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CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION OF YOUR
RELEASE OF INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. ASSASSINATED
GMB 2/24/64 (9803 RDD/RL 3/4/64 JFL)

*Amundson 12/9/61
James 1/11/61
WGB*

29 March 1967

SUBJECT: [SHAMROCK] (S)

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per CIA letter 9/23/68

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(S) 1/14/64 4/23/68

1. Please refer to your informal note, dated 27 March 1967, captioned as above, in which you propose to disseminate to the Department of Justice and Department of State a memorandum containing certain SHAMROCK information concerning the assassination of President Kennedy.

John F.

2. As you are aware, at a meeting on 18 January 1967 between representatives of your Bureau and this Agency to discuss the handling of SHAMROCK it was agreed that for the time being there would be no dissemination to other agencies of information from this source without prior agreement between your Bureau and this Agency, and that there will be no notification of other agencies about the existence of this new source at the present time. We gather that you are now prepared to make some dissemination of SHAMROCK information to other departments and agencies. We also believe that certain items of SHAMROCK's positive intelligence reporting could be disseminated at this time. However, before either your Bureau or this Agency make any dissemination of SHAMROCK information, we believe that we should reach agreement on the division of responsibility between our offices for dissemination of the various categories of information; on the appropriate source descriptions to be used in such disseminations, and on whether or not it might be necessary at this time to brief selected individuals in the Department of State and possibly the White House on the nature of the source.

3. Specifically, we would propose that your Bureau be responsible for the dissemination of all information pertaining to the internal security of the United States, while we would handle the dissemination of information pertaining to this Agency's counterintelligence responsibilities abroad, and to the Agency's own security responsibilities as well as positive intelligence reporting from the source.

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ENCLOSURE

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4. As far as source descriptions are concerned, we believe that it is important that the source description used by both your Bureau and the Agency clearly state that the reliability of the source himself (rather than simply that of his information) has not yet been established. For example, one of the following descriptions might be appropriate (S)(u)

a. "A confidential informant, contact with whom has been insufficient to establish his reliability"; (S)(u)

b. "A [Soviet] source whose reliability has not been established"; (S)(u)

c. "[Soviet official] who is aware that his information is being passed to the U.S. Government." (S)(u)

5. Because much of the positive intelligence information from [SHAMROCK] which we would propose to disseminate at this time deals with [United Nations] matters, and much of it will inevitably raise questions from consumers, we believe that we will ultimately find it necessary to discuss the existence and nature of the source with [Ambassador Goldberg] and [Secretary of State Rusk]. While we do not see any necessity for this at the present time, we do wish to call your attention to the fact that extensive dissemination of [SHAMROCK] information on [United Nations] matters will very likely require that this be done. (S)(u)

6. Even subject to agreement on the points raised above, however, we still have serious reservations about the dissemination of the information contained in your memorandum. This report deals with a subject which owing to exceptional circumstances makes objective evaluation of the information set forth extremely difficult. Essentially, the report contains two basic elements: the information about the KGB commission established to investigate the circumstances of President Kennedy's death, and information on Lee Harvey Oswald's relationship with the KGB. As far as we know, there has been no previous reporting on the existence of such a commission. It is important to note, however, that the alleged conclusions of this commission—that President Kennedy was killed by a conspiracy of right wing monopolists--have long comprised the standard Soviet line on this subject. To cite but two examples, KHRUSHCHEV took this tack in an interview he granted to columnist Drew Pearson in early 1964

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(see attached column from the Washington Post of 26 June 1964); a complete statement of the Soviet line on Kennedy's death is to be found in a book called "Where do the Tracks Lead?" [Kuda vedut sledy] by A. LORYSH and B. SERGEYEV, which was submitted for publication on 2 September 1964. This book spells out the theory of a right wing conspiracy in great detail. It is interesting in this connection that the surname of one of the two authors, SERGEYEV, is identical with the alias used by SITNIKOV in his contacts with both Pierre Salinger and Donald Brennan. In any event, aside from the existence of a KGB commission to consider the problem, none of the findings of the commission as reported by [SHAMROCK], are either new or significant. X (S)

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7. Further in this regard, we note that the identification of SITNIKOV as being chief of a sector, Information Section, International Department, Central Committee of the CPSU is misleading in that, according to [SHAMROCK], at the time that SITNIKOV was studying the assassination of President Kennedy he was still Deputy Chief of the Information Service, First Chief Directorate, KGB. (See transcript of Meeting #17, page 12, in which SHAMROCK dates SITNIKOV's transfer to the CC in 1965, when SKRYABIN retired and VIDYASOV became chief of the Information Service.) Furthermore, [SHAMROCK] ascribed to KULEBYAKIN, who was then Chief of the American Department of the FCD, the chief responsibility for weighing the evidence that had been gathered by KGB sources on the President's death. (See transcript of Meeting #4, page 18.) We suggest, therefore, that the report be made consistent by either including KULEBYAKIN's name or deleting SITNIKOV's; or at least the SITNIKOV be clearly identified as still within the KGB at the time. X (S)

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8. In connection with the Soviet assessment of President Kennedy contained on page 2 of your memorandum, we also note that [SHAMROCK] continued his discussion of this topic by providing the current Soviet assessment of President Johnson. (See transcript of Meeting #4, page 20.) While it is true that this assessment of President Johnson was in answer to a direct question by one of the interviewing officers and that the source's information on this is not directly relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy, we nonetheless believe that the juxtaposition of [SHAMROCK's] remarks on the two Presidents is X (S)

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significant and would be of some value to consumers in evaluating the report because of the similarity of these remarks to those made by ~~other~~ Soviet officials around the world in pursuance of what appears to be a semi-official "line." (A good example of this is to be found in SITNIKOV's meetings with Pierre Salinger in Moscow in the spring of 1965.) ~~X~~ [S]

9. Finally, it is the part of the report that deals with Lee Harvey Oswald's relations with the KGB--or rather the lack of such a relationship--that raises serious problems. As you are aware, much the same story about Oswald, although in considerably greater detail and allegedly based on first-hand knowledge, has been related by NOSENKO. This Agency firmly believes that NOSENKO did not in fact have first-hand knowledge of the relations between the KGB and OSWALD, and that NOSENKO's story on OSWALD is a KGB-prepared message. Similarly, this Agency believes that [SHAMROCK's] statements on OSWALD cannot automatically be accepted as accurate or valid, and that the exact nature of the KGB relationship with OSWALD has not yet been established. ~~X~~ [S]

Attachment
As Stated Above

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