**Agency Information**

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**Document Information**

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| FROM:       | HARVEY, WILLIAM K. |
| TO:         | LANSDALE, EDWARD G. |
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- OPERATION MONGOOSE
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*Case #: NW 53244 Date: 06-13-2017*
11 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General E. G. Lansdale

SUBJECT: Operation MONGOOSE - Sabotage Actions

REFERENCE: Top Secret Memorandum, Subject: Phase II Operation MONGOOSE, dated 31 August 1962

1. This memorandum is in response to the Special Group (Augmented) stated desire for more aggressive sabotage action and is forwarded to you to provide a background on the implementing actions we are undertaking.

2. The following is a summary of our current thinking and planned actions to expand sabotage operations. As our plans progress, additional actions may be proposed and some mentioned below may be discarded.

MARITIME SABOTAGE:

A. Cuban Owned Ships: A paper awaits presentation to the Special Group (Augmented) at the next meeting. Upon receiving policy approval, we are prepared to initiate selected operations as the opportunities occur.

B. Non-Bloc Shipping Carrying Carges to or from Cuban Ports: We are expanding our intelligence coverage of all phases of this category of ships and cargo and where possible are assisting in the program to convince shipowners to withhold charters from the Cuban trade. In addition, we will shortly submit a paper requesting policy approval to harass such shipping and where feasible sabotage the cargoes even though it may endanger the ships and crews of friendly or neutral nations. In some cases, we may be able to attack the cargoes prior to being placed aboard ship.

[Additional text redacted]
C. Bloc Shipping: We are studying possible ways of gaining access to the target. Some degree of access should be afforded at points such as the Panama Canal or non-Bloc country ports. We are also considering mining and hit-and-run operations in Cuban ports and waters. Operational plans for this category of target will be submitted on an individual basis as realistic opportunities develop.

D. Mining of Cuban Harbors: We are actively investigating the feasibility and practicality of mining the entrance of selected Cuban harbors with non-United States Government attributable mines. We will present the results of our study to you when completed and in the meantime we will keep you advised of our progress.

E. Blocking a Cuban Harbor by Sinking a Ship in the Entrance Channel: We have under consideration a specific proposal to block the entrance to Mariel harbor. After investigating all possible information and operational facets of the proposal and if it appears feasible, we will present a specific proposal to the Special Group (Augmented) for policy review.

F. Attacks Against Cuban Port Facilities and/or Ships by UDT Swimmers: This is under active consideration. A limited number of Cuban UDT swimmers are available and are being re-trained as necessary. In particular, we are interested in devising an attack on the Soviet craft including the Komar boats. Specific proposals will be submitted at a later date.

SABOTAGE OF LAND TARGETS

A. Major Sabotage Targets: Attached is a list of the key industrial and communications targets in Cuba. We are currently checking each one to
SABOTAGE TARGETS IN ORDER OF ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE IN CUBA

1. Consolidated Steam Power Plant (Havana). (143,000 kw) Attack through transformers - Out-going cables - Cable vault.


3. Water Aqueducts (three/3) (Havana). Use negative buoyancy limpets (without magnets), place through breather vents.

4. Diesel Railroad Locomotives (approximately 180 to 200) (Havana). Attack through lubricating oil with additive to destroy.

5. Sewerage Disposal Pump-house (Havana). Destroy one (1) special unreplaceable transformer.


10. Micro-wave at San Jose, Madruga, Colliseo.

11. CMQ TV (11 Stations). Attack SAG 19 Kloston tubes with "clams."


13. Pier I and Warehouse (Mariel). Attack by mining channel and incendiaries in warehouse.


15. Esso Refinery (Havana). Salt water cooling pump with shaped charge on instrument house, 100 pounds C 4.

17. Hydrogen Plant Melones (Havana). Needed for German electric generators Consolidated and Regla Power Plants. Will reduce electric power by 60,000 kw. Attack with shaped charge.

18. Matahambre Copper Mine (Santa Lucia). Attack cable tramway (4,000 kw) electric generator and unloading stipple.


22. Rincon de Melones (Havana). Diesel electric power plant and transformer yard using platter charges.

23. NARANJITO Sub-Station (Electric) (Havana). Attack using platter or engineer shaped charges.

24. PRINCIPE Sub-Station (Electric) (Havana). Attack using platter or engineer shaped charges.

25. Tropical Sub-Station (Electric) (Havana). Attack transformer with platter charges.


27. Steam Electric Power Plant (Cienfuegos).


32. Electric Power Sub-Station (Cuatro Caminos). Attack transformers.

33. Bauta Radio Station.

NOTE: Targets are included on this list due to economic importance. It must be recognized that on the basis of operational studies many may never be attacked due to lack of access or for other valid operational reasons.
determine vulnerabilities, possibilities of access and methods of attack. When attacks against specific targets are considered feasible, specific operations proposals will be submitted for approval. At the same time, we are re-training our presently available sabotage/raider group of approximately 25 men. We have commenced to recruit and train an additional independent sabotage/raider group. It must be realized, however, that the training of this specialized group will require at a minimum 120 days before they can be considered effective. We will discuss with Defense the joint training of additional groups. In addition, we have twenty small 3 to 5 man resistance teams in various stages of recruitment, training, or final briefing. The orientation of some of these teams may be switched to sabotage if circumstances so dictate.

Consideration is being given to providing limited financial and logistics support to selected exile groups to test their claimed capability for sabotage within Cuba. A paper requesting policy approval will be submitted on this.

D. Harassment Operations: Operations are being considered against selected installations and facilities for the purpose of harassing Cuban and/or Soviet Bloc personnel, or of damaging or destroying key targets. Our initial proposal will be for a series of strikes against facilities near the coast such as missile sites, military airfields or naval facilities. These will consist of hit-and-run operations such as lobbing mortar shells into a base or assaults on lightly held positions on coastal islands or camps. A demolition operation against one of several key bridges is also under consideration. Definitive proposals against specific targets will be submitted shortly.

C. Encouraging Widespread Minor Acts of Sabotage: Implementation of the balloonleaflet delivery capability will permit mass delivery of elementary sabotage. Fostering this development, opportunity to significantly implement this will be limited.
D. **Economic Denial Operations:** Goods destined for shipment to or from Cuba will be attacked whenever it is feasible to do so. In most cases, such as the recent sugar case and the cane cutting machine, these will be targets of opportunity offering little advance warning and limited access. Currently, we are determining the feasibility of action against several specialized petroleum product shipments, the shipment of jute bags for the sugar crop, and a large electric transformer. Specific proposals will be submitted when the operation involves unusual operational or security risks and when time and circumstances permit.

3. In our proposals for Phase II, Operation MONGOOSE, we pointed out some pertinent factors regarding sabotage operations including that sufficient access to the target may be denied due to Cuban security measures which are becoming progressively more effective; that the ability to infiltrate and exfiltrate black teams depends upon existing circumstances including Cuban security controls, logistics, and motivation of agent material and the willingness of the Cuban population to support infiltrators. Mention also was made of the necessity to simultaneously maintain an aggressive, provocative propaganda campaign with clear authority to engage in high "noise level" types of propaganda operations calling for work stoppages, slowdowns, sabotage and other forms of militant mass action. These limiting factors are still pertinent. In addition, it was pointed out that if a maximum type action program was to be undertaken, extensive support was required from the Department of Defense. Such support will again be requested as the various proposals outlined above reach the detailed implementation stage.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY

DDP/DC/TFW:BBCheever:jeo (11 October 1962)

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