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DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Future Policy toward Cuba

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By AFQ NARA, Date 8/09

Policy

Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the overthrow of the Castro regime and its replacement by one sharing the aims of the Free World. Our immediate objectives are to weaken the regime; frustrate its subversive intentions; further reduce its influence in the Hemisphere; and increase the cost to the Bloc of sustaining the regime (or split the regime off from the Bloc).


A policy of containing, undermining, discrediting and isolating the Castro regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic economic, psychological and other pressures will achieve these immediate objectives and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective.

Courses of Action

This annex will be circulated to ExCom members at the meeting called to discuss the memo.

The following overt* courses of action should be undertaken:

1. OAS action: condemning the Castro regime for its duplicity; extending the trade embargo to all items except



* for the program of covert actions, please see Annex A.

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except foodstuffs, medicines and medical supplies; further limiting air and sea communications between the Hemisphere and Cuba; authorizing air and other surveillance; and warning Cuba against continued promotion of subversive and sabotage activities.

*only if
announced*

2. Establishment of Caribbean security arrangements through ministerial level meetings of the Caribbean countries for the purposes of reaching agreement on increasing the intensity of surveillance of coastal and international waters; increased surveillance and control of land boundaries; increased control over subversive activities within national boundaries; systematic exchange of intelligence information; and, development of procedures for coordination of military contingency planning for emergencies.



3. Application of the four-point shipping restrictions re Cuba.

4. Inclusion by NATO of Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited.

5. Dissuasion of Free World industrial nations from shipping crucial spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

6. Persuasion of non-Bloc nations to limit their airlines service to Cuba and to withhold transit rights to Soviet aircraft serving Cuba.

OAS

Spelled

Committee
- subversive

7. Persuasion of Latin American nations to limit the travel of their nationals to Cuba and to intensify measures to prevent agents and groups of international communism from carrying on their subversive activities.

8. Persuasion of appropriate OAS organs to study urgently the transfer of funds to the other American Republics for subversive purposes, the plan of subversive propaganda and the utilization of Cuba as a base for training in subversive techniques; and to make recommendations to the member states regarding counter-measures.

9. Maintenance of currently enhanced VOA medium wave facilities beamed to Cuba and adoption by VOA of a more aggressive line toward Cuba.

10. Facilitation of Cuban exiles' entry into the United States Armed Forces for training, and formation of reserve units thereafter.

Timing

We should surface our program of isolating and weakening Cuba when it becomes clear that our discussions on Cuba with the Soviets are unlikely to be fruitful. Actions with respect to Cuba which may contribute substantially to creating a situation calling for United States military action should be withheld until the Soviet combat units have been removed from Cuba or efforts to persuade the USSR to remove them have failed.

12/3/62