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investig on Oswald
FBI reports NOT in CIA's possession, before
22 Nov 1963.

(b) Report dated 7 March 1961. Title:
Lee Harvey Oswald. by ^{SA} John W. Fain,
Dallas Office of the FBI. 10 numbered
pages. [This report is a chronological
account of Oswald's life from
birth to his departure to the USSR and
indicates he was contemplating
return to the US. (We received this
report on 2 Mar 1961)]

(a) Report dated June 3, 1960. to the
Office of Security of the Department
of State. ¹⁹⁶⁰ Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald
Refers to Foreign Service Report no. 234
of 2 Nov 1955 and ^{includes} other reporting
on the case and draws attention to
the fact that background check
could be made of Oswald's
the health certificate surrendered
by Oswald to the Soviets. (We
received this report on —
1975)

(c) Report dated 10 July 1962. Title:
Lee Harvey Oswald. By ^{5th} John W.
Fair, Dallas office. 14 pages
• & Civil Background info re
subjects stay in USSR and
records subject denied the
recruitment by Sov. IS. or any
deal with the Soviet government]
(We received this report on 9
March 1964.)

(d) Report dated 31 October 1962.
Title: Lee Harvey Oswald - Early
life in New Orleans and
activities for Fair Play for
Cuba Committee. Report by
St. Milton R. Kaack. 16
pages. (We received this by
letter from T. Edger Hoover on
9 March 1964.)

Notes

1. Circumstantial Facts: from late Sept - 22 Nov the case was handled as a matter of ordinary business in both Mexi and in Hqs. Handling was by the book, bearing in mind @ Mexico Station had a large on going case load. and @ LHO, was identified (by name) and reported (8th Oct) to Hqs^(9th) and disseminated (10th) was a Navy and FBI case under the delimitations agreement. @ Views & conclusions proffered by Mexi 22/9/47 ^{in 1947 meet to what was credible part of the time} leaving the matter open to further facts. (See Helms 10/25/47)

2. Criticisms can be sustained against Mexico Sta and Hqs concerning handling between 27 Sept and 22 Nov:

- (1) Mexico Station erred in its forwarding of LO identification on 8 Oct (based on Voice intercept only) on 10 Oct with ~~an arbitrarily selected description of an individual who entered the USSR Emb. some days~~ ^{on a ship which departed from the USSR} ~~On the evidence there was no reason to believe the person identified by voice intercept made any visit that day.~~ Contra: there was no reason to believe he had not or could not have. ^{But ultimately the logic was weak; only individual who would have met. who was not mentioned.}
- (2) Hqs. disseminated the Mexico info on the 8th on the 10th including the audio ^{copy} based on the photograph of unidentified individual.
- (3) In its reply to Mexi on 11th, however, Hqs. gave Mexi a correct description of (Henry) O which was at clear variance with the description of the unidentified individual and should have been sufficient, normally to break any evidential connection between the two facts.
- (4) Mexico Station though asked by Hqs. did not press or secure an identification or followup on LHO before the 22nd of Nov. (i.e. locate where he had stayed, what he had done, when he had arrived or when he had left. NB: neither did

27-10-47
Hqs. can be
criticized for not
pressing the case
for 10 days for an
ident.

the legal advisor or the Mil. representatives or the Embassy (which was informed by the 16th Oct).

- (5) Though requested by Mexico Station Hqs. asked the Navy for a photo of HD, but did not persist and secure a photo before the error.
 - (6) Mexico Station did not match the 1 Oct radio intercept with its radio intercept (of 27th and 28th Sept) until after the 22nd Nov event, when it did so with alacrity.
 - (7) Mexico Station did not match its 1 Oct coverage of the unidentified individual with its coverage of the same individual on 4 Oct in front of the Soviet Embassy and on 15 Oct. in front of the Cuban Embassy until after 22/11.
 - (8) Despite the discrepancies in description, Mex Station put the 1 Oct photos into the chain of evidence on 22 Nov. 2200 hours. Ultimately the decision having been made by the ^(council) Ambassador and the Division Chief. In effect, being faced with a fait accompli.
(Thomas notified)
 - (9) No photo coverage was obtained at any time of HD in Mexico city. The introd. of the unidentified individual - in good faith by COS - was disastrous and compromised the operations in the long run, though every effort was made to satisfy the requirements of the Commission and the security of the operations.
 - (10) Two members of Cuban Int. known to have dealt with HD: Silvia Amador and Counsel Aguirre. Both left & replaced on 7/9/205-1968. named.
9. The thrust of Hqs. investigation after the 22nd Nov event was against the USSR agents rather than the Cubans. Coverage very early however, turned up at least one unguaranteed intercept:

(a) The Cuban Collection, Conversations - affluence of the 22nd which seems not to have gone to the ... in November? or this must be checked

and (b) the ^{two} Brothers - Ramos through telephone calls on the _____ and _____,

and (c) ambiguous references by Jugoslav ambassador Vlahov -

4. Mexi. coverage after 20th based on ^{length} technical coverage, and close utilization of liaison. The two signif. challenges are:

(a) Were the Soviets & Cubans aware of the coverage received & audio before 20th?

(b) Did Sovs and/or Cubans have penetration in the Bohemian which would have permitted them to blunt the thrust of the ~~top~~ succession of major leads which were investigated tending to show a larger degree of contact between UFD than the ^{possibilities of} substantive details of the intercepts?
viz: [?]

(1) Case of Gilcherts, Alameda Ugoite - Nica.
requiring walk in 26 Nov. investigation protected through Dec.

(2) Restrictions of the amount of detail given by Silva Duran. (Can be late in May 1967) → statements to confid. source be trusted? If so there is also reason to review the Clara Carras de los details -) S. Duran was not subjected to a thorough dictionary examination based on what we know or could surmise from the intercepts.

(3) Ylario Rojas Villanueva case (in broadcast tape & logbook). [This appears to have been submitted.]

(4) Case of Elena Garro de Paz, see the successive reports of Hqs Dept Officer, Thomas. This case suggests the possibility that Cuban sources in 60s/61s were in a position to manipulate and circumscribe the Idena Bureau and other leads affecting themselves, including the Alvarez matter: note the extraordinary points these two attacks have in common - the presence of a red headed negro. (According to Alvarez in the Cuban compound, according to Elena Garro, in attendance at Cuban Bureau's party)

(5) Observations by Elis, Colette de Mass (Betty Horn) who had ^{visited} accompanied Theodore Fee on his Cuban trip for FPPC org. 28 Dec 62 - 21 Jan 1963. LHO's relationship to FPPC activity is totally unclarified and unbelievable on its face unless it can be assumed that FPPC and Cubans themselves were more aware of what he was doing than they have acknowledged.

she was on return flight

(6) Case of Oscar Contreras, to Am. Cons. Tampa's inquiries in May 1967, relative to LHO alleged contact with pro-Castro student groups at U.S. Mexico & his attempt to secure their support for visa conversions.

(7) Betty Horn

5. Acknowledging questionable aspects of LHO's whole Mexico City initiative:

(a) He denied he had made ~~such a trip~~ and got wife to remain silent about it.

(b) He was there 4 full days, 2 partial: 11 1/2 hours in all. Assuming 1/3 time at rest, there are 7 1/2 hours of full time activity unaccounted for. He says on day he left early and returned

To
lets: 77 hours.

Can it be concluded that if he had contact with either Soviets or Cubans or both, that went beyond the transit-union aspect one into that he was told to assassinate Pres. Kennedy? or anything of that kind? (Consider in this context his subsequent letters to USSR Int. Washington after return from Mexico). Operationally it makes more sense to conclude that his relations were in an elective, developmental stage and that LHO's effort to redefect was bona fide. (Note the symbolic identity between his suicide attempt in Moscow in 1953, which tipped the balance in his favor of remaining in the USSR, and the assassinations as his ultimate self-proving (and self-determining) "donations".)

NB: This allows for LHO having said ^{nothing} that was self-compromising in his ^{postulation} dealing with Soviets and Cubans, including threats against the lives of prominent ^{US} anti-Soviet and anti-Castroists which he uttered. The Soviets nor Cubans can admit after the events of 22 Nov, they knew.

6. What is the probative value - without factual collateral relating to Mexico and Dallas events - of Castro's statements as reported by AP, on 7 Sept 1963 at Washington ambony receptors? Note that VPI version ^{is} not a signif. element of the AP statements. Without factual collateral its probative value is only as a conditioning factor, which could have operated powerfully on a homicidal individual like LHO. Therefore Castro must bear a significant historical weight for what he said & whether the nature and degree of his knowledge of plotting against

him, his alibi and JFK is dead. Does one endorse an act of assassination where it may have been a conditioned response by a psychotic person, as "justifiable homicide". Or worse, do you now conduct an investigation in such a way as to suggest that the assassination was, indeed, a justified retaliation, again, in the absence of factual collateral that goes beyond what we do know, namely, that LHO was the killer of JFK and Officer Tippett and that he did it alone.

Ask the same questions of the Santos' observations* to his Dutch F.O. interlocutor: what signif. coincidentally can be attached to what he said? (Admitted the remarks gave emotions & psych. insights.)

On question of lack of supporting evidential collateral also recognizing that these were two defector sources who came out immediately after the assassination, one Soviet (Nosenko) and the other Cuban (whose info through of ranging compartments ^{protect} consisting both Soviets and Cuban intelligence & security services off the hook

*NB: On 5 Jan 62 a brief source had reported CFB cell Ludwig MORSE Benito Zuhora as having said to the cell that JFK "will be within the present year, 1962" -

7. There is every reason to be unhappy with the work of Penn & on the foreign Commission aspects, but it's no benefit ^{now} to shift blame on CIA ^{by the US Govt} for allegedly not revealing what the anti-Castro kids were doing, assuming they know. Else for I know the policy was to deal with the Cubans but NOT to encourage or to become directly involved in their anti-Castro plotting. ³ ⁴ not recognizing that the bias of the Commission's leadership & US Govt in 1963 was clearly against such a theory in the absence of credible evidence to the contrary. What was to be done: draw the conclusion vis opus of the absence of credible evidence?

(Note that C/WB specifically complimented C/S May for handling by his reporting blundered the terrible aspects of foreign involvement.)

In fact at the working level in CIA — what the FBI's position was or is not known to me — it was felt that the ^{we} report did ^{was more explicit and} could have left a larger opening for further accumulation of evidence relative to the foreign conspiracy aspect. Mr. DeLoach was or advised by C/S Staff at the time. In any case this is a matter of measure or shading and ~~there~~ we are talking here of degrees of emphasis, because the Report properly read does leave the question of ultimate responsibility of LHO as a singleton killer open.

What did the Commission Staff itself do to formulate the questions necessary to cover all aspects of the case and to get them investigated — in this instance, by the FBI

8. Status of info developed abroad after assassination & possible direct bearing on assessment of the foreign conspiracy theory.

- 1964
- Ⓐ Castro WBI defector (M May 61) — inf posed
 - Ⓑ Novak — early 1964 — inf posed in substance
 - Ⓒ Sergeevskiy — walking Br. Emb. Moscow, (28 Aug. 1964.) Allegedly knew O & inf at Gorki 1960. Mental case.

~~What further info has been developed in the case. Is it of importance to the conspiracy?~~

- Ⓐ No evidence that topic has been pursued with Latin defectors, including Costa Hidalgo and Berroa. (extrapolating)

9. Helms on record re full disclosure of field
facts held by Agency in sworn testimony Wed. May
6, 1964 (See Vol II: 120 + 129, and by affidavit
Exhibits 868 and 869). Also he announced ^{21 Feb} 1965
that in no instance was any doc. withheld
from public domain if it had a direct bearing
on the assassination.

10. In general the Oswald case file shows a
minimum input from Wove and no concern
with the implications of statement/warning by
Coster on 7 Sept 1963. [Query: what was reaction
within WH & at highest levels to that statement?
This should be traceable in Telling file, if
not Wove, Martin and Hqs.]

11. Re Martin O's test. (Vol. I): she asserts her intent was
not to go to USSR but to get to Cuba & stay there, somehow
get her to join her.

12. Note the persistent interest in control of Cuba:

① Delgado testimony, ^(Vol. III) re Marine Corps period in LA
area of contact with Cuban Consulate. One
visit from unid. individual & mail receipt.
Early identification with Castro revolution.

NB: The presumption here is that this would have
been Cuban Consulate reporting on LHO going
back to 1959 which he was still in the USMC

② See also FHTZ testimony, Vol IV: 224, 228, 239
who is hooked up by WADE, Vol V: 235

③ See Mahrenschmidt testimony, IX: 267,

④ Carlos Bringer testimony concerning phoned
sequence of events beginning on 5 Aug 63 when

NB: The
retirement
units (RMS) found

contacted him, requested to buy, offered to train
into better contacts for info, and attempted to
give him money. This happened on 9 Aug when
Bungie found LHO's housing unit, wearing a
sign, & using name of Hidell on behalf of FPCC.
On 12th there was a municipal court action
for which LHO pleaded guilty & fined 100. On 16th
he was passing out handbills in some houses. Bungie
went a friend of LHO's house on 16th. On 21 Aug. there
was a Radio debate. Pr. also reports photo of
Ed. both of info learned of the American.
(See also GERACI & Blalock testimony)

NB: it is remarkable that no one apparently focused
on the ~~WATER~~ pervasion O had attempted

① What does one make of the Andrews testimony,
of the Peña testimony, Ernesto Rodriguez testi-
mony.

② What are the implications of O's alleged subplots
activities in N.O. on behalf of the FPCC? Can
one accept the idea he had no guidance or
contacts after he had begun to write & labor
con. by Los Angeles from El Toro camp?
What does a chronic record of his known
act. & movement look like starting with the
file & pictal procedure dates?

See
Delgado test

③ Report does not note the AP report by Hooker, on
9 Sept 1963, nor was testimony taken on this
point, though the version that appeared in
Times Picayune must have been seen by him.
It reflects main lines however: p. 412 ff.

Notes

- Soviet reactions to the issuance of the Warren Report were inquiries in surrounding buildings, to ascertain available opt specs. This noted by Station on 7 Oct 1964. Coverage continued & operating by June of next year but U.S. visitors had become notably fewer and rarer. This decrease U.S. visitors attributable directly to exposure of the photo.

- Elena Garro de Paz. This is a persistent account noted by COS in MORA on 12 Oct 1964. Reported by her to Encl. Political officer, Charles Thomas 10 Dec 1965; she added that in Nov 63 she was inhibited by an official in the Gobernacion from going to U.S. Embassy with her story. Story was then reported [Mapi 562 of 16 Dec 1965] 25 Dec 1965, she was reinterviewed and complimented & corrected her earlier accounts. [NB: Elena Garro is cousin of Horacio Duran; cousin-in-law of Silvia DURAN.] NB: Garro was interviewed by Legat on 17 Oct 64 - furnished similar info but not substantiated by inquiries. Legat reported his disengagement to COS on 27 Dec 65 & Ambassador on 23 Feb 1965. Further memo of conversation by Thomas with Elena Garro on 13 July 1966, additional detail on her attendance 30 June 1966 at Embassy functions. On 13 Oct 66 Legat confirms that Elena Paz had been registered 23 Nov 1963 at Hotel Vermont, 25-26 & 28-30, as she had claimed. 7 Feb 67. Memo of Conv. between Thomas and Elena Garro on her continuing vicissitudes with Cuban 28 Aug 1967. State Dept transmits package of Garro de Paz materials as compiled by Charles William Thomas.

Examples of Repeated & Continuous Gross mis-
use of Labor Involvement at hersey or operational
level - continued:

③ Fundacion Misdegnaty bulletins.

④ Joe I LASAGE, paper, sent to White
House: "Prohibit foreign. Motivation in the
area. J. Lee. Kennedy"

⑤ American Sec. Council Int. Staff: "Background
for assassination" - analysis of Moscow
request.

⑥ Ralph de Telesma, Hidden Side of the Oswald
Case.

⑦ Cash Joe Benizera reported by FBI to be
writing a book on linking LTV with FC.
(DBA - 70147)

⑧ Detailed analysis by BILLYON - Imp. by Allen & Scott.
of LTV's activities in Soviet Union under KGB control

⑨ Ex. Amb. Henry J. Taylor did a series in Nov 67
of articles on Oswald as a Sov. agent.

