AGENCY ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM: ACTING CHIEF SR DIVISION
TO: ASSISTANT DEP DIR, PLANS
TITLE: CONTACT OF LEE OSWALD WITH A MEMBER OF THE SOVIET KGB ASSASSINATION DEPARTMENT.
DATE: 11/23/1963
PAGES: 2

SUBJECTS: JFK ASSASSINATION
OSWALD AND KGB

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
RESTRICTIONS: 1B
CURRENT STATUS: RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 05/26/04
COMMENTS: JFK56 : F4 : 20040225-1049119
MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director, Plans
FROM: Acting Chief, Plans
SUBJECT: Contact of Lee OSWALD with a member of Soviet KGB Assassination Department

1. According to an intercepted phone call in Mexico City, Lee OSWALD was at the Soviet Embassy there on 28 September 1963 and spoke with the Consul, Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV. This was learned when OSWALD called the Soviet Embassy on 1 October, identifying himself by name and speaking broken Russian, stating the above and asking the guard who answered the phone whether there was "anything new concerning the telegram to Washington." The guard checked and then told OSWALD that a request had been sent, but nothing had as yet been received. (MEG 6453, 9 October 1963) The FBI liaison officer, Mr. Fappich, told me on 23 November that the Bureau has reason to believe that OSWALD’s visit was to get Soviet support for a U.S. passport or visa matter (perhaps the new passport mentioned in the press articles).

2. KOSTIKOV is an identified KGB officer. He was a case officer in an operation which is evidently sponsored by the KGB's 13th Department (responsible for sabotage and assassination). This operation, which is controlled by the FBI under the cryptonym TUMBLEWEED, involved a German-national resident of Oklahoma who was recruited in Europe and met this year with KOSTIKOV in Mexico City and shortly thereafter with a known 13th Department officer, Oleg BRYKIN, in New York. The instructions given KOSTIKOV by the two officers, pinpointing objectives for sabotage and the instructions of their involvement in the case, left no doubt that both of them were working for the same KGB component, the 13th.

3. Of course it is not usual for a KGB agent on a sensitive mission to have such overt contact with a Soviet Embassy. However, we have two secret Soviet intelligence documents, describing Military Intelligence doctrines, which show that very important agents can be put in official installations using as cover for their presence there some sort of open business: Vice Admiral

[Document Number]

for FOIA Review on APR 1976

RECORD COPY

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 16 APR 1976
E.2.RIPPIST CL BY DALES
23 NOV 63
201-289248

183 186

COPY NO.
I. BEKRENEV, in a top secret lecture to a Soviet Military Intelligence course at Military-Diplomatic Academy, 1960, said,

"Case officers who use the cover of being a Soviet trade representative, TASS or Sovinformburo, can use their cover assignments as backstopping for non-clandestine meetings with certain agents whose part in an operation is officially associate them with the previously mentioned Soviet institutions. However, such non-clandestine meetings within a legal residency should be restricted to a minimum both as to place and time. Meetings of this type should be carried out only in exceptional cases with tested and reliable agents in order to avoid provocation by the local counterintelligence service against the Soviet installation being used as cover. Such meetings are held as a rule in the work offices of the case officer or of the agent during working hours. It is necessary that such meetings be conducted naturally, that they do not attract the attention of outsiders, and that the receipt and transmittal of intelligence matters, properly concealed, be carried out discreetly. In setting up such meetings, measures against taping must be taken. One must bear in mind that a meeting with persons outside official premises and during non-working hours usually signifies a relationship between the two parties that is above and beyond official matters."

Also, such contact in official installations is usually caused by the agent's own carelessness. Again Admiral BEKRENEV speaks:

"Some agents, because of ignorance or because of deliberate violation of the rules of security through peculiar personal rashness,... approached our case officers at places not stipulated as operational meeting sites, others telephoned the case officer at his Soviet installation and discussed personal contact arrangements, while others still showed up personally at the Soviet installation in order to contact the case officer."

4. I called the above connections to the attention of Mr. Pappich by phone to his FBI office at 1030 hours on 23 November.