
Agency Information

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10147-10240

RECORD SERIES : CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 63-01-02

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM : CIA
TO :

TITLE : ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATIONS AND LHO IN NEW ORLEANS

DATE : 03/00/1979
PAGES : 293

SUBJECTS :

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
CIA, FILES
OSWALD, LEE, POST-RUSSIAN PERIOD, POLITICAL AND
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA
COMMITTEE
NEW ORLEANS
FERRIE, DAVID

Released under the John
F. Kennedy Assassination
Records Collection Act
of 1992 (44 USC 2107
Note). Case#:NW 53080
Date: 06-05-2017

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Box 36

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Russ Holmes

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cover Sheet

The attached package of paper is the property of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and is on loan to CIA under an agreement whereby CIA is not to reproduce or copy the draft or any portion thereof.

Notes may be taken on materials in this package, and rough notes may be prepared as a basis for informal and oral exchanges with HSCA representatives. These notes, however, are to be held as though controlled and are to be destroyed under agreed conditions with HSCA. They are not to be copied or excerpted and are to be held until further instructions are received for eventual disposal.

These papers have been numbered for accountability and receipted accordingly. They are to be handled on a secure basis as though constituting sensitive papers on a need-to-know basis.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Copy # 2 of 7

21993

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by derivation: _____

[COMMITTEE PRINT]

*Anti Castro Activists and Organizations
and*

~~COMPILATION OF THE STATEMENTS OF
JAMES EARL RAY~~

Lee Harvey Oswald in New Orleans

STAFF REPORT

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION



~~AUGUST 18, 1978~~

March, 1979

~~Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Assassinations~~

~~U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE~~
WASHINGTON : 1978

31-285

~~For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402—Stock No. 032-070-01628-9~~

Table of Contents

Introduction (i) ✓

I The Ingredients of an Anti-Castro Cuban Conspiracy (9) ✓

II The Odio Incident (62) ✓

III Antonio Veciana Blanch (114) ✓

IV Cuban Revolutionary Council: a Concise history (205) ✓

V ~~Orleans~~ Cuban Revolutionary Council: New Orleans Chapter (216) ✓

VI Brigade 2506 - Manuel Artime - Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR) (232) ✓

VII Movimiento Democrata Cristiano (MDC) (247) ✓

VIII Junta Revolucionario Cubana (JURE) (266) ✓

IX Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) (286) ✓

X Movimiento Insurreccional de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MIRR) and

Orlando Bosch Arila (324)

XI Junta Del Gobierno De
Cuba En El Exilio (342)

~~XII Manuel Ray Rivera (MRP-JURE)~~

~~XII~~ David Ferre (389)

XIII 544 Camp Street And Related Events. (460)

XIV Manuel Ray Rivera (MRP-JURE)

~~XV Addendum to the Junta Del Gobierno De Cuba
EN EL EXILIO~~

~~XVI Gerry Patrick Hemming (5)~~

to come later
C.F.A.

mail
9/26/74

NO

Introduction

✓
The full
Capital

STAFF REPORTS REGARDING ANTI-
CASTRO ~~ORGANIZATIONS~~ CUBANS AND ORGANIZATIONS
AND LEE HARVEY OSWALD'S ACTIVITIES IN
New Orleans.

(1) Two primary reasons prompted the Committee to investigate anti-Castro activists and organizations. First, the Committee ascertained that as a consequence of the failure and eventual unwillingness of the Kennedy Administration to liberate Cuba from Castro, these persons and organizations ^{were} ~~being~~ located primarily in the United States, ^{were} ~~and~~ highly militaristic in nature ^{and} possessed the means, motive, and opportunity to assassinate the President. Second, the Committee felt that Lee Harvey Oswald's verified association with anti-Castro Cubans while living in New Orleans during 1963, together with his possible contacts with other anti-Castro ^{activists} ~~possibility~~, further enhanced the ~~probability~~ of the involvement of anti-Castro elements in the assassination. For these reasons, the Committee thoroughly investigated numerous anti-Castro organizations and operatives and Oswald's activi^{ties} while living in New Orleans to determine their connection, if any, to the assassination.

(2) The Committee initiated its investigation by selecting the most active anti-Castro groups and their key leaders from among the more than 100 anti-Castro organizations in existence in November 1963. These groups included Alpha 66, JURE, Commandos L, the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantial (DRE), the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC), which includes the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD), the Junta Gobierno de Cuba in Exilo (JGCE), the 30th of November, the International Penetration Forces (InterPen), Revolutionary Recovery Movement (MRR), and EIC.

Their selection evolved both from the Committee's independent field investigation and the examination of the files and records maintained by the federal and local agencies then monitoring Cuban exile activity. These agencies included local police departments, the FBI, the CIA, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (now the DEA), the Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Department of Defense.

(3) These groups can be described as "action groups." These were the movements most active on both the military and propaganda fronts, the ~~ones~~ ^{groups that} which not only talked about anti-Castro operations, but actually carried out infiltrations and raids into Cuba, conducted Castro assassination attempts, participated in a multiplicity of arms dealings and possessed the most vociferous and aggressive leaders. These were the groups and individuals who received the crux of the Kennedy Administration's crackdown on anti-Castro operations following the Cuban missile crisis. These were also the ones who, in the end, were the most bitter at President Kennedy and felt the most betrayed.

(4) ~~In its investigation~~ ^{AFTER SELECTING THESE groups} the Committee focused on investigating the key members in each group and concentrated on uncovering links to Lee Harvey Oswald. The Committee found evidence of ~~contact~~ ^{contact} between Oswald and ~~four~~ ^{who were} individuals associated with ~~four~~ anti-Castro groups. These persons were JURE member Silvia Odio, Alpha 66 leader Antonio Veciana, CRC designate Frank Bartes, and DRE member Carlos Bringuier. Oswald encountered both Bartes and Bringuier in New Orleans during the summer of 1963.

(5) The committee also focused its investigation on Oswald's activities while living in New Orleans from April to August, 1963. It appears that Oswald established associations with non-Cubans of anti-Castro sentiments who were not aligned with any group. David Ferrie is an example.

(6) The following material are staff reports ~~resulting from the~~ ~~committee investigation~~ ~~to the anti-Castro~~ ~~area and New Orleans area.~~ ~~Some~~ ~~of these reports do not state conclusions but~~ ~~only relate the facts or suspicions in~~ ~~a given area.~~ ~~They do not contain~~ ~~the conclusions as contained in the final~~ ~~report.~~ ~~and do not offer any~~ ~~conclusions.~~ ~~There is no intentional;~~ ~~the~~ ~~conclusions as contained in the final~~ ~~report.~~ ~~(7) The staff reports~~ ~~comprise~~ ~~the following~~ ~~sections:~~

Section One: The Ingredients of an Anti-Castro Cuban Conspiracy;

Section Two: The Odio Incident;

Section Three: Antonio Veciana Blanche

Section Four: Cuban Revolutionary Council:
A Concise History;

~~Section Five:~~

NOTE:
SWITCH
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/1/00
BY SP-6 BJS/ML

- Section FIVE: New Orleans Chapter
of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC);
- Section Six: Brigade 2506 - Manuel Artime -
Movimiento de Recuperacion
Revolucionaria (MRR);
- Section SEVEN: Movimiento Democrata
Cristiano (MDC);
- ~~Section Eight: Manuel Ray Rivero (MRRP-JURE)~~
- Section ~~NINE~~^{EIGHT} Junta ~~Rev~~ Revolucionario
Cubana (JURE);
- Section ~~TEN~~^{NINE} DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO
ESTUDIANTE (DRE);
- Section ~~SEVEN~~^{TEN} Movimiento Insurreccional
de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MIRR);
~~Antonio Velazquez~~ AND Orlando Bosch Avilla;
- Section ~~SEVEN~~^{ELEVEN} Junta DEL GOBIERNO
DE CUBA EN EL EXILIO;

Section Twelve David Ferrie ;

Section Thirteen 544 Camp Street and Related ;
Events

Section Fourteen ^{same} Manuel Ray Rivero (MRP-1100)

Section Fifteen ^{addendum} ;

~~Walter J. Rife, General Counsel, Herndon~~

The Committee also investigated other areas that are not directly reflected in these reports; ~~including~~ the statements of the "Clinton witnesses," seven persons who claim they saw Oswald together with David Ferrie and a New Orleans business, Clay Shaw, in Clinton, Louisiana during late August or early September, 1963, fall in this category.

DU

**I THE INGREDIENTS OF AN
ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN CONSPIRACY**

(9) Was the John F. Kennedy assassination a conspiracy involving anti-Castro Cuban exiles? There were at least two significant factors ^{that} ~~which~~ led the Committee to consider that ~~question~~ the Warren Commission's decision not to further investigate the issue despite the urging of staff counsels involved in that area of evidence ^{and} ~~the~~ the apparent fact that the anti-Castro Cuban exiles had the means, motivation and opportunity to be involved in the assassination.

^{In addition}
(10) ~~Further~~, the area of possible Cuban exile involvement was one in which the Warren Commission was not provided with an adequate investigative background. According to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, ~~which looked into the role of agency performance in the investigation of the Kennedy assassination.~~

(11) "Despite knowledge of Oswald's apparent interest in pro-Castro and anti-Castro activities and top level awareness of certain CIA assassination plots, the FBI...made no special investigative effort into,

Handwritten note:
S. 100
S. 100

Indict
S. J. Hall
Spore

questions of possible Cuban government or Cuban exile involvement in the assassination independent of the Oswald investigation. There is no indication that the FBI or the CIA directed the interviewing of Cuban sources or of sources within the Cuban exile community."¹

(12) Nevertheless, even from the paucity of evidence that was available to them in 1964, two staff attorneys for the Warren Commission speculated that Lee Harvey Oswald, despite his public posture as a Castro sympathizer, was actually an agent of anti-Castro exiles. Pressing for further investigation of that possibility, Assistant Counsels William Coleman and W. David Slawson wrote a memorandum to the Commission ^{stating} ~~stating~~:

(13) The evidence here could lead to an anti-Castro involvement in the assassination on some sort of basis as this: Oswald could have become known to the Cubans as being strongly pro-Castro. He made no secret of his sympathies, and so the anti-Castro Cubans must have realized that law enforcement authorities were also aware of Oswald's feelings and that, therefore, if he got into trouble, the public would also learn of them... Second, someone in the anti-Castro organization might have been keen enough to sense that Oswald had a penchant for violence... On these facts, it is possible that some sort of deception was

used to encourage Oswald to kill the President when he came to Dallas... The motive of this would, of course, be the expectation that after the President was killed Oswald would be caught or at least his identity ascertained, the law enforcement authorities and the public would then blame the assassination on the Castro government and a call for its forceful overthrow would be irresistible...²

(14) ~~It is~~ ^{to develop an} important in considering the possibility of anti-Castro Cuban involvement in the Kennedy assassination ~~the~~ historical awareness of the waves of political and emotional impulses which coursed through the Cuban exile communities in Miami, New Orleans and Dallas while Kennedy was President.

The Background: ~~the~~ ^{The Regime of Fidel Castro Ruz}

(15) If it can be said to have a beginning, the anti-Castro Cuban exile movement was seeded in the early morning hours of New Year's Day, 1959, when a DC-4 lifted from the fog-shrouded Camp Columbia airfield in Havana.³ Aboard the plane was Fulgencio Batista, ^{who had been} ~~for six years~~ the military dictator of ^{for the previous six years} Cuba.⁴ Batista was fleeing the country, his regime long beset by forces from within and without, now crumbling under pressure from rebel forces sweeping down from the mountains. When dawn came, the bells

tolled in Havana and, 600 miles away, Fidel Castro Ruz began his triumphal march to the capital.⁵ For seven days Castro and his 26th of July Movement rebels moved down Cuba's Central Highway while thousands cheered and threw flowers in their path.⁶ Castro finally arrived in Havana on January 8th and characteristically gave a speech. Clad in his green fatigue uniform while three white doves, which someone had dramatically released, circled above him, Castro boldly proclaimed: "There is no longer an enemy!"⁷

(16) He was wrong, of course, and knew it. A hard core of Batistianos had fled the country early, many long before their leader, and were already concocting counter-revolutionary plots from their refuges in the United States, the Dominican Republic and elsewhere.⁸

(17) And it was not very long after Castro took power that a sense of betrayal began to grow among those who had once been his strongest supporters.⁹ As each day went by it became more apparent that Castro's Revolution was, as one chronicler noted, "leading inexorably toward an institutionalized dictatorship in which individuals were contemptuously shorn of their rights and dissenters were met with charges of treasonable conduct, counter-revolutionary activity or worse."¹⁰ Then too, there was a large

number of public executions. Within two weeks of his reign, Castro shot 150 ex-Batista officials.¹¹ Within three months, there were at least 506 executions.¹²

(18) The disillusionment for many Cubans deepened when it became obvious that the form of Castro's rule was turning toward Communism and that Castro's attitude toward the United States was engendering a hostile relationship. The publishing of Castro's Agrarian Reform Law in May, 1959, was a significant sign.¹³ It was far more radical than had been expected and was obviously designed to strip both Cuban and American-owned sugar firms of their immensely valuable cane lands.¹⁴ A few weeks later the Chief of Castro's Air Force, Major Pedro Diaz-Lanz, resigned, charging "...there was Communist influence in the armed forces and Government."¹⁵ Then, when Castro's own hand-picked President, Manuel Urrutia, announced at a press conference that he rejected the support of the Communists and said "I believe that any real Cuban revolutionary should reject it openly," Castro immediately forced him to resign and accused him of actions "bordering on treason."¹⁶

(19) And so, after the broken pledges of free

V - 6

elections and a free press, the mass trials and executions, the assumption of unlimited power and the bellicose threats against the United States, it slowly began to dawn on many Cubans that Fidel Castro was not the political savior they had expected.¹⁷ ~~(20)~~ Then, on October 19, 1959, there occurred an incident which precipitated the formation of the first organized anti-Castro opposition within Cuba. Major Huber Matos, one of Castro's highest-ranking officers and considered by most Cubans to be one of the key heroes of the Revolution, resigned from the Army in protest against the increasing favoritism shown to known Communists.¹⁸ The next day Matos was arrested, charged with treason, subsequently tried and sentenced to twenty years in prison. Shortly afterwards, Castro himself called a secret meeting of the National Agrarian Reform Institute managers at which he outlined a plan to communize Cuba within three years.¹⁹ There the suspicions of Dr. Manuel Artime, the manager in Oriente Province, were confirmed. "I realized," Artime later said, "that I was a democratic infiltrator in a Communist government."²⁰

(21) Arttime returned to Oriente and began organizing students and peasants to fight against Castro and Communism. By early November each province in Cuba had an element of Arttime's new underground movement. It was called the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR). It was the first anti-Castro action group originating from within Castro's own ranks.²¹

(22) By the summer of 1960, it had become obvious both within and outside of Cuba that the foundation for an eventual confrontation between Castro and anti-Castro forces had been laid. The Eisenhower Administration had cancelled the Cuban sugar quota.²² Mikoyan had visited Havana and Raul Castro had gone to Moscow.²³ Ernesto "Che" Guevara had proclaimed publicly that the Revolution was on the road set by Marx, and Allen Dulles of the Central Intelligence Agency had said in a speech that Communism had perverted Castro's revolution.²⁴ ~~And~~ By then, Castro had seized more than \$700 million in U. S. property within Cuba.²⁵

(23) On March 17, 1960, President Eisenhower authorized the CIA to organize, train, and equip Cuban refugees as a guerilla force to overthrow Castro.²⁶

Soon it became common knowledge within Cuba that a liberation army was being formed and that a political structure in exile had been created.²⁷ As the flight from Cuba increased in size and fervor, the exile community in the United States grew in spirit and confidence. One historian captured the special characteristics of the new arrivals:

They were new types of refugees. Instead of a home, they were seeking temporary asylum. They found it along the sandy beaches and curving coastline of Florida. They arrived by the thousands, in small fishing boats, in planes, chartered or stolen, and crowded into Miami. Along the boulevards, under the palms, and in hotel lobbies, they gathered and plotted their counter-revolution. Miami began to take on the air of a Cuban city. Even its voice was changing. Stores and cafes began advertising in Spanish and English...Everyone talked of home only one hundred miles away. And everyone talked about the great liberation army being formed in the secret camps somewhere far away.²⁸

(24) By April, 1961, the more than 100,000 Cubans who had fled Castro's Revolution lived in anticipation of its overthrow. They had been buoyed in that hope by public pronouncements of support from the United States Government. In his State of the Union address, President Kennedy had spoken of "the Communist base

established 90 miles from the United States," and said that "...Communist domination in this hemisphere can never be negotiated."²⁹ In addition, the Cuban exiles had been organized, directed and almost totally funded by agencies of the U. S. Government, principally the CIA.³⁰

(25) From an historical perspective, in light of its later radical change, the attitude of the Cuban exiles toward the U. S. Government prior to the Bay of Pigs is especially significant. Author Haynes Johnson who, in writing a history of the invasion, collaborated with the top Cuban leaders, including Brigade civilian chief Manuel Artime, described that attitude in detail:

From the beginning, the Cuban counter-revolutionists viewed their new American friends with blind trust. Artime was no exception. He, and later virtually all of the Cubans involved, believed so much in the Americans -- or wanted so desperately to believe -- that they never questioned what was happening or expressed doubts about the plans. Looking back on it, they agree now that their naiveté was partly genuine and partly reluctance to turn down any offer of help in liberating their country. In fact, they had little choice; there was no other place to turn. Some, of course, were driven by other motives: political power and personal ambition were involved. Even

more important was the traditional Cuban attitude toward America and Americans. To Cubans the United States was more than the colossus of the North, for the two countries were bound closely by attitudes, by history, by geography and by economics. The United States was great and powerful, the master not only of the hemisphere but perhaps of the world, and it was Cuba's friend. One really didn't question such a belief. It was a fact; everyone knew it. And the mysterious, anonymous, ubiquitous American agents who dealt with the Cubans managed to strengthen that belief.³¹

(26) This "blind trust" by the Cuban exiles in the U. S. Government prior to the Bay of Pigs was specifically noted by the military commander of the 2506 Brigade, José (Pepe) Pérez San Román: "Most of the Cubans were there," he said, "because they knew the whole operation was going to be conducted by the Americans, not by me or anyone else. They did not trust me or anyone else. They just trusted the Americans. So they were going to fight because the United States was backing them."³²

(27) The debacle at the Bay of Pigs was not only a military tragedy for the anti-Castro Cuban exiles but also a painful shattering of their confidence in the U. S. Government. The exile leaders claimed that the failure of the invasion was a result of the lack

V - 11

of promised air support, and for that they directly blamed President Kennedy.³³ Particularly galling to them was Kennedy's public declaration to Soviet Premier Khrushchev at the height of the invasion, when the Brigade was being slaughtered in the swamps of Bahia de Cochinos: "...I repeat now that the United States intends no armed intervention in Cuba."³⁴

(28) Even those exile leaders who were willing to rationalize the extent of Kennedy's responsibility were dissuaded when Kennedy himself admitted the blame. Cuban Revolutionary Council leader Manuel Antonio de Varona, ^{Executive session} in his testimony before the Committee, told of the President gathering the Council members together at the White House when it became clear that the invasion was a disaster. ⁹⁻¹⁴⁻⁶² Varona recalled: "We were not charging Mr. Kennedy with anything; we just wanted to clarify. We knew that he didn't have any direct knowledge of the problem, and we knew that he was not in charge of the military effects directly. Nevertheless, President Kennedy, to finish the talks, told us he was the one -- the only one responsible."³⁵ A few days after that

copy
5/8/62

meeting, the White House issued a public statement declaring that President Kennedy assumed "sole responsibility" for the U. S. role in the action against Cuba.³⁶

(29) The acceptance of responsibility did not cut the bitter disappointment the Cuban exiles felt toward the U. S. Government and President Kennedy. Much later, captured and imprisoned by Castro, Brigade Commander San Román revealed the depth of his reaction at the failure of the invasion: "I hated the United States," he said, "and I felt that I had been betrayed. Every day it became worse and then I was getting madder and madder and I wanted to get a rifle and come and fight against the U. S."³⁷

(30) Prominent Cuban attorney Mario Lazo wrote a book caustically titled Dagger In the Heart.³⁸

"The Bay of Pigs defeat was wholly self-inflicted in Washington," Lazo wrote!

Kennedy told the truth when he publicly accepted responsibility...The heroism of the beleaguered Cuban Brigade had been rewarded by betrayal, defeat, death for many of them, long and cruel imprisonment for the rest. The Cuban people and the Latin American nations, bound to Cuba by thousands of subtle ties of race and culture, were left with feelings of astonishment and disillusionment, and in many cases despair. They

had always admired the United States as strong, rich, generous -- but where was its sense of honor and the capacity of its leaders?

The mistake of the Cuban fighters for liberation was that they thought too highly of the United States. They believed to the end that it would not let them down. But it did...³⁹

(31) President Kennedy was well aware of the bitter legacy left him by the Bay of Pigs debacle. It is not now possible to document the changes in Kennedy's personal attitude brought about by the military defeat, but the firming of U. S. policy toward Cuba and the massive infusion of U. S. aid to clandestine anti-Castro operations in the wake of the Bay of Pigs ^{WAS} ~~editorially~~ editorially characterized as "the Kennedy vendetta."⁴⁰

by Taylor Branch
and George Crile
in
Harper's
magazine

(32) What can be documented is the pattern of U. S. policy between the period of the Bay of Pigs failure in April, 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis in October, 1962. That pattern, replete with both overt and covert maneuvers, had a significant effect on the re-shaping of Cuban exile attitudes and, when it was abruptly reversed, ^{could} ~~may~~ have provided the motivation for involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy.

(33) In retrospect, the period between the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban missile crisis can be considered the high water mark of anti-Castro activity, almost every manifestation of the U. S. policy providing a reassurance of support of the Cuban exile cause. As a matter of fact, only a few days after the Bay of Pigs invasion, President Kennedy delivered a particularly hard-line address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on the implications of Communism in Cuba. "Cuba must not be abandoned to the Communists," he declared. In appealing for support from Latin America, he indicated that the United States would expect more from the nations of the hemisphere with regard to Cuba and asserted that the United States would not allow the doctrine of non-intervention to hinder its policy. Said Kennedy, "...our restraint is not inexhaustible," and spoke of Cuba in the context of the "new and deeper struggle."⁴¹

(34) When Castro, in a May Day speech, declared Cuba to be a socialist nation, the State Department retorted that Cuba was a full-fledged member of the Communist bloc.⁴²

(35) Another U. S. response was the establishment of the Alliance for Progress, after years of relatively

little attention to Latin America's economic and social needs.⁴³ President Kennedy gave the Alliance concept a ~~memorable~~ ^{memorable} launching in a speech in March, 1961 when he called for vigorous promotion of social and economic development in Latin America through democratic means and, at the same time, pledged substantial financial and political support.⁴⁴

(36) While the campaign to broaden its Cuban policy base was being pursued, the United States was ~~proceeding~~ proceeding on another course. In one of the first unilateral efforts to isolate Cuba from its allies, the United States in September, 1961 announced it would stop assistance to any country that assisted Cuba. In December, Kennedy extended the denial of Cuba's sugar quota through the first half of 1962.⁴⁵

(37) Meanwhile, the secret policy aimed at removing Castro through assassination continued as FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover informed Attorney General Robert Kennedy in May that the CIA had used the Mafia in "clandestine efforts" against Castro.⁴⁶ In that month, poison pills to be used in a plot to kill Castro were passed to a Cuban exile in Miami by a Mafia figure.⁴⁷ In November, 1961, the CIA initiated Operation

MONGOOSE, designed to enlist 2000 Cuban exiles and dissidents inside Cuba to overthrow Castro.⁴⁸

(38) Although the bitter aftertaste of the Bay of Pigs invasion lingered in the Cuban exile community, those who remained active in the fight against Castro came to realize that these subsequent actions of the Kennedy Administration were manifestations of its determination to reverse the defeat. What Kennedy had euphemistically termed "a new and deeper struggle" (supra) became, in actuality, a secret war:

...the new President apparently perceived the defeat as an affront to his pride. Within a matter of weeks he committed the United States to a secret war against Cuba that eventually required the services of several thousand men and cost as much as \$100 million a year...Kennedy entrusted its direction to the CIA, which ...conducted an operation that could be described either as a large-scale vendetta or a small crusade."⁴⁹

(39) The fact that the agency of the U. S. Government the anti-Castro exiles had most dealt with and relied on prior to the Bay of Pigs became, after the invasion failure, the controlling force of the "secret war" was another indication to the Cuban exiles that the Kennedy Administration was, indeed, still sincere about overthrowing Castro.

Within a year of the Bay of Pigs, the CIA curiously and inexplicably began to grow, to branch out, to gather more and more responsibility for the 'Cuban problem'.

The Company was given authority to help monitor Cuba's wireless traffic; to observe its weather; to follow the Castro government's purchases abroad and its currency transactions; to move extraordinary numbers of clandestine field operatives in and out of Cuba; to acquire a support fleet of ships and aircraft in order to facilitate these secret agent movements; to advise, train, and help reorganize the police and security establishments of Latin countries which felt threatened by Castro guerrilla politics; to take a hand in U-2 overflights and sea-air ELINT (Electronic Intelligence) operations aimed at tracing Cuban coastal-defense communications on special devices; to pump...vast sums into political operations thought to be helpful in containing Castro...⁵⁰

(40) The nerve center of the United States'

"new and deeper struggle" against Castro was established in the heartland of exile activity, Miami.

There, on a secluded, heavily-wooded 1571-acre tract that was part of the University of Miami's South Campus, the CIA set up a front operation, an electronics firm called Zenith Technological Services.⁵¹

Its code name was JM/WAVE and it soon became the largest CIA installation anywhere in the world outside of its headquarters in Langley, Virginia.⁵²

(41) The JM/WAVE station had, at the height of its activities in 1962, a staff of more than 300 Americans, mostly case officers.⁵³ Each case officer

employed from four to ten Cuban "principal agents" who, in turn, would each be responsible for between 10 and 30 regular agents.⁵⁴ In addition, the CIA set up 54 front corporations -- boat shops, real estate firms, detective agencies, travel companies, gun shops -- to provide ostensible employment for the case officers and agents operating outside of JM/WAVE headquarters.⁵⁵ It also maintained hundreds of pieces of real estate, from small apartments to palatial homes, as "safe houses" in which to hold secret meetings.⁵⁶ As a result of its JM/WAVE operation, the CIA became among ~~one of~~ ^{ONE OF} Florida's largest employers.⁵⁷

(42) It was the JM/WAVE station, ~~through its case officers, which monitored, more or less controlled, and in most cases funded~~ the anti-Castro groups.⁵⁸

It was responsible for the great upsurge in anti-Castro activity and the lifted spirits of the Cuban exiles as American arms and weapons flowed freely through the training camps and guerrilla bases spotted around South Florida.⁵⁹ Anti-Castro raiding parties that left from small secret islands in the Florida Keys were given the "green light" by agents of the JM/WAVE station.⁶⁰ The result of it all was that there grew in the Cuban exile community a renewed confidence in the U. S. Government's sincerity and loyalty to its cause.

(43) Then came the Cuban missile crisis. The more fervent Cuban exiles were initially elated by the possibility that the crisis might provoke a final showdown with Castro.⁶¹ For several months prior there was increasing pressure on President Kennedy to take strong measures against the build-up of the Soviet presence in Cuba, which was becoming daily more blatant. In a report issued at the end of March, 1962 the State Department said that Cuba had received from the Soviet Union \$100 million in military aid for the training of Cuban pilots in Czechoslovakia and that the Soviet Union also had provided from 50 to 75 MIG fighters as well as tons of modern weapons for Cuba's ground forces.⁶² Fortifying the Cuban exile's hope for action was the fact that the increasing amounts of Soviet weapons moving into Cuba became the dominant issue in the news in the succeeding months, leading to Congressional calls for action and a series of hard-line responses from President Kennedy.⁶³ In September, Kennedy declared that the United States would use "whatever means may be necessary" to prevent Cuba from exporting "its aggressive purposes by force or threat of force" against "any part of the Western Hemisphere."⁶⁴

(44) The fervent hope of the Cuban exiles -- that the Cuban missile crisis would ultimately result in the United States smashing the Castro regime -- was shattered by the manner in which President Kennedy resolved the crisis. Cuba itself was relegated to a minor role as tough negotiations took place between the United States and the Soviet Union, specifically through communication between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev.⁶⁵ The crisis ended, ~~when President Kennedy announced~~ when President Kennedy announced that all IL-28 bombers were being withdrawn by the Soviets and progress was being made on the withdrawal of offensive missiles and other weapons from Cuba. In return, Kennedy gave the Soviets and the Cubans a "no invasion" pledge.⁶⁶

(45) If Kennedy's actions at the Bay of Pigs first raised doubts in the minds of the Cuban exiles about the President's sincerity and determination to bring about the fall of Castro, his handling of the missile crisis confirmed those doubts. Kennedy's agreement with Khrushchev was termed "a violation" of the pledge he had made three days after the Bay of Pigs invasion that the United States would never abandon Cuba to Communism.⁶⁷ Wrote one prominent exile: "For the friendly Cuban people, allies of the United States, and for hundreds of thousands of

exiles eager to stake their lives to liberate their native land, it was a soul-shattering blow."⁶⁸

(46) The bitterness of the anti-Castro exiles was exacerbated by the actions the United States Government took to implement the President's "no invasion" pledge. Suddenly there was a crackdown on the very training camps and guerrilla bases which had been originally established and funded by the United States and the exile raids which once had the Government's "green light" were now promptly disavowed and condemned.

(47) On March 31, 1963 a group of anti-Castro raiders were arrested by British police at a training site in the Bahamas.⁶⁹ The U. S. State Department admitted it had given the British the information about the existence of the camp.⁷⁰ That same night another exile raiding boat was seized in Miami harbor.⁷¹ On April 3rd, the Soviet Union charged that the United States "encourages and bears full responsibility" for two recent attacks on Soviet ships in Cuban ports by anti-Castro exile commandos.⁷² The United States responded that it was "taking every step necessary to insure that such attacks are not launched, manned or equipped from U. S. territory."⁷³ On April 5th, the Coast Guard announced it was throwing more planes, ships

V - 22

and men into its effort to police the straits of Florida against anti-Castro raiders.⁷⁴ As a result of the crackdown, Cuban exile sources declared that their movement to rid their homeland of Communism had been dealt "a crippling blow" and that they had lost a vital supply link with anti-Castro fighters inside Cuba.

(48) There were numerous other indications of the U. S. crackown on anti-Castro activity following the missile crisis. The Customs Service raided what had long been a secret training camp in the Florida Keys and arrested the anti-Castro force in training there.⁷⁵ The FBI seized a major cache of explosives at an anti-Castro camp in Louisiana.⁷⁶ Just weeks later, the U. S. Coast Guard cooperated with the British Navy which had captured another group of Cuban exiles in the Bahamas.⁷⁷ In September, the Federal Aviation Administration issued "strong warnings" to six American civilian pilots who had been flying raids over Cuba.⁷⁸ Shortly afterwards, the Secret Service arrested a prominent exile leader for conspiring to counterfeit Cuban currency destined for rebel forces inside Cuba.⁷⁹ In October, the Coast Guard seized four exile ships and arrested 22

anti-Castro raiders who claimed they were moving their operations out of the U. S.⁸⁰

(49) The feeling of betrayal by the Cuban exiles was given reinforcement by prominent sympathizers outside their community, as well as by Kennedy's political opponents. Captain Eddie Rickenbacker, chairman of the Committee for the Monroe Doctrine, asserted: "The Kennedy Administration has committed the final betrayal of Cuban hopes for freedom by its order to block the activities of exiled Cuban freedom fighters to liberate their nation from Communism."⁸¹ Senator Barry Goldwater accused Kennedy of "doing everything in his power" to keep the flag of Cuban exiles "from ever flying over Cuba again."⁸² Richard Nixon urged the end of what he called the "quarantine"⁸³ of Cuban exiles.

(50) Of course, the most strident reactions came from within the anti-Castro community itself. Following the U. S. Government's notification that it would discontinue its subsidy to the Cuban Revolutionary Council, its president, José Miró Cardona, announced his resignation from the Council in protest against U. S. policy.⁸⁴ The Cuban exile leader accused President Kennedy of "breaking promises and agreements" to support another invasion of Cuba.⁸⁵ Cardona

said the change in American policy reflected the fact that Kennedy had become "the victim of a master play by the Russians."⁸⁶

(51) The extent of the deterioration of relationships between the Cuban exiles and the Kennedy Administration is indicated in the State Department's reply to Cárdena's charges. It labeled them "a gross distortion of recent history."⁸⁷

(52) Against the pattern of United States crackdown on Cuban exile activity during this period, however, emerges a counter-grain of incidents which may have some bearing on an examination of the Kennedy assassination. These incidents involve some very significant Cuban exile raids and anti-Castro operations which took place, despite the crackdown, between the time of the missile crisis and the assassination of the President. In fact, in the midst of the missile crisis, one of the most active Cuban groups, Alpha 66, announced that it made a successful raid on the Cuban port city of Isabela de Sagua, killing about twenty defenders, including Russians.⁸⁸ On October 15th, the same group sunk a Cuban patrol boat.⁸⁹ On October 31st, the day after the blockade was lifted, it struck again.⁹⁰ Immediately after the crisis ended in November, a spokesman for the

group pledged new raids.⁹¹

(53) During this period, ~~many~~ other anti-Castro groups ^{also} remained active. In April, a group calling itself the Cuban Freedom Fighters reported bombing an oil refinery outside Havana.⁹² In May, the Cuban government confirmed that anti-Castro rebels had carried out a "pirate" raid on a militia camp near Havana despite U. S. promises "to take measures to prevent such attacks."⁹³ Later that month, the anti-Castro Internal Front of Revolutionary Unity reported it had formed a military junta in Cuba to serve as "provisional government of Cuba in arms." Shortly afterwards, a group of returning Cuban exile raiders claimed they had blown up a Cuban refinery, sank a gunboat and killed "many" of Castro's soldiers.⁹⁴ It is not known exactly how many incidents took place during this period, but in April of 1963 one anti-Castro fighter asserted that, by then, the United States Government knew of eleven raids on Cuba since the missile crisis and did nothing.⁹⁵

(54) One analyst, reviewing that period of U. S.-Cuban relations, noted: "The U. S. Government's policy toward the exiles was equivocal and inconsistent..."⁹⁶

(55) It cannot be determined to what extent, if any, the military activities of the anti-Castro exile groups were sanctioned or supported by the Kennedy Administration ~~or~~ ^{or both.} or by the CIA. At a press conference in May, 1963, in response to a question as to whether or not the U. S. ~~was~~ giving aid to exiles, President Kennedy was evasive: "We may well be...well, none that I am familiar with... I don't think as of today that we are."⁹⁷ And it is known that by June, 1963, the ^{U.S. Gov.} [CIA] was supporting at least one Cuban exile group, ~~the~~ ^{JURE} ~~JURE~~, under what was termed an "autonomous operations" concept.⁹⁸

(56) In retrospect, this much is clear: With or without U. S. Government support and whether or not in blatant defiance of Kennedy Administration policy, there were a number of anti-Castro action groups which were determined to continue -- and, in fact, did continue -- their operations. The resignation of Miró Cardona actually split the Cuban Revolutionary Council down the middle and precipitated a bitter dispute among the exile factions.⁹⁹ The more moderate contended that without U. S. support there was little hope of ousting Castro and that the exiles should concentrate their efforts in mounting political

pressure to reverse Washington's shift in policy.¹⁰⁰ Other exile groups announced their determination to continue the war against Castro and, if necessary, to violently resist curtailment of their paramilitary activities in the Kennedy Administration.¹⁰¹ In New Orleans, for instance, Carlos Bringuier, the local leader of the Cuban Student Directorate (DRE) who, coincidentally, would later have a contact with Lee Harvey Oswald, proclaimed, in the wake of the Miro Cardona resignation, that his group "would continue efforts to liberate Cuba despite action by the U. S. to stop raids originating from U. S. soil."¹⁰²

(57) ~~It is perhaps significant to note that~~ The seeds of defiance of the Kennedy Administration may have been planted with the exiles even prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion. In his history of the invasion, Haynes Johnson revealed that shortly before the invasion, "Frank Bender," the CIA director of the invasion preparations, assembled the exile leaders together at the CIA's Guatemala training camp:

It was now early in April and Artime was in the camp as the civilian representative of the Revolutionary Council. Frank called Pepe (San Roman) and (Erneido) Oliva again. This time he had startling information. There were forces in the administration trying to block the invasion, and Frank might be ordered to stop it. If he received such an order, he said he would secretly inform Pepe and Oliva. Pepe remembers Frank's next

words this way:

'If this happens you come here and make some kind of show, as if you were putting us, the advisors, in prison, and you go ahead with the program as we have talked about it, and we will give you the whole plan, even if we are your prisoners.'... Frank then laughed and said: 'In the end we will win.' 103

(58) That, then, is the context in which the Committee approached the question of whether or not the John F. Kennedy assassination was a conspiracy involving anti-Castro Cuban exiles. Also kept in mind was the testimony of the CIA's chief of its Miami JM/WAVE station in 1963, who noted: "...'assassination' was part of the ambience of that time..."¹⁰⁴

(59) In this section is detailed the result of the Committee's examination of the most active anti-Castro exile groups and their key leaders. These groups were specifically selected from the more than 100 exile organizations in existence at the time of the Kennedy assassination.¹⁰⁵ Their selection was the result of both independent field investigation by the Committee and the Committee's examination of the files and records maintained by those federal and local agencies monitoring Cuban exile activity at the time. These agencies included local police departments, the FBI, the CIA, the Bureau of Narcotics

and Dangerous Drugs (now the DEA), the Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Department of Defense.

(60) The groups selected can be termed the "action groups." These were the ones most active on both the military and propaganda fronts, the ones which not only talked about anti-Castro operations, but actually planned and carried out infiltrations and raids into Cuba, conducted Castro assassination attempts, were involved in a multiplicity of arms dealings and had the most vociferous and aggressive leaders. These were also the groups and individuals who took the brunt of the Kennedy Administration's crackdown on anti-Castro operations when it came after the Cuban missile crisis. These were the ones who, in the end, were most bitter at President Kennedy, the ones who felt the most betrayed. ~~These were~~ ^{Finally,} these were the groups and individuals who had the means and motivation to be involved in the assassination of the President.

(61) The Committee, however, found no hard evidence that any anti-Castro Cuban group or individual was involved in Kennedy's assassination. It ~~was~~

V - 30

does *however,*
~~find, however, what appears, to be credible evidence,~~
that there was some kind of association between Lee
Harvey Oswald and individuals connected to at
least two of the groups.

Stretching it?

~~3~~
II. The Odio Incident

(62) Within the ~~purview of the~~ question of a possible anti-Castro Cuban involvement in the Kennedy assassination, the Committee examined one incident which, over the years, has particularly intrigued critics of the Warren Commission's investigation. It has become known as "the Odio incident," the principal person involved being a young Cuban exile named Silvia Odio.

(63) Here, in part, is how the Warren Commission detailed the incident and its conclusions in its final Report:

The Commission investigated [Mrs. Odio's] statements in connection with its consideration of the testimony of several witnesses suggesting that Oswald may have been seen in the company of unidentified persons of Cuban or Mexican background. Mrs. Odio was born in Havana in 1937 and remained in Cuba until 1960; it appears that both of her parents are political prisoners of the Castro regime. Mrs. Odio is a member of the Cuban Revolutionary Junta (JURE), an anti-Castro organization. She testified that late in September 1963, three men came to her apartment in Dallas and asked her to help them prepare a letter soliciting funds for JURE activities. She claimed that the men, who exhibited personal familiarity with her imprisoned father, asked her if she were "working

in the underground," and she replied that she was not. She testified that two of the men appeared to be Cubans, although they also had some characteristics that she associated with Mexicans. Those two men did not state their full names, but identified themselves only by their fictitious underground "war names." Mrs. Odio remembered the name of one of the Cubans as "Leopoldo." The third man, an American, allegedly was introduced to Mrs. Odio as "Leon Oswald," and she was told that he was very much interested in the Cuban cause. Mrs. Odio said that the men told her that they had just come from New Orleans and that they were then about to leave on a trip. Mrs. Odio testified that the next day Leopoldo called her on the telephone and told her that it was his idea to introduce the American into the underground "because he is great, he is kind of nuts." Leopoldo also said that the American had been in the Marine Corps and was an excellent shot, and that the American said the Cubans "don't have any guts***because President Kennedy should have been assassinated after the Bay of Pigs, and some Cubans should have done that, because he was the one that was holding the freedom of Cuba actually."

Although Mrs. Odio suggested doubts that the men were in fact members of JURE, she was certain that the American who was introduced to her as Leon Oswald

*initials
8/18/68
SNO*

was Lee Harvey Oswald. Her sister, who was in the apartment at the time of the visit by the three men, and who stated that she saw them briefly in the hallway when answering the door, also believed that the American was Lee Harvey Oswald. By referring to the date on which she moved from her former apartment, October 1, 1963, Mrs. Odio fixed the date of the alleged visit on the Thursday or Friday immediately preceding that date, i.e., September 26 or 27. She was positive that the visit occurred prior to October 1.

During the course of its investigation, however, the Commission concluded that Oswald could not have been in Dallas on the evening of either September 26 or 27, 1963. It also developed considerable evidence that he was not in Dallas at any time between the beginning of September and October 3, 1963....

In spite of the fact that it appeared almost certain that Oswald could not have been in Dallas at the time Mrs. Odio thought he was, the Commission requested the FBI to conduct further investigation to determine the validity of Mrs. Odio's testimony. The Commission considered the problems raised by that testimony as important in view of the possibility it raised that Oswald may have had companions on his trip to Mexico. The Commission specifically requested the FBI to attempt to locate and identify the two men who Mrs. Odio stated

were with the man she thought was Oswald....

On September 16, 1964, the FBI located Loran Eugene Hall in Johnsandale, Calif. Hall has been identified as a participant in numerous anti-Castro activities. He told the FBI that in September of 1963 he was in Dallas, soliciting aid in connection with anti-Castro activities. He said he had visited Mrs. Odio. He was accompanied by Lawrence Howard, a Mexican-American from East Los Angeles and one William Seymour from Arizona. He stated that Seymour is similar in appearance to Lee Harvey Oswald; he speaks only a few words of Spanish, as Mrs. Odio had testified one of the men who visited her did. While the FBI had not yet completed its investigation into this matter at the time the report went to press, the Commission has concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald was not at Mrs. Odio's apartment in September of 1963.⁽¹⁾

(69) The unequivocality of the Warren Commission's conclusions was not supported by the evidence. The Commission had based its definite conclusion on two points: One was the "considerable" evidence that Oswald could not have been in Dallas on the evening Mrs. Odio alleges she saw him;⁽²⁾

5 - Odio

the other was the FBI's report of Loran Eugene Hall's speculation that Odio misidentified his companion, William Seymour, as Lee Harvey Oswald.⁽³⁾

(70) Although the Warren Commission Report states that Odio "fixed" the date of the alleged Oswald visit on September 26 or September 27, she actually told the FBI that she was not at all positive about the exact date.⁽⁴⁾ She said it might have been as early as September 25.⁽⁵⁾

(7/a) The Warren Commission asserted that Oswald left New Orleans by bus for Houston, on his way to Mexico, on September 25.⁽⁶⁾ Yet there was no documentary evidence to substantiate that, and neither the bus driver nor any passenger could recall seeing Oswald on that bus.⁽⁷⁾ In fact, Warren Commission General Counsel J. Lee Rankin asked the FBI to investigate the possibility that Oswald left New Orleans on September 24,⁽⁸⁾ when a neighbor saw him leaving his apartment carrying two suitcases.⁽⁹⁾

Rankin pointed out in his letter to J. Edgar Hoover that "Marina Oswald told the Commission that her husband told her he intended to leave New Orleans the very next day following her departure on September 23, 1963. She has also indicated that he told her an unemployment check would be forwarded to Mrs. Ruth Paine's address in Irving

relat
S's to
Spoko

6- Odio

not
still

from his post office box in New Orleans.... It also seems impossible to us that Oswald would have gone all the way back to the Winn-Dixie store at 4303 Magazine Street to cash the unemployment check which he supposedly picked up at the Lafayette Branch of the Post Office, when he could have cashed it at Martin's Restaurant, where he had previously cashed many of his Reily checks and one unemployment check. That is particularly true if he received the check on September 25, 1963, as previously thought, and had left his apartment with his suitcases the evening before."^{10/}

(71b) The FBI never came up with any evidence which resolved the questions raised in Rankin's request. In sum, the Warren Commission developed no hard evidence ^{that} ~~which~~ could substantiate the fact that Oswald was or was not in Dallas during the time period Odio said she saw him.

(71c) Although the Warren Commission stated that the FBI had not yet completed its investigation at the time its report went to press,^{11/} it was only two days after its September 16, 1964, interview of Loran Eugene Hall that the FBI interviewed William Seymour, who denied he ever had any contact with Silvia Odio and that he had been in Dallas with Hall in September, 1963.^{12/} The FBI subsequently confirmed the fact that Seymour was working in Florida during September, 1963.^{13/} On _____

7 - Odio

September 23, 1964, the FBI interviewed Loran Hall's other associate, Lawrence Howard.⁽¹⁴⁾ Howard also denied he had ever contacted Silvia Odio.⁽¹⁵⁾ The FBI then went back and re-interviewed Hall who then said that he had been accompanied on his trip to Dallas not by Seymour but by a Cuban friend he knew as "Wahito" and that he no longer recalled any contact with Odio.⁽¹⁶⁾ The FBI determined that "Wahito" was Celio Sergio Castro⁽¹⁷⁾ who, when interviewed, said he had never heard of or met Silvia Odio.⁽¹⁸⁾ On October 1, 1964, the FBI showed Silvia Odio photographs of Loran Hall, William Seymour, Lawrence Howard and Celio Sergio Castro.⁽¹⁹⁾ She examined the photographs and said that none of the individuals were identical to any of the three men who had come to her apartment door in Dallas.⁽²⁰⁾

(72) In view of the prematurity of the Warren Commission's conclusion based on the impeached Loran Hall allegation and the unresolved question of Oswald's whereabouts at the time, the Committee considered the Odio incident one of the lingering enigmas in the original assassination investigation. Unfortunately, the nature of the incident makes it, from an investigative standpoint, particularly susceptible to the erosive effects of time. The canvassing, for instance, of both pro-Castro and anti-Castro groups in Dallas, New Orleans and Miami in search of descriptive

similarities to the men who visited Odio might have been fruitful at the time; today it would be inappropriate. The construction of a composite sketch of the individuals when their features were still fresh in Odio's memory might have provided productive evidence 15 years ^{ago} ~~ago~~; today it would be of questionable value considering the natural adulteration of recall over that period of time. A search for the car ~~which~~ ^{which} the men were driving might have been very productive at the time; today it would be useless. The Committee was, therefore, handicapped by the limitations of the initial investigation and the paucity of evidence developed. The valid investigative approaches remaining were distressingly limited. Nevertheless, because of the potential significance of the Odio incident to a possible conspiracy in the Kennedy assassination, the Committee decided that, in addition to pursuing any substantive leads it possibly could, it would also attempt to verify the record regarding Silvia Odio's credibility and the details of her allegations.

(73) Also of interest to the Committee, of course, were the initial assertions of Loran Hall that he and two associates, William Seymour and Lawrence Howard, were the ones who had visited Odio in September. ⁽²¹⁾ All three had been actively involved in anti-Castro activity and were members of a group of soldiers of fortune called Interpen. ⁽²²⁾ The group was arrested at No Name Key, Florida, in December, 1962 as part of the Kennedy Administration's crackdown on anti-Castro operations. ⁽²³⁾ That policy, which highly incensed the anti-Castro and right-wing factions, was the result of an agreement Kennedy had made with

9 - odio

Khrushchev and Castro. (24) Those factions considered the agreement a "betrayal". (25)

(74) Loran Hall provided sworn testimony to the Committee at an Executive Session on October 5, 1977. Here is an excerpt from that testimony:

Q: Did there come a time when the FBI spoke to you about whether or not you visited Silvia Odio in September, 1963?

Hall: Yes, there was.

...Q: Who spoke to you?

Hall: An FBI agent.

Q: At that time were you advised why you were being questioned about Silvia Odio?

Hall: I really don't recall. He stated as I recall, he stated something to the effect that were you ever in Dallas, Texas, and I said yes. He said do you know a Mrs. Odio, and I said I don't recall knowing a Mrs. Odio. I think I knew a Professor Odio, who was a professor at Texas, some university in Texas, just outside of Dallas, as I recall. He asked me anyway about the apartment building on Magellan, and I said it is possible, I don't know. I said do you have a picture of her and he said no, I do not have. And I said, it is possible I met her but I don't recall. He then asked me who was with me and I told him I was with Alba and Howard, and then it was like maybe a month or two.

...Q: And you told him you were there with Howard and Alba?

10 - Odio

Hall: Yes.

Q: On the first trip?

Hall: Yes. ...we both read the same FBI report. You know it is directly contradictory to what I am saying.

Q: So it is your testimony that at no time did you ever tell an FBI agent that you were in Dallas accompanied by Lawrence Howard and William Seymour, is that your testimony?

Hall: That is true.

Q: Were you ever directly or indirectly involved with Silvia Odio in acquiring military equipment for anti-Castro raids?

Hall: No, I was not. (26)

(75) ^{The} Committee ~~investigators~~ interviewed Lawrence Howard on May 23, 1978. Howard stated he has never met Silvia Odio. (27) ^{The} Committee ~~investigators~~ also interviewed William Seymour, who acknowledged his relationship with Hall and Howard but did not recall any details of a trip to Dallas, including meeting any Cubans there. (28)

(76) The Committee felt it important early in its investigation to examine in detail the substance of Silvia Odio's allegations as well as their credibility. One of the problems faced by the Committee was Odio's negative attitude toward a governmental investigation of the Kennedy assassination. Her attitude, she said, was the result of her relationship with the Warren Commission. (29) She

11 - Odio

expressed sharp disillusionment with the Warren Commission and said that it was obvious to her that the Commission did not want to believe her story.⁽³⁰⁾ A Committee investigator noted that her whole demeanor was "one of sharp distrust of the government's motives. She claims she feels she was just used by the Warren Commission for their own ends and she does not want to be put in the same position."⁽³¹⁾ Nevertheless, after contact was established by the Committee's ~~field investigators~~, Odio's cooperation with the Committee was excellent and she voluntarily submitted to interviews and, subsequently, sworn testimony.

(77) ^{evidence indicates} Basically, the ~~Committee found~~ that Odio's story remained consistent with her Warren Commission testimony. There are, however, details concerning Odio, her background and certain points of her story developed by the Committee, which should be noted.

(78) Silvia Odio was one of ten children of Amador and Sarah Odio who were sent out of Cuba when their parents began taking an active part in a counter-revolutionary movement shortly after Castro took power.⁽³²⁾

Amador Odio was among Cuba's wealthy aristocracy, the personal friend of diplomats and ambassadors, including, during the last days of the United States' presence there, American Ambassador Phillip Bonsal.⁽³³⁾ Odio was owner of the country's largest trucking business and was once

12 - Odio

described in Time Magazine as the "transport tycoon" of Latin America. (34) Yet, from their youth, both he and his wife were active, front-line fighters against the succession of tyrants who ruled Cuba. During the reign of General Gerardo Machado in the '30s, Sarah Odio was captured and beaten with a machete until her ribs were broken. (35) Twice during the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, the Odios were forced into exile for their revolutionary activity. (36) Amador Odio's trucks were the main supply line for the weapons and ammunition which kept Castro's hopes alive in the mountains. Yet when the Odios decided that Castro had "betrayed the revolution," (37) they were among the founding members, with Manolo Ray, of one of the early, most aggressive anti-Castro groups, the Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP). (38)

Worked on 1957

(79) Amador and Sarah Odio were arrested by Castro on October 26, 1961. (39) Their arrest was the result of the capture of MRP national coordinator Reynald Gonzales in hiding on their country estate. (40) Ironically, the Odios had once hosted the wedding of one of Fidel Castro's sisters on the very estate, a large, resort-like retreat in El Caño, outside of Havana. (41) Later, Castro would turn it into a national women's prison and Sarah Odio would spend eight years incarcerated there, while her

13. - Odio

husband was placed in a cell on Isla de Pinos.² (42)

Reynald Gonzales had been wanted in connection with his involvement in the assassination attempt on Castro that had been organized by Antonio Veciana. (43)

(80) Silvia was the oldest of the Odios' ten children. (44)
She had been sent for her early education to a private girls' school near Philadelphia and later returned to Cuba and attended ~~Williamson~~ Law School there. (45)

(81) When her parents were arrested, Silvia Odio was 24 years old, living in Puerto Rico with her husband and four young children. (46) The next year her husband, sent to Germany by the chemical firm for which he was working, deserted her and the children. (47) Destitute and alone, she began having emotional problems. (48) By that time, Silvia's younger sisters, Annie and Sarita, were settled in Dallas. (49) Sarita, a student at the University of Dallas, had become friendly with Mrs. Lucille Connell, the leader of a women's club at a local Episcopal church who had organized a club program to provide financial and social support to the Dallas Cuban Refugee Center. (50)
Connell also happened to be very active in the Mental Health Association of Dallas and, since her son was a psychiatrist, had personally acquired an interest in mental health problems. (51) When Sarita told Connell of her sister Silvia's plight, Connell made arrangements to have Silvia move to Dallas and to also receive psychiatric

13 - Odio

treatment for her emotional problems at the Southwestern Medical School. (52)

(82) According to Connell, who for a period was Silvia's closest confidante, Silvia's emotional problems, brought on by her suddenly being left alone with four young children, her parents being imprisoned and her lifestyle abruptly changing from one of wealth to one of deep destitution, were manifested in attacks of total loss of consciousness "when reality got too painful to bear." (53) Connell said she personally witnessed Odio suffer these attacks in her home when she first arrived in Dallas, but with psychiatric treatment their frequency subsided and they subsequently ended -- until the Kennedy assassination. (54)

(83) Silvia Odio had moved to Dallas in March of 1963. (55) By September of 1963 she was well-established in the community, had a decent income from a good job, had her emotional problems under control and was doing well enough to be planning a move into a better apartment. (56) She was scheduled to make that move on October 1, 1963, a Monday. (57) The week before, she recalled, she had done some packing in preparation for the move and there were boxes scattered across her living room floor which she had to jump over to get to the door. (58) Her sister Annie, who was then 17, had come to the apartment to help her and babysit with her

14 - Odio

children.⁽⁵⁹⁾ When the doorbell rang early one evening in that last week of September, it was Annie who went to the door to answer it.⁽⁶⁰⁾

(84) The complex in which Silvia Odio lived at 1084 Magellan Circle in Dallas was a series of garden-type rental apartments, two-story units with four apartments to each unit.⁽⁶¹⁾ The two lower units had front doors which faced a common inner vestibule which, in turn, bordered a small, open cement porch elevated a few steps above the ground level.⁽⁶²⁾ Both the vestibule and porch had overhead lights.⁽⁶³⁾ Silvia Odio lived in Apartment A of the 1084 unit, a first floor apartment.⁽⁶⁴⁾

(85a) Annie Odio provided the Committee with a sworn statement of her independent recollection.⁽⁶⁵⁾ She remembered the evening when three men came to the door of Silvia's apartment in Dallas.⁽⁶⁶⁾ One of the men asked to speak to Sarita.⁽⁶⁷⁾ He initially spoke English but when Annie answered him in Spanish he subsequently also spoke Spanish.⁽⁶⁸⁾ Annie told him that Sarita didn't live there.⁽⁶⁹⁾ Then, according to Annie's recollection:

"He said something, I don't recall exactly what, perhaps something about her being married, which made me think that they really wanted my sister Silvia. I recall putting the chain on the door after I told them to wait while I went to get Silvia. I don't exactly recall but they may have also said something about belonging to JURE,

15 - Odio

the anti-Castro movement."70/

(85b) Annie also recalled that Silvia was initially reluctant to talk with the strange visitors because she was getting dressed to go out. But she remembers Silvia coming out in her bathrobe to go to the door.71/ Annie said that she could only recall what one of the two Latin men looked like, but it is not a specific recollection, only that he was heavy set, had dark shiny hair combed back and "looked Mexican."72/ She said "the one in the middle was American."73/

(85c) In testimony to the Committee, independent of her sister's, Silvia Odio also recalled that it was early evening and that she was getting dressed to go out when the three men came to the door.74/ She recalled that it was a weekday because she worked that day.75/ She said the men identified themselves as members of JURE, spoke of both its founder, Manola Ray, and her father, who had worked closely with Ray.76/ Odio said that almost all the conversation she had was with only one of the men, the one who identified himself as "Leopoldo."77/

(85d) Odio was positive in her recollection of the name "Leopoldo"78/ but said that the men admitted to her they were giving her aliases or "war names."79/ She is less certain of the other Latin's name, but believes it

might have been "Angelo" or "Angel." (80) She described him, as her sister did, as being stocky, with black hair and looking "more Mexican than anything else." (81) The third visitor, the "American," (82) was introduced to her as "Leon Oswald." (83) She said "Leon Oswald" acknowledged the introduction with a very brief reply, perhaps in idiomatic Spanish, (84) but she later concluded that he could not understand Spanish because of his lack of reaction to her Spanish conversation with "Leopoldo." (85)

(86) Silvia Odio has been relatively consistent in her testimony to the Warren Commission and to the Committee in her specific descriptions of the three visitors. (86) Her description of "Leopoldo" is especially noteworthy because he has certain very distinct features, including an unusual hairline that is sharply recessed on the sides. (87) Her description of "Leon Oswald" is, of course, similar to the characteristics of Lee Harvey Oswald. (88) There is absolutely no doubt in her own mind that her visitor was, in fact, Lee Harvey Oswald. (89) She points out that she did have ample opportunity to view him, her conversation with the three men lasting more than twenty minutes, her viewing distance being only about three feet and the light available more than adequate. (90) She also recalls, but not very clearly, that "Leopoldo" may have told her that

they had just come from New Orleans. (91)

(87) Odio told the Committee, as she did the Warren Commission, (92) that the reason the men came to her was to get her help in soliciting funds in the name of JURE from local businessmen. (93) She said: "He (Leopoldo) told me that he would like for me to write them in English, very nice letters, and perhaps we could get some funds." (94)

That is not inconsistent with the vague recollection of her sister Annie, who was in the apartment at the time the conversation was being conducted through the open door in the vestibule. She recalled that the men came because "they wanted something translated." (95)

(88) According to Silvia Odio, her conversation with "Leopoldo" ended without her giving him any commitment to do anything, but he gave her the impression he would contact her again. (96) The visit ended without "Leon" or "Angelo" having any conversation with her aside from a brief greeting word or two. (97) After the men left, Odio decided to go to the window and watch them. (98) She saw them get into a red car that was parked in the driveway in front of the apartment. (99) She said she could not see who was driving the car, but did see "Angelo" on the passenger side of the car. (100)

(89) The cloudiest part of Odio's recollection concerns the telephone call she later received from

18 - Odio

"Leopoldo." (101) It could have occurred, she said, the day after the visit or two days after the visit. (102) She thinks it was in the afternoon, but she cannot remember. (103) She thinks it was on a Saturday, when she wasn't working, but is not certain. (104) She is, however, relatively clear in her recollection of the gist of what "Leopoldo" told her when he called her on the telephone and that, too, is consistent with her testimony before the Warren Commission. (105) She said that "Leopoldo" told her that "the Gringo" had been a Marine, that he was an expert marksman and that he was "kind of loco." (106) She recalled: "He said that the Cubans, we did not have any guts because we should have assassinated Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs." (107)

(90) On the day that President Kennedy was assassinated, Silvia Odio was coming back from lunch when she heard the news. (108) *She recalled:* "As soon as we got back to the office, everybody had their radios on and everybody was listening to it, ~~she recalled.~~ By the time the news came that the President was dead, the president of the company told us that we could go home. I started going back to -- I was very frightened and very upset...I started moving across the warehouse towards the parking lot where we kept our cars...I think next I had passed out. My mind was going around in circles..." (109)

(91) During her testimony before the Committee, Odio was asked if, when she heard that Kennedy was assassinated,

she thought of the three men who had visited her apartment almost two months prior. Her reply: "Oh, very definitely, very definitely."⁽¹¹⁰⁾ She added: "I had put them out of my mind, but they came back that day."⁽¹¹¹⁾

(92) The next thing she remembered after blacking out was regaining consciousness later in a hospital room.⁽¹¹²⁾ She recalled that her sister Annie had just walked in.⁽¹¹³⁾ She remembered watching the first image of Oswald she saw coming across the television screen in the hospital room: "Annie and I sort of looked at one another and sort of gasped. She said, 'Do you recognize him?' I said yes, and I said, 'Do you recognize him?' She said, 'It is the same guy, isn't it?' I said, 'Yes, but do not say anything.'"⁽¹¹⁴⁾

(93) This is an excerpt from the independent sworn statement given to the Committee by Annie Odio:

On the day of the assassination of President Kennedy I had gone with my girlfriend, Cherie Matlock, and some other friends to a place where we could see the President's motorcade pass by. I don't remember where it was, only that it was quite a distance from downtown Dallas and Dealey Plaza. After the motorcade passed by we went to a drive-in restaurant for some hamburgers. When we were coming out of the drive-in we heard that Kennedy was shot. When I first heard that Kennedy was shot I did not make any connection between the shooting and the men who came to Silvia's door. Later in the afternoon I was by myself in the Matlock home when I first saw Oswald on television. My first thought

was, 'My God, I know this guy and I don't know from where! But I'm not going to tell anybody because they're going to think I'm crazy.' But I kept thinking, 'Where have I seen this guy?' Then my sister Sarita called and told me that Silvia had fainted at work and that she was sending her boyfriend Jim, who is now her husband to pick me up and take me to the hospital to see Silvia. Sarita did not tell me then why Silvia had fainted. I remember that it was getting dark when Jim picked me up and that we had to drive by Dealey Plaza. I don't remember Jim coming up to the room in the hospital with me when I saw Silvia. I don't remember anyone else in the room, but it was a very small room. Silvia was in bed. The first thing I remember when I walked into the room was that Silvia started crying and crying. I don't remember her saying anything. I think that I told her: 'You know this guy on TV who shot President Kennedy? I think I know him.' And she said: 'You don't remember where you know him from?' I said: 'No, I cannot recall, but I know I've seen him before.' And then she told me: 'Do you remember those three guys who came to the house?' And that's when I realized I had seen Oswald before. And then when I realized I had seen Oswald before. And then she told me everything, including the fact that one of the men had called back, that she called him 'Leon,' that he said he wanted to be called 'Leon,' and that he said something like the Cubans should kill Kennedy because of what he did with the Bay of Pigs. Silvia also told me that when she first heard that President Kennedy was shot, she started saying: 'Leon did it! Leon did it!' I remember that Silvia was very excited at the hospital and that she kept saying that she knew that Leon was going to do it. (115)

(94) Because they were extremely frightened, concerned for their brothers and sisters and their own safety, worried

21 - Odio

about their mother and father in prison in Cuba and terrifyingly bewildered about the meaning of the three men's visit, Silvia and Annie Odio decided not to reveal the incident.⁽¹¹⁶⁾ And it was, in fact, only circuitously that the FBI came to learn of it.

(95) According to Silvia Odio's close friend, Lucille Connell, she received a call from Silvia's sister Sarita who told her that Silvia had fainted and was in the hospital.⁽¹¹⁷⁾ Sarita also told her why Silvia had fainted and the fact that Silvia had met Oswald and that he had come to her apartment.⁽¹¹⁸⁾ Connell cannot recall exactly when Sarita called; she said it was either the day of the assassination or the day after.⁽¹¹⁹⁾ However, that Sunday, Connell said, she was speaking on the telephone to a friend of hers, Mrs. Sanford Pick, then working as a receptionist in a Dallas law firm office, when they both saw Ruby shoot Oswald on their television sets.⁽¹²⁰⁾ Connell recalled: "And she said to me, 'Oh my goodness, Ruby was in our office last week and had power of attorney drawn for his sister.'"⁽¹²¹⁾

(96) Connell said that later that same day she happened to be speaking with another friend, Marcella Insua, the daughter of the head of the Dallas Cuban Relief Committee. Connell mentioned to Insua what her other friend had said about Ruby being in her law office.⁽¹²²⁾ Insua, Connell said, happened to have a class of American children to

22 - Odio.

whom she was teaching Spanish. (123) In that class, she got into a discussion of the Kennedy assassination and mentioned that she knew someone who knew someone who had some dealings with Ruby. (124) It also happened that there was a son of a local FBI agent in Insua's class. (125) That ^{is} how, subsequently, the FBI came to contact Connell and learn about the Odio incident. (126)

(97) ~~The Committee decided that~~ ^A factor in judging Odio's credibility is evidence ^{that} ~~which~~ indicates that she told someone prior to the Kennedy assassination that three men visited her, that one of them was introduced to her as "Leon Oswald," and that she was told that this "Leon" had suggested assassinating President Kennedy.

(98) Silvia Odio told the Committee that immediately after the visit of the three men, she wrote to her father in prison in Cuba to ask him if he knew who they were. (127)

Amador Odio, who was released from prison in 1969 and is now living in Miami, told Committee investigators that he received Silvia's letter and replied to it. (128) He did

not recall when he received the letter, but his reply, dated December 19, 1963, indicates it was very likely in late October or early November, 1963. (129) He wrote:

"Tell me who this is who says he is my friend -- be careful. I do not have any friend who might be here, through Dallas, so reject his friendship until you give me his name." (130)

(99) Silvia Odio told the Committee she recalled, although her recollection is "not very strong," that she also told Lucille Connell prior to the Kennedy assassination that three men had visited her apartment.⁽¹³¹⁾ She said it had to have been before the assassination because she did not see Connell after the assassination as the result of a falling out between them.⁽¹³²⁾ Prior to that, however, Odio said, she was frequently at Connell's house and she specifically recalled a dinner party, "which may have had something to do with the Mental Health Association or been given in honor of some doctor or psychiatrist," at which, during a conversation in the library, she mentioned the visit of the three men.⁽¹³³⁾ She said it would have been very likely that she told Connell because "she was the type who was a very curious person about the details of your life. She always asked a lot of questions about my life and what I was doing."⁽¹³⁴⁾

(100) Lucille Connell told the Committee she does not recall Silvia Odio specifically telling her about Oswald at any time, before or after the assassination.⁽¹³⁵⁾ She does not recall talking with Odio at a dinner party prior to the assassination, although, she said, she may have.⁽¹³⁶⁾ She said her contact with Silvia Odio had not been frequent within the months prior to the assassination.⁽¹³⁷⁾

(101) The one person that Silvia Odio is most positive in her recollection of telling prior to the assassination

24 - Odio

about the visit of the three men was her psychiatrist at the time, Dr. Burton C. Einspruch.⁽¹³⁸⁾ At the time of the Kennedy assassination, Odio had been seeing Einspruch for about seven months,⁽¹³⁹⁾ usually on a weekly basis and occasionally more frequently.⁽¹⁴⁰⁾ She was suffering from what Einspruch described as "a situational life problem. She had a large family, she was semi-impooverished, she was an immigrant, her parents were imprisoned...she had all the difficulties one might anticipate a displaced person would have."⁽¹⁴¹⁾

(102) Both the FBI and the Warren Commission staff questioned Einspruch after the assassination.⁽¹⁴²⁾ The FBI report noted that Einspruch believed Odio "is telling the truth."⁽¹⁴³⁾ The Warren Commission staff report noted that "Dr. Einspruch stated that he had great faith in Miss Odio's story of having met Lee Harvey Oswald."⁽¹⁴⁴⁾ Neither report indicated that Einspruch had been questioned about the specific details of Odio's allegations, whether he had been asked if Odio told him about the visit of the three men and, if she did, when she did.⁽¹⁴⁵⁾

(103) In sworn testimony to the Committee, Einspruch reiterated his judgement of Odio as a "truthful" person.⁽¹⁴⁶⁾ He said he no longer had any files available to document his recollection, but he believes that Odio's visits to

him had been scheduled, at around the time of the assassination, on Wednesdays. (147)

(104) Einspruch specifically recalled that Odio had told him, during the normal course of the "format" of the sessions with her in which she related what happened during the previous week, (148) that she had been visited by three men. (149) He recalled that she told him of the visit prior to the assassination. (150) He is definite that she told him that two of the visitors were "Cubans or Latins" and that the third was an "Anglo." (151) He is not sure she mentioned the name "Leon" at his session with her prior to the assassination. (152) He did remember that when he telephoned Odio on the day of or the day after the assassination, she did mention "Leon" and she did "in a sort of histrionic way" connect the visit of the three men to the Kennedy assassination and did recognize one of those men as "Leon." (153) Einspruch could not recall, however, that Odio told him prior to the assassination that "Leopoldo" had telephoned her and spoke of "Leon" suggesting Kennedy be assassinated. (154)

(105) As noted earlier the Committee's ability to investigate the substance of Silvia Odio's allegations was severely restricted not only by the time that has elapsed since they were originally made but also by the lack of material available in the basic investigative files. Both

the Warren Commission and the FBI were lax in the pursuit of investigative leads when those leads still held a potential for development. The description provided by Odio of at least one of the Latin visitors, for instance, was detailed enough to justify a thorough canvassing of both the anti-Castro and pro-Castro militant Cuban communities in Dallas, New Orleans and Miami for individuals with similar striking characteristics. That, in conjunction with a search for the specifically described car the men were seen driving, might have been fruitful. Committee reviews of Warren Commission files and FBI reports reveal no such investigative approach. The focus, instead, was on attempting to determine the possibility of Oswald being in Dallas when Odio reported she saw him. That approach proved inconclusive.

(106) Nevertheless, there were other points ~~that could~~ ^{that} ~~mittee file~~ could be examined in attempting to determine the identity of the Silvia Odio visitors. The fact, for instance, that the men claimed to know her father and have knowledge of his activities appeared to be of possible investigatory significance. ^{It was} ~~The Committee~~ discovered, however, that a front page article in the Dallas News on May 5, 1962, could have provided a source of background information on Odio's parents. (155) The article featured a large photo of Annie and Sarita Odio and detailed the plight of their parents in prison as well as their back-

grounds. (156) It also could be related to the fact that "Leopoldo" initially asked for Sarita when Annie Odio answered the door. (157)

(107) Although the Committee considered the possibility that the Odio visitors were being deceptive in claiming an association with the anti-Castro organization JURE, it nevertheless attempted to determine if they were, in fact, members of that group. The Committee conducted extensive interviews with Amador Odio, (158) who was very active with JURE in Cuba prior to his imprisonment, and made an attempt to contact remaining members of the Dallas chapter of JURE. (159) Although the results of the Committee's efforts must be viewed in terms of the lengthy period of time that had elapsed, ~~the Committee could find~~ no present recollection of JURE members active in 1963 who used the war names of "Leopoldo" or "Angelo" or fitted the descriptions provided by Silvia Odio. ^{could be found.} (160)

(108) In addition, the Committee also interviewed the founder and leader of JURE, Manolo Ray, now living in Puerto Rico. (161) Ray said he had been questioned by the FBI about the Odio incident some time after the Kennedy assassination, but he was asked only about Silvia Odio's reliability and credibility. (162) "They told me that she had met Oswald," Ray said. "I don't remember them telling me that the men who came to her said they were

28 - Odio

members of JURE... (163) Ray told the Committee that he knew of no members of JURE traveling through Dallas in September of 1963 in search of money or arms. (164) He does not recall anyone by the name of "Leopoldo" or "Angelo" associated with JURE at the time. (165) He said he had no American contacts in Dallas, nor did he receive any major financial support from anyone there. (166)

(109) In addition to these attempts to identify the Odio visitors, the Committee asked Silvia Odio to review some 300 photographs of Cuban activists, both pro-Castro and anti-Castro, and individuals who had or may have had some association with Lee Harvey Oswald and the Kennedy assassination. (167) She could not identify any of the individuals in the photographs as being the two who came to her apartment with "Leon Oswald."

(110) Finally, the Committee requested the CIA to run a ~~computerized~~ check on all individuals who used the "war names" of "Leopoldo" and "Angelo" during the period of interest. (168) The CIA comply resulted in the photographs of three individuals who might have been in Dallas in September of 1963. (169) The photographs were shown to Silvia Odio with negative results. (170)

CONCLUSIONS

(111) ~~The Committee feels~~ ^{It appears} that Silvia Odio's testimony is essentially credible. From the evidence provided in the sworn testimony of corroborating witnesses, there is no doubt that three men came to her apartment in Dallas

prior to the Kennedy assassination and identified themselves as members of an anti-Castro Cuban organization. From a judgment of the credibility of both Silvia and Annie Odio, it must be concluded that there is a strong probability that one of the men was or appeared to be Lee Harvey Oswald. ~~The Committee could reach no~~ ^{could be reached.} conclusion as to the significance of that visit, ~~although~~ ^{were considered that} ~~it considered both the possibility~~ ^{isn't} ~~that~~ Oswald actually ~~had~~ ^{had} some association with JURE, the anti-Castro group headed by Manolo Ray, and ~~the possibility~~ that Oswald wanted it to appear that he had that association in order to implicate the group, politically a left-of-center Cuban organization, in the Kennedy assassination.

(112) ~~The Committee also could reach no definite~~ ^{Additionally,} ~~conclusion on the specific date of the visit.~~ ^{could be reached.} The possibility that it could have been as early as September 24th, the morning of which Oswald was seen in New Orleans, exists. The visit was more likely on the 25th, 26th, or 27th of September. If it were, then Oswald, judging from evidence developed by both the Warren Commission and this Committee, had to have had access to private transportation, a situation which almost mandates a conspiratorial involvement.

(113) ~~The Committee found~~ ^{was} The scope of its investigation in the Odio incident ~~distastefully~~ limited as a result of the inadequate investigation performed by the FBI and the Warren Commission at the time. The lack of immediate recognition of the ~~enormous~~ significance of the Odio incident produced a far from comprehensive investigation at the only time a comprehensive and, perhaps, fruitful investigation would have been possible.

~~The Committee concludes that the Warren Commission's~~
~~definitive conclusion regarding the Odio incident, which~~
~~it reached before all its investigative reports were~~
~~submitted, was erroneous and, in its assumption, appallingly~~
~~baseless.~~

~~Team 3~~

Fonzi

III.
Antonio VECIANA BLANCH

(114) On March 2, 1976, a staff investigator from the ^{United States} ~~office of~~ ^(R-PA) Senator Richard S. Schweiker¹ interviewed Antonio Veciana Blanch, the founder and former leader of Alpha 66, in his home in Miami.¹ At the time, Senator Schweiker was a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and Co-Chairman of the Subcommittee on the John F. Kennedy Assassination.² The staff investigator told Veciana that he was interested in the relationships between U. S. Government agencies and Cuban exile groups;³ he did not specifically mention an interest in the Kennedy assassination.³ During the course of that interview, Veciana revealed that from about mid-1960 through mid-1973 he had been directed and advised in his anti-Castro and anti-Communist activities by an American he knew as Maurice Bishop.⁴ Veciana said that Bishop^{had} guided him in planning assassination attempts on Premier Fidel Castro in Havana in 1961 and in Chile in 1971; that Bishop^{had} directed him to organize Alpha 66 in 1962; and that Bishop, when breaking their relationship in 1973,^{had} paid him \$253,000 in cash for his services over the years.⁵

(115) Veciana ~~also~~ ^{further} revealed that at one meeting with Bishop in Dallas in late August or September, 1963, he saw with him a young man he later recognized as Lee Harvey Oswald.⁶

Veciana - 2

(116) Veciana told Senator Schweiker's investigator that he had not previously disclosed that information to anyone.⁷ (~~Executive Session testimony, 4/26/78, p. 37~~)^B

(117) The ~~Select~~ Committee took an intense interest in the Veciana allegations. From Senator Schweiker, it obtained the complete files of his office's investigation;⁸ ~~The Committee~~ ^{it} also conducted additional interviews with Veciana and other witnesses who might have had knowledge of Veciana ~~for~~ ^{Funder,} or Bishop. ~~and~~ on April 25 and 26, 1978, Veciana was questioned under oath before the Committee in Executive Session.

These sources uncovered the following
(118) ~~Here, from these sources, are the general~~ details of the relationship between Veciana and the American he knew ~~only~~ ^{only} as Maurice Bishop:

(119) To the best of ~~his~~ ^{Veciana's} recollection, ~~Veciana was~~ ^{him} first approached ~~in the middle of~~ ^{Harari in the middle of} Maurice Bishop in ~~the middle of~~ 1960. ~~Harari~~ ⁹ At the time, Veciana was employed in the Banco Financiero, owned by Julio Lobo, the "Sugar King" of Cuba.¹⁰ Veciana himself was ~~known~~ ^{however,} as president of the professional accountant's association.¹¹

(120) Veciana said Bishop introduced himself with a business card which indicated he was with a construction firm headquartered in Belgium.¹² Although Veciana initially assumed he was a new bank customer, Bishop's

Veciana - 3

conversation with him soon focused on the Castro Revolution. "He also made me aware of his concern regarding the Cuban government leaning towards Communism and tried to impress on me the seriousness of the situation," Veciana recalled.¹³

(121) Bishop then invited Veciana to lunch and during that and subsequent lunches convinced Veciana to work against the Castro Government. Veciana admittedly did not need much convincing because he himself had concluded only thirty days after the Revolution that Castro was a Communist.¹⁴

(122) Veciana said he did ask Bishop during their first meeting if he worked for the United States Government. "He told me at the time," Veciana testified, "that he was in no position to let me know for whom he was working or for which agency he was doing this."¹⁵

Bishop also said he could not tell Veciana whether or not it was Julio Lobo who suggested he contact him.

"Supposedly Julio Lobo had very important contacts with the United States Government," Veciana pointed out.¹⁶

Veciana, however, ~~also~~ later suspected that it might have been another very close friend, Rufo Lopez-Fresquet, who ~~put~~ Bishop ~~onto~~ him.¹⁷ Lopez-Fresquet, although

then Castro's Minister of Finance, was a covert anti-Castroite, and ~~had earlier been recruited by the Central~~

[earlier recruited]

Veciana - 4

to serve
~~Intelligence Agency~~ as a liaison with the Castro
Government.¹⁸

(123) Once Veciana agreed to work with Bishop on anti-Castro activity, he was put into a "training program."¹⁹ Veciana described this as a "two to three week" program which consisted of nightly lectures. He was the only one in the program, which was conducted by a man he knew only as "Mr. Melton." The lectures were held in an office in a building which Veciana could recall as being on El Vedado, a commercial thoroughfare. He also remembered the building housed the offices of a mining company "with an American name" and, on the first floor, a branch of the Berlitz School of Languages.²⁰

(124) Although Veciana said he was given some training in the use of explosives and sabotage techniques, most of the program consisted of lessons in propaganda and psychological warfare. "Bishop told me several times...that psychological warfare could help more than hundreds of soldiers, thousands of soldiers," Veciana testified.²¹ Veciana also said: "The main purpose was to train me to be an organizer so I was supposed to initiate a type of action and other people would be the ones who would really carry it out."²²

(125) Following the training, Veciana worked with Bishop on several very effective psychological warfare

Veciana - 5

operations, including a program ~~which~~ resulted in the destabilization of the Cuban currency and the creation of public distrust in its value.²³ Meanwhile, Veciana also became chief of sabotage for the Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MP),^R an anti-Castro group headed by ~~Manolo~~ ^{MANUEL} Ray.²⁴

(126) Before the American Embassy in Cuba was closed in January, 1961, Bishop suggested to Veciana that he *go there and* contact certain officials ~~there~~ for help in his anti-Castro activity. Veciana said the names suggested by Bishop were "Smith," "Sam Kail" and "Joe D'Acosta." Said Veciana: "Maurice Bishop suggested the names of these individuals because we needed specific weapons to carry out the jobs and he told me that these were the people that could help me."²⁵ Veciana, however, also said that Bishop asked him not to reveal his name to these people.²⁶

(127) Veciana ~~however~~ has never assumed that Maurice Bishop was a true name. At one of their early meetings in Havana, Veciana noticed a Belgian passport which Bishop had in his open briefcase. Examining it when Bishop briefly left the room, Veciana made a quick note of it on a scrap of paper. Veciana kept that scrap of paper and showed it to Senator Schweiker's investigator.

Veciana - 6

The name on the paper was "Frigault".²⁷

(128) A few months after the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in April, 1961, Bishop called Veciana to a meeting. According to Veciana: "At that time Bishop decided that the only thing left to be done was to have an attempt on Castro's life."²⁸ Although Veciana himself did not participate in the attempt, he recruited the action men and organized the operation, including renting the apartment from which the shot was to be fired.²⁹ ~~However,~~ ^{however,} the day before the actual attempt, Veciana escaped from Cuba by boat with his mother-in-law, in whose name the apartment had been rented.³⁰ His wife and children had left a few months prior. According to Veciana, it was Bishop who urged him to leave because, he said, Castro's agents were becoming suspicious of Veciana's activities.³¹

(129) Shortly after he settled in Miami, Veciana testified, Bishop again contacted him.³² Veciana said it would have been easy for anyone to locate him in the close-knit Cuban exile community in Miami.³³ The result of their re-establishing contact eventually led to the founding of Alpha 66 which, according to Veciana, was Bishop's brainchild. "Bishop's main thesis was that Cuba had to be liberated by Cubans," Veciana testified.³⁴ Veciana established himself as the civilian chief and principal fund-raiser for Alpha 66 and recruited the former head of the Second National Front of the

Veciana - 7

Escambre (SNFE), Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, as the military chief.³⁵ Menoyo had a reputation among Cuban exiles of being socialistic and Bishop had some doubts about his loyalty, but Veciana insisted that Menoyo could be trusted. Besides, he said, "if he did not work out right we could get rid of him."³⁶ Veciana said that Menoyo was not aware of the existence of Maurice Bishop.

(130) Alpha 66 became one of the most active of the anti-Castro exile groups, buying guns and boats, recruiting and training commandos and conducting numerous raids on Cuba.³⁷ At one point, Veciana proclaimed a war chest of \$100,000 and announced that all the major exile organizations were backing Alpha 66's efforts. He also publicly said that all the planning was being done by leaders "I don't even know."³⁸

(131) According to Veciana, the man behind all of Alpha 66's strategy was Maurice Bishop. Over the 12-year period of their association, Veciana estimates he met with Bishop more than 100 times.³⁹ Veciana, however, claims he had no way of getting in touch with Bishop and that all the meetings were instigated by Bishop, a procedure Bishop established early in their relationship.⁴⁰ To set up a meeting, Bishop would call Veciana by telephone or, if Veciana was out of town, call a third person whom Veciana trusted, someone who always knew

Veciana - 8

his location.

~~where he was.~~⁴¹ Veciana said that this third person never met Bishop but "knew that Bishop and I were partners in this fight because this person shared my anti-Communist feelings."⁴²

(132) ^{Besides} ~~In addition to~~ contacts with Bishop in Havana and Miami, Veciana also had meetings with him in Dallas, Washington, Las Vegas and Puerto Rico and in Caracas, Lima and La Paz in South America.⁴³

(133) Veciana specifically recalled some meetings with Bishop because of their special nature. For instance, shortly after re-establishing contact with him in Miami, Bishop took Veciana to an office in the Pan American Bank Building in the downtown section of the city.⁴⁴ Veciana does not recall the exact floor of the building nor if there was any name on the office door.⁴⁵ Bishop unlocked the office with a key, ~~Veciana said~~ and in the presence of two men who were in the office asked him to sign a piece of paper and take part in a "commitment" ceremony.⁴⁶ "It was like a pledge of my loyalty, a secret pledge," Veciana testified. "I think they wanted to impress on me my responsibility and my commitment to the cause."⁴⁷

Veciana ~~said he~~ could not identify the two men who were present with Bishop at this ceremony, nor does he recall if he was introduced to them. "They were like spectators," he said.⁴⁸

Veciana - 9

(134) From August, 1968 until June, 1972, Veciana worked in La Paz, Bolivia, as a banking advisor to Bolivia's Central Bank.⁴⁹ His contracts were financed by the U. S. Agency for International Development,⁵⁰ and his office was located in the passport division of the American Embassy.⁵¹ Veciana believes that Bishop was instrumental in his getting the AID job, because he himself was surprised that the Agency would hire a known "terrorist" and anti-Castro activist.⁵² The records indicate that Veciana was hired by the Agency even though his application was never signed.⁵³

(135) While supposedly employed as a banking advisor in Bolivia, Veciana actually did very little such work, but instead was engaged mostly in anti-Castro and anti-Communist activities with Bishop.⁵⁴ Among the operations instigated by Bishop at the time was an attempt to assassinate Castro in Chile in 1971.⁵⁵

(136) According to Veciana, that aborted assassination attempt eventually led to the dissolution of his relationship with Bishop.⁵⁶ Although Bishop directed the operation and provided Veciana with intelligence information,⁵⁷ Veciana himself recruited anti-Castro Cuban associates in Caracas to take part in the attempt.⁵⁸ Without his knowledge, Veciana said, these associates introduced a new element into the plan, a scheme to blame the assassination on certain Russian agents in

Veciana - 10

Caracas.⁵⁹ The associates even produced phony documents and photographs. ~~in order to do that.~~⁶⁰ When Bishop later found out about this unauthorized part of the scheme, he was extremely upset and accused Veciana of being a part of it.⁶¹ Although Veciana told Bishop he had no knowledge of it, Bishop apparently did not believe him and eventually suggested that their relationship be terminated.⁶²

(137) On July 26, 1973, Bishop arranged for Veciana to meet with him in the parking lot of the Flagler Dog Track in Miami.⁶³ When Veciana arrived, Bishop was waiting for him with two younger men in an automobile.⁶⁴ At that time Bishop gave Veciana a suitcase which, Veciana later ascertained, contained \$253,000 in cash.⁶⁵ Since, at the beginning of their relationship, Veciana had refused Bishop's offer to pay him for his work with him, the lump sum payment was meant as compensation for his efforts over the years.⁶⁶

(138) The Committee's ~~special~~ interest in the relationship between Antonio Veciana and Maurice Bishop is, of course, predicated on Veciana's contention that he saw Bishop with Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas a few months before the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

(139) Veciana cannot specifically pinpoint the date

Veciana - 11

of that meeting with Bishop. He believes it was in late August, 1963.⁶⁷ Over the years that he knew Bishop, Veciana had at least five meetings with him in Dallas.⁶⁸ The meeting at which Oswald was present took place in the lobby of a large office building in the downtown section of the city, perhaps a bank or an insurance building with a blue facade or lobby.⁶⁹ When Veciana arrived for the meeting, Bishop was there talking with Oswald. Veciana does not recall whether he was introduced to Oswald by name, but said he did not have any conversation with him.⁷⁰ Oswald remained with Bishop and Veciana only for a brief time as they walked towards a nearby coffee shop. Oswald then departed and Bishop and Veciana continued their meeting alone.⁷¹

(140) Veciana testified that he recognized the young man with Bishop as Lee Harvey Oswald after seeing photographs of him following the Kennedy assassination.⁷² There is absolutely no doubt in his mind that the man was Oswald, not just someone who resembled him. Veciana pointed out that he had been trained to remember the physical characteristics of people and that if it was not Oswald it was his "exact" double.⁷³

(141) Veciana's next meeting with Bishop was in Miami about two months after the assassination of President

Veciana - 12

Kennedy.⁷⁴ Although they discussed the assassination in general, Veciana did not specifically ask him about Oswald. "I was not going to make the mistake of getting myself involved in something that did not concern me," he testified.⁷⁵ Also, he said, "...That was a very difficult situation because I was afraid. We both understood. I could guess that he knew that I was knowledgeable of that and I learned that the best way is not to know, not ~~to~~ to get to know things that don't concern you, so I respected the rules and I didn't mention that ever."⁷⁶

(142) Bishop himself, however, did suggest to Veciana the possibility of some involvement. At the time there were newspaper reports that Oswald had met with some Cubans during his visit to Mexico. Veciana said that Bishop was aware ~~of the fact~~ that he had a relative, Guillermo Ruiz, who was a high-ranking officer in Castro's intelligence service stationed in Mexico City.⁷⁷ Bishop told Veciana that if he could get in touch with Ruiz he would pay Ruiz ~~a~~ a large amount of money to publicly say that it was him and his wife who had met with Oswald.⁷⁸ Veciana agreed to make the attempt to contact Ruiz because, as he testified, "I knew that Ruiz would be tempted with money; he liked money."⁷⁹ Veciana, however, was never successful in contacting Ruiz and when he mentioned it to Bishop a couple of months later, Bishop told him to forget it.⁸⁰ That was

Veciana - 13

the last time Veciana ever spoke about the Kennedy assassination or Lee Harvey Oswald to Bishop, and, he testified, he never told anyone about seeing Oswald until questioned by Senator Schweiker's investigator.⁸¹

(143) In assessing Veciana's testimony, the Committee made an attempt to evaluate his general credibility and, concurrently, take the necessary steps to determine if there was a Maurice Bishop or someone using that name and, if there was, with whom he was associated.

(144) In retrospect, the timing and circumstances of that initial interview with Veciana by Senator Schweiker's investigator may be a factor in determining his credibility. Two weeks prior to the interview, Veciana had been released from the Federal penitentiary in Atlanta after serving 27 months on a narcotics conspiracy conviction.⁸² Veciana, although having served his time, insisted he was innocent, but claimed that the case against him was so well fabricated that the Federal prosecutor actually believed he was guilty.⁸³ According to Senator Schweiker's investigator, Veciana appeared confused and frightened by the situation in which he found himself, but said he believed that in some way his legal problems were related to his previous association with Bishop, although he did not know exactly how.⁸⁵ The investigator speculated that Veciana felt that by reveal-

Veciana - 14


ing his association with Bishop to an official representative of the U. S. Government, he would be providing himself with an element of security.⁸⁶ Much later, however, Veciana apparently changed his position and decided that Castro agents, not Bishop, were responsible for his drug arrest.⁸⁷ This is inconsistent with information provided to the Committee by one of Veciana's closest associates, who said that Veciana told him that he thought the CIA framed him because he wanted to go ahead with another plot to kill Castro.⁸⁸ This associate, Professor Rufo Lopez-Fresquet, Castro's former Minister of Finance, said, however, he was not aware that Veciana had had any association with anyone like Maurice Bishop and that he, himself, could not identify Bishop.⁸⁹

(145) The Committee conducted numerous interviews of other key anti-Castro associates or former associates of Veciana, not only as part of its efforts to locate Bishop but also to further aid in assessing Veciana's credibility. Generally, Veciana's reputation for honesty and integrity was excellent. A former associate, who worked with him when Veciana was chief of sabotage for the MRP in Havana, said: "Veciana was the straightest, absolutely trustworthy, most honest person I ever met. I would trust him explicitly."⁹⁰ ~~However,~~ ^{still,} not one of his associates -- neither those who worked with him in anti-Castro activity in Cuba nor those who were associated

Veciana - 15

with him in Alpha 66 -- said they were aware of any American directing Veciana or of anyone who had the characteristics of Maurice Bishop.

(146) Nevertheless, there were many aspects of Veciana's story ~~which~~ ^{that} the Committee ~~attempted to~~ ^{did} corroborate. Veciana's claim, for instance, that he was the principal organizer of the attempt on Castro's life in Havana in October, 1961, was documented in a Cuban newspaper report at the time.⁹¹ Early in their relationship in Miami, Bishop asked Veciana to monitor the activities of an anti-Castro operation called "Cellula Fantasma."⁹² Veciana said he attended a few meetings of the group and described the operation as a leaflet-dropping mission over Cuba which involved known soldier-of-fortune Frank Fiorini Sturgis.⁹³ Veciana said he did not know why Bishop would have been interested in the operation, but the Committee reviewed files which confirmed the existence and mission of the group and the involvement of Frank Fiorini Sturgis at the time.⁹⁴



(147) While Veciana was still in Cuba, among those at the American Embassy Bishop suggested he contact for aid in anti-Castro operations was a Colonel Sam Kail.⁹⁵ The Committee ascertained that there was a Colonel Samuel G. Kail at the American Embassy in Havana in 1960 at the time Veciana said he contacted him. Kail, now retired, was located and interviewed in Dallas.

Veciana - 16

(148) Colonel Kail served as the U. S. Army attache at the United States Embassy in Havana from June 3, 1958 until the day the Embassy closed, January 4, 1961.⁹⁶ His primary mission as a military attache was that of intelligence.⁹⁷ Later, in February, 1962, he was transferred to Miami where he was in charge of the unit which debriefed newly-arrived Cuban refugees. Although he reported directly to the Chief of Army Intelligence in Washington, Kail said he assumed his unit was actually functioning for the CIA. "I suspect they paid our ~~salary~~ ^{bills}," he said.⁹⁸

(149) Kail said that prior to the American Embassy closing in Havana, there was a "constant stream" of Cubans coming through his office with anti-Castro schemes, including assassination plans, asking for American assistance in the form of weapons or guarantees of escaping. "We had hordes and hordes of people through there all the time," he said. For that reason, he said, he did not specifically remember Veciana visiting him. "I think it would be a miracle if I could recall him," he said, but does not discount the possibility that he did meet him.⁹⁹

(150) However, Kail said, ^{not} agents of the CIA would frequently use the names of other Embassy staff personnel in their outside contacts without notifying the

Veciana - 17

staff individual it was being done.¹⁰⁰ It happened "a number of times"; he said that a Cuban would come in and ask to see Colonel Kail and, when introduced to him, tell him that he was not the Colonel Kail he had met outside the Embassy.¹⁰¹ Kail said he would then take the Cuban through the Embassy to have him point out the CIA agent who had used his name.¹⁰²

(151) Kail said he was not familiar with a Maurice Bishop, nor had he ever heard of anyone using that name.¹⁰³

(152) Another aspect of Veciana's story which the Committee ~~attempted to corroborate~~ was his claimed involvement in the assassination attempt on Castro in Chile in 1971. In a report given to Senator George McGovern in 1975, Castro provided information detailing the plot and accused "counter-revolutionaries from Alpha 66" as co-conspirators.¹⁰⁴ Veciana himself, however, was not specifically mentioned. Nevertheless, Committee ~~investigators~~ ^{and} probing the anti-Castro Cuban community in Miami, found that Veciana's involvement in the plot was known by many of the active exiles. Max Lesnik, editor and publisher of Replica, the most prominent Spanish-language weekly publication in the community, said he was aware of Veciana's involvement in the assassination attempt at the time.¹⁰⁵ He said,

What is the
Agency's
show about
Kail
file

Veciana - 18

however, that Veciana told him that it was "his own plan," and did not mention the involvement of a Maurice Bishop.¹⁰⁶ Lesnik could not identify Bishop but said he always did think that Veciana must have had "some high government contacts, probably CIA."¹⁰⁷

(153) The Committee also attempted to confirm Veciana's role in the Chile plot by locating two other anti-Castro Cubans allegedly involved with him. They were interviewed in Caracas, Venezuela, and, because they are not United States citizens, they could not be subpoenaed for sworn statements.

(154) One of those named was Lucilo Pena. A Cuban-born graduate of Auburn University in Georgia, Pena is now a Venezuelan citizen and a sales manager for a large chemical firm. He has lived in Venezuela since 19~~7~~⁶1.¹⁰⁸

(155) Although Pena denied any involvement in the Castro assassination plot in Chile, he admitted to knowing Veciana since "1964 or 1965," when he was active in Alpha 66's "Plan Omega," a plot to invade Cuba from a base in the Dominican Republic.¹⁰⁹ He said he first met Veciana through a friend, Secundino Alvarez, who was the Caracas chapter leader of Alpha 66.¹¹⁰ (Alvarez was among those named by Veciana as also being involved in the Chile plot.)¹¹¹ Pena admitted he had been in contact with Veciana during the period the Chile plot was being planned but, he said, their meetings were

Veciana - 19

only casual, usually at boxing matches which Veciana promoted.¹¹² Pena also admitted that Veciana may have discussed the possibility of assassinating Castro with him during one of these encounters at the boxing matches. "I think he asked some help in raising money," Pena said, "but that's all I know about that."¹¹³ Pena denied any knowledge or involvement in any plot to blame Russian agents for the planned Castro assassination in Chile. "I am not the type to do that kind of counter-intelligence work," he said. "I am too open and honest."¹¹⁴

(156) Pena, however, admitted to knowing, perhaps since 1963, Luis Posada, another anti-Castro Cuban in Caracas who Veciana claims was also involved in the plot to kill Castro in Chile.¹¹⁵

(157) Committee ~~investigators~~ interviewed Luis Posada in the Venezuelan political prison, Cuartel San Carlos, in Caracas. Posada had been arrested in October, 1976, along with well-known anti-Castro Cuban terrorist Orlando Bosch, and indicted for being involved in the bombing of a Cubana Airlines plane in which 73 persons were killed.¹¹⁶

(158) Posada had earlier been linked with assassination plots against Cuban officials in Chile, including two who disappeared in August, 1976.¹¹⁷

Veciana - 20

(159) Posada's background as a military and intelligence operative is eclectic. He was a member of Brigade 2506 but did not take part in the Bay of Pigs landing.¹¹⁸ In 1963 he joined the U. S. Army and was commissioned a first lieutenant.¹¹⁹ He resigned his commission in 1964 and became an agent for the CIA.¹²⁰ He went to Venezuela in 1967 and shortly afterwards joined the Venezuelan secret police, called DISIP, the Direccion de los Servicios de Inteligencia y Prevencion.¹²¹ From 1971 to 1973 he was chief of operations of the General Division of Security for DISIP, which included counter-intelligence.¹²² He resigned from DISIP in 1973 and went to Washington, D. C. to take training from what he termed "a private company" in the field of lie detection.¹²³ He then returned to Caracas to open his own private detective agency.

(160) Posada told Committee investigators that he was not involved in the Castro assassination attempt in Chile in 1971.¹²⁴ He admitted that he knew Veciana but said he only met him twice, once in Miami and once in Caracas at the boxing matches.¹²⁵ He said he did talk to Veciana about the time the Chile plot was being planned, but Veciana never mentioned anything to him about it.¹²⁶

Veciana - 21

(161) Another aspect of Veciana's allegations ^{that} ~~which~~ were of ~~special~~ interest to the Committee was Bishop's suggestion of developing a misinformation scheme involving a Castro intelligence agent and Oswald.¹²⁷ Veciana said that Bishop knew that a relative of his was in the Cuban Intelligence service assigned to Mexico City at the time of the Kennedy assassination.¹²⁸ According to Veciana, a news story was circulating immediately after the assassination that Oswald had met a couple on the Mexican border while on his way to Mexico City prior to the assassination.¹²⁹ Bishop, Veciana said, suggested he attempt to get in touch with his relative and offer him a bribe to say that it was he and his wife who met Oswald in Mexico.¹³⁰ Veciana said he was never able to get in touch with his relative about it and eventually Bishop told him to forget it.¹³¹

(162) The name of Veciana's relative is Orestes Guillermo Ruiz Perez and he is, in fact, a relative by marriage, the husband of a first cousin to Veciana.¹³² Veciana said he first learned of Ruiz's affiliation with Castro's intelligence service shortly after Castro took power. He and Ruiz were walking in a Havana park when they were stopped and searched by Castro's police. Ruiz was found to be carrying a gun and was taken away. Concerned, Veciana immediately placed a call to a close friend inside Castro's government, Minister of Finance.

Veciana - 22

Rufo Lopez-Fresquet. Lopez-Fresquet told Veciana not to worry about Ruiz because Ruiz was actually working for the intelligence service.¹³³

(163) Although Ruiz was a Castro agent and Communist, he warned Veciana that he was being observed visiting the American Embassy in Havana and told him to be careful.¹³⁴ That ^{is} why Veciana later thought that he might be able to turn Ruiz into an anti-Castro agent. Sometime after the Kennedy assassination, Veciana said he was approached by another anti-Castro Cuban named Robert Vale. [whom he knew to be working for the CIA]¹³⁵ Vale asked Veciana to attempt to contact Ruiz about possibly becoming an asset for the CIA.¹³⁶ Ruiz, at the time, was stationed in Spain and when Veciana found a friend, Roblejo Lorie, who was traveling to Spain, he asked him to carry a letter to Ruiz. Lorie gave the letter to Ruiz but, according to Veciana, Ruiz tore the letter up in front of Lorie and told him that he did not want to have any contact with Veciana because he knew Veciana "was working for the CIA."¹³⁷

(164) The Committee was able to interview Orestes Guillermo Ruiz in Havana.¹³⁸ Ruiz acknowledged that he was related to Veciana through marriage.¹³⁹ He said that "everyone in Cuba" knows that Veciana is associated

Veciana - 23

with the CIA and was involved in assassination attempts on Castro.¹⁴⁰ He said, however, aside from what he read in the American newspapers he has no knowledge of Veciana's association with Maurice Bishop or who Maurice Bishop could be.¹⁴¹ He said he was never contacted by Veciana about Oswald¹⁴² and, in fact, has not seen Veciana since 1959.¹⁴³

(165) Ruiz expressed disdain for Veciana, said he considered him a coward¹⁴⁴ and "a person you cannot believe." He said Veciana had personality problems and was under psychiatric care from the time he was 16 years old until he was 21.¹⁴⁵ Ruiz said that "another counter-revolutionary," a cousin of Veciana's who is a doctor "in Miami or Chicago" and whose name is Jose Veciana, could attest to Veciana's psychiatric problems because he had advised the family about them.¹⁴⁶

(166) Committee investigators located Dr. Jose Veciana in Martin, Tennessee, where he is chief of pathology at Volunteer General Hospital. He confirmed that he is a first cousin to Antonio Veciana and that he had known him when he was a child in Havana.¹⁴⁷ Dr. Veciana said he has never known his cousin to have personality problems or to have ever been under psychiatric care. He said he himself has never provided Veciana any psychiatric advice nor offered it to his family.¹⁴⁸ He said he feels that Veciana must be of sound mental con-

Veciana - 24

dition because he knows that Veciana had to undergo vigorous tests in his rise in the banking business.¹⁴⁹

(167) Veciana himself denied Ruiz's allegations that he had had psychiatric problems as a young man. His mother confirmed his denial.¹⁵⁰

The Search for Bishop

(168) One of the factors utilized in the Committee's efforts to locate Maurice Bishop was the description of him provided by Veciana. When he first met him in 1960, Veciana said, Bishop was about 45 years old, about 6'2" tall, weighed over 200 pounds and was athletically built. He had grey-blue eyes, light brown hair and a light complexion.¹⁵¹ However, Veciana said, Bishop appeared to spend ~~a lot of~~ ^{much} time outdoors or in sunny climate because he was usually well-tanned and there was some skin discoloration, like sun spots, under his eyes.¹⁵² He appeared to be meticulous about his dress and usually concerned about his weight and diet.¹⁵³ In the latter years that Veciana knew him, Bishop ~~took to~~ ^{began} using glasses for reading.¹⁵⁴

(169) Shortly after he revealed his Bishop relationship to Senator Schweiker's investigator, Veciana aided a professional artist in developing a composite sketch of Bishop. Schweiker's office provided the Committee with a copy of the sketch. Veciana told the Committee that he considered the artist's composite sketch of Bishop a

Veciana - 25

"pretty good" resemblance.¹⁵⁵

(170) Prior to the Committee's efforts, Senator Schweiker's office, as well as the Senate Select Subcommittee he headed, looked into certain aspects of Veciana's allegations. Schweiker, for instance, requested the Belgian Embassy to conduct a record check for information about a passport issued under the name of "Frigault." The Belgian Embassy said that, without additional identifying information, it could not help.¹⁵⁶ In addition, Schweiker's investigator showed Veciana numerous photographs of individuals who may have used the name of Bishop, among them Oswald's friend, George deMohrenschildt, who was then a teacher at Bishop College in Dallas. The results were negative.¹⁵⁷

(171) It was Senator Schweiker who focused the Committee's attention on David Atlee Phillips, former chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA [Deputy] Directorate of Operations, as perhaps having knowledge of Maurice Bishop. Immediately after receiving the Bishop sketch, Schweiker concluded that Phillips, who had earlier testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, bears a strong resemblance to the sketch.

(172) When Veciana was shown a photograph of David Phillips by Schweiker's investigator, he did not provide ~~an~~ an absolutely conclusive ~~response~~ ^{157-2 158} ~~response~~. ~~Confidential memorandum to Gustavson, 9/20/76, JEB Document No. 157-2 159~~) For that reason, it was decided that Veciana be given the opportunity to observe Phillips in person. ~~(157-2 159)~~ Schweiker arranged for Veciana to be present at a luncheon meeting of the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers in Reston, Virginia, on September ~~157-2 159~~ ¹⁶⁰ 17, 1976. Phillips was one of the founders of the Association. Veciana was introduced to Phillips prior to the luncheon. ^{161 157-2} He was introduced by name but not by affiliation with Alpha 66 or involvement with anti-Castro activity. According to Schweiker's investigator, there was no indication of ~~recognition~~ ^{162 157-2} recognition on Phillip's part. ~~Following the~~ ^{163 157-2} Following the luncheon, Veciana had the opportunity to speak with Phillips ^{164 157-2} in Spanish. Veciana asked Phillips if he was in Havana in 1960 and if he knew Julio Lobo. Phillips answered both questions affirmatively and then asked Veciana to repeat his name. ^{157-2 166} Veciana did and then asked, "Do you know my name?" Phillips said he did not. ^{167 157-2} Phillips asked if Veciana was on Schweiker's staff. ^{168 157-2} He was told that he was not but that Veciana was helping Schweiker in his investigation of the Kennedy assassination. ^{169 157-2} Phillips declined to be interviewed by Senator Schweiker's investigator, but said he would be happy to speak with any Congressman or Congressional representative ^{170 157-2} "in Congress." Following the encounter of Veciana and Phillips,

Schweiker's investigator ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ asked Veciana if David Phillips was Maurice Bishop. Veciana said he was not. ~~172~~ ⁽¹⁷³⁾ However, Schweiker's investigator expressed some doubt about Veciana's credibility on the point, ^{however,} because of Veciana's renewed interest in continuing his anti-Castro operations and his expressed desire to re-contact Bishop to help him. ¹⁷³ ~~(XXXXXX)~~ In addition, Schweiker's investigator expressed doubt that David Phillips, who was once in charge of Cuban operations for the CIA and whose career was deeply entwined in anti-Castro operations, could not recognize the name of Veciana as being the founder and vociferous public spokesman for one of the largest and most active anti-Castro Cuban groups, Alpha 66. ~~158-174~~ ¹⁷⁴

(174) The Committee considered other factors in examining Phillips. Until 1963, Phillips' principal area of expertise and operations with the CIA was propaganda and psychological warfare. ¹⁵⁸⁻¹⁷⁵ In 1960, when Veciana said

Veciana - 26

he first met Bishop in Havana, Phillips was serving as a covert operative in Havana, running a public relations agency as a front. ^{159 176} From 1961 to 1963, Phillips was Chief of Covert Action in Mexico City. When Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City in 1963, Phillips was in charge of Cuban Operations for the CIA in Mexico City. Phillips had earlier lived in and had numerous associations in Chile. ^{160 177} He had also served as Chief of ¹⁷⁸ Station in the Dominican Republic, Brazil and Venezuela. ¹⁶¹

(175) The Committee ~~also~~ developed other information which further validated an interest in Phillips in

relation to Bishop. In Miami, its investigators interviewed a former career agent for the CIA, ^{who for present purposes} named Ross

^{we will call} ~~Crozier~~ ^{Row Cross}. From September, 1960 until November, 1962,

^{be} ~~Crozier~~ ^{Cross} was a case officer at the CIA's JM/WAVE station, the operational base which coordinated the Agency's activities with the anti-Castro Cuban exiles. ^{162 179} He

handled one of the largest and most active anti-Castro groups, [the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE)]. ^{180 163}

At the time that ~~Crozier~~ ^{Cross} was at the Miami JM/WAVE station, David Phillips was responsible for ^{certain} the psychological-warfare aspects of the CIA's anti-Castro operations. ^{Cross} ~~Crozier~~ coordinated ^{these} [the DRE's propaganda] operations with Phillips, who would occasionally visit the JM/WAVE station from Washington. ^{164 181} Generally, however,

^{Cross} ~~Crozier~~ worked with Phillips' direct assistant at the

Veciana - 27

station, who used the cover name of Doug Gupton.

(176) In his book about his role in the Bay of Pigs operation, former CIA officer E. Howard Hunt uses a pseudonym when referring to the chief of [propaganda for] the operation. ¹⁶⁵⁻¹⁸² The chief of propaganda was David Phillips. Hunt called him "Knight." ¹⁶⁶⁻¹⁸³

(177) When asked by ¹⁶⁶ Committee ~~investigators~~ if he was familiar with anyone using the cover name of Bishop at the JM/WAVE station, ^{CROSS} ~~Crozier~~ said he was "almost positive" that David Phillips had used the cover name of Maurice Bishop. ¹⁶⁷⁻¹⁸⁴ He said he was "fairly sure" that Hunt himself had used the cover name of Knight. ¹⁶⁸⁻¹⁸⁵ ^{CROSS} ~~However, Crozier~~ ^{however, that} said the reason he was certain that Phillips used the name of Bishop was because he recalled sometimes discussing field and agent problems [in the area of psychological warfare] with Phillips' assistant Doug Gupton and Gupton often saying, "Well, I guess Mr. Bishop will have to talk with him." ^{CROSS} ~~Crozier~~ said: "And, of course, I knew he was referring to his boss, David Phillips." ¹⁶⁹⁻¹⁸⁶

(178) The Committee ascertained that the cover name of Doug Gupton was used at the JM/WAVE station by a former CIA employee ~~William Kent~~ ^{And interviewed him. ©}

~~See INSERT, Gupton~~

(INSERT -- get Kent insert -
CIA security room safe in
FONZI - INSERTS file)

~~170-181~~

187-198

insert Veciana write up

~~insert GUPTON~~

(179) The Committee staff interviewed Doug Gupton on August 22nd, 1978 at CIA headquarters. ~~(Staff interview, 8/20/78, JFK 200-200107)~~ ^{(120) 187} Gupton said he worked for the CIA from December, 1951, until his retirement in June, 1978, much of that time ^{as a senior staff officer} on the Covert Action Guidance Staff. ~~(121) 188~~ Gupton confirmed that he was in charge of ~~propaganda~~ ^{special} operations ^{staff} at the Miami JM/WAVE station and that his immediate superior was David Phillips. ~~(122) 189~~ Gupton acknowledged that ~~Doug Cross~~ ^{Ron Cross (cover name)} was a case officer who worked for him and that he saw ~~Cross~~ ^{Cross} on a daily basis. ~~(123) 190~~ Gupton said he does not recall whether E. Howard Hunt or David Phillips ever used the name of "Knight." ~~(124) 191~~ He said he does not recall Phillips ever using the name of Maurice Bishop. ~~(125) 192~~ When told about ~~Cross's~~ ^{Cross's} recollection of him referring to Phillips as "Mr. Bishop," Gupton said: "Well, maybe I did. I don't remember." ~~(126) 193~~ He also said, however, that he never heard the name of Bishop while he was stationed in Miami. ~~(127) 194~~ When shown the sketch of Bishop, he said it did not look like anyone he knew. ~~(128) 195~~

(180) Explaining his working relationship with David Phillips, Gupton said he was in contact with him regularly in Washington by telephone and cable and that Phillips visited Miami "quite

~~(194)~~ 196
often." ~~(194)~~ Gupton said, however, that there were two
sets of operations. His set of operations was run out of
Miami and he kept Phillips informed of them. Phillips
ran another set of operations personally out of Washington
and, Gupton said, Phillips did not keep him briefed about
them. ~~(194)~~ 197
Gupton also said he knew that Phillips
used many of his old contacts from Havana in his personal
operations. ~~(194)~~ 198

Veciana - 28

(181) David Atlee Phillips testified before the Committee in Executive Session on April 25th, 1978.

NO 2

in Executive Session on April 25, 1978. He said he never used the name ~~of~~ Maurice Bishop. He said he did not know of anyone in the CIA who used the name ~~of~~ Maurice Bishop. He said he had seen Antonio Veciana only twice in his life, the second time ~~the~~ ^{the} morning of his hearing before the Committee when Veciana, who had testified earlier, emerged from the hearing room while he, Phillips, was in the hallway. Phillips said the first time he met Veciana was at a meeting of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers in Reston. He said that Veciana was brought to that meeting by an investigator from Senator Schweiker's office but, said Phillips, Veciana was not introduced to him by name but only as "the driver." He said Veciana asked him some questions in Spanish but at the time, ~~he~~ he did not know who Veciana was or why Senator Schweiker's office had sent him to the meeting.

(182) Phillips also testified that he had never used the name ~~of~~ Frigault and had never used a Belgian passport.

(183) Phillips was shown the sketch of Maurice Bishop but could not identify it as anyone he knew. He said, however, "It looks like me."

(184) In sworn testimony before the Committee in Executive Session on April 26th, 1978, Antonio Veciana said that David Atlee Phillips is not the person he knew as Maurice Bishop. He said, however, that there was a "physical similarity."

(185) On March 2, 1978, the Committee requested the CIA to check all its files and index references pertaining to Maurice Bishop. ^{192 209} On March 31, 1978, the CIA informed the Committee that its Office of the Inspector General, its Office of the General Counsel, its Office of Personnel and the Deputy Directorate of Operations had no record of a Maurice Bishop. ^{193 210}

(186) On August 10, 1978, B.H. (~~Del. [redacted] 198 Jr.~~) a former covert operative of the CIA, was interviewed by the Committee in a special closed session. ^{(194) 211} ~~Secret closed session, 8/10/78~~ B.H. was a CIA agent from 1952 to 1970. ^{(195) 12} Between 1960 and 1964 he was assigned to Cuban operations. ^{(196) 213} As such, he testified, he was involved in "day-to-day" operations with David Atlee Phillips. He characterized Phillips as "an excellent intelligence officer" and "a personal friend." ^{(197) 214}

(187) When asked if he knew an individual named Maurice Bishop, B.H. said:

"Again, Mr. Bishop was in the organization but I had no personal day-to-day open relationship with him. Phillips, yes; Bishop, no. I knew them both..." ^{(198) 215}

(188) Although he couldn't describe Bishop's physical characteristics, B.H. said he had seen him "two or three times" ^{(199) 216} in the "hallways or cafeteria" ^{(200) 217} at CIA headquarters in Langley. B.H. said he thought Bishop worked in the Western Hemisphere Division ^{(201) 218} and that he had a position "higher than me." ^{(202) 219} He could not be more specific. The two or three times he saw Bishop, he said, was between 1960 and 1964 when he himself was in Cuban operations, although, he said, he didn't know if Bishop worked in that area also. ^{(203) 220}

2, B.H. insert

(189) Asked how, if he didn't personally know Bishop, he knew the person he saw at CIA headquarters was Maurice Bishop, B.H. said: "Someone might have said, 'That is Maurice Bishop,' and it was different from Dave Phillips or Joseph Langsch or Hal Swenson, guys that I know." ~~(204) 221~~

(190) However, when shown the sketch of Maurice Bishop, B.H. could not identify it as anyone he recognized.

~~McCone insert~~

205
206

(191) On August 17, 1978, the Committee deposed John A. McCone, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from October, 1961 until April 30th, 1965. ~~(202) 222~~

~~Top Secret~~ testimony, 8/17/78, p.4)

(192) During the course of the deposition, the following questions and answers were recorded: ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Q: Do you know or did you know Maurice Bishop?

A: Yes.

Q: Was he an agency employee?

A: I believe so.

Q: Do you know what his duties were in 1963?

A: No.

... Q: For instance, do you know whether Maurice Bishop worked in the Western Hemisphere Division or whether he worked in some other division of the CIA?

A: I do not know. I do not recall. I knew at that time but I do not recall.

Q: Do you know whether Maurice Bishop used any pseudonyms?

A: No, I do not know that. ~~(203) 223~~ (Ibid, pp. 45,46)

Mr
Sigh
Space

Veciana - 29

(193) In ^{view} ~~light~~ of the information developed in the interviews with H. and former Director McCone, the Committee asked the CIA to renew its file search for any files or index references pertaining to Bishop. ~~207~~ ²²⁴ It also asked for a written statement from the CIA indicating whether an individual using either the true name or pseudonym of Maurice Bishop has ever been associated in any capacity with the CIA. ~~208~~ ²²⁵

(194) A reply was received on September 8, 1978, from the CIA's Office of Legislative Counsel indicating that all true name files, alias files and pseudonym files were again checked and, again, proved negative. "No person with such a name has a connection with CIA," ~~209~~ ²²⁶ said the reply. Added the Agency: "Quite frankly, it is our belief -- from our earlier check, reinforced by this one -- that such a man did not exist, so far as CIA connections are concerned." ~~210~~ ²²⁷ *See attached p. -*

(195) Additional efforts to locate Maurice Bishop were made by the Committee in file requests to the Federal Bureau of Investigation ~~211~~ ²²⁸ and to the Department of Defense. ~~212~~ ²²⁹ Both proved negative. ~~213~~ ²³⁰

(196) Although file reviews of Maurice Bishop proved negative, the Committee learned that Army intelligence had an operational interest in Antonio Veciana during one period. Veciana was registered in the Army Information Source Registry from November, 1962 until July, 1966. ~~214~~ ²³¹

Footnote: page 29.

(97) *On October 19, 1978, the Committee's Chief Counsel received a letter from the Principal Coordinator in the CIA's Office of Legislative Counsel. The letter said, in part: "This is to advise you that I have interviewed Mr. McCone and a retired employee concerning their recollections about an alleged CIA employee reportedly using the name of Maurice Bishop...."

"We assembled photographs of the persons with the surname of Bishop who had employment relationships of some type with CIA during the 1960s, to see if either Mr. McCone or the employee would recognize one of them.

"Mr. McCone did not feel it necessary to review those photographs, stating that I should inform you that he had been in error...."

"The employee continues to recall a person of whom he knew who was known as Maurice Bishop. He cannot state the organizational connection or responsibilities of the individual, not knowing him personally, and feels that the person in question was pointed out to him by someone, perhaps a secretary. He unable, however, to recognize any of the photographs mentioned above...."

"In summary, Mr. McCone withdraws his statements on this point. The employee continues to recall such a name, but the nature of his recollection is not very clear or precise. We still believe that there is no evidence of the existence of such a person so far as there being a CIA connection...." (JFK Document No. 012722.)

Veciana - 30

(198) The nature of the Army's contact with Veciana appeared to be limited to attempting to use him as a source of intelligence information about Alpha 66 activities, with Veciana, in turn, seeking to obtain weapons and funds. ^{215 232} Veciana acknowledged and detailed to the Committee these contacts with Army Intelligence and said that, aside from keeping Bishop informed of them, they had no relationship with his activities with Bishop. ~~216~~ ²³³

(199) Given the Army's acknowledgement of an interest in Veciana and Alpha 66, the Committee made the assumption that the CIA, ~~although officially denying any relationship with Maurice Bishop~~ ^{may} must also have had an interest in Veciana and his Alpha 66 activities as part of its pervasive role in anti-Castro operations during the 1960s.

(260) In a review of its own files on March 15, 1978, the CIA noted that Veciana had contacted the Agency three times -- in December, 1960; July, 1962; and April, 1966 -- for assistance in plots against Castro. ²³⁴ ~~For contact with CIA~~ ~~(Classified File 201-342966, Dir. 18801, 3/15/78)~~ According to the CIA: "Officers listened to Veciana, expressed no interest, offered no encouragement and never recontacted him on this matter. There has been no Agency relationship with Veciana." ~~For contact with CIA~~ ²³⁵

(201) The Committee's own review of the Agency's files basically confirmed the stated conclusions about

the meetings with Veciana in 1960 and 1966.

A review of the files dated July 7, 1962, however, revealed that Veciana had received

\$500 from ~~contacted~~ a wealthy Puerto Rican financier and industrialist, ^[code named SKEWER-1,] with whom the CIA had a ^{long standing operational} cooperative relationship.

This person gave Veciana \$500

for operational activity. Foot-236 Although

the files do not explicitly state whether the money ~~was~~ originated with the CIA,

or the ^{with Puerto Rican} industrialist, and even though [during

this same period] the Agency ^{later} ~~was~~ used to cover ^{support} payments to ^{selected} anti-Castro groups revolutionaries, it appears that in Veciana's case the money was provided by the ~~soldier industrialist, and not by the Agency.~~

Puerto Rican, from his personal funds.

(202) In a final effort to locate or identify Maurice

Bishop, the Committee issued a press release on July 30,

1978 and made available the composite sketch of Bishop

to the press. The Committee warned that it should not

be assumed that the release indicated the Committee be-

lieves the person in the sketch was involved in the

Kennedy assassination, only that information resulting

from possible citizen recognition of the sketch might

"shed additional light on the assassination." The Com-

mittee asked that anyone who had information contact

the Committee by mail, not by telephone. ~~237~~ 237

(203) By November 1, 1978, the Committee received from the general public a total of four written responses. ²³⁸ ~~238~~

None of the responses was, upon analysis, deemed a valid

lead to the identity of Maurice Bishop.

Conclusions:

(204) ~~The Committee, due to its limited time and resources, could not reach any firm conclusion~~ ^{No definitive} could be reached

as to the credibility of Antonio Veciana's allegations regarding his relationship with a Maurice Bishop or

Bishop's alleged relationship with Lee Harvey Oswald.

^{Additionally,} ~~No definitive~~ ^{could be drawn as to the} ~~conclusions~~

identity or affiliations of Maurice Bishop, if such an

individual existed. ^{While} ~~The Committee found~~ no evidence was found to discredit Veciana's testimony, ^{there was} ~~some~~

evidence to support it, although none of it was conclusive.

The available documentary record was sufficient to indicate that the U.S. ^{Government} intelligence community had a keen interest in Antonio Veciana during the early 1960's, and that he was willing to receive the financial support he needed for the military operations of his anti-Castro groups from those sources. From the files of those agencies, it thus appears, ^{reasonable} that an association similar to the ^{alleged} Maurice Bishop story ^{actually} existed. But whether Veciana's contact was really named Maurice Bishop, or if he was, whether he did all of the things Veciana claims, and if so, with what U.S. intelligence agency he was associated, ~~must remain~~ could not be determined.

Classification: _____

DRAFT 11/20/78
Betsy Palmer

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

IV

CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL

A Concise History

(205) The forerunner of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) was the Frente Revolucionario Democrático (FRD), formed in May, 1960,¹

~~_____~~

~~_____~~

~~_____~~ At the head of it were the leaders of five major anti-Castro groups. The proclaimed purpose of the FRD was to establish a democratic government in Cuba through the use of military force.²

(206) The FRD initially set up headquarters³ in Mexico, but recruited most of its proposed invasion force from Miami.⁴ The military arm of the FRD was known as Brigade 2506.⁴ The Brigade eventually was composed of 1,443 men who were trained by U.S. Army specialists at two sites on the south coast of Guatemala.⁵

(207) The leaders and their organizations which composed the FRD Executive Committee were: Aureliano Sanchez Arango of the Triple A group; Justo Carrillo of Montecristi; Antonio de Varona of Rescate; Manuel Artime of the Revolutionary Recovery Movement (MRR); and Dr. Jose Ignacio Rasco of the Christian Democratic Movement (MDC).¹⁶ Antonio de Varona served as General Coordinator¹⁷ and the membership was soon expanded to include Dr. Antonio Maceo, a noted Cuban surgeon; former Cuban President Carlos Hevia; and conservative leader Rafael Sardinas.¹⁸

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

DRAFT - CRC
Page 2

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

(208) In March 1961, The State Department ^{pressured} ~~put pressure on~~ FRD leaders to accept the Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP), headed by Manuel Ray Rivero, into the FRD. ⁹ The inclusion of Ray's group into the alliance of Cuban exiles was reportedly also "terribly important to the White House" which wanted to broaden the political base of the FRD. ¹⁰ In an effort to attract Ray and his group into the FRD, Antonio de Varona voluntarily resigned and Dr. Jose Miro Cardona was elected its new president. ¹¹ Dr. Miro was a former Havana jurist who broke with Castro after serving him as his first prime minister. ¹²

(209) Shortly before the April 17, 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) was formed to coordinate and direct FRD activities with ^{U.S. Government} ~~U.S. Government~~ support. ¹³ The new organization had direct access to President Kennedy and top White House aides. ¹⁴ All the groups within the CRC maintained their separate identities, ¹⁵ the leaders publicly expressing ¹⁶ their unity, especially during the period prior to the planned invasion. The regrouping included the following Cuban exile leaders: Chairman, Dr. Jose Miro Cardona; Board of Directors - Antonio de Varona; Justo Carillo, Carlos Hevia; Antonio Maceo, Manuel Ray; and Manuel Artime. CRC committees

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

3800851

Classification: _____

DRAFT - CRC
Page 3

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

were organized in key cities in the United States and delegations appointed in Latin American countries. ²⁰¹⁷

(210) The failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion resulted in Castro capturing and imprisoning over 1000 of the Brigade's members. ²⁰¹⁸ The dejected leaders of the CRC, who had been sequestered for security reasons at the start of the invasion, ²⁰¹⁹ were later taken to the White House for a personal visit with President Kennedy who expressed his regret and ^{assumed} ~~took~~ responsibility for the invasion failure. ²⁰²⁰

(211) Shortly after the unsuccessful invasion, Manuel Ray withdrew his organization, the MRP, from the Council, ²⁰²¹ and by October 1961, the CRC had completely absorbed the FRD. ²⁰²² Dr. Miro remained at the helm of the Council, which had been enlarged to include the Revolutionary Action and a faction of the 30th of November Movement. ²⁰²³ While some unification had been achieved through the FRD and CRC, the Cuban exile groups were plagued by factionalism, personal rivalries for leadership roles and conflicting programs. ²⁰²⁴ Nevertheless, the CRC was still considered the principal unifying organization of the Cuban exile community ²⁰²⁵ although no anti-Castro leader emerged who could command broad support of the community. ²⁰²⁶

(212) After the October, 1962 missile crisis, the policy of the United States toward the Castro regime changed drastically.

2004500

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

DRAFT- CRC

Page 4

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

In his book, The Losers, Paul Bethel, former Press Attache
at the Havana Embassy, noted: "There is no doubt that President
Kennedy and his brother, the Attorney General, consciously
set about the business of stopping all efforts to unhorse
Fidel Castro -- from outside exile attacks, and from Cuba's
internal resistance movement." ^{228 27} When two Cuban exile groups
made raids against Russian installations in Cuba and a Russian
freighter in the Cuban port of Caribarien, the Attorney General
dispatched 600 Federal agents to Miami in an effort to pre-
vent further actions against the Castro regime. ^{228 28} A directive
was issued which prohibited key anti-Castro leaders in Miami
from leaving the area without Federal approval. ^{228 29}

(213) Although individual groups received financial
aid from the U.S. Government, ³⁰

~~the effectiveness of the CRC as a~~
unifying organization deteriorated. In April, 1963, Jose
Miro Cardona resigned his position as president in a clash
with the Kennedy Administration over Cuban policy. ^{228 31} Miro
claimed that Kennedy had promised another invasion would be
launched and had instead chosen a course of peaceful coexistence
with the Castro regime. ^{228 32} The CRC was revamped and Dr. Antonio

2000001

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

~~██████████~~ - 12/13/78

~~Robert Palmer~~

V.

~~NEW ORLEANS CHAPTER OF THE~~
CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL (CRC) :

New Orleans Chapter

(216) Nine days after the assassination of President ~~John F. Kennedy~~, the United States Secret Service began an investigation into the activities of Lee Harvey Oswald during his residency in New Orleans. ¹

(217) Oswald had been arrested there in August, 1963, while distributing Fair Play for Cuba literature. Some of his leaflets had the address 544 Camp Street stamped on them. The Secret Service endeavored to ^{determine} ~~ascertain~~ if Oswald maintained an office at this address. ²

(218) During the course of its investigation, the Secret Service ^{ascertained} ~~ascertained~~ that the New Orleans chapter of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) had occupied an office at 544 Camp Street for about six months during 1961-62. At that time, Sergio Arcacha Smith was the official CRC delegate for the New Orleans area. The Secret Service also learned that Arcacha had been fired from his position by the Miami CRC headquarters in early 1962, allegedly because he did not have the confidence of the ^{New Orleans} Cuban exile community. ^{Luis Rabel} ~~██████████~~ replaced ^{Smith} ~~██████████~~ and ~~██████████~~ moved the CRC offices to his home. ³

(219) At the time of the Secret Service investigation, another Cuban exile, Frank Bartes, headed the New Orleans CRC delegation and maintained offices in his home in Metairie, a suburb of New Orleans. ⁴

(220) After an extensive investigation by the FBI and the Secret Service regarding the possibility that Oswald rented office space at 544 Camp Street, the Warren Report concluded there was no evidence that Oswald ever maintained an office

~~address~~ ^{that address.} 5
at 544 Camp Street.

(221) What the Committee discovered about the relationship of Oswald to the 544 Camp Street address and certain of its occupants is detailed elsewhere in this Report. *does not relate the relationship of Oswald to the 544 Camp Street address; it* **This material**

^{pertains to}
the Committee's attempt to ascertain if any activities of the CRC had any relationship to Oswald's activities in New Orleans.

(222) ^{The Committee questioned}

The first New Orleans delegate to the CRC, Sergio

Arcacha Smith, ⁶ ~~was questioned by the Committee.~~ Arcacha

told the Committee that he arrived in Miami in August 1960 and, at the request of Antonio Verona, a director of the CRC, agreed to establish a chapter of this group in New Orleans. ~~Initially~~

Arcacha was ^{initially} afforded free office space in the Balter Building and later rented space at 544 Camp Street. 7

(223) During his tenure as head of the New Orleans delegation, Arcacha endeavored to raise funds by selling CRC bonds, and was instrumental in organizing several rallies to promote the cause of the Cuban exiles. 8

(224) Arcacha said he had never seen Oswald in New Orleans and, from what he had read, Oswald was not even in that city at the same time Arcacha lived there. 9 When he was relieved of his official position with the CRC in early 1962, Arcacha left New Orleans. 10

(225) Arcacha's replacement, Luis Rabel, assumed the delegate duties in January, 1962, but, he told the Committee, found it necessary to resign by October of that year because his job entailed extensive traveling.¹¹ During his short tenure, Rabel said he organized several rallies and brought in prominent Miami speakers to enthuse the New Orleans Cuban exile community.¹² Other than going to the Camp Street address to remove office materials left there by Arcacha, Rabel said he had no connection with the building and never saw Oswald in New Orleans.¹³

(226) Frank Bartes, former President of Consolidated Railroads in Cuba,¹⁴ became the third designated delegate of the New Orleans CRC chapter. He reported the activities of the group regularly to the FBI¹⁵ and was primarily concerned with solicitation of monthly pledges from Cubans for the purchase of arms for their countrymen actively engaged in the fight against Castro.¹⁶ He reported that he had purchased an M-2 rifle with collections and displayed it at an October, 1963 meeting for "psychological reasons".¹⁷ ~~however, because of~~ Bartes said, ~~the~~ the rate of collections at that time, the group was able to send only enough money to the Miami CRC headquarters to purchase one gun per month.¹⁸

(227) On November 15, 1963, a CRC meeting was held at Gallier Hall. Tony Varona was invited to come to New Orleans to speak to the Cuban exiles and bolster their morale.¹⁹ Varona stayed at the home of Agustin Guitart,²⁰ uncle of Silvia Odio.

(228) Bartes told the Committee he headed the New Orleans delegation until the CRC was dissolved in 1964.²¹ During his tenure, he said, he maintained the CRC office in his home.²² He could not recall ever having visited the 544 Camp Street office maintained by Arcacha in 1961-62.²³

DRAFT - New Orleans CRC
Page 4

(229) After Carlos Bringuier and Oswald had been arrested in a street scuffle, (see detailed discussion in another section of the Report) Bartes appeared in Court with Bringuier.²⁴ Although not a CRC member, Bringuier was respected by Bartes and it was ~~in~~^{as} a show of support that Bartes appeared at Bringuier's hearing.^{23 25}

(230) After the hearing, the news media surrounded Oswald for a statement, Bartes said. At this point, Bartes got into an argument with the media and Oswald because the Cubans were not being given an opportunity to present their views.^{24 26} He also spoke to an FBI agent that day, warning that Oswald was a potentially dangerous man.^{25 27} Bartes declined to identify the agent to the Committee, saying only that he had had frequent contact with him during this period of time.^{26 28} Bartes said he had no other contact with Oswald.^{27 29}

(231) The Committee concludes ~~that the New Orleans chapter of the CRC had no relationship with Oswald other than the brief encounter with Bartes, and in no way was officially involved in any activities which touched upon those of Oswald.~~
that the New Orleans chapter of the CRC had no relationship with Oswald other than the brief encounter with Bartes, and in no way was ~~officially~~ officially involved in any activities which touched upon those of Oswald.

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

VI. BRIGADE 2506 - MANUEL ARTIME -

MOVIMIENTO de RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA (MRR)

(232) No other anti-Castro Cuban group more naturally attracted the initial attention of the Committee than Brigade 2506, the organization specifically formed for the Bay of Pigs invasion and the one which experienced the most dramatic relationship with the Kennedy administration in terms of its hopes and failures.

(233) Following their release from Castro's prisons in December of 1962, the members of the Brigade harbored deep-seated emotional conflicts in their attitude towards the Government. An observer who watched them arrive in Miami noted: "There were earnest, bewildered, still in a state of shock at their sudden liberation, still nursing a bitter sense of betrayal at the manner in which they were sent ashore and abandoned, still torn between trust and cynicism, still in awe at the power of an American government that could, at will it seemed, pluck them out of the darkest dungeons in Havana and on the Isle of Pines and deposit them back in Florida with their families by Christmas Eve." ¹

(234) In the perspective of an investigation of the Kennedy assassination, the members of Brigade 2506 had to be considered of primary interest if only in terms of motivations and means.

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

2001071

Classification: _____

Brigade 2506
etc.
Page 2

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

As one member, who later became involved in anti-Castro terrorist activity, explained: "We learned from them. We use the tactics that we learned from the CIA because we were trained to do everything. We were trained to set off a bomb, we were trained to kill"²

(235) The formation of what was to become Brigade 2506 can be traced to March, 1960 when President Dwight Eisenhower authorized the CIA to organize, train and equip Cuban refugees for the purpose of eventually overthrowing Castro.³ To head the group, [the CIA chose] a young physician ^{was chosen} who had organized the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR), the first anti-Castro action group inside Cuba.⁴ His name was Manuel Artime [and, with the aid of the CIA, he ^{who had} been spirited out of Cuba the previous December.] Castro had appointed him a member of the National Agrarian Reform Institute but when, in October of 1959, he heard Castro outline a plan to communize Cuba, Artime publicly resigned his position and denounced Castro.^{5 6}

(236) The group which eventually grew into Brigade 2506 originally consisted of only 28 men.⁷ The nucleus was 10 former Cuban military officers whom Artime had recruited. ⁸ He told them that he himself was told by a group of Americans who claimed to have no association with the United States Government that

Classification: _____

2011074

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

Brigade 2506, etc.

Page 3

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

they would receive a huge amount of arms, equipment and funds.⁹
The Americans tried to give Arttime and his men the impression
that an anonymous Cuban millionaire was paying the bills, but
the Cubans eventually began referring to their benefactor as
"Uncle Sam."¹⁰

(237) At secret camps in Florida, in Panama and eventually in
Guatemala, the CIA trained the core of future Brigade leaders
in guerilla warfare.¹¹ By September of 1960, this initial cadre
was part of a group of 160 men undergoing vigorous military
conditioning in the treacherously dense mountain jungles of
the Sierra Madre in Guatemala.¹² That month, one of the men,
Carlos (Carlyle) Rodriguez Santana, was killed in training.¹³
In his honor, the members of the unit decided they would name
the Brigade after his serial designation, 2506.¹⁴

(238) Although Manuel Arttime, through his MRR organization
transplanted in Miami, was the principal recruiting apparatus
for Brigade personnel, chosen as military leader of the Brigade
was Jose ("Pepe") Perez San Roman, a graduate of Cuba's military
academy who had also undergone United States army officer
training at Fort Benning, Georgia.¹⁵ He had been freed by
Castro from a Batista prison, then later re-imprisoned by
Castro before escaping from Cuba.¹⁶

(239) Nevertheless, it was Arttime who remained the key figure
in the U.S. Government's relationship with the activist exiles

Classification: _____

20-1071

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

Brigade 2506, etc.

Page 4.

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

and the Brigade. When, as the Cuban exile population in Miami grew and the political squabbling among anti-Castro factions spread to Guatemala and sparked a camp mutiny that almost stopped the training, it was Arttime the CIA called upon to help resolve the problem. ¹⁷ Arttime had been made a director of the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD), ¹⁸ ~~a~~ ¹⁹ ~~political~~ ²⁰ ~~organization involving several~~ ²¹ ~~and propaganda~~ ²² ~~anti-Castro groups~~ ²³ ~~formed~~ ²⁴ ~~in May, 1960.~~ ²⁵ The Brigade was to be its military arm. ²⁶ But the political fighting among the groups eventually led to its dissolution and creation of ~~a broader-~~ based organization, the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC), before the Bay of Pigs invasion. ²⁷ Arttime was made a director of that, also. ²⁸

(240) The Bay of Pigs invasion took place in April, 1961. ²⁹ More than 1200 Brigade members were taken prisoner by Castro. ³⁰ Before they were released in December, 1962, in an exchange for \$53 million in medical supplies, ³¹ the members of the Brigade suffered not only the ignomy of defeat and the humiliation of capture by Castro, they also were subject to the agony of false hope when, within a few months of their imprisonment, they saw Castro's offer to exchange them for 500 tractors become inextricably bogged in the muck of partisan United States politics. As one historian noted: "The prisoners suffered more from domestic politics than they did at the hands of Castro"

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

Brigade 2506, etc.

Page 5.

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

*1962
5.12.10
spac*
Had the political climate in the United States been less inflammatory, it is not at all unlikely that Brigade 2506 could have been released in June of 1961 for \$28 million in tractors, cash and credits. Instead of freedom through tractors, however, the men were doomed to the degradation of a year and a half longer in prison." ²⁶

(241) The final formation of Brigade 2506 took place at the Orange Bowl stadium in Miami on December 29, 1962. President Kennedy was there to welcome back the surviving members who had spent almost 20 months in Castro's prisons. ²⁷ The crowd of 40,000 friends, families and relatives cheered in tearful joy as Brigade chief Pepe San Roman presented Kennedy with the Brigade flag which had flown over the Bay of Pigs beach for three days. ²⁸ The President accepted the flag and declared: "I can assure you that this flag will be returned to this Brigade in a free Havana!" Mrs. Kennedy spoke in Spanish and called the Brigade members "the bravest men in the world." ²⁹ It was a dramatic and emotional scene but it may have been a misleading. ~~not~~ Although the event publicly reflected a concordant rapport between the President and the Brigade, beneath the surface there ran a vein of bitter resentment among those who felt the event was a display of political hypocrisy. E. Howard Hunt, once ~~assigned liaison duties~~

Classification: _____

assigned liaison duties

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

Brigade 2506, etc.

Page 6

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

with the Brigade, [later claimed] that the Brigade feeling against Kennedy was so great that the presentation of the flag nearly did not take place. ²⁰³⁰

(242) Nevertheless, it is difficult to finalize an assessment of the Brigade's collective attitude toward the U. S. Government and the Kennedy administration following the Orange Bowl event. Kennedy's resolution to the Cuban missile crisis, in which he promised Castro that raids against Cuba from the U. S. mainland would be halted, was considered an act of betrayal to their cause by many of the exiles in the anti-Castro communities. Yet most of the members of the Brigade seemed to maintain a basic confidence in the U.S. Government's resolve to topple the Castro regime, and, in fact, nearly half of them enlisted in the U.S. armed forces through a special arrangement made by President Kennedy himself. ²⁰³¹

(243) Although Brigade 2506 officially ceased to exist after December, 1962, ²⁰³² Manuel Artime, [who had become known as the CIA's "golden boy," ²⁰³³ was soon scouting around Latin America for sites on which to establish guerilla training camps. By October, 1963, he had established four bases, two in Costa Rica and two in Nicaragua. ²⁰³⁴ Artime's 300-man force consisted mainly of veterans of the Brigade. ²⁰³⁵ ~~_____~~

~~_____~~

Classification: _____

204073

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

Brigade 2506, etc.

Page 7

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

~~_____~~ Arttime would later admit that his resources included two large ships, eight small vessels, two speed boats, three planes, and more than 200 tons of weapons and armaments and about \$250,000 in electronic equipment.³⁶ ~~_____~~ During the year of his operation, Arttime was able to conduct four major operations, three of which failed: One was the mistaken shelling of a Spanish cargo ship (which caused an international uproar); another an infiltration mission in which all the participants were captured; the third an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Castro.³⁷ ~~_____~~ A six-man infiltration mission did succeed.³⁸ ~~_____~~

(244) Although Arttime ^{received CIA support,} ~~_____~~, there remained the question of whether President Kennedy was knowledgeable of or approved Arttime's anti-Castro operations after the Cuban missile crisis. Following the assassination of both John F. Kennedy and Robert F. Kennedy, Arttime publicly said³⁹ that both the President and his brother were responsible for his establishing the Latin American bases. ~~_____~~ He said that after his return from prison in Cuba, he met President Kennedy in West Palm Beach, Florida, and that Kennedy referred him to his brother.⁴⁰ ~~_____~~ Arttime said he met Robert Kennedy in Washington and that the then-Attorney General promised him military aid if he, Arttime, could get the bases.⁴¹ ~~_____~~

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

Brigade 2506, etc.

Page 8

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

(245) Arttime claimed that his anti-Castro operations from the bases ceased "when Bobby Kennedy separated from the Johnson administration." ⁴² ~~41~~ ~~Nevertheless~~ However, in December of 1964, the Costa Rican police ordered the camps shut down when it uncovered a \$50,000 contraband whiskey operation involving a plane from Arttime's group. The camps in Nicaragua were also closed, although Arttime kept close personal ties to that country by becoming a beef broker for Nicaraguan President General Anastasio Somoza, the country's largest beef producer. ⁴³ ~~44~~

(246) When Arttime was first contacted by the Committee he stated that he had had direct contact with both President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy and, through them, was given full support by the CIA for his anti-Castro operations. He said he felt the death of President Kennedy marked the end of the U. S. Government's attempts to liberate Cuba. ⁴⁴ ~~43~~ He agreed to be interviewed in depth by the Committee ⁴⁵ ~~44~~ but before that was possible, he died of cancer at the age of 45 after a very brief illness. ⁴⁶ ~~45~~

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

DRAFT - MDC Classification: _____
11/14/78

Betsy Palmer (This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

VII MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATA CRISTIANO (MDC)

(247) After Castro's assumption of power in 1959, it became evident to many Cubans that political parties were being suppressed and the 26th of July Movement was being infiltrated by Communists. This political atmosphere gave rise to the creation of underground organizations such as the Christian Democratic Movement of Cuba (MDC).¹ Proclaiming the doctrine of Christianity as its foundation, the MDC published a manifesto in March, 1960² denouncing Communism and strongly advocating the free enterprise system.³ One of the founders of the MDC, 35-year-old law professor, Dr. Jose Ignacio Rasco, was elected head of the organization⁴ and immediately criticized the violence prevalent in the Castro regime.⁵ This public criticism produced pressure on him to leave Cuba and he arrived in Miami on April 22, 1960.⁶ By June, Rasco had allied himself and the MDC with the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD)⁷ and thus became one of the five original exile Cuban leaders brought together by the U.S. government ~~State Department and the CIA~~ to form the nucleus of a Cuban government-in-exile.⁸

(248) After the Bay of Pigs invasion, the MDC split into factions. Rasco remained head of the largest faction and organized delegations in Miami, New York, Chicago, Venezuela and Cuba.¹⁰

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)
The clandestine faction operating in Cuba was lead by ~~Berón~~ ^{a Cuban} ~~Fernandez-Badue~~ who used the alias "Lucas".¹¹ When ~~Fernandez~~ ^{the foregoing Cuban} arrived in the U.S. in October, 1961, he presented his credentials to the Cuban Revolutionary Council, (CRC), claiming he was the representative of the MDC movement in Cuba.¹² Council president, Dr. Miro Cardona, accepted him into the CRC hierarchy.¹³ The "Lucas" faction remained with the Council but its role was ineffectual because ~~Fernandez~~ ^{the Cuban} eventually failed to hold the group together.¹⁴

(249) The "Rasco" faction of MDC had as its Military Chief an independently wealthy young Cuban, Laureano Batista Falla.¹⁵ Free-spirited and under no financial pressures, Batista Falla organized and partially financed the infiltration attempts of the MDC.¹⁶ It was one of the most active and effective underground groups in Cuba during the early 1960's.¹⁷

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(250) At that time, most underground groups worked together, sharing supplies and information.¹⁸ ~~However~~ ^{8/10/61/62/63}, the repressive measures of the Castro regime after the April 1961 invasion caused members of the Cuban underground to live in fear of

Classification: _____

2001-13

Classified by derivation: _____

DRAFT-
11/14/78
Page 3

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

discovery and made inter-group liaison extremely risky. ¹⁹

Despite the inherent dangers, the underground movements of the MDC and Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP) worked jointly for an all-out sabotage effort in the fall of 1961. ²⁰

(25) The "Batista" faction of the MDC (so named after the youthful military chief rose to the position of president in 1962) ²¹ entered into similar cooperative alliances with other exile groups for the purposes of propaganda, sabotage and supplying the Cuban underground. Many MDC members joined the Cuba Committee in 1962 which was formed to counteract the propaganda of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, a pro-Castro organization in the U.S. ²² The MDC and the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) worked together to formulate plans for an underground organization to infiltrate Oriente Province. ²³ The active operations between the MDC and other anti-Castro groups peaked in the year 1963. One involved the MDC, the Movimiento Insurreccional de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MIRR) and the Movimiento Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR). In April, Frank Sturgis, Miami-based soldier of fortune, supplied information that Batista Falla, Orlando Bosch Avila, Manuel Artime and Alexander Rorke were jointly planning an air strike over Havana on April 25. ²⁴ According to Sturgis, the strike was to originate from an airstrip in Puerto Rico and the target was a sugar refinery. ²⁵

Classification: _____

The bombs were homemade, assembled by Batista. ²⁶ Rorke

Classified by derivation: _____

DRAFT-1.
Page 4

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted ~~publicly announced that the strike~~ had taken place as scheduled, ~~announced publicly that the strike~~ which took the other planners by surprise. ²⁷ Sturgis claimed the strike was still in the planning stage and financial ²⁸ backing had not been completed. This incident created a stir and resulted in an intensive FBI investigation of Rorke's ²⁹ allegation. Since Radio Havana, contrary to usual policy, ³⁰ made no immediate protest over the bombing, the FBI concluded ³¹ that Rorke's story was probably untrue and, according to ³² Sturgis, merely a publicity stunt.

(252) In early June, 1963, the MDC made a unity pact with Commandos L in which the latter group was to provide training and assistance in military intelligence and the MDC to provide three small boats and a team of men to infiltrate Cuba. ³³ The MDC also made a pact with Dr. Carlos Prio Socarras, former President of Cuba who donated \$50,000 to the group for military ³⁴ aid in return for its promise of political support.

(253) Richard Rudolph Davis, a Cuban alien, ³⁵ had a peripheral association with the MDC through his contact with Batista Falla, in the summer of 1963. This association was noted in Book V, Final Report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations. ³⁶

(254) Davis was residing in New Orleans and, although not an MDC member, claimed to have once been a "coordinator" for the ³⁷ group and the New York Police Department. He was a friend

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted of Batista Falla and contacted him because, he said, Batista Falla was in a position to recommend men in the Miami area who needed work. ⁴²³⁸ Davis claimed he could provide employment for a small group of Cuban emigres. He said he had entered into a business deal with geologist David L. Raggio and a wealthy, right-wing New Orleanian, Gus de LaBarre, forming the Guatemalan Lumber and Mineral Corporation. ⁴²³⁹ It was their intention to train the Cubans on some land in Lacombe, Louisiana to which De LaBarre had access through his nephew, Frank de LaBarre. ⁴²⁴⁰ After a necessary training period, the group was to be sent to Guatemala to cut mahogany trees, he claimed. (255) A group of about 18 Cubans did arrive in New Orleans in the summer of 1963. Leading them was a well-known Cuban exile, Victor Paneque ⁴²⁴¹ who used the military code name of "Commadante Diego". ⁴²⁴² Paneque was closely associated with Batista Falla in the military activities of the MDC. ⁴²⁴³ Davis later admitted to the FBI that the men had arrived dressed in khakis ⁴²⁴⁴ and thought that they were to receive military training. ⁴²⁴⁵

(256) In the latter part of July, 1963, the FBI conducted a raid on property near that of the "lumber company" training camp. The Bureau seized a cache of dynamite and other explosives. ⁴²⁴⁶ This raid, according to Davis, unnerved his trainees, and they elected to return to Miami. ⁴²⁴⁷

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted

(257) A somewhat ~~different~~ ^{different version} of this episode comes from Gus de LaBarre's nephew and attorney, Frank de LaBarre, who first related his story in 1966 to his former law school classmate, Jim Garrison. ~~22~~ 48

(258) De LaBarre said his "Uncle Gus" had introduced him to Davis, whom De LaBarre described as a "floater." They came to see De LaBarre about drawing up articles of incorporation for the Guatemalan Lumber Company and that is when he says he learned of their plans to bring unemployed Cubans from Miami to train as lumberjacks. Uncle Gus sent provisions to the exiles on a daily basis and solicited money for food and clothing from friends and relatives. ~~22~~ 49

(259) Although he suspected that military training was being conducted at the camp, Frank de LaBarre said he didn't pay much attention to the activities of the group. However, when he heard on his car radio that the FBI had seized a cache of ammunition at a house in Lacombe, he immediately called his uncle. Although receiving assurances that the lumber group was not involved, De LaBarre called the officers of the corporation together and insisted that the Cubans be taken out of there. Davis ~~However~~ told him that the Cubans did not want to leave, whereupon De LaBarre said he had to do some real "brainstorming." He rented a Hertz ton-and-a-half

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted
truck and instructed Davis to take it to the camp and tell
the Cubans "that the invasion is on." Davis complied, and
the Cubans loaded their gear, jumped in the truck and were
brought to the Greyhound bus terminal in New Orleans. Each
was given a one-way ticket to Miami plus a small amount of
cash and told they would get their orders when they reached
Miami. Looking as though ready for war, with knapsacks and
guns bulging from under their clothes, they boarded the bus.
That was the last, De LaBarre said, he saw of them.

(260) The last he heard of Davis, he said, was in 1964 when
one of De LaBarre's friends reported he had gone into business
with Davis and was left with a lot of bills. ⁵⁰

(261) Other than providing the manpower for the training camp,
Batista Falla was not involved in this episode or was the
MDC as an organization.

(262) Concurrent with his involvement with leaders of other
exile organizations, Batista Falla was dealing with foreign
governments in an effort to gain support for his faction of
the MDC. After the World Congress of Christian Democrats in
Strasbourg, France, two ^{officials of a foreign political} ~~West German officials of the Christian~~
^{party} ~~party~~ conferred with the MDC in Miami. ⁵¹ According
to one of the officials, ^{his country} ~~the West Germans~~ after months of
study, had decided to help finance the MDC, not because they
were particularly fond of them, but felt once Cuba was liberated

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

the Cubans would have a moral superiority over the rest of
Latin America. ⁵²

(263) Another offer of help came from ^{a Nicaraguan} ~~President of Nicaragua~~ ~~former~~
^{official,} ~~President of Nicaragua~~, who provided the MDC a base for
operations in that country. ⁵³ ~~A Venezuelan official~~
~~Venezuelan President, Romulo~~
~~Betancourt~~, allegedly also offered to make a base available
for the MDC and provide it with personnel and supplies. ⁵⁴

Recognizing that these Latin American bases of operation
were important to the MDC, Batista Falla nonetheless pre-
ferred to work out of the Miami area. Its proximity to
Cuba, good facilities for operating boats and the availability
of a large number of Cubans to serve as mechanics and do other
necessary labor made Miami more desirable than the Latin
American facilities. ⁵⁵ The major drawback in Miami was the
presence of U.S. government officials determined to strictly
enforce the Neutrality Act and other Federal statutes.

(264) U.S. Customs raided MDC headquarters in Miami on
April 21, 1964 and confiscated a large cache of arms and
ammunition. ⁵⁶ Undeterred, the MDC simply relocated the
military section in separate headquarters, continued to store
materials for infiltration and attack missions against Cuba, ⁵⁷
and conducted study courses in military training and theory. ⁵⁸
In July, Batista Falla and Victor Paneque infiltrated men

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____



DRAFT-MDC
Page 9

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

and equipment into Cuba. to form a nucleus of guerrilla bands
who, once they got adequate arms and ammunition, planned to
go into the mountains of Cuba. ~~58~~ 59

(265) The MDC eventually suffered the fate of other anti-Castro
organizations -- finding it increasingly difficult to finance
infiltration and sabotage missions, and experiencing in-
creased surveillance by U.S. authorities determined to limit
their activities. The organization's activities gradually
declined, Batista Falla eventually gave up his anti-Castro
activities, moved to Washington, D. C. and received a doctoral
degree in political science. ~~59~~ 60 In the spring of 1970, he
moved to Venezuela.

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

DRAFT 11/1/78

Betsy P. mer

Classification: _____

VIII JUNTA REVOLUCIONARIO CUBANA (JURE)

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

- (266) In a Miami press interview on July 23, 1962, Manuel Ray Rivero announced the formation of JURE, an anti-Castro Cuban exile group designed to unite all the popular splintered factions outside Cuba into an effective working organization.¹ Other key leaders involved in the new organization included Felipe Pazos, Raul Chibas, Rogelio Cisneros, Ramon Barquin and Justo Carrillo.² Although Ray felt the Cuban Revolutionary Council was no longer effective, he attempted to receive financial assistance from it until JURE gained momentum.³
- (267) As its opening promotional salvo, JURE issued a "Declaration of Principles." It called for free elections, the restoration of human rights and social justice, new economic development programs and agrarian reform, breaking relations with the Soviet bloc, restoration of legitimate property, proscription of the Communist Party and release of political prisoners.⁴
- (268) Ray's group was considered an "autonomous" anti-Castro Cuban group by the CIA.⁵ The concept of autonomous operation was conceived by Walter Rostow, State Department counsel.⁶ Rostow proposed a "track two" approach to Cuban operations to parallel regular CIA-controlled Cuban teams.⁷ This approach would enable [REDACTED] financial aid, advice and

2001127

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)
guidance to independent and uncontrolled Cuban leaders such as Ray.⁸ Autonomous operations were approved [REDACTED] in June, 1963.⁹

(269) The ^{rule} "Rules of Engagement" under which the operations functioned set forth the following guidelines:

1. Operations to be executed exclusively by Cuban nationals dedicated to the idea that the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime must be accomplished by Cubans inside and outside Cuba working in concert.
2. If the effort to overthrow the Cuban regime became too costly in human lives, the U.S. would withdraw financial support and would not consider resumption at any future date.
3. All operations had to be mounted outside the territory of the United States.
4. If ever charged with complicity, the U.S. government would publicly deny any participation in the group's activities.
5. ^{U.S.} [REDACTED] presence and direct participation would be kept at an absolute minimum. An experienced [REDACTED] liaison officer would be assigned to each group to provide general advice, funds and material support.
6. No fixed time schedule would be given to these operations.¹⁰

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

(270) Possibly because of this loosely structured control over JURE, ~~from CIA—controlled documents.~~ had the day-to-day activities of the group were closely monitored. ~~by the CIA.~~ A JURE member, ~~for instance,~~ was in frequent contact with an individual identified ~~and~~ and supplied him with a variety of confidential information about JURE. ~~2~~

~~This source provided information on~~ Ray's meeting with ~~Robert F. Kennedy~~ ^{Attorney General} in September 1963;¹¹ Ray's negotiations on behalf of JURE;¹² secret JURE meetings;¹³ allegations that the Governor of Puerto Rico was purposely sidetracking an FBI and INS investigation of illegal arms possessed by JURE;¹⁴ JURE animosity toward Manuel Artime and the MRR;¹⁵ and the location of JURE training bases.¹⁶

(271) Manuel Ray himself was personally critical of the CIA and told one JURE associate that he thought CIA [agents] "...were more dangerous than the Kennedy Administration." He maintained that, "The Kennedy Administration would end but CIA [agents] always stayed, and their memory was longer than the memory of elephants and they never forgot or forgave."¹⁷

(272) During a JURE meeting in Miami in August, 1962, Ray claimed that JURE had arsenals in Venezuela and the Dominican Republic; a B-26 airplane, territory available for training in Costa Rica; and support through indirect means from the United States.¹⁸ According to an FBI report, JURE was considered one of the five major exile groups with clandestine

Classification: _____

280122J

Classified by derivation: _____

JURE Draft
Page 4

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

assets¹⁹ and the CIA was interested in the group because of
its potential for infiltration into Cuba.²⁰

(273) Because of its size and Ray's dynamic leadership, JURE
seemed destined for a role of some importance in the anti-
Castro movement.²¹ The group set a target date of October 31,
1962 to raise \$100,000. The money would be used to recruit
new members, begin a propaganda campaign against Castro and
purchase arms and supplies.²² Within a year, JURE had
membership delegations in 12 cities in the United States, a
chapter in Puerto Rico, and 12 delegations in foreign countries,
mostly Latin American.²³

(274) In August, 1963, JURE planned to sabotage a power plant
in Havana²⁴ and Ray requested that ~~_____~~ certain
high explosives and grenades ^{be cached} inside Cuba or San Juan.²⁵ It was

~~_____~~^{25a}
^{What} recommended the request be granted in order to test Ray's
capabilities.²⁶ ^{regard to this plan} Ray acquired a 25-foot boat for infiltration
and exfiltration purposes and expressed a desire to purchase
another vessel which would enable him to extend operations
along the south coast of Cuba.^{25b 28}

(275) Plans were made ~~_____~~ JURE to deliver military equipment to
Jure which would then be transported ~~_____~~ which would then
transport the material into Cuba.^{25c 29} The operation, originally

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

JURE Draft
Page 5

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

30
25e
scheduled for November 23, 1963, was moved up two days. The
cache was
[REDACTED], completed [REDACTED]

25f31
[REDACTED] The JURE boat failed to make
25g32
the scheduled pick up and Ray offered no satisfactory
25h33
explanation for this failure to perform. Ray claimed the
25i34
vessel was low on gas which was a doubtful explanation,
as the vessel arrived at its destination on schedule.
[REDACTED]
25j35
[REDACTED]

(276) Ray was not physically scheduled to be on the boat during the
25k36
operation [REDACTED] his activities during the latter part of
1963 being political in nature. He was, at this time, con-
ferring with *Harvey Samuel* 25l37
Robert F. Kennedy 25m38
about the Cuban situation
and traveling extensively in Latin America seeking support for
25n39
JURE.

(277) No documentation has been found to substantiate the success
or failure of any of the JURE raids or infiltrations during
this period, but by January, 1964, the organization had gained
enough strength to induce several other Cuban exile organizations
to merge with it. 2640
The largest of these groups were the
Ejercito Libertador de Cuba (ELC) and Cuba Libre. 2741
The ELC's
union with JURE brought to the organization former veteran
rebel army officers in exile and had the potential of giving
JURE the best military expertise and support in the entire
2842
exile community.

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

JURE Draft
Page 6

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

(278) Carlos Zarraga of Cuba Libre became the JURE Chief of support³²⁴³ and was responsible for acquiring most of the JURE arms and the large supply of explosives which were stored in Miami and Puerto Rico.³⁰⁴⁴

(279) Manuel Ray again began formulating plans to infiltrate Cuba in March 1964.³²⁴⁵ He planned to accompany two teams of commandos into Oriente Province and, once successfully inside Cuba, initiate continuous bombings of strategic and non-strategic targets.³²⁴⁶ Ray's plans, however, were delayed and a new target date of May was set.

(280) Ray's seriousness of purpose was open to question at the time because he permitted persons from the media on his infiltration attempt.³³⁴⁷ Andrew St. George, on assignment with Time-LIFE magazine, planned to accompany Ray,³⁴⁴⁸ as did Tom Duncan, then a LIFE photographer.⁴⁹⁵⁵ Rogelio Cisneros received word on May 30, 1964 that the JURE boat to be used by the infiltrators had developed motor trouble.³⁶⁵⁰ Ray's group was arrested by the British near Cayo Largo and taken to Nassau.³⁷⁵¹

(281) Ray's failure to infiltrate Cuba severely damaged his credibility within the anti-Castro community. Some exiles felt his grand infiltration scheme was a publicity stunt and others considered it a joke.³⁸⁵² JURE members were confused and undecided over how to defend Ray.³⁹⁵³

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

(282) Another episode in May, 1964 compounded JURE's problems. (This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

Rogelio Cisneros had obligated \$50,000 of JURE money to an El Monte, California, arms manufacturing company for weapons to be shipped to Florida. ⁴⁰⁵⁴

The Revenue division of the Treasury Department, ^{considered} a raid on the arms company. ⁵⁵
~~and checked with other government authorities~~ ⁴¹

~~to determine if they had any knowledge of~~

~~the purchase which was illegal under U.S. laws.~~ ⁵⁶

(283) At this point, there began a general disintegration of JURE membership. ^{56 43 57} Rogelio Cisneros ^{announced in} ~~_____~~

August ~~1964~~ 1964 that he was resigning from the organization.

He contended Ray was incapable of directing both political and military activities. ^{57 44 58} Then another key leader, Carlos

Zarraga, resigned in September. ^{45 59}

(284) JURE ^{received} ~~_____~~ \$75,000 ~~_____~~ during the period of October 1st to December 31st, 1964. The money was ^{intended} ~~_____~~ to underwrite JURE's relaxation of its ~~_____~~ activities outside the United States. ^{58 60} ~~_____~~

~~_____~~ Ray's liaison officer noted at the time: "If Ray is successful in Cuba he will not need our help; if he is not, our help won't do much

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

good. He is honest and at least the money will be largely
from CIA—controlled documents.)
spent for the purpose he wants to achieve. Whatever Ray may
ever say, he was treated the way he asked to be treated. We
have played the game in a manner beyond reproach." ⁵⁹ 48610

(285) JURE continued in existence until August, 1968 ⁶⁰ 4862 but
was relatively ineffective in its latter years.

28-1-31
Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

DRAFT 12/11/78

Barry Palmer

Book V, Section B-4, B-5, B-6, B-7, B-8, B-9, B-10

B-9, B-10

IX

DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTEL (DRE)

(286) The Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE)¹

was the outgrowth of an activist student group in Cuba which originally fought against Batista.²

In the late spring of 1960,³ three DRE leaders,

escaped from Cuba⁴ and arrived in Miami.⁵ They

immediately offered their services to the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FRD) with the intent of organizing an anti-Communist student organization within this group.⁶ ~~However,~~ ^{nevertheless} it later

was decided that the DRE would be an "affiliate", but not a member of the Frente.⁷ The leaders of the DRE were kept on a

regular monthly retainer by the ^{U.S. Government,} ~~as~~ ^{as} were all members engaged in training for paramilitary operations and propaganda dissemination.⁸ ~~They were~~ ^{They were} also supplied the group with weapons and

ammunition on occasion.⁹

(287) The first ~~team~~ ^{team} DRE infiltration team¹⁰ landed in Cuba in November, 1960,¹¹ with the objective of organizing anti-Castro student propaganda and conducting general harassment operations.¹² ~~Alberto Vazquez and Juan Salas were members of~~

Classification: _____

200113

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

~~of this document.~~
(288) By April, 1961, ~~approximately~~ 400 guerillas¹³ were operating effectively from the Sierra Maestra mountains.¹⁴ ~~However,~~ ^{Nevertheless,} ~~74 men~~ ^{were} captured¹⁵ ~~concurrently with a failure to receive~~ ^{concurrently with a} ~~air-dropped supplies.~~¹⁶ ~~This~~ ^{capture} was a severe set back for the DRE underground prior to the Bay of Pigs.¹⁷

(289) ~~One leader~~ ^{One leader} was also arrested in April, 1961, but his true identity was unknown to the authorities and he was released following an interrogation.¹⁸ Escaping again to Miami, he made three daring attempts to re-infiltrate Cuba in 1961. Although he failed, his exploits reportedly made him an underground hero to the students in Cuba.¹⁹

(290) DRE Chief of Military Operations, ~~Richard B. ...~~²⁰ also infiltrated into Cuba prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion and told the Committee that the Cuban underground felt it had the total backing of the United States.²¹ ~~However,~~ ^{however,} By March, 1961, ~~one~~ ^{one} leader testified that ~~the underground realized the invasion would be a failure,~~ because the ~~CIA~~ had failed to perform even before the invasion.²² "It never got us the supplies it promised and never did the things it was supposed to do," he claimed.²³ ~~Another leader~~ ^{Another leader} was also upset^{22A} about Agency performance and once wrote to friends threatening to kill CIA personnel if anything ever happened to

U.S. Gov.

2001130

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

DRE DRAFT - 12/11/78

Page 3

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

an individual

~~Members~~ as a result of Agency bumbling. ²⁴ The DRE Chief of Military ²⁵ ~~told the Committee~~ Operations he thought the invasion was designed to fail and that it was only conceived to relieve the pressure building in the anti-Castro exile community. ²⁵

(291) Although ~~the DRE~~ DRE members had a deep-lying opposition to U.S. plans and policies, ²⁶ ~~they~~ continued to ²⁶ "benefit terrible." ²⁷ accept U.S. funding, continued despite evaluation of the group as ²⁷ CIA headquarters received a report that the five ²⁸ top officials of the DRE had established a position for themselves ²⁸ because of their ~~contact with~~ ability to ²⁸ acquire money from the U.S. Government. This support ~~allowed~~ ²⁹ the DRE to play an inordinately influential role in the exile community. ²⁹ ~~the DRE Chief of Military Operations~~ According to ~~him~~, by July, 1962, the DRE had taken to ~~soliciting~~ soliciting support for proposed propaganda operations but actually using the funding for military operations. ³⁰

(292) For instance, in early September, 1962, ³¹ ~~the DRE official~~ ³¹ ~~another leader~~ said he received a call from ~~him~~ notifying him of an impending major military operation. ³¹ ~~The latter~~ told him the DRE had all the weapons, ammunition and support it needed. ³² The raid turned out to be the attack on the Blanquita Theater in Havana, which received a great deal of publicity. ³³ Castro even raged about it, claiming it was an attempt on his life by the CIA. ³⁴ In fact, according to ~~him~~ ³⁴ ~~the DRE official~~, the raiders did not know that Castro

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

DRE DRAFT
12/11/78
Page 4

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

was scheduled to be at the theater the night of the shelling.³⁵
In any event, there was a tremendous uproar when the raiders
returned to the U.S. The DRE leaders were called to Washington
to confront ^{U.S. Gov officials including} U.S. Attorney General, Robert ^{F.} Kennedy and CIA
Operations Chief, Richard Helms, ^{36 38} who ~~both~~ told them they were
doing a great job but wasting their time in such independent
actions.³⁷

(293) As a result of the Blanquita raid publicity, the DRE was
subsequently able to raise about \$200,000 in private funds.
That enabled the group to establish an operating base on Catalina
Island near the south coast of the Dominican Republic from which
it hoped to make a major strike against Cuba. ³⁸ ~~Deverhelox~~ after
the October, 1962, missile crisis, ³⁹ the Dominican Republic
government informed the DRE leaders that the U.S. was putting
great pressure on it to shut down the DRE operations and it
therefore could no longer permit the group to operate out of its
country.⁴⁰ Thus, the DRE was, of all the anti-Castro groups,
one of the most bitter towards President Kennedy for his "deal"
with the Russians. ⁴¹ In a letter ~~dated~~ dated February 21,
1963 and addressed simply to "Sirs," the DRE said it was grate-
ful for the initial support of the U.S. but could no longer
operate under restrictions of U.S. policy. The DRE demanded
that the U.S. government, "... understand that the Cubans cannot

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

DRE DRAFT
12/11/78
Page 5

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

continue waiting for the international policies, because those
dying of hunger are Cubans, because it is our country that
bodily suffers slavery, because it is our blood that runs in
Cuba." ⁴²

(295) Despite such strong sentiment, the DRE continued to accept
support ~~from the U.S. Government~~, although ~~the U.S. Government~~
^{had been urged} its more militant members to join Manuel Artime's Movimiento
de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR) forces, ⁴³

~~the U.S. Government~~ ⁴⁴ Whether or not this
suggestion was ever taken by any DRE members is not documented,
but the top leaders remained a homogeneous group and, by 1964,
were soliciting additional financial support outside the ^{U.S. Government} ~~U.S.~~.
They were successful in receiving some funds from the Bacardi
Rum family in Miami. ⁴⁵

(296) Although the DRE continued its relationship with the ^{U.S. Government} ~~U.S.~~
until the end of 1966, ⁴⁶ the group's activities, like those of
other anti-Castro organizations, declined in intensity and
effectiveness.

(297) Because the DRE was a very militant "action" group, the
Committee was especially interested in DRE operations prior to
the assassination of ^{President} ~~John F.~~ Kennedy on November 22, 1963.

(298) As noted, one of the effects of the Blanquita raid in
September, 1962, was to garner the DRE a blast of national

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

2001142

DRE DRAFT
12/11/78
Page 6

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

publicity, which, in turn, gave the leaders of the group the opportunity to solicit additional funding from wealthy individuals who were sympathetic to their anti-Castro cause. ⁴⁷

Among those who wound up supporting the DRE was Miami multimillionaire William Pawley, a strong right-wing conservative, former owner of the Havana bus system and ~~an associate~~ ^{a friend} of former CIA director Allen Dulles. ⁴⁸ Another supporter the DRE got was a friend of Pawley's, former Ambassador to Italy Clare Boothe Luce, ⁴⁹ then the wife of Time-Life publishing empire boss Henry Luce and a later Nixon appointee to the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

(299) In its review of DRE activities, the Committee took special interest in a relatively recent series of events involving Clare Boothe Luce. In October, 1975, Luce was being interviewed by Vera Glaser, a reporter and columnist for the Knight chain of newspapers, when she told Glaser of an alleged incident involving members of the DRE and Lee Harvey Oswald. ⁵⁰ At the time, Senator Richard Schweiker and Senator Gary Hart were in the midst of their subcommittee investigation of the Kennedy assassination as part of the Senate Select Committee inquiry into intelligence activity.

(300) According to Glaser's report of the interview, this is basically what Luce told her:

25-01142

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

DRE DRAFT
12/11/78
Page 7

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

- (301) Luce said that after the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, her friend, William Pawley, persuaded her to help sponsor a fleet of motor boats for a group of anti-Castro Cubans who, Pawley envisioned, would be Cuban "Flying Tigers," shooting in and out of Cuba on intelligence-gathering missions. Pawley had helped start General Claire Chennault's original Flying Tigers in World War II. Luce said she agreed to sponsor one boat and its three-man crew. She said she met with this Cuban boat crew about three times in New York and, in 1962, published a story about them in LIFE magazine. ~~80~~ 51
- (302) Following the missile crisis in October, 1962, Luce said that the Kennedy administration clamped down on exile activities against Cuba and the Pawley-sponsored boat raids were discontinued. Luce said she never saw her "young Cubans," as she called them, again. ~~80~~ 52
- (303) Then, on the night of Kennedy's assassination, Luce said she received a call from New Orleans from one of the boat crew Cubans. Luce told Glaser she would call him "Julio Fernandez". She said the Cuban told her he called because he wanted to tell her about some information he had concerning the President's killer, Lee Harvey Oswald. ~~80~~ 53
- (304) Luce told Glaser that, according to "Julio Fernandez," Oswald had approached the anti-Castro group to which Fernandez

Classification: _____

2801141

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

DRE DRAFT
12/11/78
Page 8

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

belonged and offered his services as a potential Castro assassin. The Cubans, however, didn't trust Oswald, suspected he was really a Communist, and decided to keep tabs on him. They eventually penetrated Oswald's Communist "cell" and tape recorded his talks, including his bragging that he could shoot anyone, even the Secretary of the Navy. ~~50~~ 54

(305) Then suddenly, Luce said Fernandez told her, Oswald came into some money, went to Mexico City and finally to Dallas. Luce said Fernandez told her he still had the tape recordings of Oswald, as well as photographs of Oswald and samples of handbills Oswald had distributed on the streets of New Orleans. Fernandez, she said, asked her what he should do. ~~50~~ 55

(306) Luce said she advised him to contact the FBI immediately. She then told Glaser that she did not think about the story again until the Garrison investigation hit the headlines in 1967. Luce said she then contacted the Cuban who had called her. He told her his group had followed her instructions and turned their material over to the FBI. But, he said, they were advised to "keep their mouths shut" until further contact. Further contact was never made, he said. ~~50~~ 56

(307) Luce said that Fernandez then told her that one of the members of his group had since been suddenly deported and that another had been murdered. He himself, he said, wanted nothing further to do with the Kennedy assassination. ~~50~~ 57

Classification: _____

20 1140

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

DRE DRAFT
12/11/78
Page 9

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

(308) After Luce told her this story, Vera Glazer immediately went to Senator Schweiker and told him about the alleged Oswald encounter. ⁵⁸ Intrigued, Schweiker contacted Luce directly and asked her for information about the Cuban who had called her. ⁵⁹ As a result, Schweiker sent a staff investigator in search of "Julio Fernandez". No such individual was ever found. ⁶⁰

(309) During the course of its own investigation into the Luce allegations, the Committee reviewed the 1977 CIA Task Force Report, which dealt with the newspaper reports of the incident. ⁶¹ According to the Task Force Report, Luce called then CIA Director William Colby on October 25, 1975 and told him that Schweiker had called her to ask her for details about the allegations. She said she had given Schweiker the name of Justin McCarthy who, along with Pawley, had initially aroused her interest in helping the anti-Castro Cubans. ⁶² Nevertheless she said she did not tell Schweiker how to locate him. ⁶²

(310) Luce told Colby that after she talked to Schweiker, she had contacted McCarthy. He told her that he doubted that anything would come of a Congressional probe and suggested instead that she contact Colby. Luce then told Colby that McCarthy gave her the names of three Cubans with whom he had been associated in DRE activities. They were: Luis Fernandez Rocha, Jose Antonio Lanusa and someone he remembered only by his code name, "Chilo". ⁶³

Classification: _____

201146

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

DRE DRAFT
12/11/78
Page 10

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

(311) According to the 1977 Task Force Report, as a result of Luce's call to him, Colby contacted Justin McCarthy and attempted to persuade him to call Senator Schweiker and provide him with any information or evidence he might have. McCarthy said he didn't want to get involved because there were too many "political opportunists" in Washington. 64

(312) With this background of information, the Committee decided to conduct its own investigation into the Luce allegations.

(313) Luce told the Committee basically the same story given to Vera Glazer. 65 Luce was specifically asked if she was certain the late night call on November 22, 1963 came from New Orleans. She was definite in her answer that it did. The Warren Report account of the Bringuier/Oswald association was outlined for her. She responded that it sounded much the same as the type activity in which her "boys" were engaged. Luce also told the Committee she did not recognize the name Jose Antonio Lanusa, mentioned in her conversation with Colby in 1975. 66

(314) ~~Initially~~, The Committee located in Miami three anti-Castro Cubans who were among the leaders of the DRE in 1963. One of them, Juan Manuel Salvat Roque, was a founder of the group. He 67 was interviewed by Committee investigators on February 7, 1978. Although Salvat did not recall Luce's involvement with the DRE, he said he "heard" William Pawley had provided the group some support. 68 He said that, as far as he remembers, the group

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

DRE DRAFT
12/11/78
Page 11

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

never received a large amount of money from any single individual, but received small contributions from a great many people. ⁶⁹ He said that, according to his knowledge, Carlos Bringuier, the New Orleans delegate of the DRE, was the only member of the group who ever had any contact with Oswald. ⁷⁰

(Committee records indicate that Carlos Bringuier became the New Orleans delegate to the DRE in the summer of 1962. ⁷¹ As detailed elsewhere in the Committee's Report, Bringuier and Oswald had a confrontation on Canal Street in New Orleans in August, 1963, when Oswald was distributing "Fair Play for Cuba" leaflets. Both Bringuier and Oswald were arrested, but were later brought together to engage in a radio debate. ⁷² ~~Further~~ ^{Prior} ~~however~~ ^{Previously} Bringuier had arranged for a friend of his, Carlos Quiroga, to approach Oswald and talk to him on the pretense of being interested in pro-Castro activities. ⁷³)

(35) Isidro "Chilo" Borja, another leader of the DRE, was interviewed by the Committee on February 21, 1978. ⁷⁴ Borja said he knew Luce was supportive of the DRE but said he did not know the extent of her financial involvement. ⁷⁵ He also recalled Bringuier's contact with Oswald and the fact that the DRE relayed that information to the CIA at the time. ⁷⁶ Borja said

Classification: _____

2001141

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

DRE DRAFT
12/11/78
Page 12

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

his responsibilities with the DRE involved only military operations⁷⁷ and he suggested that Jose Antonio Lanusa, who handled press and public relations for the group, knew Luce and had been in contact with her.⁷⁸

(316) Jose Antonio Lanusa was interviewed by the Committee on April 22, 1978. Lanusa said that on November 22, 1963, he and a small group of DRE members were at a Miami Beach hotel when they heard the news of the assassination of the President.⁷⁹ When Oswald's name was broadcast, Lanusa recalled the name as that of someone who had had something to do with one of the DRE delegates, so Lanusa and those who were with him went to the Miami DRE office to search the files to determine if Lanusa's suspicion was right.⁸⁰ By late afternoon, they had found delegate Bringuier's report from New Orleans detailing his encounter with Oswald. Along with it was a sample Fair Play for Cuba (FPCC) leaflet and a tape recording of the radio debate.⁸¹ With this discovery, someone immediately called a CIA contact. This person

~~_____~~

~~_____~~ told them not to do anything or contact anyone else for at least an hour. He said he needed that time to contact Washington headquarters for instructions.⁸² ⁷⁹ Nevertheless, However, Lanusa said, he was so anxious to release the information that Oswald was associated with a pro-Castro group that he contacted the

20-1142 Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

DRE DRAFT
12/11/78
Page 13

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

major news media before the hour was up. ⁸³

(317) When the CIA ^{contact} ~~contacted~~ called back, he told them the FBI would contact the group. The next day, Lanusa said, Miami FBI agent James J. O'Conner showed up at DRE headquarters. He was given Bringuier's report, the FPCC leaflet and the tape recording of the radio debate. Lanusa said O'Conner told them they would get a receipt for the material but, Lanusa said, they never did. Neither, he said, was the material ever returned. ⁸⁴

(318) Lanusa also told the Committee that soon after the DRE shelling of the Blanquita Hotel in 1962, he was introduced to Clare Boothe Luce by Justin McCarthy, whom Lanusa said was the DRE's public relations contact with the New York major media. ⁸⁵
Lanusa said Luce told them she wanted to publish the Blanquita raid story in LIFE magazine and that she would give the DRE the \$600 she would receive from the magazine as payment for that story. ⁸⁶ As far as he knows, Lanusa said, that was the only contact any member of the DRE ever had with Luce. ⁸⁷ Lanusa also said he strongly doubted Luce or William Pawley ever paid for motor boats for the DRE because, he said, he knew how all of the boats were acquired. Lanusa said he had no knowledge of any DRE member having been deported or murdered. ⁸⁸ Lanusa said, "I think Clare Boothe Luce shoots from the hip without having her brain engaged." ⁸⁹

Classification: _____

1150

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

DRE DRAFT
12/11/78
Page 14

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

(319) In investigating her allegations, the Committee considered the possibility that Luce incorrectly identified the source of her information. The source of the documentation of Oswald's contact with the DRE was New Orleans-based Carlos Bringuier. ~~Nevertheless~~ ^{87 90} However, Bringuier told the Committee he never engaged in any paramilitary DRE activities and therefore could not have been one of the crew members of the alleged Luce-sponsored motorboat. Bringuier's New Orleans associate, Celso Hernandez, ^{88 91} the secretary of the chapter, also said he never received any paramilitary training and did not know Oswald prior to encountering him passing out pro-Castro literature on Canal Street in New Orleans. ^{89 92} Bringuier also told the Committee he knew Luce by reputation only, had never contacted her personally, and had never given her any information about his experience with Oswald. ^{90 93} He further said he was not aware of the fact that Luce was involved in any Cuban exile activities. ^{91 94} Bringuier maintained that no member of his DRE group in New Orleans had any contact with Luce during this period of time. ^{92 95}

CONCLUSIONS

The evidence is inconclusive
The House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) feels it has adequately investigated the allegations of Clare Boothe Luce that Lee Harvey Oswald was an agent of the Government of Cuba.

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

DRE DRAFT
12/11/78
Page 15

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

(320) The investigation of the Warren Commission documented that Oswald was interested in establishing a chapter of the FPCC in New Orleans and had contact with the New York headquarters of this pro-Castro organization during the summer of 1963. ²⁵⁹⁶

Luce raised questions as to the nature and extent of involvement the New Orleans chapter of DRE had in monitoring Oswald's activities, and its association with the FBI regarding Oswald's communist activities.

(321) ~~The Committee has determined that~~ ^{The evidence indicates that} the official DRE delegate in New Orleans was Carlos Bringuier, and that he was aided by two Cubans, Celso Hernandez and Miguel Aguado. In an attempt to monitor Oswald, Bringuier approved the efforts of his friend, Carlos Quiroga, to call on Oswald to elicit additional information about FPCC activities in New Orleans.

(322) ~~It has further been determined that~~ ^{None} of the New Orleans individuals associated in these events had any involvement in the paramilitary activities of DRE. The New Orleans chapter engaged solely in propaganda and fund raising activities.

~~The Committee has determined that~~ ^{No} New Orleans DRE member had any association with Luce.

(323) ~~The Committee established that~~ The first report of Oswald's contact with the DRE in New Orleans came from the group's headquarters in Miami. This information was released to national

201152

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

DRE DRAFT
12/11/78
Page 16

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

news media, the CIA and the FBI shortly after the identification of Oswald as Kennedy's assassin. The ^{evidence} ~~Committee~~ ^{indicates} ~~concluded~~ that the Luce allegations, although related to certain facts, cannot be substantiated, due to the reluctance of key individuals to corroborate her story.

20 151

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

DRAFT-11/16/78
Betsy Palmer

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

~~X~~ MOVIMIENTO INSURRECCIONAL de
RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA
(MIRR)

and

ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA

(324) When four of Castro's army officers and 100 men deserted and left for the Las Villas mountains in August, 1960, they formed the nucleus of the Movimiento Insurreccional de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MIRR).¹ Helping lay the groundwork for this organization was the former Chief of the 26th of July Movement in Las Villas Province, Dr. Orlando Bosch Avila.² Bosch had left Cuba one month previously and, from Miami, issued a call for rebel army men to desert.³ Promoting the defection of army personnel and carrying out sabotage operations throughout Cuba were the early primary activities of the MIRR.⁴ In both, it was very effective.

(325) Former rebel army officer Victor Paneque assumed military leadership of the group⁵ and, within a few months of his escape from Cuba, organized a team of infiltrators to re-enter the country to continue MIRR operations.⁶

(326) Orlando Bosch became general coordinator of MIRR, working with individuals and other groups involved in operations against Cuba and securing necessary financial backing.⁷

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

- (327) A pediatrician by profession,⁸ Bosch became totally immersed in his political movement and for 18 years has carried out a crusade to overthrow Castro. His efforts at times have been characterized as "bumbling", but he has also been termed "single-mindedly" and "morally committed."⁹ Widely viewed in the U.S. press as a Cuban patriot when he first began his anti-Castro activities, Bosch's increased acts of violence gradually changed his image to that of a terrorist.¹⁰ The intensity and violence of his activities, which have always been widely publicized, were a major factor in the Committee's decision to examine Bosch and the MIRR among those Cuban exile organizations considered capable of involvement in an assassination conspiracy.
- (328) Bosch was interviewed by the Committee in Cuartel San Carlos prison in Venezuela. He is charged with complicity in the October 6, 1975 bombing of a Cubana Airlines plane which resulted in the deaths of 73 people.¹¹ Although denying involvement in the airplane bombing, Bosch said he approved of it.¹² Claiming terrorism a necessary evil in fighting Castro, Bosch has stated, "You have to fight violence with violence. At times you cannot avoid hurting innocent people."¹³

- (329) The activities of the MIRR in the early '60's were carried out by a small group of individuals. There were

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted reportedly never before and discovered) members in Miami.¹⁴ In 1966, Bosch claimed to have only 20 men outside Miami, located in various seaport cities in the U.S.¹⁵ One of the major interests of the MIRR was to blow up vessels trading with Cuba.^{15a}¹⁶ In this it was effective, but the MIRR successes in the early 1960's was a result of its association with a number of other anti-Castro organizations and individuals.

(330) Bosch said that in late 1961 he was contacted by Evelio Duque, leader of Ejercito Cubano Anticomunista (ECA) who indicated he might be getting CIA support for his group and wanted Bosch to join him.¹⁶¹⁷ Together they submitted a plan to the Agency outlining their conditions for CIA support and were informed about a month later the plan had been approved.¹⁷ Acting as the political leader in this alliance, Bosch joined Duque, the military leader, at a camp in Homestead, Florida, and ^{was in touch} with a CIA liaison officer, ~~_____~~
~~_____~~¹⁸¹⁹

(331) Bosch soon came to the conclusion that the camp was an exercise in futility. He felt the CIA had no intention of mounting another invasion or initiating attacks against Cuba. He felt the U.S.-sponsored camps were merely a means of keeping the exiles busy and, privately and unofficially, ^{His} ~~_____~~ ^(CIA contact) confirmed his suspicions, Bosch said.¹⁹²⁰ After nine months of frustrated inactivity, he published a pamphlet,

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

DRAFT - MIRR/BOSCH
Page 4

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)
The Tragedy of Cuba in which he accused the U.S. of misleading the Cuban exiles. He sent a copy to President Kennedy and then closed down the camp.^{20 21} After this, Bosch said he had no more dealings with the CIA.^{21 22}
(332) Bosch maintained an ongoing relationship, beginning in late 1960, with Frank Sturgis, well-known anti-Castro soldier of fortune;^{22 23} Alexander Rorke, former clerk at the FBI and an informant for that agency;^{23 24} and William Johnson, an American pilot who, along with Sturgis, ^{provided} ~~was a source of~~ information ^{to} for the CIA on Cuban exile activities.^{24 25} Johnson had full control over all MIRR operations.^{25 26} Bosch was concerned with financing raids against Cuba and did not know the nature of the missions until their completion.^{26 27}
(333) According to Johnson, American pilots were placed under contract to fly three air strikes over Cuba for the MIRR.^{26a 28} They were to receive \$2000 per mission.^{27 29} Johnson admitted his own motive was purely mercenary.^{28 30}
(334) Although relatively inactive in 1962,^{29 31} the MIRR engaged in a series of bombing raids over Cuba in 1963 primarily aimed at destroying the production of sugar^{30 32} in an effort to disrupt the economy. It also reportedly conducted air strikes against a MIG base in Cuba^{31 33} and various other strikes aimed at strategic targets.^{32 34} The raids were effective but not without risk. In several instances, the raiders' planes were shot down and pilots killed.^{33 35}

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

(335) (This form is to be used for material extracted
Concurrent CIA reports association with American ad-
venturers, the MIRR also had associations with other exile
organizations. It planned raids against Cuba in cooperation
with Commandos L³⁴ and discussed unity raids with members
of RECE.³⁵ Bosch, at this time, was interested in establish-
ing a base of operations in the Dominican Republic to
facilitate long-range planning.³⁶ 38

(336) The documentation the Committee has examined fails to
explain how the MIRR was able to finance its extensive
operations; ³⁷ further, Bosch did not specify any source.
Bosch told the Committee that his association
with Frank Sturgis alone culminated in 11 air strikes over
Cuba.³⁷ 39 At that time, he said, they usually rented a plane
for \$400 plus \$60 an hour.³⁸ 40 Bill Johnson charged \$4000 for
pilot fees for each mission.³⁹ 41 Bosch said he knew the pilots
only got \$2000 and Johnson pocketed the rest, but, his
purpose was to fight Castro whatever it cost.⁴⁰ 42 Bosch's
commitment to fight Castro extends to the present.⁴¹ 43

(337) ^{The} ~~Initially~~ ^{initially} funds were furnished MIRR from a Chicago-
based Cuban exile, Paulino A. Sierra, who allegedly collected
monies from gambling interests.⁴² 44 Some money came from
anti-Castro supporters in Puerto Rico.⁴³ 45 It is known that
the FBI was long interested in the source of finances of
the MIRR and in March, 1964 authorized a 30-day mail check⁴⁶
on it and Bosch in an effort to identify possible sources.⁴⁴

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

DRAFT - MIRR/BOSCH
Page 6

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

During this time, several wealthy Cuban exiles received threatening letters demanding large contributions for the fight against Castro. ^{45 47} Bosch was implicated in these extortion attempts, ^{46 48} brought to trial and acquitted. ^{47 49} He told the Committee that in 1967 he once used the funds he had collected in settlement for a personal injury automobile accident to buy explosives and weapons. ^{48 50} Whatever Bosch's methods of raising money, there is no indication he ever used it to enrich himself. ^{49 51}

(338) Well financed and totally dedicated, Bosch managed to run afoul of the U.S. government authorities at least seven times in slightly over a four-year period. Several of these encounters resulted in his arrest, ^{50 52} but he was always acquitted. ^{51 53}

(339) In July, 1967, Bosch and the MIRR became assimilated into a new movement, known as Cuban Power ^{52 54} and the tempo of violent activities increased. On September 16, 1968, Bosch was arrested for firing a bazooka into the hull of a Polish ship anchored in Miami harbor. ^{53 55} He was subsequently tried and sentenced to 10 years in a Federal prison. ^{54 56} From his prison cell in Atlanta, Georgia, Bosch allegedly was making plans to resume bombing Japanese and Spanish ships trading with Cuba as soon as he was released. ^{55 57} He was granted parole on November 1, 1972 and immediately began ⁵⁸ traveling through Latin America, in violation of that parole. ⁵⁹

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

DRAFT - MIRR/BOSCH
Page 7

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

He said his aim in Latin America was to forge alliances with countries which had powerful Cuban exile communities. So effective was he in making solid political alliances, that in the ensuing years he was able to travel freely, with forged passports, throughout Latin America.

(340) Whether or not Bosch was the principal conspirator in the bombing of the Cubana airliner, it is known that his Cuban Power movement, which merged with other Cuban activists in 1976 to form a Cuban Secret Government has engaged in acts of terrorism. This latter group has been linked with numerous recent bombing incidents, an assassination attempt against Henry Kissinger, the assassination of Orlando Letelier in Washington, D. C. and the bombing of the Cubana Airlines plane.

(341) Orlando Bosch is a zealot. In retrospect, he turns out to be the most aggressive and volatile of the anti-Castro leaders. That alone would validly raise the question of possible association with the assassination of President Kennedy. In addition, the Committee was presented with an allegation information that specifically connects him to a conspiracy. Investigation of the allegation failed to support the claim that Bosch had been in Dallas in November 1963 in the company of Lee Harvey Oswald. When asked, Bosch told the Committee he was at his home in Miami when he heard President Kennedy had been shot.

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

JUNTA DEL GOBIERNO DE CUBA
EN EL EXILIO

(342) In April, 1963 the spirit of the exiled Cubans who hoped to return to a liberated Cuba reached a new low. ^{U.S. Government}
The ~~U.S. Government~~, which had been subsidizing a Cuban anti-Castro ~~organization~~ organization, the Cuban Revolutionary Council, dropped its extensive backing of this most visible example of American assistance to the Cuban movement. The move came on the heels of an announcement of a tough new policy of the Justice and State Departments. They planned a ^{vigorous enforcement of} ~~to vigorously enforce~~ the laws breached by anti-Castro Cuban raiders, who were operating hit-and-run guerilla attacks from the U.S. on Cuban and Russian targets.²
These events resulted in another shuffling of alliances between various Cuban groups, but no bright new hopes.

(343) Despite a common desire to overthrow Castro and return to Cuba, the exiles differed in many ways. They represented the extremes of the political left and right and everything in between. Many had carried arms against Batista; others were former Batistianos. They differed as to how the counter-revolution could be ^{accomplished.} ~~carried out.~~
They differed as to what type of government and which leaders would take the place of the ousted government. Unification of these diverse stances seemed doubtful.

(343) Dr. Paulino Sierra Martinez, a Cuban exile and lawyer from Chicago, hoped to ^{foster a change.} ~~change all that.~~

page 7

(344) Arriving in Miami in May of 1963, Sierra scheduled a series of meetings at a local hotel and invited Cuban exile leaders of all political persuasion to discuss unification for the purpose of military invasion of Cuba.³

(345) To many Cubans the idea seemed ridiculously naive.⁴

Sierra was hoping to unify elements which had remained splintered throughout most previous efforts, attempting to draw well-known exile leaders when he himself was virtually unknown in the anti-Castro movement.

(346) But Sierra came with some big ideas and big promises. He claimed to represent a group of Americans in Chicago interested in combining their efforts with those of the Cuban exiles to overthrow the Castro regime with or without U.S. government approval.⁵ Sierra told them that American financial interests would participate on condition there was a true unity of the majority of Cubans in exile.⁶ For military planning he claimed he had the assistance of several high-ranking U.S. Navy and Army officers, who would also help arrange for arms and the establishment of training bases in a Latin American country.⁷ Most surprisingly, Sierra claimed the Chicago backers were willing to lend assistance to the extent of \$30 million.⁸

~~no~~ no small sum even for a large-scale government-backed operation. For a private group it was unheard of.

(347) While many Cubans did not immediately ^{join} jump onto Sierra's ~~bandwagon~~, by July 1963 Sierra had built a coalition of predominantly right-wing anti-Castro groups and attracted some impressive names from among the exiles to form an

page 5

organization called the Junta de Gobierno de Cuba en el exilio (JGCE - Junta of the Government of Cuba in Exile).⁹

(348) Among the groups to join Sierra's junta were the Unidad Revolucionaria faction headed by Juan Medina Vega¹⁰ and the major faction of the 30th of November group headed by Carlos Rodriguez Quesada.¹¹ Sierra could also boast the participation of Jose "Pepin" Bosch, President of Barcardi Rum, and Alberto Garrido, a much-admired Cuban entertainer.¹²

(349) In the selection process by which the Committee chose those anti-Castro groups to be further investigated, certain factors about the Junta discovered in preliminary research indicated a need to look more carefully into the purpose and activities of this group.

(350) The Junta was active during the critical period of interest to the Committee. Sierra surfaced in March 1963¹³ and the organization abruptly ceased activity by January 1964.¹⁴ The Committee hoped to discover what sparked the group's genesis and what contributed to its final demise.

(351) Its financial backing appeared to be remarkably impressive, and although Sierra claimed the group was to received funds from American companies whose financial assets in Cuba had been nationalized, it was widely rumored that the money was actually from "gambling interests" of organized crime.¹⁵ There were other rumors that wealthy individuals from Texas were behind the

page 4

group.¹⁶ The Committee hoped to determine exactly what means were available to the group and from what source.

(352) Preliminary research also indicated that the Secret Service in Chicago was investigating a "Threat to the President" case at the time of President Kennedy's assassination, in which Paulino Sierra was of interest.¹⁷ The Committee wished to explore the nature of the allegation and the extent of Sierra's involvement in the case.

(353) The Committee was able to obtain considerable information from the contemporaneous investigative reports of the Central Intelligence Agency, the FBI and Immigration and Naturalization Service regarding the structure, membership and activities of the Junta. Field interviews and research into reports of the Secret Service probed those questions raised by the alleged threats against the President.

(354) Paulino Sierra Martinez was a tall, ~~dark~~ and dapper lawyer¹⁸ employed in the Legal Counsel's office of the Union Tank Car Company in Chicago.¹⁹ Before his immigration to the United States, he had reportedly been employed by Carlos Saladrigas, a minister under Batista.²⁰ He had also worked with Santiago Alvarez Rodriguez, former senator during Batista's regime.²¹ Sierra left Havana in 1960 and settled for a time in Miami where he worked as a

page 5

Judo instructor and translator (Sierra speaks, reads and writes English, Italian, French and Spanish).²² In 1962 he moved to Chicago and was admitted to the Illinois Bar sponsored by William Browder, general counsel of Union Tank Car Company, for whom Sierra soon began work.²³

(355) By early 1963 Sierra had organized a Cuban Lawyer's Association in Chicago and gained somewhat of a reputation as "coordinator" of Cuban activities in the Chicago area.²⁴

In March 1963, he was mentioned in an article in the Chicago Tribune for his active role in Cuban exile affairs.²⁵ Nevertheless, in Chicago. However, he still had not made a national name in Cuban exile affairs.

(356) Yet, as noted previously, Sierra's meetings with anti-Castro Cuban exiles in Miami in the spring of 1963, produced the official structure of a Cuban government in exile by July.²⁶ Sierra was named Secretary General, Felipe Rivero Diaz was named Vice Secretary General; Carlos Rodriguez Quesada was appointed head of Internal Affairs; Juan Medina was to head up finances; Manuel Lozano Pino was named head of External Relations; Alberto Garrido was put in charge of Propaganda; Reinaldo Pico was given a position in charge of Labor issues; and Gilberto Rodriguez was asked to run Military Operations.²⁷

(357) The Junta was formed after an organizational meeting in Chicago in June 1963 with Union Tank Car Executive Vice-President J.W. Van Gorkum and General Counsel William Browder.²⁸ Information regarding the meeting is scant. One source who attended said that Van Gorkum and Browder

page 6

discussed the unity plan only insofar as suggesting that if the group could successfully establish a government in exile, it then might be able to obtain U.S. government support and financing from other sources. ³²⁹

(358) But evidence exists to suggest that Union Tank Car had a greater role in the Junta. The company was reportedly paying for Sierra's personal and travel expenses plus his salary. ³³⁰ Browder also told FBI agents in October, 1963 that although he did not know the identity of Sierra's backers, he (Browder) kept the group's funds under his control to avoid any possible criticism of misappropriation or mismanagement of funds by Sierra. ³³¹ Browder would not indicate the exact amount under his control other to say it was "considerable." ³³²

(359) There have been several contradictory reports to the CIA and FBI regarding the source of Sierra's funds.

(360) Early reports indicated Sierra's backers were Chicago gamblers. The Miami News headline for an article reporting on Sierra's meetings read "Gamblers Pop Out of Exile Grab Bag." ³³³ The source of such reports is unclear although there are indications it may have been Sierra himself.

(361) At Sierra's initial meetings with Cuban groups, he was accompanied by an American named William Trull, who may have been partly responsible for circulation of rumors of the involvement of gambling interests in Sierra's proposals, but whose ultimate relationship to Sierra is obscure. ³³⁴

(362) In an interview with the FBI in June 1963, Sierra said Trull had called him after seeing the March 10 article

page

about Sierra in the Chicago Tribune.³⁵ Sierra said Trull talked about sponsorship of a unified group of Cuban exiles and vaguely mentioned the owner of the King Ranch and a Mr. "Jarvis," who Trull identified as a millionaire in Texas.³⁶ Sierra said he was concerned about Trull being involved with "impure" financial sources,³⁷ and would have nothing further to do with him.

(363) Trull's story is different. A former entertainer from Dallas, Trull said Sierra had first contacted him in March 1963 and proposed that he help Sierra explain Sierra's plan to the Cuban exiles in Miami.³⁸ Trull said Sierra had wired tickets so that he could join Sierra in Miami for the series of meetings with the exiles.³⁹ Sierra carefully outlined the proposal Trull was to explain to such Cuban leaders as former Cuban Prime Minister Carlos Prío and Eusebio Mujal, a former Cuban labor leader.⁴⁰ Trull reiterated the plan to the Cubans, telling them he represented wealthy American interests who had a business proposition for the Cuban people if they would unify with Carlos Prío as President and Sierra as Secretary of a provisional government.⁴¹

(364) Reports by Cubans who heard Trull lend credence to his tale. Trull was found to be "contradictory" and "vague" about his plan,⁴² as might be expected of a person who was just repeating what he had been told.

(365) Trull later told FBI agents that he had dropped names to Sierra such as Clebrug of the King Ranch, but Sierra had told him he did not need Trull's financial influence.⁴³

page 8

Sierra claimed, according to Trull, that representatives of Las Vegas or Cleveland gambling interests had contacted him and offered up to \$14 million in exchange for 50% interest in gambling concessions in Cuba, provided Sierra was able to organize a successful ouster of Castro. ⁴⁴

(366) Trull told the FBI that because he had frequently performed before Cuban audiences, he felt he had been chosen by Sierra and used as an "actor" to sell the Cubans on Sierra's plans. ⁴⁵

(367) ^{that} Sierra had other assistance at his early meetings ~~which~~ disappeared as quickly as Trull had. According to a CIA report, one of the promoters for a meeting in May with exiles was George Franci, a Haitian national who had previously been involved in gambling interests in Havana. ⁴⁶ Franci's name does not show up as involved in any later activities of Sierra, ^{particularly} ~~notably~~ after the stories of gambler's backing hit the newsstands.

(368) As late as July, 1963, Sierra himself was the source of another report that gamblers were backing him. Miguel A. "Cuco" Leon, a colleague of Manuel Arttime Buesa, reported that when Sierra visited Nicaragua that month, he told him he represented U.S. gambling concessions in Cuba. ⁴⁷

(369) Another possible basis for the stories about Sierra's "gambler's backing" are separate reports of an actual offer to Chicago Cubans in March 1963.

Dr. Cesar Blanco of the Chicago-based Cuban Bar

page 9

Association of Illinois reported a meeting of Cuban exiles on March 11, 1963. He said that a Burt Mold of the American Education League of Los Angeles had asked Blanco how much money the Cubans needed to work out a program to free Cuba. Mold, according to Blanco, stated that the "Nevada group" would help since the U.S. government could do nothing. Blanco said that Mold even offered Blanco the job of head of police in Cuba when the country had been freed.

(370) A CIA report of March 1963 reported that Blanco and Sierra had been approached by gamblers from the west to work with them.

It was reported that Sierra spoke about an offer of \$10 million in backing for guarantees of gambling concessions in Cuba after Castro was overthrown.

(371) In his public meetings in Miami in May, Sierra had publicly named the American Educational League of Los Angeles as being in support of his proposal. When that group challenged Sierra's claims, Sierra backed off, indicating he had received assurances of assistance from other sources. But it is not known whether Mold had made the offer at the behest of the American Educational League or for some other party. His affiliation with the League was just as a member.

(372) If an offer from gambling interests was ever made, it appears that Sierra either backed away from such an offer or began to dress it in legitimate clothing after

page 17

the adverse publicity.

(373) The backers were identified in public in only the most nebulous terms. Sierra claimed several U.S. companies were behind his plans and these at first were only identified as the Lawyer's Corporation and the American Bankers. ~~57~~

Later, he frequently named such large corporations as United Fruit, ESSO, Standard Oil, Dupont and U.S. Steel, among others. ~~58~~

(374) The Chicago office of the FBI closed its investigation of Sierra's activities in June 1963, concluding that he was involved in a "con job" rather than any real activities, hoodlum or otherwise. ~~59~~

remains:

The question ~~is~~ who was conning whom?

(375) The FBI's decision to close the investigation may have been justifiable at the time, since there was no indication either through money spent or by actual group-sponsored operations that Sierra had a viable organization. The activities, however, were just beginning. ~~60~~

(376) As soon as the organization was formally set up, Sierra and Felipe Rivero left on a trip to Nicaragua and Colombia to discuss plans for a military base of operations outside the U.S. The reportedly spoke with Luis Somoza in Nicaragua and also attempted to obtain the use of the Isle of Andres off of Colombia. It was also reported that Sierra and Rivero traveled to New York, Chicago, St. Louis and Washington, D.C. to meet with backers and make further arrangements. Later it was ~~61~~
~~62~~
~~63~~

page 11.

learned that Sierra alone had spent a little over \$11,000 on travel expenses by October 1963. ~~64~~ 64

(377) The group was also spending money on arms and equipment by late summer 1963. Rich Lauchli, a well-known arms dealer from Collinsville, Ill., was contacted by Sierra in August to purchase a quantity of guns. Soldier-of-fortune and Gerry Patrick Hemming associate, Steve Wilson, was asked by Sierra to deliver the arms to Miami. Sierra also ordered a two-man submarine from California in October 1963, which was transported to Miami for storage in the garage of Cuban exile Manuel Aguilar. ~~65~~ 65 ~~66~~ 66 ~~67~~ 67 ~~68~~ 68

(378) The FBI received information that Sierra had been on an arms shopping spree in Detroit accompanied by Jose Cardoso, and purchased \$6000 to \$7000 worth of weapons to be transported to Miami. Dennis Lynn Harber, another Hemming associate, assisted Sierra in the transport of military equipment. ~~69~~ 69 ~~70~~ 70

(379) Sierra was also holding discussions with several "action" groups for assistance in a military operation against Cuba. Among those contacted who reportedly signed "pledges" of support were Aldo Vera Serafin of the militant MAPA group (American Patriotic Action Movement); Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo and Antonio Veciana Blanch of the SNFE-Alpha 66 alliance; Santiago Alvarez Rodriguez of Comandos L; Eduardo Mor Ruiz, an independent anti-Castro Cuban fighter; and Orlando Bosch of MIRR. ~~71~~ 71 ~~72~~ 72 ~~73~~ 73 ~~74~~ 74 ~~75~~ 75 ~~76~~ 76

(380) Reports of funds given to those groups indicate Sierra

~~Sierra~~ was advancing modest sums from the alleged \$650,000 at his disposal. Aldo Vera Serafin reportedly received ⁷⁷ \$3500 and Tony Cuesta of Comandos L received ⁷⁸ \$1000. Members of the Junta's board of officers also received contributions from Sierra. Carlos Rodriguez Quesada received \$2800; Felipe Rivero Diaz received \$1890; and Gilberto Rodriguez got ⁷⁹ \$1500.

(381) There are various descriptions of the military operations allegedly being prepared by the Junta. On October 30, 1963, information was received that the Second National Front of Escambray had plans for an operation from a base in the Dominican Republic. ⁸⁰ The arrangements were allegedly being made by Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, head of SNFE, and ⁸¹ Abel Camacho in Key West. The plan called for action against a bridge in Oriente Province and had been master-minded by Antonio Veciana and one of the engineers who ⁸² had designed the bridge. Consistent with this information, it was also reported to the FBI that the Junta offered soldier-of-fortune Joe Garman ⁸³ \$11,000 to lead a raid on Oriente Province.

(382) There were other reports that an attack on a Havana oil refinery was planned. ⁸⁴ Still other reports simply indicated that although all-out war against Castro was the objective, a hit-and-run raid for publicity purposes ⁸⁵ would be attempted first.

(383) While all these activities were getting underway, Sierra had some conflict with other officers in the

Junta. Gilbeto Rodriguez Hernandez was replaced as military coordinator in the summer of 1963 because, according to Sierra, Hernandez was feared to be a Castro agent. In turn, Hernandez, who had returned from Cuban prison in April 1963 in the prisoner exchange, called Van Gorkum and Browder at Union Tank Car Company and complained bitterly about Sierra's lack of leadership.

(384) After Sierra had signed a pact with Alpha 66-SFNE, another member of the Junta, Manuel Lozano Pino, resigned from his position as head of External Relations. He objected to the inclusion of such a "left-wing" organization, but also protested Sierra's expenditures.

(385) These complaints may have had something to do with Sierra's summons to Chicago in early November 1963 for a stormy session with Browder. Sierra was blasted for wasting funds, reportedly totaling up to \$50,000. According to sources of the CIA and FBI, Sierra was accompanied to the Chicago meeting with Armando Fleites of SNFE and Browder allegedly ordered Sierra to turn over all monies and supplies to the SNFE-Alpha 66 alliance. But although several of the Junta officers had asked for Sierra's replacement and had specifically named Jose "Pepin" Bosch as an attractive alternative, Sierra remained in place as the "guiding spirit" for the next two months. the remainder of the group's existence.

(386) A CIA memo reported on November 20, 1963 of the strange activities of Sierra and the Junta:

"Although he (Sierra) has been somewhat ubiquitous among Cuban exile leaders in Miami since March 1963, he still remains somewhat of a mystery-man in terms of his means of support, and indeed, his long-range objectives." ⁹⁵

(387)

The report also raised the question of how Sierra managed to remain in the exile political scene so long. "Perhaps his mysterious backers are providing him with sufficient funds to keep the pot boiling for the present," the memo ⁹⁶ conjectured.

(388)

Indeed, Sierra's activities were not only continuing, but he also soon found himself subject of interest in a Secret Service investigation into a threat against the President. See the Agency Performance Section

~~SIERRA-ECHEVARRIA ALLEGATIONS~~

of the Final Report of the Committee for more information about this threat.

DAVID FERRIE

Patricia's copy
~~3/11/77~~

(389) On Monday afternoon, November 25, 1963, David William Ferrie voluntarily presented himself for questioning to the New Orleans police who were looking for him in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy. (En) The New Orleans District Attorney's Office¹ had earlier received information regarding a relationship between Ferrie and accused assassin Lee Harvey Oswald. (En) Among the allegations: Ferrie ~~had~~ ^{may have} been acquainted with Oswald since Oswald's days in the Civil Air Patrol youth organization in 1954-55; Ferrie ^{may have} ~~had~~ given Oswald instruction in the use of a rifle and may have hypnotized Oswald to shoot the President; and that Ferrie was in Texas on the day of the assassination and ~~was supposed to~~ ^{may} have been Oswald's get-away pilot. (En)³

(390) Ferrie ~~adamantly~~ ^{Charles} denied ~~them~~ ^{stated} all. He ~~said~~ that at the time of the President's ~~death~~ ^{assassination} he had been in New Orleans, busy with court matters for organized crime ~~don~~ ^{figure} Carlos Marcello, who had been acquitted⁴ of immigration-related charges that same day. (En) Other individuals, including Marcello, Marcello's lawyer, the lawyer's secretary⁵ and FBI agent Regis Kennedy backed up Ferrie's alibi. (En)

(391) Ferrie also gave a detailed account of his whereabouts for the period from the evening of the assassination

David Ferrie - 3

Kennedy warranted examination. The Committee paid particularly close attention to a possible relationship between Oswald and Ferrie. What emerged were several parallels in the life of the two: a complexity of personality and political belief; a difficulty in attaining normal social adjustment; and a incidences of being in the same locality at the same time^{and} involved in similar activities.

(395) ~~However, an~~ extraordinarily detailed record of Ferrie's life and associates is ^{currently} available. The Committee examined FBI and Secret Service investigative reports generated immediately after the assassination and FBI and INS reports ante-dating or post-dating the assassination; it received information developed during the 1967-1968 Garrison investigation; and ^{it} examined the files of the extensive investigation of Ferrie conducted by the Federal Aviation Administration, Eastern Airlines and the New Orleans police from 1961 to 1963, an investigation ^{the} which was the result of criminal charges against Ferrie filed in 1961. ^{Additionally,} ~~In addition,~~ the Committee conducted its own field investigation.

(396) Ferrie was born in 1918 in Cleveland, Ohio, ^{the} son of James Howard Ferrie, a police captain and ^{an} attorney. 11

(Fn) Ferrie attended parochial grammar and high school. 12. ^{Although} There ^{are} no indications ^{that} his childhood was anything but normal, ^{numerous} ~~numerous interviews~~

David Ferrie - 4

acquaintances and associates of Ferrie reveal that he grew to be a complex, even bizarre individual. ~~One~~ One aptly stated, "Not inappropriately, he (Ferrie) was described as a paradox." ~~13~~

(397) His unusual personal appearance was partially a result of the loss of his body hair ^{induced} by a rare disease. ¹⁴ ~~(14)~~ ~~To compensate,~~ He wore a makeshift toupee and exaggerated fake eyebrows crudely affixed with glue as compensation. ¹⁵ ~~Persons who knew him~~ ^{him} considered sloppy and unkempt, ^{with a proclivity for} ~~known to use~~ foul language. ¹⁶ ~~(16)~~

(398) Ferrie was often described as "very aggressive" and "highly obnoxious". He resented authority, ¹⁷ ~~was~~ ¹⁸ opinionated, and often difficult to get along with. ¹⁹ Yet he was able to exert a tremendous influence over his close associates, including many young men in his Civil Air Patrol squadron. ²⁰ ~~(20)~~

(399) Several of Ferrie's associates indicate he was a homosexual and a misogynist. ²¹ ~~(21)~~ His sexual exploitation of younger men, ~~in 1941~~ would eventually cause him numerous problems.

(400) Although his formal education was not extensive, Ferrie was considered highly intelligent, even brilliant. ²² ~~(22)~~ He had originally studied theology in the hope of becoming an ordained priest, but he left seminary school before graduation because of "emotional instability". ²³ ~~(23)~~ Later, in 1941, he received a bachelor of arts degree from Baldwin-Wallace College, ²⁴

David Ferrie - 5

~~He majored~~ ^{majoring} in philosophy. ²⁵ ~~He~~ He also received, through a correspondence course, a doctorate degree in psychology from an unaccredited school, Phoenix University, ²⁶ ~~Bari, Italy,~~ ^{In August, 1957, he travelled,} ~~although he did go to Italy~~ ^{to take} ~~August, 1957, for~~ the final board exams. ²⁷ ~~()~~

(401) Ferrie spent considerable time studying ²⁸ medicine and psychology, ~~()~~ especially the techniques of hypnosis which he frequently practiced on his young ²⁹ associates. ~~()~~ Ferrie had even set up a laboratory ³⁰ over his garage, ~~()~~ ^{where, he claimed} ~~and it was there, he dramatically~~ ~~claimed, that~~ he lost his hair, alternately attributing it to a radiation experiment, chemical explosion and ³¹ cancer research experiments. ~~()~~ He listed his name ³² in the telephone book as "Dr." David Ferrie; ~~()~~ and many friends did erroneously believe he was a medical ³³ doctor and a psychologist. ~~()~~ This veneer of respectability and achievement could be why Ferrie referred ³⁴ to his Ph.D. degree as his "most prized possession". ~~()~~

(402) Ferrie was also philosophically and politically ³⁵ complex. He considered himself a devout Catholic, and ³⁶ made several attempts to become a priest, ~~()~~ ^{even though} ~~although~~ ³⁷ he described himself as a "theological liberal". ~~()~~ He also claimed to be liberal in his civil rights ³⁸ attitude. ~~()~~ ~~He~~ ³⁹ He was rabidly anti-Communist, ~~()~~ ^{however,} and frequently critical of each Presidential administration for what he perceived to be sell-outs to Communism. ⁴⁰ ~~()~~

David Ferrie - 6

(403) Ferrie often spoke to business and civic groups about politics. ⁴¹ ~~()~~ Ferrie associates told FBI agents in 1961 that Ferrie had been "critical of the Roosevelt administration... (as it) was trying to drive us into Communism." ⁴² ~~()~~ *Associates also said* Ferrie "was also critical of the Truman administration for the same reason." ⁴³ ~~()~~

(404) Ferrie was asked to discontinue his remarks at a speaking engagement in July 1961 before the New Orleans chapter of the Military Order of World Wars. ⁴⁴ His topic was the presidential administration and the Bay of Pigs fiasco. ⁴⁵ The organization put a stop to Ferrie's remarks when he became too critical of President Kennedy. ⁴⁶ ~~()~~

(405) He apparently expressed his views to anyone who would listen. During an interview with an IRS auditor in 1960, Ferrie was "outspoken" in his derogatory comments about the United States. ⁴⁷ ~~()~~ He complained bitterly about his alleged tax persecution to such an extent that the agent reported he thought Ferrie was actually deranged, a "psycho". ⁴⁸ ~~()~~

(406) Ferrie's major avocation and occupation, however, was flying. Even associates who were critical of Ferrie's character considered him an excellent pilot. ⁴⁹ ~~()~~ An early acquaintance believes that Ferrie first started to fly at his father's suggestion, to take his mind off of

David Ferrie - 7

his failures at the seminary. ⁵⁰ ~~He~~ He took lessons at Sky Tech Airway Service in Cleveland, Ohio between 1942 and 1945. ⁵¹ ~~He~~ He then worked as a pilot for an oil drilling firm which had jobs in South America. ⁵² When the company went out of business, Ferrie tried teaching at Rocky River High School, ⁵³ ~~but~~ but he was fired in 1948 for psychoanalyzing his students instead of teaching them. ⁵⁴ ~~He~~

(407) In 1949, Ferrie left the Cleveland area after rumors that he had taken several young boys to a house of prostitution ⁵⁵ ~~circulated~~ ~~through~~ through his neighborhood. ~~He~~ Although Ferrie's exact movements are not known, he appears to have gone to Tampa, Florida, where he received his instrument rating at Sunnyside Flying School. ⁵⁶ ~~He~~

(408) In 1950, Ferrie returned to Cleveland. ⁵⁷ He worked as an insurance inspector, and joined the Army Reserve for a three-year stint, leaving with an honorable discharge in 1953. ⁵⁸

(409) Life started going well for Ferrie. In 1951 he submitted an application to Eastern Airlines, omitting details of his past emotional and occupational difficulties. ⁵⁹ ~~He~~ Eastern Airlines hired him in Miami, and soon transferred him to New Orleans. ⁶⁰ ~~He~~

(410) Internal memos for Eastern Airlines indicate Ferrie was accepted for employment, but consideration was given to firing him almost immediately for falsify-

David Ferrie - 8

ing parts of his application. ⁶¹ ~~that~~ The New Orleans branch was advised to keep Ferrie only until a replacement could be found and a "close watch" on Ferrie's progress was recommended. ⁶² ~~that~~ Initial reports, however, were favorable. ⁶³ ~~that~~ Ferrie was considered by his fellow pilots to be doing a good job, although he was "odd" at times. ⁶⁴ ~~that~~ Eastern decided to ~~keep~~ ^{retain} him.

~~that~~ ⁽⁴¹⁰⁾ Ferrie ^{approached} ~~approached~~ his job enthusiastically, devoting his own time to talking at schools and clubs to promote interest in aviation and travel in the Southwest area. ⁶⁵ ~~that~~ In 1953, the president of Eastern wrote him a letter personally commending Ferrie's efforts on behalf of the company. ⁶⁶ ~~that~~ This early record of dedication and competence may have accounted for Ferrie's longevity as an Eastern Airlines captain, despite complaints ^{through} ~~that~~ the years. ⁶⁷ ~~that~~ Ultimately, the infractions became too serious, and, after a long investigation and a hearing process which lasted from 1961 until 1963, Ferrie lost his job.

⁽⁴¹²⁾ Ferrie had always been deeply engrossed in other activities related to flying, including the Civil ⁶⁸ Air Patrol, which he had first joined in Cleveland. ~~that~~ Over the years his difficulties with the hierarchy and authorities of the Civil Air Patrol would increase, but

David Ferrie - 9

Ferrie remained intensely popular with many of the members and enjoyed a reputation as a first rate instructor and organizer. ⁶⁹ Jean Naatz, an aviatrix of national renown, ^{stated,} "He had done more for the Civil Air Patrol than anyone else and built up the squadron to one of the biggest squadrons in the state of Ohio." ⁷⁰

(4/13) Ferrie also built the same reputation with many CAP cadets in the New Orleans area. One CAP commander said, "David Ferrie is a good organizer...He made the CAP at the New Orleans Airport everything it is today. He has a large following among the cadets of the CAP, and is an excellent flying instructor." ⁷¹ By 1953, there were about 80 cadets assigned to his ⁷² squadron. Ferrie spent about six hours a week in official CAP activity and much more of his own time associating with his cadets. ⁷³ Ferrie became known for his enthusiastic approach to cadet training, emphasizing tutoring in science and mathematics and putting ⁷⁴ cadets in charge of their own discipline. The squadron ⁷⁵ had an award-winning drill team.

(4/14) His appeal to several young men may have been related to his taking an extraordinary interest in them: ⁷⁶ he gave them flying instruction and flight time in his own airplane; he often gave parties at his residence where liquor flowed freely; ^{77 and} he offered his home as a place for the boys to stay when they were unhappy at

David Ferrie - 10

home. ⁷⁸ He urged several boys to join the armed
forces, ⁷⁹ take careers in aviation ⁸⁰ or en-
couraged them to join seminaries. ⁸¹ Many of Ferrie's
cadets became involved in Ferrie's wide spectrum of
activities. ⁸²

(4/5) Ferrie's tremendous influence and close association
with these young men eventually became a controversial
subject with many parents. ⁸³

(4/6) Ferrie did not bother to renew his CAP commander
charter when it ran out in 1954, ⁸⁴ although he con-
tinued to wear the insignia of the CAP on his fatigues.

⁸⁵ He did renew his commander charter in 1959, when
he augmented his cadet's standard CAP rifle training by
instituting an association with the New Orleans Cadet
Rifle Club. ⁸⁶ Ferrie also started a group called
the "Falcon Squadron," composed of Ferrie's closest CAP
associates. ⁸⁷ A group within this group, the "Omni-
potents," was allegedly started to train cadets in what
to do in the event of ^{a major} attack on the United
States. ⁸⁸

(4/7) ⁸⁹ Ferrie's job and ownership of an airplane enabled
~~him~~ ^{him} to travel around the country with relative ease.
He told officials ~~that~~ he frequently traveled to Texas
and other parts South, including Miami, ⁹⁰ and ~~he~~ visited
New York on occasion.

David Ferrie - 11

← It is unknown how much time Ferrie was spending in these other cities. ~~██████████~~ ⁹¹ In August 1959, while in Miami, Ferrie was put under a 26-hour surveillance by Customs agents who believed Ferrie was involved in gun smuggling. ⁹¹ Following a brief investigation, including a tapping of his telephone conversations, it was determined that Ferrie was not involved in any ~~██████████~~ ⁹² illegal, but merely planning an outing for his "scouts". ⁹³ ~~██████████~~ The investigation was dropped.

⁹⁴ (418) Ferrie also became involved in other activities. In 1959, he had found an outlet for his political fanaticism in the anti-Castro movement. ⁹⁴ ~~██████████~~ By early 1961, Ferrie and a young man whom Ferrie had first met in the CAP, Layton Martens, were working with Sergio Arcacha Smith, head of the Cuban Revolutionary Front delegation in New Orleans. ⁹⁵ ~~██████████~~

(419) ^{soon} Ferrie ~~██████████~~ became Smith's eager partner in counter-⁹⁶ Revolutionary activities. ⁹⁶ ~~██████████~~ ^{He reportedly} ~~██████████~~ ^{in his enthusiasm to} ~~help, he~~ built two miniature submarines which he planned to use for an attack on Havana Harbor, ⁹⁷ ~~██████████~~ ~~██████████~~ ⁹⁸ obtained several rifles and mortars for the proposed invasion, ⁹⁹ ~~██████████~~ ^{and} ~~██████████~~ was reportedly teaching Cubans how to fly. ¹⁰⁰ ~~██████████~~

Further, several of Ferrie's cadets claimed to have taken trips to Cuba in Ferrie's airplane. ~~██████████~~

(420) Ferrie was also involved with Arcacha Smith, adventurer Gordon Novel and Layton Martens in a raid on a munitions dump in Houma, Louisiana. ¹⁰¹ ~~101~~ Additionally, in September, 1961, the U.S. Border Patrol received information that Ferrie was attempting to purchase a C-47 airplane for \$30,000 and reportedly had a cache of arms in the New Orleans area; ¹⁰² ~~102~~ The report was never verified. There were also unverified reports that Ferrie provided Arcacha Smith with personal financial assistance. ¹⁰³ ~~103~~

(421) Arcacha Smith wrote Eastern Airlines then-president Eddie Rickenbacker on Ferrie's behalf requesting a 60-or 90-day leave with pay for full time work for the CRC. ~~Arcacha Smith's statement of Ferrie's assistance~~

~~to the Cuban Revolutionary Council was largely that as Ferrie was often given the credit for increasing the potency and effectiveness of the Civil Air Patrol, he was described as instrumental in producing the cause of the Cuban Revolution. Arcacha Smith~~

~~the generating of our program was the result of the prodding of Captain Ferrie and his associates here in New Orleans. Through him we have been able to get the word across on affairs political, economic and military. Further, he has helped us straighten out our affairs. As a result our organization is running smoother every day and our operations have begun. In addition, Captain Ferrie has been assisting in obtaining needed equipment. Likewise he has been assisting in the handling of the papers. We sorely need his advice day to day. At this time he holds no less than 85 many thousands of dollars in the Caribbean area that will~~

The reenergizing of our program was the result of the addition of Captain Pierre, and his associates here in New Orleans. Through him we have been able to get the best advice in all our political, economic and military matters. He has helped us structure the effort. As a result our organization is running smoother every day and our operations have begun. In addition, Captain Pierre has been assisting in obtaining needed equipment. Likewise he has been assisting in the handling of the refugees. We sorely need his advice and help to the last. At this time he holds in his hands so many treasures which pertain to the security of the Caribbean area. That is a considerable contribution which he made.

Ferrie's vacation in April 1961, ^{however} coincided with the Bay of Pigs invasion. ¹⁰⁶ ~~(E)~~ Ferrie's role, if any, is not known.

~~by name.~~ Ferrie's assistance and interest appears to have been completely voluntary.

(423) *During this time* ~~the~~ Ferrie had continued to have personal problems. In 1960 he had provoked the ire of other CAP commanders while on a cadet campout. The incident ended with Ferrie withdrawing his cadets from the outing and eventually led to his permanent resignation from the CAP in 1960.

(424) Ferrie's troubles intensified when charges were brought against him by parents of boys who had run away from home. In one instance, Ferrie had gained entrance to the New Orleans Youth Detention Center to visit one runaway boy by signing himself in as a doctor.

(425) The parents of another boy *to authorities that* ~~complained~~ *their son* was staying with Ferrie. As a result, Ferrie was arrested on August 8, 1961 for contributing to the delinquency of a juvenile.

(426) Cuban exile leader Arcacha Smith* intervened on Ferrie's behalf by telling police that the boy would be returned to his parents if they did not press charges against Ferrie. But Ferrie was arrested again on August 21, 1961 for crime against nature on a 15-year-old boy and indecent behavior with three others.

* (427) Arcacha Smith was having problems of his own. He had moved the office of the CRC to the Newman Building at 544 Camp Street in 1962, but lack of funds caused him to leave town in mid-1962, his reputation among anti-Castro Cubans tarnished by his association with Ferrie. He was also accused by several Cuban exiles of misappropriation of funds.

David Ferrie - 14

(428) An intensive New Orleans police investigation of the charges against Ferrie produced statements from several boys that Ferrie had committed indecent acts with them.¹¹⁷ The boys also told investigators Ferrie had told them he had had homosexual relations with a married man in Houston.¹¹⁸ On August 26, Eastern Airlines removed him from the payroll for an indefinite period.¹¹⁹ and the Federal Aviation Administration then opened its own investigation into the charges.¹²⁰

(429) With his problems mounting, Ferrie sought legal aid from New Orleans attorney G. Wray Gill, Sr.¹²¹ Ferrie later testified that he and Gill had entered into an agreement in March, 1962 that Gill would represent Ferrie in his legal difficulties in return for Ferrie's research and investigative work on other cases for Gill.¹²²

(430) Ferrie also testified that he also entered into a similar arrangement in February, 1962 with Guy Banister,¹²³ a former FBI agent who ran a private investigative firm.¹²⁴ By the terms of the agreement, Ferrie's work for Banister included analyzing autopsy reports in payment for Banister's investigative services.¹²⁵ Banister stated he handled Ferrie's case "personally".¹²⁶

(431) Ferrie may have first met Banister late in 1960 or early 1961 when Banister, also a strong anti-Communist, was helping to establish the "Friends of Democratic Cuba" organization as a adjunct to Sergio Arcacha Smith's CRC.¹²⁷ At the time, Banister's investigative business and the

David Ferrie - 15

128

CRC were both located in the Balter Building. In February, 1961, Banister was conducting background investigations of the members of the CRC from a list provided by Arcacha Smith. In early, 1962, both moved their offices to the Newman Building, which carried the two addresses for the two streets it faced: 531 Lafayette and 544 Camp Street.

(432) Jack Martin, a private investigator associated with Banister, may also have been contacted by Ferrie for assistance on his case. Ferrie testified in August 1963 that he had helped Martin on a case involving a phoney religious order in Louisville, Kentucky, in November, 1961. Later, Martin wrote letters to the FAA and Eastern Airlines on Ferrie's behalf.

(433) With this assistance, Ferrie was able to resolve many of his difficulties. At the end of February 1962, Ferrie was tried and acquitted of the charges of extortion. The other charges were nolle prosequied in November 1962.

(434) Ferrie ~~was~~ managed to stay afloat financially despite his loss of income from Eastern Airlines in 1961. Although he was categorized as a "poor" credit risk in October 1962 by the New Orleans Retail Credit Bureau, Ferrie ~~made~~ ^{made} payments on his car and ~~not~~ ^{not} living expenses. Meanwhile he was also attempting to be reinstated as an Eastern pilot. Attorney G. Wray Gill notified Eastern when the last of the charges

David Ferrie - 16

against Ferrie had been nolle prosequied;¹³⁹ Eastern responded with a letter inviting Ferrie to discuss the charges at a meeting in Miami.¹⁴⁰ Ferrie did not go.¹⁴¹ Instead, several individuals, including one of the boys who had been named in a sex offense charge against him,¹⁴² wrote to Eastern to plead that Ferrie be reinstated.¹⁴³ Ferrie also filed a "grievance" against Eastern.¹⁴⁴ Then, in February, 1963, he went to Miami with attorney Gill for the hearing regarding his dismissal.¹⁴⁵ Eastern ruled against him;¹⁴⁶ Ferrie filed another grievance.¹⁴⁷

(435) Hearing dates were scheduled and rescheduled.¹⁴⁸ During this period, Ferrie was often seen at Banister's offices in 544 Camp Street as he prepared his case.¹⁴⁹

(436) Ferrie's final grievance hearing was set for July 15, 1963, in Miami.¹⁵⁰ Ferrie, Gill and Banister were in Miami on July 15, 16, and 17 while Eastern Airlines presented its case against Ferrie.¹⁵¹ The record of these hearings reveal that the company's charges were based on Ferrie's deliberate omissions and inaccuracies in his original application to the company; charges of Ferrie's moral turptitude; and his having misrepresented himself as a medical doctor and psychologist.¹⁵²

(437) The hearings were resumed on August 5th.¹⁵³ Testifying in Ferrie's defense were former CAP cadet John

Irion, Ferrie's long-time friend James Lewallen,¹⁵⁴
Ferrie's investigator Guy Banister and Ferrie himself.
Layton Martens provided a sworn deposition in defense¹⁵⁵
of Ferrie's character. Banister testified to Ferrie's
good character supposedly based on his own investigation¹⁵⁶
of Ferrie. ~~However,~~ In cross-examination Banister
could not rationalize to the satisfaction of the hearing
board the reasons for Ferrie's vituperative remarks in¹⁵⁷
1961 against President Kennedy, nor could he adequately
explain Ferrie's involvement with a questionably legiti-¹⁵⁸
mate church group.

(438) On September 30, Ferrie received the final¹⁵⁹
decision from the Eastern appeal board: ~~it~~ ^{it} unanimously¹⁶⁰
upheld his discharge.

(439) By the Fall of 1963, Ferrie had become actively
involved in the defense investigation of Federal
charges of a fraudulent birth certificate against Carlos
Marcello, an alleged organized crime leader in New Or-¹⁶¹
leans.

(440) Ferrie's ties to the Marcello organized crime family
apparently continued at least until July 1966. As of that
time, Ferrie was involved with Jacob Nastasi, a known associate
of the Marcello family who had been the subject of an FBI probe
of racketeering in the New Orleans area, in a commercial¹⁶²
cargo airline venture, Space Airfreight Lines, Inc. Previously
he had been involved in the United Air Taxi Service with¹⁶³
other suspected Marcello associates.

(441) Ferrie's involvement with Marcello may have¹⁶⁴
begun as early as the Spring of 1961. An unconfirmed
from the Immigration and Naturalization Service
Border Patrol report of February 1962 alleges that Ferrie
was the pilot who flew Carlos Marcello back into the
United States from Guatemala after he had been deported
in April 1961 as part of the U. S. Attorney General¹⁶⁵
Robert Kennedy's crackdown on organized crime. This

David Ferrie - 18

may have helped Ferrie establish an enduring relationship with the Marcello organized crime family.

(442) The return of Marcello to the United States chronologically coincided with Ferrie's activities with the Cuban Revolutionary Counsel. ¹⁶⁶ According to Carlos Quiroga, a Cuban who had been involved with the CRC, Ferrie often provided Arcacha Smith with funds, ¹⁶⁷ stating, ~~_____~~, "Ferrie lent him (Arcacha Smith) money when he needed it for his family...He (Ferrie) had hundred dollar bills around all the time," even after he had lost his job with the airlines. ¹⁶⁸

(443) An FBI report of April, 1961 indicates Marcello offered Arcacha Smith a deal whereby Marcello would make a substantial donation to the movement in return for concessions in Cuba after Castro's overthrow. ¹⁶⁹ One explanation of Ferrie's ability to provide funds to Arcacha Smith may be that he acted as Marcello's financial conduit.

(444) Another indication of an early Ferrie relationship with the Marcello organized crime family may be ¹⁷⁰ the legal assistance ^{that} ~~provided by~~ Marcello lawyer, Jack Wasserman, ¹⁷¹ provided to Ferrie associates, Layton Martens, who identified himself to police as Arcacha Smith's second-in-command, and Andrew Blackmon. ¹⁷² Both had been arrested shortly after Ferrie's

David Ferrie - 19

arrest for indecent behavior. ⁽¹⁷³⁾

(445) Ferrie's ties to the Marcello organized crime family continued through his association

with G. Wray Gill, Sr., who was also attorney of record for Carlos Marcello. ¹⁷⁴

(446) Ferrie told the FBI that he had begun work on Marcello's case after his last Eastern grievance hearing. ¹⁷⁵ ~~he~~ In telling the Bureau about his work for Marcello, ^{however} he mentioned only activities in ¹⁷⁶ October and November.

(447) He said he went to Guatemala on business for Marcello from October 11th to October 18th and from ¹⁷⁷ October 30th to November 1st. The day after Marcello's trial started, November 5th, Ferrie purchased a .38 ¹⁷⁸ revolver. On the weekends of November 9th and 16th, Ferrie ¹⁷⁹ stayed at Churchill Downs, Marcello's countryside estate. He said he had gone there to map out strategy ¹⁸⁰ for Marcello's trial.

THE DAY THE PRESIDENT WAS SHOT

(448) New Orleans Police records for November 22, 1963 indicate that Guy Banister pistol-whipped Jack Martin on the evening of the assassination in a heated ¹⁸¹ argument over "long-distance telephone calls."

Although Martin reported the assault to the police, he refused to press charges against ^{Banister} ~~himself~~. ¹⁸² Within 48 hours, however, Martin had the entire New Orleans

David Ferrie - 20

183
police department out hunting for David Ferrie. He told the police that Ferrie ^{may have} ~~had~~ been involved in the Kennedy assassination. ¹⁸⁴ ~~He~~ ^{specifically, he suspected,} ~~said~~ that Ferrie was in Texas on the day of the assassination; that he was supposed to have been the getaway pilot in the assassination; and that Ferrie had known Oswald from their days together in the Civil Air Patrol, when Ferrie had given Oswald instructions in the use of a rifle. 185

(449) In an attempt to locate Ferrie for questioning, police arrested two Ferrie associates, Layton Martens and ^{Alvin} ~~Bea~~ Beauboeuf, at Ferrie's residence and charged them with vagrancy. 186 Beauboeuf was uncooperative during the questioning. 187 Martens was more talkative. 188 ^{he} ~~he~~ said Gill had come by to relay a message to Ferrie that his library card was found among Oswald's effects; ¹⁸⁹ ~~although this was not the case.~~

(450) Ferrie returned to New Orleans on the afternoon of November 25th. 190 He and attorney Gill appeared at the DA's office around 4:30 p.m. 191 He was questioned by the New Orleans police, the U. S. Secret Service and the FBI. 192 He denied ever seeing Oswald before. 193

(451) ^{also} Ferrie said that he had been in New Orleans until at least 9 p.m. on November 22nd, celebrating Marcello's trial victory at the Royal Orleans. 194 He said he then left the city with two friends for a little rest and relaxation. 195

David Ferrie - 21

(452) Ferrie's account of his travels between November 22nd and November 25th contains some contradictions.²
Ferrie said he left New Orleans by automobile, bound for Houston and accompanied by Melvin Coffey and Al¹⁹⁶ Beauboeuf. The group checked in at the Alamotel early¹⁹⁷ on November 23rd. That date on the motel registration¹⁹⁸ card was written over a November 22nd notation. ~~however,~~

The motel employee said that was because of the early morning hour of the check-in,^{however,} and that he is certain of¹⁹⁹ the correct date as the 23rd.

(453) On the afternoon of the 23rd, Ferrie said, he, Beauboeuf and Coffey went figure skating at the Winterland Skating Rink.²⁰⁰ ~~which was operated by Ernest Roland.~~²⁰¹
The three then went to the Belair Skating Rink before driving one hour to Galveston, Texas, where they arrived at 9 p.m. and, shortly after, checked into the Driftwood²⁰² Motel.

(454) Check-in and check-out times for the Houston and Galveston hotels conflict. Alamotel records in Houston indicate that Ferrie and his friends checked into the hotel early on the 23rd and did not leave until 8 or²⁰³ 9 p.m. on the 24th. Yet the registration records and witnesses at the Driftwood in Galveston show the three registering late on the 23rd and checking out at 10 a.m.²⁰⁴ on the 24th.

(455) Records from the motels indicate the group made²⁰⁵ a number of phone calls. Two calls made from the Ala-

motel went to radio stations WSHO and WDSH in New Orleans.
206
A collect call went to the Town and Country Motel, Marcello's New Orleans headquarters.
207

~~His mother worked as a switchboard operator.~~

(456) Evidence indicates that Ferrie conducted his own investigation into the Kennedy assassination. Oswald's former landlady in New Orleans, Mrs. Jesse Garner, told the Committee that, as she recalls, Ferrie visited her home on the night of the assassination and
208
asked about Oswald's library card. Mrs. Garner would
209
not talk to Ferrie.

(457) A neighbor of ~~the~~ Oswald's, Mrs. Doris Eames, told New Orleans District Attorney investigators in 1968 that Ferrie had come by her house after the assassination, inquiring if Mr. Eames had any information regarding Oswald's library card. Eames told Ferrie he had seen Oswald in the public library but apparently had no information about the library card Oswald used (210)

(458) Ferrie also talked with several former members of the Civil Air Patrol ~~in an attempt~~ to find out if any former cadets recalled Lee Harvey Oswald in Ferrie's squadron. Among those contacted was former cadet Roy McCoy, who told the FBI that Ferrie had come by looking for photographs of the cadets to see if Oswald was
210
pictured in any photos of Ferrie's squadron.

CONCLUSIONS

(459) The information of Ferrie's associations and activities as outlined above, and allegations that Ferrie and Oswald were seen together in Clinton, Louisiana in late summer 1963 are discussed in the Anti-Castro Cuban Front Staff ~~of the Final Report~~
~~and he suggested some other~~

and were acquainted while both were
in the Civil Air Patrol in 1955

544 CAMP STREET

(460) On August 9, 1963, Lee Harvey Oswald was arrested on Canal Street in New Orleans and charged with disturbing the peace.¹ The arrest was the result of a confrontation with anti-Castro Cuban exile Carlos Bringuier and two of his associates, Miguel Cruz and Celso Hernandez.² Oswald was handing out pro-Castro leaflets when Bringuier, Hernandez and Cruz approached him.³ When Hernandez tried to take the leaflets from Oswald, a shouting match began;⁴ the New Orleans police then intervened, arresting all four individuals.⁵

(461) Samples of the literature were confiscated by the police.⁶ One of the pamphlets bore the hand-stamped imprint of an address for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee--of which Oswald was the president and only member in New Orleans-- as "544 Camp Street, New Orleans, La."⁷

(462) This pamphlet was among the materials turned over by the New Orleans police department to the Secret Service following the assassination.⁸ The Secret Service and the FBI then set out to investigate the 544 Camp Street address.⁹ These agencies established several facts:¹⁰

(463) The address had been stamped with a home printing kit in the same manner Oswald had stamped other literature with his alias "A. J. Hidell" or "L. H. Oswald,"¹¹ indicating it was by Oswald's own hand that the 544 Camp Street address was printed on the pamphlet.

(464) It was learned also that Oswald had written to the national president of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee,

544 Camp
page 2

Vincent T. Lee, on August 1, 1963, eight days before his¹²
arrest. In the letter, Oswald mentioned he had rented
an office for his local FPCC chapter, but was told to
vacate after three days because the building was to be¹³
remodeled.

(465) The FBI and the Secret Service investigation
apparently focused on whether or not Oswald actually¹⁴
had rented an office at the 544 Camp Street address.

(466) In interviews with the FBI and the Secret Service,
the building owner, Sam Newman, denied renting an office¹⁵
to Oswald. Others renting office space at 544 Camp
Street were questioned and none recalled seeing Oswald¹⁶
at the Newman building or elsewhere in New Orleans.

(467) ~~However,~~ ^{however,} During the course of that investigation, the
Secret Service received information that an office in the
Newman Building had been rented to the Cuban Revolutionary¹⁷
Council from October 1961 through February 1962. Leaders
of the CRC were contacted and asked if they had any associa-
tion with or knowledge of Oswald or the Fair Play for Cuba¹⁸
Committee. The Cubans said they had none because they
had vacated the building fifteen months prior to Oswald's¹⁹
appearance in New Orleans. (See ~~Staff Report on CRC in~~
~~New Orleans, plus staff of Mr. [redacted]~~)

(468) The investigation of a possible connection between²⁰
Oswald and the 544 Camp Street address was closed. The
Warren Commission findings concurred with the Secret

544 Camp
page 3

Service report that no additional evidence had been found to indicate Oswald ever maintained an office²¹ at the 544 Camp Street address.

(469) The Committee investigated the possibility of a connection between Oswald and 544 Camp Street with ~~quite~~ different results.

(471) The Committee learned ^{from} ~~in~~ its research that the Newman building occupied the corner lot facing Lafayette²² Square. On one side its address was 544 Camp Street.²³ Its other entrance was addressed 531 Lafayette Street. It was a three-story granite structure owned and operated by Sam Newman as a rental income property for commercial²⁴ offices.

(470) The Committee interviewed Sam Newman and other witnesses to obtain a complete list of the occupants of the building for the period from May, 1963, when Oswald arrived in New Orleans, to September, 1963, when he departed.

(472) Newman told the Committee he had great difficulty²⁵ renting space in the building. Consequently, there were few tenants^{there} in the summer of 1963. The Camp Street address was the main entrance to offices for two worker's associations: the Hotel, Motel and Restaurant Worker's Union and the Amalgamated Association of Street Electric Railway and²⁶ Motor Coach Employees of America. It was also the entrance which led to the quarters of the the building's janitor,²⁷ James Arthus. There was only one office at the Lafayette

544 Camp
page 4

Street address, that of Guy Banister Associates, a private
investigative firm.²⁸ The offices once rented by the
Cuban Revolutionary Council at 544 Camp still lay empty.²⁹

"Mancuso's", a small coffee shop, was located on the ground
floor with its own entrance onto the corner of Camp and
Lafayette streets.³⁰

(473) The Committee located and interviewed individuals associated
with these organizations. Whenever possible, the Committee
obtained relevant records from the organizations to check
for any link to Oswald or persons implicated in the
assassination investigation. The Committee investigation
produced no evidence of any connection between Oswald
and any person or organizations occupying the Newman Building
in 1963, except for that involving Guy Banister's private
detective agency.

(474) Before ~~launching into~~ a discussion of the investigation
of the Banister office, ~~below follows a brief summary of~~ ^{this material sets forth} the results
of the investigation into the other occupants of 544 Camp
Street.

(475) The Hotel, Motel and Restaurant Employees Union is
known today as the Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartender's
Union (International).³¹ Although the Committee was unable
to locate personnel who had worked in the office at 544 Camp
Street and had been interviewed by the Secret Service
following the assassination, the Committee did obtain a "master"
membership list from the union.³² The lists contained names of members for th
years 1962 through 1964 ~~and~~ ^{which} were studied for names of associates

544 Camp Street
page 5

of Oswald or others of interest in the investigation.
Among the names appearing on the list as a member from
October 30, 1962, "through April 1963" was Kerry Thornley,
who had been an acquaintance of Oswald's for "three or
four months" when both were stationed at the El Toro Marine
Corps base in Santa Ana, California. Later, Thornley
learned from newspaper accounts of Oswald's defection
to the Soviet Union. Thornley found the story so interesting
that he set out to write a novel based on Oswald's defection.

(476) Nevertheless, the Committee's investigation of Kerry
Thornley uncovered nothing of significance in the appearance
of Thornley's name on the list of members of the union.
As reflected in the union's records, Thornley dropped his
membership after April 1963. Thornley had left New Orleans
to travel to California and Mexico and did not return to
New Orleans until August 1963, leaving little overlap of
time in which Oswald and Thornley could have possibly come
in contact.

(477) ~~In testimony before the Committee~~ Thornley has firmly denied
contact with Oswald at 544 Camp Street in New Orleans or
at any time since his Marine Corps days. His statements
have been ~~found to be corroborated~~ ^{CORROBORATED} and no evidence
has been found to contradict him.

(478) ^{The} Committee investigators located and interviewed George
S. Gay, present president of the Amalgamated Association of
Street Electric Railway and Motor Employees of America. Gay

544 Camp Street
page 6

has been president of the union since 1960⁴¹ and confirmed for the Committee that the union's office was located in the Newman Building in 1963.⁴² While Gay reiterated what he had told Secret Service agents, that he did not recall ever⁴³ seeing Oswald in the building, he told the Committee he was not in the office very much due to frequent business trips.⁴⁴ He said he did not mingle with the other tenants⁴⁵ in the building. Gay believed the union's secretary at the time, Mrs. Eugenia Donnelly, would have more information⁴⁶ about others in the Newman Building. Subsequent attempts to locate Donnelly proved futile and she is believed to be deceased.⁴⁷ Unfortunately, she was not questioned by investigating officials following the assassination of President Kennedy.

(479) Jack Mancuso, owner of Mancuso's Coffee Shop located on the ground floor of the Newman Building, was interviewed⁴⁸ by Committee investigators and questioned about his customers. Mancuso recalled that Guy Banister and his associates Jack Martin and David Ferrie were "steady" customers, but Mancuso could not^{personally} recall ever having seen Oswald.⁴⁹ Mancuso was not interviewed by FBI or Secret Service agents following the⁵⁰ assassination.

(480) James Arthus was interviewed by Secret Service agents⁵¹ immediately following the assassination. He told the agents that an unknown man had attempted to rent an office⁵² at 544 Camp Street, but that he had discouraged him. Arthus could not describe the man and recommended the agents

544 Camp Street
page 7

53
speak with "Mrs. Downing", presumed to be Mrs. Donnelly, since she had also seen the man and could possibly provide a description of him. As pointed out above, Mrs. Donnelly was not interviewed by either the Secret Service of the FBI on this matter. Arthus could not be interviewed by the 54 Committee because he died in 1967.

(481) The FBI and the Secret Service apparently failed to question all the occupants of 544 Camp Street, including a witness who may have had information about a man who had attempted to rent space there. While the FBI did speak to Guy Banister, there is no indication from the report of that interview that Banister was asked any questions about Oswald. Instead, he was asked about 55 Sergio Arcacha Smith and the Cuban Revolutionary Council.

(482) The overall investigation of the 544 Camp Street issue at the time of the assassination was not thorough. It is not surprising, then, that significant links were never discovered during the original investigation. The Committee concentrated on an investigation of the activities and individuals in and around the office of Guy Banister, since this was the area of the least investigation in the days following the assassination. Various resources were ^{consulted} ~~tapped~~ by the Committee for information regarding ~~the~~ Banister and his colleagues. ^{These included:} ~~the~~ original documents from Banister's office collected during the 1967-69 investigation into the Kennedy assassination by the New Orleans District Attorney; investigative reports ~~of~~ of

544 Camp Street
page 8

the District Attorney's office dating from that investigation; materials amassed during the 1961-63 investigation of David Ferrie by Federal Aviation Administration officials including transcripts of Ferrie's grievance hearings; information obtained from Aaron Kohn of the Metropolitan Crime Commission of New Orleans; and information obtained from reviews of relevant files of the FBI, Secret Service, DOD and CIA. In addition, the Committee ~~staff~~ interviewed ^{several} ~~many~~ surviving witnesses, many of whom had worked for or with Guy Banister.

(483) According to one of Banister's own biographical sketches dated March 1964, he was born in a log cabin in rural Louisiana in 1901, the eldest of seven children. ⁵⁶ He started his career in criminal justice with the ^{police department of} Monroe, Louisiana, ~~police department~~. ⁽⁵⁷⁾ In 1934 he became a Special Agent for the agency of the Department of Justice ^{that} ~~which~~. ⁵⁸ was soon to be named the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Banister served in the FBI for 20 years, 17 of those years ⁵⁹ as Special Agent in Charge. He retired in 1954 to become an assistant superintendent for the New Orleans police department and was assigned the task of investigating ⁶⁰ police corruption. After a falling out with the Mayor of New Orleans, allegedly over Banister's attempt to have the Mayor indicted on charges of "malfeasance, etc.", Banister quit public service and formed his own private

544 Camp Street
page 9

61
detective agency, Guy Banister Associates, Inc.
(444) According to FBI files reviewed by Committee staff,
Banister also became very active in anti-Communist
activities after his separation from the FBI and
testified before various investigatin bodies about the
dangers of Communism. 62 The CIA file on Guy Banister
indicates the Agency ~~in September, 1960,~~ considered
utilizing Guy Banister Associates [as a cover mechanism]
for collecting foreign intelligence. 63
The idea was
dropped when "derogatory" data about Banister was
discovered during the Agency's security investigation
into Banister's background the files indicate there
was some concern over Banister's clash with the Mayor. 64
Early in 1961, Banister helped draw up a charter for
the Friends of Democratic Cuba, an organization set up
as the fund-raising arm of Sergio Arcacha Smith's branch
of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. 65
~~on the basis of the report~~ (See Staff Report
~~on the basis of the report~~)
Banister described his work for the Council:

"Our work was primarily to gather food and
clothing for the refugees. However because
of my being known in connection with that, / and /
my background being known with Arcacha Smtih
and others, I have had high-ranking Cuban
refugees in my office asking me how to go
underground, and I gave them diagrams for that.
I have talked to military and political leaders
from the various provinces of Cuba that have
slipped out and slipped back." 66

(445) The FBI files also indicate Banister was ^{REV} forming
another service for the Cuban exile group. He ran
background investigations of those Cuban students on the

544 Camp Street
page 10

campus of Louisiana State University who wished to be members of Arcacha Smtih's anti-Castro group, ferreting out any pro-Castro sympathizers who might be among them. ^{67 Banister also talked Sam Newman into leasing the 544 Camp Street office to the Cuban Revolutionary Council.}
(486) It was probably a result of such anti-Castro activities ⁶⁸ that Banister became acquainted with David Ferrie. Ferrie, an Eastern Airlines pilot, was also very active with Sergio Arcacha Smith's anti-Castro group. ^{68 69} Ferrie shared Banister's anti-Communist and anti-Castro fervor. ^{69 70}

(487) Both Ferrie and Banister were implicated in a raid in late 1961 against a munitions depot in Houma, Louisiana, in which ^{70 71} various weapons, grenades and ammunition were stolen.

Banister's role may have been limited to storing the materièl which was reportedly seen stacked in Banister's ^{71 72} back room by several witnesses. Others who actually participated in the raid, include Andrew Blackmon, a Ferrie associate and former Civil Air Patrol cadet, and Sergio ^{72 73} Arcacha Smtih.

(488) In February 1962, Ferrie ^{requested} ~~came to ask~~ Banister's assistance ^{73 74} in fighting his recent dismissal from Eastern Airlines.

Banister investigated the case for Ferrie's defense to charges brought by the airline and local New Orleans police ^{74 75} of crimes against nature and extortion. In exchange, Ferrie provided Banister research services, such as analysis ^{75 76} of autopsy reports. Banister worked with Ferrie's lawyer, G. Wray Gill, on this matter until its culmination in Ferrie's hearing before the Airline Pilot's grievance board in the ^{76 77} summer of 1963. Banister testified on Ferrie's behalf

544 Camp Street
page 11

78
77 during those hearings. According to ^{he} statements of witnesses in the fall of 1963, Ferrie and Banister worked together again with G. Wray Gill for the defense of New Orleans organized crime head Carlos Marcello on a deportation case. 79
78 Little is known of Banister's exact contribution to that investigation which ended in acquittal on the very day 80
79 and almost the very hour that President Kennedy was shot.

(487) The long-standing relationship of Ferrie and Banister is significant since Ferrie became a suspect in the Kennedy assassination soon after it had occurred. 80
81 The information to the District Attorney's office that had put the spotlight 82
81 on Ferrie had emanated from Banister associate, Jack Martin. As detailed elsewhere in the report, although Ferrie was cleared of suspicion in the assassination during the original investigation, the Committee found persuasive evidence of an association between Ferrie and Oswald.

(490) Although Banister was questioned by the FBI following the assassination in regard to the activities of the CRC at 544 Camp Street, the FBI and the Secret Service failed to discover the significance of Banister's connection to 544 Camp Street; ~~by virtue of the building there being the location for his office~~ Banister's close association with a suspect in the assassination, David Ferrie; and Banister's close association with Ferrie's accuser, Jack Martin -- all of which begged the question of what, if anything, was Banister's relationship to Lee Harvey Oswald.

(491) Witnesses interviewed by the Committee indicate

544 Camp Street
page 12

Banister was aware of Oswald and his Fair Play for Cuba Committee before the assassination. Banister's brother, Ross Banister, who is employed by the Louisiana State Police, told the Committee that his brother had mentioned seeing Oswald hand out Fair Play for Cuba literature on one occasion.⁸³ Ross Banister theorized Oswald had used the 544 Camp Street address on his literature to embarrass Guy.⁸⁴ Ross Banister did confirm Guy's interest in the assassination and Oswald, but knew of no direct association between Oswald and Banister.⁸⁴

(492) Ivan E. "Bill" Nitschke, a friend and business associate and former FBI agent,⁸⁵ corroborates that Banister was cognizant of Oswald's leaflets distributing. Nitschke was deposed by the Committee in July 1978.⁸⁵ He testified that he had known Banister when they were both in the FBI and for a short time worked for Banister in the office in the Newman Building.⁸⁷

(493) Nitschke said he never saw Lee Harvey Oswald at 544 Camp Street and does not know if Banister ever met Oswald.⁸⁸ ~~However,~~ Nitschke recalls that Banister became "interested in Oswald" during the summer of 1963 when Oswald had been distributing handbills.⁸⁹ Nitschke recalls Banister had some of these handbills in his office or made reference to them.⁹⁰ From the context of the conversation, however, he was not pleased.⁹¹

(494) Delphine Roberts, Banister's long-time friend and secretary, stated to the Committee that Banister had gotten

544 Camp Street
page 13

very angry with James Arthus and Sam Newman over Oswald's use of the 544 Camp Street address on his handbills. ⁹²

(495) The Committee questioned Sam Newman regarding Roberts' allegation. Newman could not recall ever seeing Oswald or renting space to him. ⁹³ He did recall, however, asking a young man who was in the office once used by the Cuban Revolutionary Council to leave. ⁹⁴ Newman did not think this person was Oswald. ⁹⁵ Newman theorized that if Oswald was using the 544 Camp Street address and had any link to the building, it would have been through a connection to the Cuban Revolutionary Council or Banister's office. ⁹⁶

(496) The Committee questioned other individuals once affiliated with Guy Banister, including: Joseph Newbrough, ⁹⁷ Vernon ~~Gerdes~~ ⁹⁷ an investigator who had worked with Banister in 1963; Mary Helen Brengel, one of two secretaries in Banister's office from approximately June 1963 to December 1963; ⁹⁸ Louise Decker, a secretary in Banister's office for the period from October 1961 to January 1962; ⁹⁹ Joseph Oster, one time partner of Banister's who set up his own private detective ¹⁰⁰ agency, Southern Research, in 1958; and Carlos Quiroga, the Cuban exile who visited Oswald at his home on approximately August 16, 1963, endeavoring to learn more about the FPCC. ¹⁰¹ Quiroga told the Committee he frequently visited Banister's office and Mancuso's coffee shop in the company of Sergio Arcacha Smith and David Ferrie when all were heavily involved in Cuban exile activities. ¹⁰² However, this would have been in 1961 and 1962. ¹⁰³ None of these

544 Camp Street
page 14

individuals recalled seeing Oswald at 544 Camp Street. Several witnesses recommended the Committee speak with Jack Martin or Delphine Roberts since they¹⁰⁴ were in most contact with Banister.⁴

(497) Martin and Roberts have both been interviewed by the Committee on several occasions. Roberts, who initially refused to speak with the Committee staff, told the Committee she was very active in anti-Communist activities in the early 1960's.¹⁰⁵ She said she worked with Banister as a volunteer typing correspondence, making files and clipping newspapers because Banister was working for what Roberts believed in.¹⁰⁶ Roberts claimed Banister had an extensive file on Communists and fellow travelers, including one on Lee Harvey Oswald, which was kept out of the original files because Banister "never got around to assigning a number to it."¹⁰⁷ Roberts does not remember what was in the file other than that it contained general information on Oswald such as newspaper clippings.¹⁰⁸ Roberts also related the incident described previously in this section in which Banister became angry over Oswald's use of the Camp Street address.¹⁰⁹ Roberts ~~supplied~~ ^{gave the Committee} her version of an incident that took place late in the evening on the day of the assassination. She said Jack Martin came into the office and approached the area of the office where the files were kept, when Banister walked in.¹¹⁰ Banister accused Martin of stealing several files and hiding them in his coat.¹¹¹ When Martin protested, Banister pulled out his gun and

544 Camp Street
page 15

112
110
struck Martin on the head, causing him to bleed. Both
men then went into Banister's private office and continued
111, 113
their discussion beyond Roberts' earshot.

(498) During another interview, Roberts told the Committee
that Oswald came into the office seeking employment and
sometime later brought Marina in with him. Contrary to her
statements in the initial interview, that she had never seen
Oswald, she stated that she saw Oswald come in to Banister's
office on several occasions. 115
Because of such contradictions
in Roberts statements to the Committee and lack of independent
corroboration of many of her statements, the Committee
~~cannot attest to the~~ reliability of her statements. *can not be determined*

(499) A New Orleans Police Complaint filed by Jack Martin
on November 22, 1963 corroborates Roberts' story insofar
as it established Banister's assault against Jack
Martin with the pistol. 114, 116
According to the report, Martin
and Banister had been drinking at a bar neighboring the
Newman Building, then visited the Banister's office and
became involved in various discussions about "personal and
political subjects." 115, 117
They then began to argue about
unauthorized long-distance telephone calls which Banister
accused Martin of making from the office. 116, 118
The discussion
became more heated and Banister pulled out a .357 magnum revolver
and hit Martin on the head four or five times with the
butt of the gun. 117, 119
When Martin began to bleed, Banister
stopped hitting him and Martin went to the restroom to
clean up. 120, 119
Banister told Martin to watch himself and be

544 Camp Street
page 16

~~119~~ ¹²¹
careful. Martin then went to Charity Hospital for treatment. ¹²⁰
He returned home and called the police to file the report.
Martin refused to press charges as Banister was "like a
~~119~~ ¹²³
father" to him.

(500) Martin was questioned by the Committee regarding the incident and for information about Banister's office.

Martin told the Committee he is a part-time investigator ^{122 124}
and writer, as he was in the early 1960's. Martin was
one of the members of Banister's investigative "pool" ^{123 125}
and was frequently in and out of Banister's office. Martin
told the Committee that on November 22, 1963, he was having
drinks with Banister at a local bar and they got into an argument. ^{126 127}
They went to Banister's office and, in the heat of the quarrel,
Banister said something to which Martin replied, "What are
you going to do -- kill me like you all did Kennedy?" ^{125 127}
Banister drew his pistol and beat Martin in the head. ^{126 128}
Martin believes Banister would have killed him but for the intervention
of Banister's secretary, who pleaded with Banister not
to shoot Martin. ^{127 129}

(501) It was the day after this incident that Martin related
his suspicions about David Ferrie to the New Orleans
District Attorney's office. ^{128 130}
Martin had at one time been ^{129 131}
a close associate of Ferrie. Ferrie told the FBI he met
Martin in the fall of 1961, probably not long after Ferrie
had met Banister. ^{130 132}
Martin apparently shared Ferrie's
interest in obtaining a position with an ecclesiastical
order, although Ferrie insisted he became involved with

544 Camp Street
page 17

these religious orders only to assist Martin in an ^{Department of Health, Education and Welfare} investigation into the sale of phony certificates ^{131 133} of ordination and consecration. Ferrie said he and Martin had a falling out when he put Martin out of attorney G. Wray Gill's office in June, 1963, because Gill did ^{132 134} not want Martin "hanging around the office." Gill said Ferrie and Martin had been "close friends" until they got involved in an "ecclesiastical deal wherein Martin was supposed to represent a large territory of the Holy Apostolic Catholic Church of North America." ^{133 135} Martin held Ferrie responsible for not getting the job and has "slandered ^{134 136} Ferrie at every opportunity."

(502) Martin has ¹³⁷ told the Committee he saw Lee Harvey Oswald ^{135 135} with Ferrie in Guy Banister's office in 1963. ^{Nevertheless} In light of Martin's previous statements to authorities shortly after the assassination in which Martin made no such allegation about having seen Oswald, ^{136 138} ~~the Committee cannot place any credence in Martin's statements to the Committee.~~ ^{Contradictory} ~~it may be argued that~~ ^{should not be placed}

(503) The Committee sought to trace Banister's office files that had been reportedly scattered to various individuals or agencies soon after Banister's death in June 1964.

(504) Mary Braister Wilson, Guy Braister's widow, told the Committee she had not retained any of the files but had given many away to various ^{organizations} ~~state agencies~~. ^{137 139} Mrs. Wilson said she sold some of Banister's files ~~for \$500~~ to the Louisiana State Police in a transaction involving Russell Willie and ~~Joseph Cambre~~ ¹⁴⁰ of the State Police. She said

544 Camp Street
page 18

another portion of the file was given to Aaron Kohn of the
New Orleans Metropolitan Crime Commission. ^{14/199 the Committee learned} Several books
from Banister's collection went to Banister's associate,
Kent Courtney. ¹⁴⁰¹⁴² The rest of Banister's "extensive" library
of books was donated to the Louisiana State University
Library. ¹⁴¹¹⁴³

(505) Russell Willie and Joseph Cambre of the Louisiana
State police confirmed for the Committee that they purchased
from Mary Banister in late 1964 a five-drawer file
cabinet containing file folders belonging to the late Guy
Banister. ¹⁴²¹⁴⁴ The "half-filled" file cabinet contained ~~ten~~
large manila folders, each subject titled and numbered. ¹⁴³¹⁴⁵
One of the folders contained a group of 3" by 5" index
cards. ¹⁴⁴¹⁴⁶ The index cards contained numbers and subject
headings corresponding to the file folders in the cabinet. ¹⁴⁵¹⁴⁷
Not all the files listed in the index were among those files
given to the Louisiana State Police; most of the files obtained
by the State Police dealt with Communist groups and subversive
organizations, according to State Police Officer Cambre. ¹⁴⁶¹⁴⁸
Cambre recalled that although Lee Harvey Oswald's name
was not included among the main subjects of the files, Oswald's
name was ~~not~~ included among the main subjects of the file
on the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. ¹⁴⁷¹⁴⁹ Cambre had read the
FPCC file and found news clippings and a transcript of a
radio program ^{in which} Oswald ~~was on~~ ^{had participated}, presumably a transcript of the
August 21, 1963 debate between Oswald and Carlos Bringuier
on WDSU radio. ¹⁴⁸¹⁵⁰ Unfortunately, this file was routinely

destroyed in keeping with the requirements of the Privacy
~~149-151~~
Act.

(506) Aaron Kohn, Managing Director of the New Orleans
Metropolitan Crime Commission, acknowledged that he
received files from Mary Banister Wilson after Guy Banister's
~~150-152~~
death. The files received by Kohn dealt with an
investigation of corruption within the New Orleans Police
Department, which Banister had conducted while he was
Assistant Superintendent of Police in New Orleans in the
~~151-153~~
mid-1950's.

(57) While the Committee was unable to trace or recover
all of Banister's files, a partial index of the files was
made available by Jim Garrison, former District Attorney
of Orleans Parish, Louisiana. ~~152-154~~
Garrison had sent investigators
to the Louisiana State Police Intelligence Section in 1967
during his investigation into the assassination of President
~~153-155~~
Kennedy. The index did not include the name of Lee Harvey
~~154-156~~
Oswald or the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

(508) Thus, the Committee could find no documentary
proof that Banister had a file on Lee Harvey Oswald
nor could the Committee find credible witnesses who
ever saw Lee Harvey Oswald and Guy Banister together.
There are indications, however, that Banister at least
knew of Oswald's leafletting activities and probably
maintained a file on him. As for Jack Martin's reasons for
calling attention to Ferrie as a suspect in the assassination,
they may not have been based on personal knowledge -- Martin
never claimed such information -- but his action seems to
have been based on sincere concerns and some legitimate
suspicions. ~~The Committee was unable to definitively~~
Consequently, it is not possible
determine the reasons for Banister's assault on Martin
the night of the assassination, *specifically* ~~such as~~ whether it had
anything to do with Martin's suspicions of Ferrie.

IMPLICATIONS

(509) The primary import of the 544 Camp Street address must be analyzed within the context of evidence of a Ferrie-Oswald link. Unfortunately, the precise nature of ~~such~~ their relationship may never be known. Ferrie could have become familiar with Oswald and his background, habits and motivating factors, and groomed Oswald for use in clandestine activity, perhaps initially along the model of private investigator. ^{Q (510)} As can be seen by the Committee investigation into Ferrie's associations and activities throughout his life and especially during the summer of 1963, there are several factors which explain why Ferrie and Oswald could have become closely associated, as improbable as this may seem:

(511) A) Both men spent considerable time in the same locale: Ferrie frequently visited the office of Guy Banister in the building at 544 Camp Street; Oswald worked only one block away and had used 544 Camp Street as the address of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Additionally, the testimony of ^{another witness from} ~~the "Clinton Witnesses"~~ placing Oswald and Ferrie together in early September, 1963, ^{maybe} ~~is~~ credible.

~~(See the Anti-Castro Conspiracy Section of the Final Report).~~

Evidence also exists to support the belief that Ferrie's closest colleague, Guy Banister, was knowledgeable of Oswald's pro-Castro leafletting. ^{in his report} (See Section on Banister ~~---~~ ~~544 Camp Street~~)

(512) B) Both men had similar, fervent interest in political topics, especially the Cuban question. Although Ferrie stood firmly on the anti-Castro side of the issue and

102
(513)

Strangely, although Ferrie seemed to be straightforward during his interviews with FBI agents in discussing his opposition to Kennedy, his conflict with Jack Martin, his involvement in the Marcello case, etc., Ferrie denied outright that he had ever known "of the Cuban Revolutionary Front maintaining an office at 544 Camp Street, nor does he have any knowledge of Sergio Arcacha Smith maintaining an office at that address during the time he was head of the organization and later after he was replaced." 57 This is clearly in contradiction to the accounts of the witnesses on this subject.

Oswald was involved in pro-Castro activities, this alone would not rule out the possibility of an Oswald-Ferrie association. Oswald, on at least one occasion, made a friendly overture to a known anti-Castro activist, Carlos Bringuier, the New Orleans delegate to the Student Revolutionary Directorate (DRE) and even offered Bringuier assistance in military training of Cuban exiles. The Oswald-Ferrie association may have begun in the same manner.

(514) ~~g~~ Significant to the argument that Oswald and Ferrie were associated in 1963 is evidence of prior association in 1955 when Ferrie was Captain of a Civil Air Patrol squadron and Oswald a young cadet. ~~(See Section on the Staff Sergeant in Charge of Crime Civil Air Patrol)~~ This pupil-teacher relationship could have greatly facilitated their reacquaintance and Ferrie's noted ability to influence others could have been utilized with Oswald.

(515) ~~d~~ Ferrie's experience with the underground activities of the Cuban exile movement and as a private investigator for Carlos Marcello and Guy Banister might have made him a good candidate to participate in a conspiracy plot. He may not have been knowledgeable of what was to be the outcome of his actions, but once the assassination had been successfully completed and his own name cleared, Ferrie would have had no reason to reveal his knowledge of the plot. Further, fear for his life may have prevented him from doing so.

(516) While great gaps exist in discovering whether Ferrie

had any contact with Oswald after Oswald left New Orleans on September 24, 1963 until the day of the assassination only two months later, the Oswald-Ferrie relationship is the most significant of the Oswald associations in theorizing an assassination conspiracy. ~~See Section~~
of report ~~of~~ ~~Organized Crime~~

ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN CONSPIRACY?

Footnotes

1. "The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies," Book V, Final Report, ~~the~~ Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities, ~~94th Congress, Report No. 94-755, 2nd Session,~~ 4/23/76, Washington, DC.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, p. 4. (Cerak Report 94-755).
2. Memorandum of William T. Coleman Jr. and W. David Slawson to Warren Commission, pp. 110-111, (JFK Document No. 013105).
3. "The Longest Night," Miami Herald, Tropic, 12/28/75, p. 7.
4. Ibid.
5. Haynes Johnson, The Bay of Pigs. Norton, 1964. p. 17.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 18.
8. "U.S. Seizes Batista Backer in Miami," New York Times, 4/9/61, p. 4.
See footnote #5
9. ~~Haynes Johnson, op. cit.~~, p. 23.
10. Paul Bethel, The Losers. Arlington House, 1969, p. 102.
11. "A Selected Chronology on Cuba and Castro," March 10, 1952 - October 22, 1962, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, p. 6. (JFK Document No. 013100)
12. Ibid.
13. Mario Lazo, Dagger In the Heart, Funk & Wagnalls, 1968, p. 186.
14. Ibid.
See footnote #11,
15. "A Selected Chronology on Cuba and Castro," ~~pp. 7.~~ p. 7.
16. Ibid.
See footnote #5
17. ~~Haynes Johnson, op. cit.~~, p. 23.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.

2. footnotes - Anti-Castro

20. Ibid, p. 24.
21. Ibid.
22. ^{see footnote #11,} "A Selected Chronology on Cuba and Castro," ~~op. cit.~~ ^{1/26/60, 4/28/60} p. 9.
23. Ibid.
24. ^{see footnote #5,} ~~Haynes Johnson, op. cit.~~ p. 18.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid, p. 28.
27. Ibid, p. 19.
28. Ibid.
29. "U.S.-Cuba Relations, 1959-1964: An Analysis," Congressional Research Service, (JFK Document No. 011478)
30. ^{see footnote #5} ~~Haynes Johnson, op. cit.~~ pp. 23-31.
31. Ibid, p. 27.
32. Ibid, p. 76.
33. Ibid, p. 222.
34. ^{see footnote #11,} "A Selected Chronology on Cuba and Castro," ~~op. cit.~~ ^{4/18/61, p.26.}
of Manuel Antonio de Verona
35. Executive Session Testimony, 3/16/78, ^{Hearings Before the House Select} p. 23. Committee on ASSASSINATION!
36. ^{see footnote #11,} "A Selected Chronology on Cuba and Castro," ~~op. cit.~~ ^{4/24/61, p.29.}
37. ^{see footnote #5,} Haynes Johnson, ~~op. cit.~~ p. 213.
38. ^{see footnote #13} ~~Mario Lazo, op. cit.~~
39. Ibid, p. 299.
40. Taylor Branch and George Crile III, "The Kennedy Vendetta," Harper's, 8/75, p.49.
41. ^{see footnote #29,} "U.S.-Cuba Relations," ~~op. cit.~~ p. 39.
42. Ibid, p. 40.
43. Ibid, p. 41.
44. Ibid.

3. footnotes - Anti-Castro

45. Ibid, p. 42.
46. ^{See footnote #1,} The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy Book V, ~~op. cit.~~ p. 11, footnote 4.
47. Ibid, p. 99.
48. Ibid; See Also: "Our Heritage--The Exile Cuban Terrorists," Washington Post, 11/7/76, p. C3.
49. ^{See footnote #40,} Branch and Crile, ~~op. cit.~~ p. 49.
50. Andrew St. George, "The Cold War Comes Home," Harper's, 11/73, p. 70.
51. "How the CIA Operated in Dade," Miami Herald, 3/9/75, p. 1.
52. Ibid.
53. ^{See footnote #40,} Branch and Crile, ~~op. cit.~~ p. 51.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. ^{See footnote #51,} "How the CIA Operated in Dade," ~~op. cit.~~ p. 1.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid. See also, ~~2000~~ staff memorandum of interview of Ross, 1/16/78, (JFK Document No. 004721) ✓
59. ^{See footnote #40} Branch and Crile, ~~House Select Committee on Assassinations~~ pp. 52, 56.
60. Ibid, p. 58.
61. Ibid, p. 62.
62. ^{See footnote #29} "U.S.-Cuba Relations," ~~op. cit.~~ p. 48.
63. Ibid, p. 49.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid, p. 53.
66. Ibid, p. 54.
67. ^{See footnote #13,} ~~Mario Lazo, op. cit.~~ p. 364.
68. Ibid, p. 378.

4. footnotes - Anti-Castro

69. "A Selected Chronology on Cuba, April 1, 1963 - April 30, 1963." Legislative Reference Service, p. 1, (JFK Document No. 013101)
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid., p. 2.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid., p. 4.
75. "U.S. Nabs Anti-Castro Fighters," Miami Herald, 12/5/62, p. 21A.
76. New Orleans Times-Picayune, 8/1/63, p. 1.
77. "U.S.-Cuba Relations, 1960-1963: Neutrality Enforcement and the Cuban Exiles During The Kennedy Administration," Congressional Research Service, p. 12, (JFK Document No. 013099)
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
See footnote # 69,
81. "A Selected Chronology on Cuba," ~~000000~~ 4/6/63, p. 4.
82. Ibid., 4/7/63, p. 5.
83. Ibid., 4/20/63, p. 18.
84. Ibid., 4/10/63, p. 7.
85. Ibid., 4/15/63, p. 10.
86. Ibid., 4/18/63, p. 12.
87. Ibid., 4/15/63, p. 10.
See footnote # 69,
88. "A Selected Chronology on Cuba," ~~000000~~ 10/10/62, p. 24.
See footnote # 77,
89. "U.S.-Cuba Relations, 1960-1963," ~~000000~~ p. 8.
- ~~90. "A Selected Chronology on Cuba," op--cit.~~
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.

3. 5. footnotes - Anti-Castro

See footnote #69,

92. ^ "A Selected Chronology on Cuba," ~~pp. 61-71~~ 4/26/63, p. 24.
93. Ibid., 5/21/63, p. 10.
94. Ibid., 6/12/63, p. 5.
95. ^ ~~See footnote #77~~ "U.S.-Cuba Relations, 1960-1963, Neutrality Enforcement," ~~pp. 9-29~~ p. 9.
96. ^ ~~See footnote #29~~ "U.S.-Cuba Relations, 1959-1964: An Analysis," ~~pp. 61-71~~ p. 69.
97. Ibid. p. 71.
98. CIA/DDO, Ray Volume XVI, Memo to Director [from Chief/WH Division, 7/9/64. Subject: Chronology of Concept of Autonymous Operations Summary of Financial Support to Manuel Artime.]
99. ^ ~~See footnote #69~~ "A Selected Chronology on Cuba," ~~pp. 61-71~~ 4/19/63, p. 16.
100. Paris Flammonde, "Why President Kennedy Was Killed." p. 69, (JFK Document No. 013106.)
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid., ~~and~~ Associate Press dispatch, 5/10/63.
103. ^ ~~See footnote #5,~~ Haynes Johnson, ~~pp. 75-76~~ pp. 75-76. (In a footnote in later editions, Johnson notes that after initial publication of his book "the CIA let it be known that Frank Bender denied -- in writing -- making such statements.")
104. ^ ~~See footnote #1~~ The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy, Book V, ~~pp. 14-15~~ p. 14.
105. "Our Heritage-The Exile Cuban Terrorists," Washington Post, 11/7/76, p. C3.

Footnotes - Odio

1. Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy -- herein after, Warren Report -- 1964, pp. 322-324.
2. Ibid.
3. FBI report LA 105-15823, 9/23/64, Warren Commission Document 1553, p. 4.
4. FBI report DL 100-10461, 9/10/64, pp. 2,3, Warren Commission Exhibit 3147.
5. Ibid. *Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office (1964), p. 333 (hereinafter the Warren Report).*
6. ~~Warren Report, p. 333.~~ OFFICE (1964), p. 333 (hereinafter the Warren Report).
7. Commission Exhibit 2134; Commission Exhibit 2962.
8. Commission Exhibit 3045.
9. Warren Report, p. 730.
10. Commission Exhibit 3045.
11. Warren Report, p. 324.
12. FBI report PX 105-1529, 9/18/64, Commission Document 1553.
13. FBI memorandum, Miami 9/26/64, Commission Document 1553.
14. FBI report LA 105-1582, 9/20/64, Commission Document 1553.
15. Ibid., p. 8.
16. FBI memorandum, Miami, 10/2/64, Commission Document 1553.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Warren Report, p. 324.
22. "U.S. Nabs Anti-Castro Fighters," Miami Herald, 12/5/62, p. 21

2. footnotes Odio

23. Ibid.
24. "A Selected Chronology on Cuba," Congressional Research Service, p. 54, (JFK Document No.)
25. Statement of the chairman of the Committee for the Monroe Doctrine, "A Selected Chronology on Cuba," ~~_____~~ p. 4.
26. ~~Immunized Testimony of Logan Hall, 10/5/77, Hearings Before the House select Committee on Assassinations, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979, pp. 50-54~~ House Select Committee on Assassinations, 5/23/78, ~~_____~~ pp. 5, (JFK Document No. 008962)
27. ~~_____~~ 5/23/78, ~~_____~~ pp. 5, (JFK Document No. 008962)
28. ~~_____~~ 11/8/77, ~~_____~~ pp. 1-3, (JFK Document No. 003537)
29. ~~_____~~ memorandum, 1/8/76, ~~_____~~ (JFK Document No. 013336)
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. "Exiles Fear Parents Shot By Cuban Red Firing Squad, Dallas News, 5/5/62, p. 1.
33. ~~Interview of _____~~ ^{Amador} ~~_____~~ 4/30/76, ~~_____~~ p. 1, (JFK Document No. 013337)
34. ~~Interview of Silvia Odio by Gaetano Fonzi~~ ~~_____~~ 1/16/76, p. 4, (JFK Document No. 013339)
35. ^ Dallas News 5/5/62, ~~_____~~.
36. ^ Fonzi interview 4/30/76, ~~_____~~.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid. ^{Amador} ~~_____~~ Odio.
39. ~~_____~~ 9/5/77, ~~_____~~ (JFK Document No. 013334)
40. Ibid.
41. ^ Fonzi interview, 4/30/76, ~~_____~~
42. Ibid.
43. See section of report dealing with alleged relationship with Maurice Bishop and Lee Harvey Oswald.
44. ~~_____~~ ^{Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, (1964)} Vol. XI, p. 370 (Hereinafter the Warren Commission Hearings)
45. Ibid.
46. FBI report NO 100-16601, 9/21/64, Warren Commission Document 1553.

3.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. ^{See footnote # 32,} Dallas News, 5/5/62, [REDACTED].

50. ^{Memorandum re Staff Interview of Lucille} [REDACTED] Connell, [REDACTED], 4/5/76, ^{House Select Committee on Assassinations,} (JFK Document No. 013342).

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Deposition of Silvia Odio, 5/2/78, ^{See footnote 50, memorandum re Staff Interview of Lucille} p. 6, (JFK Document No. 009088).

56. Ibid, p. 6; also ^{See footnote # 55,} [REDACTED] Connell; [REDACTED] and FBI report DL 44-1639, 11/29/63, Warren Commission Document 205, p. 641, (JFK Document No. 000200).

57. ^{See footnote # 55,} Odio deposition, [REDACTED] p. 8.

58. ^{See footnote # 54,} ^{OF Silvia Odio} [REDACTED] Interview, 1/16/76 [REDACTED] p. 1.

59. ^{House Select Committee on Assassinations,} Affidavit of [REDACTED] Annie Odio, 9/20/78, ^{See footnote # 55,} (JFK Document No. 012269).

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid; ^{See also footnote # 55,} [REDACTED] Odio deposition, [REDACTED] pp. 8, 15, 21.

62. Ibid; also ^{Staff} [REDACTED] memorandum and ^{House Select Committee on Assassinations,} photographs, 8/23/78, ^{See footnote # 55,} (JFK Document No. 013335).

63. Ibid.

64. ^{See footnote # 55,} Odio deposition, [REDACTED] p. 8.

65. ^{See footnote # 59,} Affidavit of [REDACTED] Annie Odio, [REDACTED] p. 1.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid, p. 2.

69. Ibid, p. 1.

4.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid., p. 2.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

See footnote #55,

74. ^ Odio deposition, [REDACTED] pp. 9, 14.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid., pp. 11, 12.

77. Ibid., pp. 10, 11.

78. Ibid., p. 10.

79. Ibid., p. 13.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid., p. 16, 37.

See footnote #59, Affidavit

82. [REDACTED] of Annie Odio, [REDACTED] p. 2.

See footnote #55,

83. Odio deposition, [REDACTED] p. 15.

84. Ibid., p. 20.

85. Ibid. p. 33.

See footnote #55

86. Warren Commission Hearings, Vol. XI, p. 370; ^ Odio deposition, [REDACTED] pp. 11, 16, 35.

87. Ibid.

See footnote #55,

88. ^ Odio deposition, [REDACTED] pp. 11, 70.

89. Ibid., p. 70.

90. Ibid., pp. 15, 21, 24.

91. Ibid., p. 60.

92. Warren Report, p. 324.

See footnote #55,

93. Odio deposition, [REDACTED] p. 53.

94. Ibid.

See footnote #59, Affidavit

95. ^ [REDACTED] of Annie Odio, [REDACTED] p. 2.

5.

See footnote #55,

96. Odio deposition, [REDACTED] p. 53.
97. Ibid, p. 12.
98. Ibid, p. 28.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid, p. 30.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid, p. 31.
104. Ibid, p. 32, 50.
105. Warren Report, p. 324.
106. Odio deposition, [REDACTED] p. 44.
See footnote #55,
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid, p. 62.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid, p. 63.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid, p. 64.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid, pp. 65-66.
115. ^{See footnote #59, Affidavit} [REDACTED] of Annie Odio, [REDACTED] pp. 2-4.
116. Ibid, p. 4.
117. Contact Report with Lucille Connell, 5/15/78, (JFK Document No. O/3340).
See also footnote #50, memorandum re [REDACTED] staff interview of Lucille
118. Ibid; [REDACTED] Connell interview, [REDACTED] p. 2.
See also footnote #50, memorandum re [REDACTED] staff interview of Lucille
119. [REDACTED] Connell [REDACTED] p. 2.
120. Ibid.
121. Ibid.

6.

122. Ibid.

123. Ibid.

124. Ibid.

125. Ibid. p. 3.

126. Ibid. Also FBI report DL 44-1639, 11/29/63. N.B.: The Committee is puzzled by and cannot resolve the inconsistency of the substance of this and certain related FBI reports. DL 44-1639 states only that Connell said that Odio told her that she knew Oswald and that he had spoken to groups of refugees in Dallas. Nothing is noted about a visit of three men. Connell told a Committee investigator (Fonzi memorandum, op. cit. p. 3) that she doesn't recall ever telling the FBI that. Neither does the FBI report of the Bureau's initial interview with Odio on 12/19/63 (report DL 100-10461) mention that she had knowledge of Oswald speaking to refugee groups. ~~However,~~ The FBI interview with Connell, ~~however~~ ~~does~~ does not note Connell's report of her conversation with her friend, Mrs. Sanford Pick, regarding Ruby's visiting the law firm where Pick worked. Connell said she is positive she told that to the FBI. The Committee has found that neither Pick nor the attorney who handled Ruby's case at the law firm were questioned by the FBI. (Fonzi memorandum, op. cit. pp. 4-6) But because neither Pick nor the attorney, Graham R.E. Koch, could specifically recall Ruby requesting power of attorney for his sister and because, according to Koch, his firm's records on the case were later routinely destroyed (Fonzi memorandum, op. cit), the Committee was unable to further pursue the possibility.

See footnote #55,

127. ^{See footnote #39, Staff} Odio deposition, p. 43.

128. ^{See footnote #39, Staff} ~~interview,~~ interview, ~~interview,~~ p. 2.

129. Warren Commission Odio Exhibit No. 1, Vol. XX, p.690.

130. Ibid.

131. Contact Report, 5/17/78, (JFK Document No. 013341).

132. Ibid.

133. Ibid.

134. Ibid.

135. Contact Report with Lucille Connell, ~~interview,~~

7.

136. Ibid.

137. Ibid.

See footnote #5
138. [^] Odio deposition, ~~██████████~~ p. 40.

139. Griffin memorandum to Slawson, 5/16/64, (JFK Document No. 002969)

Deposition of Dr. Burton C. Einspruch,
140. ~~██████████ deposition~~, 7/11/78, p. 5, (JFK Document No. 010069).

141. Ibid, p. 5.

See footnote #139,
142. FBI report DL 100-10461, 12/19/63; [^]also Griffin memorandum, ~~██████████~~

143. FBI report DL 100-10461 op. cit.

See footnote #139
144. [^] Griffin memorandum, ~~██████████~~.

145. Ibid.

See footnote #140, Deposition of Dr. Burton C. Einspruch,

146. ~~██████████ deposition~~ ~~██████████~~ p. 4.

147. Ibid, p. 6.

148. Ibid, p. 13.

149. Ibid, p. 9.

150. Ibid, p. 10.

151. Ibid, p. 9.

152. Ibid.

153. Ibid, p. 17.

154. Ibid, pp. 14-15.

See footnote #32
155. Dallas News, 5/5/62, ~~██████████~~

156. Ibid.

See footnote #39, Affidavit of

157. ~~██████████~~ Annie Odio, ~~██████████~~

See footnote #39, Staff

See also footnote #33

158. ~~██████████~~ interview; ~~██████████~~ Fonzi interview, ~~██████████~~
Staff interview

159. ~~██████████~~ re Tomas and Alentado, 8/26/78, JFK Document No. 013338.

→ House Select Committee on Assassinations,

8.

160. Ibid. House Select Committee on
Assassinations,
Staff interview of Mando Ray,
161. ~~Staff interview~~ 6/28/78, (JFK Document No. 013333)
162. Ibid. p. 8.
163. Ibid.
164. Ibid.
165. Ibid.
166. Ibid.
167. Odio deposition, ~~Staff~~ pp. 91-103.
168. ~~Staff~~ memorandum, 8/30/78, (JFK Document No. 013332).
169. Ibid.
170. Ibid.

#

VECIANA FOOTNOTES

Interview of Antonio Veciana Blanch by Gaeton Fonzi,

1. ~~60000 in letter to [unclear]~~ 3/2/76, p. 1, (JFK Document No. 012927).
2. The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, Book V, Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities. 94th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Report No. 94-755.
3. ~~Memorandum to Marston~~ ^{from Gaeton Fonzi,} 3/3/76, (JFK Document No. 012924).
See footnote #1,
4. ~~Fonzi interview notes, 3/2/76, p. 4,~~ (JFK Document No. 012927).
see
5. Ibid, also pp. 1, 2, 5, 6.
6. ~~Executive Session, 4/26/78, pp. 23-27.~~
^{Ibid, p. 7.}
7. Ibid, p. 37.
8. ~~Schweiker letter~~ 12/14/76, (JFK Document No. 000521).
^{Letter from Senator Richard S. Schweiker to House Select Committee on ASSASSINATIONS,}
9. ~~Fonzi interview notes, 3/2/76, p. 4.~~ ^{Executive Session, 4/26/78, p. 6.} See footnote #1, p. 4.
10. ~~N.Y. Times~~ 7/20/58 "Sugar King a Many-Sided Man," N.Y. TIMES, 7/20/58.
11. ~~Executive Session, 4/25/78, p. 8.~~
^{Testimony of Antonio Veciana Blanch, 4/25/78}
12. Ibid, p. 6. ^{Hearup Before the House Select Committee on}
13. Ibid, p. 7. ^{ASSASSINATIONS, p. 4 (hereinafter Executive Session Testimony, 4/25/78)}
14. Ibid, p. 5.
15. Ibid, p. 8.
16. Ibid, p. 9.
17. ~~Fonzi~~ ^{Staff} Memorandum, 1/17/77, (JFK Document No. 012922).
^{from Gaeton Fonzi,}
18. My 14 Months With Castro, Rufo Lopez-Fresquet, [unclear], World Publishing Co., p. 111.
19. Executive Session, 4/25/78, p. 10.
20. Ibid, p. 11.
21. Ibid, p. 12.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid, p. 15.

24. Ibid, p. 14.

25. Ibid, p. 18.

26. Ibid, p. 19.

27. Immunized testimony

of Antonio Veciana Blanch, 4/26/78, Hearings Before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979, p. 68. (hereinafter 4/26/78).

28. Executive Session, 4/25/78, p. 21.

See footnote 1

29. ~~Fonzi interview notes, 3/2/76~~, p. 2, (JFK Document No. 012927)

30. Ibid.

31. Executive Session, 4/25/78, pp. 21, 59.

32. Ibid, p. 22.

33. Ibid, p. 26.

34. Ibid, p. 25.

35. Ibid, p. 26.25.

36. Ibid, p. 24.

37. U.S. News & World Report, 10/29/62, p. 40.

38. New York Times, 9/14/62, p. 13.

39. Immunized testimony, 4/26/78, p. 72.

40. Executive Session, 4/25/78, p. 27.

41. Immunized testimony, 4/26/78, p. 88.

42. Ibid, p. 89.

House Select Committee on Assassinations,

43. Outside Contact Report, 8/30/78, JFK Document No. 011267

44. Executive Session, 4/25/78, p. 26.

45. Ibid, p. 28.

46. Ibid, p. 27.

47. Ibid, p. 28.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid, p. 30.39

50. Department of State, telegram, (JFK Document No. 012920).
 Ibid;
51. Executive Session, 4/26/78, p. 43. ^{Testimony of Antonio Veciana Blanch, 4/26/78, Hearings Before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979, p. 38, 40 (hereinafter Executive Session 4/26/78).}
52. ~~Fonzi interview notes, 3/2/76, p. 5.~~ ^{See footnote #1}
53. Department of State, telegram, (JFK Document No. 012920). ^{See footnote #1}
54. ~~Fonzi interview notes, 3/2/76, p. 5.~~ (JFK Document No. 012927). ^{Testimony}
55. Executive Session, 4/26/78, p. 41. ^{See footnote #1}
56. ~~Ibid, p. 43. Fonzi interview notes, 3/2/76, op. cit. p. 9.~~
57. Immunized testimony, 4/26/78, p. 53.
58. Ibid. Executive Session 4/26/78, p. 42. ^{Testimony}
59. ~~Executive Session 4/26/78, p. 43.~~ Ibid., p. 43
60. ~~Fonzi interview notes, 3/2/76, p. 9.~~ (JFK Document No. 012927). ^{See footnote #1}
61. Ibid. ^{Interview of Antonio Veciana Blanch by Gaston Fonzi,}
62. ~~Fonzi interview notes, 3/11/76, JFK Document No. 012929~~
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Immunized testimony, 4/26/78, p. 73.
66. ~~Ibid. Fonzi interview notes, 3/11/76, p. 3.~~ ^{See footnote #62}
67. Executive Session, 4/26/78, p. 19. Ibid, p. 4. ^{4/26/78}
68. ~~Ibid, p. 19.~~ ^{See footnote #1} Executive Session Testimony p. 19
69. Ibid; Fonzi interview notes, 3/2/76, p. 7, (JFK Document No. 012929) ^{4/26/78, p. 24, 25.}
70. Ibid.
71. Executive Session, ~~4/26/78, p. 24, 25.~~ ^{Testimony, The House Select Committee on Assassinations, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979, p. 38, 40.}
72. Ibid, p. 21.
73. ~~Fonzi interview notes, 3/2/76, p. 7.~~ JFK Document No. 012927 ^{See footnote #1}
74. Executive Session, 4/26/78, p. 31. ^{Testimony}
75. Ibid, pp. 28, 36.
76. Ibid, pp 29-30.

Veciana footnotes - 4

77. Ibid. p. 28.
78. Ibid. p. 29.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid. p. 37.
81. Ibid. p. 32.
82. ~~Fonzi interview notes~~, 3/2/76, (JFK Document No. 012927).
See footnote #1
83. Ibid.
from Gaeton Fonzi
84. ~~Fonzi~~ Memorandum to Marston, 3/4/76, p. 1, (JFK Document No. 012923)
See footnote #1
85. ~~Fonzi interview notes~~, 3/2/76, p. 10, (JFK Document No. 012927).
from Gaeton Fonzi
86. ~~0000~~ Memorandum to Marston, 3/4/76, (JFK Document No. 012923).
Testimony
87. Executive Session, 4/26/78, p. 9. *House Select Committee on ASSASSINATIONS*
88. ~~0000~~ Staff interview with Lopez-Fresquet, 5/19/77, p. 13, JFK Document No. 001512
89. Ibid. p. 9
from Gaeton Fonzi
90. ~~Fonzi~~ Memorandum, 7/27/76, p. 2, (JFK Document No. 012919).
91. "Revolucion," 11/7/61, p. 1.
92. ~~Fonzi interview notes~~, 3/2/76, p. 6, (JFK Document No. 012927).
See footnote #1
93. Ibid.
94. CIA Memo ^{*random*} to FBI (Secret), 9/11/62; Rorke pamphlet attachment.
95. Executive Session ^{*Testimony*}, 4/25/78, p. 18.
96. Staff memorandum, Kail interview, 7/24/78, p. 1, (JFK Document No. 010307)
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid. p. 4.5.
99. Ibid. p. 2.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid.

Veciana footnotes - 5

103. Ibid, p. 4

104. Castro Report, (JFK Document No. 000593.)

105. Staff Memorandum ^{of MAX} Lesnik interview, 5/30/78, p. 4, (JFK Document No. 008888)

106. Ibid.

107. Ibid.

108. Staff Memorandum ^{of Lucilo} Pena interview, 6/12/78, (JFK Document No. 009270)

109. Ibid.

110. Ibid.

111. Immunized testimony, 4/26/78, p. 54.

112. Staff Memorandum ^{of} Pena interview, 6/12/78, p. 2, (JFK Document No. 009270).

113. Ibid.

114. Ibid.

115. Ibid; Immunized testimony, 4/26/78, p. 54.

116. Miami Herald, 10/16/76, p. 8

117. FBI file #2-2173, Sec. 6, Serials 231.

118. Staff Memorandum ^{of} Posada interview, 6/17/78, p. 1, (JFK Document No. 009412)

119. Ibid, p. 2.

120. Ibid.

121. Ibid.

122. Ibid.

123. Ibid.

124. Ibid.

125. Ibid, p. 1.

126. Ibid, p. 3 .

- Testimony*
127. Executive Session [^] 4/26/78, pp. 28-30.
- See footnote #1*
128. ~~Fonzi~~ interview notes, 3/2/76, p. 8, JFK Document No. 012927
129. Ibid.
130. Ibid.; Executive Session, 4/26/78, p. 28.
131. Ibid.
132. ~~NSA~~ ^{Staff of Orestes Guillermo Ruiz,} interview ^{House Select Committee on Assassinations,} 8/23/78, pp. 1, 7.
133. Outside Contact Report, 8/30/78, ^{by Gaeton Fonzi} p. 1, (JFK Document No. 011267)
134. ~~Fonzi~~ Interview notes, 3/16/78, p. 5, (JFK Document No. 012928)
135. Outside Contact Report, 8/30/78, p. 2, (JFK Document No. 011267)
136. Ibid.
137. Ibid.
138. ~~NSA~~ ^{Staff of Orestes Guillermo Ruiz,} Interview, 8/23/78, ^{House Select Committee on Assassinations}
139. Ibid., p. 7.
140. Ibid., p. 12.
141. Ibid., p. 13.
142. Ibid.
143. Ibid. p. 7.
144. Ibid., p. 9.
145. Ibid., p. 11.
146. Ibid. ^{House Select Committee on Assassinations,}
147. Outside Contact Report, 9/12/78, (JFK Document No. 011465)
148. Ibid.
149. Ibid. ^{House Select Committee on Assassinations,}
150. Outside Contact Report, 8/30/78, p. 1, (JFK Document No. 011267).
151. Immunized testimony, 4/26/78, pp. 65-66.
152. ~~Fonzi~~ ^{Staff of Antonio Veciana Blanch,} Interview notes 3/11/76, p. 4, (JFK Document No. 012929)
153. Ibid.

154. Ibid.

155. Immunized testimony, 4/26/78, p. 87.

156. ~~Letter from Senator Richard S. Schweiker,~~
~~Schweiker letter~~, 12/14/76, p. 3, (JFK Document No. 000521)

157. ~~from Gordon FONZI,~~
~~FONZI~~ Memorandum, 8/6/76, p. 2, (JFK Document No. 012921).

158. Executive Session, 11/27/76.

159. Ibid.

160. Nightwatch, David Phillips, 1977, Atheneum p. 5.

161. Ibid.

162. Staff interview of ~~Crozier~~, 1/16/78, pp. 1,3; (JFK Document No. 005063 004721)

163. Ibid., p. 2.

164. Ibid., p. 4.

165. Give Us This Day, Popular Library edition, p. 26.

166. Ibid.

167. Memorandum ^{OF} ~~Crozier~~ Crozier interview, 2/4/78, p. 1, (JFK Document No. 005063)

168. Ibid., p. 2

169. Ibid.

170. see Gupton insert - CIA, INSERT B

182. see Phillips insert - CIA INSERT C

190. Immunized testimony, 4/26/78, p. 70.

191. Ibid.

Letter from the Chief Counsel of the House Select Committee on Assassinations

192. ~~to CIA Office of Legislative~~
~~Counsel~~, 3/2/78.

193. Outside Contact Report, 3/31/78, p. 4, JFK Document No. 006911.

see H. insert & McCone insert - CIA INSERT D

INSERT (A)

add to footnotes - Veciana

from Gaeton Fonzi,

- 158
~~157a.~~ ~~Fonzi~~ Memorandum to Gustavson, 9/20/76, (JFK Document No. 013455)
- 159
~~157b.~~ Ibid.
- 160
~~157c.~~ Ibid.
- 161
~~157d.~~ Ibid., p. 2.
- 162
~~157e.~~ Ibid.
- 163
~~157f.~~ Ibid.
- 164
~~157g.~~ Ibid., p. 3.
- 165
~~157h.~~ Ibid.
- 166
~~157i.~~ Ibid.
- 167
~~157j.~~ Ibid.
- 168
~~157k.~~ Ibid.
- 169
~~157l.~~ Ibid.
- 170
~~157m.~~ Ibid.
- 171
~~157n.~~ Ibid.
- 172
~~157o.~~ Ibid.
- 173
~~157p.~~ Ibid., p. 4.
- 174
~~157q.~~ Ibid., p. 3.

footnotes for VECIANA

Gupton section

INSERT B

of Doug Gupton,

House Select Committee on
ASSASSINATIONS,

187 ~~170.~~ Staff interview, 8/28/78, JFK Document No. 002101

188 ~~171.~~ Ibid.

189 ~~172.~~ Ibid.

190 ~~173.~~ Ibid.

191 ~~174.~~ Ibid., p. 2.

192 ~~175.~~ Ibid.

193 ~~176.~~ Ibid.

194 ~~177.~~ Ibid.

195 ~~178.~~ Ibid.

196 ~~179.~~ Ibid.

197 ~~180.~~ Ibid.

198 ~~181.~~ Ibid.

footnotes for VECIANA - Phillips section

EXHIBIT C

of David Alice Phillips,

Hearings Before the House
Select Committee ON ASSASSINATIONS

- 199 ~~187~~. Executive Session^A, classified testimony, 4/25/78, p.89.
- 200 ~~188~~. Ibid.
- 201 ~~189~~. Ibid, p. 86.
- 202 ~~190~~. Ibid.
- 203 ~~191~~. Ibid.
- 204 ~~192~~. Ibid, p. 95.
- 205 ~~193~~. Ibid, p. 88.
- 206 ~~194~~. Ibid, p. 90.

Insert D

footnotes for VECIANA -- B.H. section McCone

Comm. Hee Interview of ~~B...~~ 11 ~~...~~

211 ~~194~~. ¹ ~~Classified~~ Top Secret closed session, 8/10/78, House Select Committee on ASSASSINATIONS.

212 ~~195~~. Ibid, p. 6.

213 ~~196~~. Ibid, p. 8.

214 ~~197~~. Ibid, p. 29.

215 ~~198~~. Ibid, p. 30.

216 ~~199~~. Ibid, p. 31.

217 ~~200~~. Ibid, p. 33.

218 ~~201~~. Ibid, p. 31.

219 ~~202~~. Ibid, p. 32.

220 ~~203~~. Ibid, p. 35.

221 ~~204~~. Ibid, p. 33.

222

~~Deposition~~

Deposition of John A. McCone, House Select Committee on ASSASSINATIONS, 8/17/78, p. 4.

223 Ibid, pp. 45-46.

- 224 letter from the Chief Counsel, Select Committee on Assassinations,
- ~~207.~~ ~~HSCA~~ Chief Counsel letter to CIA Principal Coordinator, 8/16/78.
- 225
208. Ibid, p. 2. House Select Committee on Assassinations,
- 226
209. CIA Principal Coordinator letter to ~~HSCA~~ Chief Counsel, 9/8/78, Classified Confidential, JFK Doc. No. _____.
- ~~210.~~ ~~HSCA Chief Counsel letter to S~~
- 227
210. Ibid.
- 228
211. Letter from the Chief Counsel, House Select Committee on Assassinations, to Justice Department,
- 229
212. HSCA Chief Counsel letter to Attorney General, 3/9/78.
- 230
213. Letter from House Select Committee on Assassinations, HSCA Chief Counsel, letter to Secretary of Defense, 3/9/78.
- 231
214. FBI letter, 3/17/78, (JFK Document No. 006622); Outside Contact Report, 4/19/78, (JFK Document No. 007369).
- 232
215. Department of Defense file #AA 90 49 16; HSCA file review, (JFK Document No. 012918).
- 233
216. Ibid. of Antonio Veciana Blanch,
- 234
217. ~~Donal~~ Interview ~~notes~~, 5/10/76, p.1, JFK Document No. 012930
- 235
218. Release: Select Committee on Assassinations, 7/30/78.
- 236
219. JFK Document Nos. 0105281, 010508, 010524, 011018
- 237
220. CIA Document, 3/15/78
- 238
221. CIA DIR. 188531, 3/15/78
- 239
222. Ibid.
- 240
223. CIA ~~etc~~ cable, IN 24738, 7/7/62.
- 241
224. Release: House Select Committee on Assassinations, 7/30/78
- 242
225. JFK Documents 010528; 010508; 010524; 011018.

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

FOOTNOTES

CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL

1. CIA/~~SECRET~~, Memo dated 10/30/67, ~~Subject~~
2. ~~Executive Session Testimony of~~
Antonio de Varona,
HSCA JFK Subcommittee Hearing, ~~March~~³ 16/1978, ~~Antonio~~
de Varona, p. 10. *Hearings Before the House
Select Committee on Assassinations,*
3. HSCA 012692, Item 3, FBI #105-78462-4 Teletype to Director
and SAC, New Orleans from SAC, Miami, 9/7/60, Bureau 105-78462-4,
(JFK Document 012692, Item 3)
4. Dagger in the Heart Mario Lazo, 1968 Funk and Wagnalls, p. 258.
5. Ibid.
6. Give Us This Day, E. Howard Hunt, 1973 Popular Library
Edition, p. 44.
1973
7. HSCA 012692, Sergio Arcacha Smith Black Line file, FBI Airtel
to Director from SAC, New Orleans, 12/12/60. (JFK Document 012691)
See fn. 7
8. Give Us This Day, pp. 71-72.
9. Ibid. pp. 172-73.
10. Ibid. p. 173.
11. Ibid. p. 154.
12. "Battle of Miami" Theodore A. Ediger, Dallas Morning News,
7/1/62.
13. CIA/~~SECRET~~, Memo dated 10/30/67,
~~Subject~~
14. Ibid. *House Select Committee on
Assassinations*
15. HSCA Security File #020, ~~Handbook~~^{CIA}, ~~History of~~
~~Individuals~~
16. CIA/~~SECRET~~ file,

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

17. ~~103.~~ ~~Op. cite HSCA #012691.~~ *See fn. 8*
18. ~~103.~~ ~~HSCA #012743, Library of Congress Selected Chronology on Cuba,~~
12/21/62. (JFK Document 012743)
See fn. 7,
19. ~~103.~~ ~~Op. cite Give Us This Day, pp. 191-192.~~
See fn. 3,
20. ~~103.~~ ~~HSCA Subcommittee Hearing, March 16, 1968, JFK, Testimony~~
of Antonio de Varona. p. 23.
21. ~~103.~~ ~~CIA/~~ ~~[REDACTED]~~,
Cable, ~~[REDACTED]~~, 4/9/63.
22. ~~103.~~ ~~CIA/~~ ~~[REDACTED]~~, Memo dated 10/30/67,
Subject: ~~[REDACTED]~~.
See fn. 13,
23. ~~103.~~ ~~Op. cite Dallas Morning News,~~ *House Select Committee on*
Assassinations,
Staff
24. ~~103.~~ ~~HSCA Security File, JFK #0092, FBI Senstudy Document, Volume 37,~~
Item 1, Cinal 100-422089, National Security Information -
Latin American Activities, 10/18/61.
25. ~~103.~~ ~~Ibid.~~
26. ~~103.~~ ~~Ibid.~~
27. ~~103.~~ ~~The Losers by Paul D. Bethel, 1969 Arlington House, New Rochelle,~~
New York, p. 398.
1969
28. ~~103.~~ ~~Ibid.~~ pp. 398-399.
29. ~~103.~~ ~~Ibid.~~ p. 399.
Memorandum
30. ~~103.~~ ~~CIA/~~ ~~[REDACTED]~~,
~~[REDACTED]~~, 7/9/64, Memo to Director from Desmond Fitzgerald.
undated document
31. ~~103.~~ ~~CIA/~~ ~~[REDACTED]~~,
~~[REDACTED]~~, 7/9/64; CIA undated Document.
32. ~~103.~~ ~~Op. cite HSCA #012743, 5/8/63.~~
See fn. 19,
33. ~~103.~~ ~~Ibid.~~ 4/15/63.
34. ~~103.~~ ~~"Maceo Quits as Head of Cuba Group", Dallas Morning News,~~
6/23/63.
35. ~~103.~~ ~~HSCA #012689, FBI #105-107224-126, Report from Miami,~~
6/11/63. (JFK Document 012689, Item 4)
36. ~~103.~~ ~~Ibid.~~

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Footnotes - CRC
Page 3

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

36. ✓ "Raid a Hoax. Cuban Exile Boss Quits," by Hal Hendrix,
Miami News, 6/23/63.

37. Ibid. *See fn. 19,*

38. ~~Op. cite~~ HSCA#012743, 6/24/63.

39. "Cuban Anti-Castro Chief by Day Selling Cars in Jersey by Night",
New York Times, 8/22/64.

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

2000865

Footnotes - New Orleans Chapter
Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC)

1. Secret Service Report, "Lee Harvey Oswald,"
12/9/63, Secret Service No. CO-2-34,030
(JFK Document No. 003759)
2. IBID
3. IBID
4. IBID
5. Report of the President's Commission on the
ASSASSINATION of President Kennedy,
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office (1964) p. 292
6. Staff Interview of Sergio [REDACTED]
Arcacha Smith, 7/7/78, House Select
Committee on Assassinations, (JFK
Document No. 010458)
7. IBID, pp. 12, 45
8. Deposition of Luis Rabel, 5/11/78, House
Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 23, 47
(JFK Document No. 009080)
9. IBID, pp. 21-22
10. See footnote No. 1, p. 4

11. See footnote No. 8, p. 45

12. IBID. p. 41

13. IBID., pp. 127-128

14. FBI Report, 1/20/65, (JFK Document No. 006305, Item 9)

15. IBID., Items 1-8

16. IBID., Items 3-4

17. IBID., Item 4

18. IBID.

19. IBID., Item 5

20. IBID.

21. Staff Interview of Frank Barten,
House Select Committee on Assassinations,
3/15/78, p. 2 (JFK Document No. 007252)

22. IBID.

23. IBID., p. 7

24. IBID., p. 17

25 IBID

26 IBID

27 IBID

28 IBID, p. 18

29 IBID

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

1. "The Bay of Pigs", by Haynes Johnson, Orlando Sentinel
Star, 6/12/77, p. 1C.

3. Haynes Johnson, The Bay of Pigs, W.W. Norton & Co., New York, 1964, pp. 28-29.

5 ~~4A.~~ Ibid.

7 6. Ibid., pp. 28-29.

8 7. Ibid.

9 & Ibid.

102. Ibid., p. 37.

// ~~10.~~ Ibid., pp. 34-42.

12N. Ibid.

13 ~~12~~. Ibid., p. 47

14 ~~is~~. Ibid., p. 56.

15 ~~24~~. Ibid., pp. 32-39, 55.

16 ~~15~~. Ibid., p. 32.

17 ~~16~~. Ibid., pp. 60-63.

18 ~~7~~. FBI Report #105-87912, MRR miscellaneous references,
(JFK Document #012383.)

19 ~~28~~. CIA/~~SECRET~~ Document, 10/30/67; ~~SECRET~~

26 ~~19~~. Ibid.

21. ~~20.~~ ^{See fn. 3,} ~~the site~~ Haynes Johnson, p. 62.

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Bay of Pigs Leader Artime Is Dead at 45

By GUILLERMO MARTINEZ
And KATE WHEELER
Herald Staff Writers

Dr. Manuel Artime Lueza, leader of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion and a respected spokesman in Miami's exile community, died of cancer Thursday night at 45.

A physician, poet and friend of presidents, Artime was eulogized by friends as "the best orator we had in exile and a true patriot."

He fought with Fidel Castro against Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista, but broke with his comrade in 1960 after Castro began leaning toward Communism.

Artime was splashed out of Cuba by the CIA.

Miami Herald

Nov. 18, 1977

Bay of Pigs Commander Dies at 45

FROM PAGE 1A

we had in exile and a true patriot." A stocky, gravel-voiced man, Artime was a friend of American presidents from Eisenhower to Nixon and a special favorite of John and Robert Kennedy.

When President Kennedy addressed thousands of Cuban exiles in the Orange Bowl in 1962, Artime presented Kennedy the flag of Brigade 2506.

Brigade leaders recently demanded return of the historic flag from the Kennedy library after Sen. Edward Kennedy advocated renewed relations with Castro.

ARTIME LED guerrilla efforts against Castro with the support of the CIA, although his active role in commando raids against Cuba ended in 1965.

His most recent exposure was on the CBS News documentary "The CIA's Secret Army," which in June described the Miami-based guerrilla war against Castro.

To his followers, Artime will be remembered as a fiery leader who after his split with Castro wrote a book — 20,000 Graves Cry Treason — denouncing Communism.

As a prisoner for 21 months after the invasion, he wrote poems expressing his anguish for his homeland.

Artime deplored terrorist acts within this country.

"AN ACT OF terrorism is a bomb in the U.S. Post Office and the FBI (as occurred in a wave of Miami bombings in 1975.) A bellicose act is to attack an enemy objective in order to paralyze or hurt the enemy," Artime said.

Still he said he understood the reasons for terrorist acts here.

"... out of frustration and misguided patriotism come some senseless acts, like terrorism ...," he said. "You must understand it was with an enormous patriotic sense that these men went into training and it is bad to kick them out to the street ..."

After Artime's commandos torpedoed a Spanish ship and killed its captain in early 1963, Lyndon Johnson's administration withdrew its support of Artime's commandos.

American officials said they suspected the ship attack was in retaliation for Spain's trade with Cuba. The commandos said they had confused the Spanish ship for a Cuban boat they intended to attack.

With the agency's help, Artime became a key planner in the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion.

Captured along with 1,200 of his men, Artime spent 21 months in Cuban prisons, most of it in solitary confinement, until the Kennedy Administration ransomed the exile force in 1962.

Pedro Pablo Rojas, spokesman for Brigade 2506 of the Bay of Pigs Veterans Association, said Thursday that Artime dedicated his life to the fight against Castro "until the moment of his death."

Artime learned last month that he had terminal cancer of the liver. Even before the illness, he feared for his life because of his continuing efforts against Fidel Castro.

He died at American Hospital. Funeral arrangements are being made.

ments at Rivero funeral home are incomplete. Artime's parents still live in Cuba. He also is survived by his widow Adelaida and six children. They lived in a large home in Northeast Miami.

"WITHOUT A DOUBT this is an irreparable loss to the cause of the Cuban exile," said Miami City Commissioner Manolo Reboso, a Bay of Pigs veteran and a close friend of Artime.

"As the leader of the Bay of Pigs invasion and as a doctor, Artime was always ready to help humanity," Reboso said.

"There can be no argument, he was the best orator

Turn to Page 25A Col. 1

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

Footnotes - Brigade 2506 - Arttime - MRR

~~40~~ 41. Ibid.

~~42~~ 42. Ibid.

~~43~~ 43. See fn. 33,
Orlando Sentinel.

~~43~~ 44. JFK Document #003175

~~44~~ 45. Ibid.

~~45~~ 46. Miami Herald, 11/8/77.

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

22 ~~21~~. Ibid.

24. ~~23~~. Ibid., 6/2/61.

25. ~~24~~. Ibid., 12/21/62.

See fn. 3,

26. ~~25~~. ~~Spencer~~. Haynes Johnson, p. 246.

See fn. 22,

27. ~~28.~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ JFK #013100, p. 31.

See fn. 3,

20. ~~27~~. ~~Quoted in~~ Haynes Johnson, p. 344.

29. ~~28~~. Ibid. pp. 342-346.

30. ~~29~~. E. Howard Hunt, Give Us This Day, Popular Library Edition, New York, 1973, p. 221.

See fn. 3,

3/. ~~30.~~ ~~op cite.~~ Haynes Johnson, p. 353.

32. ~~31~~ Ibid., p. 352.

32. ~~32~~. "Manuel Arttime" by Helga Silva, Profile, Miami News, 7/2/77.

34. ~~33~~ "Arttime Had a Little Help From Friends in the CIA,"
by Leonard Novarro, Orlando Sentinel Star, 6/12/77, p. 2C.

34. Ibid.

Memo [REDACTED], 7/9/64, [REDACTED]

CONFIDENTIAL

me. 5-100

See fn. 33,

36. ~~See also~~ Orlando Sentinel, Arttime; also "Manuel Arttime,
Miami News, 7/2/77 p. 1C.

37. sec fn. 3a2,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Miami News.

~~37-0000~~³⁸. Ibid.

~~39~~ Ibid.

~~39-10~~ 40. Ibid.

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

- ~~CPC~~ Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted

~~21. Ibid from CIA—controlled documents.)~~

18. ~~22.~~ HSCA Security File #092, Senstudy Document, Volume 37, Item 4, #105-95461-15, p. 4
19. ~~23.~~ Ibid p. 2
20. ~~24.~~ Ibid
21. ~~25.~~ HSCA #009303, p. 8, Item 4, FBI #105-183815
22. ~~26.~~ CIA/~~_____~~ Cable ~~_____~~
~~_____~~, 6/21/62
23. ~~27.~~ CIA/~~_____~~ Cable ~~_____~~
~~_____~~ 3/14/64
24. ~~28.~~ HSCA #009303, p. 1, FBI #9704623, Section 1
25. ~~29.~~ Ibid
26. ~~30.~~ Ibid p. 5
27. ~~31.~~ Ibid
28. ~~32.~~ Ibid
29. ~~33.~~ HSCA #009303, p. 3, FBI #97-4623, Sections II through VI
30. ~~34.~~ Ibid p. 3, FBI #97-4623, Section IV
31. ~~35.~~ Ibid p. 2, #97-4623-35
32. ~~36.~~ Ibid p. 2, Item 1 (9), FBI #97-4623
33. ~~37.~~ CIA/~~_____~~ ~~_____~~ 3536
9/3/63
34. ~~38.~~ Ibid
35. ~~39.~~ HSCA #012981
36. ~~40.~~ Book V, Final Report, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate (SSCI). On page 12 of the SSCI, the group of Cubans connected with the Guatemalan Lumber Company project are identified as the same group arrested when the FBI raided and seized dynamite on property in Lacombe, Louisiana. It should be noted that the FBI

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

Footnotes - MDC

Page 3

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

raid occurred on July 31, 1963 at property owned by William J. McLaney, whereas the Guatemalan Lumber Company trainees were on property owned, according to Frank de la Barre, by a friend of his. Although de la Barre did not mention the name of the owner, the FBI Report from Miami, Bufile #2-1821 Section 33 lists the names of the Cubans arrested on McLaney property and Victor Paneque was not among them.

37. ~~42~~. HSCA #012981
38. ~~42~~. Ibid
39. ~~43~~. Ibid
40. ~~44~~. Ibid
41. ~~45~~. Ibid
42. ~~46~~. HSCA Security File #092, Senstudy Volume 32, Item 2, #97-4110-123, p. 2
43. ~~47~~. Ibid
44. ~~48~~. HSCA #006716, p. 4, FBI, Richard Rudolph Davis, Volume 1 Report from New Orleans, 7/3/64
45. ~~49~~. Ibid p. 2
46. ~~50~~. Ibid
47. ~~51~~. Ibid
48. ~~52~~. HSCA #012981, Fonzi memo 9/6/78
49. ~~53~~. Ibid
50. ~~54~~. Ibid
51. ~~55~~. CIA/PRC, ~~_____~~ report II ~~_____~~ -4531, 1/29/64
52. ~~56~~. Ibid
53. ~~57~~. CIA/PRC, ~~_____~~ Report ~~_____~~, 7/26/63

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

герою

- 11/14/63

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: JURE

- Cable*
1. CIA/ [redacted] (this form is to be filled out by the Director of the CIA from CIA—controlled documents.) 7/25/62
 2. CIA/DDO, [redacted] Information Report, September 1962
 3. CIA/ [redacted] Dispatch, 7/11/62
 4. [redacted], Junta Revolucionario Cubana - Declaration of Principles
 5. CIA/ [redacted], Memo [redacted]
 6. Ibid.
 7. Ibid.
 8. Ibid.
 9. Ibid.
 10. Ibid.
 11. CIA/ [redacted], Cable [redacted] 9/11/63
 12. CIA/ [redacted], Cable [redacted] 10/11/63
 13. CIA/DDO, [redacted] Dispatch [redacted] from [redacted], 10/21/63
 14. CIA/ [redacted], Cable [redacted] 1/31/64
 15. CIA/DDO, [redacted], Cable to [redacted] 3/17/64
 16. CIA/ [redacted], Cable [redacted] 4/26/64
 17. CIA/DDO, [redacted] Dispatch to [redacted] 7/22/63, [redacted] Staff [redacted] 7/22/63, [redacted] [redacted]
 18. CIA/ [redacted], Cable [redacted] 8/15/62
 19. HSCA 005990, p. 4, FBI File #97-4546, Section 1 - Correlation Summary 5/30/63
 20. Ibid., Item 2, page 4

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

Footnotes - JURE

Page 2

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

21. HSCA #009974, Item 9, FBI File #105-114543-5, JURE, U.S. Army Intelligence Report, #2215 217, 24 September 1962, Subject: Jure Established - classified SECRET (JFK Document 009974)
22. Ibid.
23. HSCA #009974, p. 12, FBI File #105-114543, Volume 1, Serial 46, p. 12., (JFK Document 009974).
24. CIA/[REDACTED], Memo [REDACTED], 8/2/63, [REDACTED]
25. Ibid.

Switch ²⁷ CIA/[REDACTED], Cable [REDACTED], 12/3/63.

²⁶ CIA/[REDACTED], Memo [REDACTED], Subject: [REDACTED] Report 8/23/63.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ CIA/[REDACTED], Cable [REDACTED], 9/11/63.)

³⁰ CIA/[REDACTED], Cable [REDACTED], 11/18/63.

³¹ CIA/[REDACTED], Dispatch to [REDACTED], 12/13/63, [REDACTED]: [REDACTED]. (see handwritten notes)

³² Ibid.

³³ CIA/[REDACTED], Cable [REDACTED], 12/3/63.

34 ²⁵ⁱ Ibid.

35 ^{25j} CIA/[REDACTED], Memo [REDACTED], 12/13/63.

36 ^{25k} JFK Document #009005, p. 7.

37 ^{25l} CIA/[REDACTED], Cable [REDACTED], 10/11/63.

38 ^{25m} CIA/[REDACTED], Cable [REDACTED], 9/7/63.

39 ²⁵ⁿ CIA/[REDACTED], Cable [REDACTED], 10/22/63
Classified by derivative
10/22/63

- Classification:

(This form is to be used for material extracted from)

40 26. HSCA 0006583 CIA [redacted] (JFK Document 006 468)
41 27. Ibid. (JFK Document 006 468)

42 28. CIA/ [redacted] XII, Memo for [redacted]
[redacted]

43 29. CIA/DDO, Ray Volume XII, Memo for Record, 2/12/64

44 30. CIA/DDO [redacted] Cable to [redacted] 4/21/64

45 31. CIA/DDO [redacted] Cable to [redacted] 3/28/64
3/28/64

32 46. CIA/DDO [redacted] Memo for [redacted]
[redacted], 4/13/64

47 33. CIA/DDO [redacted] Cable [redacted] 6/6/64

48 34. CIA/ [redacted] Cable to [redacted] 5/20/64

49 35. CIA/ [redacted] Cable [redacted] 6/3/64

50 36. CIA/ [redacted] Cable 5/30/64

51 37. CIA/DDO [redacted] Cable [redacted] 6/3/64

52 38. CIA/ [redacted] Cable [redacted] 6/6/64

53 39. Ibid.

54 40. CIA/ [redacted] Memo for [redacted] 5/20/64

55 41. Ibid.

56 42. Ibid.

57 43. CIA/ [redacted] Cable from [redacted] 6/6/64

58 44. CIA/DDO [redacted] XII, Memo for [redacted] 9/11/64

59 45. CIA/DDO [redacted] Report, 9/23/64
Document undated

60 46. CIA/DDO [redacted] [redacted]

61 47. CIA/DDO [redacted] Memo [redacted] 9/22/64

Classification:

62 48. CIA/ [redacted] Cable, 1/4/69

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

Footnotes: Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE)
Document

1. CIA/ [REDACTED] 11/9/67.
2. Ibid.
3. Interview with Juan Manuel Salvat Roque, by ~~Fenzi/Gonzales~~,
2/7/78, (JFK Document #005259)
→ House Select Committee On Assassinations
4. [REDACTED]
Undated news article, "Red Terrorism Rules at
Havana University" by Hal Hendrix, Miami News.
5. ~~Op cite JFK #005259~~ See ~~fn. 3~~
See ~~fn. 4~~
6. ~~Op cite: [REDACTED]~~
Document
7. CIA/ [REDACTED] Cable to Director from
MASH, 9/13/60.
8. Interview [REDACTED] by ~~Fenzi/Gonzales~~,
1/16/78, (JFK Document #004721.)
→ House Select Committee On Assassinations
9. Ibid. pp. 2-3.
10. CIA/ [REDACTED], Cable to Director from
MASH, 11/4/60.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. CIA/ ~~[REDACTED]~~ Document, 11/1/61.
14. FBI Report from San Francisco, 5/26/64, Warren Commission
Document #1085 d 1.)
15. Ibid.
16. ~~Op cite CIA [REDACTED]~~ Document (Footnote 13).
See fn. 13
17. ~~Op cite FBI report from San Francisco~~
18. CIA/ [REDACTED] Cable [REDACTED] from
JMWAVE, 5/9/61.
19. Ibid.

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

DRE Footnotes - page 2

20. ~~Op cite JFK Document #005259~~, p. 1. *Sec fn. 3, DRE Chief of Military Operations, House Select Committee on Assassinations*
21. Interview with ~~_____~~ by ~~Fonzi/Gonzales~~, 2/21/78, ¹p. 2, (JFK Document #005765.)
22. Ibid.
- 23 ~~22A~~. ~~Ibid.~~ *Document*
- 24 ~~23~~. ~~Op cite CIA _____~~. *Sec fn. 13.*
- 25 ~~24~~. *Sec fn. 21*
~~Op cite JFK #005765~~, p. 2.
Document
- 26 ~~25~~. CIA ~~_____~~, ~~_____~~, 1/4/63.
- 27 ~~26~~. CIA ~~_____~~, Dispatch # ~~000000~~ 12395 ~~_____~~, 11/8/63.
- 28 ~~27~~. Ibid.
- 29 ~~28~~. Ibid.
Sec fn. 21
- 30 ~~29~~. ~~Op cite JFK #005765~~, p. 2.
- 31 ~~30~~. Ibid.
- 32 ~~31~~. Ibid.
- 33 ~~32~~. Ibid. p. 3.
- 34 ~~33~~. Ibid.
- 35 ~~34~~. Ibid.
- 36 ~~35~~. Ibid.
- 37 ~~36~~. Ibid.
- 38 ~~37~~. Ibid.
- 39 ~~38~~. Ibid.
- 40 ~~39~~. Ibid.
- 41 ~~40~~. Ibid.

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

DRE Footnotes - page 3

- 42 41. CIA/Document Letter [REDACTED], 2/21/63.
- 43 42. CIA/Document. Dispatch # [REDACTED]-12395 [REDACTED], 11/8/63.
- 44 43. FBI #105-85440-28, Correlation Summary, 8/11/67, p. 2
(JFK Document #012383), p. 2.
- 45 44. CIA/[REDACTED], Cable [REDACTED], 6/13/64.
- 46 45. CIA/[REDACTED], Memo [REDACTED], 1/3/67.
- 47 46. See fn. 21,
Opcite. JFK #005765, p. 3.
- 48 47. "The Bayo-Pawley Affair" by Robert K. Brown and Miguel
Acoca, Soldier of Fortune, 1975, pp. 18-19.
- 49 48. See fn. 21
Opcite. JFK #005765, p. 4.
- 50 49. JFK Document #013605, attachment p. 1.
- 51 50. Ibid., attachment p. 9.
- 52 51. Ibid.
- 53 52. Ibid., pp. 9-10.
- 54 53. Ibid., p. 10.
- 55 54. Ibid.
- 56 55. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
- 57 56. Ibid., p. 11.
- 58 57. Ibid., Cover memo.
- 59 58. Ibid.
- 60 59. Ibid.
- 61 60. CIA/TASK Force [REDACTED] Report 1977.
- 62 61. Ibid.

Classification: _____

20-1156

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

DRE Footnotes - page 4

- House Select Committee on Assassinations*
- 63-62. Ibid.
- 64-63. Ibid. ^{65 Outside} 63A. "Contact Report, 12/13/78," (JFK Document #013678)
- 66-63B. Ibid. ^{See fn. 3}
- 67-64. Opette. JFK #005259, p. 1.
- 68-65. Ibid. p. 2.
- 69-66. Ibid.
- 70-67. Ibid.
- 71-68. Deposition of Carlos Bringuier, May 12, 1978, (JFK Document #009084) ^{p. 13, 1}
- 72-69. See Also, HSCA final section on Carlos Bringuier
- 73-70. Deposition of Carlos Quiroga, May 23, 1978, pp. 11, 12, 15, JFK Document #009394. See Also, Warren Commission Volume X, p. 41.
- 74-71. Opette. JFK #005765. ^{See fn. 21}
- 75-72. Ibid. p. 4.
- 76-73. Ibid.
- 77-74. Ibid. p. 3.
- 78-75. Ibid. p. 4.
- 79-76. Interview with Jose Antonio Lanusa by Fonzi/Gonzales, 4/22/78, p. 1., (JFK Document #007463)
- 80-77. Ibid. ^{House Select Committee on Assassinations}
- 81-78. Ibid. p. 2.
- 82-79. Ibid.
- 83-80. Ibid.
- 84-81. Ibid.
- 85-82. Ibid. p. 3.

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

DRE Footnotes - page 5

- 86 83. Ibid.
- 87 84. Ibid. p. 4.
- 88 85. Ibid.
- 89 86. Ibid. See fn. 21,
- 90 87. Opote. JFK #009084, p. 23. House Select
- 91 88. Ibid. pp. 15-16. Committee On Assassinations
- 92 89. Interview of Celso "Macario" Hernandez, by Brown, 2/14/78, ¹
(JFK Document #007486.) House Select Committee on Assassinations
- 93 90. Contact report, Carlos Bringuier, 12/2/78, ¹(JFK Document
#013420.)
- 94 91. Ibid.
- 95 92. Ibid.
- 96 93. See Also, Warren Report pp. 407-08, 728-29; Warren
Commission Volume X, PP. 87-90, 94; V.T. Lee Exhibits.

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

Footnotes

(This form is to be used for material extracted

MOVIMIENTO INSURRECCIONAL de
RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA (MIRR)
and
ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA

1. ~~HSCA #009427, p. 1~~ FBI #97-4474, MIRR Miscellaneous References, Index of Anti-Castro organizations, 2/8/60, p. 1, (JFK Document No. 009427)
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. ~~HSCA #009427, Item 1, p. 2~~ FBI #97-4474, MIRR Section 1, Cable to Director from Miami, 11/2/60, Item 1, p. 2 (JFK Document 009427).
5. Ibid., p. 1
6. CIA/ ~~_____~~
Cable to Director from MASH, 11/2/60
7. CIA/ ~~_____~~ undated report
8. ~~HSCA #009362~~, Memo to G. Robert Blakey, 6/15/68, Interview with Dr. Orlando Bosch Avila by Fonzi/Gonzales, p. 1, (JFK Document 009362)
9. "Fiery Bosch Courts Terrorist Lable" by Gloria Marina and Arnold Markowitz, Miami Herald, 11/8/76 (George Fain)
10. Ibid
See fn. 8
11. ~~Op cite HSCA #009362~~, p. 1
12. "Caracas to charge Bosch, trio in bombing of Cuban airliner" Miami News, 8/23/78 (George Fain)
13. Ibid
14. ~~HSCA #009427, Item 5, p. 3~~ FBI #97-4474, MIRR Section 1, Report from Miami by George E. Davis, 1/18/61, Item 5, p. 3, (JFK Document 009427)
15. Ibid, Item 3, p. 15, FBI #97-4474, Section 6, Memo to J. Walter Yeagley from Director, 6/22/66
- 16 ~~15(a)~~ Ibid *See fn. 8*
- 17 ~~16~~ ~~Op cite HSCA #009362~~, p. 3
- 18 ~~17~~ Ibid.
- 19 ~~18~~ Ibid.

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

MIRR/Bosch
Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

- 20 19. Ibid
- 21 20. Ibid
- 22 21. Ibid Sec fn. 4
- 23 22. Op cite HSCA #009427, Item 3, p. 2, FBI #97-4474
MIRR Section 1, Report from Miami 1/23/61
- 24 23. Ibid, Item 2
- 25 24. Ibid, Item 14, p. 6
- 26 25. Ibid, Item 15, p. 6
- 27 26. Ibid
- 28 26 (a) Ibid Sec fn. 8
- 29 27. Op cite HSCA #009362, p. 5
- 30 28. Op cite HSCA #009427 Item 2. p. 12
Sec fn. 4
- 31 29. Ibid, Item 9, p. 5
- 32 30. Ibid, Items 10,11,12, p. 5
- 33 31. Ibid, Item 14, p. 6
- 34 32. Ibid, Items 1,2,3, p. 8 and Items 4,5, p. 9
- 35 33. Ibid, Items 2,3, p. 11 and Item 1, p. 12
- 36 34. Ibid, Item 5, p. 14
- 37 35. Ibid, Item 2
- 38 36. Ibid, Item 8. p. 9
- 39 37. Op cite HSCA #009362, p. 2
Sec fn. 8
- 40 38. Ibid
- 41 39. Ibid
- 42 40. Ibid Sec fn. 12
- 43 41. Op cite Miami News 8/23/78
- 44 42. Op cite HSCA #009427, Item 16, p. 6
Sec fn. 4
- 45 43. Ibid, Item 7, p. 11

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

44. Ibid., Item 6, pp. 10 be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)
45. HSCA #013071, Sections 1, 2, 4, p. 5, FBI #9-42758, Orlando Bosch, (CJFK Document ~~003007~~ 013071)
46. Ibid.
47. Op cite Miami Herald, 11/8/76 *Sec fn. 9*
48. Op cite HSCA #009427, p. 5 *Sec fn. 8, p. 5*
49. Op cite Miami Herald, 11/8/76 *Sec fn. 9*
50. Op cite HSCA #009427, Item 6, pp 15, 16, 17 *Sec fn. 4*
51. Op cite HSCA #013071, Item 1, p. 2, FBI #45-10848 *Sec fn. 47*
52. Op cite HSCA #009427, p. 18 *Sec fn. 4*
53. "I am going to declare war" by Blake Fleetwood, New Times, 5/13/77, p. 46
54. Ibid.
55. Op cite HSCA #013071, Section 4, p. 3, FBI #45-10848 *Sec fn. 47*
56. Op cite New Times, 5/13/77, pp. 46-47 *Sec fn. 55*
57. Ibid. p. 47
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid. p. 48
60. Op cite HSCA #009427, Item 3, p. 2 *Sec fn. 4*
61. Op cite HSCA #013071, Item 1, pp. 1-2, FBI #45-10801 *Sec fn. 47*
62. Ibid.
63. Op cite HSCA #009427, Item 14, p. 5 *Sec fn. 4*
64. Op cite New Times, 5/13/77, p. 51 *Sec fn. 55*

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

67 65.

Hearings Before
the House Select
Committee on
Assassinations,
95th Congress,
2nd Session,
Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government
Printing Office,
1979.

~~HSCA~~ Immunized Session Testimony of Marita Lorenz, May 31, 1978.] Marita Lorenz, who had publicly claimed she was once Castro's mistress (Miami News 6/15/76), told the Committee she was present at a September 1963 meeting in Orlando Bosch's Miami home during which Lee Harvey Oswald, Frank Sturgis, Pedro Diaz Lanz and Bosch made plans to go to Dallas. (pp. 31-34). She further testified that around November 15, 1963, she, Jerry Patrick Hemming, the Novo brothers, Pedro Diaz Lanz, Sturgis Bosch and Oswald travelled in a two-car caravan to Dallas and stayed in a motel where they were contacted by Jack Ruby. There were several rifles and scopes in the motel room. (pp. 43-54). Lorenz said she returned to Miami around November 19 or 20.

All possible individuals involved in this allegation were questioned by the Committee with the following results.

Interviewed on June 16, 1978, Orlando Bosch told the Committee he had met Lorenz once in 1962 at which time he was planning an air raid over Cuba with Alexander Rorke. Lorenz later called him and said she wanted to get involved in anti-Castro activities, but Bosch turned her down and never saw her again. He further stated he had never travelled west of New Orleans in his life. (JFK Document #009363, p. 2)

In a March 21, 1978 deposition in Miami, Florida, Jerry Patrick Hemming responded negatively to the questions: "Did you ever drive from Miami to Dallas with Marita Lorenz? Or Frank Sturgis? Or a man identifying himself as 'Ozzie'?" (pp. 170-71)

Immunized testimony was received in Washington, D.C. on April 28, 1978 from Pedro Diaz Lanz, who denied Lorenz's allegation, (p. 64) and explained his whereabouts on November 22, 1963 (p. 65).

In a March 20, 1978 deposition in Miami, Frank A. Sturgis was asked if he did, "... in the company of Marita Lorenz, Leon Oswald and others drive from Miami to Dallas a day or two before the assassination?" Sturgis responded:

"Sir, that is an absolute lie. I have never been with Marita Lorenz and Osie, as she calls him, or with Pedro Diaz Lanz, or Marcus Diaz Lanz, or Dr. Orlando Bosch, or Jerry Patrick, which she claimed all of us besides some other Cubans, were in two ~~at~~ Classification: left Miami, Florida two days before the assassination of the President of the United States. She is a liar. I took a polygraph examination to that effect that I have never been

Classification: _____

(This form is to be used for material extracted
involved in a conspiracy to kill the President
of the United States, nor was I with her at any
time conspiring to kill the President of the
United States, nor was I with her in any automobile
with these people or any other people going to
Dallas to plot to kill the President of the United
States. She is an absolute liar." (p. 157)

Sturgis said that on November 22, 1963, he was in his
home in Miami, Florida. (p. 155)

The Committee found no evidence to support Lorenz's
allegation.

68

66.

~~Op. cite~~ ^{HSA} ~~JFK Document #009362, p. 1~~ See fn. 8

Classification: _____

Classified by derivation: _____

JUNTA DEL GOBIERNO DE CUBA
EN EL EXILIO

FOOTNOTES

1. ~~████████████████████~~ CRS Chronolgy of U.S.-Cuban Relations,
~~████████████████████~~ (JFK Document No. 010426)
2. Ibid. ~~████████████████████~~
3. JFK ~~████████████████████~~ HSCA Staff summary of FBI file for
Paulino Sierra Martinez, p. 1, ~~████████████████████~~
April 30, 1963, ~~████████████████████~~ p. 2 ~~████████████████████~~
~~████████████████████~~ (JFK Document No. 012887)
4. Ibid., at 2. (Ref. FBI LHM, Re: Santiago Alvarez Rodriguez,
June 3, 1963)
5. Ibid., at 1. ~~████████████████████~~ also
HSCA Staff summary of CIA file ~~████████████████████~~
p. 1, (CIA Dispatch ~~████████████████████~~ 12627, November 20, 1963) and
~~████████████████████~~ Sec. 3, ~~████████████████████~~ report.
6. JFK ~~████████████████████~~ (Ref. CIA ~~████████████████████~~ report
April 30, 1963, ~~████████████████████~~ p. 1) (Ref. CIA ~~████████████████████~~
May 7, 1963,) and (FBI 105-121010-3, May 5, 1963, Teletype
to Director from SAC, Chicago, Re: Paulino Sierra Martinez, p. 2
(JFK Document No. 012887) report
7. Ibid., at 1 (Ref. CIA ~~████████████████████~~; April 30, 1963)
~~████████████████████~~
8. Ibid., at p. 2, (Ref. CIA ~~████████████████████~~ report
~~████████████████████~~; p. 3 (Ref. FBI #105-121010-3
Memo to Attorney General from Director); p. 5 (Ref. #105-
121010-35, Memo to Director from SAC Chicago, May 3, 1977
House Select Committee on Assassinations,
9. HSCA Staff summary of CIA file, ~~████████████████████~~
p. 1, (Ref. Dispatch ~~████████████████████~~ 12627, November 20, 1963
and attachments)
11. JFK ~~████████████████████~~ HSCA Staff Summary of FBI file
for Carlos Rodriguez Quesada, (Ref. FBI #94-1-19634
August 28, 1963), House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2, (JFK Document
CIA No. 012655).
10. HSCA Staff Summary of ~~████████████████████~~ Handbook, ~~████████████████████~~ House Select
~~████████████████████~~ Committee on Assassinations
(JFK Security #020).
12. HSCA Staff Summary of CIA files, ~~████████████████████~~
~~████████████████████~~ p. 2, (Ref. Dispatch ~~████████████████████~~ 12627, November 20, 1963)
House Select Committee on Assassinations,
13. Ibid., at 1;
also ~~████████████████████~~ Staff Summary of ~~████████████████████~~ CIA Handbook
~~████████████████████~~ (JFK Security #020)

JGCE, Footnotes, p. 2

- CIA
14. ~~HSCA~~ Staff Summary of ~~_____~~ Handbook, ~~_____~~, (JFK Security #020);
See fn. 3, also ~~JFK #012887~~, p. 6, (Ref. FBI Report February 25, 1964, from Miami, Re: Paulino Sierra Martinez), (JFK Document # 012887).
- CIA
15. ~~HSCA~~ Staff Summary of ~~_____~~ Handbook, *House Select Committee on Assassinations,*
[Section on JGCE (Secret)], (JFK Security #020)
See fn. 3,
16. ~~JFK #012887~~, p. 4, (Ref. FBI Memo from Chicago, June 26, 1963, Re: Paulino Sierra Martinez)
17. ~~JFK #007601~~ U.S. Secret Service Report, November 27, 1963, to Chief from SAIS Martineau, Chicago, Re: Homer S. Echevarria, p. 2 & 3. (JFK Document # 007601)
See also
Secret Service Report #1266, File #CO-2-34,104, 12-19-63, From Tucker and Noonan, p. 4 & 5.
18. ~~HSCA~~ Staff Summary of CIA file, *House Select Committee on Assassinations,*
~~_____~~ (rough notes) (Ref. ~~_____~~ November 7, 1963)
See fn. 3, *CIA report*
19. ~~JFK #012887~~, p. 1, (Ref. FBI Report #105-121010- of departure, January 8, 1963)
20. *report*
Ibid., at 2, (Ref. CIA ~~_____~~, May 7, 1963, Re: ~~_____~~)
21. Ibid., at 3, (Ref. FBI Memo, June 3, 1963, Re: Santiago Alvarez Rodriguez)
22. Ibid., at 4 (Ref. FBI Memo, June 26, 1963, Re: Paulino Sierra Martinez)
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., at 8, (Ref. FBI Memo November 2, 1963 from Miami.
25. ~~JFK #_____~~ News article, Chicago Tribune, March 10, 1963, (JFK Document # 013397)
- CIA
26. ~~HSCA~~ Staff Summary of ~~_____~~ Handbook, *House Select Committee on Assassinations,*
~~_____~~ (JFK Security Number #020).
27. Ibid.
- See fn. 3,*
28. ~~JFK #012887~~, p. 6, *4*
(Ref. FBI Report, February 25, 1964 from Miami, Re: Paulino Sierra Martinez, information from Gilberto Rodriguez Fernandez)

- 29 ~~30~~. Ibid.
- 30 ~~31~~. HSCA Summary of CIA files, *House Select Committee on Assassinations*
p. 6, (~~_____~~)
~~_____~~ Undated report
- 31 ~~32~~. JFK ~~_____~~, p. 3, HSCA Staff summary of FBI file
for Carlos Rodriguez Quesada, (Ref. FBI Report #105-
1210-31, January 28, 1964, from Chicago, Re: Paulino
Sierra Martinez.), *House Select Committee on Assassinations*, p. 3.
- 32 ~~33~~. Ibid.
See fn. 3,
- 33 ~~34~~. JFK #012887, p. 1, (Ref. News article, May 19, 1963,
Miami News, Miami
- 34 ~~35~~. Ibid., p. 2, (Ref. CIA ~~_____~~, May 7, 1963,
~~_____~~ *report*
- 35 ~~36~~. Ibid., p. 4, (Ref. FBI Memo from Chicago, June 26, 1963,
Re: Paulino Sierra Martinez)
- 36 ~~37~~. Ibid.
- 37 ~~38~~. Ibid.
- 38 ~~39~~. Ibid., p. 2, (Ref. FBI report #105-121010-2, June 14, 1963)
- 39 ~~40~~. Ibid., p. 2, (Ref. FBI Report #105-121010-3, May 25, 1963,
Teletype to Director from SAC, Chicago, Re: Paulino
Sierra Martinez)
- 40 ~~41~~. Ibid.
- 41 ~~42~~. Ibid.
- 42 ~~43~~. Ibid., p. 3, (Ref. FBI Memo, June 3, 1963, Re: Santiago
Alvarez Rodriguez)
- 43 ~~44~~. Ibid., p. 4 (Ref. FBI Memo, June 29, 1963, Re: Paulino
Sierra Martinez)
- 44 ~~45~~. Ibid.
- 45 ~~46~~. Ibid.
- 46 ~~47~~. Ibid., p. 2, (Ref. CIA ~~_____~~, May 7, 1963; *report* See
Re: ~~Paulino Sierra Martinez~~)
also CIA
HSCA Staff Summary of ~~_____~~ Handbook,
~~_____~~. *House Select Committee on Assassinations.*
See fn. 3,
- 47 ~~48~~. JFK #012887, p. 7, (Ref. FBI Memo, September 23, 1963, Re:
Paulino Sierra Martinez)

JGCE, F tnotes, p. 4

48 ~~49~~. HSCA Staff Summary of CIA ^{undated report}
~~██████████~~ p. 6, (Ref. ~~██████████~~)
(House Select Committee on Assassinations)

49 ~~50~~. Ibid.

50 ~~51~~. Ibid.

51 ~~52~~. Ibid.

52 ~~53~~. Ibid., p. 3, ^{CIA undated report}
~~██████████~~

~~53~~ ~~54~~. Ibid., p. 3 (Ref. Attachment to #00 A(S) 3, 255, 815)

53 ~~54~~. Ibid.

54 ~~55~~. ^{Sec fn. 3}
~~JFK #012887~~ p. 7 (Ref. FBI Memo to Director from SAC, Miami, December 10, 1963, re: Americanism Educational League)

~~55~~ ~~56~~. Ibid.

~~56~~ ~~57~~. Ibid. *Note: Mold was also listed as a member of "Americans for Freedom" at the same address as the American Educational League. There is no evidence that this group was ever investigated by the FBI (See HSCA Staff Summary of CIA file ~~██████████~~ p. 6, ~~██████████~~ undated CIA report

~~57~~ ~~58~~. ^{Sec fn. 3}
~~JFK #012887~~ p. 1 (Ref. CIA ~~██████████~~ report April 30, 1963, confidential)

~~58~~ ~~59~~. Ibid. p. 11 (Ref. CIA ~~██████████~~ report, July 5, 1963, Secret)

Also, p. 2 (Ref. CIA ~~██████████~~ report, May 7, 1963, ~~██████████~~)
Also, HSCA Staff Summary of CIA file ^{House Select Committee on Assassinations} for Sierra, p. 6, ~~██████████~~ May 9, 1963 ~~██████████~~

~~59~~ ~~60~~. ^{CIA memorandum}
^{Sec fn. 3}
~~JFK #012887~~ p. 3 (Ref. Memo to Director from SAC, Chicago, June 26, 1963, Re: Paulino Sierra Martinez)

~~60~~ ~~61~~. ^{Conclusion based on review of all documents pertaining to Sierra}
^{Sec fn. 3}
~~██████████~~ report

~~61~~ ~~62~~. ~~JFK #012887~~ p. 10 (Ref. CIA ~~██████████~~ report, November 7, 1963, ~~██████████~~ and p. 11 (Ref. ~~██████████~~, 406, July 5, 1963, ~~██████████~~)

^{House Select Committee on Assassinations}
~~62~~ ~~63~~. HSCA Staff Summary of CIA files, ~~██████████~~ p. 10 (Ref. CIA ~~██████████~~ Cuba/Columbia, November 7, 1963) ^{report}

^{Sec fn. 3}
~~63~~ ~~64~~. ~~JFK #012887~~ p. 9 (Ref. FBI Memo, November 2, 1963 from Miami, Re: JGCE, p. 41)

JGCE, tnotes, p. 5

~~64~~ ~~64~~ Ibid, p. 9 (Ref. CIA ~~██████████~~ ^{report}, November 14, 1963, ~~██████████~~)

~~66~~ ~~65~~ Ibid, p. 7 (Ref. FBI Memo, November 14, 1963 from Miami Re: INTERPEN), p. 8 (FBI Memo, November 2, 1963, from Miami, Re: JGCE, pp. 29-30)
Also, ~~██████████~~ Gerry Patrick Hemming Chronology from FBI files, ~~9~~.

~~67~~ ~~66~~ ~~██████████~~ ^{Sec fn 3,} JPK #012887, p. 8 (Ref. FBI Memo, November 2, 1963, from Miami, Re: JGCE, pp. 29-30)
*Note: The use of soldiers-of-fortune types such as Wilson and Garman may have been a result of prior contact with Hemmings' men by Carlos Rodriguez, Quesada and the MILTN. See FBI notes - Quesada; Hemming Chronology)

~~68~~ ~~67~~ Ibid., p. 10 (Ref. CIA ~~██████████~~ ^{report}, October 16, 1963, Confidential)

~~69~~ ~~68~~ Ibid. *Note: Aquilar's group affiliation is unknown. However, he was known to be acquainted with Loran Hall, Lawrence Howard, and William Seymour, who spent much time at Aquilar's house. See Memo 6/5/68 of conversation with Aquilar. See also 11/1/63 Miami Police Memo Re: Hemming complaint that Hall stole rifle. Notes that Hall staying with Aquilar at that time.

think
~~70~~ ~~69~~ ~~██████████~~ ^{Sec fn 3,} JPK #012887, p. 6 (Ref. FBI Memo, November 1, 1963 from Miami, Re: SNFE)

~~71~~ ~~70~~ Ibid., p. 7 (Ref. CIA ~~██████████~~ ^{report}, November 22, 1963, Confidential). Also, HSCA Staff Summary ^{House Select Committee on Assassinations,} of CIA file for Sierra, p. 2 (Ref. ~~██████████~~ 4039, November 14, 1963)
^{CIA Report}

~~72~~ ~~71~~ Ibid., p. 9 (Ref. FBI Memo November 2, 1963 from Miami, JGCE, p. 43) and p. 5 (Ref. CIA ~~██████████~~ ^{report}, May 17, 1963). Also, HSCA Staff Summary of CIA file, ~~██████████~~ ^{House Select Committee on Assassinations,} p. 1 (Ref. Dispatch ~~██████████~~ 12627, November 20, 1963 with attachment ~~██████████~~)

~~73~~ ~~72~~ ~~██████████~~ ^{Staff} HSCA Staff Summary of CIA file, ~~██████████~~ ^{House Select Committee on Assassinations,} pp. 1-2 (Ref. Dispatch ~~██████████~~ 12627, November 20, 1963, with attachment ~~██████████~~)

~~74~~ ~~73~~ Ibid., pp. 1-2 and p. 5 (Ref. CIA Memo ~~██████████~~, April 18, 1963)

74. Ibid., p. 2 (Ref. Dispatch [redacted] 12627, November 20, 1963, with attachment [redacted])
75. Ibid., also JFK #012887, p. [redacted] (Ref. CIA [redacted] Report, September 27, 1963, Confidential)
76. HSCA Staff Summary of CIA file, [redacted] p. 9 (Ref. CIA [redacted] report: Cuba, September 14, 1963)
77. HSCA Staff Summary of CIA file, [redacted] p. 2 (Ref. [redacted] report, November 14, 1963)
78. See fn. 3, JFK #012887, p. 8 (Ref. FBI Memo, November 2, 1963 from Miami, Re: JGCE, pp. 29-30)
79. HSCA Staff Summary of CIA file, [redacted] p. 2 (Ref. [redacted] report, November 14, 1963)
80. See fn. 3, JFK #012887, p. 7 (Ref. FBI Memo, November 1, 1963, Miami, Re: SNFE)
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid., p. 8 (Ref. FBI Memo, November 2, 1963 from Miami, Re: JGCE, pp. 29-30)
84. Ibid., p. 10 (Ref. CIA [redacted] report, October 15, 1963, [redacted]); Also, HSCA Staff Summary of CIA file, [redacted] p. 2 (Ref. [redacted] report, October 15, 1963 Extract)
85. HSCA Summary, [redacted] CIA Handbook, House Select Committee on Assassinations
86. See fn. 3, JFK #012887, p. 9 (Ref. FBI Memo, November 2, 1963 from Miami, Re: JGCE, p. 37)
87. Ibid., pp. 10-11 (Ref. CIA [redacted] report, September 13, 1963, [redacted])
88. HSCA Staff Summary of CIA file for Sierra, [redacted] p. 2 (Ref. CIA report, November 14, 1963 extract); Also, JFK #012887, p. 9 (Ref. CIA [redacted] report, November 14, 1963, [redacted])
89. HSCA Staff Summary of CIA file, [redacted] p. 2 (Ref. CIA report, November 14, 1963)
90. See fn. 3, JFK #012887, p. 8 (Ref. CIA [redacted] report, December 11, 1963, [redacted])

JGCE, otnotes, p. 7

91. Ibid. *House Select Committee on Assassinations*
Also, HSCA Staff Summary of CIA file, [REDACTED], p. 2
(Ref. Dispatch [REDACTED]-12627, November 20, 1963, with
attachment [CAS-63-154])
See fn. 3,
92. JPR #01288, p. 8 (Ref. CIA *report* [REDACTED], December 11,
1963, [REDACTED])
93. JPR #01288, p. 11 (Ref. CIA *report* [REDACTED],
September 13, 1963, [REDACTED]) *House Select Committee on Assassinations*
94. HSCA Staff Summary of CIA file, [REDACTED], p. 2 (Ref.
Dispatch [REDACTED]-12627, November 20, 1963, with
attachment) [REDACTED]
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.

DAVID FERRIE

FOOTNOTES

~~Printer's Note: JFK file numbers~~
~~have been placed in front~~
~~of documents when they~~
~~should go at the end of the~~
~~cite. Please correct this as~~
~~you find it.~~

1. Memo from Sedgebeer to Giarmusso, New Orleans DA's office, '5/22/64, (JFK #003840).
New Orleans Police Report of Francis Martello, 11/25/63

2. FBI Report, #62-109060, Interview of Jerry P. Stein, 11/25/63, (p.300);

FBI report, #62-109060, Interview of Jack S. Martin, 11/25/63, (p.309);

Note: All FBI reports were obtained from File #62-109060 unless otherwise specifically noted.

3. JFK #014904, FAA Vol. 1, Jack Martin letter to Robert Robey of FAA, 11/25/63;
FBI report, Interview of Jack Martin, 11/25/63, (p.309);
New Orleans Police Report, Interview of Edward Voebel, 11/27/63, ↗

4. FBI Report, Interview of David Ferrie, 11/26/63

5. ~~Immunized Testimony~~ *Hearing Before the House Select Committee on Assassinations,*
~~Deposition of Carlos Marcello, 1/11/78,~~ ¹ p. 67.

FBI Report, Interview of G. Wray Gill, 11/27/63;

FBI Memo, #62-109060-5255, Regis Kennedy, p.2, 5/18/67

Note: There are discrepancies as to whether Ferrie was in the courthouse or in Gill's office on the day of the assassination. Marcello and Kennedy said Ferrie was in the courtroom. (Both Statements taken some years after the event) Gill said he knew Ferrie was in Gill's office at 12:15 p.m. on 11/22/63, because Gill had called his secretary at that time to tell her the Federal Grand Jury had returned a verdict in favor of Marcello. Gill's secretary told Gill Ferrie had left Gill's office at that time (12:15p.m.) stating he would return at 1:30 p.m. which he failed to do. Gill's secretary, Alcie Guidroz, was not questioned as to Ferrie's whereabouts.

Ferrie told the FBI he was in New Orleans "all day" on November 11, 1963. The date, November 11, may have been a typographical error meant to have been 11/22/63,

FERRIE, Footnotes, p.2.

since there is no significance to 11/11/63. (See FBI report 11/26/63 for interview with Ferrie)

6. FBI report, interview of David Ferrie, 11/26/63
7. FBI Report, Interview of Melvin Coffey, 11/20/73. Coffey told of plan for trip since November 20, although he did not know the destination. He said Ferrie and Beauboeuf particularly interested in ice skating so they went to Houston.
8. FBI Report Interview of M. Coffey, 11/30/63, Said Plane not airworthy for some time. Last heard it used Feb. '63;
- FBI Report, Interview of James Lewallen, 11/27/63, p. 214.

161. Report statement of David Korte, 1/28/63, p. 200.
Korte said the phone had not been disconnected
until the Spring of 1962.

NOTE: While the evidence tends to ^{show} indicate ~~indicate~~ Ferris
plane had not been in working order for
some time, an FBI document would
indicate that Jack Martin believed Ferris
Stinson was airworthy as of July 1963, or
at least that a Stinson aircraft was
available to him at that time. (See Tenn
Criminal FBI vol 1, memo to file 7/18/63.)

9. SS Report #CO-2-34, 030, 12/13/63, p.5.

(JFK 014204)

FERRIE, Footnotes, p.3

- Vol. 4
15. ~~SR~~ ^{Ferrie} 11/19/62 p.10 Meister interview:
Said ~~some~~ "wears a toupee, possibly self-made"
FBI Report 9/22/61, p.5. Mrs. Nichols who knew of
~~some~~ said he wears a wig."
FAA ~~Vol. 4~~, Robey Report, p.9, Interview of
~~Mr~~ E.W. Christiansen, p.10 Interview Col Joseph G.
Ehrlicher.

~~Ibid~~, ~~FAA Vol. 2~~, Exhibit III, Statement of Cadet;

16. FBI report, Interview of Mrs. Dunn and Mrs. Nichols
9/22/61. ~~FAA Vol. 2, Exhibit III, Statement of Cadet~~
(~~"A. B. ..."~~)

17. ~~SR~~ ^{FAA Vol. 2} 11-N-224, 11/19/62, p.10, Interview of Al Meister, ^(JFK Document 014904)

18. ~~FAA~~ ^{Ferrie} Vol. ~~3~~, Exhibit XX.
~~some~~ file from St. Charles Seminary 12/1/61. ~~some~~
^{Ferrie} described as "critical of authority", "careless about
observing rules", ignored authority", "indulges freely
in criticism of his superiors";
FAA Vol. 4 Robey Report, p.10 Interview of Col. Joseph
G. Ehrlicher - "resided authority".

19. ~~Ibid~~, ^{grs} ~~FAA Vol. 2~~ ^{Ferrie}
SR 1-N-224, 11/19/62 Interview of George Piazza who
told ~~SR~~ investigator, "~~some~~ is the type of individual
who fancies himself an expert in all matters and, hence,
believes himself infallible. To this end ~~some~~ would
express his philosophical ideas in no uncertain terms." ^{Ferrie}
FAA Vol. III Exhibit XX Ferrie file from St. Charles
Seminary.; FAA Vol. 4, Report of Robey, p.7.
Rev. Francis B. Sullivan, professor of Theology at
St. Charles Seminary - Feels Ferrie to be a "pre-
conditioned ~~psycho~~", impresses people by pretending
to be an expert on everything, definitely has a talent
for character assassination" p. 11 Douyear McGray -
called Ferrie "Eccentric and dictatorial" p. 12 -
Al Meister - "Officious and dictatorial."

20. ~~Ibid~~ ⁴
FAA File, Vol ~~3~~, Exhibit III, Statement of Cadet (~~some~~
~~Al Meister~~) 12/1/61 Ferrie seemed to hold
the cadets in the palm of his hand", p. 4. S.R. 11-N-224,
11/19/62, p.10, Interview of Al Meister, Ferrie, very
influential. Interview of Pi ~~some~~, ~~some~~ Ferrie,
"seemed to have a certain talent and background in the
use of psychology and would use this as well as his
philosophical ideas to influence some of the youths in
the CAP Squadron."

~~some~~ Interview of Bob Boyleston, 10/17/78, ^{House Select Committee on Assassinations} (JFK Document 012865)

FBI Report 10/30/61, "David William Ferrie" Interview of

FERRIE, DAVID Footnotes, p.4.

- (JFK# 014904) John Harris - "Ferrie has a group of young boys whom he supports and controls completely; ~~FAA Vol. 4, Robey Report, p.9. Interview of Col. Harry A. Webb I had ability to get affection of the cadets and that they would do almost anything for him.~~"
21. Ibid.
SR 11-N-244, 11/19/62, p.10 Meister advised that he had heard through cadet sources...That subject is possibly a homosexual." Also, Ferrie "hated women.";
FBI Interview of ~~A.~~ Gifford, 11/25/63;
~~FAA Vol. 4 Robey Report, p.11, Joseph Howard - Ferrie told him girls and women were no good and intellectually inferior to men. John Johnson~~ ^{said} Ferrie thought women dense. (JFK Document 014904)
22. Ibid.
SR 11-N-224, 1/25/63 p.16, Mrs. Jean ^aNatz;
FBI Report, 9/22/61, #105-104-340-3, p.4,
Interview of Joseph Lisman, and Interview of Mrs. Ruby Nichols p. 5.
23. ~~SR 11-N-224, 12/19/62, p.19,~~
~~St. Charles Seminary~~ ↑
Ferrie was treated for emotional problems in 1944, (JFK Document 014904);
FAA Vol 2,
Letter of J.H. Ferrie to St. Charles Seminary
~~SR 11-N-224, Exhibit 777, p. 23.~~
24. Ibid., p.18-19
FAA, Vol III, exhibit
25. Ibid.
FAA Vol III, exhibit
Transcript of grades from Baldwin - Wallace College, Berea, Ohio, 6/9/41, Lists all courses
26. JFK# 014930, synopsis of Southern Research,
SBA Hearing, testimony of Ronald Hubner, ~~SBA~~ investigator,
~~p.3;~~
JFK# 014904
VOL K. FAA file - ALPA SBA,
D.W. Ferrie, 15-63, 29-63, 48-63
EAL EXH #6, Letter of 12/17/62 from ~~Vernon D. McDaniel~~ ^{of}
U.S. Foreign Service to Mr. Risley, Southern Research ↑
27. JFK# 014930
SBA Hearing, Ferrie Testimony, Synopsis, p.4,
Ferrie claims he also wrote a doctor's thesis for his degree on an aspect of the psychology of vision - the use of hypnotherapy in ~~retinitis~~.

FERRIE, Footnotes, p.5

28. ~~Interviews of associates~~

JFK # 014904

FAA Vol 4 Robert Robey Report, p.11, John Johnson, - Ferrie told them he had taken a pre-medical course; p.12, Al Landry ^{said Ferrie} told him he was studying at Tulane University, Robert Morrel (FAA Vol 4, Robey Report, p.11) Ferrie led people to believe he was studying medicine at Tulane University.

p. 15 - Karl Koster ^{said Ferrie} told him he studied medicine. Ferrie also had a copy of a PHD degree in psychology on ~~his~~ his wall.

29.

JFK # 014930 Synopsis

SBA Hearing, "Testimony of John Irion; ✓

JFK # 014904

FAA, Vol. 4, Robey Report, p.8 Edward W. Strubo, advised ~~some~~ tried hypnosis on the students.)
Ferrie

p. 10 Robert E. Morrell, "he had seen David Ferrie use hypnosis" →

30.

~~Staff~~ Staff Interview of John Irion, 10/19/78, p.3

JFK # 012754;

JFK # 014904

FAA Vol 4, Robey Report, p.8, Report,
FAA Vol 4, ~~Statement of~~ ~~Confidential~~ (p.1)
8/22/61 Jefferson Parish PD, Juvenile Division

House Select Committee On
ASSASSINATIONS,

31.

^(bid) FAA, Vol 4, Robey Report, p. 10 Robert Morrell - (Ferrie claims he lost his hair in an experiment with Cancer ~~serum~~ p. 12, Al Landry ^{said} Ferrie told him loss due to chemical explosion; Landry's father was told it was due to radiation, p. 13 Larry C. Adams "lost in a Chemical experiment"

serum,

32. ^{Sis of} SBA Hearing, Dr. Isadore Yager, p.2; ~~thought it had been~~

~~SBA Hearing, Ferrie testimony~~ of David Ferrie, p.4-5

~~SBA Hearing, Ferrie testimony~~ - Ferrie admitted using "Dr.", but ~~for~~ legitimate reasons, ^{He claimed he had} a PHD degree from Phoenix University, Bari, Italy.

~~He listed himself as Dr. David W. Ferrie, "Research Psychologist" for billing with telephone company, SA # 224, 11/19/62~~

JFK # 014904

VOL K FAA File ALPA SBA,
DW Ferrie, 15-63-29-63, 48-63,
EAL Exhibit 4a photocopy of telephone book with Ferrie listing.

FERRIE, Footnotes, p.6

33. bid,
FAA Vol. 2, Exhibit III, Statement of Cadet (~~protest identity~~) "he was believed to be a medical doctor and a doctor of philosophy."
JFK#014930
SBA Hearing, testimony of Dr. Isadore Yager, Synopsis, p.2.
34. bid,
SBA Hearing, Ferrie Testimony Synopsis, p.4.
35. JFK#014904
FAA, Vol 2, Exhibit III, p.4, Statement of Cadet (~~protest identity~~) Ferrie constantly preached to us on the subject of religion. . . . insisted we attend church . . . and remember to pray."
36. Although Ferrie denies applying for ordainment to any church, (SBA hearing, Ferrie testimony) ~~however~~, he has shown such a desire since his youth - SR-11-N-224-12/19/62, JFK#014904 ;

See FBI Report #52-109060-4595, 3/2/67, p.1 Interview of Carl John Stanley, "Archbishop of the Metropolitan Eastern Province, American Orthodox Catholic Church, told the FBI he consecrated Ferrie as bishop in July 1961 but deposed him in January 1962 when it was learned he had been discharged from his Eastern Airlines position because of homosexual activity." JFK#014904 in FAA Vol. 2 Exhibit III, p.4, Statement of Cadet (~~protest identity~~) Several times he (Ferrie) considered becoming a priest."
Note to writer: separate cite from FBI report - Cite.
37. JFK#014930
SBA Hearings, Testimony of Ferrie Synopsis, p.4.
38. FBI report of SA's E. Wall and T. Viatel, Interview of Ferrie, 11/27/63 62-109060 Supported Kennedy Civil Rights program
39. JFK#014904
~~Indication of this~~ - FAA Vol. 3,

Ferrie letter to Capt. G.E. Greiner 10/30/61 suggesting persecution of himself by Communists.
40. FBI Report, 9/22/61, Interview of Joseph Lisman
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.

FERRIE, Footnotes, p.7

43. Ibid.

44. JFK# 014904
Vol. K. FAA file, ALPA, SBA EAL EXH#7, D.W. Ferrie, 15-63,
29-63, 48-63 Title of talk - "Cuba" - April 1961 Present, Future

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. FBI report 11/27/63 p. 199 Ferrie later admitted that after the Bay of Pigs invasion he severely criticized President John F. Kennedy, both in public and in private. ~~He~~ He said he had also been critical of any President riding in an open car and had made the statement that anyone could hide in the bushes and shoot a president. ~~He~~ However, he denied ever making a statement that Kennedy should be killed with the intention that this be done. ~~He~~

47. JFK# 014904
FAA, Vol. 4, p.17 Robey Report, Interview of Charles Williams IRS Agent.

48. Ibid.

49. JFK# 014930, Synopsis of SBA Hearing,
~~SBA Hearing~~, testimony of Cornelius Michael Kramer, p. 4

50. JFK# 014904
FAA Vol 2, Exhibit GGG, 11-N-224, 1/25/63, p.10, ↓

51. Ibid.
FAA Vol. 4, Attachment J. Ferrie application for employment for Eastern Airlines 4/16/51.

52. Ibid. FAA Vol. 2
SR 11-N-224, 1/25/63, p.15.

53. Ibid.
FAA Vol 2 Exhibit FFF SR-11-N-224, 12/19/62 p.20

54. Ibid.
~~SR 11-N-224, 12/19/62, p.20 Exhibit FFF~~

55. Ibid, p.21
~~SR 11-N-224, 12/19/62 Exhibit FFF, p.21~~

56. Ibid.
~~SR 11-N-224, 12/19/62, Exhibit FFF, p.21~~

FERRIE, Footnotes, p.8

57. Ibid.
FAA, Vol 2, Exhibit GGG, SR 11-N-224, 1/25/63, p. 13-14
58. Ibid. FAA Vol. 3, Exhibit SS
U.S. Civil Service Commission, report of Record search, 9/29/61
for David Ferrie, gives military record (~~FAA, Vol 2, Exhibit~~
~~SS~~)
59. Ibid.
Vol. K, FAA file ALPA SBA, D.W. Ferrie, #1563, 29-63, 48-63, Legal
Brief, ~~of EAL~~ grievance of David W. Ferrie, p. 9-10.
of Eastern Airlines
60. Ibid.
Vol. R - EAL file, Ferrie, D.W. Personnel Records
6/15/51 - Transferred to N.O. "due to domicile preference."
61. Ibid.
FAA Vol 4, Attachment L, Memo from J.H. Halliburton to
Capt. J.F. Gill, 5/23/51;
EAL received derogatory info. from Retail Credit Bureau
5/21/51
62. Ibid.;
Memo from J.F. Gill to Capt. G.E. Thomas, 6/26/51 Attachment M,
Memo from F.A. Stone to G.E. Thomas 7/5/51 Attachment O
63. Ibid.
FAA Vol. 4 Attachment Q;
Memo 7/13/51 from G.E. Thomas to Capt. F.A. Stone. "I have
had him with a couple of Captains here and their reports are
nothing but the best." They say he has excellent possibilities.
64. Ibid.
Attachment P,
Handwritten note from "George" to Capt. John on Memo from
J.H. Halliburton to Capt. G.E. Greiner, 7/61/59
65. Ibid.
FAA Vol. 4, Attachment T. Memo 3/19/59 A.T. Thornhill to
Capt. E.V. Rickenbacher.
66. Ibid.
FAA, Vol 4, Attachment H
Letter E.V. Rickenbacher to D.W. Ferrie 3/23/53,
Rickenbacher had noted to the file "This man's efforts
bear watching and his qualifications justify his being
used and helped whenever possible in line of duty - and
even beyond."

FERRIE, Footnotes p. 9

67. Among the complaints *against Ferrie:*

ibid, FAA exhibit HHH 9/7/60 letter to Ferrie from R.W. Tyler. Acting regional counsel for Eastern. Re: use of Ferrie's plane by student pilot carrying a passenger. Plane not properly certificated or registered.;

SR-11-N-224, 11/19/62, *Regarding*: Allowing use of rider pass to George Piazza who Ferrie claimed was his "ward".;

Also FAA; Vol. 3, Exhibit EE;

FAA, Vol.3, exhibit II, Memo to Capt. P.L. Foster, 12/19/59, ~~RE: A Near Miss, 11/24/59~~ *Regarding a near miss of a mid-air collision, 11/24/59*

68. *ibid*, ASR-11-N-224, 12/19/62 Exhibit FFF, p.21

69. FBI Report #105-104-340-1, 9/22/61, p.4

70. *JFK#014904*
SR-11-N-224, 1/25/63, p.15, ↓

- 70a. *ibid*, FAA, Vol. 3, Ex YY, Letter to Col. D.H. Haas, 10/21/58, from Robert E. Morrell

71. FBI Report #105-104-340-1, 9/22/61, p.4.

72. *JFK#014904*
FAA Vol. 3, Exhibit XX, letter 10/21/58, Robert Morrell to Col. D. Haas ↑

73. FBI Report # 105, 104340-1, 9/22/61, p.4.

74. *JFK#014930* Synopsis of SBA Hearing
JFK#014904 Testimony of John Irion; ↓
FAA Vol. 3, EX YY, Letter 10/21/78 From Robert Morrell to Col. D.A. Haas, →

75. *ibid*, FAA Vol. 4, Robey Report, p.9 Attach XX;

JFK#014904 CAP
The Drill Team once went to Dallas, according to Bob Boyleston, HSCA Interview, 10/18/78. Ferrie made all the arrangements and appeared to have had contacts there. *Date of the alleged trip is unknown*

76. *JFK#014904*
Flight FAA Vol 4, p.14-15 Robey Report - Interview of Ted Abernathy. *He said* instructions and flight time forbidden to CAP cadets.

FERRIE, Footnotes, p. 10

77. JFK#014930 Synopsis of SBA Hearing Testimony of Ronald Hubner. Synopsis p. 3. JFK#014904 FAA, Vol. 2, Exhibit III, Statement of Cadet ~~(P. Abernathy protect identity)~~ p.2
78. ibid FAA, Vol 2, Exhibit III, Statement of Cadet ~~(P. Abernathy protect identity)~~, p.2 Ferrie's house "center of operations for his group."
79. ibid FAA Vol. 4, Robey Report; p. 10, Interview of Robert Morrell.
80. JFK#014930 Synopsis of SBA Hearing, 8/8/63, Testimony of James R. Lewallen, p.8
81. JFK#014904 SR 11-N-224, 11/19/62, p.21, Interview of Spontenelli; FAA Vol. 2, Exhibit III, Statement of Cadet ~~(P. Abernathy protect identity)~~ p. 6 Ferrie "encouraged the boys to become priests if the felt inclined in that direction." FAA Vol. 4, Robey Report p. 11, Father Ward, Priest, Ferrie called him up and started sending him CAP members expressed a desire to go into the priest-hood. p. 13, Al Meister - Ferrie was instrumental in persuading him to go into seminary.
82. House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK document 008629) Contact Report of Layton Martens, 5/25/78, from Jim Garrison 11/14/77, JFK#003287
83. JFK#014930 Synopsis of SBA Hearing, Testimony of ~~SBA testimony~~ John Espenan, ~~His father~~ father of Cadet JFK#014904 SR 11-N-224, 11/19/62 ex. EEE, p.9, ibid FAA, Vol, 4, Robey Report, p.10 Interview of Col. J. Ehrlicher
84. JFK#014930 Synopsis of ~~SBA Hearing~~ SBA Hearing, testimony of John R. Espenan, ~~Synopsis~~ p.2-3; Testimony of David Ferrie, synopsis, p.6; JFK#014904 SR 11-N-224, 11/19/62, Exhibit EEE, p.9
85. ibid Vol K. FAA file, ALBA SBA, D.W. Ferrie, 15-63, 29-63, 48-63 Brief of EAL on grievance of Ferrie, p. 13
86. ibid FAA Vol 2, Exhibit GGG SR - 11-N-224, 12/19/62, p.6
87. JFK#014930 Synopsis of SBA Hearing, Testimony of Ferrie, Testimony of John Ernest Irion; JFK#014904 FAA Vol 4, Robey Report p. 14 ~~Groups on different echelons~~

FERRIE, Footnotes, p. 11

88. Ibid.
FAA Vol. 4, Attachment I,
10-30-61, FBI Report;
SR 11-N-224, 12/19/62, p. 7 ~~also statement of Abernathy~~
While would-be members claimed approaches were made to them
to join the group, ~~Banister~~ testified there never was such
a group by that name, SBA Hearing, ~~Banister~~ testimony.
Banister
89. Ibid.
~~Florida New York~~
- 90a. JFK#003840 Secret Service
~~Report~~ Report, 12/13/63 #CO-2-34, 030
p. 4 ~~Report~~ travelled to San Antonio, Corpus
Christi, Brownsville
91. JFK#014904
FAA Vol. 3 Exhibit FF. Memo to C.J. Simons from S.J.
Minnisale, 8/14/59
~~He emphatically denied he had been to Dallas for about the~~
~~last 8-10 years.~~
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. JFK#014904
FAA, Vol. 3
Letter to Capt. G.E. Greicher, 10/30/61 from Ferrie
95. JFK#008629
~~Martens, p. 5~~ HSCA Contact Report - Layton Martens, 5/25/70;
- JFK#014904
FAA, Vol. 4 Robey report, Attachment I FBI Report 10-30-61
Interviewed ~~Ferric~~ Ferric 8/22/61, p.4;
FAA file, ALPA SBA D.W. Ferrie, 15-63, 29-63, 48-63;
EAL EXH;
Juvenile Bureau Report 8/18/61, Item #H8507-61, pg.2
96. Ibid.
~~Report~~ FBI 8/22/61 Report
Note:
It was also reported that Ferrie had applied for Visa to
Venezuela on 11/15/61, which request was denied. Ferrie had
also applied for a passport. His purpose ^{is} unknown.
FAA Vol. 5, Attachment QQ
97. Ibid.
Note: The submarines were found in a 9/22/61 search of Ferrie's house.
Also discovered among Ferrie's effects: a Morse code key, four

FERRIE, Footnotes, p. 13

110. VPK# 014983, Synopsis of SBA Hearing, Testimony of Roland P. Fournier, Re: Ferrie involvement in Alexander Landry and Albert Cheramie cases, p. 12
111. Ibid. SBA Hearings Testimony of Roland P. Fournier, Sergeant, New Orleans - Juvenile Bureau;
JFK# 014904 Vol. K. FAA file, ALPA SBA D.W. Ferrie, #15-63, 29-63, 48-63, EAL Exhibit, Insert #1, Juvenile Bureau Report, 8/18/61 Item H-8507-01 p.6
112. Ibid. FAA Vol.D Vol. 4, Attach C, Investigative results - Jefferson Parish Pd Juvenile Division 8/29/61, Ferrie "suspected of harboring the juvenile and also encouraging him to run away from home."
Alpa #48-63 - Letter from William G. Bell to Capt. V.O. Rowland, 5/2/63;
Vol. K. FAA file ALPA, SBA, D.W. Ferrie 15-63, 29-63, 48-63, EAL Exhibit, Insert #1, Juvenile Bureau Report 8/18/61 Item # H-8507-61
~~Protect Identity~~
113. Ibid. SR-11-N-224, 11/19/62, ~~Ex 1~~ EEE, p.3 from Louisiana State Police Criminal Record for David N. Ferrie;
Alpa #48-63, Letter from Bell to Rowland 5/2/63
114. Ibid. Alpa file #48-63, Letter from William Bell to Capt. V.G. Rowland 5/2/63;
FAA File - ALPA, SBA, D.W. Ferrie, 15-63, 29-63, 48-63, EAL Exhibit, Insert #1, Juvenile Bureau Report, 8/18/61, Item #H-8507-61, p.4

FERRIE, Footnotes, p. 12

1903 model springfield rifles, two .22 calibre rifles, one ~~English~~ rifle, a flare gun, .38 calibre revolver, a sword a quantity of ammunition 3 maps (of Havana Harbor, the coast of Cuba, west Indies, Cuba and North Coast) plus the two submarines.
FAA Vol. 4 - Attachments F thru I-~~he~~^{he} said he purchased the guns at the Crescent Gun Shop, N.O.

98. JFK # 008846 HSCA interview of Carlos Quiroga, ~~interview~~ 6/2/78, attached material. Also in FBI 62-109060 FOIA materials, interview of Quiroga by New Orleans District Attorney's office.
99. JFK # C14904 FAA Vol. 4, Robey Report, p.12, Michael Finney said Ferrie had been training Cuban pilots in the New Orleans area.
100. JFK # 012728 Interview of John Irion, 10/28/78; JFK # 012754, interview of John Irion, 10/19/78.
101. FBI Teletype 5/7/67, to Director from New Orleans, 62-109060-5237.
102. JFK # 014904 FAA Vol. 4, Attachment I, FBI Report 10/30/61 New Orleans, Los Angeles, for David William Ferrie. (~~in FAA Vol. 4, Attachment I~~)
103. FBI 62-109060, copy of ^{District Attorney's} New Orleans interview of Carlos Quiroga, 1968. ~~Note: There are indications Ferrie also helped Arcacha Smith obtain a loan. See JFK # 00834, Statment of Herbert R. Wagner of Herb Wagner Finance Service, 12/6/67, indicating Ferrie assisted Arcacha Smith in obtaining a loan.~~
104. JFK # 014904 FAA Vol. 5, Exhibit BB, 7/18/61 Letter from Arcacha Smith to Capt. Eddie V. Rickenbacker
105. Id. FAA Vol. 5, Exhibit CC. Letter to Arcacha Smith from J.P. Halliburton, 8/1/61
- 105 - 1510, EAL file Kerne, D.W. Vacation Information Form, 4/17/61. Request for
106. ~~106. [REDACTED]~~
107. JFK # 014930 Synopsis of SR-11-N-224, 11/19/63, p. 14; SBA Hearing, Ferrie Testimony, p. 73
109. JFK # 014904 SR-11-N-224, 11/19/63, p.14,

FERRIE, Footnotes, p. 14

115. ^{bid.} SR 11-N-224, 11/19/62, Exhibit EEE,
p. 3 from La. State Police records for David W. Ferrie.;

News article "Times Picayaune, New Orleans, La.,
8/22/61, Attach B; FAA, Vol. 4;

FAA Vol. 4 Attach C,
Jefferson Parish Police Department Investigative
Report.

116. ^{bid.} SR 11-N-224, 12/19/62 FFF, p.10
Lt. Martello, P. 9-10;

JFK#003191 Secret Service interview ^{of Amesto Rodriguez,} 12/9/63 by SAs Gerrets and Rice
~~with Amesto Rodriguez~~

117. JFK#014930 Synopsis of
SBA Hearing, testimony of Sgt. Roland P. Fournier
of New Orleans Police - Juvenile Bureau

118. JFK#014904 FAA Vol. 4, Attachment C, Investigative Report of
Jefferson Parish, Police Department, New Orleans,
8/22/61, Statement of ~~Sub M. Proulx~~ juvenile.
~~(Protect Identity)~~

118. ^{bid.} FAA, Vol. 3, Exhibit HH, 8/26/61
Eastern Airlines to FAA, informing them Ferrie
removed from payroll;

Exhibit JJ. 8/29/61, Greiner to Ferrie.

120. ^{bid.} FAA Vol. 4, Exhibit A, Case of "Good Moral Character"
opened 9/8/61 by Richard E. Robey. Summary of Report.;
FAA, Vol. 3, Exhibit KK - Eastern ^{Airline} opened investigation ^{also}.

- ~~121.~~ JFK#014930 Synopsis of SBA Hearing, testimony of David Ferrie

122. JFK#014904 SR 11-N-224, 11/19/62, p. 6.

123. ^{bid.} EAL File. Grievances of David W. Ferrie, 8/5/63,
Vol. 3, Testimony of Banister, p. 840.

124. ^{bid.} ~~EAL File. Grievances of David W. Ferrie, 8/5/63,
Vol. 3, Testimony of Banister, p.825.~~

125. Ibid p. 855

126. Ibid p. 855

127. ^{bid.} ~~EAL Grievances of D. Ferrie, 8/5/63, testimony of
Guy Banister, p. 840;~~

~~USCA~~ Staff Summary of FBI file for Guy Banister, ^{House Select Committee on Assassinations}
(JFK# 012799)

FERRIE, Footnotes, p. 15

128. JFK#001986, Guy Banister File, Garrison Papers, 8/14/77. ✓
129. HSCA Staff Summary of FBI file for Guy Banister, JFK#.012799
- Note: Banister explained before the Airline Pilots Board about his work with "Arcacha Smith and others". Banister had high-ranking Cuban refugees in my office asking me how to go underground and I gave them diagrams for that. "I have talked to military and ~~political~~ political leaders from the various provinces of ~~Asia~~ Cuba that have slipped out and slipped back." ~~p. 84, SA testimony~~
- (JFK#014904)
Vol. 5. EAL File - Grievances of David W. Ferrie, 8/5/63, Vol. 3, Testimony of Banister, p. 841
130. ~~GRS SS Interview of Sam Newman~~ Secret Service file # CO-2-34, 030, 12/3/63, SA. A. Vial, p. 14. Regarding telephone
131. ~~HSCA Staff Interview of Jack Martin, HSCA~~ interview of Sam Newman
12/5-6/77 (JFK# 005212)
- ~~HSCA Staff Interview of Sam Newman, 2/14/78~~ HSCA 3/2/78, (JFK# 005962)
132. ~~HSCA Staff Interview of Jack Martin, HSCA~~
12/5/77, ~~12/6/77~~ interviews
(JFK# 005212); HSCA
- ~~HSCA Staff interview of Jack Martin, 12/6/78~~
(JFK# 005213)
133. ~~BA Hearing, Ferrie Testimony, p. 56, (JFK 014 930)~~
Synopsis of
134. ~~JFK 014904, FAA, Vol. 1, Correspondence from J. Martin.~~
ibid, FAA, Vol. 2,
135. ibid SR. 12/19/62, 11-N-224, p. 14.
136. ibid SR 11 N 224, 12/19/62, p. 14.
137. ibid SR 11 N 224.
138. ibid SR 11 N 224.
139. ibid Alpha #48-63.
Letter from G. Wray Gill to Capt. George Greiner. 1/8/63.
140. ibid FAA, Vol. 3, Exhibit KK letter from Capt. Greiner to Ferrie, 9/1/61.
141. ibid FAA, Vol. 3, Exhibit LL, letter from Ferrie to Capt. Greiner, 9/5/61.
142. ibid FAA, Vol 2, Exhibit AAA, letter of Eric Michael Crouchet to FAA, 10/22/62
143. ibid ~~letter of~~
~~Jack Martin to FAA,~~

FERRIE, Footnotes, p. 16

143. *and.*
Among those who intervened on Ferrie's behalf were Congressmen Morrison and Long, old friends of ~~Bill~~ **Go Wray Gill**
See Alpha #48-63, Letter from William G. Bell to Mr. J.O. Jarvard, 5/2/63, (JFK #014904)
144. *Ibid.*
Alpha #48-63, Letter from EAL 4/11/63 to Ferrie. Grievance #15-63 filed 1/21/63
145. *Ibid.*
Vol. K., FAA file, ALPA SBA D.W. Ferrie, #1563, 29-63, 48-63 Minutes of meeting 2/18/63, Miami
146. *Ibid.*
147. *Ibid.*
Grievance #29-63 filed 2/18/63
Grievance #48-63 filed 2/13/63;

Alpha #29-63, 6/4/63 to J.B. Railsback, **EAL**, from Charles H. Ruby, Airline Pilots Assoc.;

Letter from Ferrie to EAL 2/15/63 in ALPA 29-63
148. *Ibid.*
See Alpha files for correspondence; Alpha ~~#29-63~~ #29-63
Alpha file #48-63
Letter to Capt. J.T. Robertson from J.B. Railsback;
Alpha 45-62
Letter to D.W. Ferrie from R.W. Riverbark
149. *Vernon Gerdes, Regarding*
~~HSCA~~ Staff Interview of Louis Decker, 2/15/78 *House Select Committee on ASSASSINATIONS*
(JFK# 005207)
~~HSCA~~ Staff Interview of Carlos Quiroga 2/22/78, (JFK# 006190)
HSCA Staff Interview of Jack Martin, 12/15/77, (JFK# 005212)
150. *(JFK# 014904)*
Vol S - Miscellaneous

Letter to Capt. George W. Youngeman et al, from J.B. Railsback ~~Riverbark~~, EAL Pilots System Board of Adjustment, 7/8/63
151. *Ibid.*
Vol. T, EAL File, Grievances of David W. Ferrie, Miami, Transcript of Hearing 7/15, 16, 17, 63 Vol. I.
152. *Ibid.*
Vol. K. FAA file, ALPA SBA, D.W. Ferrie, #15-63, 29-63, 48-63 Brief of EAL on grievance of David W. Ferrie, p. 9-10

FERRIE, Footnotes p. 16

153. Ibid, Vol. U,
EAL file - Grievances of David W. Ferrie, Miami Transcript of Hearing, Vol. II
154. Ibid,
Vol. V, EAL file, Grievances of David W. Ferrie, transcript of hearing, 8/5/63 Vol. 3 p. 461-743
155. Ibid,
Vol. K, FAA file, ALPA SBA D.W. Ferrie, 15-63, 29-63, 48-63 Brief of EAL on grievances for David Ferrie, p. 10 (ALPA ex. 24)
156. Ibid,
Vol. V EAL file Grievances of David W. Ferrie 8/5/63, Vol. 3 Testimony, p. 856-857.
157. Ibid, p. 842, 858
158. Ibid, p.8
159. Ibid,
FAA Vol. 4, Robey Report p. 17
7/30/63, Attachment DDD,
Letter from William G. Bell.;

Vol M, EAL file, D.W. Ferrie ALPA
#15-63 filed 1/21/63
Decision of the Board, 9/25/63
160. Ibid,
Vol. M, EAL file, D.W. Ferrie, ALPA
#14-63, filed 1/21/63 Decision of the board 9/25/63

Note: Ferrie was awarded \$1635.90 in full settlement of all claims. See memo from T.J. Kennedy to Capt. C.F. Hamher, 10/11/63, Ferrie, D.W. file
161. FBI Report, Interview of David W Ferrie, 12/5/63
162. (JFK #014904) FAA Vol. 1, Attachment L.
Ferrie was reportedly fired from the job with Space Airfreight following complaints by FAA officials that operations under Ferrie's direction were not being carried out according to FAA regulations.
163. FBI Report 92-10976-2, 11/27/68, p. 1-4

164. (JFK #012305) ~~HSCA~~ Staff Summary of Immigration and Naturalization Service file for David Ferrie, *Committee on Assassinations, Please Select*
165. Ibid.
166. Ibid.
- (JFK #010904) FAA Vol. 4, Robey Report, Attachment I, FBI Report, 822/61, Interview of David Ferrie
167. FBI Report, Interview of Carlos Quiroga by New Orleans District Attorney's Office, 1968.
168. Ibid.
169. ~~HSCA~~ Staff Summary of FBI file for Sergio Arcacha Smith, JFK #004110 *HSCA, HIA*
170. ~~HSCA~~ Outside Contact Report, 3/13/79, 014933.
171. Ibid.
172. Ibid.
173. Ibid.
174. FBI Report, Interview of G. Wray Gill, Sr., p. 2
175. FBI Report, Interview of David Ferrie, 11/26/63, p. 3
176. Ibid.
177. Ibid.
178. (JFK #012523) Receipt of Purchase, Ewing materials, 10/16/78.
179. FBI Report, Interview of David Ferrie, 11/26/63, p. 3
180. Ibid.
181. (JFK #001985) *Item GB-2* Guy Banister File, Garrison papers, New Orleans Police report, 11/22/63.

Note: There are conflicting reports as to why Banister attacked Martin. Martin has told the Committee that it was over a remark he (Martin) had made in jest ~~xx~~ about the Kennedy assassination. Banister's secretary, Delphine Roberts, who was also present, told the Committee the two men came to blows when Martin tried to ~~xxx~~ remove certain files from the office. (See HSCA Interview of

Jack Martin, 2/15/78, p. 3, JFK # 005212 and HSCA Interview of Delphine Roberts, 7/6/78, p. 3, JFK # 009478.) The original police report referenced above indicates Banister and Martin were engaged "in various discussion about personal and political subjects" when the matter of the

FERRIE, Footnotes, p. 18

182. Ibid.

183. FBI interview of G. Wray Gill, 11/27/63,
p. 219, ~~no~~ SA J. Smith;

FBI Teletype - 11/26/63 to SAC Dallas, and Director from
SAC, New Orleans p. 2-3, 7, 15.

184. Ibid.

185. Ibid., p. 2-4, 7-8,
JFK #014904, letter from Jack Martin to Richard Rober, FAA Investigator,
11/25/63, FAA, Vol. 4.

186. FBI report, 11/25/63 Interview of Layton Martens, St.
Horerson, p. 2 (p. 302)

187. FBI Report; 11/25/63 Interview of Alvin ~~Lower Bearbeent~~ ^{Reaubeuf} by
SA Scheffer, (p. 307)

188. FBI Report, Interview of Layton Martens, 11/27/63, SA Hoverson
p. 2 (p. 303)

189. Ibid.

190. FBI Teletype, 11/26/63, to Director from SAC, New Orleans
p. 16.

191. Ibid.

SS Report, 12/13/63, CO-2-34, 030, p.4
in JFK #003840

192. FBI Teletype 11/26/63 to Director from SAC New Orleans,
p. 11-17;

SS Report, 12/13/63, CO - 2-34-030, p.3 in JFK #003840

193. FBI Teletype, 11/26/63 to Director from SAC New Orleans,
p. 12-13

Statement by David W. Ferrie in FBI File, p. 580, No. #44-2064,
12/10/63

194. FBI Teletype 11/26/63, to Director from SAC New Orleans,
p. 13;

FBI Interview of G. Wray Gill, 11/27/63

FERRIE, Footnotes, p. 19

195. FBI Interview of David Ferrie, 11/26/63, No 89-69, p. 3-4
Ferrie's ~~involvement~~^{activities} for the period 11/22-25/63 are described
in most detail in this report.
- FBI interview of Melvin Coffey, 11/30/63 New Orleans SA E. Wall.
196. FBI Report #62-109060-2143, 12/18/63
197. FBI Report #62-109060-2143, 12/18/63, p.1 Interview of Lee
Fletcher.
198. Ibid.
199. Ibid.
200. FBI Report #62-109060-2143, 12/18/63, p.1
Interview of Chuch Rolland-Ferrie called ahead on 11/22/63.
Arrived 11/23/63 between 3:30 and 5:30. Did not discuss
operating rink as Ferrie had suggested he would.
201. FBI Teletype, 11/26/63 to Director from SAC, New Orleans,
p. 14.
202. FBI Report #62-109060-2143; 12/18/63, p.2.
203. FBI Report #62-109060-2143, 12/18/63; p.1
204. FBI Report #62-109060-2143 12/18/63 p. 2 Hotel registration
card #38063 Checked in 11p.m. 11/23/63; checked out 11/24/63
Mrs. Shirley Dial, Clerk Driftwood recalled 3 individuals
checked out at around 10 a.m. on 11/24/63.
205. FBI Report #62-109060-2143, 12/18/63 Five calls made from
Alamotel, Houston and
One call made from Drift wood, Motor Hotel, Glaveston.
206. FBI Report #62-109060-2143, 12/18/63, p.1
207. FBI Report #62-109060-2143, 12/18/63, p.1 indicates Ferrie
called 947-6435 in New Orleans collect
208. ~~FBI~~ Deposition of Mrs. Jesse Garner, p. 34.

Note: While Mrs. Garner believes it was the night of

FERRIE, Footnotes, p. 20

of the assassination it would appear given that Ferrie left New Orleans that evening, that Ferrie may have come by her house on a later date.

209. Ibid.
210. JPK# 003840, Ferrie file, Item DF-T, 3/11/68, Garrison file. ✓
211. FBI Report, 11/27/63, interview of Roy p. 212 McCoy
105-82555-10, SA Callendel

544 Camp Street

Footnotes

1. Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (1964), p. 728 (Hereinafter cited as Warren Report)
2. Ibid. *Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, (1964),*
3. ~~Ibid.~~ Vol. XXVI, CE 2966 A & B (hereinafter Warren Commission Warren Report Hearings).
4. ~~Ibid.~~, p. 728; *Deposition of Carlos Bringuier, 5/12/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp.126-129 (JFK Document 009084)*
5. Ibid.
6. Warren Report, p. 826
7. Ibid. *Warren Commission Hearings*
8. ~~Ibid.~~, Vol XXVI, CE 3120, Pamphlet "The Crime Against Cuba," Corliss Lamont, p. 39
9. Ibid., Vol. XXVI, CE 3119, Secret Service Report, 11/30/63, CO-2-34,030, p. 11
10. Ibid.; FBI Teletype, FOIA Materials, 62-109060-1668, 11/26/63, pp. 1-3
11. Warren ~~Report~~ *Commission Hearings*, Vol. XXVI, CE 2966 A & B
12. Ibid., Vol. ~~XX~~, Lee DE 7
13. Ibid. *Warren Report*,
14. ~~Ibid.~~, p. 408; *Warren Commission Hearings, Vol. XXII, CE 1414;* Vol. XXII, CE 1414; FBI Teletype, FOIA Materials, 62-109060-1668, 11/26/63, pp. 1-3
15. Ibid.; *Commission Hearings*, Warren ~~Report~~, Vol. XXII, CE 1414
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.; FBI Teletype, FOIA Materials, 62-109060-1668, 11/26/63, pp. 1-3

Footnotes, page 2

21. Warren Report, p. 292 and 408
22. Deposition of Sam Newman, 11/6/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 21 (JFK Document 014020)
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., p. 5
25. Ibid., p. 22
26. ~~Warren Report~~, Vol. XXII, CE 1414, Secret Service Report, CO-2-34,030, p. 4-5 *Commission Hearings*
27. Deposition of Sam Newman, 11/6/78, HOuse Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 12
28. Ibid., p. 9, 21
29. Ibid., pp. 23-24
30. Ibid., p. 13
31. Outside Contact Report (with Mrs. Anna Stewart), 4/11/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations, with Attachment (JFK Document 007364)
32. Ibid., Attachments: Rosters through October 1962, April 1963, and March 1964
33. Ibid., Roster through October 1962, p. 14 (First List); Roster through April 1963, p. 16 (Second LIst)
34. FBI Teletype, FOIA Material, 62-109060-1668, 11/26/63, p. 9
35. Kerry Thornley Affidavit, 1/8/76, p. 1 (JFK Document 012740)
Note: This statement, while rambling and confusing, remains consistent on the major point; that Thornley had no contact with Oswald after service in the Marines.
36. Ibid.;
Testimony of Kerry Thornley, Hearings Before the Warren Commission, 5/18/64, pp. 96-97, Vol. XI
37. Outside Contact Report (With Mrs. Anna Stewart), 4/11/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 007364), Attachment Roster through March 1964
38. FBI TEletype, FOIA Material, 62-109060-1668, 11/26/63, p. 9
39. Ibid.;
Secret Service Report, 12/2/63, CO-2-34,030 (JFK Document 003675);
Testimony of Kerry Thornley, Hearings Before the Warren Commission, 5/18/64, p. 110, Vol. XI

Footnotes, page 3

40. Outside Contact Report (with George S. Gay), 1/13/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations, (JFK Document 005191)
41. ^{Commission Hearings,} Warren ~~Report~~, Vol XXII, CE 1414, Secret Service Report, CO-2-34,030, 12/9/63, p. 5
42. Outside Contact Report (with George S. Gay), 1/13/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 005191)
43. Ibid.; ^{Commission Hearings} Warren ~~Report~~, Vol. XXII, CE 1414, Secret Service Report CO-2-34,030, 12/9/63, p. 5
44. Outside Contact Report (with George S. Gay), 1/13/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 005191)
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Outside Contact Report (with George S. Gay re: Eugenia Donnelly), 6/6/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations, (JFK Document 009115)
48. Outside Contact Report (with Jack Mancuso), 1/26/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 014120)
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid. ^{Commission Hearings}
51. Warren ~~Report~~, Vol. XXVI, CE 3119, Secret Service Report 11/30/63, CO-2-34,030, p. 15
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Outside Contact Report (RE: James Arthus), 6/1/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations, (JFK Document 009047)
55. FBI Teletype, FOIA Material, 62-109060-2668, 11/26/63, p. 2
56. Material received from files of New Orleans District Attorney's office pertaining to INvestigation and trial of Clay Shaw, 1967-1969, Attachment D, Section 5, Regarding Guy Banister, "Biographical Sketch" (JFK Document 007271)
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.

Footnotes, page 4

59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.;
FAA Materials, Systems Board of Adjustments Grievance
Hearing of David Ferrie, Testimony of Guy Banister,
8/5/63, p. 828 (JFK Document 014904)
61. Material recieved from filed of New Orleans District
Attorney's office pertaining to Investigation and trial
of Clay Shaw, 1967-1969, Attachment D, Section 5,
Regarding Guy Banister, "Biographical Sketch" (JFK
Document 007271)
62. Staff Review of FBI files for Guy Banister, 10/28/78,
pp. 1-2
63. CIA Document ~~Office of Security~~ file [on Guy Banister]
64. Staff Review of FBI files for Guy Banister, 10/28/78, p. 1-2
Note: Coincidentally, Gerard F. Tujague, owner of
Gerard F. Tujague, Inc. Forwarding Company, who had
employed Oswald as a messenger from November 1955 to
January 1956, was also a member and officer (vice-
president) of Friends of Democratic Cuba (See FBI
Teletype, 62-109060-1668, 1/26/63, p. 5)
65. Ibid.
66. FAA Materials, Systems Board of Adjustments Grievance
Hearing of David Ferrie, Testimony of Guy Banister, 8/5/63,
p. 828 (JFK Document 014904)
67. Staff Review of FBI files for Guy Banister, 10/28/78,
pp. 1-2
Deposition of Sam Newman, 11/6/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 22
JFK Document 014020
68. Staff Report of Anti-Castro organizations, anti-Castro
Activities and Lee Harvey Oswald's activities in
New Orleans. House Select Committee on Assassinations,
95th Congress, 2nd session, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1979, Para. 419ff (hereinafter the
Anti-Castro Cuban Staff Report)
69. Ibid., para. 402 & 418
70. FBI Teletype, FOIA Material, 62-109060-5237, 5/7/67, pp. 1-2
71. Outside Contact Report (with Vernon Gerdes), 1/10/78, p. 3,
(JFK Document 005208); *Deposition of Sam Newman, 11/6/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 49; Outside Contact Report (with Jack Light) 12/5/77, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 6 (JFK Document 005208)*
72. FBI Teletype, FOIA Material, 62-109060-5237, 5/7/67, pp. 1-2
73. FAA Materials, Systems Board of Adjustments Grievance Hearing
of David Ferrie, Testimony of Guy Banister, 8/5/63, p. 825

Footnotes, page 5

~~7475~~ Ibid., p. 841

~~7576~~ Ibid.,

~~7677~~ Ibid.

~~7778~~ Ibid., p. 825-855

~~7879~~ Outside Contact Report (with Mary Helen Brengel), 4/6/78,
House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document
008861);
Anti-Castro Cuban Staff Report, para 439 ff

~~7980~~ Ibid., para 390

~~8081~~ Ibid., para 390ff

~~8182~~ Ibid., para 392

~~8283~~ Outside Contact Report (with Ross Banister), 2/20/78,
House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (JFK Document
005967)

~~8384~~ Ibid.

~~8485~~ Ibid.

~~8586~~ Deposition of I. E. "Bill" Nitschke, 7/31/78, House Select
Committee on Assassinations, p. 5&12 (JFK Document 012308)

~~8687~~ Ibid., p. 12-14

~~8788~~ Ibid., p. 36-37

~~8889~~ Ibid.

~~8990~~ Ibid., p. 38-41

~~9091~~ Ibid.

~~9192~~ Outside Contact Report, (with Delphine Rpberts), 7/6/78,
House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (JFK
Document 009979)

~~9293~~ Deposition of Sam Newman, 11/6/78, House Select Committee
on Assassinations, p. 27 (JFK Document 014020)

~~9394~~ Ibid., p. 35-36

~~9495~~ Ibid.

~~9596~~ Ibid., p. 30

~~9697~~ Outside Contact Report (with Joseph Newbrough), 4/10/64,
House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK

Footnotes, page 6

924cont)

- Document 009113) Newbrough was associated with Banister's agency from approximately 1958 to 1964;
Outside Contact Report (with Vernon Gerdes), 1/10/78,
House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 005208)
Gerdes was associated with Banister for period 1960-1963.
- 97.98 Outside Contact Report (With Mary Helen Brengel), 4/6/78,
House Select Committee on Assassinations. p. 1 (JFK Document 008861)
- 98.99 Notes of an Interview of ~~Outside Contact Report with~~ Louise Decker, 5/30/78, House
Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 015045)
- 99.100 Outside Contact Report (with Joseph Oster), 1/27/78, House
Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 005207)
- 100.101 Deposition of Carlos Quiroga, 5/23/78, House Select
Committee on Assassinations, p. 21-27 (JFK Document 009394)
- 101.102 Ibid., p. 50, 51, 57
- 102.103 Ibid.
- 103.104 Deposition of Sam Newman, 11/6/78, House Select Committee
on Assassinations, p. 31, 38 (JFK Document 014020) Newman
recommended the Committee speak with Martin because he was
in Banister's office "90 percent of the time; every day
almost" and he "kept up with all that stuff" related to
the Cubans.
Deposition of I.E. "Bill" Nitschke, 7/31/78, House Select
Committee on Assassinations, p. 59-60 (JFK Document 012308)
Nitschke told the Committee, "...If you were trying to
explore this to the fullest extent, I would say that Delphine
(Roberts) would be number one..."
- 104.105 Outside Contact Report (with Delphine Roberts), 7/6/78, House
Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Document 009979)
- 105.106 Ibid., p. 3
- 106.107 Ibid.
- 107.108 Ibid.
- 107a.109 Ibid.
- 108.110 Ibid.
- 109.111 Ibid.
- 110.112 Ibid.
- 111.113 Ibid.

Footnotes, page 7

~~112~~¹¹⁴ Outside Contact Report (with Delphine Roberts), 8/27/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (JFK Document 011196)

~~113~~¹¹⁵ Ibid.

~~114~~¹¹⁶ Guy Banister File - Garrison Papers, 8/14/77, Item GB-2, Report of Offense Against Persons, 11/22/63, New Orleans Police Department (JFK Document 002066) The report indicates the incident took place at 5:15 PM and was classified as "Aggravated Battery"; the motive "sudden anger"

~~115~~¹¹⁷ Ibid.

~~116~~¹¹⁸ Ibid.

~~117~~¹¹⁹ Ibid.

~~118~~¹²⁰ Ibid.

~~119~~¹²¹ Ibid.

~~120~~¹²² Ibid.

~~121~~¹²³ Ibid.

~~122~~¹²⁴ Outside Contact Report (with Jack Martin), 12/5/77, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Document 005212)

~~123~~¹²⁵ Deposition of I.E. "Bill" Nitschke, 7/31/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 9-16 (JFK Document 012308)

~~124~~¹²⁶ Outside Contact Report (with Jack Martin), 12/5/77, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (JFK Document 005212)

~~125~~¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 4

~~126~~¹²⁸ Ibid.

~~127~~¹²⁹ Ibid.

~~128~~¹³⁰ FBI Interview of Jack Martin, 11/25/63, Bureau file NO 89-69

~~129~~¹³¹ FBI Interview of G. Wray Gill, 11/27/63, Bureau file NO 89-69, p. 2

~~130~~¹³² FBI Interview of David Ferrie, 11/26/63, Bureau file NO 89-69, p. 9

Footnotes, page 8

- ~~131~~ 133 Outside Contact Report (with Jack Martin), 12/6/77,
House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK
Document 005213);
FBI Interview of G. Wray Gill, 11/27/63, Bureau file NO 89-69,
p. 2;
FBI Interview of David Ferrie, 11/26/63, Bureau file NO 89-69,
p. 9
See also - FAA Systems Board of Adjustment Grievance
Hearings for David Ferrie, July 15-17 and August 5, 1963
for more discussion of Ferrie's and Martin's involvement
in unusual religious orders.
- ~~132~~ 134 FBI Interview of David Ferrie, 11/26/63, Bureau file NO 89-69,
p. 9
- ~~133~~ 135 FBI Interview of G. Wray Gill, 11/27/63, Bureau file NO 89-69,
p. 2
- ~~134~~ 136 Ibid.
- ~~135~~ 137 Outside Contact Report (with Jack Martin), 12/5/77, House
Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (JFK Document
005212)
- ~~136~~ 138 Ibid.;
See also - FBI Interviews of Jack Martin, 11/25/63 & 11/27/63;
Secret Service Interview of Jack Martin, 11/29/63 reported
in Report of 12/13/63, p. 5 Martin makes no mention of
the alleged sighting of Oswald and Ferrie together.
- ~~137~~ 139 Outside Contact Report (with Mary Banister Wilson), 4/7/78,
House Select Committee on Assassinations, (JFK Document 012448)
- ~~138~~ 140 Ibid.
- ~~139~~ 141 Ibid.
- ~~140~~ 142 Outside Contact Report (with Kent Courtney), 3/19/78,
House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document
006676)
- ~~141~~ 143 Outside Contact Report (with Mary Banister Wilson), 4/7/78,
House Select Committee on Assassinations. (JFK Document 012448)
- ~~142~~ 144 Outside Contact Report (with Russell R. Willie), 6/8/78,
House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 009262)
Outside Contact Report (with Joseph Cambre), 6/8/78,
House Select Committee on Assassinations, (JFK Document 009263)
- ~~143~~ 145 Outside Contact Report (with Russell R. Willie), 6/8/78,
House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 009262)
- ~~144~~ 146 Ibid.

Footnotes, page 9

145. ¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

146. ¹⁴⁸ Outside Contact Report (with Joseph Cambre), 6/8/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 009263)

147. ¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

148. ¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

149. ¹⁵¹ Ibid.

150. ¹⁵² Outside Contact Report (with Aaron Kohn), 1/20/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 005121)

151. ¹⁵³ Ibid.

152. ¹⁵⁴ Guy Banister file - Garrison Papers, 8/14/77, Item GB-1, Index of Banister file (JFK Document 002066)

153. ¹⁵⁵ Outside Contact Report (with Joseph Cambre), 6/8/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 009263)

154. ¹⁵⁶ Guy Banister file - Garrison Papers, 8/14/77, Item GB-1, Index of Banister file (JFK Document 002066)

155. ¹⁵⁷ FBI Interview of David Ferrie, 11/26/63, Bureau file NO 89-69, p. 10