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that something behind the Iron Curtain had been put in motion in his behalf. Our investigation of this particular problem has come up with the following results:

In the first place, both Chayes and McVickar have their dates wrong. This does not reflect on their capabilities, because they are undoubtedly basing their conclusions upon State Department memoranda which were in turn based upon statements made at the time by Oswald himself, and subsequent investigation has shown that these were probably inaccurate. Oswald's American passport, which he of course had in his possession at the time he traveled to Russia, was subsequently surrendered to the Department of State, after he was repatriated, and has since been placed in the hands of the Commission. Stamps on this passport show that the Soviet Tourist Visa was issued (not applied for) in Helsinki on October 14. Confidential information made available from a source which the CIA says is "very reliable" relates that Oswald arrived by airplane from London in Helsinki on October 10. Everything we know about his trip points to the fact that he proceeded to his destination, Moscow, as rapidly and as directly as his financial resources would permit. Despite statements made to fellow travelers along the way that he was "only a tourist" or "just a student on his way to college," he in fact wasted no time in sightseeing but made connections as rapidly as he reasonably could. Therefore, although we have no direct evidence indicating when he first applied for a visa, it seems highly probable that he applied for it as soon as he arrived in Helsinki, namely, on the 10th of October. Perhaps, however, his airplane arrived in Helsinki too late for him to have reached the Consulate before it closed that evening. Should this have

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Gutierrez came around a corner of a wall and bumped into the Cuban who was talking with the American, thereby seeing them both for a split second face-to-face. He apologized, the Cuban graciously accepted the apology, and all three men immediately continued walking in their respective directions. When he overheard their conversation, however, which must have been resumed almost instantaneously, Gutierrez turned around to get another look. Thus, he got a good look only of the backs of both men. Likewise, when he followed them to their automobile, he saw them only from a distance and again only their backs. The conclusion of the FBI representatives assigned to this case is that Gutierrez probably did see money being passed to a man who appeared to be an American, but that whether that man was Lee Harvey Oswald is by no means certain.

From reviewing his work schedule, which he says he rigorously adhered to, Gutierrez is able to fix the time at which he must have seen the Cuban and the American as 10:50 a.m. on October 1, give or take a very few minutes. From the CIA wire-tapping facilities in Mexico City we know that at exactly 10:30 a.m. on October 1 Lee Harvey Oswald telephoned into the Soviet Embassy and spoke very briefly with someone there. The conversation was short because he was not able to reach the person who was handling his case (the Consul) and therefore was quickly asked to call back on a different number. We do not know, nor do we have any way of finding out, from where Oswald was telephoning. At 11:30 a.m., exactly, he telephoned the number which had been given to him at 10:30 a.m. - the Russian Consulate - and had a slightly longer conversation about whether the telegram sent to Washington had been answered. The Cuban and Russian Consulates in Mexico City are located very close to one another, only

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now possess. Moreover, the sensitivity of this precise point had not been brought to the attention of the FBI interrogators. It is not inconceivable that when Nosenko says the first word the KGB received was when Oswald arrived in "Moscow" that he was speaking loosely and meant when Oswald arrived in "Russia" or "at the Russian border." Or what is even at least as likely, that Nosenko really does not remember the precise moment at which Oswald first made his intentions known to the Soviet Government.)

One other piece of evidence relating to the same point should be brought to the attention of the Commission. The following paragraph is an exact quote from a CIA report (Commission No. 698):

"c. October 1959: Stockholm newspaper, Dagens Nyheter, of 25 November 1963 states Lee OSWALD passed through Sweden during October 1959. Article also adds that OSWALD was unsuccessful in obtaining visa to the USSR in Helsinki which resulted in his returning to Stockholm. Two days after he arrived in Stockholm OSWALD traveled directly to Moscow. Concluding sentence of article states 'This indicates that the Russian Embassy (Stockholm) gave him a visa.' According to a reliable source there was no record that there was any request for a USSR visa processed through normal channels for OSWALD at any time during 1959, and source indicated it was difficult to explain how OSWALD might have received his visa in two days without going through normal channels. The only conclusion which can be drawn is that OSWALD must have received his visa directly from the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm which occasionally is done in special cases, but the source had no evidence to confirm this assumption."

The information contained in the foregoing paragraph is flatly at variance with the other CIA report, previously mentioned, to the effect that Oswald stayed in Helsinki after having arrived there on October 10, with the information obtained from Oswald's American passport, with his own statement to the American Embassy in Moscow on October 31, 1959, and with the documentary material given us by the Russian Government. All

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*Discussions but intended
business of marital journey*

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makes no sense if the intent was to facilitate Oswald's return to his native country. It does make sense, however, if Marina was so important to the contemplated use of Oswald that the additional difficulties in connection with repatriation which would be added by the marriage, were worthwhile. It also makes sense, of course, on the hypothesis that Marina herself, rather than Oswald, is the Russian agent. This latter conjecture, though perhaps somewhat startling at first, is probably at least as plausible as the conjecture that Marina and Oswald were agents together. All the questioning which Marina has undergone since the assassination has shown that she is an intelligent, coolheaded woman. She had a rather unfortunate affair with her business manager after the assassination which might have been caused by her being carried away by her emotions. This is not necessarily evidence that she is not coolly calculating, however. The incident is equally explainable as a simple miscalculation on her part that it was either necessary or desirable from a survival viewpoint. Moreover, if the Russians were anxious to plant an agent in the United States, marrying her to a repatriating defector would be a comparatively easy means of transporting her here.

Facts tending against the speculations of the previous paragraph include the following: First, according to the statements of Marina herself and of her acquaintances, she learned practically no English as long as her husband was alive. This was supposed to be mainly because he was so jealous of her that he feared even this small degree of independence on her part, but also because she was so exclusively home and children oriented that she just did not care to make the effort to

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when she testified to the Commission that, as just related, Oswald had told her that he was going and why. The few witnesses we have who spoke with Oswald while he was on a bus going to Mexico City confirm what Marina has stated, that Oswald's intent was to evade the travel ban by reaching Cuba by way of Mexico.

The Mexican law-enforcement authorities and the CIA and FBI have all carried on extensive investigations within Mexico of Lee Harvey Oswald's activities there. These three groups have produced evidence which appears quite firm that when Oswald appeared at the Cuban and Soviet Embassies he told them that his destination was Russia, not Cuba, and that he only wanted an "in-transit" visa for Cuba in order that he might visit that country on his way to the Soviet Union. When he visited these embassies he carried with him newspaper clippings, letters and various documents (some forged by himself) purporting to show that he was a "friend of Cuba." With these papers, and with his proven record of previous residence in the Soviet Union and marriage to a Soviet national, he tried to curry favor with both embassies, but the attempt seemingly failed. His last known telephone call to the Russian Embassy in Mexico City ended with the Consular official with whom he was talking hanging up in the middle of a question Oswald was trying to ask, and Marina has testified that when she first saw him after his return to the United States he was discouraged and convinced that he would never reach Cuba.

When questioned on the discrepancy between his telling her that he wanted to get to Cuba and his telling the Cuban and Russian Embassies that his ultimate destination was Russia, Marina answered

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