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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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RECORD SERIES : JFK
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F. Kennedy
Assassination Records
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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : ACTING CHIEF, SR DIV
TO : ASSISTANT DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS
TITLE : MEMO:CONTACT OF LEE OSWALD WITH A MEMBER OF KGB
ASSASSINATION DEPARTMENT
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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED 104-10438-10106

3-5958

23 November 1963

EX-25550

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director, Plans

FROM: Acting Chief, SR Division S

SUBJECT: 0 Contact of Lee OSWALD with a member of Soviet KGB
Assassination Department

1. According to an intercepted phone call in Mexico City, Lee OSWALD was at the Soviet Embassy there on 28 September 1963 and spoke with the Consul, Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV. This was learned when OSWALD called the Soviet Embassy on 1 October, identifying himself by name and speaking broken Russian, stating the above and asking the guard who answered the phone whether there was "anything new concerning the telegram to Washington." The guard checked and then told OSWALD that a request had been sent, but nothing had as yet been received. (MEXI 6453, 9 October 1963) The FBI liaison officer, Mr. Pappich, told me on 23 November that the Bureau has reason to believe that OSWALD's visit was to get Soviet support for a U.S. passport or visa matter [perhaps the new passport mentioned in the press articles].

2. KOSTIKOV is an identified KGB officer. He was a case officer in an operation which is evidently sponsored by the KGB's 13th Department (responsible for sabotage and assassination). This operation, which is controlled by the FBI under the cryptonym TUMBLEWEED, involved a German-national resident of Oklahoma who was recruited in Europe, and met this year with KOSTIKOV in Mexico City and shortly thereafter with a known 13th Department officer, Oleg BRYKIN, in New York. The instructions given TUMBLEWEED by the two officers, (pinpointing objectives for sabotage) and the circumstances of their involvement in the case, left no doubt that both of them were working for the same KGB component, the 13th.

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SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
NOV 23 1963	
FBI - MEMPHIS	

34-538
Document Number

for FOIA Review on APR 1976

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 16 APR 1976
E2 IMPDET CL BY 012208

RECORD COPY

23 Nov 63
201-289248

L. BEKRENEV, in a top secret lecture to a Soviet Military Intelligence course at Military-Diplomatic Academy, 1960, said,

"Case officers who use as cover, let us say, the Soviet Trade Representation, TASS or Sovinformburo, can use their cover assignments as backstopping for non-clandestine meetings with certain agents whose particular activities officially associate them with the previously mentioned Soviet institutions. However, such non-clandestine meetings within a legal residency should be restricted to a minimum both as to place and time. Meetings of this type should be carried out only in exceptional cases with tested and reliable agents in order to avoid provocation by the local counterintelligence service against the Soviet installation being used as cover. Such meetings are held as a rule in the work offices of the case officer or of the agent during working hours. It is necessary that such meetings be conducted naturally, that they do not attract the attention of outsiders, and that the receipt and transmittal of intelligence matters, properly camouflaged, be carried out discreetly. In setting up such meetings, measures against tapping must be taken. One must bear in mind that a meeting with persons outside official premises and during non-working hours usually signifies a relationship between the two parties that is above and beyond official matters."

Also, such contact in official installations may be caused by the agent's own carelessness. Again Admiral BEKRENEV speaks:

"Some agents, because of inexperience or because of deliberate violation of the rules of security through peculiar personal rashness,.... approached our case officers at places not stipulated as operational meeting sites, others telephoned the case officer at his Soviet installation and discussed personal contact arrangements, while others still showed up personally at the Soviet installation in order to contact the case officer."

4. I called the above connections to the attention of Mr. Pappich by phone to his FBI office at 1030 hours on 23 November.


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- 1) a summary of our information on KOSTIKOV; and
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- a. Extracts from Report on the Soviet State Security Service (KGB), dated May 1963, based on information from AELADLE.

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- c. Soviet Strategic Executive Action, dated October 1961.


Tennent H. Bagley
Chief, SR/CI

SUBJECT: Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV

KOSTIKOV, who was born on 17 March 1933 in Moscow, was assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City as Vice Consul on 19 September 1961.

A fluent Spanish speaker, he had travelled abroad at least three times before this permanent assignment; moreover, in 1959 KOSTIKOV applied for a visa to accompany Premier Nikita Sergeevich KHRUSHCHEV's party to the United States as an official of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but we have no record of his having come to this country at that time. KOSTIKOV served as an interpreter at international conferences at Madrid and Barcelona in 1958 and 1959. In late 1959 and early 1960 he attended Soviet exhibitions in Mexico City and Havana; he is known to have been in Cuba from 6 January to 7 March 1960.

The physical description of KOSTIKOV quite accurately fits that of a Soviet case officer who nearly a year ago met in Mexico an FBI-controlled double agent. This double agent's Soviet case officer in the United States has been Oleg Danilevich BRYKIN of the Thirteenth Department, KGB First Chief Directorate, occupying the overt position of translator-trainee, U.N. Secretariat, New York City. BRYKIN was stationed in New York City from December 1960 to July of this year.

Since arriving in Mexico, KOSTIKOV is known to have travelled three times outside the capital: In March 1963 and again for the first two weeks of September he went to Tijuana, Ensenada, and Mexicali, ostensibly for the purpose of purchasing cotton. The U.S. Department of State, however, has reported that during these trips KOSTIKOV met local representatives of Movimento Liberation National and Central Compesina Independienta, both large Communist front organizations. In addition, according to FBI sources, KOSTIKOV was accompanied on the September trip by Ivan Gavrilovich ALFEREYEV, and he contacted in Ensenada several persons including Communist sympathizers who previously had been associated with Soviet officials stationed in Mexico City.

ALFEREYEV, a PRAVDA correspondent in Mexico, was in close contact with Cuban diplomats and local Communist leaders during a February 1962 visit to Quito.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION

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3-5958

23 November 1963

LX-25550

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director, Plans

FROM: Acting Chief, SR Division S

SUBJECT: 0 Contact of Lee OSWALD with a member of Soviet KGB
Assassination Department

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34-538 [DENIED]
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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 16 APR 1976
E 2 IMPDET CL BY 12329

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23 Nov 63
201-289248

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PAGE 207 of 212
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- 2 -

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The physical description of KOSTIKOV quite accurately fits that of a Soviet case officer who nearly a year ago met in Mexico an FBI-controlled double agent. This double agent's Soviet case officer in the United States has been Oleg Danilevich BRYKIN of the Thirteenth Department, KGB First Chief Directorate, occupying the overt position of translator-trainee, U.N. Secretariat, New York City. BRYKIN was stationed in New York City from December 1960 to July of this year.

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ALFERYEV, a PRAVDA correspondent in Mexico, was in close contact with Cuban diplomats and local Communist leaders during a February 1962 visit to Quito.

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PAGE 209 of 212
COPY NO. _____

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SUBJECT: Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052)

KOSTIKOV, who was born on 17 March 1933 in Moscow, was assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City as Vice Consul on 19 September 1961.

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Positively identified by photo → *Discovered (Acoustic)*
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11/27/63 check at NSA showed Dept of State Dispatch from Tijuana dated 10/10/63 which stated source who had reported contact with CCI + YLN later said the man was in Mexico, also there was no record of shipment of 24,000 bales of cotton.

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Wife: Rosa Aleksandrovna, born 2 March 1932 Arkhangel Oblast.

Daughter: Svetlana Valerievna born 1959, Moscow.

Wife and daughter accompanied Subject to Mexico.

Graduate of Foreign Language Institute and/or Institute of Foreign Affairs, Moscow.

From 30 June to 10 July 1959 was at the Electrotechnical Congress in Madrid; attended a conference in Madrid and Barcelona in 1958.

November 1959 to 6 January 1960 - Soviet Exposition in Mexico City.

6 January 1960 - in road accident at Vera Cruz.

Contacts in Ensenada, Baja, California, September 1963:

1. Daily with Isaak Karlos CHAPLUK (201-229418) and with CHAPLUK's son.
2. 7 September, stayed 45 minutes at Nuna SIMANOVKA's Curio Shop.
3. 7 September, dinner with Miguel POPOFF (201-286055)

Note that ALFEREV claimed that he was a guest of the party of Eva Samano de Lopez MATEOS, wife of the President of Mexico, Adolfo Lopez MATEOS. On the trip to Baja, California; Mrs. Lopez was attending a Congress of the National Institute for the Protection of Children.

201-289248

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0002084

PAGE 211 of 212
COPY NO. _____

*V R
Montgomery*

~~SECRET~~

23 November 1963

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FROM: Acting Chief, SR Division

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