Cheever on this same subject, I had taken it up again with Bundy -- and Bundy had told me that he would tell McConie to have CIA hold everything. I presumed that Bundy had so informed McConie. Also, Harvey had called me Sunday night, asking my permission to discuss CIA assets with CINCLANT and JUWTF for contingency planning; I had given Harvey permission to assist in this planning, if he felt that the U.S. military needed more planning help from CIA.

"After the talk with McConie, I talked with Bruce Cheever who assured me that he had similar orders from Carter and that all militant actions under CIA were being held at a stop. I gave similar orders to General Johnson for Defense/JCS. Lt-Col Patchell concurrently informed State and USIA along the same lines."

34. Three memoranda written by General Lansdale on October 31, 1962 are reproduced in full at Tab 1.

35. On January 17, 1963 General Lansdale sent a memorandum on "Operation Mongoose Files." It stated:

"At the next meeting of the Special Group (5412),
request that the disposition of the Operation Mongoose files be decided upon. Much of this material is quite sensitive and requires continuing protection or secure destruction.

"The practical solution for the Mongoose files held by State, Defense, CIA, and USIA would be to turn them over to the officials within those Departments and Agencies now responsible for Cuban activities in the new coordinating committee. The remaining files, held by the Special Group (5412), the Attorney General, and the Mongoose Chief of Operations, might be consolidated and held in the files of the Chairman, Special Group (5412)."

On January 25, 1963, Mr. Parrott advised General Lansdale as follows:

"I have discussed your memorandum of the 17th of January with Mr. Bundy. He suggests that the disposition of these files be handled in accordance with your proposal. That is, the files in State, Defense, CIA, and USIA, would be taken over by the people now responsible for this operation, and the files held by you as Chief of Operations, could be transferred over to me as the custodian of the Special Group records."