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CIA
7-13-78
Wash, D.C.

Inspector General's Report - 1977-

Subj: Comments on Book II, SSC Final Report - The Investigation of the Assassination of President Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies.

Introduction

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- states the principal theme of Book II is the possibility of retaliatory theory by Castro & that the CIA operations specifically may have caused any possible actions by Castro.
- the CIA notes that many tensions between the U.S. & U.S.S.R. & Cuba existed at the time-
- p. 3- states that the persons involved at a senior level in the invest of 1964 (Warner Comm) are no longer in the CIA
- primary reliance placed on the records; looked into all Cuban operations & carefully analyzed the content & nature with sp. attention to security contained in TABS B-G
- CIA also conducted an invest. looking at the "other end" - to see if a theoretical provocation theory could have occurred.
- feels that the SSC tried to make AMLASH fit the pattern. (p.5)

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- Report concludes that the WC invest. the possibility of Cuban or Soviet involvement & did not find it - since the WC did not report anything it did not exist "To hold differently would be to accept uncritically a social paranoia often prevalent today, which ~~SECRET~~ would hold that a significant number of government employees could engage in such a well-disciplined conspiracy to suppress evidence.

(p.5)

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p.6 - AMTRUNK operation, started in 1963,

- purpose - join dissident elements in Cuban leadership in effort to oust Castro. - slow in developing; little progress during JFK's life. In 1965, it was believed to be compromised & CIA withdrew from the operation.

- states that there are basic questions about the security of the operation. - Center could have known from the beginning.
- since it did not develop momentum until after JFK's death, probably not related.

p.6 AMLASH - SSC says that this operation planned Castro's assassin. preceding the murder of JFK; the CIA holds otherwise, "prior to the Pres' assassination not only had CIA not agreed to give any support to AMLASH /1, but had repelled his proposals to assassinate Castro." (p 7)

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- Rpt then says that the SSC was offered this confirming evidence but dismissed it out of hand as false - SSC would only admit that AMLASH /1 was at least indiscreet in his actions. Rpt says that the SSC suggests that he "may have been acting for Castro as a provocateur, to lead the US into a plot against Castro's life which in turn ~~was~~ was then to provide Castro with the justification to order President Kennedy's assassination." (p 7)

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- Rpt says that had Castro learned of AMLASH /1,

he would only know that an inclusion relationship existed.

TAB A

- - response to Book II object - study group established to view the problem - chaired by a rep. from the O of IG - also consisted of members from C.I. staff, LA Division, & OS. (p.1)

good indicator

Two points emphasized.

- 1) "to conduct a full review of information and operations on the Cuban target to identify any activity that might relate to the assassination of Pres. Kennedy, and
- 2) to review the possibility that CIA activities against Castro, and, by their nature, cause Castro to order the assassination of President Kennedy." (p. 1-2)

- main files for the period held is
 LA DIVISION } Directorate of Operations
 C.I. STAFF }

- also less voluminous files held in OS & IG. (p. 2)

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LA DIVISION - file review from 1 Jan 61
to 1 Jan 65. (p.2)

- research group composed of 5 full-time
researcher, a group leader & a task
force supervisor - an additional 4
researchers participated in different phases.
(p.2)

Types & Number of Files Rev (p.3)

- | | |
|---|-----------------|
| (1) Operational | |
| (601 with findings and
with no findings) | 1,128
1,729 |
| (2) Subject files | |
| (186 with findings +
with no findings) | 361
547 |
| (3) Cella Policy Files | 101 |
| (4) Chief, WH Division Chrono Files
(TASK FORCE W CHRONOS) | 37 |
| (5) Official 201 Dossiers | <u>100-plus</u> |
| | TOTAL 2,514 |

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- the rpt also notes that as a result of a memorandum prepared by the Cuban desk, in August 1975, they had traces of the names that appeared in the so-called Black Book that Castro passed to McGovern. (p 4)

C.I. STAFF

- assigned me senior officer to review the files on LHO.

"Oswald File" - so called - nonfiled 57 volumes - comprises some 142 file folders and portfolios. - has also accumulated some 50 supplemental files.

- this is now the Agency's - central repository for info & documentation

- a. Life of LHO

- b. Agency's role in the INUCR 1963-64

- c. testimony by various Agency officers before several commissions & committees

- d. FOIA request responses. (p 6)

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Office of Security

- assigned me officer to identify material; included volume on LHO, AMLASH, various ind. connected with the Criminal Underworld Plot, and a collection of names concerning name trace conducted at the time of the Garrison investigation. p 8

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Office of Ins General

- two members of staff - also employed on a contract a retired employee who had served as a special case officer in Mexico city during the period preceding JFK's death & during the invest. afterwards. - conducted an extensive review of all Mex city records p 9

~~ADDED~~

Terms of Reference agreement 4 Aug 76

p. 6 - signed by
S.D. Breckinridge

OIG

Robert Wall OI

William Sturbitts LA Division

Raymond Beardon OS

TAB B CIA Performance ON THE INQUIRIES

p. 1 - says that Book II of the SCC Final Report portrayed a pattern of neglect not supported by the evidence.

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- mentions "D"

AMLASH - p(2)

Oswald's board p 3-5

- this section deals with Book II allegations of mishandling various aspects of the investigation - it does not deal with the retaliation ideas.

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p.10 - mentions the two Havana flights to Havana from Mexico City on 22 November & 27 NOV 1963 -

p.11 - CIA conducted regular surveillance of Havana flights - filing cable reports to Hdqtrs. - one unilateral CIA surveillance team -

LIFIRE - reported a departure & arrivals.

p.11 - also, a telephone operation (LIFE NOY) against the Cuban embassy provided transcripts of conversations with the Cuban office & the Mex. Airport Control Office.

TABC CIA OPERATIONS AGAINST CUBA

p.6 - areas of operational activity

1. Oper. directed against Cuban leadership - AMTRUNK

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2. Oper. involving the criminal underworld.

3. Other reports to assassinate Castro.

Operation AMTRUNK - p. 7

- to develop capability for splitting the leadership of Cuba & eventual overthrow never reached the point of implementation -

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p. 7

early 1963 - two Cuban exiles - wished to change Cuba

{ Nestor Antonio Moreno Lopez
Enrique Cayardo Lora

developed operational concept "Lemaire Plan"

p 8

- assoc of Moreno was Jorge Azkargoye Volsky - in Miami in 1961.

p 8

Cayardo & Moreno - discussed plan with Volsky - Volsky then discussed it with Tadew Witold Syzyc, NYTIMES.

p 8

- Syzyc had developed friendship with many Cubans. incl Ambassador John C. Wilcy. Syzyc reportedly could see both Kennedys & Bundy any time he wanted.

- early '63 - Syzyc arranged an int. in Wash with Mr. Richard Goodwin, a White House advisor.

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Volsky & Syzyc then met with Robert Herwitsch, a senior official in the Dep't of State, who presented the concept to the CIA with approval. CIA

p 8

assigned it to Miami station - known as AMTRUNK

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p 9

AMTRUNK - conceived as identifying key personnel in Cuban Armed forces who could be

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used to overthrow the castro regime.

p 9 - by Aug, 1963, events had still not progressed far

early Sept 1963 AMTASNIK had 3
intelligence sources in Cuba:

Miguel A. Diez Salgue
Ramon Guin Hector Robello
Modesto Orozco Basulto

One of these sources, Guin, was close
to AMTASNIK/. p 9

- nothing developed over many months; by
1965 its security had been seriously
jeopardized & the decision was made
to end all connection. (p. 10)

p. 11 - CIA says they discuss this operation
because of its weakness from the beginning -
say that Szulc & Volsky are highly
suspect & are discredited - also are
other person.

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Tad Szulc - suspect since '48 when FBI
records said he was a Communist -
his daughter, Nicole Szulc, reportedly
an avid Communist. She is believed
to be an agent of the Cuban DGI.
Doubts about Tad Szulc are unconfirmed

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but still alive.

p. 11 Jose Ajkuszyc Volosky - like Szyble,
of Polish origin; Volosky & Szyble
became acquainted during 59-60 in
Cuba. suspected of being a
Communist, not confirmed.

p. 12. Jose Ricardo ~~But~~ Rabel Nunez

p. 13 - involved in AMTRUNK ~~+~~ through
the JM WAVE station - accusation
that he was a Cuban agent -
never proven.

p. 14 CIA says there was very little ^{proper} planning
and no ~~any~~ concrete planning of
AMTRUNK during JFK's life

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NEW CONSIDERATIONS ON THE SYNDICATE
OPERATION



p. 14 - mentions a by-line story by Paul Meisid
in the NY Times, 20-25 April, 1975,
which quoted Frank Sturgis.

Daily
news

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Sturgis says the Wood arsenals scheme
involved a bomb in Castro's office -
Sturgis says he knew Juan Orta.

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(*) p. 15 - CIA says this news article is the first public reference to Juan Orta, is the role of an arm in the plan against Castro.

p. 16 - Orta was the man the CIA had, in the operation with the syndicate, to kill Castro

says that the plan failed (poison) because Orta lost his position in January, 1961 - prior to delivery of the pills in late Feb or early March 1961.

p. 16 says that Orta's role was over when he took refuge in the Venezuelan Embassy in Havana in 1961 - April. Left Cuba in 1964 & settled in Miami in Feb, 1965.

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on p. 15 the rpt says that Slays claimed on a number of occasions that he had a special relationship² was an employee of the CIA, although no record of any such relationship.

"He was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban employees in the Miami area, but had no direct relationships with the Agency."

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① p. 17 - Rpt says that because Sturgis knew of Orta's involvement in some plot it raises the question of whether Sturgis may have been a source of info to Castro.

p 17 - New York Daily News - 13 June 76 - refers to possible relationship btwn Sturgis & Trappicante - also mentions Norman Rothman as a gambling partner of Trappicante.

p 17 - says that it is interesting to note that Juan Orta's availability to the Mafia was understood ~~to~~ to be due to his having lost payoffs that he had once received from gambling interests. Then goes on to say two ways for Sturgis & Orta to have known each other

1. mutual gambling activities
2. - heads of gambling activities

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① p 18 N Y Daily News - 1976 - story by Marie Loreny in 1960 acted for Sturgis in an attempt to assassinate Castro. This story says that soon after her mission failed the CIA recruited Mafia mobsters to kill Castro.

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Loreny claims that the plan involved the use of poison pills concealed

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in a jar of face cream, she said they dissolved & could not be used.

p 18 - Rpt next mentions Oct 18, 1960 FBI memo re: Graniana - concludes that it involves a woman to kill Castro but that the date is too early for the CIA work. (no delivery until late Feb, 1961). Rpt says that the syndicate may have been moving on its own.

p 19 Following collapse of CIA's access to Castro through Orta, Roselli said he knew Cuban exile leader, DeVarma, who might join. - mentions that DeVarma not satisfied with the CIA support of the exile movement to date & that the Miami Station suspected he was not keeping bargain with agency.

- concludes that Varma may have already been involved in plots with mafia when CIA approached him. Two FBI xps bear on this:

1) 21 Dec 60 - CIA rec. support for some Cuban

p 20 2) 18 Jan 61 - Varma one of those rec. support, not confirmed.

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(A) p20 - Rpt says that although the operation with maps called off after BOP (4-61) it seemed like it was still going on when re-activated in April, 1962.

p26 Agent Henays in 1961 Mentions Plans to Kill Castro.

p26 3 messages - seem to relate to same plan - same agnts.

27 March 1961 - sent by an agency asset, AM BRONC/5. - proposed sabotage of an elec. co. in Havana; could be coordinated with attempts against Fidel in public appearance at Sports Palace. said that the attempt "against Fidel (s) is accordance with general plan." "no record if this was answered."

p27 25 March 61 - same agent sent another message - said plan was scheduled for April 9th. Castro to talk at palace & "assassination attempt at said place (will be) followed by a general ed shutting off of main electric plants in Havana." "

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answered on 30 March - saying major effort should be launched in date you selected - the message addressed the general issue &

