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In Reply, Please Refer to

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Miami, Florida

NOV 20 1972

IN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
KP 11-17-91

#211326
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Declassify on: OADR 12/14/84
(S) (u)
8/17/94 (u)

RE: ~~CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES~~
~~IN THE UNITED STATES~~
~~INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA~~ (u)

Source, a Cuban defector, was interviewed by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the presence of a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer from January 18-21, 1972. (S) (u)

Source is a former member of the Cuban General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI), who has been active in security and intelligence affairs for the past ten years. He acquired knowledge of some of his information through personal experience and the rest directly and indirectly through contact with other DGI officers. (S) (u)

Source furnished the following information:

OBJECTIVES OF CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (u)

Cuban intelligence objectives in the United States are divided into two major categories. One concerns political and economic matters of the United States. The second is counterintelligence, which has as its primary concern the operations of the CIA and counterrevolutionary activity of Cuban exiles in the United States. (S) (u)

The major objective of intelligence officers at the Cuban Mission to the United Nations (CMUN) is to gather information regarding the political viewpoints and foreign policy of the United States Government. This is considered (S) (u)

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RE: ~~CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES~~
~~IN THE UNITED STATES~~] x(S)(u)

political intelligence and has priority in the United States over the other intelligence activity which is classified as counterintelligence. The majority of the officials at the CMUN are concerned with the collection of political intelligence. This is of much more importance to Cuba than the counterintelligence information obtained. (S)(u)

The intelligence operations in Miami are only vehicles to obtain information regarding CIA and counter-revolutionary operations of Cuban exiles. The importance of DGI officers at the CMUN who are in charge of the collection of counterintelligence information is subordinate to that of those who are in charge of collection of political intelligence. The latter have priority in their task. (S)(u)

This order of priority may be reversed in other countries of the world where the politics of the country affects the Cuban situation to a lesser degree. Regarding the Cuban mission in Canada, its purpose is to support the activities of the Cuban Intelligence Service (CIS) in the United States in all aspects, including financial, logistics, and administrative. In the past CIS has not engaged in the collection of intelligence data concerning United States military installations, however, plans are being formulated to seek the collection of such information in the future. The DGI has established a new desk which has as its function the gathering of information concerning United States military operations. (S)(u)

CUBAN AGENTS IN THE UNITED STATES] x(S)(u)

The CIS has expended a considerable amount of time recruiting and training individuals to serve as collectors of intelligence information in the United States. The CIS has recognized that the United States intelligence agencies would counter these efforts by the CIS. In order to place agents of value in an operating capacity in the United States, the CIS considered it worthwhile to expend (S)(u)

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IN THE UNITED STATES] x (S) (U)

efforts to attempt to confuse the United States intelligence agencies. In this regard, the CIS established, in about 1962^(S) or 1963^(S), what it termed its [Plan Piloto]^(S). This plan was to recruit almost every Cuban who was leaving Cuba to travel to the United States to [be agents of CIS]^(S). This was a massive plan to have numerous persons travel to the United States as refugees in the [hope to cause untold amounts]^(S) of work for the United States intelligence agencies and to confuse United States efforts to [identify those agents sent by CIS] whom they hoped to be of value. [These persons]^(S) were trained briefly in matters of utilizing lemon juice for secret writing and given instructions to obtain information concerning anti-CASTRO activities. They were furnished accommodation addresses in Cuba and warned to be very secretive in their activities in the United States and to never divulge their recruitment to United States authorities. It was expected that they would immediately divulge such [recruitment and] cause confusion and concern for United States intelligence agencies. It was expected that this type of activity would help [cover those agents]^(S) who were seriously [trained and sent on missions to] the United States. (S) (U)

The CIS did not keep track of the identities of these people on the whole and were not concerned with the results of their efforts. Source cited one instance wherein a [letter was received by the DGI offices]^(S) in Havana with a [secret-writing message]^(S) saying that the writer had made contact with an anti-CASTRO organization. The DGI was unable to identify the [author of the letter]^(S). About six weeks to two months later, a second [secret-writing letter]^(S) was received by the [DGI offices] from the same author. This [letter]^(S) advised that [the author] had certain information about the anti-CASTRO organization and asked for instructions as to what to do with his information. The [DGI] could never determine who [the author]^(S) was and disposed of [the letters]^(S). (S) (U)

Another method used by DGI officers to confuse United States intelligence agencies was to send form letters (S) (U)

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to various Cuban exiles in the Miami area. The DGI never expected to receive much of value from these letters. However, if they were fortunate enough to obtain someone through this tactic who would eventually develop as a valuable agent, the DGI felt that nothing would be lost. These letters were prepared in the DGI offices and requested the recipients to make contact in some way with DGI officials. Often they were instructed to make contact with officials of the CMUN. Source said he knows of no Cuban agent of value who was ever developed in this way (S)(u)

Most of the efforts outlined above were intended for the purpose of neutralizing the counterintelligence efforts of United States intelligence agencies. In the meantime, however, CIS recruited, trained, and sent agents to the United States. The most important agent sent by CIS to the United States, who was believed to still be operating as late as the beginning of [1971] was known to source only as G-11. (S)(u)

CUBAN AGENT G-11 (S)

Name (S)(u)

Source does not know the name of [G-11]. He believes that he saw the name in [G-11's dossier] on one occasion and believes that the first name is short and the last name long. The name [JOSE CARBONELL] was suggested to the source who said he did not recognize that name but this would be a good example of the length of [G-11's] name which he observed in the file. (S)(u)

Recruitment (S)(u)

[G-11] was believed to have been recruited by [CARLOS ENRIQUEZ RODRIGUEZ (DGI code name JACOBO)], a [section chief] at DGI headquarters. This recruitment probably occurred sometime prior to 1967, however, source is unable to pinpoint the exact time of the recruitment. [G-11] was not compelled to serve in the capacity of [an agent]. There is (S)(u)

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no hostage situation case, and he is apparently serving as an agent because of his ideological values and on a voluntary basis (S)(S)(X)

*Training (S)(U)

(S) [G-11]'s training was carried out under the overall supervision of [JACOBO] (S). His case officer, however, was [AUGUSTO CESAR VEGA HERNANDEZ (DGI code name OCTAVIO)] (S). Case officers were prohibited from giving the actual training. Therefore, [OCTAVIO] would have been in charge of insuring that [G-11] received all phases of the training necessary to be an agent in the United States. [OCTAVIO] would have seen to it that [G-11] received the proper number of hours in each phase of his training and insuring that all of his needs were cared for during this training period. The actual training given to [G-11], as well as other agents, was given by technicians, and others trained for this purpose. For example, [G-11] probably received several hours of training in radio operation, several hours of training in secret writing, and several hours of training in photography until his entire training was completed. None of this training would have been done directly by his case officer, [OCTAVIO] (S)(X)

*Departure from Cuba (S)(U)

The source does not know for sure how [G-11] left Cuba to make his way to the United States. He could have come to the United States by any of several methods. However, since [G-11] was under the control of [JACOBO] (S), it is source's belief that he probably came illegally because of [JACOBO]'s penchant to send his agents out in this manner. The source speculated that [G-11] was also probably sent out this way. He feels he could have possibly come to the United States by small boat or some other illegal means. (S)(X)

*Reporting Assignments (S)(U)

Originally [G-11] was scheduled to spend at least (S)(X)

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six months in the United States, acclimating himself and collecting routine information concerning Cuban exile activities. Sometime early in 1969, G-11^s began to branch out, and he furnished the DGI a detailed and comprehensive study which he had made concerning several anti-CASTRO organizations in the United States with emphasis on their capability to mount attacks on Cuba. The DGI was very pleased with this information furnished by G-11^s and instructed him to become more aggressive and attempt to determine the United States Government's position concerning anti-CASTRO activities originating in the United States. In this regard, G-11^s was instructed to attempt to obtain information concerning certain Cuban persons in the employ of President RICHARD M. NIXON and persons associated with President NIXON, including CHARLES "BEBE" REBOZO^s and EDGARDO BUTARI^s, prominent in the Cuban colony in Miami. (S) (u)

It was generally understood by DGI officials in Havana that President NIXON^s as well as Mr. REBOZO^s and Mr. BUTARI^s surrounded themselves with Cubans who worked in such capacities as butlers, chauffeurs, and maids. The DGI had generally received information that persons of Cuban extraction worked for President NIXON^s. It was understood that President NIXON^s was associated with Mr. REBOZO^s and possibly lent him money. President NIXON and Mr. REBOZO^s were reportedly very close friends. The DGI officials felt that G-11^s could learn the identities of these Cubans and determine whether they could be utilized in the future to obtain whatever piece of conversation they might have overheard between President NIXON^s and his friends. The ultimate purpose for obtaining data concerning persons close to the President^s was to learn from them the political policies of President NIXON^s regarding the Cuban situation. The DGI officials felt that these persons could not work around President NIXON^s without hearing something which he might say to Mr. REBOZO^s or his other associates. (S) (u)

G-11^s sent information concerning one chauffeur^s of President NIXON^s. The source does not know whether this (S) (u)

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[IN THE UNITED STATES]

[chauffeur] (S) was employed in Miami. The information concerning this [chauffeur] was biographical in nature and included his name, a short description, and an address, which later proved to be erroneous. Similar information was provided concerning Mr. REBOZO's chauffeur, caretaker or butler (S) and a [maid] (S) (S) (S)

To the best of source's knowledge, there was never any indication that any plan existed whereby persons associated with [the President] (S) would be utilized to cause physical harm to [President NIXON] (S) or his associates. No significant information regarding [President NIXON] (S) was ever received from [G-11] (S). No information was ever received from any of the people surrounding [President NIXON] (S) and there was no indication these people were ever approached to furnish such information. (S) (S)

The DGI hoped to receive information from [G-11] (S) concerning ["BEBE" REBOZO] (S) for the same purpose. The DGI hoped to receive information which might have been overheard during conversations between [the President and Mr. REBOZO] (S) or what [REBOZO] might say about conversations with [the President] (S). (S) (S) (S)

The DGI expected [G-11] (S) to furnish information concerning [EDGARDO BUTARI] (S) and his activities in the Miami area. It was also hoped that bits of information from [BUTARI] (S) concerning [President NIXON's policies] (S) might be obtained. [G-11] (S) was expected to determine whether [BUTARI] (S) had any connection with CIA or whether he was furnishing any financial aid to [JOSE DE LA TORRIENTE, well-known] (S) Cuban exile leader. A great deal of biographical information was received concerning [BUTARI] (S). Fla. Cuba (S) (S)

The source believes that [G-11] (S) was personally acquainted with [Mr. BUTARI and Mr. REBOZO] (S). It is his belief that [G-11] (S) knows [Mr. REBOZO] (S) quite well on a personal (S) (S)

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basis and that he also knows [BUTARI]^(s) but not so well. He believes he knows [JOSE DE LA TORRIENTE]^(s) but only very slightly. The information that DGI received concerning [Mr. REBOZO]^(s) came almost totally from [G-11]^(s). The information concerning [BUTARI]^(s) came from several sources although a great deal of it came from [G-11]^(s). There is much more information in the DGI files regarding [BUTARI]^(s) than there is about [REBOZO]^(s) but it has come from different sources. The file on [BUTARI]^(s) covers a long period of time in reporting and is very comprehensive. (S)(X)

A concerted effort was made to obtain background information concerning [Mr. BUTARI]^(s) and to determine his associates, activities, and connections within the Cuban colony in Miami. Efforts were concentrated on [Mr. BUTARI]^(s) because of his position and remote possibility that he might in some way be recruited to work on behalf of the Cuban Government. Source emphasized this was considered a goal to strive for, but there was no known basis for believing [Mr. BUTARI]^(s) would ever cooperate with the Cubans. (S)(X)

Source believes that [G-11]^(s) once reported on the activities of [ROLANDO MASFERRER]^(s) former Cuban [Congressman]^(s) and prominent Cuban exile. Source believes he remembers having seen reports submitted by [G-11]^(s) concerning [MASFERRER]^(s) activities in Miami but cannot remember specifically. (S)(X)

Reports which were furnished by [G-11]^(s) were sent to the various DGI officers in final form. The DGI officers never saw the original reports which were furnished by [G-11]^(s). All reports containing biographical information on individuals was sent to one DGI official. Information concerning Cuban exile anti-CASTRO activity was sent to other DGI officers. The various officers would periodically have meetings where their analyses of the information furnished would be discussed. In this way the officers became aware of information furnished by [G-11]^(s) even though it was not routed directly to them. (S)(X)

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IN THE UNITED STATES X 2/4Health and Age (u)

In recalling that he had on one occasion seen the file of [G-11] source remembers that there was a very limited amount of background information and description. He does not recall whether there was a photograph of [G-11] in the file. He does not remember exactly, but it is source's impression that the file indicated [G-11] to be between [46 and 48] years of age. To substantiate this impression concerning [G-11]'s age, source related the circumstances of a meet with [G-11] made by DGI officers in New York. This meet was believed to have taken place in early [1968]. On this occasion [JUAN JOSE MULKAY GUTIERREZ] (DGI code name [MENENDEZ]), a DGI officer, and [OCTAVIO] traveled to New York City. Ordinarily an official as high as [MENENDEZ] would not make a meet with an agent such as [G-11]. It would be a normal matter for [OCTAVIO] to make such a meet. Source knows of no serious problem or unusual circumstance in relation to this meet. This meet was probably pre-planned for at least a year in advance so there was probably no emergency connected with it. [MENENDEZ and OCTAVIO] traveled to New York by way of [Nassau].

After their return from this trip, several DGI officers were in the office of [CRESCENCIO PALENZUELA PAEZ] (DGI code name [CANDIDO]), discussing the possible recruitment of [ALFREDO CORDERO PERNIA] who is also known as [TOBITA], a Cuban exile living in Miami. [MENENDEZ] walked into the room, and the conversation changed to his recent trip to New York. [CANDIDO] asked [MENENDEZ] about the trip, if he had been surveilled by the FBI, and other personal matters. Source believes that both [MENENDEZ] and [OCTAVIO] participated in the meet with [G-11]. [CANDIDO] asked [MENENDEZ] if he saw "EL VIEJO" (the old man). [MENENDEZ] said, yes, and that it was interesting because the meet, which was made on a bridge or an overpass, had been under pressure because of a surveillance by the FBI. According to [MENENDEZ], the surveillance car proceeded ahead and [MENENDEZ] had followed behind. [MENENDEZ] said he made a couple of turns and evaded.

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~~[IN THE UNITED STATES]~~

the surveillance, then doubled back and met with [G-11] (s). CANDIDO asked about [G-11's health]. MENENDEZ said [G-11] (s) looked very good and seemed quite happy. DGI officials had often talked about [G-11's health] (s) as though he suffered from some [type of ailment] (s). Source had heard officials talk about the need of [G-11] (s) for some type of [medicine] (s) and whether [G-11] (s) had obtained his [medicines] (s) on one occasion. Source does not know the nature of [G-11's health] (s) problem but believes he has some type of [affliction] (s). It is source's impression that [G-11] (s) has to take [medicine] (s) regularly although he cannot specify the nature of this [medicine or the sickness] (s). (S)(X)

From the above story and from his recollection of [G-11's file] (s) source believes that [G-11's] (s) age is between (46 and 48) (s). Source said that it is possible that [G-11] (s) could be an [older man] (s). Source also noted the possibility that the official who made up the file for [G-11] (s) could have inserted a false age in order to better conceal the identity of the agent. Also, the file could have been several years old and the age noted correctly. (S)(X)

Source pointed out that it is a normal thing for Cuban agents to send a message to their principals saying that someone is [sick] (s) if they believe they are about to be detected by the FBI. Source does not believe this is the case in the matter of discussion of [G-11's health] (s). He believes that [G-11] (s) has an actual [health] (s) problem. (S)(X)

*Residence (S)(X)(u)

Source does not know the exact residence of [G-11] (s). However, source feels quite sure that [G-11] (s) has established his residence in the [Miami, Florida] (s) area. Source said he makes this conclusion because [G-11] (s) has an extremely wide circle of acquaintances in [Miami] (s). He circulates very well. (S)(X)

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in [Miami] ^(S) and appears to be able to obtain any type information which he is asked to acquire. [G-11] ^(S) seems to have a good facility to become knowledgeable of the activities of the anti-CASTRO groups in [Miami] ^(S) and has furnished precise information concerning them in the past. ~~(S)~~ (U)

Possible Imprisonment ~~(S)~~ (U)

Source does not know for sure whether [G-11] ^(S) has ever been imprisoned in the United States. Source does recall that during the time he was active in the DGI in Havana there were two or three cases in which Cuban agents were jailed in the United States. The circumstances surrounding these Cuban agents' imprisonment never had anything do with their CIS involvement. These periods of detention have always been for short periods of time. For example, source pointed out, [EPIFANIO ROMERO DELGADO] ^(S) Cuba, who operated until late 1969 as a Cuban agent, was in a United States prison for about six months. Source cannot definitely recall whether [G-11] was thus detained. Source said, however, that it is his impression that in addition to [ROMERO, G-11] was possibly imprisoned for a short period of time, but not for intelligence activities. ~~(S)~~ (U)

Principals ~~(S)~~ (U)

In addition to the individuals who first recruited and assisted in the training of [G-11], JACOBO and OCTAVIO, G-11 ^(S) was handled by personnel from the CMUN. Among those who handled [G-11] were: ~~(S)~~ (U)

JESUS JIMENEZ ESCOBAR
(DGI code name JULIAN)

LAZARO EDDY ESPINOSA BONET
(DGI code name ESTEBAN)

PEDRO LUIS PINERO EIRIN
(DGI code name ALEJANDRO)

Cuba

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