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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

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Those Still Living

The list of names in the report of those still living, who had some role in the various activities, is long. The names picked out in the review of the draft are below:

- (1) James O'Connell
- (2) Robert Maheu
- (3) John Roselli
- (4) Santos Trafficante
- (5) (FNU) Maceo
- (6) Tony Varona
- (7) Juan Orta
- (8) J. C. King
- (9) William Harvey
- (10) Samuel Halpern
- (11) Bronson Tweedy
- (12) Sidney Gottlieb
- (13) ~~Arnold Silver~~ 03
- (14) Edward Gunn
- (15) (FNU) Gomez (otherwise unidentified in text)
- (16) Henry Dearborn
- (17) John Barfield
- (18) Robert Owen
- (19) ~~Alonzo Berry~~ 03
- (20) ~~Colonel Wimer~~ 06
- (21) David Phillips
- (22) Justin O'Donnell
- (23) Glenn Fields
- (24) Lou Concin
- (25) John Richardson
- (26) ~~David R. Smith~~ 03

This list omits persons not directly involved other than in the line of command, from the level of Deputy Director up. Two division chiefs are listed--J. C. King and Bronson Tweedy--and might, by reason of their seniority, be omitted from the list of those whose names should be deleted. The list, otherwise, is a mix of Agency employees, cooperating individuals, and agents. The comments below first treat the question of Agency employees.

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Agency Employees

The day-to-day record of events is subject to relatively direct reconstruction, and the draft opts for detailed recitation. In some instances, the format calls for treatment of the same subject matter from more than one point of view. Relying on this approach, there has been extensive recording of the true names of individuals. This is so extensive in some sections of the report that major editorial revision will be required to protect those entitled to it.

Those employees still living--either still active or retired--require protection from whatever repercussions that might flow from official connection with the reported events. They are entitled to this both in traditional terms of protection of employees and agents in their work, and in terms of separating them from such unpredictable incidents as may flow from publication.

Other U. S. Employees

Publication of the names of Henry Dearborn, John Barfield (Department of State) in connection with the Trujillo affair should be omitted (Section E). Mention of ~~Colonel Wimer~~⁷⁰⁶ (Section F) in connection with the Schneider affair also should be accorded the same treatment.

Cooperating Individuals

Robert Maheu, whatever publicity he has been given, is entitled to protection from official confirmation of the press stories. Not only is he entitled to protection from direct association in the Castro operation, he is entitled to protection from incidental revelation of his involvement in other unrelated activities (The report cites his involvement in an Onassis-Niarchos contest, on which he reported to the government, and in making ~~a motion picture to discredit a foreign leader~~).

The Syndicate members through whom Maheu worked pose a somewhat different problem, but the same central issue remains. We cannot divine how publicity would impact on their future. Giancana is dead, presumably as a result of unrelated events, but how publicity would affect Trafficante

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and Maceo is debatable. Both are entitled to this protection. Roselli, now engaged in deportation proceedings, may wish the publicity to strengthen a claim to special consideration, but he nevertheless is entitled to the same protection that the others are.

Great care is taken to conceal the identity of an action asset inside Cuba (Section D.I., pp 18-19), but his true name appears at page 21. He is believed to still be alive, and is entitled to protection.

The full name of Tony Varona appears often. (Section D.I. p 19, ff). He is entitled to protection.

One man named in the draft, but unknown to this reviewer, (FNU) Gomez (Section E, p 5), should be checked for identification. He would seem entitled to protection, in the context that he is mentioned.

The name of ⁰³ ~~Alonzo Berry~~ is included (Section E, pp 16-22, p. 31). Although he has received publicity in the past, he is entitled to protection from official confirmation of his role in the Trujillo affair.

Section F. pp 30-42. The listing by name of a number of Chilean officers, some of whom have been tried in Chile for their role in plotting, would reveal additionally contacts with a foreign power. This might open them to new charges at some time in the future.

Reference Inaccurately Conveying
Impression of Operational Involvement of American Citizen

D.I. pp 28-29. In reporting the various schemes conceived at working levels in CIA to infect a diving suit, the impression is conveyed that Attorney James Donovan might be aware of what was being discussed, while there is no evidence that he was. His being mentioned in true name, in this context, is subject to correction.

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Uninvolved Bystanders

Recitation of the Las Vegas bugging incident is such as to expose both Dan Rowan and the person associated with him in the incident. Official publication would give the press a free run at this unnecessary detail in a private life. (Section D. I. pp 13-17).

Identification by Description

In some instances, where the actual name is not recorded, the description is such that the identification can be made readily by knowledgeable persons.

Section D.I. p. 4. The summary of an offer by a Cuban pilot in July 1960, to cause an accident that would kill senior Cuban officials, makes his identification a relatively simple thing for the Cuban DGI.

Section D.I. pp 29-34. The description of AMLASH/1 is such that his identity is fairly simple. Were there any doubt, the citing of specific dates on which he was met outside Cuba (pp 31, 33, 34 and 35) would make it very clear who he is. He is now in prison in Cuba and is entitled to this protection.

Section E. Even if the name of COS Ciudad Trujillo is omitted, the title is still revealing to knowledgeable persons. More general reference to cables to and from the "Station" would generalize the identity, assuming that any reference is necessary.

Section F. p 27. The COS is cited but not named. It is preferable that reference be to the "Station" and not to him as an individual.

Section F. pp 30-42. In conjunction with a listing of Chilean officers by name (supra), the additional identification of a "Lieutenant Colonel," a "Navy Captain," and an "Air Force General," presumably not previously identified, could lead to further inquiry in Chile. General reference to "Chilean military figures" should suffice, if any treatment is necessary.

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Section G. The use of the pseudonym "Hedgman" for the Chief of Station in Leopoldville/Kinshasa would be illusory if it is intended to conceal his identity. Those knowledgeable would soon penetrate the device. Some more general reference to the CIA Station is a minimum requirement.

²⁴ Section G. p 13. The direct citation of Station use of a ~~Congolese security man~~ who was in liaison with the CIA Station would permit his ready identification.

Cryptonyms

The draft report employs cryptonyms of agents and operations that probably should not be contested. New digraphs may be necessary in the Latin American Division (e. g., AMLASH, JMWAVE), but these probably cannot be avoided. Preferably they should not be used, but the Rockefeller Report set a precedent that might as well be followed.

Section F. p 21. Reference to the initials "CAS" is no more than a designation employed by other government agencies in referring to CIA in certain communications. It should be replaced by the "CIA" initials, if used at all.

Sources and Methods

It is impossible to treat the entire subject of these various operations, recording day-to-day activities in such detail, without revealing a great deal about patterns of thought and activity that will reveal a great deal to foreign intelligence analysts about CIA techniques, attitudes and modus operandi. The draft report is highly revealing, in its extensive detail. While it would be misleading in some respects, it nevertheless reveals a great deal about staff planning at lower levels (prior to elevating the results, if ever, for senior review), methods for approaching potential agents (and considerations in how to try to bring them under control and direct them), use of cut-outs, etc. Some specific revelations are noted below:

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Section D.I. pp 22-28. In describing Harvey's past and other roles, interesting bits of information are revealed to the knowledgeable analyst. Harvey's role with the Berlin tunnel is cited. Description of his later division--surreptitious acquisition of codes--could present an interesting organizational concept for the analyst. The recruitment of a foreign agent for his criminal talents, by a named Agency employee working for Harvey (according to the draft report), would be read by foreign analysts for what it was, a man to steal codes. The speculation in the draft report doesn't seem to support a rationale for including these bits of information.

Section D.I. pp 29-34. It is noted above that AMLASH could be identified by the pattern of his foreign meetings. It also highlights the ability of the Agency to follow the coming-and-going of foreign intelligence targets, an item that would attract the attention of foreign CI analysts.

Section D.I. p 38. Reference to a meeting in Madrid between AMLASH and another Agency operational contact, arranged by the Agency without the knowledge of either participant, is a technique that should not be publicized.

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